



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**NATIONAL SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONAL
PATHOLOGIES: A PATH DEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF
U.S. INTERVENTIONS IN IRAN, GUATEMALA, CUBA,
AND IRAQ**

by

Matthew K. Thompson

September 2016

Thesis Advisor:
Co-Advisor:

Diego Esparza
Thomas Bruneau

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 2016		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE NATIONAL SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES: A PATH DEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF U.S. INTERVENTIONS IN IRAN, GUATEMALA, CUBA, AND IRAQ			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Matthew K. Thompson				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) U.S. covert interventions in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Cuba (1961) represent one path dependent event sequence whereby institutions adopted pathological characteristics that carried the U.S. national security apparatus into the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Likewise, the U.S. overt intervention in Iraq (2003) represents a similar institutionally driven event sequence that carried the United States to war with Iraq under dubious justification. Through analyzing systemic factors that influenced policy formulation prior to and during the Eisenhower and Bush administrations, I argue that sufficient evidence exists to suggest that institutions developed based largely on ideologically driven threat perceptions of communism and terrorism negatively influenced policy formulation and contributed to undesirable outcomes in both event chains. Agency driven shifts in national security institutions to achieve ideologically based objectives during each administration drove U.S. foreign policy outside of previously institutionalized procedures by seizing upon opportunity structures created during periods of national fear stemming from salient political environments plagued with excessive communist and terrorist threat perceptions and rhetoric. Understanding how institutional path dependent factors converged in each of these cases may shed light on how to prevent such foreign policy missteps in the future.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS communism, Cuba 1961, institutions, Iran 1953, Iraq 2003, Guatemala 1954, economic nationalism, Latin American studies, national security affairs, path dependence, national security strategy, terrorism, Western Hemisphere			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 133	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

**NATIONAL SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES: A PATH
DEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF U.S. INTERVENTIONS IN IRAN, GUATEMALA,
CUBA, AND IRAQ**

Matthew K. Thompson
Major, United States Army
B.S., Tarleton State University, 2005

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (WESTERN HEMISPHERE)

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2016**

Approved by: Dr. Diego Esparza
Thesis Advisor

Dr. Thomas Bruneau
Co-Advisor

Dr. Mohammed Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

U.S. covert interventions in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Cuba (1961) represent one path dependent event sequence whereby institutions adopted pathological characteristics that carried the U.S. national security apparatus into the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Likewise, the U.S. overt intervention in Iraq (2003) represents a similar institutionally driven event sequence that carried the United States to war with Iraq under dubious justification. Through analyzing systemic factors that influenced policy formulation prior to and during the Eisenhower and Bush administrations, I argue that sufficient evidence exists to suggest that institutions developed based largely on ideologically driven threat perceptions of communism and terrorism negatively influenced policy formulation and contributed to undesirable outcomes in both event chains.

Agency driven shifts in national security institutions to achieve ideologically based objectives during each administration drove U.S. foreign policy outside of previously institutionalized procedures by seizing upon opportunity structures created during periods of national fear stemming from salient political environments plagued with excessive communist and terrorist threat perceptions and rhetoric. Understanding how institutional path dependent factors converged in each of these cases may shed light on how to prevent such foreign policy missteps in the future.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCING INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGY	1
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
B.	LITERATURE REVIEW	2
C.	POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES	13
D.	RESEARCH DESIGN.....	14
E.	ROADMAP.....	17
II.	U.S. COLD WAR POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND THE 1953 INTERVENTION IN IRAN.....	19
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	19
B.	POST-WORLD WAR II RECONSTRUCTION AND IRAN.....	20
C.	IRANIAN ECONOMIC NATIONALISTS.....	24
D.	NEW COLD WAR STRATEGIES	26
E.	LINKING IRAN TO GUATEMALA	28
F.	CONCLUSION	30
III.	GUATEMALA AND OPERATION PBSUCCESS	33
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	33
B.	BANANA REPUBLIC AND COFFEE COUNTRY.....	35
C.	ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA.....	39
D.	THE KENNAN FAMILY AND THEIR COLD WAR.....	50
E.	THE SOVIET CONNECTION TO LATIN AMERICA	52
F.	GUATEMALAN DOMESTIC POLITICS	54
G.	LAND REFORM IN GUATEMALA.....	59
H.	OPERATION PBSUCCESS	61
I.	THE GUATEMALA-CUBA CONNECTION.....	69
J.	ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION.....	70
IV.	CUBA AND THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.....	73
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	73
B.	THE CUBAN REVOLUTION	74
C.	U.S. AND CUBAN INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES CONVERGE	76
D.	CASTRO'S LAND REFORMS.....	88
E.	THE DECISION TO REMOVE CASTRO	93
F.	BAY OF PIGS INVASION	94
G.	ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION.....	98

V.	IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES AND THE 2003 U.S. INVASION OF IRAQ	105
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	105
B.	PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION FOR INVADING IRAQ	105
C.	SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGY	110
D.	FUTURE CONCERNS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS....	113
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	115
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	121

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
CFEP	Council on Foreign Economic Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INRA	Institute of Agrarian Reform
IRCA	International Railways of Central America
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OIR	Office of Intelligence Research
PNAC	Project for a New American Century
UFCO	United Fruit Company
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialists' Republic
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCING INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

Theodore Draper referred to the Bay of Pigs invasion as, “the perfect failure,” and President John F. Kennedy called the disaster, “the worst experience of my life.”¹ In 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) organized a brigade of Cuban dissidents to infiltrate and overthrow Fidel Castro on the island of Cuba. The landing was a tactical failure due in large part to Castro’s having expected that the United States would intervene and thus having already taken steps to consolidate control of the armed forces prior to the covert action. The tactical failures and constraints placed on U.S. military support to the Cuban brigade are not the only causal mechanisms that led to the failure. From analysis of the U.S. interventions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Cuba in 1961, a pattern emerges that suggests that institutions took on path dependent characteristics and created instances of behavioural lock-in among relevant actors within U.S. national security institutions responsible for the development and execution of U.S. policies during the Cold War.² In this thesis, I argue that the perception of successful U.S. interventions in Iran and Guatemala played a significant role in the failure at the Bay of Pigs, and contributed to the development of an institutional pathology that provided motivations in policy formation that led to an overall escalation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Through identifying the factors that explain the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 from the perspective of historical institutionalism, I argue that a path dependent sequence emerged, and directly contributed to the failed invasion. The failed invasion is significant because it had far-reaching impacts beyond the tactical failure of the operation. U.S. intervention in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Cuba in 1961, sought regime change that would allow the United States to further its Cold War objectives to contain and, where possible, roll back the proliferation of communist institutions. The repercussions of the failed invasion

¹ Peter Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New York: The New Press, 1998), 2, 3.

² William Barnes, Myles Gartland, and Martin Stack, “Old Habits Die Hard: Path Dependency and Behavioral Lock-in,” in *Journal of Economic Issues* 38, no. 2 (2004): 372.

contributed significantly to escalations of U.S.-Soviet tensions during the Cold War, and fueled grievances of class division within Latin America. In my conclusion, I argue that contemporary implications of similar path dependent sequences created by institutions drove the United States into its 2003 invasion of Iraq under circumstances of dubious justification.

Understanding path determinacies within institutional behaviour is an emerging field of research that offers institutions the opportunity to understand hazards associated with the development of means and ways to reach desired ends when those policies themselves constrain actors along paths that prevent achievement of the sought after ends. This is particularly significant in national security affairs because the institutions responsible for executing national security strategy are typically shrouded from immediate external criticism and disinterested oversight that less sensitive institutions receive from more open debate and dialogue. Perhaps even more significant is the power of institutional constructs to drive events even when that open debate and dialogue exists but is subverted to achieve institutional pretexts, as shown in the case of the Iraq war justification. While much scholarship exists on the failure of the Bay of Pigs, and the conclusion that the failure was influenced by the preceding operations in Iran and Guatemala, it seems that little research has directly attempted to identify the causal process that led to the failure. By using pre-existing theory on path dependence phenomena tested against this event sequence, I determined that an institutional pathology developed that potentially could have been identified and possibly prevented the subsequent chain of events that ultimately led to the failed invasion.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

The use of path dependence to describe institutional phenomena typically traces its origin to economic scholarship highlighting an example that demonstrates consumer preference for a less-efficient keyboard layout that defeated a more efficient design, counteracting what market theory suggests as the ideal outcome. The less efficient QWERTY keyboard layout triumphing over the more efficient DVORAK layout, and similarly the adoption of VHS cassettes over the allegedly superior VCR format,

represent functions of historical circumstances rather than predicted market selected efficiencies in traditional economic theory.³ In other words, even though the DVORAK keyboard layout offered a more efficient typing solution, the QWERTY keyboard's early proliferation made adoption of the DVORAK keyboard unappealing. Path dependency finds much of its origin in this type of economic scholarship, which often argues the phenomena of "increasing returns" as contributing to a deterministic path of events that may not be optimal, yet persevere nonetheless due to the perceived costs of breaking from the established sequence.

This theory applies in the field of historical institutionalism as well. James Mahoney concludes, "path dependence occurs when a contingent historical event triggers a subsequent sequence that follows a relatively deterministic pattern."⁴ Mahoney argues that two types of path dependent sequences exist. Self-reinforcing sequences that initiate when a "contingent period corresponds with the initial adoption of a particular intuitional arrangement" and continues with a deterministic pattern that results in the institution's reproduction over time.⁵ In reactive sequences, a breakpoint in history known as a critical juncture corresponds with the contingent period leading to a deterministic pattern of reactions logically following from the breakpoint.⁶ Like the QWERTY keyboard layout and the VHS format, Mahoney argues, for example, that the "development of the steam engine was a contingent breakpoint that led England to diverge sharply from other countries with similar preconditions for industrialism."⁷ Paul Pierson elaborates on the notion of increasing returns within path dependence theory, arguing that the "investigation of increasing returns can provide a more rigorous framework for developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship in historical institutionalism."⁸

³ Barnes, Gartland, and Stack, "Old Habits," 371.

⁴ James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," *Theory and Society* 29, no. 4 (2000): 535.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 536.

⁸ Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (2000): 251.

Pierson describes the increasing returns process as “the probability of further steps along the same path [increasing] with each move down that path” because “the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time.”⁹ Pierson asserts that this is Mahoney’s self-reinforcing, or positive feedback process.¹⁰

Pierson builds further on Mahoney’s argument that “when certain actors are in a position to impose rules on others, the employment of power may be self-reinforcing,” and that “actors may use political authority to generate changes in the rules of the game (both formal institutions and various public policies) designed to enhance their power.”¹¹ The institutional significance of this path dependency, as Pierson points out, is that “once established, basic outlooks on politics, ranging from ideologies to understandings of particular aspects of governments or orientations toward political groups or parties, are generally tenacious.”¹² Pierson also notes that time horizons in political path dependence differ from economic path dependence because of the potential for short-term pay-off seeking politicians who set in motion a particular path that provides “powerful incentives to stay on it.”¹³ Pierson also argues that unlike the economic realm’s dynamic ability to change, the political realm, with its “public policies and formal institutions,” is typically “change-resistant,” and therefore more likely to be bound on a particular path.”¹⁴ He also concludes that inertia, driven by positive feedback signaling, often may lead to a change-resistant “single equilibrium” state within the institution.¹⁵ Despite this challenge, Pierson argues, “the claims in path dependent arguments are that previously viable options may be foreclosed in the aftermath of a sustained period of positive feedback, and cumulative commitments on the existing path will often make change difficult and will condition the form in which new branchings will occur.”¹⁶ The investigation of the

⁹ Pierson, “Increasing Returns,” 252.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 259.

¹² Ibid., 260.

¹³ Ibid., 262.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 263.

¹⁶ Ibid., 265.

increasing returns process is “historical because it recognizes that political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time,” and that “it is institutionalist because it stresses that many of the contemporary political implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions—whether formal rules, policy structures, or norms.”¹⁷ The challenge of path dependent analysis, as Pierson argues, lies in the difficulty of evaluating sequences of several variables over time, the “many variables, few cases” problem.¹⁸

Barnes, Gartland, and Stack further build upon path dependency and identify circumstances they refer to as behavioral lock-in, which they describe as occurring “when the behavior of the agent (consumer or producer) is ‘stuck’ in some sort of inefficiency or sub-optimality due to habit, organizational learning, or culture.”¹⁹ The authors elaborate on this concept, stating that “once a product has become established as an industry standard, and once consumers or users have invested time or money in learning a particular system or become comfortable with a traditional practice, they will be less likely to try a rival process, even if over time it proves superior.”²⁰ These authors do not propose a completely new field of path dependency, but build upon traditional technology oriented examples—the keyboard layout—found in economic studies by also including “lock-ins emanating from ‘learning and habituation’ of agents within institutions” as part of the theory.²¹

Kurt Weyland attempts to further expand upon path dependency by applying cognitive psychological findings regarding bounded rationality into the practical applicability of institutional change.²² Weyland argues that political institutions are “imbued with special legitimacy and depicted as reflections of long-standing cultural and historical traditions,” which leads historical institutionalism to predict that these countries

¹⁷ Pierson, “Increasing Returns,” 265.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Barnes, Gartland, and Stack, “Old Habits,” 372.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 376.

²² Kurt Weyland, “Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change,” *World Politics* 60, no. 2 (2008): 284.

will “follow their established regime trajectory.”²³ Due to the “political and personal risks” associated with regime change, Weyland points out that within these types of institutions, changes are typically wrought through violence and that “institutional inertia, deep-seated cultural values, and historical traditions” tend to propel countries along “long-standing political trajectories.”²⁴

Thomas Bruneau utilizes New Institutionalism to analyze civil-military relations in defense contracting in *Patriots for Profit*. He highlights the work of Claus Offe’s study, “Political Institutions and Social Power,” who identified five functions of institutions: (1) the formative impact on actors, (2) the congruent preference formation, (3) economizing on transaction costs, (4) frictionless self-coordination, and (5) continuity.²⁵ The final function of continuity implies that successful institutions become more powerful and self-perpetuating over time because they naturally breed conservatism, stifle innovation, resist change, and tend toward path dependence.²⁶ New Institutionalism defines institutions as “the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy.”²⁷ The theory concludes that institutions originate from the “goals and motivation of the actors who create them,” and that the “process of creating and implementing institutions is all about power.”²⁸ Institutions represent the rules that structure how actors behave, but are themselves manipulated to benefit the actors who create them, for better or for worse.

In *The Origins of the National Security State*, Athan Theoharis traces just such institutional competition for power within the post-World War II U.S. intelligence community that led to the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, and the creation of the

²³ Weyland, “Toward,” 306.

²⁴ Weyland, “Toward,” 306.

²⁵ Thomas C. Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford: University Press, 2011), 8–9.

²⁶ Ibid., 8–9.

²⁷ Ibid., 7.

²⁸ Ibid.

Centralized Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC).²⁹ Later, in February 1956, and in response to the Clark Task Force's report that the CIA lacked appropriate congressional oversight, the Senate voted 59 to 27 against a resolution to create a ten-member joint congressional committee to oversee the CIA.³⁰ The argument against that proposal came from one senator who stated, "If there is one agency of government which we must take some matters of faith on, without a constant examination of its methods and sources, I believe that agency is the CIA."³¹ In the absence of oversight and accountability, the potential for undesirable trajectories to continue to the point of unintended outcomes arguably increased significantly during the agency's formative years.

Defining success in the types of interventions that occurred in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba is somewhat ambiguous, but conditions that lead to a tactically successful intervention are easier to define than their long-term implications. According to Steven R. David, the preconditions that led to success in close to half of the 200 coups executed between the end of World War II and the early 1980s were: (1) regimes lacking popular legitimacy; (2) society lacking a popular sense of community; (3) low citizen participation in governance; and (4) a concentrated, and thus vulnerable, elite political class.³² David also argues that the U.S. should maintain a counter-coup policy to promote stability, primarily for the sake of the critical element of speed required to successfully execute such operations.³³ Drawing upon examples in Gabon in 1964, the Sudan in 1971, Laos in 1973, and Gambia in 1981, David formulates certain criteria to define success in these operations in the future, but the author concedes that each coup is unique and must

²⁹ Athan Theoharis, *The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 110–113.

³⁰ Theoharis, *Quest*, 134–35.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 135.

³² Steven R. David, "Coups and Anti-Coups," *The Washington Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (1982): 189–190. doi: 10.1080/01636608209450778.

³³ *Ibid.*

be weighed in its own right.³⁴ For that reason, a deeper historical analysis of the circumstances in Cuba leading up to the failure at the Bay of Pigs is warranted.

Analysis of Edward Luttwak's, a *Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook*, offers an explanation of the historically understood pre-coup conditions. Luttwak draws a distinction between a "Palace Revolution" and a coup as a matter of state bureaucratization, the former being an overthrow of a personalized leader that must be accomplished by insiders, and the latter differing in that it may be carried out external of the government bureaucratic apparatus but inside the state.³⁵

The criteria dictating intervention may be more important in understanding the long-term eventual outcome, as well as potential for tactical success, than the peculiarities of the orchestration of the intervention. Mark J. Mullenbach and Gerard P. Matthews compiled an extensive analysis of both international and domestic factors that led to U.S. intervention, identifying that political ideologies, economic stress, presidential popularity and political success, electoral cycles, and Congressional support to the Executive all play domestic roles in influencing the decision to intervene in another nation's internal politics.³⁶ Likewise, the antithesis of domestic variables argues that statistical analysis fails to correlate these domestic factors as influential in U.S. intervention policies.³⁷ Mullenbach and Matthews conclude that what actually drives U.S. decisions to intervene are a combination of international factors, and that the majority of these historical interventions were driven by Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in a nuclear constrained environment.³⁸ This structural argument supports institutionally driven outcomes since institutions are created to confront systemic challenges within the international environment, and further helps to illuminate motivations behind the choices of individual actors based on how they

³⁴ David, "Coup and Anti-Coup," 198, 200–201.

³⁵ Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook* (Cambridge: Penguin Press, 1968), 20.

³⁶ Mark J. Mullenbach and Gerard P. Matthews, "Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes," *International Interactions* 34, no. 1 (2008): 28–29. doi: 10.1080/03050620701878835.

³⁷ Mullenbach and Matthews, "Deciding to Intervene," 28–29.

³⁸ Ibid.

perceive themselves as part of that system, and how they perceive their respective institutional constraints.

Controlling the perception of legitimacy in regime change operations also appears to be a critical factor in determining the tactical and strategic success of such interventions. In Iran and Guatemala, the CIA was able to assist the opposition groups in manipulating this perception more effectively than in Cuba, through organizing protests in Iran, and the use of propaganda radio broadcasts that were particularly successful in Guatemala. One of the principal lessons from the failure at the Bay of Pigs was the danger that the incongruence of U.S. foreign policy, which aimed at maintaining the United States' moral and political standing, and an intervention that would be perceived as a grossly illegitimate act of aggression against a smaller state.³⁹ Of course, the risk associated with conducting operations outside of the realm of legitimacy lies in the damage to national credibility their attribution will create for the intervener. In Kermit Roosevelt's account of the operation in Iran, he concluded that public and military support for the Shah, when challenged by what they had been made to believe were the Soviet-backed puppets—Mosaddegh and the Tudeh party—public perception regarding legitimacy fell overwhelmingly with their king.⁴⁰ Had the preconditions for that kind of sentiment not existed, Kermit Roosevelt argues that the operation would not have been likely to succeed.⁴¹

In the case of Iran, a considerable amount of literature exists arguing the origins of U.S. intervention and the implications U.S.-Iranian relations. The most common argument describes the strategic British and American oil interests in Iran, and suggests that the Iranians themselves had little say in the events that placed the Shah back into power. Yet Fariborz Mokhtari points out that there is considerable evidence that the uprising against Mosaddegh was, in fact, “a popular reaction to the failed coup,” considering the actual coup to have been orchestrated initially by Mosaddegh himself

³⁹ Mullenbach and Matthews, “Deciding to Intervene,” 14.

⁴⁰ Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 210.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 210.

against the Shah.⁴² The author argues that shifting political dynamics within the country had aligned against the prime minister even before the actual uprisings and protests arranged by the CIA. This coincides with Kermit Roosevelts' conclusion that, in the case of Iran, the success of operation AJAX lay in the correctness of the CIA assessment of the situation in Iran, and not in the intrinsic functionality of the methods of the operation itself.⁴³ Rouhollah Ramazani, provides an excellent summary regarding the political environment in the post-World War II years and the nationalist movement, led primarily by Mosaddegh on the demand of oil nationalization. He also describes the circumstances of the Iran crisis of 1945 to 1946 regarding withdrawal of occupying Soviet troops, the Shah's increasing attempts at forming an alliance with the United States, and the political divisions created within Iran between Shah loyalists and the nationalist movement.⁴⁴

U.S. intervention in Guatemala occurred the following year in 1954, and in his book, *Countercoup*, Kermit Roosevelt suggests that he was offered the job to lead the operation in Guatemala; however, he doubted that the political circumstances were favorable to an undertaking similar to Iran.⁴⁵ Much of the debate around the Guatemalan operation named PBSUCCESS focuses on the link between the United Fruit Company and John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State, and his brother Allen Dulles, director of the CIA. Nick Cullather wrote a narrative history of the Guatemalan operation for the CIA in 1992, and concluded that Washington officials were consumed with seeing the world as a "global pattern of Communist activity," and in the case of Guatemala, failed to consider the internal political reform movements that were happening in the country.⁴⁶ Despite Cullather's conclusion that Washington officials were unaware of the circumstances unfolding in Guatemala, James Siekmeier argues that Washington was

⁴² Fariborz Mokhtari, "Iran's 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics Versus External Intrigue," *Middle East Journal* 62, no. 3 (2008): 486. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25482541>.

⁴³ Roosevelt, *Countercoup*, 210.

⁴⁴ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 10–11.

⁴⁵ Roosevelt, *Countercoup*, 210.

⁴⁶ Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 9.

well aware of the growing trend of economic nationalism.⁴⁷ Siekmeier also argues that Washington saw growth in Latin America as the imperative, and that the growing sentiment of nationalism in the region was a potential economic threat U.S. interests in the region.⁴⁸ Deborah Yashar argues that the 1944 revolution that brought democratic rule to Guatemala was already under threat from a growing conservative movement within the country that would have eventually overthrown Arbenz, and she concluded that the external intervention might have been unnecessary.⁴⁹ John Coatsworth, on the other hand, questions if this would have been possible without U.S. intervention acting as a catalyst for conservative counteraction against leftist reforms.⁵⁰ Frederick W. Marks argues that much of the literature on Guatemala and operation PBSUCCESS victimizes Arbenz and his supporters, and fails to emphasize the suspicious connections of the assassins of Arbenz's political opponent, Colonel Francisco Javier Arana, who had been expected to win the presidency.⁵¹ Marks also draws attention to the nature of Arbenz's land reforms as a form of popular patronage: land was given in exchange for political support, and the author also highlights the number of known communists within Arbenz's administration as having been a significant threat to Guatemala's stability.⁵² The arguments span the levels of analysis: personal, domestic, and international factors drove the process.

In the case of Cuba, the communist threat dominates much of the debate. Peter Kornbluh's compilation of declassified documents, however, suggests that both Castro and the level of popular support he possessed in Cuba were greatly underestimated by

⁴⁷ James F. Siekmeier, *Aid, Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States 1945–1961* (Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 160–61.

⁴⁸ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 162.

⁴⁹ Deborah J. Yashar, *Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala 1870s–1950s* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 13.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=a_WSbBHeRxC&oi=fnd&pg=PR15&dq=Deborah+Yashar+guatemala&ots=rrMM_NeAD6&sig=2PzjZtP9t6zzSrJZNx8-f6KwPGQ#v=onepage&q=Deborah%20Yashar%20guatemala&f=false

⁵⁰ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), xiv–xv.

⁵¹ Frederick W. Marks III, *Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles* (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 113.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 114–15.

Washington initially. Kornbluh highlights the connection of operation PBSUCCESS in Guatemala to the failure at the Bay of Pigs.⁵³ LeoGrande and Kornbluh conclude that, despite Washington's initial period of acceptance toward the Cuban Revolution, the Eisenhower administration could not reconcile its distrust of Castro and what threat he would pose for U.S. interests on the island.⁵⁴ The Lyman Kirkpatrick official investigation into the failure at the Bay of Pigs invasion concluded that tactical errors with the mission and the overall assessment of the political situation within Cuba were primarily responsible for the failure.⁵⁵ On the contrary, Richard Bissell, the head of the operation, concluded that the lack of political will to see the operation through due to the unsavory means required to do so was the proximate cause of the failure.⁵⁶

The nationalist sentiment that the Iran operation seems to have exploited so well, also seems to have been overlooked, or ignored, in both the Guatemala and Cuba operations. A wave of economic nationalism existed in the developing world after the conclusion of World War II. Particularly in the Western Hemisphere, this form of nationalism challenged the standing inter-American economic system and led to Latin American reformists' seeking to reduce economic interdependence with the United States.⁵⁷ The Iranian operation demonstrated to the Eisenhower administration that it had a proven covert instrument of coercive national power that could exert U.S. will on nations short of armed confrontation, and preferably in a plausibly deniable manner if things did not go as planned. Both the Guatemala and Cuba operations are uniquely tied to one another, not only because they both occurred in Latin America, but also because many of the same individual actors were intimately involved with the planning and execution of those operations. Members of the CIA attribute at least a fair share of the Guatemala operation's success to mere luck, combined with incompetence on the part of

⁵³ Peter Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New York: New Press, 1998), 7–8.

⁵⁴ William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 11–12.

⁵⁵ Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs*, 99–100.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 11–14.

⁵⁷ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 8.

Arbenz's administration to maintain government control, but concede that the psychological victory of the operation actually allowed the overthrow to succeed.⁵⁸

The perception of legitimacy produced by the psychological operations of the Guatemalan intervention managed to turn failure into a success, but the series of events that followed the overthrow's tactical success eventually took Guatemala into a 30-year calamity of internal violence and repression, drastically increased the financial burden of U.S. aid, and wreaked havoc on the Guatemalan economy. Nonetheless, in after action briefings, the operation was hailed as a resounding success for the national security apparatus underneath the Eisenhower administration.⁵⁹ It certainly legitimized the potential to use proxy paramilitary forces as a solution for regime change for the Eisenhower administration's national security institution, and was influential in shaping the plan for the Cuban intervention that resulted in failure.

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The systemic factors which explain the emergence of the institutional pathology that contributed to the Bay of Pigs failure—beyond the tactical failures of the invasion itself—were three fold. First, U.S. policymakers blurred communist subversion with economic nationalist movements in the decolonizing Third World. Second, U.S. threat perceptions increased when Third World leaders attached communist labels to domestic opposition groups creating salient domestic political rhetoric—both in the United States and Third World nations—which helped drive interventionist policies, but also emboldened U.S. adversaries. These factors combined with the perception of successful intervention in Iran and Guatemala to create a self-reinforcing deterministic chain that helped carry the incoming Kennedy administration into the failure in Cuba. A pattern of increasing returns emerged from the perception of success, which led to a condition of institutional behavioral lock-in—driven largely by confirmation bias—that contributed to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba.⁶⁰ In other words, the Guatemalan

⁵⁸ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs*, 8.

⁵⁹ Cullather, *Secret History*, 109.

⁶⁰ Barnes, Gartland, and Stack, "Old Habits," 372.

operation, which later came to be characterized as a textbook example of how not to orchestrate a covert operation, succeeded mostly by chance, and was then adopted as a tried means of accomplishing foreign policy objectives. Washington officials, while able to correctly identify nationalist reform-oriented movements and often able to distinguish them from communist insurrections, were constrained by Cold War policies and attitudes toward the Soviet Union, which combined with the political salience of the threat of communist subversion at home. In the Cuban case, early U.S. policies reacting to the Cuban Revolution and actions taken prior to the invasion had the ironic effect of pushing the Cubans into alignment with the Soviet Union, actually strengthening Castro's position and increasing the improbability of success for the operation. Identifying and linking the historical evidence that supports this hypothesis of institutional path dependence during the Eisenhower administration provides additional explanations of the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs beyond the tactical failures that occurred during the landing operations, and the decision not to provide more air support to the brigade of Cuban dissidents.

The case of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 differs due to the fact that it was an overt military operation, as opposed to the covert methods of regime change in the preceding three cases. Yet, at the institutional level, the factors that created the path determinate event chain that carried the United States into Iraq differs little from the path that carried the United States into the failure at the Bay of Pigs. In both cases, a similar confirmation bias emerged that resulted in behavioral lock-in among the relevant actors, and determined the course that the nation would take.⁶¹ The key difference in the Iraq case is that the Bush administration systematically created the structure for the confirmation bias that seems to have developed more in the absence of competing view points within secret planning cells under the Eisenhower administration.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

Alexander George and Andrew Bennet argue that in a case comparison study, standardizing data requirements is critical to a successful single or comparative case study, and by asking the same questions within each case, the "results can be compared,

⁶¹ Barnes, Gartland, and Stack, "Old Habits," 372.

cumulated, and systematically analyzed.”⁶² This thesis draws upon the historical institutional approach of path dependence, initially to test the theory of path dependence against a single expanded case, and then to apply that theory to a second comparative case to determine if the same phenomenon of path dependence existed. Analysis of the extended case of regime change interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, which span the Eisenhower administration into the early years of the Kennedy administration, provides a concrete example of what James Mahoney referred to as a self-reinforcing sequence of path dependency. Tracing the contributing factors of the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs by connecting the institutional perceptions of success—the increasing returns—in the Iran and Guatemala interventions, highlights the significant causal factors that contributed to the development of an institutional pathology within the U.S. national security apparatus of the period. During my investigation of these three events, I find a pattern in the apparent decision-making applied to each of these cases that is indicative of path-dependent institutional behavioral lock-ins described by Barnes, Gartland, and Stack.⁶³

The period of investigation for the expanded case study centers on the Eisenhower administration, but also addresses factors that occurred immediately before and after the period, into the first part of the Kennedy administration. The intent is to identify the contingent events and critical junctures that set in motion the chain sequence leading to the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs, with the understanding that the failure itself likely represents a critical juncture in U.S.-Latin America relations during the second half of the 20th century. Once these junctures are identified, they build a strong case for my hypothesis that the Iran and Guatemala interventions are part of that chain sequence. During my initial investigation of material, I found that other interventions might also be worth addressing, but believe these three to be the most significant, and material rich, sources for the study. There is considerable literature on each of these interventions, and in addition to a number of secondary sources, I reviewed primary source documents

⁶² Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 86–87.

⁶³ Barnes, Gartland, and Stack, “Old Habits,” 372.

available in the Foreign Relations of the United States collection, and declassified documents available within the National Security Archive collection.

I also incorporated Weyland's empirically grounded theory of institutional change, which focuses on human judgment and choice, as opposed to simply rational choice, based on his argument that "human rationality is distinctly bounded."⁶⁴ Weyland argues that the "insufficiency of adaptation [change] over time increases the problem load on the existing institutional framework," and that when change does occur it is generally in bursts that "set in motion waves of contagion" that have thus far rarely been analyzed by historical institutionalists.⁶⁵ The goal was to make my findings more broadly compelling as a useful case study for the construction and adaptation of institutions based on the challenges of path dependency by positing the potential for actors to intervene if such paths can be understood to develop within our institutions.

Finally, I found that the institutional patterns leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq are compellingly similar to the institutional pathology leading up to the Bay of Pigs invasion to include this as a secondary case that links the problem of path dependence within institutional challenges in national security affairs. This approach gave what John Gerring referred to as a diachronic linkage through time and provided the experimental opportunity to test my hypothesis regarding the Bay of Pigs case against the Iraq case.⁶⁶ Though the Iraq case represents an overt, rather than covert, intervention, the U.S. national security institution as a whole was explicitly involved in justifying the action, and the pattern of institutional behavioral lock-in appears quite similar to the Bay of Pigs case. Furthermore, the U.S. compulsion to justify the Iraq invasion internationally is an outcome of Latin American attempts at "soft balancing" of U.S. power, which in many ways appears as blowback from Cold War policies in Latin America.⁶⁷ George and

⁶⁴ Weyland, "Toward," 313.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ John Gerring, *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework* (Cambridge: University Press, 2001), 222–23.

⁶⁷ Max Paul Friedman and Tom Long, "Soft Balancing in the Americas: Latin American Opposition to U.S. Intervention, 1898–1936," *International Security* 40.1 (2015): 120–156, <https://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/article/589750/pdf>.

Bennet argue that “process-tracing” can be useful when comparing similar cases and that identifying the conditions created by a particular policy, or in this case the pattern of institutionally provoked behavior, leads to a similar outcome and therefore explains the causal role of a “particular independent variable across all cases.”⁶⁸ While this thesis is limited to two cases, it may provide the framework for further investigations of institutional path dependency in other cases.

E. ROADMAP

The thesis is divided into five sections, beginning with the description and definition of the concepts of path dependency theory as they apply to this thesis. Analysis of the of the interventions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Cuba in 1961, as they contributed toward a self-reinforcing chain sequence within the U.S. national security institution that ultimately led to the failure at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 follows. The critical junctures, perceptions of increasing returns and institutional behavioral lock-ins that contributed to the failed invasion demonstrate the inherent dangers that institutions face when they unwittingly adopt these dependent paths. Examination of the implications that these institutional hazards had on the security of the United States as an immediate outcome of this chain sequence illuminates the significance of such institutional pathologies and their long term implications. The thesis starts with the formulation of Cold War policies and the 1953 and 1954 U.S. interventions in Iran and Guatemala to set the foundation for the problems of the 1961 invasion of the Bay of Pigs, and then concludes by analyzing similar problems that arose during the buildup and justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in the concluding chapter.

⁶⁸ Gerring, *Social Science*, 81–2, 78–9.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. U.S. COLD WAR POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND THE 1953 INTERVENTION IN IRAN

A. INTRODUCTION

The development of U.S. policy during the early years of the Cold War set in motion the chain of events that would follow and ultimately lead to the failed intervention in Cuba. The policies formulated during the period of fear and uncertainty that followed the conclusion of World War II were a product of the extent of the war itself. The vast institutions and bureaucracies created to fight the war militarized the international system in a way the world had not yet seen. The dawn of the nuclear age and its subsequent proliferation to the Soviet Union changed the nature of the globe's geopolitical battlefield. Once the Soviet Union acquired the bomb, it further reinforced the need for mobilization of new elements of national power to confront that threat. The creation of institutions to prevent a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, which would have been devastatingly costly for both sides, pushed policymakers on both sides to create institutions that could reduce the chance of a full scale confrontation, yet still provide coercive force in the form of covert interventions.

In this chapter, I argue that the development of U.S. Cold War policies that began in Iran, carried over into the Western Hemisphere after those means were vindicated in the 1953 operation to place the Shah of Iran back into power. The operation's success marked a critical juncture in the path that led to the failed intervention in Cuba as it provided early confirmation of the feasibility of regime change and the creation of puppet states that could contain the spread of communism, and perceivably roll it back. Hindsight, however, has provided evidence that the unique conditions in Iran at the time allowed for the operation's success more so than the means used to conduct these types of operations. Nonetheless, the technique became an instrument of policy to fight the Cold War and project power in a nuclear constrained geopolitical environment, while simultaneously countering economic nationalist movements and preventing the spread of communism.

B. POST–WORLD WAR II RECONSTRUCTION AND IRAN

At the close of World War II, Barry Rubin argues that Iran found itself caught between the machinations of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and looked to the United States to provide some degree of mediation to ensure Iranian sovereignty.⁶⁹ Rubin argues that the United States, eager to take on its new role as an international power, sought to broker a balance of power between British and Soviet interests within Iran, and “Iran became a testing ground for the containment policy and a key experience in persuading Americans of Soviet bad faith.”⁷⁰ At issue were Soviet desires for a “buffer zone” in northern Iran and aspirations for “direct access to the Persian Gulf,” which would provide a long-sought-after warm water port for the Soviet navy.⁷¹ The signaling of Soviet intentions came quickly after the conclusion of World War II, when American and British occupying troops agreed to be out of Iran by January and March 1946, while the Soviets refused to set a withdrawal date.⁷² The Soviets had also “established a Kurdish puppet state alongside their Azerbaijan satellite,” and used propaganda radio broadcasts to incite discord among the masses in the Iranian regions of Gilan and Mazandiron, as well as inside Tehran.⁷³ Rubin argues that while these threats worried officials in Washington, Stalin’s speeches regarding communism’s incompatibility with capitalism and George Kennan’s predictions regarding Soviet expansion, came to coincide with both Iranian domestic political maneuvering that called for U.S. support and U.S. domestic political allegations that the Truman administration was appeasing Stalin.⁷⁴ The Iranians began carefully maneuvering within opportunity spaces created by competing Soviet, British, and American interests in the region, and the United States had an opportunity to test a new means to counter Soviet aggression, and quiet economic nationalism in the Third World.

⁶⁹ Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 29.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*, 31.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 32.

The Iranian Prime Minister Qavam es-Sultanah used “Iran’s American card” in an effort to pressure the Soviet Union to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran.⁷⁵ Understanding the international pressure placed on the Soviet Union, Rubin argues that Qavam was able to demand of Stalin that any Soviet oil concessions would have to be ratified through elections of new Majlis (Iranian Parliament), and that those elections would be incumbent on a Soviet withdrawal from Iran.⁷⁶ The Soviet withdrawal permitted those concessions and gave rise to the Tudeh Party, as Iranians began to see the Soviets as “the wave of Iran’s future.”⁷⁷ Qavam managed to settle a revolt by the southern tribes of Iran, who “hated the Shah’s authority but feared the Tudeh even more,” by gaining their electoral support.⁷⁸ This gave way to pro-Soviet Iranian officials passing on internal details regarding Iranian politics to the Soviet Union, which Qavam used as leverage to curry favor from the U.S. ambassador.⁷⁹ Both the U.S. Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that Soviet interests in Iran represented a U.S. national security threat in the form of Soviet access to oil and as a “defensive position to protect United States-controlled oil wells in Saudi Arabia.”⁸⁰ The result was broad based financial and military support to Qavam’s government that allowed the Iranian army to march into Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and overthrow the Soviet backed regimes.⁸¹ Rubin highlights that these victories by Iran’s prime minister placed U.S. desire for Iranian democratization in a paradoxical position, since Qavam’s success had actually strengthened popular support for the Shah.⁸²

Rubin describes Iran’s political and economic situation as “chaotic,” and that the supporters that the Shah had gained would just as quickly turn on him if their own

⁷⁵ Rubin, *Paved*, 32.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 33.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 34.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 35.

⁸¹ Ibid., 35.

⁸² Ibid., 39.

interests came to be threatened through reform efforts.⁸³ The Iranians wanted a huge stimulus package from the United States, mostly in the form of tanks, jet planes, and an enlarged army, which the United States feared would only exacerbate Soviet-Iranian tensions.⁸⁴ The United States preferred a more subtle aid package that would help Iran focus on internal security issues and domestic reform.⁸⁵ Rubin argues that domestic reform was complicated by the fact that the Majlis were “controlled by Iran’s traditional landlord elite,” who were “hesitant to act on any social reforms.”⁸⁶ The degree of domestic division within Iran during the period is highlighted by the 1949 assassination attempt on the Shah. The attacker was connected to the Tudeh Party and Islamic-fundamentalist groups, but the Shah also faced opposition from the Fedayeen-i-Islam terrorist organization, the Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al Qasim Kashani, other devout Muslims who felt the Shah’s “modernization program had gone too far” and, of course, the communists themselves, whose power base had declined considerably.⁸⁷

After the assassination attempt, the Shah moved to consolidate his power in a series of crackdowns, including outlawing the Tudeh Party. Rubin points out that this coincided with an intensification of anti-Iranian Soviet propaganda, which charged that Iran had become “a United States military base,” and border clashes between Soviet and Iranian forces increased.⁸⁸ A coinciding crop failure also took Iran into an economic depression, which led to more calls for U.S. assistance. As Rubin points out, U.S. foreign aid was a relatively “new and somewhat suspect program for Congress,” and already spending heavily on the reconstruction of Western Europe meant that much of those calls for aid went unanswered.⁸⁹ This spurred the Shah’s first visit to the United States, as he sought consulting for bank loans to stimulate the economy, but the visit had another effect on the American people. Rubin points out that the U.S. press received the Shah as

⁸³ Rubin, *Paved*, 39.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 37–38.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

“not only a progressive ruler but also the head of a friendly nation which provided the lifeline of the grand alliance during the war and which has now become one of the principal bulwarks against Soviet imperialist expansion.”⁹⁰ This contrasted starkly with Washington’s assessment of the Shah. Secretary of State Dean Acheson saw him as “a very impractical young man . . . full of grandiose ideas” who “fancied himself as a great military leader,” and that his economic ambitions for Iran’s modernization were simply outside the realm of Iran’s capacity.⁹¹ Acheson concluded that the Shah’s obsession with military spending to counter the Soviets would ultimately bankrupt the country and that a better course of action would be to pursue “free economic and social structures that the Russians would be deterred from attacking.”⁹² The division between U.S. and Iranian developmental goals meant that U.S. aid for Iran would not be forthcoming, which intentionally forced Iran to look to its oil reserves for state revenue.

The British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the Iranian government had already been negotiating for a “more favorable petroleum revenue contract” in light of the government’s financial needs, and as Rubin points out, “Iranian resentment toward AIOC operations had been growing for decades.”⁹³ In the early 1950s, this resentment stemmed from the fact that the “British government and English stockholders had received three times as much from company profits as did the Iranian government.”⁹⁴ Rubin argues that the AIOC’s size and political power within Iran involved it in “a play of social forces” within Iran, and that the company was involved in “activities in intelligence, bribery, and political intrigue,” often acting as a “law unto itself.”⁹⁵ The AIOC failed to recognize the “rising national spirit” that was as much a regional phenomenon as it was Iranian, and as Rubin argues, by the time the AIOC responded to

⁹⁰ Rubin, *Paved*, 41.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 41–42.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 42.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

the more moderate Iranian requests, that nationalist fervor had already placed significant popular pressure on Tehran.⁹⁶

Washington found itself negotiating with the British on Iran's behalf in an attempt to maintain "political stability and continued oil production," than to "provoke a counterproductive and bitter conflict."⁹⁷ This was possible because the U.S. interest in Iran was purely strategic, while the British had significant economic stakes in Iran. Despite efforts to negotiate a mutually beneficial arrangement between the British and the Iranians, it seemed unlikely that a concession both parties would agree to would materialize. Rubin highlights that Iranians were influenced, at least in part, by "American companies in Latin America and the Persian Gulf [that] were moving toward a 50/50 profit split with the local governments," and that it seemed unlikely that the Iranians would settle for anything less.⁹⁸ Washington saw the Iranian government as plagued with a "traditional pattern of corruption," a mismanaged economy, and a persistent inability to undertake serious social reforms, and the British as unwilling to meet the international norm of renegotiating its petroleum contracts, which only fueled growing Iranian nationalism.⁹⁹

C. IRANIAN ECONOMIC NATIONALISTS

Iran continued to ask for U.S. aid, mostly for its military, and Washington continued to find the Iranian state's financial capacity incapable of supporting more military equipment.¹⁰⁰ Then the Shah found an opportunity to further persuade U.S. strategic interests with the communist invasion of South Korea. The Shah began expressing Iran's military vulnerability to a similar communist invasion of Iran, and requested a \$250 million loan, which Washington responded with only \$25 million.¹⁰¹ Rubin argues that this was symbolic of Washington's policies that comprised a "pattern

⁹⁶ Rubin, *Paved*, 43

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 44.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 46.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 49.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 50.

of watching Iranian politicians go out onto a limb and then abandoning them there.”¹⁰² Out on a limb is where then prime minister General Ali Razmara found himself. Rubin argues that “without United States aid, the Shah’s support, or British concessions on the oil issue, Razmara could find no way out of his dilemma.”¹⁰³ Mohammad Mosaddegh had risen to the head of a Majlis committee to investigate the Supplemental Agreement with the British regarding the oil concessions on the same day that Razmara had been appointed as prime minister. Combined with supporters in the National Front, Mosaddegh began demanding nationalization of AIOC facilities and a complete cancellation of the oil concession.¹⁰⁴ Despite Razmara’s attempts to mitigate the growing nationalism centered on the Iranian oil issue, and the British realization that a 50/50 share in profits similar to those that had just passed between Saudi Arabia and the United States would be desirable, the wave of nationalist fervor had already forced the Shah to pressure Razmara to push the issue forward.¹⁰⁵ However, Razmara was assassinated on March 7, 1951 by Khalil Tahmasibi, a member of the Islamic Fedayeen-i-Islam terrorist group, and on April 30, 1951, the Majlis passed a law that nationalized the AIOC, which the Shah also backed.¹⁰⁶ In hindsight, the failure of the British to negotiate with the Iranians seems to have been a risky and unnecessary gamble. Rubin concludes that the British concessions would have been a “small price to pay,” in light of the turmoil that was to follow in the coming years.¹⁰⁷

The timing of this shift in Iranian domestic politics also coincided with a change of administration in the United States, as the Eisenhower administration was set to replace the Truman administration in 1952. John Foster Dulles replaced Dean Acheson as Secretary of State. Dulles’s younger brother Allen was the CIA director and gained greater access to the White House through that relationship. Rubin argues that combined with the atmosphere of McCarthyism, the “rapid Communist victory in China,” and the

¹⁰² Rubin, *Paved*, 50.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

tougher stance on communism that helped bring Eisenhower into office, only served to increase Washington's trend toward "greater suspicion of Third World nationalism."¹⁰⁸ Rubin argues that at this point, "covert activities, including deep involvement in foreign coups, were enthusiastically undertaken."¹⁰⁹

D. NEW COLD WAR STRATEGIES

Dwight Eisenhower entered office as the President of the United States in 1952, a Republican who won out after some 20 years of Democrat presidents. Athan Theoharis argues that Republicans during that year were able to campaign on "the perceived failures of the Truman administration: a seemingly indecisive and ineffective foreign policy, a seeming indifference to the Communist internal security threat, and a seemingly inefficient and corrupt domestic policy."¹¹⁰ Upon taking office, Eisenhower had appointed former Republican president Herbert Hoover to head up a study to examine the Organization of the Executive Branch, and as part of this study, a commission to examine the CIA was included. That team was led by air force General James Doolittle due to the classified nature of that agency, and Doolittle's findings went straight to the president. Theoharis argues:

Doolittle's commission endorsed 'an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective than that employed by' the Soviet Union . . . 'it is now clear, . . . that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means, and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of 'fair play' must be reconsidered. We must develop; effective espionage and counterespionage services. We must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people will be made

¹⁰⁸ Rubin, *Paved*, 56.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Athan Theoharis, *The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 132.

acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.¹¹¹

Perhaps more troubling than Doolittle's assessment of the unavoidable need for the United States to engage in such strategies, is the reaction by leadership within the Armed Services Committee at that time. Senator Saltonstall framed the issue as one of "essential secrecy," and stated that "it was not on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, "it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally as a member of Congress and as a citizen would rather not have, unless I believed it to be my responsibility to have it because it might involve the lives of American citizens."¹¹² Senator Saltonstall's fellow Armed Services Committee member, Senator Richard Russell, stated that "If there is one agency of government which we must take some matters of faith on, without the constant examination of its methods and sources, I believe that agency is the CIA."¹¹³ These arguments proved persuasive, as the Senate voted down the proposal of Senator Mike Mansfield calling for a ten member oversight committee for the CIA in a 59–27 vote.¹¹⁴

Theoharis highlights that a similar "deference" characterized oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA), as well. The author argues that the Congressional deference continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s, that "U.S. intelligence policy was at times set by presidents and at other times by the heads of the agencies," and that "their actions were based on their personal conceptions of perceived national security threats."¹¹⁵ Theoharis concluded that, "Eisenhower, beginning in 1953 and sustained throughout his presidency, turned to the CIA to orchestrate coups to overthrow nationalist leaders—in Iran in 1953 (Mohammad Mosaddegh), Guatemala in 1954 (Jacobo Arbenz Guzman), and Indonesia in 1958 (Achmed Sukarno)."¹¹⁶ The absence of oversight of the decision to orchestrate these

¹¹¹ Theoharis, *Quest*, 133–34.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 134–35.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 135.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 134–35.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 137.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

types of operations likely enhanced interagency rivalries as these entities competed with one another for their own existence. The institutional structure that emerged was vehemently anti-communist and possessed no qualms for using whatever means available and deemed necessary to counter those threats.

The emerging nuclear environment sowed fear and uncertainty in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the early 1950s, however, the significance of effectively managing threat perceptions and communicating intent would not blossom until after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Aggressive—often brash—moves and countermoves during the early years of the Cold War influenced state behavior during these years. Ideology also played a role in shaping the way decision makers perceived the structure of the international environment. The institutional construct that emerged in the aftermath of World War II was driven largely by the roles that various regions of the world would play in the international economic model sought by Washington.

E. LINKING IRAN TO GUATEMALA

In August 1953, the United States executed a successful regime change in Iran, restoring the monarchical rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and ousting the Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. Though an exhaustive analysis of operation AJAX is beyond the scope of this thesis, its connection to the interventions in Guatemala and Cuba is important for developing the causal relationship and the development of increasing returns that led to the institutional pathology that developed within the U.S. national security apparatus of the period. While most scholarship tends to focus on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in executing these types of interventions, it is important to emphasize that these interventions were authorized by the president. These interventions did not occur under the Truman administration, but rather emerged with the Eisenhower administration, which took a tougher stance against communism.

Stephen Kinzer argues that the Truman administration had frustrated then director of the CIA Allen Dulles due to the past tendency toward inaction in the fight against

communism.¹¹⁷ In fact, a tougher stance on communism was one of the driving debates of the campaign that brought the Eisenhower administration into office. Kinzer points out that Vice President Richard Nixon had referred to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson's policies as a "college of cowardly communist containment;" and that the truce to end the war in Korea had weakened Eisenhower's political position, necessitating a strong stance against communism.¹¹⁸ The allure of a covert operation, plausibly deniable and potentially achievable in an "open society" as existed in Iran, proved to be a lucrative target for the Eisenhower administration; the fact that it bordered the Soviet Union and possessed lucrative oil reserves only increased the motivation and justification for the intervention.¹¹⁹ Yet even Kinzer fails to mention that Acheson had made "many attempts to work with Mosaddegh," and that it was Mosaddegh's "ill-fated decision to use the Communist threat as a means of gaining American support [that] boomeranged."¹²⁰ Mosaddegh provided the rhetorical fuel to the fire that would bring about the justification for his own removal. What Barry Rubin points out as significant in the Iranian case, is that it is incorrect to say that the CIA replaced Mosaddegh with the Shah, but rather that the Agency provided the resources for the Iranians to do it themselves.¹²¹ Rubin argues that the Iranians themselves had feared both the instability that Mosaddegh was creating and they feared the Tudeh party's motivations.¹²² Rubin concluded that what had been missed in the CIA, and particularly Allen Dulles' understanding of the operation's success, was that in Iran, "overthrowing Mosaddegh had been like pushing on an already-opened door."¹²³ The preponderance of success had not come from specific actions by the CIA, but rather the favorable conditions provided by "support from the general population and a united military" that allowed for the operation's success.¹²⁴ Likewise,

¹¹⁷ Stephen Kinzer, *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2013), 128.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 129.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Rubin, *Paved*, 88.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 88–89.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 88–89.

the chief of the CIA operation, Kermit Roosevelt, concluded that, “we were successful in this venture because our assessment of the situation in Iran was correct . . . that if the people and the armed forces were shown that they must choose, that Mosaddegh was forcing them to choose, between their monarch and a revolutionary figure backed by the Soviet Union . . . the people and the army came, overwhelmingly, to the support of the Shah.”¹²⁵

Perhaps more significantly than the operation’s success, were its implications for the future of Iran. The operation virtually eliminated the checks and balances that had existed between the Shah, prime minister, and Majlis, and significantly strengthened the Shah’s power.¹²⁶ Rubin argues that this brought about the end of representative government in Iran, and that “the middle class and the National Front, including many of Iran’s most capable, honest, and forward-looking people, were removed from any real role in the decision-making process.”¹²⁷ When Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked that Kermit Roosevelt head up a similar operation in Guatemala, Roosevelt declined the offer, believing that the requirements for success would not exist in the same manner as they had in Iran.¹²⁸ Rubin assesses that the success did alleviate the political instability created under Mosaddegh, “but did little to resolve the underlying problems of political legitimacy and cyclical economic crisis that had plagued Iran for so many decades.”¹²⁹ Nonetheless, it confirmed for Washington that the CIA could orchestrate a low political cost method of regime change as an alternative to more costly conventional military interventions.

F. CONCLUSION

Economic nationalism was an influential political force in the developing world during the period, and appears to have motivated Mosaddegh and the Tudeh party’s attempt to nationalize Iranian oil, which also appears to have been part of a broader

¹²⁵ Roosevelt, *Countercoup*, 210.

¹²⁶ Rubin, *Paved*, 89.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹²⁸ Roosevelt, *Countercoup*, 210.

¹²⁹ Rubin, *Paved*, 91.

decolonization process that sought to remove foreign influence from domestic economies in an effort to reshape institutions and consolidate national sovereignty. The United States found this to threaten sustainable economic growth in the developing world, and threatened strategic U.S. economic interests and private U.S. investments abroad. Similarities between economic nationalism and Soviet backed communism provided the rhetoric necessary to win political justification among policymakers for U.S. interventions in the Western Hemisphere, and Operation AJAX in Iran provided the first example of a politically low-cost tool for implementing favorable regime change. In this thesis, I argue that these perceptions led to an institutional pathology that drove the creation of Cold War policies contributed to the failed intervention at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Driven largely by Cold War ideological constructs stemming from these perceptions, the Eisenhower administration's institutional development took on pathological characteristics that seem to have unwittingly opened the door to Soviet influence in the region, disrupted a more natural course of democratic social reform, and helped perpetuate many of the social challenges that continue to plague these regions. These unforeseen consequences eroded international perceptions regarding U.S. legitimacy, and provided rhetorical political fuel to domestic opposition groups both at home and abroad, at times strengthening their positions, and weakening U.S. soft power.

The significance of this study lies in the outcomes that institutions have in shaping the behaviors of the bodies those institutions are meant to govern and direct. Institutions are meant to shape behavior, which produces a deterministic path toward future outcomes, and understanding the potential long-term implications of these processes is important for constructing institutions that lead to desirable outcomes. In the cases of U.S. interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, the rules created to shape the organizations that would interpret and respond to the threats of the period ultimately proved counterproductive toward long-term U.S. strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere and beyond. In the next two sections I argue that the path created by these policies carried the United States into interventions in Guatemala and Cuba, largely driven by the manner in which individual policymakers perceived and responded to their international and domestic environments while trying to manage both opportunities and

threats within their own institutionally constrained environments. This appears to have been particularly true in the case of Cuba, which built on the increasing returns from the operations in Iran and Guatemala, and ultimately led to a behavioral lock-in that detrimentally influenced those involved in planning the Bay of Pigs invasion. Those behavioral lock-ins, clouded by threat perceptions, combined with institutional changes implemented during the presidential changeover between Eisenhower and Kennedy immediately prior to the invasion and contributed significantly to the operation's failure. While this is a specific case of institutional pathology, the phenomenon appears applicable to a range of institutional applications to overcome challenges and enhance techniques for institutional change.

III. GUATEMALA AND OPERATION PBSUCCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

The circumstances surrounding the decision for American intervention in Guatemala's internal politics in 1954 requires an understanding of the background of U.S. interests in Latin America juxtaposed against the international environment in 1954. The 1954 intervention both sought to counter communist influence in Guatemala and to secure long time U.S. economic interests in Guatemala. The early days of the Cold War had already polarized the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of capitalism and communism in a competition for a dominant global institution. Unfortunately for Guatemala, these interests intersected with a rise in nationalism and idealistic desires for social change by President Arbenz, which was interpreted by policymakers in the United States as a looming communist insurrection into the Americas. The evidence suggests that the U.S. intervention in Guatemala was driven by an inflated perception of Soviet backed communist encroachment in the hemisphere, and U.S. domestic ties to commercial interests in Guatemala, which combined in the form of both political and institutionally motivated opportunism. The preceding intervention in Iran the year prior confirmed the feasibility of orchestrating regime change in states with key U.S. interests. Likewise, the perceived success of the operation in Guatemala initiated a pattern of increasing returns and behavioral lock-in that propelled Washington forward into the Bay of Pigs failure. Analysis of the intervention in Guatemala demonstrates that success was not due to the conduct of the operation, or its design, but rather due to the inability of the Guatemalans to respond adequately to the intervention's tactics. As the following analysis will demonstrate, this was not the most important factor regarding the intervention, and that in hindsight, a better understanding of the actual situation in the country could have led to a less risky operation, and certainly would have contributed to more effectively assessing and managing risk in the Cuban intervention that followed in 1961. Understanding those conditions requires a more thorough understanding of the political economy of Guatemala during the late 19th and early 20th centuries through the

what is known as the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944–1954. The social and political forces at work during this period greatly influenced the 1954 intervention.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. The primary catalyst for this operation was the agrarian land reform that Arbenz instituted under Decree 900. The reform affected only 1,710 of the 341,191 private land holdings in the country, but comprised more than half of the private land holdings, much of which represented the holdings of the UFCO. The Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) for the State Department assessed that the implementation of the decree “would strengthen the government’s influence in the countryside and would provide the communists with ‘an excellent opportunity to extend their influence over the rural population.’”¹³⁰ The reforms instigated a wave of violence in the countryside as landowners felt greatly undercompensated for the reforms.¹³¹ The linkage to communism and the threat to economic interests in the country provided the justification for the Eisenhower administration to execute the intervention, which managed to achieve its sought after ends of regime change. In the years that followed, it was later determined that the covert operation, codenamed “PBSUCCESS, was a success through dumb luck more than anything else,” and that it was only through the successful psychological operations that managed to intimidate Arbenz’s army into betraying him and forcing his resignation.¹³² The success of this operation played a significant role in the decision to invade Cuba that resulted in the failure at the Bay of Pigs seven years later. Washington officials seemed to find the linkage between nationalist economic policies and communism unacceptably dangerous, despite their own assessment that the reforms would extend government control into the countryside. Ironically, expanding government reach into the countryside continues to challenge the Guatemalan government today. In the years that followed the overthrow, U.S. aid to Guatemala increased significantly to \$138 million between 1953 and 1961, second only to Bolivia in the region.¹³³ Siekmeier

¹³⁰ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 152.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 155.

¹³² Peter Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New York: New Press, 1998), 8.

¹³³ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 341.

assessed that while private investment and economic growth did occur in Guatemala, so too did the division between rich and poor, and that the poor actually became worse off than they had been since food production actually decreased under that aid.¹³⁴ The roots of that social class division lies in Central America's postcolonial economic relationship with the United States.

B. BANANA REPUBLIC AND COFFEE COUNTRY

The extent to which coffee and bananas dominated Guatemala's exports in the first half of the 20th century played a significant role in U.S. policy toward the country. Walter LaFeber summarized that the United Fruit Company (UFCO), "owned two huge plantations and monopolized the banana trade, but also controlled the docks in the nation's ports, ran the railroad, provided its own 'Great White Fleet' for Guatemala's merchant shipping, operated the country's communication network, and provided loans to the profligate dictators."¹³⁵ By the 1930s, German entrepreneurs held the lion's share of coffee exports, while UFCO dominated the banana trade. Washington officials found it concerning that German influence in Guatemala coincided with the rise of fascism in Europe, along with the Guatemalan president, Jorge Ubico's fascination with Mussolini and Franco, including close relations to the German Minister in Guatemala City. As LaFeber points out though, Ubico was able to mitigate Washington officials' concerns by allowing a U.S. officer to head the Guatemalan military academy, and in combination with rising banana prices and an increase in coffee purchases in the United States, shifted the German coffee share from 60 to 15 percent by 1939.¹³⁶ Ubico was notorious for changing laws to prolong his stay in power, and U.S. policy at the time seemed to ignore Ubico's dictatorial rule to protect its economic and political interests in Guatemala.¹³⁷ More importantly was the need to transition the responsibility for maintaining order in the region from U.S. Marines to local police forces controlled by regimes favorable to

¹³⁴ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 343.

¹³⁵ Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984), 75.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 77–78.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 81.

Washington.¹³⁸ By monopolizing economic and political influence, Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy "maintained order and protected private property" through support of pro American dictators in the region, including Ubico in Guatemala, and further ensured that what amounted to less than 2 percent of the population would continue to control most of the land.¹³⁹ As LaFeber concluded, "the system could work as long as the few in Central America dominated the many."¹⁴⁰

In 1944, an experiment in "national capitalism" sought to challenge this previously established "system." James F. Siekmeier identified the goals of this movement as "asserting more control over their national resources, constraining the activities of foreign investors, and . . . branching out into several economic fields."¹⁴¹ Up until that point, U.S. policy had found itself in somewhat of a legitimacy dilemma, seeking to improve conditions for the poor, but also wanting to ensure the status quo and position of elites, principally through expansion of American commercial and industrial undertakings.¹⁴² The status quo that had existed in Central America was one of traditional patrimony whereby a very small ruling elite class owned the majority of the land and controlled exports to the more developed world. While the Monroe Doctrine had laid out U.S. policy toward the region for much of the 1800s, U.S. interest in the region escalated dramatically during the presidential administration of Theodore Roosevelt. Langley and Schoonover refer to three epochs in Central America consisting of North American "opportunists, filibusters, and mercenaries" who "ravished Central America" from 1850 to 1870, 1900 to 1930, and again in the 1980s.¹⁴³ As the authors conclude, these "soldiers of fortune and mercenaries" were responsible for the "expansion of slavery" and the "pursuit of wealth" which directly paralleled the "economic, social, and

¹³⁸ LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, 81.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 83.

¹⁴¹ James F. Siekmeier, *Aid, Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States 1945–1961* (Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 209.

¹⁴² Ibid., 134–37.

¹⁴³ Lester D. Langley and Thomas Schoonover, *The Banana Men: American Mercenaries and Entrepreneurs in Central America, 1880–1930* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 6–7.

political disequilibrium identified with industrial revolution.”¹⁴⁴ Langley and Schoonover assessed that U.S. attitude toward the Americas was the outcome of an opportunistic shift in the political economy created by the industrial revolution and the frequently revived rhetoric of the Monroe Doctrine calling for the exclusion of any “foreign penetration” into the Western Hemisphere.”¹⁴⁵ The Americas to the south represented a new land of opportunity for adventurous opportunists and risk takers, who could also enjoy operating outside of the laws more likely to be enforced within the United States, thus leading to the creation of a special relationship of U.S. protection of private interests in the region.

Transnational companies dominated ownership of land in Central America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by controlling agro-export economies. The use of the terms, “home” and “host” country, identified where a company was based out of and where it operated, respectively. As Langley and Schoonover point out, the “home” country for United, Standard, and Cuyamel fruit companies was the United States, while they operated in the “host” countries of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala.¹⁴⁶ These companies tended to control far more than just agricultural enterprise in their respective “host” countries, often dominating economic interests, and U.S. security interests in the region, including taking over from the French the construction of the Panama Canal in 1904. As Langley and Schoonover assess, U.S. policy at this time had begun to call for “replacement of non-U.S. interests in areas deemed strategically important or essential to canal security.”¹⁴⁷ As the authors conclude, the problem with U.S. policy at this time lay in its hypocrisy. On the one hand, the United States wanted a developed and democratized Central America, yet on the other it wanted to secure its commercial and security interests, often through outright force. In Guatemala, this resulted in U.S. favor being afforded to President Manuel Estrada Cabrera in exchange for his favor toward the United Fruit Company.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Langley and Schoonover, *Banana Men*, 6–7.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 26–27.

Part of the U.S. efforts in Guatemala involved running out German competition with the United Fruit Company.¹⁴⁹ The security interest lay in Nicaragua's resistance to the construction of the canal in Panama.¹⁵⁰ The Guatemalan connection with Estrada Cabrera was thus useful in both camps, as he harbored a rivalry with Nicaragua's Jose Santos Zelaya and was supportive of U.S. economic interests in Guatemala. As Langley and Schoonover point out, the Guatemalan president was known for employing lobbyists in Washington to secure his own domestic interests in exchange for favorability toward those U.S. commercial interests.¹⁵¹ One German who was run out of the country in 1908 even accused the Guatemalan dictator of providing \$10,000 to the campaign of Theodore Roosevelt.¹⁵² Regardless, Estrada Cabrera was known to have run a ruthless spy ring and effectively operated a "police state" in Guatemala, as his interests favored expanding Guatemalan control throughout Central America.¹⁵³ This resulted in endless in-fighting between Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala, in which the United States actually sought to end the perpetual conflict and bring "peace, progress, and, above all, stability" to the region.¹⁵⁴ This leads one to believe that U.S. policy would have been to prop up dictators that would have a stabilizing presence over the region, however, this was actually not the case. As the authors argue, "U.S. officials and entrepreneurs could seldom agree about which isthmian leaders or factions best served U.S. interests, in part because these varied interests were often in conflict themselves."¹⁵⁵ In the case of Central America, and similarly in Cuba, the overlap of institutions, both formal and informal, all with divergent and adversarial ends in mind, contributed to the problems of effective rule of law and governance throughout the region, and made it difficult for Washington to choose sides.

¹⁴⁹ Langley and Schoonover, *Banana Men*, 29.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 70.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 70.

C. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Understanding the process in which economic nationalism emerged in Latin America provides the process by which the Eisenhower administration developed institutions to counter these movements. After the conclusion of the Second World War, reform movements in Latin America that sought to address the centuries old societal divisions between wealthy elites and the impoverished also challenged U.S. economic interests in the Western Hemisphere. Economic nationalism became the label applied to movements that sought to challenge what was perceived as “foreign economic imperialism” in the region beginning in the first half of the 20th century. In Guatemala in 1954, and in Cuba in 1961, this confrontation of economic institutions resulted in U.S. interventions in each of these countries to counter these movements, which the U.S. perceived and labeled as communist subversion. U.S. Cold War policy in the third world lies largely in these perceptions of domestic politics associated with economic nationalist movements, and I argue that U.S. policy toward Latin America often failed to distinguish important differences in these economic nationalist movements and communist subversion that ultimately—and unintentionally—opened the door to increased Soviet influence in the region. The successful intervention in Iran in 1953 set the stage for confrontations that would follow in the Western Hemisphere as it provided confirmation of a tactic to initiate regime change and provided Washington with increasing returns that further entrenched an aggressive policy to counter communism in the hemisphere. A look at the background to the economic situation that developed during the first half of the 20th century in the Western Hemisphere sheds light on the greater phenomenon at work within the region. Analysis of the situation that emerged with regard to the United States, Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba suggests that the origins of the conflict were not entirely communist in nature and the institutions that were created to counter such movements were misguided from the start and subsequently took the United States down a path toward the failed intervention in Cuba.

John Charles Chasteen provides an excellent summary regarding the background on economic nationalist movements in the Americas. The sense of nationalism in Latin America has its roots in the independence movements of the early 19th century; however,

it quickly faded in the chaotic environments that followed independence until it reemerged in the early 1900s with a “strong economic agenda.”¹⁵⁶ This nationalism was a direct reaction to the “Great Export Boom” that occurred during the last quarter of the 19th century, which in Mexico alone, “trade grew by 900 percent between 1877 and 1910.”¹⁵⁷ Coffee from Brazil, sugar from Cuba, minerals from Chile, wheat from Argentina, coffee and bananas from Guatemala and Honduras, cacao from Ecuador, and tin from Bolivia dominated the commodity boom.¹⁵⁸ The greatest beneficiaries of this were the long-time elite landowners of Latin America, but the boom also paved the way for a rapidly growing middle and urban class, and led to drastic improvements in infrastructure to transport commodities to export facilities.¹⁵⁹ During this period, however, the most impoverished populations of the region once again lost out, often having their native farm lands taken away from them, stripping them from their subsistence-oriented life styles.¹⁶⁰ The massive growth in the economies in the region did not translate to improved conditions for the poorest, who lost their land, effectively destroying their subsistence economic systems.

Plantation agriculture and heavy industrial mining were particularly responsible for sharpening the division between rich and poor in the region.¹⁶¹ The industrialization of commodity extraction required expensive refinement infrastructure that was typically paid for with foreign investment.¹⁶² Much of that foreign investment came from the United States. Chasteen describes banana production as a “neocolonial nightmare for the palm-studded coasts of the Caribbean.”¹⁶³ Much of the banana production in this region was controlled by the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which operated in Costa Rica,

¹⁵⁶ John Charles Chasteen, *Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America* 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 217.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 182–83.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 184.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 186.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 187.

Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela.”¹⁶⁴ These types of operations were purely extractive, managed by white foreigners, and worked by unskilled local labor, and as Chasteen argues, when they ceased operations for various reasons in an area, they left behind “ex-banana choppers with no job, no land, no education, and a lot of missing fingers.”¹⁶⁵ During the first quarter of the 20th century, these types of operations sparked a mass migration of people to urban centers in search of jobs.¹⁶⁶ Still, it took time for this movement of people to occur, and during the first half of the 20th century, the politics of Latin America, though at times democratic, were largely controlled by wealthy land owners who actually took their local clients to the poles to vote on elections days.¹⁶⁷ Populism drove domestic politics in the region, and political rhetoric divided along conservative lines that sought to maintain the status quo and reformist lines that sought to improve conditions and address the social inequities that had developed. Unfortunately, these reformist movements were often perceived as left leaning and communist backed, which shaped U.S. policy development in an attempt to stabilize the social discord in order to protect U.S. interests in the region.

Foreign influence in the late 1800s and early 1900s shifted from British dominance to the United States, particularly in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. In 1914 alone, the foreign investment in the region totaled \$10 billion, \$99 million in Guatemala and \$471 million in Cuba, half of which was British owned.¹⁶⁸ U.S. interests in the region had increased steadily since the invasion of Mexico in the 1840s and Cuba in 1898, and by the early 1900s the United States was intervening regularly in Puerto Rico, Panama, Haiti, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.¹⁶⁹ Historians attribute much of this increase in U.S. interventionism to President Theodore Roosevelt’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which sought not only to exclude European influence in the internal affairs of the Americas, but to spread U.S.

¹⁶⁴ Chasteen, *Blood and Fire*, 187–88.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 188.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 201–02.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 201.

institutions throughout the Americas, known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁷⁰ By 1929, the U.S. controlled some 40 percent of all foreign investment in the Americas, which influenced the establishment of the Pan-American Union for the encouragement of free trade within the hemisphere.¹⁷¹

Interventions to protect and expand interests and investments in the region sparked a considerable degree of backlash and resentment toward U.S. policies. In the 1920s, “U.S. Marines were in a five-year shooting war with Nicaraguan patriot guerillas” who accused the United States of “imperialism,” and created a hero out of Augusto César Sandino for standing up to the United States.¹⁷² This led to a growth in resistance movements and provided fuel for nationalist sentiments throughout the region. The 1929 crash of the stock market caused the export generated wealth of Latin America to plummet. Chasteen argues that the crash crumbled the mechanism of dictatorial and oligarchical rule in the region, and allowed the nationalists to finally “shatter” the neocolonial mold.¹⁷³ Combined with the international specter of communism, it also provided the domestic political rhetoric that shaped U.S. involvement in the region throughout the Cold War, and it became salient for political actors, particularly right wing military politicians, to label left of center opposition as communists. Economic nationalism became synonymous with communism, and any political group that leaned too far to the left, was likely to be labeled communist.

Latin American nationalist movements began in Mexico, where U.S. influence, and “imperialism” as the Mexicans viewed it, had been the worst.¹⁷⁴ The Mexican revolution was won by the Constitutionalists, who wrote into the Mexican Constitution measures such as “wage and hour laws, pensions and social benefits, the right to unionize and strike . . . sharply limited the privileges of foreigners . . . [and] curbed the rights of

¹⁷⁰ Chasteen, *Blood and Fire*, 206.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid., 207.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 209.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 221.

the Catholic Church.”¹⁷⁵ Nationalism differed in Argentina and Uruguay, where economic nationalism was born in the rhetoric of José Batlle y Ordóñez’s movement known as Batllismo, which Chasteen describes as, the “concerted state action against ‘foreign economic imperialism.’”¹⁷⁶ The region also saw the birth of *idigenismo* during this period, particularly in Mexico and Peru, which championed indigenous society’s similarity to the Marxist theory of social construction.¹⁷⁷ The linkage of Marxist theory with economic nationalism became important in the justification for U.S. interventions in Guatemala and Cuba and certainly contributed to U.S. interventions in the region, but it also affected domestic political competition for power in the region. What was born as reformist nationalism to both address social inequity and inspire domestic political support from the masses often looked very much like communism, a linkage that dominated institutional construction to counter those movements during the 1950s, both in the United States and within the nations of Latin America.

The Great Depression accelerated the movement of economic nationalism in Latin America during the 1930s with the increase in industrial production in the region.¹⁷⁸ It also legitimized arguments in favor of economic nationalism and independence from a dependent economic system with the United States that had developed during the late 1800s. The large countries in the region, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, benefited from import-substitution industrialization (ISI) since their size allowed them to diversify production and offered a larger consumer market for finished goods.¹⁷⁹ Small, rural countries, like Guatemala and Cuba, benefited little from ISI since they lacked the market population and wealth for manufactured goods from many factories.¹⁸⁰ Still the trend of ISI continued and flourished under the wartime conditions of the Second World War since the United States was focused on factory production of wartime material, opening

¹⁷⁵ Chasteen, *Blood and Fire*, 222.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 225.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 228.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 230.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

U.S. markets to Latin America's producers.¹⁸¹ Chasteen argues that a great deal of social progress occurred in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, who benefited the most from ISI, however, Central America and the Caribbean followed the same "old-style landowning oligarchies" track of before.¹⁸² Latin America bifurcated down two separate institutionally driven paths, both of which would lead to ideological problems with the United States after World War II, but the small agricultural states were particularly divided. A small land owning oligarchy held most of the political power in countries like Guatemala and Cuba, had close ties to influential U.S. investors, and counted on that relationship to maintain the status quo.

The end of the Second World War changed the economic structure in the hemisphere. The war machine of the United States was quickly converted to satisfy production of consumer goods for the reconstruction of Europe and East Asia. This meant that Latin America's ISI factory production would no longer be able to compete with the United States, Europe, and the budding East Asian transformation that was to come. Populist rhetoric centered on nationalism had also grown to be the most politically useful way of garnishing domestic political support in the region. As Chasteen concludes, this rhetoric became, perhaps quite unfortunately, confused with "leftist, or even communist" speech by U.S. diplomats during the early days of the Cold War.¹⁸³ Containing communism largely guided U.S. international behavior during the Cold War era, however, James F. Siekmeier argues that in the 1940s and 1950s, the United States saw Latin American nationalism as "both more prevalent and dangerous than communism."¹⁸⁴ Siekmeier's observation points to the manner in which U.S. Cold War policy was constructed vis-à-vis the developing world, and that it was at least partially centered on the national security interest of U.S. economic capacity, largely an outcome of the huge bureaucratic wartime machine that dedicated institutions to focus on the war economy. Washington calculated that Latin America's role in the economy was vital to

¹⁸¹ Chasteen, *Blood and Fire*, 230.

¹⁸² Ibid., 240–41.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ James F. Siekmeier, *Aid, Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States, 1945–1961* (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 3–4.

the achievement of postwar reconstruction and Cold War objectives, and that maintaining the status quo in Latin America posed less risk than the potential disruptions of either communism or economic nationalist movements. Thus, the United States created policies that sought to counter those forces in the region, yet also attempt to promote core U.S. democratic and humanitarian values. The contradictory nature of these policies wreaked havoc on perceived U.S. legitimacy in the region, and provided additional rhetoric for the economic nationalist and communist movements.

Siekmeier argues that during the 1940s and 1950s, the United States used economic aid as a policy tool in an unsuccessful attempt at creating “strong, stable, nations that were firmly pro-United States.”¹⁸⁵ In Guatemala, Juan Jose Arevalo described his country’s nationalism as “custom barriers, independent industry, protection of the native citizen, exaltation of creole life; and also just prices for raw materials produced inside our country [and sold on world markets], insistence on commercial equality, defense of our money, reciprocity, respect, dignity.”¹⁸⁶ Washington officials tended to oppose economic nationalism because it placed limitations on foreign investors, access to natural resources, and participation in key sectors of the economies of the region.¹⁸⁷ In Guatemala in particular, land reforms and increased agricultural productivity sought to increase individual purchasing power to lift much of the population out of abject poverty.¹⁸⁸ Washington officials saw these types of moves as having the potential to “undermine the inter-American economic system” by limiting the “free flow of goods and investments between North and South America.”¹⁸⁹ The United States envisioned a circular symbiotic relationship between North and South, whereby resources would flow out of Latin America and into U.S. factories that would assemble finished goods, which would then flow back into markets in Latin America and other parts of the world. Policymakers at the time thought that the smaller Latin American

¹⁸⁵ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 6.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

countries would be best served not by following economic nationalist practices centered on independent economies, but rather by using each of their comparative advantages in their strongest sectors they would achieve the greatest economic growth. Washington officials felt that freer trade would lead toward sustainable economic growth, and the wealth generated from that growth would address the Latin American nations' social, political, and economic demands to stabilize the region.¹⁹⁰ To many in Latin America, these policies appeared to be thinly veiled justification for neocolonial imperialism, and populist leaders jumped on the opportunity to use that anti-imperialist rhetoric to gather domestic support within their countries.

The 1944 revolution that brought democracy to Guatemala sought to diversify the country's economy, place restrictions on foreign capital, and push the land reform issue forward.¹⁹¹ At the same time, in Argentina, populism was gathering steam under the leadership of Juan Peron, who had come to power in a coup orchestrated in 1943.¹⁹² Siekmeier points out that the populism of Peron was not limited to Argentina, but was actually a regional phenomenon of the period, but that Peron was particularly troublesome for the United States because Argentina failed to support the Allies in World War II.¹⁹³ U.S. officials also felt that Peron followed the 1933 to 1938 German pattern of governance, and despite U.S. appeals to the Argentine inherent desire for democracy, Peron was able to rally considerable support with his anti-American rhetoric.¹⁹⁴ Anti-imperialism resonated within the polities of Latin America. Yet, Peron eventually capitulated, patched relations with the United States, and agreed to enter into the Rio Pact of September 1947, an agreement that any attack on one American nation represented an attack on all.¹⁹⁵ By the end of the 1940s the global security environment had become

¹⁹⁰ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 10.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 104.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 105.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 107.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 109.

more threatening; the Soviet Union had acquired nuclear weaponry, China went communist, and the free world's economies stagnated.¹⁹⁶

Siekmeier argues that the early 1950s security environment can best be understood by examining reports written toward the end of the Truman administration. The reports stated that funds for industrialization in the developing world must come from private sector capital, and that public sector aid should focus on infrastructure that would benefit private sector investments.¹⁹⁷ The 1950 State Department policy objectives in Latin America were “the security of the United States and of this Hemisphere, the achievement of world peace, the encouragement of democratic representative institutions [in the region], and positive cooperation in the economic field *in order to help the attainment of the first three objectives*.”¹⁹⁸ Siekmeier argues that the meaning of this policy statement signified that U.S. understanding of the U.S.-Latin American relationship was that the nations to the south of the United States would “produce raw materials and intermediate manufactured goods while the *norteamericanos* would offer finished goods [back to the south].”¹⁹⁹ This arrangement directly contradicted the objectives of most economic nationalist movements in the region and virtually guaranteed future conflict.

The United States feared that if economic nationalist movements took power they would implement economic policies in Latin America that would slow economic growth to the point that it would not be able to keep up with the growing population of the region, and would therefore represent a threat to the stability of the region and the security of the United States.²⁰⁰ Siekmeier argues that what economic nationalists actually sought was to “eliminate the feudal agriculture system that persisted in some Latin American countries; to incorporate the Indians into the economic, social, and political life of the region; to vastly reduce the oligarchy's power; to increase the power

¹⁹⁶ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 121.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 121.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 131.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 158.

and participation in government of the lower and middle classes; and to diversify the economy in order to mitigate the pernicious effects of monoculture.”²⁰¹ Of course, much of U.S. interest in the region lay in private investment, by 1944 in Guatemala alone, some \$93 million was concentrated in three U.S. companies, the *Empresa Eléctrica*, International Railways of Central America (IRCA), and the United Fruit Company (UFCO).²⁰² The UFCO commanded an annual budget larger than the Central American countries in which it operated, and as Piero Gleijeses argues, was politically well connected in Massachusetts: Thomas Cabot had been the “company’s president in 1948, and his brother, John Moors, was assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs in 1953.”²⁰³ The UFCO was also Guatemala’s largest private land owner with over half a million acres, and employed 15,000 Guatemalans.²⁰⁴ Despite the seemingly entrenched connections with government, Gleijeses points out that the U.S. government had never directly intervened on behalf of UFCO until the presidency of Arevalo, and that in fact, the UFCO had made considerable contributions toward the development of medical and sanitation services, and the company’s workers were “better paid, better fed, and better housed than those who toiled for other landowners.”²⁰⁵ Still, conditions in Guatemala created a great sense of social injustice, and there was considerable dissent from the right regarding the reform efforts of Arevalo, and more especially, those of his successor Jacobo Arbenz.

Fredrick R. Pike argued that the passage of the 1946 social security law, and the 1947 labor codes in Guatemala aroused “bitter opposition . . . in the ranks of the visionless landed aristocrats of the country.”²⁰⁶ During the 1950 election, Jacobo Arbenz was expected to have been defeated by the leading candidate Francisco Javier Arana, who

²⁰¹ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 159.

²⁰² Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton: University Press, 1991), 86.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 90.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 90.

²⁰⁶ Fredrick B. Pike, “Guatemala, the United States, and Communism in the Americas,” *The Review of Politics* 17, no. 2 (1955): 235. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1405084>.

was also anti-communist and supported the interests of Guatemala's right.²⁰⁷ During the campaign, Arana was gunned down in the summer of 1949, ensuring Arbenz's ascension to the presidency. Pike points out the suspicious connection with his murder, and also that Arbenz was complicit in the development of the secret (until 1950) communist party led by Jose Manuel Fortuny, who sympathized with Arbenz's fascinations for more land, tax, education, and labor reforms.²⁰⁸ The communist party in Guatemala was growing under the auspices of economic nationalism, but the most influential interests remained in the major economic enterprises controlled by the right and supported by U.S. investments in the country.

In the United States, Max Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, two Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) economists, prepared a paper for the White House entitled, "A Proposal for a New United States Economic Policy," which highlighted the rise of the Soviet Union, the general apathy felt toward economic improvement in the developing world, and the potential this had for increasing communist influence in the developing world.²⁰⁹ Millikan and Rostow argued that the United States needed to demonstrate to the developing world that rapid economic growth was possible under liberal capitalist principles.²¹⁰ The economists felt that too much of U.S. aid was going directly to military assistance and not enough toward development, and that long term development was more strategically important than just winning short term Cold War battles.²¹¹ They envisioned the United States injecting billions of dollars in aid into the non-industrialized world to expand these nation's stock of plants and machinery for production.²¹² Millikan and Rostow's proposal was essentially shot down by Milo Perkins, head of the Council of Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP), who argued that it would be "psychologically unwise to raise expectations in poor nations that could not be met," and that "communists often

²⁰⁷ Pike, "Guatemala," 235.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 234–35.

²⁰⁹ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 186–88.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 188.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 189.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 192.

made their greatest gains where living standards were in an upswing.”²¹³ Perkins’ arguments won President Eisenhower’s endorsement.

Christopher Baughn and Attila Yaprak found linkage between nationalistic economic policies with other measures of national and international orientations by states, and found a readiness to support such policies exists when a perceived economic threat posed by foreign economic competition emerges.²¹⁴ These authors found that the competition for scarce resources, such as jobs and economic benefit, suggests “elevations in economic nationalism as a function of unfavorable economic conditions,” with the strongest indicator being the level of perceived threat felt within the state.²¹⁵ Baughn and Yaprak felt that these indicators may be useful in tracking the “ebb and flow” over time, using heightened economic nationalism as a potential indicator of inter-state conflict.²¹⁶ There seems have been either a perception of threat to the scarce resources that Baughn and Yaprak consider critical to creating increased sentiments of economic nationalism, as well as the perception of imperial contestation over who would profit from those resources, which led to policies that helped guide the path for U.S. interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba. The growth in economic nationalism in those countries threatened U.S. interests in the region and also inspired anti-imperialism within in large enough segments of those populations to become politically salient. U.S. policy’s aimed and intentioned at achieving economic growth in the Third World were perceived as threatening by large segments of those populations, and once those movements became intertwined with the specter of communist subversion, U.S. intervention became inevitable.

D. THE KENNAN FAMILY AND THEIR COLD WAR

A simplistic analysis of Latin America’s position during the Cold War as merely another battleground of the containment strategies proposed by the Soviet expert George

²¹³ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 194.

²¹⁴ C. Christopher Baughn and Attila Yaprak, “Economic Nationalism: Conceptual and Empirical Development,” *Political Psychology* 17, no. 4 (1996): 760. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792137>.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 773.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 773.

Kennan fails to account for the highly competitive interests that had been battling within Latin America for nearly 100 years. In his famous memorandum to then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on March 29, 1950, Kennan assesses that the principal security interest within Latin America lay in the vital access to that region's natural resources in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. His assessment of the international community at the time is summed up in his statement that it was an arena of "band-wagon psychology in which nothing succeeds like success."²¹⁷ Kennan assessed that if there was a sudden loss of connection with the Eurasian landmass in conjunction with a lack of allegiance among the nations of the Americas, then the probability for conflict among the United States and its southern neighbors would have increased. His assessment of Latin America was quite fatalistic, as he described the region doomed as a result of "the large scale importation of Negro slave elements . . . extensive intermarriage of all these elements . . . which seemed to have weighed scarcely less heavily on the chances for human progress."²¹⁸ In retrospect, his notion that the Latin American citizen "lives, by and large, by a species of make-believe: not the systematized, purposeful make-believe of Russian communism, but a highly personalized, anarchical make-believe, in which each individual spins around him, like a cocoon, his own little world of pretense, and demands its recognition by others as the condition of his participation in the social process," speaks to the U.S. exceptionalism of the time, but his conclusion that the average foreign representative who finds him or herself in this "Alice Wonderland" environment, and feels compelled toward "cynicism, participation, or acute unhappiness," seems to be quite an accurate assessment.²¹⁹ Overt racism and exceptionalism was pervasive in the minds of policymakers during the period, and thus the institutions they created were heavily influenced by those biases.

²¹⁷ George Kennan, "Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State," accessed December 14, 2015 (March 29, 1950), 599. <http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/475/85683/Kennan%20Excerpts.pdf>.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 601.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 603.

E. THE SOVIET CONNECTION TO LATIN AMERICA

Kennan summed up the relationship between the Latin American communist and Moscow as “tenuous and indirect,” due to the character of Latin Americans as inclined toward “individualism, to indiscipline and to a personalized, rather than doctrinaire, approach to their responsibilities as communists, they sometimes have little resemblance to the highly disciplined communists of Europe, and are less conscious of their status as tools of Moscow.”²²⁰ Kennan goes on to explain that Soviet leadership in Moscow probably viewed Latin American communists with “a mixture of amusement, contempt, and anxiety,” and that he concluded that the greatest threat of popular support of communism in Latin America existed in Guatemala. Kennan is largely regarded for the influence his writings had on the U.S. containment strategy that developed during the Cold War. While a deep analysis of Cold War escalations is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that in the years after the covert interventions in Latin America, George Kennan felt “the United States should not fuss too much over Latin Americans, but ‘expect less of them and try to get them to expect less of us, to give up the search for understanding or popularity, to wait for them to come to us.’”²²¹ This is significant because had Kennan known the events that were going to unfold in the next few years in Guatemala, he may have worded his assessment differently.

The wording of his memorandum and his references of prior policy centered on the tenants of the Monroe Doctrine does suggest that he felt the United States should view stopping communist encroachment into the Western Hemisphere as a vital strategic interest. Certainly his statement suggesting that where local popular resistance was not enough that “harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedure; and that such regimes and such methods may be preferable alternatives, and indeed the only alternatives, to further

²²⁰ Kennan, “Memorandum,” 603.

²²¹ David Allan Mayers, *George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 266.

communist successes,” played a role in policy formulation.²²² The entirety of the memorandum suggests a firm stance against the spread of communism in the Americas, but actually does reject any form of militant anti-communism undertaking that could have been used as propaganda by the communists. Rather, Kennan argues that the United States should leverage its position of superiority and the needs of other weaker American states to recognize the utility of good international relations with the United States.²²³ Interestingly, the writing in the memorandum can be interpreted as the reader wishes, promoting either interventionism, or noninterventionism, depending how it is understood by the individual reader.

Today, most scholars generally agree that Soviet influence in Latin America during the 1940s and 1950s was indirect at best, and that a true interest in the region did not develop until after the successes of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and Fidel Castro’s ability to survive in, what they viewed as the U.S. sphere of domination.²²⁴ Nicola Miller points out that “in 1951, Stalin [denounced] the exclusion from the United Nations of the People’s Republic of China, [and] berated the twenty Latin American republics for being the ‘most solid and obedient army of the United States.’”²²⁵ Edgar Bravo’s 1978 dissertation, *The Soviet View of the Latin American Military Regimes*, offers an interesting perspective on Soviet attitudes toward Latin America. Generally, Moscow viewed Latin American militaries as merely a police force for the “bourgeoisie” elites, and the common peasants as too backward and uneducated to be inspired to the revolutionary cause.²²⁶ Most populist uprisings amounted to little more than militant regime changes across the region. However, as Bravo points out, this interest changed with Guatemala’s revolution first under Arevalo and later under Arbenz.²²⁷ For the

²²² Kennan, “Memorandum,” 607.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 622.

²²⁴ Nicola Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959–1987* (Cambridge: University Press, 1989), 5–7.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

²²⁶ Edgar R. Bravo, *The Soviet View of the Latin American Military Regimes* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 1978), 32.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 28–31.

Soviets, Arbenz's failure was "due to the 'cowardice and treachery of certain bourgeois circles in Guatemala which played a role in the success of the counterrevolution.'"228

The failure was understood to have been due to "limited arms shipments and 'advice' from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."229 Bravo concludes that the Soviets interpreted that the eventual assassinations of General Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in 1956, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas in 1957, and General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic in 1961, and likewise the overthrow of military dictatorships in Argentina in 1955; Peru, Haiti, and Colombia in 1956; Venezuela in 1957; Cuba in 1959; and El Salvador in 1960, were "proof of the masses' desire to get rid of their oppressors and of the 'general advance of the liberation movement' in that period."230 It would seem that, at least in the eyes of Moscow, that the operation to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala sparked a chain reaction of popular working class uprisings against what they perceived as the imperial United States, yet as Bravo points out, even the Soviets viewed all of these—minus Cuba—as failed efforts due to the various movements' inability to "consolidate the gains [they had] achieved."231 Thus, the danger to national security posed by these leftist movements was much less than Washington argued them to be, and the aggressive policies taken to contain them had as much a role in destabilizing the region as it did in protecting it. The plausible counterfactual argument is that in many of these cases, through domestic political balancing, the issues would have likely resolved themselves absent of U.S. intervention.

F. GUATEMALAN DOMESTIC POLITICS

For the 16 years prior to 1944, Jorge Ubico's military dictatorship ruled over Guatemala. Ubico saw himself as a beloved dictator by his people, likened himself in the image of Napoleon, and had been sympathetic to Hitler and the Nazi cause until Washington officials corrected him, sending down FBI agents to oversee internment of

228 Bravo, *The Soviet View*, 28–31.

229 Ibid.

230 Ibid., 33.

231 Ibid.

German Guatemalans during the war years.²³² Schlesinger and Kinzer argue that the dictator ruled Guatemala for the wealthy elite with the mandate to prevent any social change within the country, and that he did so with “ruthless gusto.”²³³ The authors state that “he massacred rebellious Indians, killed labor leaders and intellectuals and enriched his friends,” and that “the long-suffering country reached a ‘savage climax under the megalomaniac General Jorge Ubico.’”²³⁴ While Schlesinger and Kinzer state that the dictator’s contributions were merely “a handful of schools, some inadequate roads and an airport,”²³⁵ James Siekmeier argues that, in fact, Ubico “had sown the seeds of his own destruction,” through his promotion of economic growth that primarily benefited the elites, but also partially gave rise to a dissatisfied middle class.²³⁶ Siekmeier also points out that the World War II experience and the rhetoric of Franklin Roosevelt speaking of universal ideals of “peace, freedom, and prosperity,” resonated powerfully in the ears of many Latin Americans, including Guatemala’s budding middle class.²³⁷

Perhaps most interesting in the saga of Guatemala is the manner in which this dictator was removed from power. In what came to be known as the “Petition of the 311,” some 311 “teachers, lawyers, doctors, small businessmen, and other citizens,” many of whom were friends of the general, presented him with a petition calling for him to step down.²³⁸ Ubico, who was shocked at the lack of popular support, relinquished power to General Federico Ponce. Ponce quickly moved to consolidate his position through a fictitious election that would guarantee him a fictitious popular mandate. However, his aspirations were cut short by a plot orchestrated by two army officers, Major Francisco Arana and Captain Jacobo Arbenz, who executed a revolt known as the “October

²³² Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 26–27.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 26–27.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ James F. Siekmeier, *Aid, Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations—Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States 1945–1961* (Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 211.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 28.

Revolution,” and forced Ponce to flee the country in an arrangement brokered by the *chargé d’affaires* at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala.²³⁹

Ubico’s protesters asked a popular teacher, who at the time was living in Argentina, Dr. Juan José Arevalo Bermejo, to return to Guatemala and run as the candidate of choice in the elections that Arana-Arbenz junta had arranged. Arevalo’s popularity was due in part to his “uplifting textbooks on history, geography, and civics that were in use throughout Guatemala.”²⁴⁰ Schlesinger and Kinzer also point out that the junta saw Arevalo as a “clean” civilian and that the two hoped to “manage” the new president after he came into office.²⁴¹ When Arevalo arrived to Guatemala from Argentina in the fall of 1945, he was greeted by cheering crowds and won the presidency that December with more than 85 percent of the vote.²⁴² The reforms instituted were wide spread and immediate. The old regime of military generals was removed completely, and a number of measures to create a democratic system that limited terms of office and set up checks of powers between the Congress, Supreme Court, and the Executive branches. The reforms also, for the first time, set up elections for local representation of mayors and local councilors. A Bill of Rights was instituted that guaranteed numerous social equalities, including equality between husbands and wives, equal pay for men and women, laws against racial discrimination, anti-trust measures, university autonomy from government control, and other forms of social justice before unbeknownst to Guatemalans.²⁴³ Arevalo also proclaimed his disdain for communism, that it was “contrary to human nature,” and professed the “superiority of democracy, which does not seek to destroy anything that man has accomplished, but humbly seeks to ‘straighten out crooked paths.’”²⁴⁴

²³⁹ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 31.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 32.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 33–34.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 32.

Siekmeier points out that the reforms also included the encouragement of workers to “organize and bargain collectively.”²⁴⁵ He also argues that the United States was initially supportive of the reforms undertaken in Guatemala, stating that the Guatemalan law, Decree Number 459, “gave economic incentives to foreign capitalists who wanted to export capital and goods to Guatemala.”²⁴⁶ Siekmeier argues that the U.S. concern with Guatemalan initiatives arose due to its contradictory nature in regard to intra-hemispherical relations in Latin America.²⁴⁷ During the 1947 signing of the Rio Pact, the Guatemalans challenged the U.S. delegation with wording of the final portion of the agreement regarding the definition of aggression by another state. The Guatemalans felt the language should require signatories to “abstain from lending aid, direct or indirect, to any aggression or attempts thereof against one or more of the other signatory states and prevent, in their territory, the exercise of any objectives which aim to change the constitutional regime of the others by means of force,” while the U.S. delegates sought to define “aggression as simply ‘unprovoked armed attack.’”²⁴⁸ Then, in 1948, the Guatemalans again challenged U.S. delegates and their assertion at the Bogota convention regarding expropriations of foreign nationals’ property arguing that these individuals should be “compensated in a ‘prompt, adequate, and effective manner.’”²⁴⁹ Guatemala, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, Venezuela, and Honduras countered this argument, stating that the manner in which expropriations would be determined should be a matter independent and in accordance to each countries constitutional laws.²⁵⁰ Siekmeier argues that the Guatemalans saw this as room for “foreign investors to argue that they were not subject to the laws of the host country.”²⁵¹ The author points out that much of Arevalo’s encouragement in foreign investment was actually unattractive for

²⁴⁵ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 211.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 212.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 213.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 213–214.

investors due to the stipulations for benefits to the Guatemalan people.²⁵² The U.S. government was particularly “distressed” over the concessions to foreign oil companies, and the collective bargaining movements of Guatemalan workers. Siekmeier points out that the reforms were “particularly stringent” for foreign companies employing 500 or more Guatemalans, and that this was a point of contention with the United Fruit Company because they felt that this measure unfairly targeted them specifically.²⁵³ As Schlesinger and Kinzer argue, “some 40,000 Guatemalans depended directly or indirectly on the United Fruit Company and its subsidiaries,” and that most peasant workers earned between five and 20 cents per day, and even experienced bank clerks only took home 90 dollars a month.²⁵⁴ The company certainly had enormously powerful influence within the country.

Arevalo possessed a “romantic vision of Guatemala” according to Schlesinger and Kinzer, highlighting that his speeches contained a vision of “spiritual” socialism centered on a “fundamental change in human values.”²⁵⁵ These reforms came at a particularly dangerous time for the Guatemalans. Prior to the formation of the CIA, the FBI held responsibility for intelligence collection in the Americas, and as the two authors point out, were tipped off by former Ubico supporters that a “Communist influence” lay behind Arevalo’s Labor Code and the collective bargaining movements.²⁵⁶ Throughout Arevalo’s presidency, he was constantly challenged by the conservative Colonel Francisco Arana, the same Arana that had orchestrated the 1944 revolt that allowed Arevalo to secure the presidency. Colonel Arana commanded considerable support and even threatened to use the armed forces to dissolve the Congress when they tried to remove him from his military position. At the same time, a more liberal movement that wanted to proceed with more ambitious social reforms organized opposition to Colonel Arana’s growing support, and chose his counterpart in the 1944 revolt, then Defense

²⁵² Siekmeier, *Aid*, 214.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 215.

²⁵⁴ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 38.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 39–40.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 40.

Minister Jacobo Arbenz. As Schlesinger and Kinzer argue, Arana and Arbenz were equally popular candidates, but on July 18, 1949, Colonel Arana was gunned down by the chauffeur of Arbenz's wife in a plot organized by one of his associates who was apparently a known communist "firebrand."²⁵⁷ Then in November 1950, Castillo Armas, who "revered" Arana, led a group of 70 men in a failed uprising against Arbenz. Armas nearly lost his life in the uprising, was arrested, jailed and sentenced to death. He subsequently escaped, supposedly through a tunnel underneath the prison in which he was held, but many suspect that a more likely escape route was through bribery.²⁵⁸ Armas spent the next several years in Colombia and Honduras, plotting a return to Guatemala, until he was approached by the CIA in August 1953, and eventually appointed as the chosen "liberator" of Guatemala."²⁵⁹ Guatemala may have found democracy, but it was still coping with intensely violent domestic politics.

G. LAND REFORM IN GUATEMALA

Under Arevalo's presidency there was a considerable amount of social progress in Guatemalan society, but the most important issue, that of land reform, had yet to be resolved. According to Schlesinger and Kinzer, annual per capita income of agricultural workers in 1950 was 87 dollars per year, 2.2 percent of landowners owned 70 percent of the nation's arable land, and Guatemala's entire industrial sector employed 23,000, less employees than the United Fruit Company.²⁶⁰ Bringing Guatemalans out of the feudal agriculture economy was one of Arbenz's primary objectives during his time in office. Schlesinger and Kinzer even highlight an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) report on Guatemala that called for reforms in many of the same areas, including energy, regulation of foreign business, tax reforms, which included "stinging criticism of the Guatemalan upper class for holding prices unnecessarily high, seeking exorbitant profits and investing them abroad."²⁶¹ The agrarian reform act, issued

²⁵⁷ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 44–45.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 123.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 124–25.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 50

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

as Decree 900, expropriated only uncultivated portions of large plantations, with complete exemptions for farms under 223 acres, farms of 223–670 acres cultivated at two-thirds or more, and any farm that was fully worked. The government issued 25 year bonds at three percent for the declared taxable worth of the land in May 1952.²⁶² For United Fruit Company, this was especially upsetting because they were in the habit of undervaluing their land to reduce their tax liability.²⁶³ As Schlesinger and Kinzer highlight, after eighteen months, the government had paid \$8,345,545 in bonds and provided nearly 100,000 families with 1.5 million acres in land; the expropriated lands also included President Arbenz's dowry of 1,200 acres from his wealthy Salvadoran wife, and land of his political allies.²⁶⁴

Problems with the reforms began almost immediately for Arbenz. Schlesinger and Kinzer argue that the reasons behind these problems included: peasants anxious for more land, peasants awaiting land that had not yet been appropriated, hostilities committed against frightened landowners, and most unfortunately Arbenz's government composed of communist leaders organizing leftist movements hoping to spark a more Marxist-Leninist style revolution.²⁶⁵ The authors argue that while Arbenz did not join any political party, he was supported by the communist party in Guatemala, but that the infiltration of the communists into government entities was minimal.²⁶⁶ The communists had no authority in "the National Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and most domestic bureaucracies other than the land reform and communications agencies."²⁶⁷ Schlesinger and Kinzer argue that there is no credible evidence that Arbenz was under foreign communist influence, that the Soviets were very cautious in their approach toward Guatemala at that time, and that Arbenz may have tolerated the communists more out of respect for the democratic process.²⁶⁸ As the authors conclude, what most

²⁶² Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 53.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 54.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 58–59

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 61.

concerned status quo elites were the access to ideas and organizational movements that the reforms of Arevalo and Arbenz had “brought to poor Indians and ladinos in rural Guatemala.”²⁶⁹

In March 1953, the land reforms seized some 209,842 acres of United Fruit Companies uncultivated land, and the government offered the company \$2.99 per acre.²⁷⁰ United Fruit Company had paid \$1.48 per acre when they purchased the land twenty years earlier, but the U.S. State Department insisted that the company be reimbursed at \$75 per acre.²⁷¹ Then in October 1953 and February 1954, Arbenz’s government expropriated two more plots of uncultivated land from the fruit company, bringing the total to 386,901 acres.²⁷² Schlesinger and Kinzer emphasize that while the State Department was negotiating with Arbenz government to mediate the dispute with the United Fruit Company, that the company was, at the same time, lobbying in the United States with elements of government to come to their aid, chiefly the heads of the CIA and State Department.²⁷³ The result would be formulation of a policy to remove Arbenz from power and replace him with someone more agreeable to U.S. interests in Guatemala, both opposed to communism, and more protective of U.S. private investments.

H. OPERATION PBSUCCESS

James F. Petras and Morris H. Morley concluded that in the 1950s, “the convergence of U.S. policy and investor interests with those of the Central American ruling classes led to a historic compromise in which successive U.S. administrations sacrificed democratic rights in exchange for capitalist economic opportunity and U.S. strategic interests.”²⁷⁴ The masterminds in Washington behind the plot to overthrow Arbenz and install Colonel Castillo Armas were the brothers John Foster Dulles, then

²⁶⁹ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 63.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 75–76.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² *Ibid.*

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 77.

²⁷⁴ Morris H. Morley and James F. Petras, “Economic Expansion, Political Crisis and U.S. Policy in Central America,” in *Revolution and Intervention in Central America* ed. by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1983).

Secretary of State, and Allen Dulles, then Director of the CIA. Foster Dulles assessed that the sitting ambassador was unqualified to oversee a coup and decided to replace him with John Peurifoy, who had been working in Greece, and was also a Democrat. Which Schlesinger and Kinzer point out, was the “more Machiavellian . . . choice: Peurifoy, as a Democrat, was a perfect fall guy for the Republican administration if the coup went awry.”²⁷⁵ Peurifoy did not speak Spanish and knew nothing of Guatemala, during his rise within the State Department, he came under Senator Joseph McCarthy’s communist accusations targeted at the State Department, managed to emerge undamaged, but thereafter always felt the need to “prove his staunch anti-communism.”²⁷⁶ He arrived in Guatemala in October 1953, received a briefing from then Foreign Minister Dr. Raul Osegueda about the situation in the country and the virtues of the reforms. At the close of the two hour brief, Peurifoy spoke for the first time, “chastising Osegueda’s government for taking over United Fruit Company land,” and inquiring if the foreign minister was aware that China had also instituted land reforms that led to communism.²⁷⁷

The ambassadors’ cables to Washington only reinforced his initial assessment that Arbenz was a communist supporter and could only be dealt with by removal from power.²⁷⁸ In a January 1954 interview, Peurifoy’s told *Time* magazine that, “Public opinion in the U.S. might force us to take some measures to prevent Guatemala from falling into the lap of international Communism . . . we cannot permit a Soviet Republic to be established between Texas and the Panama Canal.”²⁷⁹ The provocative nature of that statement almost cost Peurifoy expulsion from office, and that same month, President Eisenhower met with Guatemala’s ambassador to the United States, Guillermo Toriello. During the encounter, Toriello was taken aback by Eisenhower’s “abysmal ignorance of Guatemala,” later writing that the president “could hardly believe the exaggerated

²⁷⁵ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 132.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 134–35.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 136.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 139.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 140.

privileges which [foreign] firms have enjoyed [in Guatemala].”²⁸⁰ Schlesinger and Kinzer point out that this must have been a feign by Eisenhower as six months earlier he had already given the order to overthrow Arbenz.²⁸¹ The decision to covertly orchestrate the regime change had apparently already been decided upon.

The greatest public condemnation of Arbenz’s administration came from John Foster Dulles at the 10th Inter-American Conference of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Caracas, Venezuela, in March 1954. Dulles called upon the Rio Treaty of 1947, stating that “the domination or control of the political institutions of any American state by the international communist movement . . . would constitute a threat” to the entire hemisphere and require “appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.”²⁸² Ambassador Toriello, responded during the OAS conference to Dulles remarks, calling out specifically the U.S. efforts to block Guatemala’s national liberation and its support to the United Fruit Company, “cataloguing as ‘communism’ every manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social progress, any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive and liberal reforms.”²⁸³ Dulles won the day at the conference, the delegation passed his resolution, but even U.S. press reports concluded that “America’s heavy-handed tactics had decreased its prestige in Latin America,” and that the other Latin American diplomats were very sensitive and receptive to the words spoken by Toriello.²⁸⁴

The most fateful of decisions for Arbenz was probably his decision in the spring of 1954 to buy arms from Czechoslovakia. At the time, Arbenz felt an invasion led by Castillo Armas was imminent, and that, according to Schlesinger and Kinzer, Czechoslovakia was a “kind of last resort,” since all of the country’s usual suppliers refused to sell to Arbenz.²⁸⁵ The CIA monitored the arms shipment all the way from the

²⁸⁰ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 141.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 141.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 142.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 143–44.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 144.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 147–49.

ship's loading in Czechoslovakia, and tracked its movement to Guatemala. Apparently this was convenient for the CIA as they had already been working a staged "discovery" of Soviet marked boxes of rifles by Nicaraguan police as pretext for Castillo Armas' pending invasion of Guatemala.²⁸⁶ Washington officials determined this as sufficient cause to begin the operation, first with a failed covert attempt to derail the train carrying the arms from Puerto Barrios to Guatemala City, then with an information operation to sway public opinion in the United States, led by Foster Dulles' declarations to the press that it could signal a communist build up near the canal zone.²⁸⁷ Unfortunately, for Arbenz, the shipment contained virtually useless weaponry, including antitank guns and artillery pieces that were impractical for use in the Guatemalan environment at that time, and nonfunctional machine guns and rifles, a shipment that the *New York Times* later dubbed, "white elephants."²⁸⁸ Nick Cullather called the *Alfhem* (the name of the Czech ship) incident, a "propaganda bonanza," stating that the State Department "declared that the shipment revealed Guatemala's complicity in a Soviet plan for Communist conquest of the Americas."²⁸⁹ Cullather also highlighted the rhetoric coming from U.S. Congressmen at the time, Representative Paul Lantaff likening the event as a "signal to ride . . . if Paul Revere were living today," and House Speaker John McCormack's fiery statement that "this cargo of arms is like an atom bomb planted in the rear of our backyard."²⁹⁰

The *Alfhem* incident was the catalyst that Washington needed to initiate the operation to overthrow Arbenz, and the CIA codenamed that operation, PBSUCCESS. Before the operation could begin, Washington decided to increase pressure on Arbenz's government with a sea blockade named HARDROCK BAKER, which Cullather points out that its "blatant illegality made it a powerful weapon of intimidation" against the

²⁸⁶ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 150.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 152.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁹ Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 79.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Guatemalans.²⁹¹ Operation PBSUCCESS itself used an effective propaganda campaign of disinformation that resulted in sufficient panic in Guatemala, the army, and Arbenz himself, that he felt compelled to resign. Schlesinger and Kinzer state that members of the United States Information Agency “wrote more than 200 articles about Guatemala based on information from CIA sources, and distributed them in scores of Latin newspapers.”²⁹² The agency also distributed tens of thousands of anti-communist pamphlets, cartoons, and posters in Guatemala, and produced three propaganda movies in support of the operation.²⁹³ The authors point out that the most effective of the propaganda tools was the use of clandestine radio campaigns in Guatemala, which targeted specifically “women, soldiers, workers, and young people,” to encourage them to join the Castillo Armas’ Liberation movement.²⁹⁴

The loss of two planes conducting psychological terror operations and Castillo Armas’ troops faltering during the operation, forced Washington to make decisions on how committed the officials were to seeing the operation through. The decision to orchestrate PBSUCCESS was significant because that type of unilateral anti-communist action had been prohibited in the resolution passed at the OAS meeting that March.²⁹⁵ Rumors that the United States was behind the events unfolding in Guatemala were already being published in newspapers, and Foreign Minister Toriello had called upon Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to provide support against the planes that were attacking targets in Guatemala from Honduras and Nicaragua.²⁹⁶ Of course the United States ignored those pleas. The confusion created by the CIA operation was enough to force Arbenz to believe that he had lost control of his army and that Castillo Armas was garnering support within Guatemala. Ambassador Peurifoy filtered virtually every piece of information that went to the press at the time, and the press painted a story of Castillo

²⁹¹ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 82.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 166–68.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 166–68.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 177.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 183–84.

Armas and his liberating rebels fighting off a “Goliath-like Red Army.”²⁹⁷ Despite the apparent absurdity of this notion, Arbenz gave his resignation on June 27, 1954.

Cullather points out that in the 11 days that followed Arbenz’s resignation, “five successive juntas occupied the presidential palace, each more amenable than the last,” but that Peurifoy wanted Castillo Armas in office. Peurifoy finally persuaded an agreement at the negotiations that took place in El Salvador for a “combined *Army-liberacionista* junta.”²⁹⁸ Many of the leading communists evaded capture in the confusion that followed the coup, which ultimately led to many of the problems the United States and Castillo Armas’ government faced in the coming years.²⁹⁹ In the aftermath of the coup, a team from the State Department, aided by Castillo Armas’ junta, confiscated 150,000 official documents, but as Cullather points out, “most of what was found had only ‘local significance,’ with little relevance to ‘the elements of Soviet support and control of Communism in Guatemala’ that had been justification for the intervention.”³⁰⁰ Cullather goes further to highlight the research findings of Ronald M. Schneider’s investigation into the PBHISTORY documents regarding the coup. Cullather stated that Schneider had “found no traces of Soviet control and substantial evidence that Guatemalan Communists acted alone, without support or guidance from outside the country.”³⁰¹ Still, the State Department team put together a book for the “National Security Council (NSC), members of the Senate, and other interested officials,” containing Arbenz’s “library of Marxist literature, Chinese Communist materials on agrarian reform, pages from Mrs. Arbenz’s copy of Stalin’s biography, evidence that Arbenz had tried to purchase arms from Italy, and various letters and cables revealing a ‘strong pro-communist bias,’” all of which Cullather argues as, “sufficient to impress the NSC staff.”³⁰² Cullather also points out that the captured arms from the *Alfhem* were reported to have been “obsolete and in poor

²⁹⁷ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 186–87.

²⁹⁸ Cullather, *Secret History*, 103.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 107.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² *Ibid.*

conditions,” and that they “could be easily traced” back to their origin; however, CIA Director Allen Dulles “declined the offer” for further investigation.³⁰³

Washington focused on ensuring the roundup of communists who had fled during the coup, seizing on the opportunity to identify them as a threat if they tried to organize their return to Guatemala, and as an opportunity to smear Moscow by offering them up as asylum seekers and proof of a Soviet hand in Guatemalan politics. The idea was that Moscow would lose either way, through confirming their complicity if they accepted them or having sold them out if they refused to give the conspirators asylum.³⁰⁴ Nonetheless, what actually followed in Guatemala was a roundup of thousands of peasants who had been granted land under Arbenz’s reforms.³⁰⁵ Cullather concludes that the Guatemalan Army had an opportunity to crush Castillo Armas and his men at Chiquimula, and that had that happened, it probably would have ended the coup attempt outright, and that most Washington officials had expected it to fail.³⁰⁶ Just when they expected that Castillo Armas’ small band of liberators was going to be destroyed by the Guatemalan Army at Chiquimula, in what seemed “curious and magical” to CIA observers in Miami and Washington, Arbenz’s government collapsed.³⁰⁷ To the observers, as Cullather argues, it seemed that Arbenz had lost his nerve, when in fact, a military coup had been orchestrated to overthrow him.³⁰⁸ During the president’s brief on the operation, the misinterpretation of the circumstances led Eisenhower to react in astonishment when he heard Castillo Armas had lost “only one” of his men.³⁰⁹ Cullather concludes that this misinterpretation of the events obscures the actual “chronic lapses in security, the failure to plan beyond the operation’s first stages, the Agency’s poor understanding of the intentions of the Army, the PGT, and the government, the hopeless weakness of Castillo Arma’s troops, and the failure to make provisions for the possibility

³⁰³ Cullather, *Secret History*, 108.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 108.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 109.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 97.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 97–98.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 109.

of defeat,” that plagued operation PBSUCCESS, despite Washington championing it as a resounding success.³¹⁰

The United States received a considerable degree of backlash for its suspected role in the overthrow of Arbenz. Cullather points out that the UN Secretary General at the time, Dag Hammarskjöld, “charged that ‘the United States’ attitude was completely at variance with the [UN] Charter,’” and that British officials saw the “gloating remarks” of John Foster Dulles as evidence that PBSUCCESS was an “outside job.”³¹¹ Even more damaging was the view of the coup by Latin Americans, as it resulted in anti-American demonstrations in Havana, Santiago, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro, and propaganda for the communist cause. Cullather concluded that the Guatemalan attempt to cast off its feudal yoke became an example of the type of armed conflict that would be required to do so and ended any “illusions about peaceful, legal, and reformist methods” of social change.³¹²

Once in power, Castillo Armas ran down Guatemala’s foreign reserves from \$42 million to \$3.4 million during his first two months, and as opposition against him and his policies grew, so too did his crackdowns against that opposition, ultimately rolling back many of the freedoms that Guatemalans had come to enjoy and expect since Arevalo’s reforms in 1945.³¹³ Castillo Armas’ regime backed by Washington immediately took advantage of the opposition and labeled those groups as communist collaborators, but given the perspective of hindsight, it seems it would have been difficult for the opposition groups to have made any other choice at that point. The United States had demonstrated its position to Guatemala and the rest of the Americas. It had rejected supporting the reforms sought after by Guatemalans, and instead chose to support its economic interests in the region, and made communism out to be the existential threat within not just Guatemala, but the entirety of the Americas. The United States chose to violate its agreements to not act unilaterally to fight communism in the hemisphere, and

³¹⁰ Cullather, *Secret History*, 109.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 111.

³¹² *Ibid.*, 112–13.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 114–15.

did so in a *covert* manner that the whole world seems to have been well aware of, even at the time. Washington officials also misjudged their ability to make a client state out of Guatemala by failing to control and temper Castillo Armas' extreme rightist tendencies. Armas ultimately proved to serve his own domestic political interests first.³¹⁴

I. THE GUATEMALA–CUBA CONNECTION

In Andrew Sinclair's biography of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, he opens with the revolutionaries "autobiographical synthesis: "I was born in Argentina, I fought in Cuba, and I began to be a revolutionary in Guatemala.""³¹⁵ The Argentinian had initially set out to become a doctor, but his experiences watching a failed Indian uprising in Bolivia, combined with his journey across the continent to view its injustices, peaked his curiosity at revolutionary social reform in Latin America. Sinclair states that Guevara "seemed to feel responsible for all the world's injustices," and that he felt called to Guatemala in 1953 to observe the revolutionary land reforms being undertaken by Arbenz at the time.³¹⁶ While he was there he witnessed, and according to Sinclair, was involved in trying to organize resistance in Guatemala City to put down the U.S. intervention.³¹⁷ Regardless, Guevara left for Mexico, became fully radicalized in the Marxist-Leninist movement, and met Fidel Castro, himself in exile in Mexico, in the summer of 1955.³¹⁸ Castro wrote of Guevara's experiences in Guatemala as having inspired the man to a "profound spirit of hatred and loathing for imperialism."³¹⁹ The unfortunate thing about the use of violence, even violence legitimized by the state, is that it tends to set off a chain reaction of consequences. Prior to the invasion of Guatemala, Eisenhower had called in key members associated with the coup and told them, "I want all of you to be damn good and sure you succeed . . . When you commit the flag, you commit it to

³¹⁴ Cullather, *Secret History*, 117.

³¹⁵ Andrew Sinclair, *Che Guevara* (New York: Viking Press, 1970), 1.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7–8.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 12–13.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

win.”³²⁰ The president then stated, “I’m prepared to take any steps that are necessary to see that it succeeds, for if it succeeds, it’s the people of Guatemala throwing off the yoke of Communism. If it fails, the flag of the United States has failed.”³²¹ The operation in Guatemala, while perceived as a win for the Eisenhower administration, was not due to the overall design of the operation itself, but nonetheless provided the additional increasing returns and confirmation that Washington had an effective tool for shaping favorable regime changes in troublesome states.

J. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The 1954 coup in Guatemala resulted from the collision of U.S. economic interests in Guatemala and fears incited by the early days of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of the global economic model. Guatemala’s rising nationalism mixed with a desire for social change was interpreted by policymakers in the United States as evidence of a communist insurrection seeking entry into the Americas. Despite the intentions that lay behind the justification for orchestrating covert interventions to shape the internal politics of another state, as occurred in Guatemala in 1954, it seems that these types of interventions produced subsequent outcomes that were largely out of control of the interveners. Fear of communist encroachment in the hemisphere and domestic ties to commercial interests in Guatemala provided opportunities for a number of actors to perceive the ends as justification for the interventions, but also provided motivations for actors such as Castillo Armas and Guatemala’s elite land holding class to manipulate the threat of communism to their own individual ends.

The writings of Polanyi, in his work *The Great Transformation*, offer another perspective on the history of the political economy that also seems applicable to the forces that shaped global policy during the Cold War. Rather than seeing the struggle between each side as either a purely capitalistic or communistic form of economy that Adam Smith and Karl Marx may have envisioned, Polanyi argued that the reality of the

³²⁰ Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 170.

³²¹ Ibid.

political economy is more of a “double movement: the extension of the market organization in respect to genuine commodities accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones.”³²² What Polanyi assessed was that both politics and the economy are the outcomes of the rebalancing of social preferences, and that the forces that lay behind capitalistic and communistic outcomes in their purest senses would probably lead to the destruction of society if it were not for that “double-movement” and the persistent “counter-moves” that occur within society to balance out social preferences with societal needs. What was going on domestically in Guatemala was arguably less about capitalism or communism, and more akin to Polanyi’s “double-movement.” The rising economic nationalism that Washington saw as a threat was actually certain factions within Guatemalan society attempting to balance societal needs that had already occurred in Europe and the United States through social movements during the Industrial Revolutions. Through a violent, though democratic movement, Guatemala was trying to break from its structural legacy of colonialism. The problem presented by the external intervention conducted by the United States is that it inadvertently interrupted this natural domestic movement for social reform, perhaps even tilting it in the direction it was already headed. Still, it does appear that domestic actors within Guatemala were using the Cold War rhetoric to manipulate Washington’s response to meet their own domestic political objectives. Regardless, the operation seemed to work flawlessly for Washington, and they had a twice proven tool for exerting plausibly deniable coercive pressure to shape domestic politics within other countries.

The perception of success in Iran and Guatemala reaffirmed Washington’s policy stance during the early years of the Cold War, and confirmed its most cost effective manner of dealing with regime’s with communist tendencies. The behavioral lock-in appears confirmed with the Guatemala intervention’s hailed success. The evidence, however, suggests that the operation did not end in disaster save only for several key moments of luck, particularly in regard to Armas’ small force that by all rights should have been defeated by the Guatemalan army at Chiquimula. Nonetheless, the operation

³²² Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 79.

worked, and provided the increasing returns that all but ensured that Washington would allow itself to be carried into the Bay of Pigs debacle as the U.S. response to the Cuban Revolution. The threat of communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere provided a strong ideological motivation and justification for restructuring Guatemalan domestic politics to conform to the Eisenhower administration's interpretation of American exceptionalism. Yet, despite being immediately successful in removing Arbenz, Guatemala has since traced a long history of domestic instability. While Guatemala's instability cannot be entirely accounted for due to the 1954 intervention, defeating communism at any cost eroded U.S. legitimacy in the Western Hemisphere and polarized domestic politics in the region. The escalation of an adversarial environment also made applying the communist label to opposition groups politically salient, as it drew the attention of U.S. power and resources, and conversely Soviet power and resources. Hindsight, provides the perspective required to recognize that the benefits of the interventionist policies in Iran and Guatemala fail to outweigh their costs. The perception of success in these interventions made the method seem to be the appropriate solution for the problems that emerged in Cuba in 1959.

The U.S. reaction to the Cuban Revolution and the timing of the decision to remove Castro from power is critical to understanding the failure at the Bay of Pigs. In the following chapter, I argue that the U.S. reaction to the Cuban Revolution, Castro's intolerable anti-American rhetoric, and flirtations with the Soviet Union convinced the Eisenhower administration that the proven method of intervention would deal with Fidel Castro and the communist threat to Cuba as it had with Mosaddegh and Arbenz. The perceived successes in Iran and Guatemala convinced the incoming Kennedy administration that the method would work. Guatemala built on the pattern of increasing returns established from success in Iran and fueled the U.S. justification to orchestrate a similar, though larger, version of operation PBSUCCESS in Cuba, and its public failure did significant damage to U.S. legitimacy in the Western Hemisphere.

IV. CUBA AND THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION

A. INTRODUCTION

The interventions in Iran and Guatemala followed a path carved by the institutional constructs of early policy development during the Cold War and guided planners decisions in planning the intervention in Cuba in April 1961. While the justifications for these interventions are multifaceted, the locus of motivation centered on U.S. perceptions of communist penetration into these states' domestic politics. Time provides perspective on the exaggerated nature of that penetration and a better understanding of the social forces at work that underlay the perceived threat. Analysis of the intervention is significant because the U.S. response to the Cuban Revolution marks a critical juncture, not only for U.S.-Cuban relations, but hemispherical interstate relations as a whole during the Cold War. Erosion of U.S. hemispheric legitimacy and the degradation of U.S.-Latin American relations followed for decades and continues to persist today. We develop laws, rules, and policies—our institutions—as a way to shape human behavior and guide our social interactions down a path of order, progress, in an attempt to provide domestic political stability. Yet there exist circumstances where the paths carved by those institutions yield unintended, and often destabilizing consequences. In this section, I argue that the path carved by Cold War institutional constructs mutated into a pathological course that contributed to the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs and ultimately escalated U.S.-Soviet tensions to the nuclear standoff that followed. Cold War institutional constructs, in many ways driven by U.S. and Soviet reactions to the Cuban Revolution, and the perceived successes of U.S. interventions in Iran and Guatemala, provided a structural apparatus that guided individual policy makers—U.S., Cuban, and Soviet—in their actions that strained U.S. hemispherical relations for decades. The events leading up to the Bay of Pigs failure provides some of the most compelling evidence of institutional pathology because it can be seen from the perspectives of Washington and Cuba, each succumbing to their own institutionally carved paths that drove the impetus for the intervention, ultimately resulting in failure for the United States and Cuba in the Soviet sphere of influence.

B. THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

In 1956, Fidel Castro landed in Cuba to lead a revolution to overthrow Fulgencio Batista's regime, and just three years later, Castro led his force of 9,000 guerillas into Havana, seizing power from Batista. Batista himself had come to power in a 1952 military coup, and had enjoyed considerable, though waning, support from Washington, in spite of the repressive nature of his regime. During the course of the events that unfolded after the revolution, it became increasingly clear to the Eisenhower administration that Castro's regime could not be tolerated, and thus Washington organized a plan to discredit Castro and remove him from power. Though the administration initially found itself open to the transition to Castro, Washington officials soon became "full of trepidation about the shape of things to come" in Cuba.³²³ But what actually made Castro unacceptable as a potential leader of Cuba? The factors that lay behind the Eisenhower administration's ultimate conclusion that Castro was unacceptable and his removal was necessary to U.S. interests helps to understand the path toward the failed invasion.³²⁴ The revolution's swift show trials and executions, Castro's persistent anti-American rhetoric, his land reforms and expropriations of private U.S. investments, and the threat to vital interests certainly contributed to the decision to remove Castro from power. Nevertheless, what seemed to be intolerable for the United States was Castro's reckless, and seemingly naïve, flirtations with communism that directly challenged and threatened to unhinge vital strategic economic interests throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Framing the decision to remove Castro from power within the context of global events surrounding and coinciding with the Cuban Revolution highlights the island's significance to the Eisenhower administration. Much of the literature regarding the period centers on the Eisenhower administrations' escalation of anti-communist policies and the

³²³ William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 9–10.

³²⁴ "Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation: Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1959-January 1961, vol. 3," The National Security Archive, Accessed January 30, 2016. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB353/bop-vol3.pdf>.

interventionist role the United States assumed to secure its economic interests throughout the Americas. Stephen Rabe concludes that the administration “wanted Latin Americans to support the United States in the Cold War, adopt free trade and investment principles, and oppose communism.”³²⁵ Yet, Rabe acknowledges that Eisenhower personally considered the U.S. assault on Castro as “a policy ‘approximating gangsterism.’”³²⁶ More than communism, Washington officials feared the charismatic power of an individual who knew how to stoke the social and economic frustrations of the masses in Cuba, calling for radical reform in the name of promoting progress in Cuba that also produced a new narrative that directly threatened the economic system of dependency between the United States and Latin America. Through examining the *Foreign Relations of the United State* (FRUS) documents for the period, one realizes that Washington officials could not voice that agenda publicly, thus strengthening U.S. anti-communist rhetoric, and feeding Castro’s domestic political support.

The increase in movements of economic nationalism occurred throughout the Americas during the period immediately following World War II, and Cuba was no exception. Washington officials considered these reformist movements and communist connections to be a threat to the long-term economic interests of both Latin America and the United States, but they also often directly threatened U.S. private interests abroad. James Siekmeier concluded that the overall goals of these reformist movements in Latin America were to eliminate the persistent feudal agriculture system, integrate indigenous peoples into society, reduce the oligarchical stronghold, increase the middle class, and promote general economic diversification.³²⁷ Washington, however, saw economic nationalism as a threat not only to existing U.S. business interests, but that it also endangered the ability for foreign capital to enter the region, potentially leading to stagnation, and also endangering long-term economic growth in the region.³²⁸ Indeed,

³²⁵ Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 174.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 175.

³²⁷ James F. Siekmeier, *Aid, Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States 1945–1961* (Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 159.

³²⁸ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 162.

Castro's agrarian reform plans, and particularly the expropriation of U.S. investments in the sugar industry, appear to have eliminated the chance for warm relations between Castro and Washington.³²⁹ On the contrary, William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh have proposed that Washington was less troubled by the agrarian land reforms and lack of financial compensation for expropriated properties than the signaling of Castro's radical new direction for Cuba.³³⁰ Additionally, as Kate Doyle argues, the revitalization of the left in Mexico in response to the Cuban Revolution weighed heavily on the minds of Washington officials at the time, and this fixation on the spread of communism throughout the hemisphere is what U.S. policymakers feared most.³³¹ Analysis of diplomatic correspondence during the period suggests that expropriation without adequate compensation of privately held U.S. interests combined with Castro's persistent and growing anti-American rhetoric and Soviet flirtations antagonized Washington to the point of intervening. In hindsight, it appears that this path was largely carved by both U.S. and Cuban perceptions regarding U.S. interventionism in response to rising movements of economic nationalism. The institutional pathology that emerged not only influenced U.S. actors, but also the Cuban response to those actions.

C. U.S. AND CUBAN INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES CONVERGE

During the first months of 1959, events were unfolding rapidly in Cuba, and Washington appeared to be reacting on the best information that it had at the time regarding Castro's 26th of July revolutionary movement. In a memorandum to the president dated January 7, 1959, secretary of state John Foster Dulles summarized the initial aftermath of the revolutionary movement led by Castro, stating that order had been restored and Dr. Manuel Urrutia Lleó had been appointed as the provisional president of

³²⁹ LeoGrande and Kornbluh, *Back Channel*, 22–23.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*

³³¹ Kate Doyle, "After the Revolution: Lazaro Cardenas and the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional," The National Security Archive, accessed January 31, 2016. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB124/>.

Cuba.³³² In the memorandum Dulles expressed his belief that the new government would maintain order and meet Cuba's international commitments, and that the new government appeared to be "free from communist taint" and would pursue friendly relations with United States.³³³ Due to the perception that the U.S. ambassador in Cuba may have recommended to Batista to flee the country—though apparently untrue—President Eisenhower suggested that a change of ambassadors would be necessary to promote friendly relations between the two countries.³³⁴ During Castro's victory speech given to a crowd of some 40,000 Cubans, he declared that the revolution belonged to the people of Cuba, and that they would now have "peace without dictatorship, without crime, or censorship."³³⁵ He also expressed that he would accept no ministerial position, that the greatest threat to the revolution were self-interested revolutionaries, and that there was no danger of dictatorship since the government had the support of all Cubans.³³⁶ Washington remained concerned that Castro's intentions were more than he was stating in his speeches, and in a White House special staff note that gave background information on Castro, dated January 13, 1959, he was described as having a "predilection for violence, relentlessness, and direct independent action to attain his ends," but also that he was not believed to have been a communist-sympathizer.³³⁷

Perhaps one of the most radical and internationally condemned initial actions of the new regime were the summary tribunals that tried members of the Batista regime for

³³² Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, January 7, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 217. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d217>.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, January 8, 1959; Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between the President and the Secretary of State, January 9, 1959; and Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba, January 9, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 218, 219, and 221. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/ch5>.

³³⁵ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 220. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d220>.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ White House Special Staff Note, January 13, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 224. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d224>.

war crimes. These trials took place in a soccer stadium in front of crowds of thousands. They sentenced as many as 550 to death after trials lasting only a few weeks.³³⁸ Some figures put the Batista regime's reign of terror as high as 20,000 Cubans killed between 1956 and 1958.³³⁹ For this reason, many of the revolution's supporters, who happened to also have been communists, were at least tolerant of the trials. The fact that the trials and executions were also broadcast on television certainly must have amplified the sentiments of both sides. A memorandum from the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs to Dulles stated that the executions were seen unfavorably across Latin America, and that most of the support in favor of them came from elements of the communist aligned press.³⁴⁰ The growing concern for the potential communist exploitation of the anti-American sentiments of the revolution were expressed in a letter from the consul at Santiago de Cuba to the deputy director of the office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs. In the letter, Park F. Wollam expressed his concerns that the United States was taking on an unwarranted amount of blame for atrocities committed by the Batista regime that was hidden from the Cuban people under that regime's censorship.³⁴¹

In a January 20, 1959 meeting between the counselor of the embassy in Cuba and the minister of state for Cuba, the Cubans charged three complaints against the U.S. mission in Cuba. These objections included Ambassador Smith's relationship with Batista, the American press, and U.S. military missions in Cuba, but the Cuban diplomat stated his government's pleasure with the appointment of Philip Bonsal to ambassador, a

³³⁸ Thomas C. Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution* (Westport: Praeger, 2001), 26.

³³⁹ Hugh Thomas, "The Origins of the Cuban Revolution," in *The World Today* 19 (10) (1963). Royal Institute of International Affairs: 448. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40393452>.

³⁴⁰ Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Secretary of State, January 19, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba doc. 232 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002). Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d232>.

³⁴¹ Letter from the Consul at Santiago de Cuba to the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, January 19, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 234. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d234>.

career officer fluent in Spanish who had recently been the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia.³⁴² The Cuban response to the international condemnation of the trials was an invitation extended to Congressmen Adam Clayton Powell and Charles O. Porter to witness the revolution's war crimes trials firsthand, which they accepted and attended a rally of some 500,000 Cubans on January 21, 1959, and listened to a speech given by Castro for nearly five hours. During the speech Castro called on the crowd for a show of solidarity and approval of the executions of Batista's "assassins" to which the crowd responded with raised hands and a "vengeful roar."³⁴³ Castro then challenged the condemnations by contrasting the scale of the trials with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the deaths justified in the name of peace for those causes.³⁴⁴ Castro's rhetoric resonated domestically with the grievances held by many Cubans, and aided his consolidation of power, but it brought concern to Washington.

The influence of communism weighed most heavily on the minds of Washington officials, yet they seemed to have been consistently assured that Castro was not leading Cuba toward communism. A January 27, 1959, letter the U.S. ambassador in Costa Rica summarizes a conversation with the former president of Costa Rica, Jose Figueres Ferrer, in which they discussed the future of Cuba under Castro. Figueres expressed his opinion that Cuba was likely to go in the direction of another Latin American dictatorship, but not in the direction of communism.³⁴⁵ The ambassador then said to Figueres that he felt that, since the Cuban Revolution was successful in spite of the arms given to the Batista regime, the notion that dictators had been propped up by arms from the United States no longer held true, and that it was inaction on the part of the people that kept dictators in

³⁴² Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, January 20, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 237. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d237>.

³⁴³ Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 238. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d238>.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Letter from the Ambassador in Costa Rica to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, January 27, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 242. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d242>.

power.³⁴⁶ The ambassador stated that the reason for furnishing arms to dictators was to “avoid a vacuum into which the Iron Curtain countries might move.”³⁴⁷ The vacuum in Cuba that concerned both the ambassador and Figueres was one that existed in the labor field, and at the time, was being exploited by the communists.³⁴⁸ Apparently, up until that time, Castro’s 26th of July movement had remained somewhat ignorant of communist intentions in Cuba.³⁴⁹

Despite Castro’s boisterous rhetoric and frequent public speeches, he did retreat temporarily from the public view in late January after a visit to Venezuela. During that visit he had called for solidarity among Latin Americans, particularly among the Caribbean nations, and continued his anti-American speeches, stating that there was a campaign within the monopolistic American news corps to slander him and the revolution.³⁵⁰ What concerned Washington was the “wild acclaim” that he received during his visit to Venezuela.³⁵¹ Additionally, alarming to Washington officials were assessments given by the Cuban exile leader, Dr. Carlos Piad in a conversation with the counselor for the American Embassy in Cuba Daniel Braddock, stated that the communists in Cuba were increasing their activity by selling communist “bonds” in the capital.³⁵² Even more disturbing to him were the anti-American statements and bias of Castro, yet even Piad admitted that he felt that Castro was falling victim to poor intelligence given to him by the anti-American president of the Cuban national bank a

³⁴⁶ Letter from the Ambassador in Costa Rica to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, January 27, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 242. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d242>.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 243. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d243>.

³⁵¹ Editorial Note, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba, doc. 243.

³⁵² Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chargé in Cuba and Carlos Piad, February 4, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 247. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d247>.

registered agent of the 26th of July movement in the United States.³⁵³ Piad felt that Castro would benefit from a visit to the United States.³⁵⁴ Castro continued his anti-American rhetoric in a speech given at Guantanamo on February 3, 1959, accusing U.S. ambassadors of being responsible agents for “Cuba’s perennial economic troubles.”³⁵⁵ Braddock, however, believed that Castro was using the anti-American rhetoric to trump up his domestic support from the “uniformed masses,” and that a cordial visit to the United States might help “dispel much of his suspicion and prejudice” toward the United States.³⁵⁶

Washington’s concerns for Castro’s lack of attention given to the domestic situation is expressed in a briefing memorandum by the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs special assistant, dated February 6, 1959, which emphasized that in the six weeks since Batista’s absence, little progress toward stabilizing and organizing a new government had been made, and that Castro appeared preoccupied with giving triumphant victory speeches and consolidating government positions with members of the 26th of July movement than being accessible to construct a functioning government with President Urrutia.³⁵⁷ Similar concerns regarding the communist Ernesto “Che” Guevara and his plans to spread the revolution to Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay, combined with the acknowledgement that the technically illegal Communist Party was now operating in the open in Cuba.³⁵⁸ Despite these concerns, U.S. objectives in Cuba focused on “strengthening the moderating and stabilizing influences on Castro

³⁵³ Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chargé in Cuba and Carlos Piad, February 4, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 247. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d247>.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, February 5, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 248. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d248>.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant, February 6, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 249. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d249>.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

and the Cuban government,” with the understanding that this would have to be approached delicately to successfully negotiate the atmosphere of anti-Americanism developing in Cuba.³⁵⁹

On February 14, 1959, the U.S. embassy in Cuba telegraphed the Department of State that the prime minister of Cuba had resigned and that Castro would assume the role of prime minister with increased power to “dictate policy of government” and “dispatch administrative orders.”³⁶⁰ Castro then became Prime Minister of Cuba two days later embassy cables reported that, despite Castro’s resentment of the United States, given time to cool off a “fully friendly relationship” could still be established between the two governments.³⁶¹ The office of Mexican and Caribbean affairs assessment of the Cuban political economic environment at the time concluded that with tens of thousands of Cubans out of work, thousands accustomed to guerilla warfare, and many thousands more having gone without university for at least the last four years, that the challenges facing the future leader of Cuba were significant, and potentially dangerous.³⁶² Additionally, officials saw three groups emerging as contenders for the future leadership of Cuba. A radical communist group led by Raul Castro and “Che” Guevara, Castro’s more moderate revolutionary elements, and the mature moderates and government technicians that would seek to work for Cuba’s advantage in its future relationship with the United States.³⁶³ The report concluded that the United States should support the mature moderates and

³⁵⁹ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant, February 6, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 249. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d249>.

³⁶⁰ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, February 14, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 251. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d251>.

³⁶¹ Despatch from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, February 18, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 253. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d253>.

³⁶² Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Mexican and Caribbean Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, February 19, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 254. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d254>.

³⁶³ Ibid.

attempt to nudge Castro toward the moderates and isolate the more radical elements, but that publicly the United States should not appear too helpful to Castro, particularly financially, in light of his excessive anti-American rhetoric for fear of how other more pro-American countries might react to such assistance.³⁶⁴

These cautions came about at the same time as the realization that an estimated \$60 million in state coffers had been emptied by the fleeing Batista regime which seriously threatened the stability of the Cuban peso.³⁶⁵ Weighing heavily on the minds of Washington officials was the potential for significant social unrest if the Cuban peso were to seriously devalue, which could lead to violence and put at stake the \$800 million in U.S. private investments on the island.³⁶⁶ Castro was still an enigma at this point, and officials could not tell if he was supportive of democracy, communism, or dictatorship, and his actions did not appear to be leading the country in a direction of order and stability. By March 9, 1959, Castro had accepted an invitation from the American Society of Newspaper Editors to visit the United States in April 1959, and Ambassador Bonsal was committed to encouraging the best possible relations between the United States and Cuba.³⁶⁷

Just five weeks after Castro had been appointed to prime minister, during the 400th meeting of the National Security Council on March 26, 1959, Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, expressed his concerns over Castro's gravitation toward dictatorial rule founded in demagoguery, and the permissive environment for communist infiltration that

³⁶⁴ Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Mexican and Caribbean Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, February 19, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 254. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d254>.

³⁶⁵ Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, February 10, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 255. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d255>.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 5, 1959; and Despatch from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 9, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), docs. 258, 259. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d258>.

was developing in Cuba.³⁶⁸ The primary subject of discussion during this meeting concerned how Washington would handle Castro's planned visit to the United States. Officials were particularly agitated by Castro's inflammatory rhetoric that U.S. imperialism was the biggest threat to Cubans, and they discussed options of denying a visa for his visit, or whether economic pressures placed on the Cuban sugar industry might persuade Castro to tone down his anti-imperialist language.³⁶⁹ President Eisenhower, however, expressed concerns that such a move would likely meet with Soviet offers to purchase Cuban sugar.³⁷⁰ The meeting concluded with remarks from the president that the "slow-growing movement against Castro in Cuba" should not be discouraged from growing in anyway.³⁷¹ Castro's visit to the United States had been scheduled for a two week period at the same time as a leave of absence planned for the president, so it was arranged that Castro would meet with Vice President Richard Nixon during his tour instead.³⁷²

Prior to Castro's visit, in a memorandum from the president of the Cuban national bank, the economic troubles that Cuba faced were laid out in planned discussion points that could be addressed during the prime minister's visit. The points of discussion included: (1) a balance of payments program to alleviate unemployment; (2) credit to finance projects; (3) a long-term loan for the Agriculture and Industrial development banks; and (4) loans for sanitation and agricultural productivity projects.³⁷³ In preparation for Castro's visit to the United States, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

³⁶⁸ Memorandum of Discussion at the 400th Meeting of the National Security Council, March 26, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 266. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d266>.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Memorandum of a Conversation at the Department of State, April 4, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 271. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d271>.

³⁷³ Memorandum from the President of the Cuban National Bank to the Embassy in Cuba, April 7, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 272. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d272>.

distributed an internal memorandum emphasizing that official responses to Castro's statements would need to be "reasoned, moderate, and should show . . . comprehension and understanding of the Cuban revolution, but they should also be firmly in defense of what we consider to be right."³⁷⁴ During the same week, the U.S. Embassy in Cuba also reported that significant numbers of anti-Batista, yet pro-revolutionary, Cubans had approached the embassy stating that they were concerned with the communist penetration of government and unfriendly attitude of Castro toward the United States, and they were equally concerned with the unsound handling of the economy which was reaching critical levels.³⁷⁵ These Cubans feared that economic assistance given to Castro's regime while making such bold anti-American statements would make the United States "lose further prestige internationally."³⁷⁶ Apparently in Washington, officials remained unaware that Castro would be requesting any assistance, but they had not made a determination either way nor had they prepared any position papers on the topic.³⁷⁷

In a pre-trip meeting held between Ambassador Bonsal and Castro, the prime minister made several noteworthy comments that Bonsal cabled back to the United States. First was Castro's annoyance with what he felt were misleading reports in the U.S. media, stating that the media in the United States had the "freedom to lie."³⁷⁸ Second, Bonsal noted that Castro seemed cynical about the "goodness of man," and third, Castro felt that the success of U.S. democracy was attributed more to "education of the

³⁷⁴ Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs' Staff Assistant to Certain Officers in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, April 8, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 273. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d273>.

³⁷⁵ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, April 9, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 274. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d274>.

³⁷⁶ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, April 9, 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba, doc. 274.

³⁷⁷ Memorandum from the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, April 10, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 275. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d275>.

³⁷⁸ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, April 14, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 276. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d276>.

people rather than U.S. political forms.”³⁷⁹ Castro’s wide popularity, communist efforts to consolidate their positions in government, and the sensitivity of anti-American sentiment in Cuba concerned Bonsal in his reports, yet he also noted a growing anti-Castro and certainly anti-communist sentiment, which he called the “bourgeois mentality.”³⁸⁰ Bonsal felt that any U.S. condemnation of Castro would be taken by the majority of Cubans as an assault on the Cuban revolution itself.³⁸¹ The ambassador concluded that the United States “should give the Cubans themselves as much opportunity as possible to straighten themselves and Castro out before unlimbering our artillery against Castro.”³⁸²

The growth of the communist movement in Cuba was expressed in a report to the State Department in a lengthy dispatch from the embassy on the April 14, 1959. The report highlights the degree of infiltration within the Cuban armed forces, government, labor movement, media, and cultural realm, and the reasons for its success.³⁸³ By not supporting the Batista regime during the revolution, the party earned the right to exist in public again and were ready and organized to move when the opportunity arose.³⁸⁴ Castro’s radical reform programs and anti-Americanism also met with the party’s overall objectives.³⁸⁵ The report recommended that the United States remain openly supportive of Castro and the revolution, but to also promote an “unyielding attitude toward communism,” since the objective of the communists was to “drive a wedge between the revolution and the United States.”³⁸⁶ Despite the doubts that the assistant secretary of

³⁷⁹ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, April 14, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 276. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d276>.

³⁸⁰ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, April 14, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 277. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d277>.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*

³⁸² *Ibid.*

³⁸³ Despatch from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, April 14, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 278. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d278>.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

state for inter-American affairs, Roy Rubottom, had for both the “character and motivation of Prime Minister Castro,” he did agree with the embassy’s conclusion that the United States should hear Castro out and attempt to guide him away from leading his country into a “position of nationalistic neutralism.”³⁸⁷ As for U.S. economic assistance, it was suggested that such loans be dependent on a satisfactory stabilization agreement arranged through the International Monetary Fund (IMF).³⁸⁸

The Department of State concluded that Castro’s visit to the United States was contrived, and that Castro had been on his best behavior, closely advised by his accompanying ministers.³⁸⁹ The Department of State’s understanding of the post trip situation with Cuba was that Castro had allayed the criticism against him in the general press and public, that he had not made a strong enough declaration of anti-communism, and that his land reform plans may have been a threat to private U.S. interests in Cuba, including the \$85 million U.S. government owned nickel plant in Nicaro.³⁹⁰ The significance of this nickel mine came up later in January 1960 during the decision to initiate active covert action against Cuba, and President Eisenhower felt the nickel deposits to perhaps be sufficient enough reason to possibly blockade Cuban nickel from

³⁸⁷ Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State, April 15, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 280. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d280>.

³⁸⁸ Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 281. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d281>.

³⁸⁹ Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, April 23, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 292. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d292>.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.; Peter Ostendorp, “Nickel: Hidden in Plain Site,” Dartmouth Toxic Metals: Superfund Research Program, accessed February 27, 2016. <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~toxmetal/toxic-metals/more-metals/nickel-history.html>. Ostendorp explains: “Nickel was used as a strengthening agent in many of these alloys. Similar needs for stress and temperature resistance prompted the use of nickel-containing alloys in the burgeoning space race. Rocket engines have similar engineering demands as jet engines due to the high temperature and pressure of exhaust gases, and they also must endure extreme vibration caused by the combustion of rocket fuels. The early space industry used nickel in conjunction with other high-strength materials like titanium to create new classes of superalloys capable of withstanding the turbulence of space flight.”

reaching the Soviet Union.³⁹¹ The department also concluded that Castro was more concerned with the roaring approval of a crowd than following democratic rule of law.³⁹² Despite these indicators, the department still considered Castro an enigma, but a potentially dangerous enigma, and that his trip had likely given him “knowledge of American public reaction which may make him a more difficult man to deal with on his return to Cuba.”³⁹³

D. CASTRO’S LAND REFORMS

Following Castro’s visit to the United States, a summary of the situation in Cuba was transmitted to the assistant secretary of state on April 24, 1959. The report concluded that a stark division between the impoverished masses, who wildly supported Castro, and the propertied elite class who had a growing concern for the “mushrooming of communism” within the country.³⁹⁴ The Communist Party in Cuba was the only organized political party at the time, and it was taking advantage of this rift and would continue to exploit it to the party’s advantage in the months to come.³⁹⁵ The report concluded that it was necessary to prepare acceptable alternatives for either Castro’s

³⁹¹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 432nd Meeting of the National Security Council, January 14, 1960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 423. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d423>: “Mr. Langborne Williams had worked out a deal with the Cuban Government whereby a small amount of nickel ore could be shipped out of Cuba without payment of the 25 per cent tax. Mr. Gray said this deal had been possible because of a decision that the material exported was a concentrate, not an ore. He added that he had been shown figures indicating that the known reserves in Cuba of nickel were greater than the total reserves of the Free World producing countries. Mr. Dulles said that while Cuban nickel deposits were rich, he questioned the conclusion presented by Mr. Gray pending further study. The President said he had been told during World War II that Canada was our only reliable source of nickel. Mr. Dulles said there were some reports that the USSR was interested in buying Cuban nickel. It was estimated that Soviet production met the nickel needs of the Soviet Union but not the needs of the entire Bloc. The Soviet Five Year Plan, which provided for doubling nickel production, showed that the USSR felt the need of increasing nickel production. The Sino-Soviet Bloc as a whole was short of nickel. The President said it might be necessary to blockade Cuba yet.”

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Memorandum of Discussion at the 432nd Meeting of the National Security Council, January 14, 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba, doc. 423.

³⁹⁴ Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, April 24, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 295. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d295>.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

assassination, Castro endangering vital U.S. interests, or a general degeneration of the situation in Cuba.³⁹⁶ Just a few weeks after Castro's return to Cuba, on May 17, 1959, the Cuban Cabinet "promulgated" the controversial Agrarian Reform Law.³⁹⁷

The new law expropriated land that exceeded certain limits, and within the sugar industry, required that plantations must be owned and registered to Cuban shareholders.³⁹⁸ It also created cooperative farms run by the newly formed Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), which also distributed 67 acres to individuals, and limited future land purchase to Cubans only.³⁹⁹ Ambassador Bonsal pointed out that "Che" Guevara particularly desired the land reform program, which was opposed by the minister of agriculture, Sori Marin, and that the U.S. could expect that the communists would try to infiltrate INRA.⁴⁰⁰ Bonsal also pointed out that Cuban and American sugar industry's felt that these reforms would seriously disrupt the Cuban economy, but also that "several other" Cuban and American sources felt the program could be beneficial in the long-term, and at least could withstand the transition with the seven million tons available to harvest.⁴⁰¹ Nonetheless, the reform initiated a firestorm of debate from both sides of the issue. Particularly debated was whether to extend the Sugar Act that was due to expire on January 1, 1961. Traditionally, the act was extended a year prior to expiration since the sugar crop cycle is 18 months, but Congressional debates for the Sugar Act were usually not heard during presidential election years.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁶ Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs' Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, April 24, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 295. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d295>.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 306. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d306>.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, May 19, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 307. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d307>.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Memorandum of a Conversation, June 1, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 313. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d313>.

The State department desired to postpone the decision until the following year, pending developments with the land reforms that could threaten Cuba's ability to meet its quota of U.S. sugar consumers.⁴⁰³ The assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, Thomas Mann, argued that he could not support a bill that "would assure Cuba 70% of all U.S. sugar imports for a period of years at a time when \$800 million of U.S. investments in Cuba are threatened."⁴⁰⁴ Mann also argued that the United States, "[had] investments totaling \$9 billion in Latin America, and every country in the hemisphere [was] watching to see what U.S. reaction to Cuba's expropriation will be."⁴⁰⁵ To answer these fears, Castro sent a cablegram to the Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Benson that Cuba was prepared to "sell the United States of America 8 million tons of sugar at four cents per pound in 1961" and that it would not be necessary to "liberate" U.S. domestic production.⁴⁰⁶ This seems to have done little to quell Washington's fears of the potential damage that Castro's anti-American rhetoric and near hysterical popular support could do to the economic relationship between Latin America and the United States.

On July 1, 1959, the chief of the Cuban air force, defected and fled to the United States in a small boat with his wife, brother, and another officer, trying to escape what he described as a purge of anti-communist officers.⁴⁰⁷ U.S. officials felt Diaz Lanz gave a unique glimpse into the inner workings of Castro's regimes, and most troublingly, the spread of communists within the armed forces.⁴⁰⁸ The United States used this opportunity to press for the Organization of American States (OAS) to convene and pressure Castro

⁴⁰³ Memorandum of a Conversation, June 1, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 313. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d313>.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 316. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d316>.

⁴⁰⁷ Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 327. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d327>.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

on his fascinations to launch further revolutionary expeditions in the Caribbean.⁴⁰⁹ The problem was that it could easily be made to seem that the United States was merely using Diaz Lanz to discredit Castro and intervene in Cuba.⁴¹⁰ CIA Director Allen Dulles was particularly concerned with Cuban efforts to launch attacks against the Dominican Republic, perhaps through Haiti, and that the groups preparing to launch these attacks were “either communist-led or communist-infiltrated.”⁴¹¹ Coinciding with these events, Diaz Lanz appeared before the U.S. Senate Committee, inciting a furiously anti-American speech by Castro, proclaiming the imperative need for the agrarian reforms, the hypocrisy of the OAS calling a meeting against him [Castro] and not against Batista, and stating that no country has the right to interfere in Cuba’s internal affairs.⁴¹²

On July 17th, 1959, Castro resigned, brutally denounced President Urrutia leading to his resignation as well, and then, in less than 24 hours, Castro resumed the position of prime minister.⁴¹³ Bonsal pointed out at this time that despite taking the position of non-persecution of communists, Castro had taken on an “almost pathological resentment at any implications of communism in government, which he referred to repeatedly as efforts to ‘blackmail’ him and as infamous calumny.”⁴¹⁴ For the next month and a half, the relationship between Castro and the United States became increasingly distrustful of one another until a September 3, 1959 dinner between Castro and Bonsal, in which Castro interestingly asserted that Bonsal was being “unduly pessimistic about the state of our

⁴⁰⁹ Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 327. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d327>.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council, July 9, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 331. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d331>.

⁴¹² Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 13, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 332. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d332>.

⁴¹³ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 18, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 339. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d339>.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

[U.S.-Cuban] relations.”⁴¹⁵ The discussion that night between Bonsal and Castro illustrates the apparent naiveté of Castro as he seemed completely taken aback by how seriously the United States took his permissive stance on communism, lack of fair compensation for the expropriated U.S. property, and the revolutionary expeditions in the Caribbean.⁴¹⁶ Castro and his foreign minister, Raul Roa, had urged Bonsal that the United States owed Latin America aid to the scale that Africa and Asia had received after World War II.⁴¹⁷ LeoGrande and Kornbluh concluded that at this point, it was too late to mend relations between Washington and Havana, and that the anti-American rhetoric had taken an irreversible toll on the domestic political front in the United States.⁴¹⁸ These authors point out that on October 16, 1959, a Department of State official mistakenly revealed that the United States had urged Great Britain not to deliver jet aircraft that were purchased during Batista’s regime but still awaiting delivery, which once again infuriated Castro.⁴¹⁹ Apparently, this was a familiar scheme used by Allen Dulles in an attempt to push Castro into purchasing arms from the Soviet Union, as it had worked in the CIA plot to overthrow President Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954, when that president was forced to purchase arms from Czechoslovakia when the United States would not sell to his regime.⁴²⁰ Schemes such as these are telling, in that the justification for intervention was built on attempting to create the justifiable conditions for initiating the interventions by the institutions that would be conducting them.

⁴¹⁵ Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, September 4, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 359. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d359>.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ LeoGrande and Kornbluh, *Back Channel*, 26–27.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., 27.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

E. THE DECISION TO REMOVE CASTRO

The January 14, 1960 minutes of the discussion at the 432nd meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) sums up the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations.⁴²¹ The assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, Roy Rubottom, explained that “the period from January to March [1959] might be characterized as the honeymoon period of the Castro Government. In April a downward trend in U.S.-Cuban relations had been evident, partly because of the preparation by Cuba of filibustering expeditions against the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama.”⁴²² He went on to say that, “In June we had reached the decision that it was not possible to achieve our objectives with Castro in power and had agreed to undertake the program referred to by Mr. Merchant.”⁴²³ Livingston Merchant was the undersecretary of state for political affairs, and the plan he referred to was one that would accelerate opposition in Cuba to bring about change in the Cuban Government, one more favorable to U.S. interests, and under best circumstances would appear that Castro was responsible for his own demise.⁴²⁴

The principal drivers of the breakdown in relations seems to have been Castro’s anti-American rhetoric, permissiveness of communists in Cuba, agrarian reforms and expropriations of U.S. property, and U.S. intolerance of communist infiltration into the Americas, even if that came in the form of economic nationalist movements seeking long overdue reform. In September 1959, Ambassador Bonsal also expressed to Roy Rubottom that “our alleged failure during the past five or six years to take a more positive attitude toward the problems of economic development in Latin America is responsible for some of the unhappy aspects of our relations with the Castro Government and with

⁴²¹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 432d Meeting of the National Security Council, January 14, 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba, doc. 423.

⁴²² Memorandum of Discussion at the 432d Meeting of the National Security Council, January 14, 1960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 423. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d423>.

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

other governments and groups in the hemisphere.”⁴²⁵ The significance of the breakdown of U.S.-Cuba relations during this transitional period following the Cuban Revolution is that it seems to have catalyzed a series of events that led to the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union, and escalation of Cold War tensions that eventually led to the Cuban missile crisis. Perhaps most catastrophically, it polarized the Americas into fundamentally opposed camps on the right and left for the duration of the Cold War. It seems plausible that had the relationship between the Eisenhower administration and the Castro regime not been so polarized by mistrust and rhetoric on both sides, a much different course of events may have unfolded.

F. BAY OF PIGS INVASION

In April 1961, the U.S. orchestrated the invasion into Cuba that resulted in disaster. Later that year, the board of inquiry into the tactical failure of the initial invasion of the brigade of dissidents into Cuba placed much of the blame on “a shortage of ammunition resulting from poor ammunition discipline by the invading forces, the loss of the freighters *Rio Escondido* and *Houston*, and . . . failure to destroy Castro’s air force . . . due to restraints placed on the anti-Castro air force to protect the covert character of the operation.”⁴²⁶ That group of dissidents had been stood up in August 1959, as a paramilitary force to be used as a response to crisis situations in the Western Hemisphere, and Cuba had only been designated as one of the potential targets.⁴²⁷ The Cuban dissidents were primarily recruited in Florida and sent to, Fort Knox, New Orleans, and Guatemala for training, and in November 1960, increased considerably in size. The number in Guatemala increased from 644 at the end of January to 1,390 by the time of

⁴²⁵ Memorandum from the Ambassador to Cuba to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, September 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 364. Accessed February 23, 2016. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d364>.

⁴²⁶ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs*, 324.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

the invasion in April.⁴²⁸ Those three months were plagued with additional problems as trainees arrived sporadically and frequently broke into disturbances.⁴²⁹

The 1960 U.S. presidential campaign cycle also contributed to lapses in policy generation that adversely affected planners and likely contributed to the failure. Eisenhower had given a general go ahead for the operation on November 29, 1960; however, the upcoming change in administrations was affecting the flow of the operation.⁴³⁰ Meetings were held to brief the president on the pending operation, much of which places a significant emphasis on the urgency of conducting the intervention before Castro could further consolidate his position, thus necessitating a conventional and “sizable organized military force” to complete the operation.⁴³¹ Kennedy approved the operation and the invasion went ahead on April 17, 1961, but air strikes planned to destroy the rest of the Cuban air force the night prior were called off at the last minute, before the landing force could be halted.⁴³² The landing force met heavy resistance and after days of intense fighting and the inability to be resupplied with ammunition, they abandoned the fight and surrendered on April 19, 1961.

Richard Bissell points out that a great deal of institutional change was implemented during the initial months of the new administration.⁴³³ Kennedy eliminated Eisenhower’s planning board that provided many of the checks and balances that aided in providing “oversight functions and [to] analyze prospective plans and policies,” including the elimination of half of the support staff for the National Security Council.⁴³⁴ Bissell also points out that within the interagency culture of the time, that when one agency had the action, then the other agencies left it to them to handle the action, despite any

⁴²⁸ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs*, 32.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, 38.

⁴³³ Richard Bissell, Jr., *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 197.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*

reservations they may have had.⁴³⁵ In the case of the Bay of Pigs invasion, this meant that the CIA had the action, and to a certain extent kept the Joint Chiefs and the Department of Defense from deep investment in the project, which had grown in the last few months from a plausibly deniable insurgency by dissident Cubans to a full blown military invasion by relatively poorly trained individuals.⁴³⁶ The desire to maintain plausible deniability constrained the role that the U.S. military could play in supporting the invasion, and thus contributed to the tactical failure of the invasion. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy confirmed that “large-scale covert activity” may not be possible in a “society like ours;” and that “limitations were accepted that should have been avoided, and hopes were indulged that should have been sternly put aside.”⁴³⁷ It would seem that the combination of turmoil created by the handover of the presidency combined with a plan that grew larger than could reasonably be expected to remain covert had made the operation untenable from the outset.

Stephen Kinzer highlights another important change during the planning phases of the intervention in Cuba, that for the first time, CIA director Allen Dulles had turned over the planning reins to Richard Bissell.⁴³⁸ Kinzer also points out that Bissell had also ran the “rebel air force” during PBSUCCESS in Guatemala, and that he assembled virtually the same team for the Cuba operation.⁴³⁹ The Guatemalan operation had been dependent on the army’s betrayal of Arbenz. Kinzer argues that Castro understood that purging his army and eliminating dissent would be critical for the revolution’s success; all lessons Castro learned from Guevara’s Guatemalan experience in 1954.⁴⁴⁰ According to Kinzer, during a briefing in late December 1960 regarding the Bay of Pigs invasion, Marine Colonel Jack Hawkins had emphasized that without neutralizing the Cuban air force and

⁴³⁵ Bissel, *Reflections*, 198.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, 198–99.

⁴³⁷ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs*, 322.

⁴³⁸ Stephen Kinzer, *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2013), 287.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, 289.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 290.

naval vessels, that the invasion would be “courting disaster.”⁴⁴¹ If that fact was courting disaster, then ensuring it lay in the decision to go ahead even after its “operational security had been breached” through publications in the *New York Times* and the *Miami Herald* that identified the training bases in Guatemala.⁴⁴² Eisenhower was convinced to go ahead with the operation, and Kennedy, according to Kinzer, was sold the operation by Bissell’s relentless commitment to the plan.⁴⁴³ Neither Kennedy, nor Bissell, could conclude that calling off the operation was acceptable. Kinzer argues that Kennedy would have faced the “disposal” problem of disbanding the 1,500 dissidents in Guatemala back to Miami, and Bissell would have forfeited his stake as Allen Dulles’s successor.⁴⁴⁴

In assessing the failure, Kinzer highlights an important debate regarding intelligence functions that appeared in *Time* shortly after the disaster. “Should any intelligence gathering organization also have an operational responsibility? The British have long said no, arguing that a combination of the functions gives such an organization a vested operations interest in proving its intelligence correct.”⁴⁴⁵ That vested interest drove the justification for the operation and created the institutional pathology, built on the increasing returns from Iran and Guatemala, and ensured the institutional behavioral lock-in that occurred between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

Piero Gleijeses came to similar conclusions on the path toward failure in Cuba. In an interview with Bissell, he stated that he, “never saw a postmortem of AJAX [Iran] and, to the best of my knowledge, there was no postmortem of PBSUCCESS [Guatemala].”⁴⁴⁶ Gleijeses points out that during Inspector General Kirkpatrick’s investigation into the Bay of Pigs, he also looked back into the Guatemala operation, concluding that “the Agency did a miserable job.”⁴⁴⁷ The institutional memory of the Guatemalan operation

⁴⁴¹ Kinzer, *Brothers*, 295.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, 296–97.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, 299.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 297, 299.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 302.

⁴⁴⁶ Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 372.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 373.

that had developed was one of an “omnipresent CIA that had penetrated every nook and cranny of Guatemala—the army in particular.”⁴⁴⁸ Gleijeses points out that the further reflections on the Guatemalan operation by Richard Bissell, who concluded that the U.S. penetration of the Guatemalan army was limited principally to “the military attachés and the military missions, rather than through the CIA.”⁴⁴⁹ This is something that Castro understood well, as Guevara had informed him of that “precious lesson: ‘We cannot guarantee the Revolution before cleansing the armed forces.’”⁴⁵⁰ Yet, even Gleijeses concludes that this revelation had less to do with the failure at the Bay of Pigs than the perception of overwhelming success: “Coming in the wake of the overthrow of Mosaddegh, it [PBSUCCESS] strengthened confidence in the agency’s abilities and so contributed to the disaster of the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban nemesis of Washington’s victory in Guatemala.”⁴⁵¹ The institutional pathology that had developed carried decision makers on a path with multiple warning signs that it would likely end in catastrophe unless that absolute best of conditions evolved for the landing force. Even had the brigade made it through the insertion phase, it seems likely they would have still met considerable resistance from Castro’s consolidated army.

G. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The Cuban Revolution represents another turn toward nationalist economic policies in Latin America. The revolution was a direct reaction to “thirty years of *de jure* U.S. rule and 25 more of *de facto* control” of the country.⁴⁵² Siekmeier argues that Cubans were particularly frustrated by the sight of U.S. tourists who “gambled, drank, and fornicated while members of the mafia—the owners of the Havana casinos, big money makers for the corrupt regime of Fulgencio Batista—killed each other in the street.”⁴⁵³ The U.S. and Cuban economies were more closely linked to one another than

⁴⁴⁸ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 373.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 374.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 372.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 372.

⁴⁵² Siekmeier, *Aid*, 374.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*, 375.

Guatemala's, and the chief crop was sugarcane instead of bananas, "in 1958, 82.9% of Cuba's foreign exchange was earned from the sale of sugar."⁴⁵⁴ Cuba also received 70.4% of its imports from the United States, and sent 66.9% of its exports back to the United States.⁴⁵⁵ The Cuban economy was actually one of the strongest on paper at the time in Latin America due to its uniquely close economic ties to the United States. However, this obscured the intense social division within the country itself. While average per capita income was \$353, one of the highest in Latin America, the rural worker received only \$91 per year. Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement played off of those social frustrations, and his anti-American rhetoric resonated deeply in the majority of Cubans, especially since the Batista regime had been seen as essentially the chief of a corporate mafia on the island, supporting the interests of the highest bidder.⁴⁵⁶ When Castro marched victoriously into Havana in 1959, he quickly began consolidating his gains, and despite the United States' attempt at dealing with Castro more favorably, he continued to push the anti-American rhetoric that had come to drive domestic politics in Cuba, forcing Washington's hardline approach to dealing with him.

Siekmeier argues that Castro's initial summary trials of Batista's officials, and their executions, combined with his Agrarian Reform in May 1959, was an "economic nationalist attempt to control a segment of Cuba's economy traditionally dominated by foreigners," and were similar to Arbenz's moves in Guatemala five years earlier.⁴⁵⁷ Castro's fellow revolutionary, "Che" Guevara, had been in Guatemala in 1954 and observed the fall of Arbenz, and Siekmeier argues that Castro was careful to not make the same mistakes that Arbenz had made in dealing with the United States.⁴⁵⁸ The land reforms were particularly problematic for the United States, since U.S. private investments in the country totaled nearly \$900 million and the concern was that the

⁴⁵⁴ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 376.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 377.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 377–78.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 379.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 379–380.

reform would not adequately compensate those interests.⁴⁵⁹ Washington officials felt that those reforms meant that “Castro was not going to be a man with whom the United States could work.”⁴⁶⁰ Officials also saw this as an example of “the growing and rampant nationalism all over the world,” further reinforcing the institutional path that U.S. policy had taken.⁴⁶¹ Siekmeier points out that at this point, communism was not even a point of discussion among Washington officials in their decision that Castro would be an unacceptable leader of Cuba, but rather the agrarian reform.⁴⁶² The reforms marked the point at which the United States and Cuba began a steady escalation of tensions which “included a United States-sponsored invasion of the island, tolerance of *norteamericano* attempts to sabotage the Cuban economy, and CIA assassination attempts on Castro’s life.”⁴⁶³ Siekmeier points out that the significance of this lies in the fact that the decision to force Castro from power was made in July and August 1959, “before Castro’s connection to the Soviet Union became clear, both in reality and in the minds of Washington officials.”⁴⁶⁴ The steady disintegration of U.S.-Cuban relations appears to have inadvertently pushed Castro into the Soviet sphere, only further—and perhaps unnecessarily—confirming the path carved out by U.S. policy. The decision to use regime change tactics similar to Iran and Guatemala, based largely on the perceived success of those interventions, seems to have greatly influenced decision makers in Washington as they formulated a strategy for installing more favorable leadership in Cuba.

In November 1959, Secretary of State Christian Herter argued to President Eisenhower that “the continued existence of the Castro regime would hurt the United States because Castro’s policies flagrantly undermined the private-foreign-capital model of economic development advocated by Washington.”⁴⁶⁵ The unwillingness of the United

⁴⁵⁹ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 384–85.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 385.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, 385–86.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 386.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 387

States to work with the Castro regime opened the door for Soviets to do business with Cuba, but even after those relationships had begun, on March 10, 1960, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Livingston T. Merchant, still did not feel that the Cuban government was “communist dominated.”⁴⁶⁶ Yet, just one week later, on March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower approved the CIA to plan to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro. Washington felt it imperative to “impress upon Latin America the nature and seriousness of communist penetration of Cuba.”⁴⁶⁷ Once that decision was made, the agency drew up plans for the operation based on Iran and Guatemala models.

The similarity between both the Guatemalan and Cuban phenomena of economic nationalist movements is that they each seem to have been largely aimed at implementing reforms to address the social divisions within each country, and to achieve a degree of autonomy in their internal politics. Individual actors inside each of these countries competed for domestic power within their own institutional constructs, in as much as the United States was exerting coercive pressure to influence those outcomes through interventions. The policy of the United States remained determined to stop any such reformist movements that would significantly endanger U.S. strategic interests in the region, private commercial interests, but also those that threatened the greater U.S. hemispherical economic agenda, and to prevent Soviet influence from entering the region. The connection between economic nationalism and communism evolved as the reform situation in both Guatemala and Cuba gained traction, and thus a political justification was required to use U.S. coercive national power to intervene and challenge those reform movements. Within the countries themselves, opportunities to ally with one side or the other allowed for these states to achieve some degree of autonomy, at least for their internal political movements, especially in the case of Cuba. In the 1950s, the strongest U.S. political justification for intervention most certainly lay in efforts to fight communism around the world. Failure to distinguish between reform oriented economic nationalists attempting to address domestic social grievances and Soviet-backed communist infiltration of domestic politics, especially in the Guatemalan and Cuban

⁴⁶⁶ Siekmeier, *Aid*, 390.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 391.

cases, led to the creation of policies that took on path dependent characteristics that carried the United States into the failure at the Bay of Pigs. The interventions in Guatemala and Cuba may not provide concrete evidence of a shortfall in U.S. understanding of internal political dynamics in these countries at the time, but the tool chosen by Washington speaks to an over dependence on a particular method of exerting coercive force to protect its interests within a weaker state. The threat to U.S. commercial interests did not drive Washington in its actions but it certainly contributed to the attention paid to Guatemalan and Cuban agrarian land reforms and the perceived lack of compensation to private U.S. investors.

Much of the literature suggests that U.S. perception of Latin America's connections to the Soviet Union was inflated to some degree, and that the Soviets had little direct involvement in Latin America until after the Cuban Revolution. In fact, strategic background information found in a declassified 1982 Special National Intelligence Estimate by the CIA concluded that: (1) the Soviets "had ties with some Latin American Communist parties since the 1920s, but until the 1960s they expended little effort to expand their influence in the hemisphere;" (2) "Castro's alignment of Cuba with the USSR by 1961 marked a turning point in Soviet involvement in Latin America [and] handed Moscow an opportunity to establish an ideological, political, and military foothold in the hemisphere;" (3) in the 1960s, "[Moscow] emphasized in its policy the more pragmatic concerns of building diplomatic, commercial, and even military relations with the existing [pro-Communist] governments . . . discouraged the small orthodox Communist parties from engaging in violence and were reluctant to support leftist groups advocating revolution;" and (4) "this measured approach by the Soviets yielded both political and economic benefits," expanded Moscow's relations with regional states, and increased Soviet imports tenfold during the 1970s.⁴⁶⁸ This analysis speaks volumes to the implications of the course that U.S. policy carved out for relations with Latin America and subsequent efforts to counter Soviet influence in the region. That estimate was in response to Soviet encouragement of "unrest in various Central American states, gaining

⁴⁶⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, "Special National Security Estimate, Soviet Policies and Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean," June 25, 1982, 6.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/19820625.pdf>.

a foothold in Nicaragua, and improving their relations with the governments of the more important South American countries” in the early 1980s.⁴⁶⁹ The path taken at the end of World War II continued to pave the course of U.S. interventions in Latin America well into the 1980s.

The consequences of the failed intervention in Cuba were the polarization of relations in the Western Hemisphere and erosion of U.S. legitimacy, both at home and abroad. The failure also had the negative effect of empowering Castro’s legitimacy in his campaign of anti-imperialism, which only served to escalate the adversarial environment in the hemisphere and necessitate more U.S. interventions. The effect at home culminated in the 1975 Senate probe into the intelligence community’s actions, which Loch K. Johnson argues contributed to the adversarial relationship between the executive and legislative branches that became so pronounced under the Ronald Reagan administration.⁴⁷⁰ The fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the communist threat, however, seems to have confirmed the notion of American exceptionalism, at least in the ideological perceptions of some senior officials. In the concluding section that follows, I argue that a similar version of institutional path dependence emerged in the years following the end of the Cold War, which found its catalyst in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and drove the justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Ideology founded in American exceptionalism promoted a new pattern of increasing returns and a new overt institutional pathology drove the justification for war in Iraq, similar to the pattern that developed in the Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba interventions.

⁴⁶⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Special National Security Estimate,” 1.

⁴⁷⁰ Loch K. Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 263.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES AND THE 2003 U.S. INVASION OF IRAQ

A. INTRODUCTION

There are a number of distinct differences between the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the previous interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba. Foremost, the previous three were covert interventions not subject to public discourse prior to their execution. Additionally, the Iraq invasion was a full scale military operation conducted by a coalition of nations. Yet, at the institutional level there are sufficient similarities that warrant comparison. The purpose of this thesis is to identify whether institutional factors took on path dependent characteristics that significantly determined the actions of policymakers through process tracing and analysis of events that led up to the Bay of Pigs failure, and to compare those institutional factors to the process that led to the Bush administration's justification for invading Iraq. Since much of the evidence to support this comparison will likely remain classified for decades to come, this portion of the thesis is inherently somewhat speculative. Yet, the obvious paths carved by institutions in determining the course the United States would take in regard to Iraq is evident in the publicly available information on the Iraq invasion. This concluding section argues that such a process did emerge in the Bush administration's efforts to justify the intervention to remove Saddam Hussein from power. As in the previous interventions, the tools used to justify the invasion involved the political opportunity structure created by the environment of fear within the American public following the September 11 terrorist attacks, and highlights the power that institutional constructs have in determining the actions of nations beyond covert operations conducted in the shadows to full scale war openly harnessing citizen political will by manipulating mass enmity and threat perceptions.

B. PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION FOR INVADING IRAQ

The public justification for the 2003 intervention in Iraq centered on Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical,

biological, and nuclear materials that posed a danger to national security if they were to fall into the hands of terrorist organizations targeting the United States. This, however, was only the most agreed upon justification that was used in arguing the case before the United Nations Security Council of the many competing reasons argued between Washington decision makers.⁴⁷¹ James P. Pfiffner argues that additional reasons included idealistic goals of ridding Iraqis of a tyrant, installing democratic governance, and the geo-strategic reconstruction of the Middle East.⁴⁷² More telling than the nature of the justification is understanding when the planning for the 2003 invasion began. Thomas E. Ricks argues that the “formal Pentagon consideration of how to attack Iraq began in November 2001,” and that the timing of this decision—just after the Afghanistan invasion—divided the uniformed military and the office of the secretary of defense on the issue of whether the United States should invade Iraq and on the number of troops that would be used to do so.⁴⁷³ Ricks also points out that the U.S. Central Command, led by General Tommy Franks considered that, through at least May of 2002, that planning remained a mechanism to provide options for the president.⁴⁷⁴ The next month, President George W. Bush gave a speech at the U.S. Military Academy centered on preemptive military strategy that would seek to “confront the worst threats before they emerge.”⁴⁷⁵ Ricks argues that the new strategy marked a departure from a historical tradition of promoting stability to one that actually targeted stability in an attempt to create change.⁴⁷⁶ This largely came out of perceptions among members of the new Bush administration that prior stability strategies promoted by Brent Scowcroft and James Baker “had led to decrepit regimes, sallow economies, and growing terrorism,” and that

⁴⁷¹ James P. Pfiffner, "Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (2004): 43. <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/27552561>.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 32–33.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., 38.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., 47–48.

only through a restructuring the Middle East could the new administration secure the United States from terrorism.⁴⁷⁷

According to David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes, this new strategy drew largely from products produced by a think tank known as the Project for a New American Century (PNAC).⁴⁷⁸ The new strategy sought to achieve hegemonic—yet benign—American power aimed at securing its global interests through an expanded military capable of preemptive strikes to counter emerging threats.⁴⁷⁹ The think tank’s many proclamations signatories included: “Elliot Abrams, William Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Steve Forbes, Donald Kagan, Norman Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.”⁴⁸⁰ Altheide and Grimes argue that the “PNAC was very influential in changing U.S. foreign policy as well as promoting favorable news coverage about going to war with Iraq following the attacks of 9/11.”⁴⁸¹ In the buildup for the war, one of the most vocal advocates was Vice President Dick Cheney, delivering “fire-and-brimstone” speeches, and proclaiming that there was “no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.”⁴⁸² Cheney was also a vocal advocate of preemptive strikes against threats to U.S. national security in the months leading up to the war, despite evidence that suggests that the WMD threat had been inflated, including retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who commanded U.S. Central Command prior to Franks, stated that he had never seen intelligence reports that supported the extent of Bush and Cheney’s claims.⁴⁸³ There was pushback within the government in regard to the WMD threat from agencies that included: the International Atomic Energy Agency, CIA, Department of Energy, Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Air Force, who believed that while Iraq may “have been motivated to develop such weapons,

⁴⁷⁷ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 47.

⁴⁷⁸ David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes, “War Programming: The Propaganda Project and the Iraq War,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 46 No. 4 (2005): 624–625.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 624.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸² Jean Edward Smith, *Bush* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 313.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*

there was no evidence of their existence.”⁴⁸⁴ Altheide and Grimes argue that, “over time, with much repetition, the theme about Iraq’s dangerousness remained viable even when evidence was produced that neither point was true.”⁴⁸⁵ What Altheide and Grimes found to be significant is that “the lack of reporting about PNAC’s success at planning the Iraq War illustrates propaganda as a feature of institutionalized news sources and media formats,” and that “the major television networks were tightly aligned with the war scenario.”⁴⁸⁶ Essentially, the Bush administration was creating new institutions through political rhetoric and pressures exerted on government agencies and the press.

The similarity with the institutional path carved in the Cold War covert interventions is that in this case, despite happening overtly, the new institutions developed under the Bush administration largely to meet PNAC inspired strategic objectives inspired “journalists’ penchant to get on the ‘war’ band wagon, not only for patriotic purposes, but also because that was what ‘people were interested in,’ and that is ‘where the story was.’”⁴⁸⁷ The powerful effect PNAC influence had on U.S. institutions accelerated in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks and the environment of fear and anger that followed. The ability of the Bush administration to dismiss criticism of those institutions only further consolidated the path that the new institutions were carving for the invasion of Iraq. Altheide and Grimes give the example of Bush “breaking decades of tradition by not permitting” United Press International correspondent Helen Thomas from asking questions due to her criticism of the policies.⁴⁸⁸ The authors state that actions by the Bush administration similar to these created pressure for “journalists to conform and not rock the boat.”⁴⁸⁹ By channeling the patriotic enmity flowing throughout the country in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and by silencing critical dissent of the new policies, the Bush administration was able to execute PNAC strategic objectives.

⁴⁸⁴ Altheide and Grimes, “War Programming,” 627.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., 627—28.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., 628.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., 629

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

The strategies and ideological world view originated with midlevel officials—who referred to themselves as “Vulcans”—in the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations under the direction of Paul Wolfowitz and Condoleezza Rice in the new George W. Bush administration.⁴⁹⁰ Vulcans sought to “transform the world and spread democracy,” but when necessary to do so through “muscular foreign policy, military might, and moral clarity,” rather than “working within the structure of international law and diplomacy.”⁴⁹¹ Wolfowitz—along with Cheney and Rumsfeld—founded the PNAC in 1997, “to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.”⁴⁹² Wolfowitz called for Saddam’s overthrow in open letters to President Clinton starting in 1998.⁴⁹³ Remaking the Middle East was a top priority for Bush administration members well before the attacks of September 11th; the attacks merely provided the political opportunity to make those plans a reality. Jean Edward Smith argues that this stemmed from a Hegelian hubris that is best summed up in Karl Rove’s own words from an interview with Ron Suskind in the summer of 2002: “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. . . . We are history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”⁴⁹⁴ These ideological constructs based in moral absolutes chose to ignore the complex ethnic tensions that would be unleashed in the aftermath of Saddam’s removal. Retired General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the coalition during the First Gulf War, found Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz’s dismissal of recommendations and concerns expressed by senior professional military operational planners—particularly in regard to how to contain the ethnic tensions between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds during postwar occupation—to be especially troubling.⁴⁹⁵

The influence these new institutions created by the Bush administration exerted on the press also placed pressure on the intelligence community to join the war’s band wagon. As Pfiffner argues, the intelligence community felt similar pressure from

⁴⁹⁰ Smith, *Bush*, 176.

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 176—77.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*, 180.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, 180—81.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 332.

Cheney's visits to CIA headquarters "to question the CIA judgment that Iraq did not pose as immediate a threat as the administration was arguing it did," which had the effect of creating the perception that the agency was under political pressure to "come to the conclusions that the administration wanted."⁴⁹⁶ The pressure was not limited to the CIA, as similar pressures were felt among DIA and State Department analysts, who felt that their analysis was not being accurately represented.⁴⁹⁷ Where the administration found too much pushback, it chose to create the Office of Special Plans in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which argued heavily on the now debunked information on Saddam's WMD programs provided by the dissident Iraqi Ahmad Chalabi.⁴⁹⁸ When combined with the Defense Planning Board under Richard Perle, these entities provided the justification needed to circumvent the resistance to going to war with Iraq that was coming from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, chaired by Brent Scowcroft, who had been George H. W. Bush's national security advisor and opposed the war.⁴⁹⁹ By placing individuals who supported the administration's cause for war into key influential positions, the justification behind invading Iraq met with less resistance, and the institutions took on pathological characteristics that carried the nation to war, despite considerable concern vocalized by senior leadership within the national security apparatus.

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGY

Despite the differences in methods—covert versus overt interventions—the ideological motivation of state reconstruction differs little between the Eisenhower and Bush administrations. Covert interventions appealed to the Eisenhower administration because the U.S. domestic political opportunity structure for overt interventions was low in the wake of World War II and the Korean War. Covert interventions offered a solution to continue reconstructive interventions abroad, not only to contain communist subversion, but to aggressively counter it. Similarly, the Bush administration was able to

⁴⁹⁶ Pfiffner, "Did President Bush Mislead," 41.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., 42.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid., 43.

capitalize on the U.S. domestic political opportunity structure created by the September 11 attacks by pressuring the intelligence community to make a strong case for removing Saddam and creating an environment hostile to criticism by both the press and senior officials not on the war bandwagon. What links these interventions? The erosion of perceived U.S. legitimacy, both abroad and domestically. The Iran case appears most successful because the Shah managed to ruthlessly suppress dissent for a quarter of a century until the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Guatemala case appeared immediately successful but contributed to a costly and persistent destabilization of the state. The Cuba case was a complete failure and isolated the United States and Cuba from one another for half a century. The Iraq case, though militarily successful in removing Saddam, drew the United States into a costly quagmire of dubious necessity.

The power that institutional pathology has on determining the actions taken by the organizations that those institutions govern is evident in both the covert operations developed and undertaken by the Eisenhower administration, as well as the overt invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the Bush administration. Creating the rules that will determine the course of nations—as well as their component government elements—is a strong example of human agency, as those rules will largely dictate the future decisions of the majority of the body governed by those institutions. Strong institutions also have the power of circumventing dissent, as is evident in the overt case, but even in the covert Cold War case, antinationalist and anticommunist policies and rhetoric drove the actions more so than objective analysis. In all of the cases the justification for the intervention developed to support a decision that appears to have been largely made well ahead of time. The administrations determined that Mosaddegh, Arbenz, Castro, and Hussein would no longer remain in power, and the case for their removal developed from there, justified largely by communist links under the Eisenhower administration and terrorist links under the Bush administration.

Ideology played a role in shaping decisions within the Eisenhower administration and its tough stance on communism, and the Bush administration's tough stance on terrorism, which stems from the long—and hubristic—tradition of American exceptionalism and the occasionally militant exportation of freedom and democracy. As

Toby Dodge argues, “Individuals in the White House or indeed anywhere do not react to neutral, ‘objective’ situations . . . Instead, the range of choices they consider to be viable have been shaped—limited or widened—by the analytical categories through which they impose meaning on the world.”⁵⁰⁰ This does not mean that humans are not rational actors, but rather that rational choice is inherently constrained by an individual’s own perceptions of the world around them. As Dodge argues, “Decision-makers are both empowered and constrained by the ideational categories they have inherited from within their own societies and through which they make sense of the world.”⁵⁰¹ Dodge goes further to explain that, “Individuals do not create the analytical categories they deploy; they operate within societies and institutions which give priority and validity to a set of units of analysis that are deployed to understand the world.”⁵⁰² How and why institutions are created will necessarily drive the behavior of individuals within those bodies until those institutions are altered. Institutional survival appears to be largely dependent upon its perceived legitimacy, as are an individual’s internalized ideological constructs. Each of these constructs draw political power from the perceived legitimacy of those institutions by the people those institutions are intended to govern. According to Dodge, ideological motivations largely drove the policies of de-Ba’athification that dismissed virtually all of Iraq’s civil servants and the dismissal of Iraqi security forces that followed the initial invasion of Iraq and accelerated state collapse into civil war.⁵⁰³ The three year quagmire and thousands of Iraqi and American deaths that followed also destroyed the U.S. domestic political legitimacy for the Bush administration’s policies that carried the nation into war, requiring a paradigm shift in policy that adopted a counterinsurgency strategy that sought to remedy the failures of the previous policies.⁵⁰⁴ The new strategy required a “surge” of troops that should have been deployed during the initial invasion, but by that time the administration had already lost much of the domestic political will

⁵⁰⁰ Toby Dodge, "The Ideological Roots of Failure: The Application of Kinetic Neo-liberalism to Iraq," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 86, no. 6 (2010): 1271. <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/40929761>.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² Ibid., 1272

⁵⁰³ Ibid., 1286.

⁵⁰⁴ Dodge, "Ideological Roots," 1285.

required to continue with the intervention for the amount of time that would be required to truly stabilize Iraq.

Though the precise nature of the consequences in Iraq are considerably different from the aftermath of the interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, the role that institutions—formed from an ideological construct centered on American exceptionalism—had in determining the negative consequences bears strong similarities. The Cold War interventions centered on the rhetoric of preemptively halting the spread of communism, particularly into the Western Hemisphere, while also suppressing economic nationalist movements that were perceived as threatening to strategic economic interests. The Eisenhower administration developed an institutional construct centered on covert action to meet this threat by using techniques perceived as effective instruments of regime change based on success in Iran and Guatemala. The perception of success in these operations created a confirmation bias that helped carry the new Kennedy administration on an institutionally driven path created by the Eisenhower administration's policies. The embarrassing failure at the Bay of Pigs that followed resulted in a paradigmatic shift in intrahemispheric relations for the remainder of the Cold War, eroded the legitimacy of the United States and covert interventions, yet increased their necessity by emboldening both the nationalists and the communists within the region and increasing their ties with the Soviet Union. The Iraq case differs only in the fact that the policies were developed and implemented overtly rather than covertly, but both sought to implement an ideologically driven, interventionist foreign policy that sought to reconstruct the governing institutions in those nations under the pretext of national security facing the threat of terrorism.

D. FUTURE CONCERNS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The most useful lessons drawn from this analysis are the evidence that human agency exists and plays a powerful role in determining institutional construction, but also that agency is inherently constrained by individual world view and attachments to ideological constructs when those combine with threat perception. In the Cold War case of covert intervention under the Eisenhower administration, the secretive nature of covert

policy development lacked objective scrutiny, adopted confirmation biases, and took on path dependent characteristics that contributed to the failure at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. The overt Iraq case exhibits similar consequences, but rather than drawing from a small pool to create its own confirmation bias during policy development, the Bush administration behaved in a manner that systematically suppressed critical scrutiny of their policies which ensured the path dependent characteristics that carried the United States into an intervention built on dubious justification.⁵⁰⁵ The consequences that emerge when U.S. power is applied under circumstances of questionable justification has the undesirable effect of eroding international and domestic perceptions of U.S. legitimacy. The principles of joint operations spells out the importance of both actual and perceived legitimacy in influencing operations, going so far as to argue it to be a decisive factor in operational success.⁵⁰⁶ For this reason, it is of great importance that U.S. power projection seeks to do so only under the most legitimate of circumstances, and strives to maintain both actual and perceived legitimacy. Restraining the executive branch from unnecessary power projection is fundamental to the U.S. checks and balances system, in large part for the very reason of maintaining the perception of U.S. legitimacy, both at home and abroad, as a core national security priority. The United States is an exceptional country, but it is perceived as exceptional when it adheres to the values that make it an exceptional place for an individual to live in the world.

⁵⁰⁵ Smith, *Bush*, 322.

⁵⁰⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), A-4. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Altheide, David L., and Jennifer N. Grimes. "War Programming: The Propaganda Project and the Iraq War." *The Sociological Quarterly* 46, no. 4 (2005): 617—43.
<http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/4121509>.
- Barnes, William, Myles Gartland, and Martin Stack. "Old Habits Die Hard: Path Dependency and Behavioral Lock-In." *Journal of Economic Issues* 38, no. 2 (2004). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4228022>.
- Baughn, C. Christopher, and Attila Yaprak. "Economic Nationalism: Conceptual and Empirical Development," *Political Psychology* 17, no. 4 (1996): 759—778.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792137>.
- "Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After, Chronology." The National Security Archive. Accessed January 31, 2016. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/bayofpigs/chron.html>.
- Bissell, Richard M., Jr. *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.
- Bravo, Edgar R. *The Soviet View of the Latin American Military Regimes*. Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, 1978.
- Bruneau, Thomas C. *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- Chasteen, John Charles. *Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America* 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.
- "CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents," on *The National Security Archive* ed. by Kate Doyle and Peter Kornbluh.
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. Special National Security Estimate. *Soviet Policies and Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. June 25, 1982.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/19820625.pdf>.
- Cullather, Nick. *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- David, Steven R., "Coups and Anti-Coups." *The Washington Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (1982): 189–201. doi:10.1080/01636608209450778.

- Dodge, Toby. "The Ideological Roots of Failure: The Application of Kinetic Neo-liberalism to Iraq." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 86, no. 6 (2010): 1269-286. <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/40929761>.
- Doyle, Kate. "After the Revolution: Lazaro Cardenas and the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional." The National Security Archive. Accessed January 31, 2016. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB124/>.
- Friedman, Max Paul, and Tom Long. "Soft Balancing in the Americas: Latin American Opposition to U.S. Intervention, 1898–1936." *International Security* 40.1 (2015): 120- 156. <https://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/article/589750/pdf>.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennet. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.
- Gerring, John. *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework*. Cambridge: University Press, 2001.
- Gleijeses, Piero. *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Handy, Jim. *Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala*. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984.
- Johnson, Loch K. *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985.
- Kinzer, Stephen. *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2013.
- Kennan, George. "Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department to the Secretary of State." March 29, 1950. Accessed December 14, 2015. <http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/475/85683/Kennan%20Excerpts.pdf>.
- Kornbluh, Peter. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba*. New York: New Press, 1998.
- LaFeber, Walter. *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984.
- Langley, Lester D., and Thomas Schoonover. *The Banana Men: American Mercenaries and Entrepreneurs in Central America, 1880–1930*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995.

- LeoGrande, William, and Peter Kornbluh. *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014.
- Luttwak, Edward. *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Ma, Shu-Yun. "Political Science at the Edge of Chaos? The Paradigmatic Implications of Historical Institutionalism." *International Political Science Review* 28, no. 1 (2007). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445077>.
- Mahoney, James. "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology." *Theory and Society* 29, no. 4 (2000). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3108585>.
- Mayers, David Allan. *George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Oxford: University Press, 1988.
- Marks, Frederick W., III. *Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles*. Westport: Praeger, 1993.
- McClellan, Grant S., ed. *U.S. Policy in Latin America*. New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1963.
- Miller, Nicola. *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959–1987*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Mokhtari, Fariborz. 2008. "Iran's 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics Versus External Intrigue." *Middle East Journal* 62 (3). Middle East Institute: 457–88. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25482541>.
- Morley, Morris H., and James F. Petras. "Economic Expansion, Political Crisis and U.S. Policy in Central America," in *Revolution and Intervention in Central America* ed. by Marlene Dixon and Susan Jonas. San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1983.
- Mullenbach, Mark J., and Gerard P. Matthews. "Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes." *International Interactions* 34, no. 1 (2008): 25–52. doi: 10.1080/03050620701878835.
- "Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation: Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1959-January 1961, vol. 3." The National Security Archive. Accessed January 30, 2016. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB353/bop-vol3.pdf>.

- Peters, Guy, Jon Pierre, and Desmond S. King. "The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism." *The Journal of Politics* 67, no. 4 (2005): 1275–1300. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00360.x>.
- Pfiffner, James P. "Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (2004): 25–46. <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/27552561>.
- Pierson, Paul. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (2000). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586011>.
- Pike, Fredrick B. "Guatemala, the United States, and Communism in the Americas," *The Review of Politics* 17, no. 2 (1955): 232–261. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1405084>.
- Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001.
- Rabe, Stephen G. *Eisenhower and Latin America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
- Ramazani, Rouhollah K. *The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence*. New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin Press, 2006.
- Rubin, Barry. *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran*. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.
- Schlesinger, Stephen, and Stephen Kinzer. *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Siekmeier, James F. *Aid, Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations—Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States 1945–1961*. Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999.
- Sinclair, Andrew. *Che Guevara*. New York: Viking Press, 1970.
- Smith, Jean Edward. *Bush*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016.

- Smith, Timothy J., and Abigail E. Adams. *After the Coup: An Ethnographic Reframing of Guatemala 1954*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2011. Accessed March 9, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.
<http://site.ebrary.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lib/nps/reader.action?ppg=91&docID=10532396&tm=1457578627833>.
- Theoharis, Athan. *The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007.
- Thomas, Hugh. "The Origins of the Cuban Revolution." *The World Today* 19 no. 10 (1963). Royal Institute of International Affairs: 448–60.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40393452>.
- U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, vol. 6." Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. Accessed January 29, 2016.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06>.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.
- Weyland, Kurt. "Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change." *World Politics* 60, no. 2 (2008): 281—314. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40060197>.
- World War II: Holocaust, The Extermination of European Jews, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Presidential Library, accessed December 15, 2015,
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/holocaust.html.
- Yashar, Deborah J. *Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala 1870s–1950s*. Stanford: University Press, 1997.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=a_WSbBHeRxkC&oi=fnd&pg=PR15&dq=Deborah+Yashar+guatemala&ots=rrMM_NeAD6&sig=2PzjZtP9t6zzSrJZNx8-f6KwPGQ#v=onepage&q=Deborah%20Yashar%20guatemala&f=false.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California