Strategic Utility of the Russian Spetsnaz
Abstract
The Russian annexation of Crimea stimulated the authors interest in researching the little green men (allegedly the Russian Spetsnaz) that appeared at a decisive point in the coup de main. The intent here is to understand the capabilities and limitations of the Russian special operations forces (SOF) and the level of threat they present to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and Russia's neighbors. This study uses Colin Grays strategic utility theory to understand why Russian leaders choose unconventional warfare over conventional warfare, and how well the Spetsnaz execute assigned missions. Soviet and Russian military doctrines constitute a baseline for the evolution of Russian strategy and of Spetsnaz in parallel. Three case studiesOperation Danube in Czechoslovakia, the first and the second Chechen wars, and the annexation of Crimeacontribute to this research. Russian Spetsnaz per se are competent enough to fulfill their duties; however, they do not make up for poor planning, weak strategy, and general incompetence.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2016
- Accession Number
- AD1030678
Entities
People
- Abdullah Atay
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School