

BOKO HARAM:  
A SYSTEMIC AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

BY  
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## APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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## DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Marine Corps, the United States Air Force, or Air University.



## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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## ABSTRACT

As of this writing, Boko Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in the world today. Its recent association with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has provided it an additional level of prestige and legitimacy it had not previously enjoyed. Boko Haram threatens the security and stability of Nigeria. It threatens the security and stability of West Africa, which in turn threatens the security of the international community and system. Because terrorism is such a large concern in the modern view of security for the United States, Boko Haram obviously requires a response from the United States. Or, does it?

Despite these facts, Boko Haram is not a significant variable in America's strategic calculus. Nevertheless, the United States allocates a limited amount of resources to help Nigerian and other countries in their struggles against the terror group. These resources and the strategy governing their use are not likely to solve the problem. If they are to have a substantial effect, America's limited resources must efficiently and effectively attack the root causes of the Boko Haram problem. Otherwise, the resources will be spent down a black hole attacking surface-level and symptomatic issues, destined to make no difference at all.

This thesis analyses Boko Haram using a systems-based approach to determine how the United States can and must effectively employ its resources to help Nigeria and its regional neighbors defeat the terror group's threat. It concludes that the United States must encourage and reinforce actions by the Nigerian government to develop a more heterogeneous culture. These actions over time, likely several generations, will erode or eliminate the root causes of the conflict by using symptomatic treatment to buy time for long-term cultural change.

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## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

20 January 2012 was a Friday. It probably seemed just like any other Friday. There was no real reason to be concerned. There was no indication that something was amiss. This Friday, however, would not soon be forgotten in Kano.

Kano is a large city in northern Nigeria. It sits very close to the geographic center of the country's predominantly Muslim northern states, which have long been a region of strife, division, and war. The twentieth of January seemed beyond all this. The afternoon call to prayer blared over the loudspeakers, calling people to mosque. Their prayers completed, many hurried home to be with their families. Wellington Asiayei was not one of them, and his day seemed like just any another Friday.

Wellington was the 48-year-old assistant police superintendent, serving a neighborhood called Bompai. As many in town scurried home, Wellington finished his paperwork and went to his rooms in the barracks. As he arrived at his door, he heard explosions. While the other police officers ran out of the barracks to determine what happened, Wellington stopped. He realized that he forgot to lock his barracks door. Quickly turning around, he ran back to his room. As he locked the door, Wellington saw what appeared to be one of his men, wearing a police uniform and holding an AK-47. Wellington screamed to him to run to headquarters. The man did not run. He raised his weapon and fired. Wellington fell, lying in a pool of his own blood. The siege of Kano had begun.<sup>1</sup>

### **Problem Statement and Methodology**

Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad, or the People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad, also known as Boko Haram, laid siege to Kano. This Friday in 2012 was a continuation of the group's relatively short but horrifically bloody history.<sup>2</sup> In fact, as of 2015 Boko Haram surpassed the Islamic State

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<sup>1</sup> Mike Smith. *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, (New York, New York: I.B. Taurus and Company, Ltd., 2015), 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> Corina Simonelli, Michael Jensen, Alejandro Castro-Reina, et al, "START Background Report: Boko Haram Recent Attacks," *START*, (College Park, MD. May 2014), [https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport\\_BokoHaramRecentAttacks\\_May2014](https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014)

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), claiming the title of the most deadly terror organization in the world, amassing a 2014 body count of almost 6,700.<sup>3</sup> Its methods range from garden-variety murder, assassination, beheading, and intimidation to the spectacular, coordinated offensive successes, such as the siege of Kano, and the group's ongoing struggle for the control of Maiduguri, Borno State's largest city. Its violence crosses international borders, and its radical ideology parallels that of ISIS. Boko Haram's recent pledge of support and acceptance by ISIS reinforced this ideological similarity in the world's eyes, even prompting some to bestow upon the group the title of the Islamic State-West.<sup>4</sup>

While these numbers, the group's methods, and its recent allegiance to ISIS are certainly frightening, many questions remain. For example, do this group and its declaration of war on western culture constitute an American problem? This thesis examines that issues and others related to it.

The thesis seeks to determine what, if anything, the United States should do to help the Nigerian Government deal with Boko Haram. To address this issue, the thesis applies a lens created from a combination of systems theory and Systemic Operational Design. This theory and methodology combined yield a sample model, which the thesis then applies to Nigeria's Boko Haram problem. This application and its subsequent analysis allows for the study of systemic change over time. Ultimately, the changes in any system state result from exogenous, endogenous, or structural factors. Endogenous factors exist within the geographical bounds of the system state, but exogenous factors exist in two areas: the regional area or the larger international community. While these two factors exist within the thesis's boundaries of the system, the structural factors are a result of the anarchic nature of the international system. Changes in system states reveal long-term, causal factors influencing the contemporary conflict. After the model reveals the factors influencing this conflict, the thesis assesses the system under the consideration of the United States' Strategic Posture. This portion of the analysis will show whether

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4\_0.pdf. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, (New York, New York: I.B. Taurus and Company, Ltd., 2015), x.

<sup>3</sup> Rose Troup Buchanan, "ISIS overtaken by Boko Haram as world's deadliest terror organization," *Independent*, November 17, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-overtakes-isis-as-worlds-deadliest-terror-organisation-a6737761.html>

<sup>4</sup> Rose Troup Buchanan, "ISIS overtaken by Boko Haram."

Boko Haram is a strategic problem for the United States and if it is, what action the United States should take to address the conflict's underlying causes. The course of action suggested should fit within J.F.C. Fuller's conception of economy of force. The limited means allocated must be applied in the most efficacious manner, effectively gaining the greatest return on investment, which means they should be applied to the underlying causes of the problem, not addressing symptomatic issues.<sup>5</sup>

A historical review of the Nigerian region, a history of the insurgency, the contemporary state of the conflict, the current United States strategic posture, and the United States posture in Africa comprise the primary sections of the study. The historical materials, reporting, and contemporary sources for this study are voluminous. Secondary sources serve as the foundation for the explanation of systems theory, the historical narrative of the Nigerian region, and the history of Boko Haram. The contemporary system state relies on contemporary reporting from the last 10 years and some primary sources from Nigeria. Analysis of America's strategic posture draws from primary sources from the United States government, United States Africa Command, and the United States State Department

### **Structure**

The argument's structure consists of three main sections: theory, historical narrative, and analysis and conclusions. The theory section includes Chapters Two and Three. The historical narrative resides in Chapter Four, and the analysis and conclusions consist of Chapters Five through Eight.

Chapter Two outlines the theory used to construct the analytical model. It provides a short overview of systems theory and defines some of its key concepts, such as system effects, phase spaces, and attractors. This investigation distills system's theory down to its key elements, all of which resurface in the model's construction and analysis. In essence, the chapter seeks to introduce systems theory to readers not familiar with systems concepts.

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<sup>5</sup> J.F.C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*, (Newbury, England: Books Express Publishing, 2012), 201.

Chapter Three builds on the theoretical foundation by constructing the thesis's analytical model. It examines and explains the model from the inside out. For example, it discusses the geographic bounding of the system state and the reasons for that geographic bounding. It also defines and constructs endogenous, exogenous, and structural influences on the geographically bounded system state. Finally, it discusses the flow of time through the model and, for this paper, what constitutes a change in the system state.

Chapter Four encompasses two historical narratives and one contemporary narrative. The first historical narrative examines the history of Nigeria, but it is not limited to the European-constructed, contemporary Nigeria. Historical endogenous cultural conflict, the spread of Islam as an extemporaneous influence, and extemporaneous European colonization on what is now Nigeria are all exceptionally important. The second narrative addresses the history of Boko Haram. It begins with the education and radicalization Boko Haram's founder, Mohammad Yusuf, and moves through 2015. The last narrative seeks to outline the key elements in the contemporary system state, addressing Nigeria's current political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructural, and physical terrain.

Chapter Five constructs the systemic model used in this study. It takes the narrative from Chapter Four and applies it to the model from Chapter Three. It discusses the flow of time and the changing Nigerian system states. It also shows and discusses the exogenous, structural, and endogenous influences that caused phase shifts in the Nigerian system states. The thesis ranks the importance of these factors in influencing the current conflict. Finally, the lens established in Chapter Five provides the final determination of whether or not Boko Haram is a strategic problem for the United States.

Chapter Six examines America's strategic posture and situation. It uses five primary-source documents, from the National Security Strategy to United States Africa Command's Strategic Posture. It also outlines the United States' current geopolitical situation and domestic struggles. In essence, this chapter depicts the United States' current strategic situation.

Chapter Seven offers strategy and policy recommendations for the United States' government to deal with Boko Haram. This chapter answers the research question: what

actions, if any, should the United States government take to help Nigeria defeat the Boko Haram insurgency? Costs, risks, and benefits to the United States provide the framework for evaluation of each recommendation. Finally, Chapter Eight offers final thoughts and conclusions.



## Chapter 2

### Systems Theory and Systemic Operational Design

*Physicists like to think that all you have to do is say, these are the conditions, now what happens next.*

Richard Feynman

There is only one system, the universe. Systemic approaches and systems theory attempt to provide a useful framework to bound and explain the various portions of that universe. Because the thesis uses a systems methodology to analyze the Boko Haram insurgency, this chapter introduces several key concepts of systems theory. This analysis proceeds generally from the large to the small. It begins by introducing the reader to the concept of a system, starting with a simple definition, and then describing several distinct properties of systems and their effects. It then discusses the concept of phase spaces and their utility in understanding and visualizing a system. It also investigates the significant limitations of phase spaces as the systems under study become increasingly complex, which forces analysts to substitute models for phase spaces. The chapter closes with a short analysis of strange attractors, their existence in phase spaces, and their implications for system stability.

### Systems

What is a system? Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz provide the basics for this discussion. Waltz describes a system as a set of “interacting units” and structure.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Jervis says that a system exists when two criteria are satisfied: “(a) a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts.”<sup>2</sup> While Jervis acknowledges Waltz’s concept of structure in his book *System Effects*, he does not specifically use it to define a system. He instead uses the concept of emergent properties, or properties and

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<sup>1</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc, 2010), 79.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 4.

behaviors exhibited by the system that are not exhibited by the parts, thus not additive. Defining systems in this fashion allows Jervis's definition to encompass Waltz's structure as an emergent property of systems. As such, this thesis uses Jervis's definition throughout, as it simultaneously accounts for both micro and macro-level phenomena.

Waltz argues that "agents and agencies act; systems as wholes do not."<sup>3</sup> The interacting units or elements in the system can be anything; the interaction of thermal currents in a flowing liquid, the interaction of nation-states, the interaction of ethnic groups, or the interaction of multiple people in a room as long as these units are connected and acting against and with each other exhibiting some non-additive, emergent quality. In the case of highly complex social systems, such as war and conflict, the actors generally are groups of people, organized and grouped along any number of social characteristics, such as ethnic or tribal groups, religious organizations, gang affiliations, or political orientation. Each of these units have their own "incentives, goals, and calculations," and these groups cause the system to change by injecting energy into it, otherwise known as taking actions.

Energy inputs into the system have any number of forms. For example, nation-states inject energy into the system through war, economic sanctions, information operations, and diplomacy. Non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and non-governmental organizations, inject energy through other methods. Terrorist organizations can use targeted violence to achieve some sort of micro-level systems change. Transnational criminal organizations can control under-governed or non-governed spaces to bring about systems change, and non-governmental organizations can affect systems change by influencing governments and societies. While the effects of these injections of energy may be predictable close to the injection site, or at the local level, the predictability of effects decreases as they reach more broadly into a system.<sup>4</sup>

Systems are different from their parts. Holistically, they encompass their parts, but they become something more than just the addition of their constituents.<sup>5</sup> While

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<sup>3</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 74.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 16.

<sup>5</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 13.

analyzing and understanding the interacting units has some explanatory power, reductionist techniques are not appropriate for understanding systems as a whole. Emergent properties are not additive. They are not necessarily accountable to the characteristics of the interacting agents alone. Therefore, reductionist techniques combined with holistic techniques provide more comprehensive explanatory power, and that is the subject of systems theory.

### **Systems Theory**

Systems theory attempts to explain and provide an understanding of systems. Waltz said that an approach to understanding was “systemic” if it could demonstrate how the “systems level, or structure, is distinct from the level of the interacting units.”<sup>6</sup> Differentiating between these two levels, it follows that there are two types of theories to understand systems, reductionist and systemic. Reductionist theories explain the characteristics and behavior of the system’s interacting units. Systemic, or holistic, theories explain the total system and the constraints and restraints the system structure places on the behavior and characteristics of the interacting parts. They are two sides of the same coin, representing two levels of analysis attempting to explain the complexity people experience. Thus, systems theory encompasses the body of knowledge that attempts to describe systems, their interacting units, the units’ connections, the system’s characteristics, their structure, their effects, and their sensitivity to conditions.<sup>7</sup>

A system’s interconnections are the links among interacting system units. These interconnections come in any number of forms. For example, in the international system interconnections may refer to diplomatic, informational, military, and economic relationships among nation-states. However, on a level subordinate to the international, the interconnections of interacting units include, but are not limited to, religious, ethnic, political, social, military, and informational dynamics. Any interacting body in a system can have more than one interconnection with any other interacting body. Jervis posits that the density of these interconnections among interacting bodies may have a somewhat proportional relationship to the difficulty in understanding and predicting system effects.

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<sup>6</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 40.

<sup>7</sup> James Gleick, *Chaos*, 8.

“When the interconnections are dense, it may be difficult to trace the impact of any change even after the fact, let alone predict it ahead of time, making the system complex and hard to control.”<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the system’s constraint and restraint of an individual unit’s actions also applies to the density of the unit’s interconnections. Simply stated, if two interacting units, A and B, have a set of dense interconnections, then there is a higher likelihood of actions taken by A affecting B. There is also a higher likelihood of system effects acting on A, in turn affecting B. While the density of interconnections does not determine whether an action by A has a direct effect on B, only the likelihood of it, the nature and characteristics of the interconnections certainly enables direct, indirect, delayed, and cascading effects among the interacting units of a system.

Clausewitz said, “war is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy.”<sup>9</sup> The effects of these explosions of energy are also variable. Thus, complex war and conflict systems exhibit several types of effects, which can be categorized as direct, indirect, delayed, and cascading. Direct effects are the simplest types of effects. They represent a direct causal relationship between an interacting unit injecting energy into the system and an immediate result exhibited on another interacting unit, interconnection, or the system itself. For example, strategic bombing in World War II exhibited some direct effects. The bombers delivered bombs to their targets, and the immediate destruction was the direct effect of the bombing mission.

Indirect effects are system effects, where one interacting agent injects energy into the system and that injection of energy affects other agents “far removed” from the initiator. These types of effects are not additive, and many of these indirect effects are unintended consequences of the initiating action.<sup>10</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower captured the essence of indirect effects when he said, “Anyone who becomes immersed in international affairs soon realizes that no important issue exists in isolation; rarely is it

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<sup>8</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 17.

<sup>9</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 29.

only bilateral.”<sup>11</sup> This character of indirect effects means that there is more than just a strictly cause and effect relationship between two, interacting agents. If one agent injects energy into the system and acts upon another, there will certainly be direct effects from that interaction. However, there will also be other indirect effects not directly related to the injection of energy. Continuing the strategic bombing analogy, bombing missions delivered indirect system effects as well. The destruction of some bombing targets affected the German economy and thereby their ability to produce weapons and materiel for the war effort. The resulting reduction in the German economic output was not a direct effect of the bombing but an indirect effect based on the resulting reduction in capability and capacity of the German economic system. This disruption constituted second, third, fourth, or larger-order effects from the direct bombing actions.

Delayed effects can be either direct or indirect. The length of time associated with the effect does not matter. Delay means simply that effects do not immediately manifest themselves as the result of an energy injection into the system. For example, direct, delayed effects are the causal result of an injection of energy into the system, but the effect becomes manifest after a period of time. Indirect effects are not, however the direct result of the energy injection. Their results also become manifest after a period of time following the causal injection of energy into the system. The election of the President of the United States gives a perfect example of a direct, delayed effect. It is a direct result of the voters casting their ballots for a candidate, which translates into the make-up of electors in the Electoral College. This injection of energy into the system through voting directly causes the assumption of office by a new President, even though the effect, the new President’s taking office, is delayed. This same injection of voting energy also displays delayed, indirect effects, such as the newly elected President’s adoption of new policies and a new administration.

Aside from delayed and indirect effects, systems also display a third type of effect, which is not normally equated with linear or causal logic, cascading effects. Jervis describes this phenomenon as it relates to “chains of consequences.”<sup>12</sup> He says that an

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<sup>11</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, vol. 1, *Mandate for Change: 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 409.

<sup>12</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 10.

actor's injection of energy into a system never has one effect. It has multiple effects outside of the direct causal relationship.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, no matter how well an actor understands the actors in a system, their interconnections, and the system structure, injections of energy will always have primary, secondary, and tertiary effects. This becomes especially true when no action by a system actor is taken in isolation from other injections of energy into the system. Such injections exist in parallel, in conflict, in complement, and in congruence with each other. Jervis captures it well when he discusses system resilience and the consequences of disruption due to nodal destruction. "Because most systems have either been designed to cope with adversity or have evolved in the face of it, breakage or overload at one point rarely destroys them. It will, however, produce disturbances at other points. Furthermore, while the extensive interconnections in the system made it flexible, it also meant that disruptions could spread throughout the system."<sup>14</sup>

In addition to the set of interconnecting units that exhibit effects based on their interconnections and time, Jervis also said that to qualify as a system the set of interconnecting units had to exhibit another quality. His second system criterion was that, "the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts."<sup>15</sup> This characteristic of systems falls under the category of emergent properties.

While emergent properties are not intuitive, they do not exist in the realm of fantasy or witchcraft. They are normally either quantifiable or qualifiable, and they are usually observable. They are not, however, additive. Emergent properties of systems normally cannot be inferred from the character of their interacting parts or the addition of the interacting parts. A person with significant knowledge of the system may be able to deduce a future emergent quality, but simple analysis will not lead directly to it. Therefore, the analysis of emergent properties exists in a holistic, rather than a reductionist, analysis of the system itself. In some cases, these emergent qualities could categorize as either exogenous or structural influences on the bounded system under

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<sup>13</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 10.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 19.

<sup>15</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 4.

consideration, which will be discussed below. Francisco Ayala provides a useful example of emergent properties in physics and chemistry by pointing out the characteristics of benzene versus its constituent interacting parts. "Can the properties of complex systems be inferred from knowledge of the properties that their component parts have in isolation? For example, can the properties of benzene be predicted from knowledge about oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon? No matter how exhaustively an object is studied in isolation, there is usually no way to ascertain all the properties that it may have in association with any other object."<sup>16</sup> Clausewitz also notes that emergent properties exist in complex war and conflict systems. "The scale of a victory does not increase simply at a rate commensurate with the increase in size of the defeated armies, but progressively. The outcome of a major battle has a greater psychological effect on the loser than the winner. This, in turn, gives rise to additional loss of material strength [through abandonment of weapons in a retreat or desertions from the army], which is echoed in loss of morale; the other two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies the other."<sup>17</sup>

As noted above, systems have structure, which relates to system effects and is a driving force in them, as well. Structure is distinct from the level of the interacting units, and for any theory or model to be systemic, it must account for and make distinctions among these levels.<sup>18</sup> Waltz says that at its most basic level structure defines and codifies the ordering of the system's interacting parts.<sup>19</sup> Structure is not, however, that simple. While the ordering and arrangement of the system's interacting units restrains and constrains those units' actions, the environment in which they exist exhibits constraining and restraining actions as well. The environment and arrangement of system bodies constitutes structure. Jervis describes this phenomenon as the holistic nature of

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<sup>16</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 15. Francisco Ayala, "Biological Reductionism: The Problem and Some Answers," in F. Eugene Yates, ed., *Self-Organizing Systems* (New York: Plenum, 1987), 318.

<sup>17</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 253.

<sup>18</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 40.

<sup>19</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 81.

the system itself affecting, changing, and influencing the characteristics of the system's individual interacting units.<sup>20</sup>

Waltz's description of the anarchic nature of the international system provides an example of structure.<sup>21</sup> In his example, the system's main interacting units are nation-states. He does not account for other actors in the international system, such as transnational terrorist organizations or transnational criminal organizations, likely for the sake of simplicity and a focus on international politics. While these types of organizations are actors in the system, they are not the primary actors that can cause immediate, system-wide change. While transnational criminal organizations and terror organizations can change the system state, their effects are normally limited compared to those of nation-states. In Waltz's model where nation-states as the primary actors in the international system, the system under analysis is bounded by the limits of the planet Earth. This international system exists in a state of anarchy, meaning that there is no supreme, supranational governing body, international law enforcement body, or punitive body that binds a state's sovereignty. This system structure of anarchy constrains and restrains a nation-state's behavior in their relations with other states and the international community.<sup>22</sup> "Agents and agencies act; systems as wholes do not. But the actions of agents and agencies are affected by the system's structure. In itself a structure does not directly lead to one outcome rather than another. Structure affects behavior within the system, but does so indirectly."<sup>23</sup>

Alexander Wendt also divides a system's structure's effects on the system into two categories, causal effects and constitutive effects.<sup>24</sup> A structure's causal effects are exactly what they appear to be like. Changes in the system state directly follow injections of energy provided by the system structure or due to its constraining and restraining properties on system actors. Constitutive effects are more nebulous. Constitutive effects become manifest where the characteristics of the system structure

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<sup>20</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 16.

<sup>21</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 66.

<sup>22</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 66.


<sup>23</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 74.

<sup>24</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 165.

directly cause changes in the internal characteristics of the system actors.<sup>25</sup> “The failure to appreciate the fact that the behavior of the actors is in part responsible for the environment which later impinges on them can lead observers—and actors as well—to underestimate [the system’s and the] actors’ influence.”<sup>26</sup>

In addition to interacting elements, interconnections, and structure combined with the different types of system effects, there are several other important concepts to consider. The following concepts relate to how theorists analyze and study systems. The phase space is the first discussed.

Phase spaces are non-real spaces, which may take several forms. For example, some analysts use two and three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate planes as phase spaces. In this type of space, each point contains all of the possible characteristics of a given system. The “x,” “y,” and “z” dimensions are treated as measurable characteristics. For example, a two-dimensional Cartesian plane can represent the entire system for a simple pendulum. In this phase space, the “x” coordinate represents velocity of the pendulum, and the “y” coordinate represents the pendulum’s position. The resulting graph of the system characteristics is either a spiral or circle, a spiral ending at the origin if the system accounts for friction. Ultimately, plotting the change in system



<sup>25</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 165.


<sup>26</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, 56.

characteristics over time in a phase space results in both a graphical representation of the history of the system and a powerful tool for predicting future system change.<sup>27</sup> It is important to account for time in phase spaces and modeling.

Figure 1: Example Pendulum Phase Space

Source: James Gleick, *Chaos*, 137.

Using a two-dimensional phase space seems simple enough, but what happens when analysts begin including additional characteristics? For example, the pendulum's system could include a nudging force to overcome the effects of air resistance. With this nudge, the pendulum becomes a rotor, which a three-dimensional coordinate system can represent. The first two coordinates remain the same, velocity and position. However, the “z” coordinate now represents the energy added to keep the pendulum swinging. This construction of a phase space captures all of the elements of the simple system, represented graphically below. As the rotor spins, it traces a line through phase space, where each point on the line contains the entirety of the information available about the system. As it receives its energy input, it continues to spin and move along through the three dimensional space. The entire history of the system is contained in the space.<sup>28</sup>



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<sup>27</sup> James Gleick, *Chaos: Making a New Science*, (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 48-52, 136-137.

<sup>28</sup> James Gleick, *Chaos*, 140-143.

Figure 2: Example Rotor Phase Space

Source: James Gleick, *Chaos*, 143.

Three characteristics seem simple enough, but this is where the simplicity ends. How does an analyst account for more than three elements? What about systems that contain five, or ten, or thousands of elements? An analyst could take the three dimensional phase space and add more dimensions to it. The diagram below is a modification of a phase space from the CIA Analyst Tradecraft Primer.<sup>29</sup> It accounts for six continuously moving characteristics.

Forbes Variation on Futures Analysis  
Figure 1




Figure 3: Modification of Alternative Futures Analysis

Source: Author's original work derived from the CIA Tradecraft primer.

<sup>29</sup> United States Government, Central Intelligence Agency, *A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis*, March 2009, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf>.

However, this type of space does not show smooth change over time, as any significant change in the system could see instantaneous jumps of system points from one side of the space to another. The resultant graph would likely have periods of stability in one portion of the space, but it could also just as easily have a “fog” of points all over the space. This is the key problem with phase spaces and complex social systems. The addition of characteristics to measure quickly becomes difficult to visualize and measure simultaneously.

To get around this limitation analysts use models. In its ideal form, a model should be a phase space, encompassing all of the systems factors and tracking its changes over time. However, such comprehensiveness is not possible. Models are approximations, or could be considered significantly limited phase spaces. Many theorists have already reached this conclusion. Waltz sums it up best.

"Reality" will be congruent neither with a theory nor with a model that may represent it. Because political scientists often think that the best model is the one that reflects reality most accurately, further discussion is needed. Model is used in two principal ways. In one sense a model represents a theory. In another sense a model pictures reality while simplifying it, say, through omission or through reduction of scale. If such a model departs too far from reality, it becomes useless. A model of a theory will be about as far removed from reality as the theory it represents. In modeling a theory, one looks for suggestive ways of depicting the theory, and not the reality it deals with. The model then presents the theory, with its theoretical notions necessarily omitted, whether through organismic, mechanical, mathematical, or other expressions. Theory explains some part of reality and is therefore distinct from the reality it explains. If the distinction is preserved, it becomes obvious that induction from observables cannot in itself yield a theory that explains the observed.<sup>30</sup>

This distinction between modeling theory and modeling reality is important for the discussion of phase spaces. The phase spaces discussed above depict reality, and the model this thesis constructs in the next chapter attempts to depict reality, as well. It is

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<sup>30</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 6-7.

also important to note that the model is not reality.<sup>31</sup> A model is a simplified depiction of the relevant aspects of the analysis of the reality, and as such, it is not the only model that could depict reality. The closer the model gets to reality, the closer it gets to achieving the status of phase space, rather than a reduced phase space.<sup>32</sup>

The final aspect of systems theory considered here is strange attractors. Strange attractors are sets of system characteristics that exhibit stability or slight oscillation.<sup>33</sup> In simple systems the concept of stability is fairly simple. The concept of stability in highly complex social systems or the international system, however, is something else entirely. In fact, stability means different things to different analysts. Herein, Jervis's definition of system stability suffices. He said a system is "unstable if its dynamics make it prone to experience changes-especially wars-that are so large that they will alter such basic characteristics as the number, arrangement, and goals of the [actors] that in turn affect many patterns of behavior." In essence, for the system to be stable, it must have not have dynamics that drastically alter the number, interests, or orientation of the actors in the system. It is important to note that this definition of stability does not make a distinction about stability in war or peace. Thus, a constant state of war or violence could conceivably constitute stability, and thus a lack of changing dynamics, or a strange attractor.

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<sup>31</sup> John F. Schmitt, "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design," *Thoughts on the Operational Art*, (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, October 2006), 4.

<sup>32</sup> John F. Schmitt, "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design," 25-56.

<sup>33</sup> James Gleick, *Chaos*, 136-137.

## Chapter 3

### Model Explanation and Construction

*The way to deal with a complex operational situation is to carry out a heuristic operational design to provide a logical foundation for all planning and execution, and continuously to assess and revise the design over time in response to changes in the situation. As the design evolves, so too will plans and actions.*

John F. Schmitt

This chapter describes the general systemic model used to analyze the Boko Haram insurgency in the following chapters. It builds upon the concepts discussed in the Chapter Two, melding them into a usable model that accounts for changing system states over time. Ultimately, these “snapshots” in time account for partially stable system states that have endogenous, exogenous, and structural states acting on them, which produce changes to the state. It begins with a discussion of systems thinking and follows with the step-by-step construction of the model. It ends with the general representation of the finished model.

### Systems Thinking

Systems thinking is the process of applying systems theory to complex phenomena. At its most basic level, systems thinking means looking at phenomena as a series of interconnected, interacting elements of a complex whole that exhibits non-additive properties and conditions from the interacting elements. Placing these elements into a broader environment and then understanding that the elements and their environment influence and receive influence from the international system ensures that systems thinking applies to the human situation. In essence, it is the mental discipline of applying Jervis’s definition of systems to the real world and understanding that no system, aside from the universe, exists in isolation.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> John F. Schmitt, “A Systemic Concept for Operational Design,” 11, 23-24.

Systems thinking helps theorists and analysts construct conceptual models. Schmitt describes the basis for these models as sets of “discourse” undertaken by teams studying complex problems.<sup>2</sup> In the case of Nigeria, no such team exists. Chapter Four’s narrative of the history and problem situation, therefore, stands in place of the discourses. As discussed in Chapter Two, a model’s utility becomes more powerful as it becomes more detailed, with the most powerful models achieving the nature of a phase space.<sup>3</sup> However, when dealing with complex social phenomena, more than one model may represent the reality on the ground. The ideal model has enough detail and fidelity to represent accurately the salient factors affecting the reality. It does not, however, have to embrace all the variables affecting that reality.

### **Model Building**

The first step in building this thesis model is identifying the model’s boundaries. Boundaries exist in three types, system, environmental, and structural. Boundaries are not physical phenomena, and they are certainly not impermeable walls. They are mental constructs of semi-permeable “membranes” that attempt to limit the scale of the system under analysis.<sup>4</sup> As such, system boundaries do not, either directly or indirectly, limit the system’s contact with exogenous influences or structural influences. Schmitt’s depiction below of a system provides a good starting point for the construction. Here, he shows that the system itself has a “purpose, structure, and process,” and it is surrounded by a boundary that does not necessarily limit its influence on and its ability to be influenced by its environment.

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<sup>2</sup> John F. Schmitt, “A Systemic Concept for Operational Design,” 26.

<sup>3</sup> John F. Schmitt, “A Systemic Concept for Operational Design,” 27.

<sup>4</sup> John F. Schmitt, “A Systemic Concept for Operational Design,” 24.




Figure 4: Example System Model

Source: John F. Schmitt, "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design," *Thoughts on the Operational Art*, (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, October 2006), 24.

If one adds this construction to the Waltzian concept of structure, which exists beyond the immediate system environment, one may visualize the result below. This additional




Figure 5: Example Structural System Model

Source: John F. Schmitt, "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design," *Thoughts on the Operational Art*, (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, October 2006), 24 and the author's original work.

structure boundary effectively differentiates between endogenous, exogenous, and structural differences discussed in Chapter Two. Endogenous influences exist within the system's artificial boundary. Exogenous influences are influences that affect the system from Schmitt's environment and vice versa. Finally, structural influences are influences that originate from the anarchic order of the international system, or in history the anarchical nature of the planet beyond the nation-state and transnational actors.

The model must also incorporate the interconnected and interacting elements of the system itself. It addresses how they are defined, interconnected, and where are they located. It also examines if they are inside the system boundary, exist as exogenous influences, or if the influencing factor is the nature of the international order? Jervis says the number and density of interconnections specifically affects the transmission of energy through the system thereby affecting the analyst's predictive ability, for this thesis's purpose the number and density of interconnections is important, especially combined with the nature of the energy input into the system.<sup>5</sup> Interconnections themselves, however, are nothing more than transmission lines. While their number and density has an influencing effect on the resultant effect of an energy injection into the system, they are not necessarily causative. For example, the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and familial nature of the relationship between Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany and Britain constituted a significant number of interconnections between the two sides prior to World War I. These interconnections likely influenced the magnitude of effects felt by one body in the system. For example, Wilhelm's injection of energy by implementing the Schlieffen Plan affected England in larger and more distinct ways than it affected Japan. While there were Germanic and Japanese interconnections, it could be posited that the number and density of the interconnections with Germany and England, versus the number and density of the interconnections of Germany and Japan, influenced the resultant effects on the interconnected and interacting bodies. Therefore, England's receipt of the effects from Germany's injection of energy, the Schlieffen Plan, was

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<sup>5</sup> Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 17.

significantly more profound than Japan's. The illustration below portrays these interconnections graphically.




Figure 6: Interconnections

*Source: Author's original work.*

As noted in the previous paragraph, the number and density of interconnections certainly influences system effects. However, for this model the nature of the energy input across the interconnections is more important. Once again, Schmitt gives us a starting point for this type of modeling. In his model below, he identifies actors and conditions present in an imaginary system. However, rather than specifically looking at the number and density of interconnections, he identifies the possible effect of the energy injected into the system as it acts across the relationship.




Figure 7: External Factors and System Effects

Source: John F. Schmitt, "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design," *Thoughts on the Operational Art*, (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, October 2006), 39.

For example, the instability present and the incompetence of the government, shown in the upper left portion of the model (Figure 7), probably reinforce crackdowns and popular grievances. Therefore, the actions of one agent or the increase or decrease in the presence of certain conditions influences other actors and conditions in the system. Understanding this phenomenon, the thesis uses an adaptation of this type of model to illustrate the relationships and interconnections for the system states in the subsequent chapters.

While Schmitt's model is exceptionally helpful, it does not account for large systemic changes over time. For example, it does not show the addition or subtraction of system actors or the changing system conditions throughout the life of the system, which combined are instability. This system is a snapshot of a relative state of stability in time. If the system becomes unstable and changes or other actors affect it, it is not considered. Therefore, to study historical influences or complex changing social phenomena, a few modifications are required. When those systems states become unstable or change significantly, another snapshot over time must be added to the model, ideally accounting for the endogenous, exogenous, or structural influence that caused the phase shift. The diagram below represents this idea.




Figure 8: Accounting for Time and System Changes

Source: John F. Schmitt, "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design," *Thoughts on the Operational Art*, (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, October 2006), 24 and the author's original work.

In the diagram above, time flows from left to right. Time (t) begins at  $t_0$  and flows to  $t_n$ . The changing system states exist through time from left to right, which covers the same mentally bounded system and its corresponding shifting states.

The diagram above (Figure 8) constitutes the final though generalized model employed throughout the rest of this paper. It covers endogenous and exogenous relationships in the bounded state, and it takes into account the structural influences of the anarchical international system. It certainly will provide insight into this complex social system under consideration.

## Chapter 4

### Nigeria: A Thematic Narrative

*The white man is very clever. He came quietly and peaceably with his religion. We were amused at his foolishness and allowed him to stay. Now he has won our brothers, and our clan can no longer act like one. He has put a knife on the things that held us together and we have fallen apart.*

Chinua Achebe

This chapter provides a thematic narrative of the Nigerian experience. It begins with a short chronological history of Nigeria to familiarize the reader with the basics of the ensuing narrative. It then organizes and categorizes the historical narrative into a thematic narrative for the systemic model. This thematic narrative divides the Nigerian historical narrative into chronological segments, or frames. These frames each encompass a period of time considered as a system state, which receives energy from exogenous, endogenous, or structural influences. The energy injection causes a phase shift in the system state to the following frame.

#### Orientation and Chronological History

Modern Nigeria is the relatively recent creation of many influences, interlopers, and forces. Its current borders are the result of western imagination, but its current state of conflict is only partially due to western influence. Contrary to Chinua Achebe's assertion above, the region's history shows that Nigeria and the people residing within its borders are no strangers to conflict, strife, and atrocity. Nigerian history contains many divisions and subtle changes, but for this thesis, it divides primarily among several major periods: Pre-Islamic history and Islam's arrival, the arrival of Europeans, Jihad and Islamic schisms, European colonization and indirect rule, decolonization, regime change, civil war, states of flux, and contemporary Nigeria.

Prior to the introduction of Islam and other influences from northern Africa, the Nigerian region began as a conglomeration of local tribes and ethnic groups. Over 250 ethnic groups exist in contemporary Nigeria; and they all have traditions, histories, and

identities that reach into the distant past.<sup>1</sup> The first known human remains emerged in southwestern Nigeria, dated to approximately 9000 BCE.<sup>2</sup> However, in the northeastern reaches of the country, Boko Haram's area of operations, the first signs of human life date from 3000-2000 BCE.

Islam's introduction into the region began to show significant influences throughout the Lake Chad region and the areas that make up modern northern Nigeria as early as the eleventh century. Later centralized states emerged, and by 1500 CE, these centralized states included the Kanem-Borno Empire near Lake Chad and the Hausa states in north-central Nigeria. While Islam was a powerful influence in the region, it was not a panacea of control. It did not unite the people, and it did not permeate all of the societies in these regions.

The existing Islamic states received a major shock along their southern frontiers with the introduction of European sea trade. This introduction almost singlehandedly turned the focus of the people southward and away from the historic trade routes through the Sahara. The overseas markets for slaves and other trade goods were simply too good to pass up, and they caused significant changes in the region's economics and socio-cultural dynamics.

The conglomeration of influences on his society caused Shehu Usman dan Fodio to respond. Dan Fodio's early nineteenth century jihad changed the face of Nigeria. The resulting Sokoto Caliphate united many of the Hausa kingdoms and waged war against the people of Kanem-Borno. It attempted to install a pure form of Islam throughout northern Nigeria. Its results and influences show through in modern Nigerian society today. For example, many of the resulting offices and aristocrats established to govern the caliphate are still existing traditional offices that wield great influence, though not often actual political authority.

While establishment of the caliphate represented a powerful shift in the Nigerian system, it was not long lived. It succumbed to its own influences and the arrival of overwhelming exogenous forces, in the form of European colonization. While European

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<sup>1</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 17.

<sup>2</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 18.

presence in the region through trade was nothing new, colonial designs and the need to counter other European powers throughout Africa compelled the British to expand their operations in Nigeria. Their subsequent invocation of the “hinterland rule” and “indirect rule” produced another massive shift in the Nigerian system state. As such, the Nigerian region saw the rampant expansion of Christianity in the south, the stagnation of the north, the emplacement of an extractive economy, and the subjugation of the region to British influence.

After the conclusion of World War II, the British left Nigeria. While they tried to make the country a self-sustaining state prior to their departure, they were not successful. The periods after decolonization saw the results of the divisions in Nigerian society spring into full view. Corruption, mismanagement, fears of domination, religious feuds, ethnic feuds, and other strife combined with the complex historical influences ultimately led to regime changes, civil war, and military rule.

While these dark times are over, Nigeria today may or may not be in a better state. Economic mismanagement, corruption, terrorism, and insurgency plague the quasi-nation. Once again, these modern influences, combined with deep-seated societal divisions, may be another recipe for disaster.

### **Chronological Thematic History**

This portion of the chapter places the Nigerian historical narrative into its appropriate thematic groups. These groupings allow for the narrative’s inclusion into the systems model in the subsequent chapters. Ultimately, this organization and grouping begins in pre-Islamic Nigeria and proceeds through several system states through to the present day.

#### **Pre-Islam, Islam’s Arrival, and Trade Routes (Frame 1)**

This portion of the narrative lays the background and establishes the model’s initial system state. It moves through three main factors: the rise of states, the introduction of Islam, and the importance of trade. None of these factors, however, is independent of the others, so the ordering in the narrative is arbitrary. The first portion discusses the rise of centralized states. It begins with a discussion of the areas around

Lake Chad and then moves to northwestern and north-central Nigeria. It then describes the arrival of Islam across the overland trade routes and its importance in the rise of the centralized states. Finally, it discusses trade and its relation to the development of some of the region's economic and social factors.

To begin, the people living within the geographic bounds of what the west refers to as Nigeria speak many different languages, retain many different historical memories, and identify with many different social groups, all of which reach deep into the past.<sup>3</sup> Archaeological findings date the first known humans to the Iwo Eleru rock shelters in southwestern Nigeria about 9000 BCE.<sup>4</sup> Further evidence from the Daima and Kursakata, areas around in the Lake Chad region in the extreme northeast of the country, shows that locals possessed domesticated animals between 3000-2000 BCE.<sup>5</sup> Some scholars said this period encompassing the emergence of sedentary agricultural lifestyles was the beginning for many of the unique social identities and language groups that compose present-day Nigeria. Over time some of these sedentary societies evolved into “decentralized state systems, while others developed into the first large scale centralized states by 1100 CE.” Many of these centralized states incorporated the cultural identities of many different village groups.<sup>6</sup>

These centralized states all claimed different historical origins, some of them likely mythical and some likely based on more concrete historical events. For example, to the northeast of Lake Chad, the Kanuri (the primary tribe providing Boko Haram's membership) claim to be descendants from Saharan migrants, known as the Zaghawa, intermarrying with local people. The Kanuri further claim that the descendants of this union united the Kanuri people around 700 CE.<sup>7</sup> Their centralized government created and maintained the city of Kanem, while gaining significant amounts of wealth from both

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<sup>3</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 17.

<sup>4</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 18.

<sup>5</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 19.

<sup>6</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 21.

<sup>7</sup> Dierk Lange, “Ethnogenesis from within the Chadic State: Some Thoughts on the History of Kanem-Borno,” *Paideuma* 39: 261-277, 1993, [www.dierklange.com](http://www.dierklange.com), 263.

agricultural pursuits and its strategic location along trans-Saharan trade routes linking the Nigerian region with northern Africa.<sup>8</sup>

Kanem organized its political system around the mai, a “hereditary monarchical ruler,” of the Saifawa dynasty.<sup>9</sup> Kanem’s wealth and its centralized society also allowed it to create a standing army, which it used to dominate its surrounding neighbors expanding throughout the lands to the south, southeast, and north of Lake Chad. Some scholars describe them as having attained the status of full empire by the thirteenth century, collecting taxes and reaping resources from the areas under its control.<sup>10</sup>

Kanem soon began to experience significant destabilizing pressures from within and without. Unstable Saifawa dynastic politics caused numerous internal struggles for control within the dynasty. These struggles combined with revolting populations, such as the Balula, helped to destabilize the state. The Balula revolt was so successful that the Saifawa abandoned the area, migrating to the western side of Lake Chad. There they established a new city, Gazargamu, on another trade route, allowing the Saifawa to regain much of their lost wealth. By the fifteenth century, Mai Idris Aloma reconquered much of the Saifawa territory lost to the Balula. This reconquest paved the way for the emergence of a new combined empire, Kanem-Borno.<sup>11</sup>

The Hausa states emerged much later than the Kanem-Borno Empire. Their origination story claims Bayajidda, the son of a Baghdadi king, married the daughter of a Borno mai after fleeing Baghdad because of a conflict with his father.<sup>12</sup> While the Hausa may have had a foundation for the emergence of their state by the eighth or ninth century, the state itself emerged in the fifteenth and sixteenth century due to a combination of factors. To the west, the fall of the Malian empire in the fifteenth century and the fall of the empire of Songhay in the sixteenth century left a significant power vacuum along major trade routes. This probably caused the primary trade routes and their cargo to shift

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<sup>8</sup> Dierk Lange, “Ethnogenesis,” *Paideuma*, 263-264. Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 26-27. “Borno State,” *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015, [www.onlinenigeria.com/links/bornoadv.asp?blurb=223](http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/bornoadv.asp?blurb=223).

<sup>9</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 26.

<sup>10</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 26-27.

<sup>11</sup> Dierk Lange, “Ethnogenesis,” *Paideuma*, 263-264. Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 26-27. “Borno State,” *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

<sup>12</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 28.

eastward into Hausa areas. The instability caused by the movement of the Kanuri to western Lake Chad may also have caused a shift in trade to the western routes from the east. The resulting shifting focus of trade into the areas controlled by the Hausa probably provided a significant stimulus for the emergence of the Hausa states.<sup>13</sup>

The evolution of Hausa states differed from the Kanuri most distinctly in that they did not create a single, monolithic empire. Instead, the Hausa states consisted of many completely autonomous states, originating from the indigenous local people and the influences of nomadic Fulani pastoralists. While the Fulani were not of the same ethnic group as the Hausa, their nomadic nature allowed them to maintain contact with many other areas and it provided them with more links to trade. Furthermore, after the fall of the empires of Mali and Songhay, significant portions of their populations migrated from the western Sudan and took up residence in the Hausa states. While the Hausa states shared a common language and later shared a pseudo-common Islamic religion, each of the individual Hausa people likely identified with their particular state of origin. For instance, a person from Kano or Gobir would probably identify with that state instead of an overarching ethnic group. Historians call the conglomeration of these individual identities and independent states Hausaland.<sup>14</sup>

Aside from the near-simultaneous rise of states, the arrival of Islam into the Nigerian region was one of the most important factors in the rise and fall of at least one empire and the resulting Nigerian system states.<sup>15</sup> Considering the history of the region and the conditions on the ground today, it is safe to say that it was one of the commanding influences. Islam's arrival and emergence had dramatic effects on the historical and contemporary states of the region and people, and it is likely to have a profound effect on the future states as well.

Islam's movement to the Nigerian region passed across established trans-Saharan trade routes.<sup>16</sup> While these trade routes were not completely static, their geographic

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<sup>13</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 28.

<sup>14</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 28-30. "Borno State," *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

<sup>15</sup> Dierk Lange, "Ethnogenesis," *Paideuma*, 265.

<sup>16</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, (New York, New York: I.B. Taurus and Company, Ltd., 2015), 29.

shifts over time coincided with and influenced the shifts in the geographic movement and the political rise and fall of states and empires in the Nigerian region. For example, groups like the Fatimids, Almoravids, and Almohads spread Islam along the northern bounds of the Sahara and the central and eastern bounds of the desert as well. They moved from city to city, Tripoli, to Fez, to Awdaghust; and they moved from oasis to oasis, Awjila, to Bilma, to Agadez. This movement along established and shifting trade routes provided lines of communication to the Nigerian region for Islamic influences, which would ultimately be both a boon and a burden to the modern state.<sup>17</sup>

Scholars believe that Islam first appeared in the Nigerian region when Mai Humai converted as the ruler of Kanem in the eleventh century, perhaps 1075-1085.<sup>18</sup> Islam probably moved across the eastern and central Saharan trade routes passing from Egypt and Tripoli to Bilma and Kavar. Ultimately, both of these routes terminated in the regions around Lake Chad, also known as the Kanem-Borno Empire.<sup>19</sup>

While this may have been the first documented appearance, Islam also moved simultaneously along the northern, western, and central Saharan trade routes. These paths allowed Islamic traders and pastoral migrant influences to pass throughout the region. Islam first touched the Kanem-Borno Empire, but its movement through other trade routes caused a double envelopment of the north-central Nigerian region. This envelopment influenced the Mali, and later the Songhay, empires of the western Sudan. Ultimately, these influences, combined with the influences from the pastoral Islamic Fulani and the conversion and influence of Kanem-Borno, created a three-pronged assault into Hausaland. This region received Islam directly from trading to the west and north and was influenced from the east by Kanem-Borno. It was a perfect storm of religious movement into the modern Nigerian region.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Mervin Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, (New York, New York: Longman Groups Limited, 1984), 24-42.

<sup>18</sup> Dierk Lange, "Ethnogenesis," *Paideuma*, 269-270. Mervin Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, 59.

<sup>19</sup> Mervin Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, 59, 320.

<sup>20</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 29-30. Dierk Lange, "Ethnogenesis," *Paideuma*, 269-270. "Borno State," *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015. Mervin Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, 59, 320.

The first Hausa ruler to convert to Islam was Yaji of Kano around 1370. Following this initial conversion, the rest of the decentralized Hausa states began to experience the influences of Islam and convert for different reasons. By the mid-seventeenth century, all of them had converted, and Islam was the dominant religion in the northern region of Nigeria. Islam did not, however, penetrate the forested regions of central and southern Nigeria, probably because the tribal and ethnic peoples of this region did not have either a common language or heritage with the north. When these issues are combined with the fact that the southern reaches held different religious beliefs, and some of the enduring cleavages and schisms in Nigeria show through in stark relief.<sup>21</sup>

While some of the Nigerian region's early converts to Islam may have been true believers, many of them, especially in the ruling class, saw the advantages to be gained through the adoption of Islam. For example, Islam brought political advantages to the rulers of Hausaland and Kanem-Borno. Their conversion reinforced an interconnection with other local rulers, the northern Sahara, the Middle East, and Europe. This allowed them to call on allies in the name of Islam when they needed aid. The standing rituals of Islam, such as the Hajj, also reinforced the Nigerian states' connection to culture and wealth in other parts of Africa and the Middle East. Finally, the replacement of polytheistic, local religions and animism with a monotheistic religion centered on the rulers gave those ruling classes "access" to spiritual knowledge and other forms of legitimacy with which to preserve their control.<sup>22</sup>

While Islam's influence cannot be overstated, several important points should be noted about its adoption. First, simply because Mai Humai of Kanem converted to Islam did not mean that all of his subjects or the people that lived in his realm converted to Islam.<sup>23</sup> Many of them maintained their traditional religions. The conversion of the people took time, and many of the conversions were forced. Second, the adoption of Islam by a ruler for the benefits it brought did not necessarily mean the ruler also suppressed or renounced his own traditional religions. Many of the rulers of the Nigerian

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<sup>21</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 29-30. "Borno State," *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

<sup>22</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 29-32. "Borno State," *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

<sup>23</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 29-30.

states were pragmatists. They attempted to maximize their methods of control by any means necessary, including religion. Adopting Islam reinforced their external connections, but maintaining their local native religions kept their internal controls strong. Third, the Islam that the converts of the Nigerian region practiced was not a pure form of Islam. Here, pure Islam means that form of Islam that the Prophet Muhammad and his followers practiced, which legend says was the Islam practiced by the Arab Muslims of the Middle East and north Africa. The local versions of Islam became amalgamations of Islam and the native religions, and they changed and adapted to the people and the governments practicing them.<sup>24</sup>

As discussed above, trade and trade routes had a significant influence on the development of the Nigerian region. These routes served as lines of communication across the Sahara to northern Africa and to the Middle East. They also provided paths for Islam's expansion into the region. It is also important to note some of the particular goods that moved across these overland routes prior to the introduction of trans-Atlantic trade and European shipping.

Trade in Nigeria revolved around several different commodities. The surpluses in foodstuffs provided by centralized, agrarian economies and textile manufacturing provided part of a sturdy economic base. Salt, leather goods, horses, and weapons made their way from Nigeria to the Middle East and Europe. The two most important commodities exported from the Nigerian region, however, were gold and slaves.<sup>25</sup> While gold was always valuable, it gained importance in the centralized states when many of these states started to use gold as their primary currency.<sup>26</sup> Besides gold, slaves were one of the most profitable and dominant trade goods. Slavery existed as an institution in Nigeria long before the arrival of Europeans and the establishment of the trans-Atlantic slave markets on the Nigerian coast. Mali, Songhay, Hausaland, and Kanem-Borno all participated in and entrenched the institution of slavery in the societies of the region.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 32. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 29.

<sup>25</sup> Peter Baxter, "Biafra: The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970," *Africa at War, Volume XVI*, (England: Helion and Company, 2015), 4.

<sup>26</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 33. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 31-32.

<sup>27</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 44.

Prior to the main European arrivals along the coast in the fifteenth century, however, slavery and slave trading retained a different character than the “chattel” form of slavery associated with the European slave trade. Mervin Hiskett described the trans-Saharan trade as distinctly Islamic in character.<sup>28</sup> By this statement, he meant that Islam provided rules for slaves and the slave trade and that the predominant people involved at that time were Islamic nations acting under these rules.<sup>29</sup>

While these findings are certainly valid, there are other aspects to slavery and slave trading that must be taken into account. First, the tensions arising from the proximity of the nations of Hausaland and the Kanem-Borno Empire as well as their competition for trade caused regular wars and conflicts between the two societies. One of the benefits of this continued conflict was that the victor gained large amounts of slaves. These slaves then were either kept or traded. In some cases slave raiding became both a tactic and a goal between warring parties.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, while Islam had rules for the treatment of slaves, not all slaves experienced slavery in the same way.<sup>31</sup> Depending on their owners, some slaves gained an amount of status and social mobility. But, in some cases earning the ire of their masters subjected other slaves to horrible punishments at their master’s whims.<sup>32</sup>

### **Trade History and the Arrival of Europeans (Frame 2)**

While Europeans knew of and had interactions with Africa prior to the 1400s, they arrived in force around the late fifteenth century and began to shift the region’s system state.<sup>33</sup> Europeans came to the southern coasts, and they wanted the same things that others wanted. They came for gold, textiles, food, and slaves. Slaves and the European version of the slave trade dominated the coast by the seventeenth century.<sup>34</sup> By the eighteenth century, the Hausaland slave trade had turned almost exclusively southward to the coasts, where humans were the equivalent of cowry shells, brass,

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<sup>28</sup> Mervin Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, 101.

<sup>29</sup> Mervin Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, 98-104.

<sup>30</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 39.

<sup>31</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 40, 59-60.

<sup>32</sup> Mervin Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, 98-104.

<sup>33</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 40.

<sup>34</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 40.

firearms, ammunition, textiles, and beads. By the nineteenth century, the southern coast slave trade was a major economic factor in most of the societies of the Nigerian region.<sup>35</sup>

### **Jihad and Islamic Schisms (Frame 3)**

In addition to growing trade and the increasing presence of Europeans in Nigeria, the nineteenth century also saw one of the greatest upheavals in Nigerian history. This event brought war and social change sweeping through a massive swath of the country, and its outcomes and consequences are still visible in contemporary Nigerian society. That change was Shehu (Sheik) Usman dan Fodio's jihad and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate.

A ruler's adoption of Islam did not imply that Islam's influences reached those rulers' governments, religious institutions, or the social aspects of their societies. Islam was neither the Nigerian rulers' way of life nor their people's. It existed in parallel with indigenous religions, and in some cases Islam blended with the local regions creating hybrid forms. Furthermore, the successors of some Islamic kings repudiated their predecessor's beliefs or conversions and returned their lands to indigenous religions. Falola and Heaton characterized the religious situation in Nigeria by saying, "since one of the principal beliefs of fundamental Islam is that society and government should be ordered solely upon the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad, Fulani clerics of the eighteenth century accused the ruling elite of the western and central Sudan of illegitimacy because of their inability or unwillingness to adopt wholesale Islamic governing principles and social mores."<sup>36</sup> This state of affairs laid much of the foundation for the jihad to follow.<sup>37</sup>

Usman dan Fodio was a Fulani cleric and one of the leaders of a movement that sought to reform the Hausa and Islamic societies by bringing them closer to what they perceived as Muhammad's ideal. During his travels, his oration and sermons gained many followers throughout the region's ethnic groups including the Hausa, the Fulani,

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<sup>35</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 48.

<sup>36</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 62-63.

<sup>37</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 32.

and the Tuareg. He believed in the establishment of a pure Islamic state, as the Prophet Muhammad created. He did not, however, immediately resort to war. He attempted to gain these Islamic reforms through the ruler's voluntary means rather than violence. To correct what he saw as the failure to adopt Sharia, the improper enslavement of Muslims, government corruption, improper dietary regulations, and numerous other violations he attempted to work through the system rather than overthrow it. He attempted to convince the Sultan of Gobir to "overturn excessive taxes,"<sup>38</sup> which the Sultan did when it became clear how numerous were dan Fodio's followers.<sup>39</sup> These reforms, however, were fleeting, as the next Sultan of Gobir sought to overturn the new reforms and combat dan Fodio's influence through violence.

This struggle for the control of government, society, and the people broke into open hostilities when the newest Sultan of Gobir, Yunfa, made an attempt on dan Fodio's life.<sup>40</sup> In response to this hostility, people who wanted to practice dan Fodio's form of Islam left Gobir. But, Yunfa used his military and forcibly repatriated them to his lands, killing many of them in the process. After witnessing these acts and being directly threatened by the Sultan, dan Fodio fled Gobir, on 21 February 1804. He referred to this flight from Gobir to Gudu as his very own hijra, alluding to the Prophet Muhammad's flight from Mecca to Medina.

After his arrival in Gudu, he began preparing for war. Yunfa and Gobir fell by 1808.<sup>41</sup> Gobir was only the beginning. Usman dan Fodio's jihad continued throughout the rest of Hausaland. Usman dan Fodio's hordes conquered all of the small, independent Hausa kingdoms by 1810. By the 1830s dan Fodio's Sokoto Caliphate ruled portions of the Kanem-Borno outskirts, and the Oye Empire fell before its onslaught. The new caliphate was one of the largest kingdoms to exist in west Africa, controlling Gobir, Zamfara, Kebbi, Jukun, Nupe, Kano, Zazzau, and Kitsina.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 64.

<sup>39</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 62-64.

<sup>40</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 64.

<sup>41</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 64-65.

<sup>42</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 9. Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 64-65. Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, (London, England: Newsweek Insights, 2014), 51. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Charles River Editors, 2015), <http://www.charlesrivereditors.com>, 2.

While this may sound like the beginning of a long-lasting empire, like many other things in Nigeria, it was short-lived. Shehu Usman dan Folio was the first caliph of the Sokoto Caliphate. He enlisted his two sons to run the functions of government. To do this they divided the caliphate into two regions, the eastern region governed by Muhammad Bello from Sokoto and the western region governed by Abdullahi from Gwandu. The caliphate divided each of these regions into sub-regions governed by generally autonomous emirs, who had to be approved by the caliph. That appeared to be a formality, as the caliph rarely denied the approval of an emir nominated by the local power brokers.<sup>43</sup> Muhammad Bello, his father's successor, also instituted several other institutions to reinforce the authority of the caliph and continue the centralization of the society. He emplaced a kind of political commissar and spy in each emirate, called a kofa. These kofa observed the emir and reported directly to the caliph on issues within the regions. Bello also established ribats, or fortresses, in the emirates. These fortresses were built to secure the "Dar al-Islam (the land of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (the land of war) [from] Dar al-Kufr (the land of non-believers)."<sup>44</sup> This arrangement ultimately resulted in a different government and social system, but it was not unlike the independent Hausa kingdoms of the past.<sup>45</sup>

These institutions and reforms did not end challenges to the caliph's authority, border wars, or insurrections within the caliphate. Many of the defeated Hausa kings fled to the north during the jihad, where they continued to wage war against the Sokoto Caliphate. War with Kanem-Borno was continuous, and the caliphate's attempts to expand southward were met with continuous resistance in the forested lands.<sup>46</sup> Internally, some emirs were unwilling to accept dictates from the central authority in Sokoto, and some were in open revolt. Emir Buhari of Hadeija, resisting the power of the caliph, fought open battles for personal power and glory with the caliphate on the borders

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<sup>43</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 65-66.

<sup>44</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 67.

<sup>45</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 65-7.

<sup>46</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 68.

of the Kanem-Borno Empire.<sup>47</sup> With the backing of Kanem-Borno, he waged a twelve-year long campaign against the caliph.<sup>48</sup>

Ultimately, dan Fodio's jihad swept through the Hausa kingdoms, bringing them all under one ruler. His reach even extended into some of the Kanem-Borno lands to the east, effectively dominating most of northern Nigeria. While he and his followers looked for a return to the pristine version of Islam, which they believed only Muhammad and his immediate followers practiced, they were ultimately unsuccessful. Furthermore, while dan Fodio believed that all of the people that answered his call desired a return to Islam's vision of purity, many actually desired more worldly material gains. However, the changes and influences they wrought on the northern lands helped not only to exacerbate the religious divide prevalent in modern Nigeria, but also to galvanize the northern people with a shared history and culture dependent on an Islamic state.<sup>49</sup>

Meanwhile, the Fulani jihad also had significant effects on the Kanem-Borno region. The jihad and its constant warfare, which allowed the jihadists to take over portions of Kanem-Borno, weakened the mai's control on the region. This allowed an Islamic scholar, Muhammed El-Amin Ibn El-Kanemi, to raise an army and overthrow the government, establishing the El-Kanemi dynasty. His dynasty was short-lived because in 1893, a Shuwa Arab named Rabeh took control, effectively destroying much of the Borno region in the process. He subsequently transferred the capital to Dikwa and took the title of Shehu, or sheik.<sup>50</sup>

#### **European Colonization / Indirect Rule (Frame 4)**

The Portuguese arrived in Lagos in 1472, and the increasing involvement and meddling of Europeans in African affairs through the latter half of the nineteenth century changed the social, political, and economic aspects of the area that would become modern-day Nigeria.<sup>51</sup> European involvement cemented and exacerbated ongoing cultural and social divides, and it emplaced systems of exploitation throughout the region.

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<sup>47</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 68.

<sup>48</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 69.

<sup>49</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 61-62, 73.

<sup>50</sup> "Borno State," *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

<sup>51</sup> Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 28.

These exploitative systems fundamentally changed the Nigerian landscape, and their effects can be seen in the contemporary system.

British, French, German, and other European influence in the Nigerian region were nothing new. The establishment of trading posts in southern Nigeria occurred many years prior to colonization. By 1884 the “Scramble for Africa,” driven by the outcome of the Berlin Conference, was in full swing, and the British in particular felt their interests would be best preserved by increasing their involvement in African affairs.<sup>52</sup> Otherwise, they might have lost their “dominant position” as compared to the other European powers in the region.<sup>53</sup>

Prior to the Berlin Conference, European influences through their contact at the southern ports and trading posts brought other changes. Christian missionaries arrived through these ports to preach and convert the people they saw as backward heathens. They brought with them not only European influences, but also European education, specifically British. They set up schools and taught the locals to read, write, and speak English, which eased trade and administration. The local leadership of the southern communities saw that adopting some European methods was good for communication and trade, which had the added benefit of helping to secure their power bases.<sup>54</sup>

The Berlin Conference simply made formal what was already occurring. Its main contribution was the formalized process that the European powers used to divide the African continent for their own material gains. The rules it laid out codified the long-standing norm of “treaties of protection,” protectorates, and “effective occupation.”<sup>55</sup> The European governments entered into “treaties of protection” with the local governments. These treaties created protectorates, which entitled the particular holder of the treaty to dominate the local areas and exploit its resources. These protectorates could be colonized by the “effective occupation” of the colony by military forces. The British obviously feared the ongoing influences of the French and Germans in the area, as they

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<sup>52</sup> The Berlin Conference of 1884 codified European imperialism, trade, and colonization in Africa, and it effectively divided Africa into areas of influence among many European nations.

<sup>53</sup> United States Government, *The World Factbook*, 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>. Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 87.

<sup>54</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 87-88.

<sup>55</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 93.

held heavy influence to the east in the borderlands of Kanem-Borno. Therefore, they took steps to solidify their hold on the lucrative areas and resources of the Nigerian region. It took them over forty years of trial and error, repression, direct control, and indirect control to bring Nigeria under their total dominance, but one factor stood out in their methods. They were always willing to use their superior military might.<sup>56</sup>

The British began colonizing Nigeria from the coasts inward. By 1885, they had centralized control of Lagos and began moving east and north, dealing with local tribes and ethnic groups along the way. The British understood that not only was the coast instrumental to control of Nigeria and its resources, but also to the river systems as well. As they moved inland and took over Yoruba lands, they used any means necessary to gain control. For example, when they met resistance from the Ije people, a subset of Yoruba, they brought overwhelming military force to bear, conquering the Ije in 1891, after only four days of fighting.<sup>57</sup> After they completed the domination of the southern peoples, they reached the Niger and Benue rivers. These natural formations formed a convenient boundary between the north and south that would have significant distinctions throughout the rest of Nigerian history. By 1900, the British controlled the Niger River, and they turned their attention to the regions of the Sokoto Caliphate to the north.<sup>58</sup>

In the far eastern portion of the country, Rabeh, the Shehu of Borno transferred his capital to Dikwa. Ongoing expansion of the British, French, and German areas of influence, along with the military and other pressures that it brought, caused the fragmentation and defeat of Borno. The majority of the areas under the control of the Shehu fell to the British, but outlying areas to the east and north went to the French and Germans. In 1902, the British placed Umar, the son of the former El-Kanemi dynasty, as the Shehu of Borno. But after the end of World War I, the reduced German influence in central Africa allowed the British also to emplace another Shehu in Dikwa. Thus, “Kanuri politics is dichotomized along this line even today!”<sup>59</sup>

By 1885 the British controlled the Niger Delta, but they had to cement their control of the other portions of the Niger and Benue against the advances of the French

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<sup>56</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 85-86, 93.

<sup>57</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 95.

<sup>58</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 93-95.

<sup>59</sup> “Borno State,” *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

and the Germans. Rather than attempting to establish another protectorate, they granted the National African Company, under Sir George Goldie, a royal charter in 1886.<sup>60</sup> The establishment of this charter marked a defining moment in the history of Nigeria. As the colonizing powers determined it, the charter gave the National African Company, later renamed the Royal Niger Company (RNC), the power to control the administration and government of any area in Nigeria where it could obtain a treaty with the locals. The RNC used this near monopoly to consolidate its hold on all of the trade on the Niger and Benue rivers.<sup>61</sup>

It began with legal maneuvering. Since it had treaties with most of the local tribes and groups in southern Nigeria, the RNC set the rules for travel and trade in the protected zones, which included the Niger and Benue. To minimize competition in trade, it emplaced a series of taxes for travel up and down the rivers. These taxes not only helped to keep out other European traders, but also shifted the advantage of trade away from locals and to the RNC. The effects of these policies were so oppressive to some of the indigenous groups that they caused open revolts, as in the case of the Brass people. The Brass was an ethnic group that relied on river trade for their survival. Working out of the southern mangrove swamps, they exported fish, salt, and other European items to the interior in exchange for foodstuffs. Because they could not afford the taxes emplaced by the RNC and their efforts at smuggling failed, they began to starve. The RNC's lack of concern for their plight caused the Brass to revolt. They attacked the company's headquarters, destroying warehouses and carrying off as much as they could, including several company employees. The Brass even ritualistically ate these employees in an attempt to stop a simultaneous smallpox epidemic in their communities.<sup>62</sup>

The RNC also took military action to shore up their position in Nigeria, because the French had not given up in their attempts to expand their influence into the region.<sup>63</sup> The British set up the West African Frontier Force under Sir Frederick Lugard, an

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<sup>60</sup> Peter Baxter, "Biafra," *Africa at War*, 4.

<sup>61</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 98-99. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 1-2.

<sup>62</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 101-102.

<sup>63</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 102-103.

accomplished colonial officer with prior service in Uganda.<sup>64</sup> Because of the RNC's effective monopoly on commerce in Nigeria and its ongoing efforts to shut out other British companies, the Colonial Office charged Lugard with conducting a campaign against the French independent of the RNC's influence.<sup>65</sup> These actions effectively broke the RNC's monopoly in Nigeria and resulted in the administrative consolidation of the Nigerian region into two large protectorates, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. The Colonial Office even went so far as to name Lugard the northern protectorate's first high commissioner.<sup>66</sup>

To secure his new protectorate, Lugard turned his attention to the Sokoto Caliphate, as the British focus on imperial control marked a decided shift in British policy from rule primarily through policy and law to rule by conquest. Thus, the Sokoto Caliphate's territory constituted a threat to the "safety and stability" of British interests for several reasons. First, the authority of the caliph in the territory constituted a threat to the British rule and Lugard's personal authority over the protectorate. Second, as an independent society the caliphate left open avenues for other European powers to gain influence through the region. The French controlled much of the territory directly north of the Sokoto Caliphate, and they were expanding throughout the areas of Western Sudan. Third, the British believed that competing interests and governments would further revolts in the region. In combination, all of these reasons led Lugard to conclude that the best measures of security could only be obtained by military conquest.<sup>67</sup>

The Sokoto Caliphate quickly and easily fell to the British onslaught. The caliphate had no standing army and was not able to put up a unified resistance. Furthermore, the caliphate's individual emirates were largely autonomous. This arrangement meant that the emirates generally fended for themselves while under attack, unless they worked with one of their immediate neighbors. Once conquered, the British brought the territories under control by emplacing rulers and leaders who supported

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<sup>64</sup> Peter Baxter, "Biafra," *Africa at War*, 2-3.

<sup>65</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 103.

<sup>66</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 103-104.

<sup>67</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 104-105.

British aims.<sup>68</sup> By 1904, not only was the conquest of Sokoto complete, but also the territories of Kanem-Borno.

To govern their territories, both previously and newly conquered, the British implemented a system of “indirect rule.” The basic mechanism of this system was to put a local face on the British government’s possessions and policies. In essence, it co-opted local and traditional rulers to enforce British mandates. The ones who cooperated prospered, and the ones that resisted were simply replaced.<sup>69</sup> While the particular implementation of system of “indirect rule” varied based on the British elements in charge of particular regions, its exploitative, extractive nature was common throughout. It also had the effect of “alienating” local rulers from their people, as the incentive structure shifted toward pleasing the colonial masters rather than the population. Furthermore, not playing by British rules often constituted a death sentence for those inclined to resist, as the British had no qualms about continuing to use violence to gain their ends.<sup>70</sup>

In the northern protectorate, Lugard governed by simply replacing the remnants of the Sokoto government with a British version. The emirs and chiefs of local regions retained their control under the British system. They were simply re-cast as extensions of British authority. Traditionally, these emirs reported to a kofa who oversaw their activities on behalf of the sultan and caliph. The British replaced the kofa with a British citizen who worked directly for Lugard.<sup>71</sup> In the southern protectorate, the system differed dramatically. The authorities there preferred to extend British social structures to administer the Nigerian regions. Therefore, they expanded British education, which was meant to make trade easier. They also propagated the idea of social services being provided to the people by the government.<sup>72</sup> Ultimately, these two different systems of “indirect rule” further cemented existing social schisms in Nigeria.

The British consolidated the northern and southern protectorates from 1912-1914, and Sir Frederick Lugard received the first appointment as governor general of the new,

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<sup>68</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 105.

<sup>69</sup> Peter Baxter, “Biafra,” *Africa at War*, 3, 6.

<sup>70</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 108-111.

<sup>71</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 115.

<sup>72</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 116.

unified Nigeria.<sup>73</sup> The rationale for combining societies that were completely different was economic. The British wanted to maximize the benefit of their extractive system, and to that end a single system was much more effective. Lugard began by implementing his northern style of “indirect rule” on the southern societies. In an interesting paradox, he thought that the existing system put entirely too much power into the hands of the colonial administrators. Therefore, in contrast to the existing system and traditional systems, he placed emirs as the kings and chiefs of the southern areas and invested them with responsibilities they had not previously held. He also mandated that these rulers receive compensation for their service to make them debtors to the central colonial authority. To build up enough money to pay these new expenses, he also instituted a system of direct taxation, which was contrary to any previous or existing social system in Nigeria.<sup>74</sup>

All of the changes had one intention, to increase the efficacy of the exploitation of Nigeria by their colonial masters. In this, the British had three main economic goals. First, they wanted to establish a completely extractive economy, which exported Nigerian raw materials to England and imported finished products back to Nigeria. To increase the efficiency of exports, the British sponsored local improvement projects, such as constructing roads, dredging swamps, and building rail and telegraph lines. Second, the British built a cash economy in Nigeria based on British currency. Finally, they wanted all Nigerians to work for cash in the new economy. These steps maximized the control that the British had throughout the country.<sup>75</sup> Ultimately, “British colonial rule was founded on the ideology that Africans, as a race, were inferior to Europeans and needed gradual amelioration under British supervision.”<sup>76</sup> Indirect rule was simply the cheapest and easiest method of realizing that ideal. Furthermore, all of the changes inflicted on the

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<sup>73</sup> Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 1-2.

<sup>74</sup> Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 18-20. Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 117-118. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 2-3.

<sup>75</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 119-120.

<sup>76</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 129.

Nigerian region due to British influence and colonization laid the groundwork for the system states to follow.<sup>77</sup>

### **Decolonization and the First Republic (Frame 5)**

British colonial rule was repressive, racist, and exploitative. While many of the Nigerian people acclimated and adjusted to the new ways, many did not. Resistance movements opposed the British colonization from the beginning. However, many of these movements began at the grass roots level, agitated by the European-educated group of Nigerians that administered the local economy. They focused on change within the system rather than independence from the system. However, by the 1930s Pan-African movements and other ethnically based political parties began to take on larger roles in Nigerian politics. But, at the same time, the Nigerians had a crisis of identity, in that individuals normally identified along kinship and ethnic lines rather than identifying as a Nigerian. Therefore, Nigerian nationalist movements generally played off the race-based dichotomies of black natives and white European invaders.<sup>78</sup>

The beginning of World War II caused significant economic and social changes, which exacerbated Nigerian nationalist feelings. The war effort demanded the institution of a war economy in Nigeria to complement Britain's. Therefore, the extraction and export of materials increased significantly. To accomplish these ends, the British government instituted more economic controls, which played directly into the narrative of the nationalists. One of these controls was the increasing centralization of the Nigerian region. While it was rational to increase the efficacy of the extractive economy, it was opposed along the existing social and identity schisms. For example, the northern regions did not have the same number or quality of European educated administrators, because they had developed under a different form of indirect rule. This meant that the new governmental institutions would be dominated by southern ethnicities. Thus, the northern ethnic groups feared domination by the southerners.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 2-3. Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 18-20.

<sup>78</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 134-139.

<sup>79</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 142, 150.

By the mid-1940s, ethnic identities and groups organized along those lines completely emerged, but more importantly they became increasingly politically relevant. The Nigerian Youth Movement was a Yoruba-dominated organization. Its stated purpose was to further the cause of Yoruba nationalism in the western region. The Igbo people also had the Igbo Federal Union, which promoted European education for the Igbo people. Finally, the north had its own groups as well. The Northern People's Congress emerged in 1949, working to resist centralization and retain autonomy for the Islamic people. To add even more complications to these ethnic and regional cleavages, some of these organizations fell under the purview of acting and traditional political and religious leaders. For example, the Sarduna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, ran the Northern People's Congress. By the 1950s, just prior to decolonization and Nigerian independence the country had three major political regions: "a Yoruba-dominated Western Region, an Igbo-dominated Eastern Region, and a Hausa/Fulani-dominated Northern Region."<sup>80</sup> The constitutional reforms of 1951 changed these previously cultural distinctions into full-fledged political battle lines."<sup>81</sup>

During the 1950s and up to the point of independence in 1960, the main argument in Nigerian politics was over how strong the central government should be in relation to the autonomy of the regions. By 1951, the west and eastern regions wanted full autonomy and self-government, but the north opposed this move. The north was still far behind the other regions in western-educated people, and its people knew that autonomy required strong administrators and others capable of interacting with the outside world. To bridge the gap, the Lyttleton Constitution allowed regions to make the determination of when they would become more self-governing. It also established Nigeria as a federation of three regions, the north, west, and east, which reflected the situation prior to the agreement. Under this constitution, the western and eastern regions gained self-government in 1957, while the northern region gained it in 1959.<sup>82</sup>

Complicating these divides were the social changes that occurred immediately after World War II, specifically the schisms that developed between life in the cities and

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<sup>80</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 142-151.

<sup>81</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 152.

<sup>82</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 152-154. United States Government, *The World Factbook*, 2013-14.

life in the country. The cities were melting pots of many cultures, whereas the various areas in the countryside were more ethnically and culturally homogenous. Thus, cities sometimes bred ethnic tension that resulted in violence. Furthermore, the city dwellers manifested another schism in Nigerian society, with their own ideas about what the future of Nigeria should look like and how its resources should be allocated and government should function.<sup>83</sup>

This notion of the allocation of resources bears particular importance. The Nigerian economy was a direct reflection of the extractive policies of the British colonials. While the British did attempt to set up some infrastructure for a self-sustaining economy, government, and nation, prior to independence, their efforts were not completely successful. The 1958 discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the Niger River Delta promised an unbelievable potential to take up the slack left behind by the British departure. Oil was, however, both a promise and a curse, as it ultimately deepened societal divisions and turned the government away from its people.<sup>84</sup>

This “intricate ethnic tapestry,” combined with social, urban, economic, religious, and many other divides endemic to Nigerian society provided the backdrop for its vote for independence in 1959.<sup>85</sup> The election gave the National People’s Congress, a decidedly northern-focused political party, the most seats. When the National People’s Congress combined its seats with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons’ seats, that coalition produced the majority needed to govern Nigeria’s First Republic.<sup>86</sup> However, all the former cleavages in Nigerian society remained. There was no national identity, and now the dominance of a partisan group reinforced the fears of many in the electorate. The foundations of the new Nigerian state later proved to be significantly more fragile than anyone had hoped.<sup>87</sup>

## **Regime Change (Frame 6)**

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<sup>83</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 154-156.

<sup>84</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 157.

<sup>85</sup> Peter Baxter, “Biafra,” *Africa at War*, 7.

<sup>86</sup> Peter Baxter, “Biafra,” *Africa at War*, 8, 10.

<sup>87</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 156-7.

The National People's Congress (NPC) quickly dominated the government of the First Republic, but its rule was marred by rampant corruption and funneling funds and work projects to their northern constituencies. The NPC handed out commissions and positions in the Nigerian military and government to unqualified northerners, which they hoped would ensure northern dominance. The Nigerian military became a northern-dominated force led primarily by educated southerners. The NPC also funneled public-works money and public-works projects primarily to benefit the northern regions. Much of this corruption was due to the northerners' belief that they should be allowed to catch up to the development level of the southern region because the north stagnated and fell far behind the south's development under indirect rule. This view was not reciprocated by southerners, who believed northern dominance was the beginning of the Islamization of Nigeria.<sup>88</sup>

This fear of the overwhelming influence of other ethnic groups in Nigerian society characterized Nigerian in the 1960s. Payola and Heaton referred to this phenomenon as "domination."<sup>89</sup> In "domination" smaller ethnic groups feared the consequences of government and political control in the hands of larger ethnic groups. The smaller groups believed the larger groups would use the power of the government's normative systems, such as the law, control of the police forces, and control of the military, to subjugate or destroy the smaller groups. This attitude held from the local and regional level, all the way to halls of national power. Ultimately, both sides concluded that they had to control power at almost any cost. To gain power, both the northern and southern regions manipulated census numbers, attacked the bases of the other groups' power, and excluded rival candidates from the elections.<sup>90</sup>

The conditions resulting from this rampant government corruption and the domination fears of ethnic groups not in power led to constant instability in the Nigerian system. Its first manifestation appeared when Igbo military officers from the Western Region began planning an overthrow of the national government. By 15 January 1966, five Nigerian Army majors were ready, and they began to change the system.<sup>91</sup> The

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<sup>88</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 166.

<sup>89</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 165.

<sup>90</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 165-170.

<sup>91</sup> Peter Baxter, "Biafra," *Africa at War*, 11.

majors and their confederates took all of the key regional leaders into custody, and they “killed federal Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Premier S. L. Akintola of the Western Region, and Premier Ahmadu Bello of the Northern Region.”<sup>92</sup> These were the primary men the majors believed responsible for the chaos of the first years of Nigerian independence.<sup>93</sup>

After the coup, the majors did not retain power. They handed the reigns of Nigeria over to the commanding officer of the Nigerian army, Major General John Aguiyi-Ironsi. The Nigerian government under Ironsi immediately set about “re-establishing law and order, maintaining essential services, eradicating regionalism and tribalism, and ending corruption.”<sup>94</sup> To accomplish these objectives, Ironsi banned political parties and set up a military-run quasi-police state with military governors in each of the Nigerian regions. While many appreciated these actions, the deposed northerners viewed them as nothing more than an Igbo attempt at domination. This rang especially true in some circles because four of the five majors responsible for the coup were Igbo and most of the Nigerians killed in the coup were northerners.<sup>95</sup>

Determined not to go quietly, the northerners acted against the perceived southern aggression. The northern Non-Commissioned Officers’ (NCO) began their own coup on 29 July 1966. The NCOs captured and killed Major General Ironsi and placed Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu (“Jack”) Gowon as the new head of state and leader of the Nigerian army. Following this countercoup, the Nigerian region descended into chaos. Mass killings took place in both northern and southern regions. The northerners found southerners in their areas and massacred them, and the inverse occurred throughout the south. Some estimates put the death toll of Igbo alone at over 100,000.<sup>96</sup> The violence was so rampant that the sitting military governor of the eastern region, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka (“Emeka”) Odumegwu Ojukwu, issued a statement saying that easterners should return home and non-easterners should leave the eastern regions.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 172.

<sup>93</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 172.

<sup>94</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 172.

<sup>95</sup> Peter Baxter, “Biafra,” *Africa at War*, 12. Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 173.

<sup>96</sup> Peter Baxter, “Biafra,” *Africa at War*, 15.

<sup>97</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 174.

## Civil War (Frame 7)

Here is a piece of heresy. The British governed their colony of Nigeria with considerable care. There was a very highly competent cadre of government officials imbued with high level of knowledge of how to run a country. This was not something that the British achieved only in Nigeria; they were able to manage this on a bigger scale in India and Australia. The British had the experience of governing and doing it competently. I am not justifying colonialism. But it is important to face the fact that British colonies, more or less, were expertly run.<sup>98</sup>

Ojukwu's call for easterners to return home resulted in mass migrations of the Nigerian populace. He also took actions to make the eastern Nigerian region mostly autonomous, such as collecting all tax revenue and taking over all federal departments. In response, Gowon and the Nigerian government placed economic and naval embargoes on these regions. In Ojukwu's statements, these responses and conditions led him to declare the eastern regions independent of Nigeria, claiming the name of the Independent Republic of Biafra.<sup>99</sup>

Biafra's departure from the Nigerian region was completely unacceptable to the Federal Military Government (FMG). At the time, Gowon said that Biafra could not be allowed to break away from Nigeria for at least three reasons. First, allowing it to happen went against perceived Nigerian unity. Second, the Gowon government feared the precedent and the consequences of allowing one ethnic group to leave Nigeria. Third, and most importantly, Biafra controlled at least 67% of the Nigerian oil reserves. Seen in this light, the departure of Biafra from Nigeria would probably have spelled the end of the Nigerian state.<sup>100</sup>

To stop the departure of Biafra, the Gowon regime began policies of "isolation and impoverishment."<sup>101</sup> Gowon believed this policy would cause the opponents of Biafra, within the eastern region, to rise against the Biafra government. This belief was

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<sup>98</sup> Chinua Achebe, *There Was a Country*, (The Penguin Press, New York, 2012), 43.

<sup>99</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 175. Peter Baxter, "Biafra," *Africa at War*, 18.

<sup>100</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 175. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 4.

<sup>101</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 175.

based on and turned out to be pure fantasy. It allowed the Igbo government of Biafra to sell the people a narrative of northern domination followed by Igbo extermination, causing a renewed and revitalized resistance. The invasion of the newly created state only bolstered that belief. While international aid organizations provided relief to both sides of the war, the Biafran Civil War<sup>102</sup> caused the deaths of between one and three million Nigerian people. In the end, Ojukwu left Biafra for the Ivory Coast, all the while proclaiming the righteousness of the cause of independence.<sup>103</sup>

### **States of Fluctuation (Frame 8)**

While the emergence of Nigeria from the Biafran Civil War had the potential to unite Nigerians and heal cleavages in the society, that was not the reality of the resulting system. The Gowon government remained an example to all Nigerians of extreme corruption and mismanagement. Gowon and his administration displayed this corruption through numerous avenues like their uneven distribution of the nation's oil revenues and the quadrupling of Nigeria's cement imports for an army barracks, the contracts awarded to political allies. This corruption led to another coup, this one bloodless, by Gowon's own security team. His security-team members, Colonel Joseph Garba and Lieutenant Colonel Musa Yar'adua, handed the reins of government over to General Murtala Mohammed on July 30, 1975 while Gowon was attending a conference in Uganda.<sup>104</sup>

General Mohammed quickly began to institute reforms. He intended to return Nigeria to a democratic and inclusive form of government, while restoring the military to a trusted force. But he was unable to carry out any of his goals, as his rule lasted only six months. General Mohammed was assassinated 13 February 1976 in another coup, which brought Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo to power.<sup>105</sup>

The Obasanjo regime had three main goals: "rooting out corruption in the government, promoting "national unity," and transitioning to civilian rule."<sup>106</sup> To

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<sup>102</sup> For a detailed history of the Biafran Civil War, see John de St. Jorre's *The Brothers' War: Biafra and Nigeria*.

<sup>103</sup> Peter Baxter, "Biafra," *Africa at War*, 61-62. Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 179-80.

<sup>104</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 187-8.

<sup>105</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 188.

<sup>106</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 189.

accomplish these goals, the regime began by conducting massive purges of the government workforce. Over 11,000 people were fired or removed from their positions for charges of corruption or incompetence. The regime also created several new Nigerian states in an attempt to distribute oil revenues more equitably, as each state was entitled to a direct share of the revenue. Finally, the regime reformed the political system by banning what they considered to be non-national political parties. Future parties had to demonstrate their national and inclusive character before the federal government would certify them.<sup>107</sup>

Unfortunately, Obasanjo's reforms did not alter the Nigerian system enough to be successful, as the emergence of the Second Republic was simply more of the same. The same politicians came back into power. Corruption in the distribution and allocation of oil revenues continued, and the people in power set up another patronage system meant to benefit only a few with access to the government. The Nigerian government became a kleptocracy almost entirely unaccountable to the Nigerian people and seemingly uninterested in their welfare. The Second Republic dramatically expanded the police forces throughout the country and armed them heavily with military equipment. These new police forces dealt violently with any criticism of the government, arrested political opponents, and harassed participants in the political process. As such, it only endured for a very short time.<sup>108</sup>

31 December 1983 saw another military coup. This time the military removed the Second Republic government of Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari and replaced it with Major General Muhammadu Buhari. The military ran Nigeria for the next fifteen years under three regimes, all of which were characterized by coups, corruption, mismanagement, and oppression. The attempt to prosecute corrupt officials shows one such example of the extremes of these military governments. One official suspected of corruption escaped to London, where General Buhari's agents found him. The agents drugged him and packed him into a crate labeled "Property of Nigeria." They then attempted to ship him back to

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<sup>107</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 189-199.

<sup>108</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 201-206.

Nigeria. But, the British discovered the plot, rescued the suspected official, and refused to extradite him.<sup>109</sup>

The military leaders attempted to transfer power back to civilian rule under the Third Republic in 1993, but concerns over the transfer caused the people in uniform to retain power. Their rule finally ended with the emergence of the Fourth Republic under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. The army handed over power to a man who previously ascended to power in a military regime after the assassination of his superior in 1976.<sup>110</sup>

### **Emergence of Boko Haram (Frame 9)**

The history of Nigeria provides the corresponding history of the dynamics that resulted in the rise of Boko Haram. The cleavages apparent in Nigerian society, long-standing ethnic tensions, the result of decolonization, poor governance, governmental mismanagement, oil rents, and other factors caused some Nigerians to turn to religion as a solution to their problems. While these factors are partial explanations of Boko Haram's rise, they are not the whole story.

The British colonization of Nigeria had profound effects on the native people. One of these effects was the manifestation of a schism among the Islamic people of the northern region. One side of this schism aligned with the British, effectively becoming their colonial administrators under the policies of indirect rule. These groups were primarily the Hausa and Fulani, who were the heirs to the former Sokoto Caliphate. The Kanuri ethnic group of the northeastern region fought against the Hausa and Fulani, as they had for centuries.<sup>111</sup> The discovery of oil in the south and the south's resulting advancement put them far ahead in the race to modernization. The north quickly began

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<sup>109</sup>United States Government, *The World Factbook*, 2013-14. Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 22-23. Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 213.

<sup>110</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 209-211.

<sup>111</sup> Femi Owolade, "Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria," *Gatestone Institute International Policy Council*, March 27, 2014. <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko-haram-nigeria>. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 2-3. Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 18-20. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 9.

to exert its influence through domination in politics, but some in the north rejected the influences of the west. Some of these rejections of western influences pushed people to radical versions of religion, including Islamic fundamentalism.<sup>112</sup>

Boko Haram translates into English as either “western education is forbidden” or “books are blasphemous.”<sup>113</sup> It is the commonly used term for the group Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad, also known as the “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad” or the “Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad.”<sup>114</sup> There are two main hypotheses about the founding of Boko Haram. Some authors believe that Boko Haram rose as a response to national and local government corruption. Western influences and western forms of government caused people to be sinful, which led to corruption. Therefore, the return to pure Islamic forms of society was the only cure for society's ills.<sup>115</sup> Others argue that Boko Haram emerged as an offshoot or new manifestation of a local insurgent group called Sahaba.

Most scholars and authors regard Mohammad Yusuf as the founder of Boko Haram. Yusuf was a malam, or teacher, who worked in the northeastern city of Maiduguri in Borno State.<sup>116</sup> While some authors believe he did not have much formal education, Yusuf's Quranic studies in Chad and Niger were probably the source of his radicalization. Other researchers and authors such as Hussain Zakaria believe that Yusuf

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<sup>112</sup> Femi Owolade, “Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria,” *Gatestone Institute*. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 4-5.

<sup>113</sup> Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 52. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 5.

<sup>114</sup> Corina Simonelli, Michael Jensen, Alejandro Castro-Reina, Amy Pate, Scott Menner and Erin Miller, “START Background Report: Boko Haram Recent Attacks,” *START*, (College Park, MD, May 2014), <https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/>. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 2, pg 5. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, x. Solomon Hussein, *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram*, (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 85-86.

<sup>115</sup> Femi Owolade, “Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria,” *Gatestone Institute*.

<sup>116</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, (New York, New York: Council on Foreign Relations: Center for Preventative Action, Special Report No. 70, 2014), 9. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 2, pg 5.

was “graduate educated and very proficient in English.”<sup>117</sup> He founded the Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad in 2002, and he started his own mosque in Maiduguri.<sup>118</sup> In that mosque he preached the rejection of all things Western, including education and technology; and he demanded that Nigerian society return to a pure form of Islam.<sup>119</sup> His extremism is evident in his statement that “belief that the earth is spherical in shape is a sharp contradiction to Islamic thought and therefore should be rejected along with Darwinism and the theory that rain comes from water evaporated by the sun.”<sup>120</sup>

For Yusuf and his followers, preaching simply was not enough, so they took action. Boko Haram created a settlement on the border of Nigeria and Niger, which they named “Afghanistan.”<sup>121</sup> Boko Haram probably began this settlement to form the basis of their realization of a return to a pure form of Islam and continue to expand. However, the Nigerian local and national government did not approve of Yusuf or his followers. Both entities demanded the removal of the settlement. When Yusuf and Boko Haram refused, the Nigerian military removed it by force, killing several members of Boko Haram in the process.<sup>122</sup> The government later launched an attack on the mosque and headquarters of Boko Haram in Maiduguri. During the five days of violence that followed, the government captured Yusuf, probably injured his number one lieutenant Abubakar Shekau, and killed over 800 members of the group. After interviewing Yusuf, security forces extrajudicially executed him.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Femi Owolade, “Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria,” *Gatestone Institute*.

<sup>118</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram*, 9. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa’s Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 2, pg 5.

<sup>119</sup> Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 52. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa’s Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 2, pg 5.

<sup>120</sup> Femi Owolade, “Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria,” *Gatestone Institute*. Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*,

<sup>121</sup> Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 52. Corina Simonelli and Michael Jensen, “START Background Report: Boko Haram,” *START*.

<sup>122</sup> Corina Simonelli and Michael Jensen, “START Background Report: Boko Haram,” *START*.

<sup>123</sup> Jidefor Adibe, “Explaining the Emergence of Boko Haram,” *Africa in Focus* (blog), May 6, 2014, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/05/06-emergence-of-boko-haram-adibe>. John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram*, 9. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa’s Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 2, pg 5; Ch 3, pg2. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War*, 4-5.

## Contemporary System (Frame 10)

Now that the history of both the Nigerian region and Boko Haram have been detailed, the following section deals with other aspects of the contemporary conflict environment. It provides short overviews of the following categories: political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure. Its purpose is to provide the contextual detail necessary for the analysis of today's Nigerian system.

**Political.** Today Nigeria is governed under the Fourth Republic, which is a Federal Republic consisting of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. The head of state is the president, who governs with a bicameral legislature known as the National Assembly. The National Assembly consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate. At the state level, executive power resides in the state governors, while legislative power resides in the Houses of Assembly. All elected officials serve four-year terms and have two-term limits. The national judiciary adjudicates issues between the national executive and the legislature, and it answers questions from the lower courts.<sup>124</sup> The Nigerian states are further subdivided into multiple local-government areas, which each consist of multiple districts.<sup>125</sup>

While Nigeria has currently the longest period of civilian rule in its history, Nigerian politics under the Fourth Republic generally revolve around several main themes: division, domination, power, and money.<sup>126</sup> Nigerian politicians routinely use the complementary concepts of division and domination in national and state-level politics. Division strategies allow politicians to set interest groups and audiences in opposition to one another.<sup>127</sup> When these groups are in opposition, they are not a combined voting block, which allows the sitting political oligarchy to retain power. Nigerian politicians reinforce these division strategies by sowing the fears of domination. Smaller ethnic groups' fears of domination are prevalent throughout Nigerian history.

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<sup>124</sup> "Nigeria: Past, Present, and Future," The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Nigeriaembassyusa.org*, 2014, <http://www.nigeriaembassyusa.org/index.php?page=nigeria-past-present-and-future>.

<sup>125</sup> "Borno State," *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

<sup>126</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 8.

<sup>127</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 6.

They manifest at the national level between Christians and Muslims, because Muslims are more populous. At the state level and below, the fears show through between larger and smaller ethnic groups.

To appear to combat the fears of religious domination, the Nigerian government exercises a form of power sharing and alternation, which began with Obasanjo's regime. Under this scheme the residency and vice presidency alternated between Christians and Muslims. If the president is a Muslim, then the vice president is a Christian, and vice versa. Thus, this alternation's logical outcome was the alternation between north and south because the majority of Muslims hailed from the north and Christians from the south.<sup>128</sup> Power alternation ended in 2011 when Vice President Goodluck Jonathan served out the term of the deceased president. He ran for president in the next election and won all of the southern states. Many in the north believed the election was rigged and that it was still the north's turn to govern.<sup>129</sup>

Nigeria's politics also revolve around money. The discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the Nigerian Delta and the subsequent nationalization of oil revenues ensured that oil and money would always be a part of politics. In fact, 80-85% of all Nigerian gross domestic product (GDP) comes from oil revenues, and oil provides a huge percentage of the Nigerian government's receipts. Thus, control of the government means control of money, and the people have few recourses for redress against a government that is not accountable to them.<sup>130</sup>

While Nigeria advertises itself as a secular nation, religion has significant influence in Nigerian governance. Nigeria's twelve northern states adopted a version of Sharia Law so Muslims could be judged by Islamic law.<sup>131</sup> The national appeals courts also employ judges versed in Sharia Law when dealing with cases originating from northern Sharia courts.<sup>132</sup> Furthermore, northern Nigeria has a shadow set of leaders and rulers, most of whom come from the traditional offices of the past Islamic states. For

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<sup>128</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 6-7.

<sup>129</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 7.

<sup>130</sup> Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 23.

<sup>131</sup> Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch2, pg 3.

<sup>132</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 206.

example, the Emir of Kano and the Sardauna of Sokoto are traditional offices that trace their lineage back to the Sokoto Caliphate.<sup>133</sup> But, in the northeastern Kanuri-dominated areas, offices like the Shehu of Borno trace their lineage to the Borno Sultanate.<sup>134</sup> While these offices are traditionally hereditary and they do not technically hold any political power, they are enormously influential in local and state Nigerian politics.

Boko Haram, on the other hand, has no “conventional political activity.”<sup>135</sup> Its rejection of western influences, includes the rejection of all forms of western government, in favor of pure Islamic government. Boko Haram and the Nigerian government do not have official dialogues, and even if they did the likelihood of a cease fire or other negotiated solution is very small.<sup>136</sup> Abubakar Shekau, Mohammad Yusuf’s successor went so far as to say that government should be “by Allah, for Allah, and of Allah.”<sup>137</sup>

Boko Haram called for the establishment of a caliphate, beginning in the town of Gwoza. While they acknowledge Usman dan Fodio’s caliphate, their ideal caliphate seems to have a decidedly ethnic flavor. As such, Boko Haram reaches back to the Borno Sultanate and other ideas as the model of their Kanuri-centered idea of a caliphate.<sup>138</sup>

**Military.** The Nigerian state fields the largest military force in West Africa. Their ground forces consist of approximately 60,000 soldiers and 25 standing infantry battalions. The Nigerian military’s equipment consists of numerous pieces of equipment, such as Mi-34 helicopters, Mi-35P gunships, T-72 tanks, BTR-3 APCs, 105 mm howitzers, 155mm self-propelled howitzers, and BOFORS Archer 155mm gun-howitzers.<sup>139</sup> The sampling of equipment shows that the Nigerian military has the equipment with which to be a capable combined arms force. But, the Nigerian army is barely proficient in basic defensive operations for several reasons. Its history of military

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<sup>133</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War*, 17.

<sup>134</sup> “Borno State,” *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War*, 29.

<sup>135</sup> Corina Simonelli and Michael Jensen, “START Background Report: Boko Haram,” *START*.

<sup>136</sup> Corina Simonelli and Michael Jensen, “START Background Report: Boko Haram,” *START*.

<sup>137</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram*, 12.

<sup>138</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War*, 9. Jacob Zenn, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Interview with the author, 2 August 2015.

<sup>139</sup> “Nigerian Army,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, Last modified, March 6, 2014, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/army.htm>.

coups caused the Nigerian government to intentionally hollow out the force, helping to ensure that it is not capable of another seizure of power. And, despite the fact that Nigeria spends approximately one-quarter of its budget on security, its military services are bastions of corruption. While its defense budget grew by about twenty-percent per year from 2007-2013, a great deal of the money and resources allocated to the military forces disappears through embezzlement. In fact, 2013 brought the first decline in Nigerian defense spending in almost a decade.<sup>140</sup> Furthermore, the individual Nigerian military member makes more money from oil scams, siphoning revenue from the government than running combat operations in the northeast.<sup>141</sup> Additionally, the Nigerian military services have a significant lack of training, equipment sustainment, and cooperation with their neighbors.<sup>142</sup> Therefore, advanced concepts such as effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations are probably out of the army's reach. Despite these deficiencies, Nigeria is making inquiries into the acquisition of Scorpion multi-role fighter aircraft, which may allow it to increase their capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, while conducting counterinsurgency operations.<sup>143</sup>

Despite the Nigerian military services' inadequacies, they have conducted numerous operations against Boko Haram, most of which have been direct military strikes. For example, Nigeria's armed forces conducted strikes against numerous Boko Haram safe havens, and they have likely slowed Boko Haram's operational tempo. However, Boko Haram's 2010 response to these types of offensives was to increase the numbers of civilians they killed and establish a base of operations along the Cameroonian border.<sup>144</sup> Nigeria and its neighbors' strikes on Boko Haram also claimed successes from air strikes and ground operations against safe havens throughout the forested regions near

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<sup>140</sup> Craig Caffrey, "Nigerian defence (sic) spending to fall for the first time in a decade," *IHS Janes Defence Weekly*, January 08, 2014, <http://www.janes.com/article/32167/nigerian-defence-spending-to-fall-for-the-first-time-in-a-decade>.

<sup>141</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 14.

<sup>142</sup> "Nigerian Army," *GlobalSecurity.org*.

<sup>143</sup> Gareth Jennings, "Nigeria wants to procure Scorpion ISR and light attack jet," *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*, 17 November 2015, accessed 20 March 2016, [www.janes.com/article/45858/nigeria-wants-to-procure-scorpion-isr-and-light-attack-jet](http://www.janes.com/article/45858/nigeria-wants-to-procure-scorpion-isr-and-light-attack-jet).

<sup>144</sup> Jacob Zenn, "Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria." *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point* (2014), <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadership-analysis-of-boko-haram-and-ansaru-in-nigeria>.

Lake Chad and the areas along the borders.<sup>145</sup> Cameroon claimed to have killed as many as 100 Boko Haram fighters in a single operation in response to a Boko Haram border crossing.<sup>146</sup>

Aside from these perceived direct combat successes, the Nigerian government had to declare a state of emergency in its three most northeasterly states: Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. The resurgence of activity by Boko Haram led not only to a redeployment of military forces to the area, but also the formation of Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTF). These CJTFs are simply “local armed bands of vigilantes”<sup>147</sup> that may or may not have an interest in actually rooting out Boko Haram. The responses to Boko Haram’s attacks in the area over the last several years by both the military and CJTFs are human-rights atrocities in themselves. Over 950 people may have been the victims of a law enforcement establishment run amok.<sup>148</sup>

While it may seem so up to this point, Nigeria is not alone in this struggle. The United States operates a base in Niger conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The French government supports local forces with air power and other assets from bases in Mali and Chad, and the neighboring nations teamed up with Nigeria to field a Multi-National Joint Task Force to take down Boko Haram.<sup>149</sup> While these operations have not been decisive in the struggle against Boko Haram, they have been helpful in setting back the group’s progress.

While Boko Haram’s military capabilities may not be as pronounced as those of the Nigerian government, they are substantial. Some scholars believe that Boko Haram has a rigidly hierarchical structure, with Abubakar Shekau at the top ruling with the advice and consent of a twenty-to-thirty member Shura Council.<sup>150</sup> But, the Boko Haram

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<sup>145</sup> Beacham Publishing’s TRAC (Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium), “Boko Haram,” accessed Wednesday, November 19th, 2014, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/boko-haram>.

<sup>146</sup> “Cameroon ’kills over 100 Boko Haram fighters,” *Aljazeera.com*, September 09, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/cameroon-kills-over-100-boko-haram-fighters-20149822435540376.html>.

<sup>147</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram*, 13.

<sup>148</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram*, 14.

<sup>149</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War*, 11-12.

<sup>150</sup> United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, *Boko Haram: Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland*, 2013, 10. Corina Simonelli and Michael Jensen, “START Background Report: Boko Haram,” *START*.

cells probably function autonomously to enhance security, while taking overall direction from Shekau and the Shura Council. While the core group of Boko Haram members likely numbers a few hundred, their supporters and sympathizers raise that number into the thousands.<sup>151</sup>

This non-monolithic quasi-independent, quasi-hierarchical structure allows Boko Haram to outpace the Nigerian government in actions and allows it to be flexible. For example, sharing soldiers allowed the group to both kill thousands while steadily increasing the frequency and lethality of its attacks.<sup>152</sup> It seized border towns in Nigeria and Cameroon, conducted small arms fire (SAFIRE) attacks in both countries, and they spectacularly kidnapped over 200 schoolgirls from Chibok.<sup>153</sup> Boko Haram also conducted complex, coordinated attacks against schools, police stations, and military barracks, while employing tactical deception in some of their attacks by wearing Nigerian army uniforms.<sup>154</sup> Boko Haram also conducted improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks (VBIED) against churches, government organizations, and seminaries.<sup>155</sup> Reports from the United States House of Representatives suggest they have access to and can employ surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-7 and SA-14 man portable air defense systems (MANPADS).<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> United States Congress, House of Representatives, *Boko Haram*, 10. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 7, pg 2.

<sup>152</sup> United States Congress, House of Representatives, *Boko Haram*, 18. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 4, pg 3. (Nigeria Students)

<sup>153</sup> "Nigeria says ceasefire agreed with Boko Haram," *Aljazeera.com*, October 18, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/10/nigeria-boko-haram-ceasefire-2014101714535213561.html>. "Boko Haram storm town near Cameroon border," *Aljazeera.com*, September 07, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/boko-haram-storm-town-near-cameroon-border-201496192036810814.html>. "Boko Haram seizes strategic Nigerian town," *Aljazeera.com*, September 02, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/boko-haram-seize-strategic-nigerian-town-201492185035408733.html>. "Civilians killed by Boko Haram in Cameroon," *Aljazeera.com*, September 20, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/civilians-killed-boko-haram-cameroon-201492015239897110.html>. John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 3. Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 13. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 2.

<sup>154</sup> Corina Simonelli and Michael Jensen, "START Background Report: Boko Haram," *START*.

<sup>155</sup> Corina Simonelli and Michael Jensen, "START Background Report: Boko Haram," *START*. United States Congress, House of Representatives, *Boko Haram*, 18.

<sup>156</sup> United States Congress, House of Representatives, *Boko Haram*, 19.

Boko Haram maintains affiliations with several other terrorist and insurgent organizations to train and maintain their capabilities. For example, it maintains relationships with Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb for training, funding, and supplies.<sup>157</sup> The recent removal of the Qaddafi regime in Libya also means that the flow of weapons across the Sahara through the Sahel and into the hands of Boko Haram will probably increase.<sup>158</sup> Boko Haram also accepted fighters from and sent fighters to training camps in Mali, Somalia, and Algeria.<sup>159</sup> Furthermore, its use of child soldiers and female suicide bombers may indicate advanced relationships with other terror organizations.<sup>160</sup> Finally, Boko Haram pledged its support for and was accepted by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As such, it now refers to itself as Islamic State's West Africa Province, and it probably accepted help from ISIS's propaganda arm in re-working its image as a true manifestation of Baghdadi's caliphate.<sup>161</sup>

**Economic.** Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa and the twenty-sixth largest in the world. Since 2000, it has experienced significant economic growth, usually with a seven percent annual average.<sup>162</sup> But, this wealth, growth, and Nigeria's economy revolve almost exclusively around a single economic driver: oil. This is not, however, a mature oil economy where the commodities are extracted, refined, and sold in the country. Nigeria's oil economy is much less complicated, and it is controlled by a small group of elites in the government.<sup>163</sup> Nigeria is a "rentier" state, i.e. one that derives a significant amount of its revenue from rents external groups or nations pay for access to resources.<sup>164</sup> Today, Nigeria is Africa's largest producer of oil, but it exports its oil and

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<sup>157</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 11. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 3, pg 4. Corina Simonelli and Michael Jensen, "START Background Report: Boko Haram," *START*.

<sup>158</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 11.

<sup>159</sup> Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 4, pg 2. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 11, 14.

<sup>160</sup> Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 3, pg 4.

<sup>161</sup> Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 3, pg 4-5. (Buchanan, ISIS Overtaken, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-overtakes-isis-as-worlds-deadliest-terror-organisation-a6737761.html>)

<sup>162</sup> Jidefor Adibe, "Explaining the Emergence of Boko Haram," *Africa in Focus*.

<sup>163</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 6.

<sup>164</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 184.

imports refined gasoline from places such as the United Kingdom.<sup>165</sup> Oil makes up about 80-85% of Nigeria's gross domestic product; and it accounts for a huge majority of the Nigerian government's receipts, vastly outpacing the country's meager tax earnings. Thus, the Nigerian government's most powerful constituency is not the Nigerian people, but the oil companies and foreign businesses.<sup>166</sup> This shows through decidedly in the World Bank statistics that list 64% of Nigerians as "very poor," over 73% in the rural areas, and the predominance of Nigerian citizens live on less than one dollar a day.<sup>167</sup>

The concentration of Nigeria's economy into a single economic driver and a small oligarchy controlling that driver combine to produce an economic and government situation ripe for corruption. Nigeria's government has been characterized by some scholars as a "kleptocracy."<sup>168</sup> Politicians and bureaucrats stole or funneled vast amounts of money and resources out of the Nigerian economy, either into their own pockets or to their preferred recipients. For example, the Nigerian government issued a statement on its corruption problems, where it estimated over \$300 billion disappeared from its oil accounts between 1960 and 1995.<sup>169</sup> In 2013 alone, the Governor of the Nigerian Central Bank informed President Goodluck Jonathan that over \$20 billion disappeared from the same oil accounts. Corruption rules at the national level of government, and some scholars believe that it is only getting worse.<sup>170</sup>

While oil is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy now, it has not always been the sole economic driver. Historically, the Nigerian region had a much more diverse economic base, with drivers in agriculture, non-food production, and non-petroleum mineral wealth. For example, agricultural food products such as maize, ground nuts, palm oil, millet, onions, okra, cocoa, rice, animal husbandry, and plantains provided significant wealth. These food products combined with cotton, timber, and rubber production provided the basis of the historical economy. However, Nigeria also boasts

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<sup>165</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 7.

<sup>166</sup> Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 21.

<sup>167</sup> John Litwack, *Nigeria economic report*, Nigeria economic report; no. 1, Washington DC; World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/05/17708026/nigeria-economic-report>, 9. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 8.

<sup>168</sup> Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 7.

<sup>169</sup> Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 23.

<sup>170</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 6.

large amounts of mineable resources like coal, clay, salt, copper, zinc, tin, and iron, which if wisely managed and put to use could allow a diversification of the national economy away from oil.<sup>171</sup>

While the contemporary state of Nigeria revolves around one economic driver, Boko Haram has no such handicap. The organization is a fine example of the diversified portfolio of opportunists. Boko Haram makes its money through two main venues: illegal activities and outside support. Robberies, kidnapping, extortion, black marketing, and ransom operations provide huge amounts of money.<sup>172</sup> For example, Nigerian authorities believe Boko Haram earned between 15 and 20 million dollars in one year's worth of ransom operations alone.<sup>173</sup> Boko Haram also subscribes to the concept of "ghanima," which is an interpretation of a Quranic concept that says spoils of war from operations in support of Allah's wishes are acceptable sources of income and for paying taxes.<sup>174</sup> In addition to criminal activity, Boko Haram receives funding from other organizations abroad. Financial transactions reveal that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb provided money to Boko Haram from organizations in Saudi Arabia and Great Britain.<sup>175</sup>

**Social.** Nigeria has more than 250 ethnic groups within its borders. These groups practice a large number of religions and speak over 500 languages.<sup>176</sup> Four, however, stand out as the largest and most influential. The largest of the four is the predominantly Muslim Hausa and Fulani, who are concentrated in the northern regions. The Yoruba dominate the western portion of the Christian southern states. Finally, the Igbo dominate the eastern portion of the southern states. The Kanuri, who provide most of Boko Haram's membership are only about four percent of the population, and they reside

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<sup>171</sup> Tobin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 3. "Borno State," *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

<sup>172</sup> United States Congress, House of Representatives, *Boko Haram*, 5. Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War*, 13.

<sup>173</sup> Jacob Zenn, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Interview with the author, 2 August 2015.

<sup>174</sup> Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 4, Pg 3.

<sup>175</sup> United States Congress, House of Representatives, *Boko Haram*, 5.

<sup>176</sup> United States Government, *The World Factbook*, 2013-14. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 1, pg 1-2.

primarily in the regions around Lake Chad. While the cleavage of Nigerian society is generally expressed as the Muslim north and Christian south, many people and groups still practice their native religions, animism, or amalgamations of native religions and either Christianity or Islam.<sup>177</sup>

There are five main religious strains of Muslims in Nigeria. First, there are the Shia Muslims. The Shia are predominantly Iranian influenced, and their four million strong population is concentrated around Zaria. Second, there are the Sunni Muslims. These are the majority of the Muslims in Nigeria. Most of the Sunni want to reside under a caliphate, and they encompass two sub-groups. The first Sunni sub-group is the Salafists, who are generally associated with militant Islamic movements supporting a caliphate, like Boko Haram. The second group is the Sufi orders. The Sufi are considered moderate, mystical Islamists that also desire a caliphate. Finally, there are the unaligned Muslims, who are neither Sunni nor Shia. Their thoughts on residing under a caliphate are unknown.<sup>178</sup>

It is important to note that scholars collected anecdotal evidence about Muslims' feelings toward the caliphate and democracy. This evidence suggests that significantly less than 50% of the Nigerian Muslim population believe that democracy and Islam are compatible. It appears that the Muslims who do believe they are compatible are the university-educated group. While not all Nigerian Muslims desire a caliphate, many who are ambivalent do not actively reject it either.<sup>179</sup>

As stated above, Boko Haram is composed predominantly of Kanuri. The Kanuri tribe occupies northeastern Nigeria and the contiguous areas of Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and other local ungoverned spaces. These lands are generally concentrated around Lake

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<sup>177</sup> John Campbell, *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 6. Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart*, 18. Femi Owolade, "Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria," *Gatestone Institute*. United States Government, *The World Factbook*, 2013-14. Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa's Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, Ch 1, pg 3.

<sup>178</sup> Jacob Zenn, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Interview with the author, 2 August 2015.

<sup>179</sup> Jacob Zenn, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Interview with the author, 2 August 2015.

Chad, and they are the ancestral lands of the Kanem-Borno Empire.<sup>180</sup> The Kanuri speak both their native Kanuri tongue and English. The Kanuri are also distinguishable from other ethnic groups in Nigeria and the surrounding countries because of their accents, scarification, and other noticeable minutiae. Thus, their tactical and operational reach may be limited by not being able to move about freely through the Nigerian countryside.<sup>181</sup>

**Informational.** Information systems and access to information in northeastern Nigeria is highly limited. The telephone network is limited and only links with Maiduguri, Bama, and Biu. Nigerian television is limited to Maiduguri. However, towns near the Nigeria-Cameroon border receive Cameroonian television.<sup>182</sup>

**Infrastructure.** Borno State's infrastructure of services; specifically education, water, electricity, and connection; is mediocre at best. For example, it is one of the worst states in Nigeria regarding education. While there are enough state provided facilities and materials, 1,206 primary schools and 78 secondary schools, only one in seven children complete primary school and make it to the secondary level. The lack of water in the region translates to constant states of drought. The state has begun work on dam projects and boreholes to augment the water supply. But, the poor maintenance scheme for the 1,548 wells and 692 boreholes causes less than half to function at any one time. Electricity is limited to the major cities, which are also the main connection points to other areas of the country by rail, road, and air. The rural areas have a very low road density, and "many parts of the state are remote and inaccessible."<sup>183</sup>

## Conclusion

This chapter provided a chronological and thematic narrative of Nigerian history. The chronological overview gave the reader a basic background of Nigerian events. The thematic history provided significantly more detail and arranged the events of Nigeria's

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<sup>180</sup> Dierk Lange, "Ethnogenesis," *Paideuma*, 275. United States Congress, House of Representatives, *Boko Haram*, 10.

<sup>181</sup> Jacob Zenn, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Interview with the author, 2 August 2015.

<sup>182</sup> "Borno State," *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

<sup>183</sup> "Borno State," *Onlinenigeria.com*, accessed: August 4, 2015.

history into discrete sections. The thematic history's discrete sections provide the foundation for the systems-based analysis in the following chapter.



## Nigerian Systems Model and Analysis

*Where chaos begins, classical science stops. For as long as the world has had physicists inquiring into the laws of nature, it has suffered a special ignorance about disorder in the atmosphere, in the turbulent sea, in the fluctuations of wildlife populations, in the oscillations of the heart and brain.*

James Gleick

This chapter provides a systems analysis of Boko Haram. It begins with a brief model review, to reorient the reader to Chapter Three's systems model. It then analyses each of the thematic frames from Chapter Four, explaining in turn endogenous, exogenous, and structural influences. Finally, the chapter diagnoses Boko Haram.

## Systems Analysis

### Model Review.




Figure 9: Model Review

*Source: Author's original work, derived from Schmitt.*

The figure above is a variation of the model described in Chapter Three. It accounts for system state change over time, beginning with the Pre-Islamic Period through to the contemporary system state. Endogenous influences exist within the Nigerian region on the map. Exogenous influences show through from external forces arrayed around the edges, and structural forces exist outside the system graph. While not shown here for simplicity of view, structural influences exhibited by the anarchical nature of the international system affected the Nigerian system indirectly. The British desire to extract all available Nigerian resources to support Britain's effort in World War II represents an indirect, delayed structural influence. The diagrams do not show all of the connections present in the system, as to do so would make the graphics overly complicated. The reader may infer many more connections.



## Frame One: Pre-Islam, Islam's Arrival, and Trade Routes (~700 C.E. – 1472 C.E.).




Figure 10: Frame One

Source: Author's original work.

In Frame One, the systems diagram lays over a modern map of Nigeria to keep the reader oriented to the geographic aspects of the region's actors, actions, and effects. Moving clockwise from the upper left, the shaded portions represent the Hausa States (Hausaland) in northern Nigeria, the Kanem-Borno Empire in northeastern Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon, and other ethnic groups (Yoruba and Igbo) in southern Nigeria.

**Endogenous Influences.** This frame contains several endogenous influences that caused shifts in the system state. In Kanem-Borno, the Saifawa desire for conquest, perhaps influenced by structural considerations, combined with the revolt of the Balula directly caused the movement of the Saifawa dynasty to west to Garzagamu. While this empire had contact with the Hausa groups to the west, the movement of the Kanem-Borno Empire nearer to Hausa lands may have indirectly sparked deeper and ongoing

ethnic conflict among the groups. In Hausaland, which was not a centralized or contiguous state, the internal tensions among the smaller states, perhaps an indirect structural influence, drove conflict among themselves and their neighbors to the east. Finally, each group in northern Nigeria experienced ongoing conflict among the adherents of different religions, which was an indirect effect of the exogenous religious influence detailed below.

**Exogenous Influences.** As mentioned above, during this period the main exogenous influence was the introduction of Islam along the trade routes running around and across the Sahara. This indirectly caused significant conflict, within the region, both among the adherents of Islam and between Islam and those who continued to practice their native religions. As Islam gained greater influence among the people of northern Nigeria, it also blended with the native religions, taking on a form unique to the area. While the dynamics and characteristics were different to each case, this blending of religious influences could be considered analogous to the blending of Christianity with native West African religions later, forming more and new variations. Once again, this blending of religions was an indirect, delayed element of the main exogenous influence.

**Structural Influences.** The anarchy of the system at the level higher than the Kanem-Borno mai and the kings of Hausaland likely also had indirect effects on the internal conflicts among the Hausa States. The anarchical nature of the system also indirectly influenced several of the ethnic and conquest conflict dynamics between the Hausa States and the Kanem-Borno Empire.

## Frame Two: Trade History and the Arrival of Europeans (1472 C.E. - ~1800 C.E.)




Figure 11: Frame Two

Source: Author's original work.

Prior to the arrival of Europeans and sea trade along the Nigerian coast, trade mainly followed the trans-Saharan routes and the route along the coast circumventing the Sahara. The arrival of European sea trade provided a catalyst to change the system state to the diagram above. Trade shifted to southern ports and markets, away from northern routes, and other external influences began to affect the Nigerian region.

**Endogenous Influences.** Most of the endogenous influences from Frame One continued throughout Frame Two. The newest endogenous influence was the internal shift of trade routes from the northern routes to the southern routes. This shift was a direct, but delayed, result of the introduction of European sea commerce along the coast road. This shifting of trade routes also indirectly affected the ethnic conflicts among the

region's major groups. While it is unclear whether trade shifts exacerbated or alleviated the conflicts, due to the desirability of both power and wealth, it is undoubtable that they affected the dynamics of the conflict groups.

**Exogenous Influences.** Ongoing Islamic influence in the region continued to affect the conflict dynamics described in Frame One. The main external influence on the Nigerian system in Frame Two, however, was the arrival and establishment of trade on the Nigerian coast. This arrival of sea trade, over time, directly caused trade lines to shift to the southern ports. It also indirectly affected the ongoing conflicts among the region's stakeholders as described above.

**Structural Influences.** The structural influences affecting the ethnic conflicts among the groups depicted are likely ongoing and unchanging at this point. The ethnic conflict continues between Kanem-Borno and Hausaland. Furthermore, the ethnic conflicts between the northern, northeastern, and southern groups also continue.

### **Frame Three: Jihad and Islamic Schisms (~1800 C.E. - ~1884 C.E.).**

As noted in Chapter Four, this was a time of significant change in the Nigerian system state, especially for Kanem-Borno and Hausaland. The Hausa directly felt the changes to their social system wrought by Usman dan Fodio's jihad. The Kanem-Borno Empire lost territory to the new Sokoto Caliphate, and the mai's weakened control over his empire set the stage for multiple coups. While the southern ethnic groups did not directly feel the social upheaval brought on by these northern social changes, their continued dealings with Europeans and sea trade brought their own societal influences.





European influences in the region began with the Portuguese in 1472, but the conclusion of the Berlin Conference and the resulting “Scramble for Africa” brought large numbers of Europeans. These exogenous influences and the desires the Europeans brought with them overwhelmed the local influences. They, in fact, changed the system so profoundly that the region would never be the same.

**Endogenous Influences.** Three continuing endogenous drivers influenced the creation of the subsequent system state. First, the region’s ongoing ethnic conflict among the Hausa-Fulani, Kanuri, Yoruba, and Igbo directly and over time shaped the relationships between the actors in the Nigerian system. Second, the ongoing tensions within Islam, such as conflicts between Sufis, Wahhabists, and Sunnis indirectly drove the developing relationships among the groups occupying the northern territories. Third, the religious tensions between expanding Christianity, Islam, and native religions, especially between the northern and southern regions both directly and indirectly over time shaped one of the most profound cleavages in Nigerian society, the north-south division.

**Exogenous Influences.** Many exogenous influences caused the formation of this system state. First, the Berlin Conference and its resulting Scramble for Africa indirectly and over time caused not only the destruction of the Kanem-Borno Empire and the Sokoto Caliphate but also the increased influence of Christianity in the southern regions of Nigeria. This deepening divide in religion over time led to many of the characteristics of the subsequent system states. Second, British colonization and its aims required the institution of western economics and education, especially in southern Nigeria. These influences directly and over time influenced the follow-on system states. Third, the ongoing influence of Islam from the Middle East and North Africa continued to bring fundamentalism with it. This fundamentalism and a desire for a more pure form of Islam indirectly influenced the follow-on ethnic conflicts in later system states. Next, the French and German influences from the east, which were a result of the Berlin Conference, pressed on Kanem-Borno, and their influence directly led to its fall. Finally, British colonization of Nigeria brought with it a significant influence from Christianity, Western education, Western culture, and a British view of social organization. While indirect rule was a direct result of British colonization, its other influences were not. The

particular British administrators' view of indirect rule's role in the development of the northern and southern regions both directly and indirectly over time led to the expanded chaos in Nigeria's follow-on system state.

**Structural Influences.** The anarchy of the European system influenced the direction of Nigerian development. The onset of World War I and Britain's great-power conflicts drove a desire to harness resources. For Britain, that resulted in the imposition of extractive economies in the colonies for the benefit of the security of the homeland. The anarchy that drove some of the European powers' decision calculus resulting in war, therefore, had an indirect and delayed effect on the Nigerian system.

#### **Frame Five: Decolonization and the First Republic (mid 1940's C.E. - ~1960 C.E.).**




Figure 14: Frame Five

*Source: Author's original work.*

Aside from their colonization of the country, the British departure from Nigeria may have had some of the most profound effects on the region's system state and

subsequent states. Their amalgamation of the northern and southern regions into a single country, combined with their attempts to westernize Nigeria, so that it would be a functioning nation-state, were unsuccessful and generally misguided. The cleavages and conflicts in the so-called Nigerian society remained, and the departure of the British colonial structure allowed old, deep, and ongoing grievances to surface.

**Endogenous Influences.** The exogenous drivers of Islam not just as a religion but also a paradigm of social organization were in direct conflict with the western social organization imposed by the British. This conflict indirectly led to another conflict where the imposition of sharia law to judge the Muslim population of Nigeria was in conflict with the western version of the rule of a single law among the entirety of the Nigerian populace. This conflict of a Muslim society and other societies driven by different criteria drove the deepening and widening of significant cleavages in the Nigerian region. The movement from the country to the city, where populations moved from near homogeneity to heterogeneity, also significantly colored the worldview of the actors in the Nigerian region.

**Exogenous Influences.** The discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the Niger River Delta brought with it its own set of influences. The Nigerian government and society set-up by the British did not have the industrial capacity to drill, harvest, collect, refine, and sell oil alone. The government and the government-owned oil corporation relied on outside help to bring their product to market. Thus, oil and oil rents were an indirect but nearly immediate driver of the Nigerian government's changing policy toward its people. The government's growth and gross domestic product, ultimately, had nothing to do with the people, tax collection, service provision, or being responsive to the people's desires. The local ethnic groups jockeyed for control of the central government to control the oil money and resources that they then directed to their regions. Nigeria, ultimately, became a rentier state.

**Structural Influences.** While the character of structural influences shifted with the British departure, they were still present in the Nigerian region. The indirect effect of western education caused some southerners and northerners educated in western thought to see power and interest dynamics at play in Nigeria and among the states of West Africa. While the immediate effects of that influence are not clear, the subsequent

development of a standing national army to deal with internal and external threats to the Nigerian state was a likely delayed, indirect result.

### Frame Six: Regime Change (1960 C.E. – 1967 C.E.).




Figure 15: Frame Six

*Source: Author's original work.*

This frame saw the first major coups in the national government. Local leaders, specifically ethnically aligned army officers, decided that overthrowing the government was the best way to avoid domination, correct governmental corruption, and seize power and resources for their own regions. Their chosen leader, Major General Ironsi was not successful at running the government and retaining power, as another group of ethnically aligned non-commissioned officers conducted a counter-coup a short while later.

**Endogenous Influences.** The endogenous influences in this frame remain the same as the previous frame, with four major additions. First, the international

establishment of a Nigerian state that has no consistent Nigerian identity begins to show through in stark relief. This identity problem became a constant indirect driver of many of the subsequent system changes. Second, corruption in the new “nation-state” government, intending to distribute resources to preferred constituencies and line the pockets of politicians and power brokers, ran rampant. Fourth, the ongoing debate among the politicians at the national level and the politicians at the regional and local levels about federalism and the extent of the control the federal government would have focused and influenced many of the internal conflicts of Nigerian politics. Finally, the determination among the federal, regional, and local government levels about the distribution of the tremendous amount of oil wealth directed, influenced, and colored the Nigerian system state over time all the way through to the present day.

**Exogenous Influences.** The exogenous influences of oil and Islamic influence remained the same in this frame.

**Structural Influences.** The structural influences on the Nigerian state remained the same in this frame.

#### **Frame Seven: Civil War (1967 C.E. – 1970 C.E.).**

The Nigerian state erupted into civil war when eastern region attempted to secede and form its own country of Biafra. The northern run national government could not allow this departure for several reasons. First, it weakened the perception of Nigerian unity. Second, it might set a precedent for other ethnic groups to continue breaking away from Nigeria. Third, and most importantly, the geographic region of Biafra contained most of Nigeria’s oil wealth.





government made were only on the surface, as the ongoing conflict drivers and system state remained generally the same.

**Endogenous Influences.** Once again, the endogenous drivers of system change revolved around corruption, resource distribution, and the lack of a Nigerian identity. Corruption and resource distribution were indirect, immediate influences. Identity was indirect and delayed. As the figure shows, however, each change in government was technically a shift in the system state, but all of the other underlying causes of instability in the system remained. Government shifts did not fundamentally alter the character of the system state.

**Exogenous Influences.** While Islamic influence remained constant, western economic influences were the main exogenous drivers of this system state. They were indirect, both immediate and delayed. Each government cited equitability in the distribution of oil wealth as one of their main concerns, and the governments consistently viewed inequitable distribution or the disappearance of oil money as corruption. The link between exogenous and endogenous forces, thus, shows through again.

**Structural Influences.** The structural influences on the Nigerian region remained the same in this frame.

## Frame Nine: Emergence of Boko Haram (2002 C.E. - Present)




Figure 18: Frame Nine

Source: Author's original work.

**Endogenous Influences.** Several endogenous influences that led to the rise of Boko Haram. First, the ongoing schisms between the practitioners of local forms of Islam and fundamentalist forms of Islam directly influenced some aspects of Boko Haram's emergence, such as Yusuf's education and view of society. Second, these religious conflicts received indirect influences from the ongoing ethnic frictions in the area. The lack of a cohesive Nigerian identity and the conflicts over resource distribution also indirectly influenced the emergence of Boko Haram.

**Exogenous Influences.** The conflict between fundamentalist views of Islam from the Middle East and the local forms of Islam were a direct influence on the emergence of Boko Haram. Furthermore, western influences and Boko Haram's subsequent rejection of them were also external influences. These influences include, but are not limited to,

western forms of education, western economics, western government, and its corruption, indirectly drove their emergence and its subsequent ideology.

**Structural Influences.** The structural influences remain the same.

### Frame Ten: Contemporary System State (1999 C.E. – Present).




Figure 19: Frame Ten

Source: Author's original work.

**Endogenous Influences.** With one exception, the endogenous influences in the Nigerian system remained the same, with one exception. The emergence of Boko Haram now directly acts on the northeastern region, and it indirectly acts on the government and the rest of the nation. It also directly and indirectly acts on the neighboring states, as it is not a uniquely Nigerian problem.

**Exogenous Influences.** The new exogenous influences on this system state arrived as an indirect response to Boko Haram's influences. First, ISIS and Al Qaeda in

the Islamic Maghreb influenced the trajectory of Boko Haram directly, indirectly, immediately, and over time, depending on the specific actions taken. Second, the arrival of the militaries of Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon are indirect government responses to Boko Haram's actions. Finally, increasing Western involvement, including the United Nations, Red Cross, and the United States are also indirectly related to Boko Haram's actions.

**Structural Influences.** The structural influences on the Nigerian region remained the same.

### **Diagnosis of Boko Haram**

When viewed through these lenses, Boko Haram is a modern manifestation of old problems, wrapped in the guise of fundamentalist Islam. Many of the same problems that drove the system state throughout the history of the Nigerian region resulted in the emergence of Boko Haram. Problems that may seem new are, in fact, old problems viewed through new frames of reference.

First, the Kanuri compose almost all of Boko Haram's membership, and throughout the history of the region, the Kanuri have been in conflict with neighboring ethnic groups.<sup>2</sup> The Kanem-Borno Empire fought against Hausaland and its neighbors to the south. Later, it fought against the Sokoto Caliphate. One of the most recent manifestations of these longstanding ethnic conflicts was the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls. Chibok is the local government area occupied by the Kibaku people, who are an "ethno-cultural fusion of Babir/Bura, Kanuri, Kilba, Margi, Shuwa and Fulani."<sup>3</sup> They are their own ethnic group with their own language, and Boko Haram likely saw them as a lucrative target.

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<sup>2</sup> Solomon Hussein asserts in *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram* that terrorist groups and their current manifestations cannot be separated from their historical roots or ethnic characteristics. Solomon Hussein, *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram*, 19, 98-99.

<sup>3</sup> "A Short History of Chibok," *Metropole*, 11 July 2015, accessed 20 March 2016, <http://metropole.ng/index.php/component/k2/item/1893-a-short-history-of-chibok>.

Second, Boko Haram emerged partially as a result of the ongoing influence of fundamental Islam in the region. Fundamentalist Islam is nothing new. Its influence drove many changes throughout Nigeria's history. Usman dan Fodio's jihad began as a partial answer to the perceived indulgences and excesses of the region's Muslims and their leaders. Yusuf and Boko Haram simply appropriated these views for their own purposes.

Third, Boko Haram's rejection of western influence is not a new phenomenon. Many of the northern Islamic societies rejected western influences and education during the period of indirect rule. They also continued to resist these influences by insisting Sharia law be a part of the federal constitution, so Muslims could be judged by Muslims. Oil rents, Western economies, and the accompanying government corruption and mismanagement that came with them are simply the newest consequences of western influences that certain sects of Nigerians reject.

Finally, Nigeria's lack of a complete Nigerian identity is a symptom and result of several old problems.<sup>4</sup> People in the geographic range of Nigeria continue to determine their identities from the bottom to the top, beginning at the local level. They begin with their ethnic group, tribe, and religion and then move to the idea of Nigeria, if they recognize Nigeria at all. Some groups, such as the Biafrans, do not believe that Nigeria is a legitimate political entity. Thus, having a Nigerian identity is incompatible with their social and political outlook.

### **Conclusion**

Boko Haram is a new manifestation of old influences, packaged in the guise of fundamentalist Islam. It revolves around long-standing cleavages in Nigerian society that can only be fixed by fundamental systemic and cultural change, which must radically alter the characters of the Nigerian people and government. As the next chapter will demonstrate, existing United States policy is inadequate for dealing with this type of long-standing cultural problem. It does not address the root causes, and it should be

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Solomon Hussein, *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram*, 97-98.

altered to address those causes within the resource-constrained environment so it can effectively reinforce and encourage the Nigerian government's actions.



## Chapter 6

### America's Strategic Security Environment

*We are deepening our investment in Africa, accelerating access to energy, health, and food security in a rapidly rising region...But, we have to make hard choices among many competing priorities, and we must always resist the over-reach that comes when we make decisions based upon fear.*

Barack Obama

This chapter examines America's strategic security environment. It draws almost entirely from primary-source documents, including the *National Security Strategy*, *National Military Strategy*, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*, *United States Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan*, and several other United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) planning documents. The analysis begins by defining the United States' strategic priorities, which reflect its perception of security threats. It then describes the state and non-state actors the United States considers security threats and their respective priorities among the rest of the threats. The chapter then discusses the priority, strategy, and overlapping lines of effort that AFRICOM applies to Nigeria and consequently to Boko Haram.

### Strategic Environment

The United States views its strategic security environment in global terms, accounting for both state and non-state actors as threats. It also considers food, water, and energy security as stabilizing factors that either mitigate or prevent conflict. National decision makers rank threats to security along a theoretical continuum, from low-intensity threats that destabilize partner nations to existential nuclear threats to the United States homeland. Nuclear existential threats obviously rank the highest.

The *National Security Strategy* considers "combat[ing] the persistent threat of terrorism" its third priority, behind national defense and homeland security.<sup>1</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> United States Government, President of the United States of America, *National Security Strategy 2015*, [https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015\\_national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf), 7-9.

strategic lens, however, is not that simple. While national defense accounts for among others, nuclear-deterrent forces; cyber forces; space forces; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), homeland security includes preventing terror attacks inside United States territory. Building partner-nation capacity, priority four, and combating climate change, priority six, are also key aspects of dealing with terrorist and insurgent threats, such as Boko Haram.<sup>2</sup> While it seems that terrorism is front and center in the national conversation, Boko Haram is not. The section detailing the Obama Administration's view of the "International Order" further illuminates this categorization. The United States' top two priorities for the international order are the Asia-Pacific region and Europe, respectively. Seeking peace in Africa and making investments in Africa are third and fourth. Considering the rise of China, the perceived threats to the international order from its actions in the South China Sea, and its posture toward United States allies in the region, this is completely understandable. Recent Russian actions in Crimea and Syria, among others, also show the need for renewed importance of European security. Africa may have massive amounts of ungoverned space, as well as breeding grounds and safe havens for terrorists; but according to the *National Security Strategy*, it is simply not the nation's most pressing national security threat.

Refining the *National Security Strategy*'s broad guidance, the *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015* brings the strategic environment into even sharper focus. While it also accounts for state and non-state actors, it makes clear that states are the "dominant actors" in the international system, and it specifically lists several states that the U.S. considers the highest security threats, such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China. Violent extremist organizations are last. Military planners, however, acknowledge that the United States has to deal with all of these threats simultaneously, though some will receive a more weighted response.<sup>3</sup>

The United States perceives Russia as a threat to its national security for several reasons. First, Russia has an emerging offensive cyber capability. When fully developed

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<sup>2</sup> United States Government, *National Security Strategy 2015*, 10-12.

<sup>3</sup> United States Government, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*, [http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015\\_National\\_Military\\_Strategy.pdf](http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf), 1-3.

this capability will allow the Russians to conduct propaganda operations, malware attacks, and data corruption almost anywhere. Furthermore, unattributable Russian cyber actors, which may or may not be part of the Ministry of Defense, are developing capabilities to affect industrial control systems that run many countries' critical infrastructures. These include air-traffic control and power grids.<sup>4</sup> Second, Russia maintains a standing nuclear arsenal capable of striking the United States, and it is currently developing intermediate-range cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. America has asserted that the Russian development of intermediate range cruise missiles was a violation of the standing Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) between the two nations. Considering Russia's ongoing development plans, the United States may understandably question Russia's intentions regarding the INF.<sup>5</sup> Third, Russia's actions in Ukraine, including its seizure of Crimea, cast doubt on Russia's intentions regarding its neighbors. These actions, combined with the pressure Russia places on its neighbors to join the Eurasian Economic Forum, give the West reason to question possible Russian international revisionist actions.<sup>6</sup>

The United States views Iran as a threat for many of the same reasons. It is an emerging nuclear power pursuing missiles capable of deploying nuclear weapons, in clear violation of United Nation resolutions.<sup>7</sup> Iran also maintains a robust cyber capability, which it uses for ISR and against western financial institutions and businesses.<sup>8</sup> In addition to these provocative acts, Iran sponsors terrorism, repeatedly calling for the destruction of Israel, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East. Finally, Iran continues its

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<sup>4</sup> United States Government, Director of National Intelligence, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, February 26, 2015, [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified\\_2015\\_ATA\\_SFR\\_-\\_SASC\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf), 2-3.

<sup>5</sup> United States Government, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 7, 18.

<sup>6</sup> United States Government, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 17-18.

<sup>7</sup> United States Government, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*, 2. United States Government, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 5.

<sup>8</sup> United States Government, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 3.

buildup of conventional military and naval capabilities, which could allow them to close vital sea lines of communication, adversely affecting global commerce.<sup>9</sup>

North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and its continued testing of ballistic-missile delivery programs are two of the United States' main concerns. The country's demonstrated capabilities in missile technology allow it to threaten a huge portion of the East Asian region including Russia and China, its traditional allies. It is only a matter of time until its missile technology can directly threaten the U.S. homeland.<sup>10</sup> North Korea is also an advanced cyber actor, as demonstrated by its responsibility for the Sony Pictures hack, which both introduced malware to a local system and erased hard drives.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, the United States views China's rise in global power and standing with suspicion. While American rhetoric suggests that the United States supports China as a current and future world leader, China's recent actions have caused concern. First, China's claims to almost the entire South China Sea are clear violations of international law. Despite calls for cooperation from the international community to address China's security and economic concerns, it has developed man-made islands and stationed military forces on them.<sup>12</sup> These actions threaten a vital international shipping lane and the well-being of the global economy. China is also a major cyber actor, whose "economic espionage" against U.S. companies continues unabated.<sup>13</sup> China is also steadily expanding its nuclear force, probably to ensure it has a survivable second-strike capability. It is also increasing its mobile missile systems, upgrading its silo-launch facilities, and increasing its submarine-launch capability.<sup>14</sup>

"Concurrently with state challenges," the United States recognizes that violent extremist organizations (VEO) undermine security in the nations and regions where they

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<sup>9</sup> United States Government, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 14.

<sup>10</sup> United States Government, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*, 2. United States Government, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 6.

<sup>11</sup> United States Government, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 3.

<sup>12</sup> United States Government, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*, 2.

<sup>13</sup> United States Government, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 3.

<sup>14</sup> United States Government, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 7.

operate.<sup>15</sup> VEOs threaten stability, radicalize populations, and attempt to impose their views of society on the people in the areas they control or influence. The United States assesses that VEOs are most prevalent in failed or failing states where there are large tracts of ungoverned or under-governed areas. The presence of VEOs also correlates with the presence and freedom of movement of transnational criminal organizations in the same areas. Ultimately, the combination of VEOs undermining local and regional security, combined with transnational criminal organizations, undermines the stability of the international system, directly conflicting with American interests.<sup>16</sup>

The United States believes that none of the nations identified above want a direct conflict, but it assesses that the probability of a major nation versus nation war is growing. The United States also identifies hybrid conflicts among loosely linked nations and non-state actors or groups of non-state actors as the most likely type of conflict for the near future.<sup>17</sup> Understanding the American view of the security environment, an obvious question presents itself. If VEOs are the lowest priority, where does Boko Haram fit into the ranking of VEOs? It is one of the most dangerous terror organizations in the world, and they count the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as one of its closest allies. The U.S. considers ISIS its number-one terror priority, so where does Boko Haram rank on its security continuum?<sup>18</sup> The AFRICOM planning documents help answer this question.

AFRICOM's theater-campaign plan outlines its policy and strategy to deal with threats on the continent, and it identified five major lines of effort. First, AFRICOM seeks to "neutralize Al-Shabaab / transition AMISOM," the African Union Mission in Somalia.<sup>19</sup> Second, the command intends to "degrade VEOs in Sahel-Maghreb / contain

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<sup>15</sup> United States Government, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* 2015, 3.

<sup>16</sup> United States Government, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* 2015, 3-4.

<sup>17</sup> United States Government, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* 2015, 4.

<sup>18</sup> United States Government, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* 2015, 3.

<sup>19</sup> Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan, 2000-2016: Fiscal Years 2016-2020*, Stuttgart, Germany, 18 August 2015, vi.

instability in Libya.”<sup>20</sup> Third, the combatant commander wants to “contain Boko Haram.”<sup>21</sup> Fourth, AFRICOM means to “interdict illicit activity in [the] Gulf of Guinea / Central Africa.”<sup>22</sup> Finally, the command intends to “build peace keeping / humanitarian assistance disaster response capacity of African Partners.”<sup>23</sup> Thus, Boko Haram ranks third among the combatant command’s priorities, and even though the *National Military Strategy* calls for the disruption, degradation, and defeat of VEOs, AFRICOM at present intends to contain Boko Haram through African partners.<sup>24</sup>

Boko Haram obviously is not the top priority of AFRICOM or national decision makers; this does not mean the fight against it will not be resourced. In the world of depleted budgets, smaller forces, and possible sequestration, Nigeria will receive a significant amount of attention.<sup>25</sup> AFRICOM has three lines of effort that affect Nigerian security: illicit trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea, containing Boko Haram, and conducting peacekeeping operations.<sup>26</sup> These efforts aim to build Nigeria’s capability and capacity, ideally enabling it to defeat Boko Haram on its own. AFRICOM’s efforts reinforce those of Nigeria both by interdicting Boko Haram supply lines through the illicit smuggling of arms, money, and drugs through the Gulf of Guinea and by training Nigeria’s security forces to take direct action against the group. AFRICOM believes that by 2018, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), composed of Nigeria and its partner nations will have fully contained Boko Haram inside Nigeria’s borders. AFRICOM further assesses that by 2020 Nigeria and its partner forces will be able to conduct independent, sustained operations, and they will have a national leadership with the fortitude and capacity to deny Boko Haram safe havens and sanctuary.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan*, vi.

<sup>21</sup> Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan*, vi.

<sup>22</sup> Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan*, vi.

<sup>23</sup> Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan*, vi.

<sup>24</sup> United States Government, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*, 8. Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan*, vi, 16.

Commander, United States Africa Command. *Welcome Brief*. Stuttgart, Germany. 2015.

<sup>25</sup> United States Government, Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, [http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_Quadrennial\\_Defense\\_Review.pdf](http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf), 38-41.

<sup>26</sup> Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan*, 30.

<sup>27</sup> Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan*, 39-43. Cascario, Mike, *Theater Security Cooperation Programs: United States Africa Command*, Stuttgart, Germany, 2015.

## Conclusion

Boko Haram is not a significant strategic concern for the United States. It is not an existential threat, and it does not have weapons of mass destruction. Boko Haram also does not field large numbers of conventional forces. Bearing these factors in mind and considering that Nigeria alone fields 60,000 soldiers, its neighbors joined with it to form a MNJTF, and the ongoing help from the U.S., it is clear that national decisions makers and AFRICOM senior leaders believe the Boko Haram problem is manageable. A cursory glance at recent news reporting, however, quickly undermines that assessment.<sup>28</sup>

The next chapter builds on the analysis of Nigerian security and Boko Haram in Chapter Four as well as Chapter Five's American security lens. It uses systems analysis to identify the underlying, root causes of the Boko Haram conflict. It then diagnoses the Boko Haram conflict in its context of Nigerian history, leading finally to Chapter Seven's analysis of America's current strategy and suggested changes to the courses of action.

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<sup>28</sup> "Boko Haram and Mass Starvation," New York Times, 10 March 2016, accessed 25 March 2016, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com). Haruna Umar, "Nigerian President Accused of Overstating Boko Haram losses," Associated Press, 13 March 2016, accessed 25 March 2016, [www.news.yahoo.com](http://www.news.yahoo.com). Doug Stanglin, "Officials: Female Suicide Bombers kill 24 at Nigerian Mosque," USA Today, 16 March 2016, accessed 25 March 2016, [www.usatoday.com](http://www.usatoday.com).

## Chapter 7

### Strategic Recommendations

*If, in its entirety, we could grasp the law of causation, we could then so economize our force that, whatever force might be at our disposal, we should expend it at the highest profit.*

*J.F.C. Fuller*

The United States cannot deal with Boko Haram by itself. It must have help. It also cannot deal with Boko Haram through solely military means, as it is not a military problem. It is rather the manifestation of deep cultural, ethnic, and religious cleavages in Nigerian society.<sup>1</sup> Solving the problem of Boko Haram requires a holistic solution that addresses all of the underlying influences and conflict drivers, by both the United States government and the Nigerian government. Thus, this chapter builds on the diagnosis of Boko Haram, considering the current United States policy. It also makes several strategic recommendations that, if implemented correctly, should seek to address the root causes of the conflict even though it is not a strategic priority for the United States.

### Current Actions.

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) will provide resources to Nigeria along three lines of effort: suppressing illicit trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea, containing Boko Haram, and conducting peacekeeping operations.<sup>2</sup> The United States has already deployed approximately 200 troops to Cameroon to battle Boko Haram, and it is preparing a platoon-size element of special operations forces for deployment to Nigeria.<sup>3</sup>

Aside from military deployments, the United States has also said that it intends to take other actions.<sup>4</sup> First, the U.S. plans to send advisors to the Nigerian Government, so

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<sup>1</sup> Solomon Hussein, *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram*, 101-103.

<sup>2</sup> Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan*, 30.

<sup>3</sup> Andrew Tilghman, "U.S. troops likely headed to Nigeria for Boko Haram advisory mission," *Military Times*, 26 February 2016, accessed 20 March 2016, <http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/02/26/pentagon-may-send-troops-nigeria/80984348/>.

<sup>4</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "*FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government in its Fight against Boko Haram*," (Washington, DC: The White House,

it could build capability and capacity, while expanding intelligence sharing between the two nations. It also intends to conduct engagements in northeastern Nigeria both to counter Boko Haram's influence and to provide support to the local populations. The US has also enacted economic sanctions, attacking Boko Haram's sources of funding from legitimate businesses throughout the world.<sup>5</sup> Finally, the US plans to allocate funds to support Nigeria's education system and to provide counseling for Boko Haram victims.<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that while these seem like a solid beginning, there is significant doubt as to how much of this the United States and Nigeria will accomplish. Some U.S.-backed assistance missions stopped in 2014 due to diplomatic tensions between the two nations.<sup>7</sup> Thus, it is difficult to be certain of the extent of the effects of any of these measures.

### **United States Priority.**

As noted in Chapter Five, Boko Haram is not a top United States military priority, nor is it a top priority for American security. While the stability of Nigeria affects the stability of West Africa, which in turn affects the stability of the international system, at this point Boko Haram does not represent an existential threat to the Nigerian nation. Thus, the military strategic end of containing Boko Haram within the bounds of Nigeria is appropriate.<sup>8</sup> The ways and means employed to contain Boko Haram, understanding its place in the hierarchy of strategic threats and its place in the limited budget environment however, should be shifted to ensure they address the underlying causes of the conflict.

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2014), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/14/fact-sheet-us-efforts-assist-nigerian-government-its-fight-against-boko->

<sup>5</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, "FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government in its Fight against Boko Haram."

<sup>6</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, "FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government in its Fight against Boko Haram."

<sup>7</sup> Andrew Tilghman, "U.S. troops likely headed to Nigeria for Boko Haram advisory mission."

<sup>8</sup> Commander, United States Africa Command, *Theater Campaign Plan*, 30.

### **Assumptions and Recommendations**

The validity of two main assumptions drives the validity and applicability of the suggestions below. First, the analysis assumes that Nigeria will remain a viable nation-state for the near to mid-term future. Second, Nigeria will remain a federal system.

#### **Diplomatic.**

The following diplomatic suggestions are not addressed in the existing American strategy. First, the United States should encourage and partially resource programs designed to make Nigerian society gradually more heterogeneous.<sup>9</sup> A more heterogeneous society will enable the emergence of a truly Nigerian identity, as it has the potential to replace the dominant local identities formed along ethnic, tribal, and religious lines. While it is impossible to eliminate micro-cultures, the adoption of a holistic, dominant culture will help Nigerian stability tremendously. The types of programs recommended here could be applied across Nigeria in any number of ways. For example, the United States could fund education programs that have curricula promoting inclusion, Nigerian history, human rights, and respect for other ethnicities. This recommendation recognizes that the changing of Nigerian society is a multi-generational problem, and the United States must understand it in this context and treat it as such.

Second, the United States should encourage and if necessary exert pressure on the Nigerian government to remove and punish corruption at all levels of government and military service. To ensure such action is taken, elements of continued foreign aid should be tied to compliance. To solve the Boko Haram problem, there must be a paradigm shift in Nigerian society, such that losing control of the federal government and the national oil company can no longer be tantamount to losing all resources and funding for a particular region. This will, over time, help to build a more cohesive society that does not view ethnic and religious matters as existential threats. Skimming and graft should also no longer be the main forms of payment for people in government and military jobs. Wages must rise, and resources must be directed to the welfare of the people.

#### **Informational.**

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<sup>9</sup> Solomon Hussein, *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram*, 101-103.

Three main informational steps should be taken to attack the root causes of Boko Haram. First, the United States should conduct an information and messaging campaign undermining Boko Haram's adherence to the Salafist ideal. Their association with ISIS rests on their shared ideology. If Boko Haram's adherence to that ideology is brought into question, their associations with ISIS could be jeopardized and with it ISIS's funding and support.

Second, the education programs mentioned above, seeking to build heterogeneity in society, cannot be Muslim or Islamic in character. Nigerian programs should be secular, ideally celebrating the coexistence of Muslims with Christians and worshippers of native religions. All fundamentalism, whether Islamic, Christian or otherwise, should be rebuked by the Nigerian government, whether it is headed by Christians or Muslims. State supported education should also emphasize tolerance among ethnic groups.

Finally, the United States and the Nigerian government should invest in the development of air, land, and electronic lines of communication throughout the northeastern portion of the country. Bringing Nigerians in the northeast into growing and sustained contact with Nigerians in other portions of the country will help the creation of a heterogeneous society. Developing roads, air travel, and electronic infrastructure all help to bring isolated areas of the country together.

#### **Military / Law Enforcement.**

Boko Haram is not a military problem for the United States, and it should not be treated as one. The deployment of troops as advisors and counterinsurgency (COIN) trainers to Nigeria should continue, but they should never take part in operations. They should, to the maximum extent possible, be concealed from the populace. The smaller and more invisible the American military presence is the more palatable it will be to the Nigerian society. The realization of American troops operating in Nigeria may invoke renewed ideas of colonialism or other fears of domination, and the United States should avoid that at all costs.

In addition to expanded intelligence sharing, the United States should also deploy and employ persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) employing full-motion video (FMV) and other sensor suites would be very helpful in identifying areas of Boko Haram activity, providing early warning of

attacks, and focusing the efforts of Nigerian COIN operations. Production, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) could be deployed to the region if necessary. But, these actions could also be performed in the continental United States (CONUS) to keep the United States presence in the country to a minimum. Such UAVs should not be armed, and no strikes should be conducted from the air. They are for information purposes only. Overhead intelligence assets with CONUS-based PED should also receive tasking as appropriate.

In addition to very small military deployments, the United States in coordination with Nigeria should work to improve both law-enforcement training and law-enforcement capabilities for the Nigerian police. Current and former law-enforcement officers should conduct the training in investigative procedures, community policing, and any other areas required. American military personnel must not be involved in law-enforcement activities.

#### **Economic.**

Finally, economic initiatives should focus on both the macro and micro-levels. At the macro level, the United States should encourage and support the diversification of Nigeria's economy. This could involve renewed emphasis on farming and commodities or the development of industry in the cities. The United States should also encourage the Nigerian government to consider the possibility of privatizing the national oil company, or at least making it an independent agency not subject to governmental authority. This would remove some of the motivation for corruption. Furthermore, if the government enshrined in law the distribution of oil profits the fear of losing all funding that goes with loosing government control could be ameliorated.

To support several of these initiatives, such as the construction of lines of communication, the United States should encourage the Nigerian government to establish a program like the New Deal's Works Progress Administration (WPA).<sup>10</sup> This program would enable the government to show that it is working for the people. It would also provide a work force with which to construct the lines of communication mentioned above. It would also raise the daily wages of many Nigerians, thereby removing a

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<sup>10</sup> "The Works Progress Administration," *PBS*, accessed 20 March 2016, <https://us-mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/launch?.rand=4a82jqtoplo4q#9065898199>.

motivation for corruption and criminality. If the people employed by the program worked on projects away from their homes, it would even reinforce the ideas of heterogeneity in Nigerian society.

### **Conclusion**

Boko Haram is not a strategic priority for the United States. It is a problem the United States must confront with the limited amount of means the United States is willing to allocate. Since it is not a priority security interest, those limited means must attack the root causes of the conflict, efficaciously applying means to ends where the return on investment is highest. This chapter sought to provide a way forward to that end.



## Chapter 8

### Conclusion

*The iterating of these lines brings gold;  
The framing of this circle on the ground  
Brings whirlwinds, tempests, thunder and lightning.*

Dr. Faustus Marlowe

This thesis has sought to determine what, if anything, the United States should do to help the Nigerian Government counter Boko Haram, understanding the strategic priority the Americans place on its extermination. To answer its central research question the thesis applied a lens, built from both systems theory and Systemic Operational Design. Applying this lens to Nigeria revealed not only systemic change over time but also, long term factors that influenced phase shifts in the current system state and the resultant system states of Nigeria as a political entity. These exogenous, endogenous, and structural factors constantly exerted pressure on the system, and their constant presence shaped systemic change over time.

Boko Haram, when viewed in systems terms, is a modern manifestation of old problems, wrapped in the guise of fundamentalist Islam. It revolves around four main problems. First, ancient ethnic tensions propel Boko Haram. The Kanuri ethnic group provides nearly all of Boko Haram's membership, and it has been in conflict with neighboring groups throughout the history of the region. Second, the perception that fundamentalist Islam provides an answer to modern problems also drives the organization. Fundamentalist Islam existed in the region for centuries, and its influence drove other shifts in the Nigerian system state. The third factor strongly relates to the second. The rejection of western influences also existed in the region in several guises throughout its history. Many Islamic northern groups, for example, resisted a completely western federalism during decolonization by demanding sharia law be a part of the federal constitution. Muslims should be judged by Muslims, not western law. Finally, Nigeria does not have a Nigerian identity. This is simply an old problem re-told in the language of the very young Nigerian state. Many people within the geographic bounds of Nigeria still identify from the local-level up, and this is a product of numerous ethnic groups, tribes, religions, and other factors being amalgamated into the western idea of a Westphalian nation state.

To be effective combatting Boko Haram, while understanding that it is a problem that will be minimally resourced, American policy must address these root issues. Chapter Six convincingly demonstrated Boko Haram's priority among America's security concerns. It ranks far below existential threats to the nation, which tend to be nation-states fielding nuclear forces, advanced cyber capabilities, and large conventional forces. It even ranks third among United States Africa Command's lines of effort. Boko Haram is simply not strategically significant to the United States. It does not represent an existential threat. It does not have weapons of mass destruction. It does not have large numbers of forces, and it is generally isolated in its area of operations.

Since this is a low priority issue and solving it requires efficaciously applying allotted means against root causes, certain changes in the United States' strategy seem appropriate. The current efforts, if they are ongoing as many stopped because of political tensions in 2014, address both the symptoms of the problems and a small amount of the underlying causes. To ensure maximum effect, the strategy should address more of the underlying causes, while addressing the symptoms (targeting of Boko Haram) to buy time for ongoing action. Currently, the United States deploys troops as advisors to the Nigerian and Cameroonian militaries. While those deployments are helpful, they address surface-level issues. The United States should also encourage the Nigerians to develop programs, which over time develop a more heterogeneous culture. This would significantly reduce both the ethnic and religious overtones to conflict in the region. Second, the United States must help address the economic components of the conflict, at both the macro- and micro-levels. Such support should help the Nigerians reduce the incentives for criminality and corruption in both Boko Haram and the Nigerian government.

These elements of a revised United States strategy can also be employed over time to develop gradual system change. The United States should also monitor these change; and if the resulting shifts are not determined to be beneficial, the strategy can easily be adjusted. Ultimately, the stability of Nigeria directly contributes to the stability of West Africa. The elimination of Boko Haram also contributes to wider United States objectives when dealing with violent extremist organizations. To achieve lasting success, however, the system states must be brought, at least to some extent, in line with both

western ideals and western world-views. Accomplishing these objectives will certainly not happen overnight, but enacting measures with a long-term view to produce constructive system change is the only way finally to win, not just in Nigeria but many other places, as well.



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