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THESIS

**RESONANCE OPS: HOW DEVELOPING SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS CAN OPERATIONALIZE IDEOLOGIES**

by

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December 2016

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OPERATIONALIZE IDEOLOGIES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Many members of the United States government seem to misunderstand one of the most important concepts of social competition and politics—the interpretation of ideology. This qualitative study provides an explanation of how ideologies go to war armed with unique profiles for social movements. In a connected world, which includes prisons and other grievance breeding grounds, the spectrum of strategic to grassroots ideological warfare will never go away. Knowing how to fight influentially in the information domain requires a communication pathway with resonant messages for the intended audiences. After studying ideologies and social movements as domestic and international phenomena, my recommendation is an initial attempt to modify Special Operations organization and expectations and to improve their effectiveness in information warfare.

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I. PURPOSE

A. SCOPE

Ideas drive the sociopolitical world. Components of an ideology can be combined, separated, manipulated, attacked, and blocked by social organizations for different purposes. A significant proportion of United States (U.S.) policy analysts and strategists lack an abstract conceptual model of ideological social movement strategy, which may assist an effective counterstrategy or preserve worldviews. That is, many policy analysts and decision makers are unclear about the necessary and sufficient conditions for social movements to put their ideologies into effect. Some may think that ideologies are abstract and therefore irrelevant to strategy. Others may discount the power of a highly resonant ideology carried by a social movement. Additionally, many people misunderstand ideology, simplifying it to a broad political thought-belief system—involving rational debate, which political thinkers value as the right way of approaching political questions.¹ This study will allow the United States to gain a better understanding of collective action and its observable outputs. Military, political, and diplomatic decision makers who understand ideologies and how they are used by social movements can then be prepared to create effective policy solutions.

This thesis examines how ideas interact and how they are used by social movements to form “conditional generalizations” about recruitment outputs.² Its purpose is to isolate the ideological considerations of a social movement from other group needs and wants. It will determine what ideology does *for* the social movement and what it does *to* the social movement. In this thesis, I will highlight numerous movement behaviors to illustrate a range of ideology activities for unarmed resistance, insurgencies, revolutions, and so-called terrorist groups.

¹ Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1.

² Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 120, 133. For generic knowledge, George argues conditional generalizations are more useful than probabilistic generalizations.

This work seeks to fill a gap in knowledge between the political realm and the social sciences—how ideology can be partially and tentatively controlled. It began with an interest in the study of competing ideologies in the context of social movements. Policy analysts, strategists, and decision makers can benefit from a better understanding of how political leaders leverage ideology to enhance an effective social movement. The central question this thesis aims to answer is this: how can developing social movements operationalize ideologies?

B. THE SITUATION AND PROBLEM

Investigation into the nature of ideology helps us understand the roots of radical and oppositional political motivations. Politics is about collective organization and social relations for a purpose.

1. Current Tensions with American Security

Each social movement needs to make choices about its degrees of formality and size in order to achieve “the good society”—the social movement’s ideological goal. Movement leadership determines how flexible or rigid the organization should be at different stages of development. Ideological commitment (or the degree of commitment to the cause) by movement members is assumed to be a significant factor during developmental recruitment, but a movement’s leaders tend to balance this with operational flexibility. This is because competing movements will attempt to limit their operational constraints at every phase, and this includes those constraints brought on by ideological commitment.

As such, in order for a given movement’s ideas to live, an insurgency might deprioritize ideology-based recruitment for organizational security, as was seen, for example, with the South African Communist Party’s armed support to the African National Congress. At other times, ideology may inflame movement growth, as it did with Nazism or countless other social movements. Ideology can be used by a government, insurgency, or terrorist group to recruit and mobilize supporters of the cause.

One's religious stance is part of one's ideology. As I will discuss in the next chapter, an ideology can be transmitted to individual people, so I will switch references periodically between groups and individuals. Ideology, like religion, often permeates an actor's being and sense of self from birth. For most actors, it is something they are taught and convinced about. Ideological promises, however, can often be invalidated in the tangible world.³ Consider the Nazi-proclaimed thousand-year Reich, which in fact lasted just over a decade. The same is true of religious promises, like the doomsday flood prediction by the Millerites or the mass suicide of over 900 People's Temple followers in Jonestown. Such strategic contradictions might be effective at disrupting external support for a movement, but those in the movement at the grassroots level will likely dismiss the rhetoric of the external naysayers. For many, the belief in the ideology driving a social movement runs too deep.

Ideology encompasses a movement's political thoughts and survival strategy, and it remains an effective resource for drawing popular support away from existing government systems and increasing support for developing movements. Whether for reform or revolution, social movements hold grievances against the system and seek to rectify them. The situation in the United States and around the world at present features competing ideological movements with varying degrees of flexibility. Understanding ideology profiles like liberalism, conservatism, socialism, fascism, and religious fundamentalism can inform policy analysts and decision makers on how to diagnose security problems in information warfare. Proper diagnosis can then lead to more effective strategies in this realm.

2. A Lack of Understanding

A significant problem in the ongoing information war is not knowing how ideologies are structured and how they move from one group to the next. This problem is acknowledged by many who deal with security affairs. For example, a recent *Washington Post* article headlined that former U.S. secretary of defense Leon Panetta and former

³ Anna Simons, "Recommendations" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 09 December 2015).

British prime minister Tony Blair were taking the lead on a new Commission on Countering Violent Extremism sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In that piece, Panetta claimed that “government leaders do not yet fully understand the problem. ‘We haven’t been very effective at developing a strategy to reduce the allure of extreme ideologies both at home and abroad, to understand what we can do to undermine this narrative that attracts so many recruits to violence.’”⁴

Recently, the Center released its first report on countering violent extremism. My thesis supports and further develops the strategy recommendations outlined in the report. Specifically, the report asks for research to focus on extremist “motivations and drivers, the radicalization process, and effective interventions.”⁵ This thesis addresses all three of these topics. However, the report outlines a complex and expensive plan for the international community, while this thesis adds a ready-to-execute and inexpensive Special Operations Forces recommendation in Chapter VI.

The Commission’s report offers testimonials of extremist violence and recruitment, while this thesis discusses the mostly invisible competition of ideological narratives. In this way, it serves as a complement to the Commission’s report: First, the thesis offers a clear definition of ideology, as well as a depiction and explanation of social movement outputs. It questions claims such as the possibility of defeating violent extremist ideologies in 10 years or so.⁶ Further, it provides some needed introspection on American ideologies. Finally, it seeks to recognize that the justification of violence is often dependent on perspective. The Commission’s report highlights certain actors like religious leaders and pop culture stars to assist with countering narratives.⁷ However, Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are not explicitly mentioned in the

⁴ Elise Viebeck, “Tony Blair, Leon Panetta to launch antiterrorism commission,” *The Washington Post*, February 21, 2016, accessed March 8, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/02/21/tony-blair-leon-panetta-to-launch-anti-terrorism-commission/>.

⁵ Shannon N. Green and Keith Proctor, *Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism* (A Report of the CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism) (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 November 2016), 62, <https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point/?block1>.

⁶ Ibid., V-VI.

⁷ Ibid., 18.

Commission's strategy. Similar to this thesis, the Commission's strategy aggressively seeks a turning point for the international community of partners to disrupt the "underlying ideologies" that lead to violent extremism.⁸

This thesis adds important information about ideology competition and offers actions to undermine ideological recruitment to extreme social movements. However, this study looks at ideology in broader terms than simply religious fundamentalism. Without more extensive information, participants risk entering information warfare insufficiently armed. Knowing how social movements operationalize ideology allows policy makers to form an authorizing policy for operational organizations like Special Operations Forces to anticipate actions and better compete internationally.

C. A VERY SHORT REVIEW

In this section, I provide a brief overview of ideology, its development, current understandings of it, and what it means for social movements to operationalize ideology. I also introduce readers to the political process model of social movement emergence and persistence. This section concludes with a brief discussion on consciousness to highlight the dynamics involved with ideological message interpreters.

1. History and Development of Ideology

An overview of the evolution of ideology will help clarify the term's current usage. It was first coined in 1796 in a prison cell during the French Revolution by Antoine Destutt de Tracy, based on a concept in Sir Francis Bacon's *Novum Organum*, published 176 years earlier.⁹ Bacon argued that what people believed was based on untruths, which led de Tracy to conceive of the scientific study of ideas. Iain MacKenzie explains the Napoleonic and Marxist views: Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) went further, claiming that ideology was purely false ideas.¹⁰ Then, Karl Marx (1818–1883)

⁸ Green and Proctor, *Turning Point*, 8.

⁹ Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 5th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 5.

¹⁰ Iain MacKenzie, "The Idea of Ideology," in *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 3rd ed., additional authors Robert Eccleshall et al., (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3–5.

and Friedrich Engels criticized German philosophers and the conceptions of the German middle class, believing that reason, as well as revolution, could overcome ideology. Like Napoleon, Marx and Engels argued that false ideas could destroy political culture, explains MacKenzie. They saw ideology as a class struggle, not as a science for studying the development of true and false ideas. To them, ideology emerged from a socioeconomic base. They advocated revolutionary activities with the goal of dissolving class conflict. MacKenzie continues, they believed that in order to destroy false ideas, or ideologies, the contradictions in the class system must also be destroyed.

Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) built on Marx and Engels but deemphasized false ideas and class divisions.¹¹ He conceptualized ideology as the foundation of all sociopolitical behavior, which is much closer to the current understanding of the term. MacKenzie recounts, Lenin saw ideology as a political weapon in class conflict and concluded that all forms of action are to a degree ideological. In fact, he saw socialism as an ideology in itself.

Neo-Marxists added elements and complexity to the concept of ideology. Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser (1919–1990), and to a lesser degree Antonio Gramsci, conceptualized ideology as a binding agent for societies—a means of identifying one another and interacting together.¹² If this definition of ideology is true, ideology can be organic and can encompass one’s total worldview. According to Althusser, liberal capitalist society includes “ideological state apparatuses” such as schools, churches, trade unions, and the family unit, which socialize people to status, competition, and rules of good citizenry.¹³ To Althusser, ideology was a permanent part of the material world.¹⁴ Like Marx, he insisted on separating ideology and science, with the goal of removing false ideas from social and political life. When asked whether Marxism was an ideology, Althusser instead claimed that it was a science of political economy.

¹¹ MacKenzie, “The Idea of Ideology,” 6.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 6–7.

¹⁴ Michael Freeden, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 27.

Another viewpoint of the nature of ideology is the Anglo-American idealist tradition. Ideology, under this concept, does not provide people with solutions to all moral dilemmas. The development beyond the idealist view believes ideology to be more complex, because ideas have a cultural life.¹⁵ Ideology exists in regular people engaging in political and social life, and pure logic is not usually the method to solve dynamic social problems.

2. Defining Ideology

The founding editor of the *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Michael Freeden, one of the most significant writers and editors on ideology today, defines ideology as political thinking about one's world with action consistent with that understanding.¹⁶ The study of ideology investigates "organized, articulated, and consciously held systems of political ideas incorporating beliefs, attitudes, and opinions."¹⁷ Freeden argues that ideologies are structured and "characterized by a morphology that displays core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts."¹⁸ Morphological analysis, which ties in to history and culture, cannot reduce an ideology to a single viewpoint (e.g., political economy), as Marxists do.

Andrew Heywood claims all ideological characteristics fit into three distinct features. They:

(a) offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a "world view"

(b) advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the "good society"

(c) explain how political change can and should be brought about—how to get from (a) to (b).¹⁹

The framework of "problem, solution, strategy" informs this study, and later I demonstrate how it relates to Freeden's definition of ideology.

¹⁵ MacKenzie, "The Idea of Ideology," 9.

¹⁶ Ibid., 9, 10–11.

¹⁷ Ibid., 8.

¹⁸ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77.

¹⁹ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 11. This definition is consistent with Freeden's contemporary works and de Tracy's original conception of the term.

3. Operationalizing Ideology

In this thesis, *operationalizing ideology* refers to the process of controlling ideas and activating them for one's purpose. This is the process by which social movement leaders generate significant action from political ideas. Put another way, it is how a group appropriates an ideology for a significant political purpose. This definition entails sending ideas at a certain time along a communication pathway and attempting to influence the ideas of another sender. When a concept like an ideology is operationalized, the concept is not an abstract, logical thought-belief. Rather, ideas carry their own operative force that goes beyond logic and can be causal at unexpected times. For example, leaders of social movements such as the civil rights movement might operationalize ideology by employing mechanisms like slogans to modify the beliefs of their followers.

4. The Political Process Model

Social movements can illustrate the action of ideological groups that often operate outside legitimate institutions. They are just one type of social organization that employ ideologies, but the analysis of how they do so can be instructive. As the title of this thesis suggests, I will look at social movement organizations as they exist in a developmental process rather than in the emergence phase of social movements.

Doug McAdam, in his analysis of the civil rights movement, developed models of movement emergence and development.²⁰ He claims that elites monopolize power in political matters, such that excluded groups will always functionally hold less power. Thus, it is inevitable that the masses will compete for power.²¹ His model of movement *emergence* begins with the broad socioeconomic processes that can fracture existing political power.²² These, in turn, directly affect two additional factors: political

²⁰ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

²¹ Ibid., 37. McAdam proposes an alternative model to classic theories of collective behavior, status inconsistency, and resource mobilization for movement emergence. The political process model looks at movements as political rather than psychological.

²² Doowan Lee, "A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare," *Special Warfare* (July - September 2013): 29–30.

opportunities (e.g., political instability by destroying the status quo) and indigenous organizational strength (e.g., minority community resources). If political opportunities expand and indigenous resources of a minority population increase, the chances that a social movement will emerge increase. Expanding political opportunities and increased indigenous organizational strength can then interact and generate what McAdam calls cognitive liberation, which is the collective belief of a group that together they can bring about change.²³

When discussing movements in this thesis, I assume that the movement has already emerged and focus on how it persists. Whether a social movement persists depends on four factors: 1) shifting political opportunities, 2) shifting levels of social control, 3) sustaining organizational strength with resources, and 4) collective attribution (a continuation of the cognitions shared before emergence).²⁴ The collective ideas that hold a group together are as vital as the resources it takes to sustain a given movement. As I will discuss later, operationalizing ideology is one way to recruit new members and thereby make the movement more likely to last. Many other important factors to movement development that will not be discussed in this paper include issues related to limited resources, impermanence, and co-opting. However, by operationalizing ideology effectively, movements can hedge against such dangers.

5. Consciousness

The receivers of ideological messaging use their minds to interpret whether ideas fit within their views of the sociopolitical world. Susan Blackmore claims that “information enters the nervous system through the senses... and ultimately affects a person’s speech and other actions.”²⁵ Individuals often understand the world as either problematic or not problematic, and within that framework, they work to understand other people’s behaviors.²⁶ Human behavior plays a significant role in consciousness—

²³ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 51.

²⁴ Ibid., 52–56.

²⁵ Susan Blackmore, *Consciousness: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 37. When I bring up consciousness later in this thesis, I shift to Blackmore’s second edition.

²⁶ Ibid., 72.

and in ideology, as I will describe later. While definitive statements about consciousness can be contested, the topic is still worthy of analysis, since the social sciences constantly refer to it and interpretation of ideology involves it.

D. A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF POLITICS

This project does not equate politics to political parties; the term has a broader meaning in this context. The purpose of politics is to achieve collective goals and regulate conflict “within a society and among societies.”²⁷ People come together for certain purposes, one of which is to manage violence against them. According to Freeden, the goal of ideology is maximum penetration of and acceptance from significant intended audiences, “to capture control over political language and collective decision-making” to improve social life.²⁸

E. THE GAP AND HOW TO APPROACH THE QUESTION

Many theorists in the field accept Michael Freeden’s analysis of ideology, and this paper leverages his work. Most people who use the term seem to understand it is political but fail to place it in the right context or give it the appropriate degree of significance. Some use *ideology* as a partial reference for some political initiative or thought-belief. However, *ideology* is fundamentally a major political term and involves behavior.

It was unclear at the beginning of this project how leaders of social movements operationalize ideology. To answer the research question, I took a qualitative heuristic research approach. Ultimately, I deconstructed and analyzed the bridge between ideas and the organization of goal-directed collective action. I also searched for patterns of ideological description.²⁹

²⁷ Freeden, *Ideology*, 127.

²⁸ Ibid., 64, 69, 70, 115. Quote on page 69.

²⁹ Gerhard Kleining and Harald Witt, “The Qualitative Heuristic Approach: A Methodology for Discovery in Psychology and the Social Sciences. Rediscovering the Method of Introspection as an Example,” *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* vol. 1, no. 1 (January 2000): article 13, <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1123/2495>.

During that process, my interpretation of information warfare changed. Ultimately, the research question was found important, although the question shifted from emerging to specifically developing social movements, from resistant movements to social movements in general, and to an overall mixed hypothetical argument, the soundness of which is based on the persuasiveness of its premises. This paper builds on concepts from chapter to chapter. Moreover, many concepts about human behavior stitch each section together. Both a valid, reliable model and an argument have emerged in this research.

This thesis does not focus on a single case study but is a comprehensive analysis and synthesis of topics bridging ideology and social movement literature. The historical references seek to provide contextual validation for the model. Some readers, of course, may not accept this thesis's definition and application of ideology. Its argument is scientific yet may be more complex and uncertain than the arguments of other quantitative works. I have mitigated this by collecting data on numerous observable implications for the theory.

F. PRELIMINARY CLAIMS

The following are my claims before completing research on ideology and social movement theory. I will discuss how the claims have been modified in the conclusion of Chapter III, which will assist readers in understanding the operationalization of ideologies as discussed in the final three chapters.

1. The transformation of consciousness as evidenced by new behavior is a way ideology is operationalized.
2. Identifying totally with a cause is a way ideology is operationalized.
3. Individuals are more inclined to act after a transformation of consciousness.
4. Individuals are more inclined to act violently after total identification with the cause.
5. In order to shape mass behavior, one must have a grassroots understanding of a culture and the logic of its narrative or pre-existing ideology.

G. ASSUMPTIONS

The most significant of my assumptions are listed in this section, to inform the reader of ideas that I accepted before, during, and after research analysis.

1. Social movements and ideologies do not always emerge via in-state actors; origins can be traced to external organizers.
2. Although ideology illuminates problems and offers solutions, alone it is not the mechanism that creates *us versus them*. Instead, identities and discourse illuminate sides. So, considering how one interprets messages then identifies with an ideology or not is the best way to determine ideological friend and foe.
3. The ultimate goal of ideology is an accepted collective solution and strategy to reach the future good society.

H. CONCLUSION

This research design turned out to have both depth and breadth, not from similar case comparisons but by diving into research segments: ideology, resonance, social movement theory, consciousness, communication, and influence. A model, an argument, and a few policy recommendations emerge.

The answer to the original research question—How can developing social movements operationalize ideologies?—is a combination of the communication pathway and the operationalizing sequence, both of which will be detailed in subsequent chapters. The argument itself is a simple syllogism, as follows. If viable ideologies compete through the real sociopolitical communication pathway to intended audiences, then the operationalization of the social movement's external and internal considerations maximizes its potential for worldview resonance. The findings in this paper argue that it is true that ideologies compete through the pathway; therefore, this operationalization does indeed maximize resonance potential. This argument is structurally valid. If all the premises can be shown to be true, then the argument is sound. My aim is to demonstrate why we have strong reasons to conclude that these premises are, indeed, true.

It is important to security policy analysts, decision makers, and warfighters to understand how movements influence ideas. Developing social movements communicate across a particular pathway to resonate with intended audiences and ultimately seek to

transform adherents into action agents. Hence, social movements operationalize ideology by controlling and influencing communicated ideas. Being armed with this information allows for anticipating moves, counter-messaging, and organizing war adherents to compete in the information domain. The remainder of this thesis covers different types of ideologies in Chapter II and resonance and social movements in Chapter III; Chapter IV depicts the communication pathway for ideologies; the operationalizing sequence is described in Chapter V; and finally, I give policy recommendations in Chapter VI. Chapters II and III prepare readers with important concepts on ideologies and social movements before reaching the heart of this thesis in Chapters IV and V.

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II. IDEOLOGIES

A. INTRODUCTION

In the first chapter, I outlined the confusion among policy analysts and decision makers about understanding ideologies, how ideologies compete in information warfare, and how they create visible social movement action. This chapter discusses ideology profiles such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, and totalitarianism. Understanding various ideology profiles allows the U.S. security apparatus to better prepare for, identify, and compete against threatening social movements.

Some people may overlook the ability of ideologies to spread from one individual to another. Children are born into a sociopolitical world, and as they become aware—and this is true in all societies—their first incomplete, or thin, ideology is one of authoritarianism.³⁰ Parents carry ideologies and pass their understandings of the world to their young. Obedience is one of the main solutions understood by a child. So, each person resonates with a pre-existing ideology, which is absorbed at an early age and modifies during adolescence, before they join a social movement. However, a child does not have an ideology of multifaceted solutions to attain the future good society, so his or her ideology is not “fully fledged.”³¹

In this thesis, a social movement in its early stages of development is viewed as a group ranging in size from two closely tied people up to a significant portion of a nation. While an individual might be the first to articulate a particular grievance, ideologies *develop* in a group. They “are produced, directed at, and consumed by groups.”³² However, it is essential to add that groups can direct ideology recruitment toward individuals, as parents do with a child; also, it is possible for one person to articulate a new, wholly synthesized ideology for the first time to a group. This is true even if the

³⁰ Freeden, *Ideology*, 47.

³¹ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 226. Freeden does not discuss ideologies with children in the texts reviewed for this paper. Ideologies like feminism, nationalism, and ecologism are examples of “thin” ideologies because they do not offer solutions to all of life’s problems. Fully fledged ideologies offer total solutions. Adherents of thin ideologies usually connect to major ideologies.

³² *Ibid.*, 22.

majority of those ideas were freely floating around the society beforehand. Once an ideology is explained, there is generally a refinement and strengthening process among insiders.

Freeden's group-to-group communication concept oversimplifies two key experiences: adolescence and recruitment. As with a child, a chance circumstance, or a targeted individual, ideologies can be absorbed by one person at a time. Variant ideologies or new competing ideologies pass from one person to another, for example via direct emails; from one person to a group, for example via a website; or from a group to an individual, as seen with some marketing schemes or YouTube-type channels.

An ideology has a unique configuration of sociopolitical ideas and informs the holder's grievances, solutions, and actions to achieve the ideal society. However, there is a paradox when it comes to whether an ideology operationalized a social movement or the social movement operationalized the ideology. While people can disseminate, block, and contradict ideologies, they too are influenced by an ideology. Is it possible for an individual to create a completely new ideology, including all of the ideology's internal ideas? No. Ideologies are not born in a vacuum. They are born into a history, a culture, a place, and may be perceived and regarded as new ideas. The ideas, however, are not new in total comparative analysis; they combine elements of grievances, solutions, or strategies from ideas that already existed, possibly adding in some actual new concepts.

B. PROFILING IDEOLOGIES

Any given ideology covers all political concepts.³³ Indeed, an ideology holds approval or disapproval for every sociopolitical concept the individual carrying that ideology is aware of. However, while some concepts will be made central in the person's ideological explanation, others will be marginalized or removed; in fact, most concepts are eliminable to any given ideology's central definition or profile.

³³ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 83.

Critical to this discussion is the concept of decontesting ideas, a process that has to do with finding and believing in the meaning of political concepts.³⁴ In the depiction of liberalism in the following subsection, for example, I will talk about different configurations of concepts within this ideology that hold different meanings to different people; these people have decontested political ideas differently. They understand the connection of political concepts in different ways, and the words involved mean different things to them.³⁵ Decontesting defines the limits and boundaries of ideal concepts, eliminating aspects the person in question finds irrelevant and leaving only the ideas she values.³⁶

Freeden explains ideologies as total and general political worldviews. However, ideologies are distinguished by ordering similar concepts, decontesting concepts, and interpreting messages. The ideational profile of an ideology is a result of decontestation of neighboring concepts. Freeden explains, “the decontesting of political concepts performed by an ideology is an attempt to legitimate a preferred political order by controlling the meaning of key political words.”³⁷ The process of decontesting provides a given concept with more determinate meaning. So, ideologies take on “lives of their own” based on how concepts are grouped.³⁸

Of the utmost significance, ideologies are not thought-beliefs but thought-behaviors and therefore exist both internally and externally to language.³⁹ The difference between thought-beliefs and thought-behaviors is that the latter are empirical and involve fallible participants, while thought-beliefs can be discussed purely rationally.⁴⁰ Ideological language is accountable to reality, as it exists and derives meaning in the real

³⁴ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 76.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 92.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 236.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 117.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 337.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

world. Ideologies are the convergence of “meaning and form...presented through a communicable and action-inspiring pattern.”⁴¹

Ideologies do not ignore logical adjacencies, as Freeden explains, but rely heavily on cultural adjacency, resulting in a mixed variety of reason, emotion, and cultural preferences. Ideologies attempt to connect specific political ideas. Initially, they determine the meaning of the overall concept, then they give meaning to political terms. According to Freeden, ideologies are then best understood as “configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts.”⁴²

People can reflect on and decontest political meanings, but this process is not absolute. There is flexibility with political ideas due to changing conceptions of history and culture. Then, “ideology is...the macroscopic structural arrangement that attributes meaning to a range of mutually defining political concepts.”⁴³

As noted earlier, ideology is structured as “core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts” attempting to map the structural arrangement of these political concepts.⁴⁴ These conceptual layers can be imagined as a biological cell: nucleus, cytoplasm, and then cell membrane. Alternatively, imagine the content ideas of an ideology as furnishings in a dwelling. A kitchen has essential components that are core to it, such as a stove and a sink.⁴⁵ Remove one and the room becomes difficult to recognize. Lose both core components, and the room is no longer a kitchen. Hybrid ideologies combine core concepts from two families, such as an office-kitchen with bookshelves, a desk, a sink, and a stove. Although furniture can be rearranged, being able to identify a room or ideology involves a structural perspective and historical family resemblances.⁴⁶

Adjacent concepts of how we understand kitchens may include countertops and a ceiling, and a periphery concept may be something like a dinner table. In the liberalism

⁴¹ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 54.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁴⁵ Freeden, *Ideology*, 61.

⁴⁶ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 88–89.

ideology, for example, from core to periphery, the ideas of liberty, human rights, and nationalism are connected.⁴⁷ The concepts of liberty and democracy, as another example, can combine in multiple ways: 1) with close association, democracy may mean self-determination, and 2) with structural interlinkage, democracy may mean limited popular government.⁴⁸ Adjacencies are culturally relevant concepts and act like fertile soil for core concepts.

The three layers are essential to understanding the structure of ideologies. Certain ideas form groupings that distinguish an ideology from other ideologies. Within a given ideology structure, adjacent and periphery concepts are more flexible and moveable than the core concepts are. Concepts connect among the three layers to form a specific ideology conception.

Within this morphology model, there are two kinds of peripheral concepts: the margin and perimeter.⁴⁹ The margin does not affect the core. Indeed, as Freedman explains, it is possible for concepts to be on the margin of the profile purely because a competing ideology has forced them onto the agenda. The perimeter periphery concepts are distinct from marginal periphery concepts in that they are the ideology's ideas as they engage real-world issues in space and time.⁵⁰ The perimeter is an essential interface between core-adjacent concepts and the real world. Perimeter components are specific ideas, policies, and applications, which "serve as the micro-ideological conduits of cultural constraints that impact on the macro-ideological structure, as well as conduits of structural and logical constraints... through which social facts and concrete events are construed."⁵¹

Some perimeter concepts may actually be marginal, too, as with the concept of free trade for 19th-century liberalism before it moved and became an adjacent concept.⁵²

⁴⁷ Freedman, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77, 187, 189.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 78–80.


⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁵² *Ibid.*

Within a given ideological morphology, concepts can move between the margin and the core. Liberalism, for example, saw the concept of natural rights move outward, and fascism saw violence move to the center, as noted by Freeden. However, some ideas are fixed. Liberty for liberalism and equality for socialism are ineliminable from their respective cores.⁵³ Freeden also explains that concepts can be core in one ideology and marginal in another: consider social order for conservatism and liberalism, respectively. Adherents to the ideology can stress the importance of different core concepts; Freeden illustrates this by describing the debate in socialism over equality, creativity, and welfare. Figure 1 illustrates the general core-adjacent-periphery structure of an ideology in Freeden's model as discussed thus far.

Figure 1. Depiction of Freeden's Ideology Profile⁵⁴



In the model, beliefs within an ideology are identified as routes along core, adjacent, and perimeter concepts.⁵⁵ Some people refer to ideologies as “beliefs,” and this

⁵³ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 84, 343.

⁵⁴ Adapted from Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77. Depiction is my interpretation of Freeden's description.

is correct so long as what they mean is holistic belief systems that involve all one's sociopolitical thoughts and behavior in life.

To help clarify this discussion of how ideas connect and create meaning across this model, Table 1 presents a hypothetical core-adjacent-periphery decontestation route. As core, adjacent, and perimeter ideas connect—such as human welfare, human rights, and the pain and suffering caused by a policy proposal, respectively—we see that these ideas in turn become interpreted and valued as human flourishing, rights to social services, and undesirable and avoidable pain.

Table 1. Example of a Core-to-Periphery National Health Service Belief⁵⁶

Connections	Decontested and then valued as...
Core: Human welfare	Human flourishing
Adjacent: Community and responsibility	Involving state intervention
Adjacent: Human rights	Rights to services
Perimeter: Pain caused by a policy proposal	Undesirable and avoidable
Perimeter: Needs	Medical services

An important clarification is to show how Heywood's problem-solution-strategy and Freeden's core-adjacent-periphery ideology explanations overlap. Key to understanding the difference between them is that Heywood reviews the nature of *ideologies* (plural), while Freeden investigates the nature of ideology itself. Solutions for Freeden are addressed in his core and adjacent concepts, while strategies are addressed in the perimeter periphery. Since Freeden usually decontests the ideas within an ideology, the images his framework paints of a given ideology seem to be missing problems, but most of those ideas have been pushed to the margin periphery or removed from the profile. Think of the images created with Freeden's descriptions as pure form, while the problems they address are implied. These ideas can seem invisible without investigation. On the other hand, Heywood's delineation is crude, easily visible, and clunky. This thesis


⁵⁵ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 81.

⁵⁶ Adapted from Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 81. Description reconfigured into this format.

uses Heywood's simple definition to explain ideologies and Freeden's morphology to depict them.

To demonstrate how I meld these two approaches in this thesis, see Figure 2. This figure shows how Freeden's morphology of core-adjacent-periphery aligns with Heywood's working definition of problem-solution-strategy. From top to bottom, Freeden's core concepts depict what Heywood calls solutions, which implies associated problems. Next, adjacent concepts depict culturally viable solutions. Then, Freeden's marginal concepts display explicit problems for an ideology. Finally, the morphology perimeter depicts policies and programs acted on by ideology members—the strategies.


Figure 2. Ideology Alignment of Freeden's Morphology and Heywood's Definition⁵⁷



Before describing and depicting some major ideologies, it is important to see how intellectuals think of the range of ideology options. Figure 3 shows a traditional left-right spectrum of major ideologies. It shows that communism and fascism are totalitarian ideologies. Communism touches socialism because it is an extreme version of it. Also, there are three moderate ideologies situated in the center of the spectrum. Liberalism is pulled closer to socialism because they are both progressive ideologies; conservatism sits between ideologies to its left and right, unless one of its neighboring ideologies are exerting competitive pressure. Conservatism's mirroring strategy, as with the other ideologies, will be discussed briefly in the following sections.

⁵⁷ Adapted from Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 81; Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 11.

Figure 3. The Popular Ideology Spectrum⁵⁸



Employment of ideologies is an aspect of political action and decision making. Freedren explains that decisions are made by decontesting the meaning of political terms. As such, political thoughts configure decontested concepts.⁵⁹ Due to personal interpretation, choices among political ideas and configurations are not necessarily as exclusive as Figure 3 suggests.

The following sections give a brief description of certain ideology profiles so that readers can appreciate the different major worldviews people hold while engaging in information warfare. Having an appreciation of different ideologies illuminates biases and what different people value in their worlds.

1. Liberalism and Tensions in America

In this section, I provide a brief description of a liberalism profile that has evolved throughout history and point out some of the embedded conceptual tensions that liberalism entails. I go into more detail with liberalism since the intended audience for this research is primarily Americans and it is important to consider domestic issues. Many Americans resonate with liberalism today.

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) explained liberty not only as self-determination but subsequently as self-development and imperfect self-realization.⁶⁰ Mill looked to the central concepts of French liberalism to formulate a British interpretation of what is

⁵⁸ Adapted from Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 16.

⁵⁹ Freedren, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 5.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 147, 168, 175.

referred to as 19th-century classic liberalism. Liberalism has many core concepts, which allows it flexibility in connecting with other ideas. As listed by Freeden, French liberalism's core ideas were "Liberty, individuality, progress, rationality, the general interest, sociability, and constraints on power."⁶¹ However, Mill offered different connections and meanings to political ideas, which allowed varieties of liberalism to emerge.⁶² Over time, liberalism demonstrated that it did not overlap (to any significant degree that would confuse the families) with later emerging ideologies such as conservatism and socialism.


For a view of Mill's liberalism, see Figure 4. The figure depicts color-coordinated connections of ideas among the core and periphery layers. Liberty, for example, is a core concept that has never been eliminated from liberalism. Liberty connects with different core concepts. Depicted in red, liberty takes a route connecting with individualism, which is also in the core. Liberty further connects with property in the cultural adjacency region of the figure and with education in the perimeter of policies and activities. Another connection route for liberty, in blue, is with freedom in the core, equality as an adjacent concept, and women's rights in the perimeter-periphery. It is the connection of these ideas in profile that determines how one views liberty.⁶³

⁶¹ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 176.

⁶² Ibid., 177, 179.

⁶³ For a different profile of liberalism, Appendix A depicts Thomas Hill Green's ideal liberalism, in which people develop toward self-realization. The centerpiece of this version is rational liberty, and the ideology still holds many core concepts. Although it has evolved, this ideology is the origin of the view still held by many academics in America.

Figure 4. Not Completely Classic Liberalism by John Stuart Mill⁶⁴



The social unit of value in liberalism is the individual. There exists a central tension within liberalism that casts the individual in contrasting ways: it describes both the uniqueness of each human's inner qualities and her status as equal to all others in the society.⁶⁵ That society can then be viewed as a collection of individuals competing for personal interests and yet born with equal moral worth or human rights. Equal individual citizenship, here, implies equal social status. Privileges and advantages based on race, gender, or religion are denied by liberals. Equality, usually demands equal *opportunity*,

⁶⁴ Adapted from Freeden's *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pages on core concepts 144–153, 155, 165, 178, adjacent concepts 154–164, and periphery concepts 165–167. Colors code linkage of certain concepts per Freeden's explanation. Black text usually indicates the ideas were not readily explained in association with other ideas.

⁶⁵ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 28.

not equal outcomes. However, when it comes to talents, skills, and merit, people are not born equal. Equality affords individuals the opportunity to develop their personal unequal abilities. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, deemed social equality unjust, since unlike characters are treated wholly—and poorly—due to their black alikeness.⁶⁶ While liberals promote civil-right equalities, they still accept that some of their members have poor character. Before demanding equal opportunity, they admit some will be judged as underperformers or failures while others will succeed.

It is important to note, however, that not all Americans hold the liberalism ideology. In contrast to the civil rights movement in the United States, decisions by the First Americans community illuminate a key distinction with the pan-Indian movement. Indian ideology, according to Charles Wilkinson, encompasses the present and layers of people and events of the past. The past is important, Wilkinson argues, because Indians are “place-based peoples.”⁶⁷ He explains the Indian worldview holds tribal sovereignty, homelands, gods, nature, ceremony, family, and sharing close to its core components.

Unfortunately, the First Americans did not utilize the communication processes of the civil rights movement. They intentionally avoided using the channels and other options effective for another movement to raise awareness of specific Indian issues. These channels, as will be discussed in Chapter IV, are part of the pathway to increase adherents or supporters of a cause. Although the Indians appreciated how the civil rights movement brought attention to minority rights, they felt merging the two movements was contradictory. Wilkinson’s analysis is, “Blacks were determined to eliminate segregation and allow integration; Indians sought to reverse forced assimilation.”⁶⁸ Native Americans wanted sovereignty, while black Americans wanted an equal seat at the shared table of sovereignty. Not all inhabitants of the motherland want freedom as it is defined by the framers of the Constitution or even the respected Martin Luther King, Jr. Ideologies and social movements continue to compete in America.

⁶⁶ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 33–34.

⁶⁷ Charles Wilkinson, *Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005), 27.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 129.

2. Conservatism

Contrary to popular misconception, conservatism is not about maintaining the status quo.⁶⁹ Rather, properly understood, it is about ensuring change occurs naturally, safely, and with respect for the past, as Freeden explains. The progressive drive to artificially or humanely control change is the major threat to conservatism today. Conservatives, by contrast, do not search for new solutions to social problems.⁷⁰ Yet the conservative becomes systematically active once she does not understand the current state of things and is moved to reaction.⁷¹ To the conservative, the perceived threat “dictates the tempo and the form of the battle.”⁷² Freeden explains, in the long term, conservatism can generally deal with stress better than other ideologies. In the short term, however, the flexible strategy depends on its opponents. This means that the more threatening progressivisms or totalitarianisms are to the conservative core, the less it can adapt, because it becomes more and more rigid. Yet the death of a conservative concept does not stop it from re-emerging. As such, conservatism is often an ideology of trial and error.⁷³ For a look at the conservatism profile, see Appendix B. It has only four core concepts, and the key takeaway is the organic change centerpiece, which is connected to many adjacent and perimeter concepts.

3. Socialism

The core concepts of socialism only occasionally seem in harmony due to the adjacent and peripheral concepts working to contain certain tensions.⁷⁴ The present and future are in a tense relationship.⁷⁵ This dualism is different than conservatism’s mirroring strategy (or its competitive reaction to threatening ideologies on its flanks), in that socialism sees a world that ought to be and is attainable. Like conservatism, its range

⁶⁹ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 332–333.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 335.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 336.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 341.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 383.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 417.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 418.

is free and unbounded—sometimes in the realm of impossibility—and the cultural constraints seen with liberalism and conservatism are usually absent.⁷⁶

With socialism, the unit of analysis is the group or community, which usually parallels the individual and is sometimes above him.⁷⁷ Freeden explains, an individual can only develop in society. Equality in socialism is not about sameness or identical incomes but “commutable human status and worth,” although Marx’s “equality” originally referred to the level of political power between the rich and poor.⁷⁸ Marx recognized individuals’ objectively valued needs differently, so he dismissed the concept of equal distribution based on merit or achievement.⁷⁹ Appendix C depicts socialism with five core ideas but no centerpiece. Many adjacent and periphery concepts reconfigure to sustain its core.

4. Totalitarianism

A totalitarian ideology forces on its consumers an artificially inflexible, simplistic worldview.⁸⁰ Totalitarian ideologies are all-encompassing of the private and public spheres of human thought and activity, and they entitle the state to regulate all individual and social life.⁸¹ This section describes how such ideologies are not created in a vacuum.

Adolf Hitler did not create ideas from nothing. Hitler formed the National Socialist German Worker’s Party, or Nazis, by drawing heavily on related ideas circulating at the same time. For example, Hitler was influenced by Benito Mussolini’s Italian Fascist Party and Friedrich Nietzsche’s view that humans are motivated by the will and power of their emotion rather than rationality.⁸² He was also influenced by Charles Darwin’s work on natural selection, which was influencing sociopolitical thought

⁷⁶ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 419.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 426.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 431.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 432.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁸¹ Freeden, *Ideology*, 90–91, 121–122.

⁸² Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 203.

at the time, proposing that humanity is about competition and struggle. These ideas and others ultimately encouraged the Nazi program of eugenics.

Heywood lists the central concepts of fascism as: antirationalism (against abstract thought as seen during the Enlightenment), struggle, leadership and elitism, socialism, and ultranationalism.⁸³ For example, one concept that impacted Nazi action was Aryanism, the idea that Germans are the master race—a form of racial nationalism. This, too, did not originate in a vacuum; German Aryanism was based on Joseph Arthur Gobineau’s racial anti-Semitism doctrine.⁸⁴ At the same time, Houston Stewart Chamberlain had spelled out a history of German misfortune blaming Jews for their loss in World War One, humiliation at Versailles, and enslaving the lower and middle classes by controlling banking.⁸⁵ These concepts each influenced the fascist ideology that ultimately emerged through Hitler and the Nazi regime. That fascist ideology is best characterized as a Manichaeian (or good versus evil) worldview, specifically one that pitted a racial struggle between Germans and Jews wherein one or the other would dominate the world.⁸⁶

As with Nazism, religious fundamentalism illustrates that ideologies are not born in a vacuum. According to Heywood, the “war on terror” highlights “the emergence of new ideological battle lines.”⁸⁷ This contest is better described as a global campaign against those considered terrorists by some who share a different ideology. Religious fundamentalism does not separate the church and state.⁸⁸ Fundamentalism exists in many religions. American evangelical Protestants, for example, were the first to use the term *fundamental* in doctrinal pamphlets between 1910 and 1915 claiming the literal truth of the bible.⁸⁹ American fundamentalists denied modern science and despised Darwinian

⁸³ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 200, 202–206.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 217.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 220.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 19.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 281.

⁸⁹ Karen Armstrong, *Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 303.

evolutionary social theory about a brutal and godless struggle. Any religion can find religious texts to justify killing heretics or infidels.⁹⁰ Karen Armstrong explains that attacking fundamentalists usually causes them to become more extreme, establish new doctrine, retreat from the mainstream, and build on the margins.⁹¹ Fundamentalists are defiant and seek to recover their identities and culture from others.⁹² Islamic fundamentalism, particularly, seeks to construct a theocracy in which the state is based on religious principles. As Heywood explains, “Politics, in effect, is religion.”⁹³

Among violent religious fundamentalist movements, there is a basic pattern: they withdraw from mainstream society; they develop a fear of the destruction of their faith, life, and lifestyle; then, some groups conduct a counteroffensive to convert others.⁹⁴ With modernization comes secularization: the valuing of rational ideas over religious or sacred ones. This shifting of the source of value creates uncertainty for many. Fundamentalism, says Heywood, usually emerges “in deeply troubled societies... afflicted by an actual or perceived crisis of identity.”⁹⁵ He notes that fundamentalists search for meaning in a world of uncertainty.

Religious fundamentalism is a major ideology.⁹⁶ Without drawing a distinction between religion and politics, fundamentalism tends toward totalitarianism. Heywood explains that the core concepts include religion as politics, anti-modernism, and militancy.⁹⁷ The radical is unwilling to compromise, does not want to extend relationships, and is willing to fight. The moderate, on the other hand, is open-minded, wants to avoid chaos, is afraid of consequences, and generally wants to avoid a fight.⁹⁸

⁹⁰ Armstrong, *Fields of Blood*, 247. I expanded the meaning of the original statement beyond Armstrong’s claim about Christianity. I added “infidels.”

⁹¹ Ibid., 305.

⁹² Ibid., 305–306.

⁹³ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 281.

⁹⁴ Armstrong, *Fields of Blood*, 303.

⁹⁵ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 282.


⁹⁶ Ibid., 284.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 284.

⁹⁸ Anna Simons, “Radicals and Moderates” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 07 December 2015).

Figure 5 depicts religious fundamentalism placed between communism and fascism. These three totalitarian ideologies are considered extreme compared to the three moderates. The left-to-right spectrum is replaced here with a circular configuration.

Figure 5. Religious Fundamentalism Over the Extremism Line⁹⁹



Heywood argues, “political Islam shares much in common with fascism and communism, in that each of them promises to rid society of corruption and immorality.”¹⁰⁰ Fundamentalists are not necessarily scriptural literalists. Modern-day religious fundamentalism, socially and psychologically, has been able to mobilize activists. Heywood continues, the solutions religious fundamentalism offers are usually more straightforward than other competing ideologies, and it is absolute. The rigidity, however, can be viewed as a weakness, as it will struggle to provide comprehensive solutions to complex social problems—but it will provide solutions. Key to religious fundamentalism is that it “is selectively traditional but also selectively modern.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Adapted from Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 17. Depicts horseshoe spectrum, not circular configuration.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 296.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 290.

Heywood says, it resents *and* envies modernity, despising perceived amoral behavior like adultery, homosexuality, prostitution, and pornography but willing to use the Internet, build a state, and seek nuclear materials.¹⁰² Fundamentalists tend to hold a modern, dynamic interpretation of religion that is not stuck in tradition.

Religious ideas are part of ideologies. If religion is considered a device for social organization with collective goals and for regulating conflict within society, there is no separation of religion and politics. Christianity and Islam hold global orientations claiming to be the true religion and that salvation is reserved for believers only, non-believers be damned.¹⁰³ All ideologies have answers to questions about God.

Islamic fundamentalism traces its roots back to 1928 with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.¹⁰⁴ Since the 1970s, Islamic fundamentalism has attracted many young activists. Sayyid Qutb, who influenced Osama Bin Laden, hated the materialism, immorality, and sexual exploits of the West.¹⁰⁵ But while Qutb focused on Westernized leaders in Egypt and elsewhere, Osama Bin Laden saw the United States as the primary target.

Sayyid Qutb, from the Brotherhood's propaganda wing, came up with the idea in prison that even a Muslim ruler based on the Western model would not work.¹⁰⁶ Qutb looked at Muhammad's actions in the Quran and transferred four concepts into his book *Milestones*, which was smuggled out of prison. He wrote about how Muhammad created a party, or *jamaat*, committed to justice; about division of the godly and godless; about an Islamic state formed in Medina, Saudi Arabia; and about conducting jihad against Mecca, Saudi Arabia.¹⁰⁷ Although dormant for a time, Qutb's work resonated with young Brotherhood inmates who followed him. Texts like *Milestones* continue to influence

¹⁰² Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 291.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 307.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 294–298. Hassan al-Banna's Brotherhood movement especially with the youth is detailed in Armstrong's, *Fields of Blood*, 320. His grassroots reforms resonated quickly in Egypt.

¹⁰⁵ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 297.

¹⁰⁶ Armstrong, *Fields of Blood*, 322.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 322.

jihadists today. Ideological texts can sit dormant or float in society until they are operationalized by a movement.

C. CONCLUSION

This chapter prepared readers with information on major ideologies to provide context prior to discussing how an ideology is communicated and influenced by people. Ideologies can be absorbed one person at a time, and young teenagers remain a great recruiting pool for social movements. Another recurring theme with ideology is prison populations; many social movement leaders like Hitler, Nelson Mandela, and Qutb grew in influence during their incarcerations.

Politics is about collective goals and the regulation of conflict. Ideologies contain political ideas. Rather than looking at politics as a simple left-right spectrum, in this thesis I treat it as a dynamic ring of perpetual competition including religious fundamentalism, which I consider a major ideology. Indeed, the inability to see relationships with others who hold different ideologies is often the root cause of war.¹⁰⁸

From this view, ideologies are differently configured problem-solution-strategy weapons on the information battlefield. Ideologies are not born from nothing. Rather, many of their ideas are pulled from competing sociopolitical thoughts and behaviors in society. Every ideology holds an opinion on all political matters known to an interpretation agent. Armed with this understanding of how ideologies evolve from ideas floating in society, in the next chapter I will investigate how they resonate. Ideologies vary widely, and the major ideologies act more like central harmonic resonances.

¹⁰⁸ Armstrong, *Fields of Blood*, 214.

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III. RESONANCE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

A. INTRODUCTION

Now that readers should have some sense of what an ideology is and some of the major varieties in modern society, I will introduce the concept of resonance operations (ops) and describe social movement categories and outputs. Through analogies, concepts on consciousness to better understand the complexities with interpretation agents, and an example of a social movement recruiting scheme, this chapter prepares readers for Chapter IV, which covers communicating ideologies.

Communicated ideas must travel from one person to the next. Sometimes this involves the literal resonance of radio waves, but more significantly, this is about ideas resonating in an audience member's mind. Resonance is about ideas reaching audiences and the absorption or acceptance of those ideas. An ideology that is successfully resonant impacts someone who more or less agrees with the problem, solution, and strategy the ideology puts forth. The major ideologies in particular can be seen as moving between people and being held on different frequencies.

B. ANTENNAS, HARMONICS, AND ANALOGY

When considering transmitting and receiving ideas, think of humans resonating like antennas. The qualities one would look for in a functional antenna are also the qualities of people who will resonate with an ideology and pass it to others. Antennas work when they radiate (or transmit) and receive power,¹⁰⁹ and they function best at frequencies near their resonant frequency.¹¹⁰

Donald Hall explains that resonance delivers energy efficiently, continuously, and cooperatively when the driving force runs at nearly the same frequency that the receiving


¹⁰⁹ "How Does An Antenna Work?," YouTube video, 4:32, posted by "weBoost," 11 September 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PPKEpJEt_cM&list=PL47kcJjNuD4NI7mrB28C-I0tzSDbef9n7.

¹¹⁰ "Basic Antenna Resonance Fundamentals," YouTube video, 3:55, posted by "Dan Vanevenhoven," 24 August 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TDHo1M9-r2I>.

force naturally prefers.¹¹¹ An example of such resonance is gently pushing someone on a swing with the same frequency as its natural motion.

One can picture ideologies as frequencies; an ideology will only resonate with someone who is already thinking or primed to think similarly. At different harmonic levels, things do not resonate, since they are on different frequencies. Resonance is not about harmony with all others but harmony with like others. See examples in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Resonant Harmonics¹¹²



Ideologies are oriented to specific sociopolitical actors, though not necessarily the ones intended.¹¹³ Ideologies are absorbed by people when the packaged concepts resonate with them. A group's perceptions can impose new interpretation rules on an ideology, which creates variance, but the new interpretation generally remains within the harmonic range. Building upon this analogy, we can argue that unrealistic solutions and strategies often result in non-resonance.


¹¹¹ Donald E. Hall, *Musical Acoustics*, 3rd ed. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 2002), 213, 33–34. Author discussion on delivering energy to an oscillator—substituted for “someone.”

¹¹² Adapted from Wil Offermans, “For the Contemporary Flutist Online,” Studio E Music Creation (2012–2016), <http://www.forthethecontemporaryflutist.com/etude/etude-02.html>.

¹¹³ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 113–114, 262, 77.

Resonance can also be seen in applause at a political speech, the roar of the crowd at a rally, musical notes with an emotional audience, or screams when it is time to disrupt the status quo.¹¹⁴ When it comes to social movements resonating with new recruits, they ultimately seek harmony of ideology. The competition of two different harmonics, or major ideologies, does not create resonance in one's mind. Figure 7 illustrates what happens when two ideologies, of equal strength, converge on different frequencies. Think of this as a pre-existing ideology being exposed to divergent ideas for the first time.

Figure 7. Non-Resonant Messaging



Because of this, before sending an ideological message, social movements will want to ensure the intended receiver is naturally designed and oriented to receive and transmit its ideology. To this end, social movements seek, or at least should seek, a compatible receiver design. As with antennas, good targets of ideology will be able to receive messages from the social movement and radiate sympathetic messages to others to diffuse the ideas. The implication is that communication of ideology does not end between sender and receiver, but as with the function of antennas, the messages are

¹¹⁴ Susan Blackmore, *Consciousness: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 282. These are all complex messages according to Blackmore.

passed on to others for additional recruitment for the movement and/or for acceptance of the ideology.

To continue the analogy, the ideal type of power gain for humans to be good ideology antennae is directional or high gain. Directional antennas receive and transmit with great power within a narrow angle.¹¹⁵ While people are able to receive from multiple directions, their attention focuses narrowly. The human antenna will have better signal quality if he is oriented toward additional susceptible bystanders and passive constituents while not distracted by non-believers. Especially for smaller social movements, there is little time and resources to message unwilling and unhelpful audiences. In humans, directivity hinges on how distracted people are and their positions within a communication network. The intended audience is then one that has better power gain than other multidirectional receivers (or distracted people).

The human antenna should also be efficient at transferring ideas. Efficiency deals with the amount of information that is misdirected as messages attempt to pass to the intended audience.¹¹⁶ Specific efficiency characteristics that social movements can assess are conduction (those who directly allow and transmit the flow of ideas) and reflection (those throwing back ideas to some degree without absorbing them). If a social movement wants an ideology to spread, it is inefficient to send an idea specifically to someone who totally disagrees with an ideological message. This, like all characteristics, can be tested and observed.

The next feature is to have a tolerable impedance level and match.¹¹⁷ Impedance is about natural imperfections with receiving and sending messages, such as, in the human antenna case, forgetful minds. This is different than inefficient disagreement of a message and deals with mental capacity. To transfer power maximally requires matching the impedance between sender and receiver. For example, an ideological message should

¹¹⁵ Constantine A. Balanis, *Antenna Theory: Analysis and Design*, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997), 29, 3, 39.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 60, 78. Incorporating humans as analogous to antennas.

¹¹⁷ Wikipedia, s.v. "Antenna (radio)," last modified 04 October 2016. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antenna_\(radio\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antenna_(radio)).

be clear and concise about what the grievances, solutions, and plans are to improve the world. By sending a message that an audience understands and can carry, impedance is matched. In such a case, a resonant ideology is easy for people to understand and repeat to others.

A fourth feature has to do with matchable frequency within bandwidth, the range of frequencies within which an antenna conforms to a certain standard. With humans, this idea of bandwidth means the resonant ideology does not need to match perfectly between sender and receiver, only sufficiently to achieve the goal. When social movements see the expected or desired behaviors in their potential recruits, these are indicators of adequate resonance for a given message—though, of course, false positives can sometimes occur. To resonate with an audience, there are two options: send random messages to resonate with random audiences or determine which messages resonate with a certain audience and then prepare resonating messages aligned to them. The latter approach is more likely to find matchable frequencies, which is a key requirement for passing messages.¹¹⁸

Horizontal polarization is the final feature of this antenna analogy. The antenna's orientation determines the direction a wave it transmits travels. An antenna, with its upright stance, emits a wave that flows parallel with the Earth's surface to reach other devices; similarly, ideal (or healthy) audiences are oriented toward and engage other humans, and the ideologies we transmit impact other human interpretation agents.¹¹⁹

C. INTERPRETATION AGENTS

If a receiving antenna is the person who interprets political ideas, it is important to look at how that person's mind processes information. Richards Heuer argues that the human mind simplifies reality, so perception is influenced by one's experiences, values,

¹¹⁸ Wikipedia, s.v. "Antenna (radio)," last modified 04 October 2016. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antenna_\(radio\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antenna_(radio)).

¹¹⁹ Balanis, *Antenna Theory*, 64.

and roles and the stimuli received by the senses.¹²⁰ Operating from a given mindset is neither bad nor good but unavoidable.

1. Perception

Perceptions are quickly created but resist change. Once someone forms an image, future information is assimilated into the existing model.¹²¹ Heuer explains, “despite ambiguous stimuli, we form some sort of tentative hypothesis about what it is we are seeing. The longer we are exposed to the ambiguous data, the greater confidence we develop in this initial and perhaps erroneous impression.”¹²² It can take a great deal of data to change someone’s mind.

2. Consciousness

Consciousness is subjective experience, or what being is like. In the study of skilled motor actions, Susan Blackmore outlines five categories of consciousness in actions: spinal reflexes, such as growing hair; usually unconscious actions, like a beating heart, which can sometimes come under conscious control; conscious skilled actions, like bike riding, which become easy or automatized with practice; skilled actions that can be controlled or passive, like driving a car; and actions that seem always to be conscious, like moral decision making.¹²³ Perception, too, can be conscious or unconscious.

Subjectivity is a key difference between unconscious and conscious processes.¹²⁴ Using ideology is a conscious undertaking. Ideology is related to consciousness because both are about how people perceive the real world and act accordingly.

¹²⁰ Richards J. Heuer, Jr, “Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception,” in *Strategic Military Deception*, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 31–32.

¹²¹ Ibid., 36–37.

¹²² Ibid., 39–40.

¹²³ Blackmore, *Consciousness*, 2nd ed., 42, 71, 79, 98, 225.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 263.

D. SOCIAL MOVEMENT COMPONENTS

Analyzing social movement categories provides context on whom and why groups may choose to leverage ideologies. While major ideologies are maintained by professional political thinkers or institutional political organizations such as interest groups and parties, this study highlights a third group: partly noninstitutional social movements and their organizations born from the mass population. It is likely the producers within the mass population use multiple interpretations of a creative ideology to compete.¹²⁵ Doug McAdam and David Snow define a social movement “as a loose collectivity acting with some degree of organization, temporal continuity, and reliance on noninstitutional forms of action to promote or resist change in the group, society, or world order of which it is a part.”¹²⁶ It is a group of people who engage in joint action for a purpose.

Social movements are carriers or vehicles of change.¹²⁷ They are not trends like industrialization or urbanization, changes in public opinions or beliefs, mass migrations like a land rush, or interest groups like the National Rifle Association.¹²⁸ The key difference between social movements and interest groups is that interest groups are embedded in the institutionalized policy-making system of legitimate actors and have means such as lobbying.¹²⁹ Social movements, by definition, exist outside these institutionalized systems.

Formal organizations serve as the public faces of social movements, and at least one is essential for activity.¹³⁰ An organization carries and dramatizes the issues important to the movement’s members.¹³¹ Social movement organizations carry

¹²⁵ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 124.

¹²⁶ Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, “Introduction,” in *Readings on Social Movements: Origins, Dynamics, and Outcomes*, ed. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1, 3.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 3–4.


¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1, 3–4.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 4–5.

ideologies and operationalize those ideologies to allow the movement and its worldviews to survive. When there is widespread political dissent in a population, the environment simmers with ideological competition. This offers a movement options for how to operationalize political ideas. While social movements can coerce and offer incentives to gain public compliance, an ideology might be sufficient to carry a movement toward its goals. In the social movement context, there are three categories of relevant actors: protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders.¹³² As Figure 8 depicts, the three types of protagonists are all supporters and have interests represented by the movement.

Figure 8. Social Movement Protagonist Actors¹³³



¹³² McAdam and Snow, *Readings on Social Movements*, 5.

¹³³ Adapted from McAdam and Snow, *Readings on Social Movements*, 6. My interpretation of description.

In Figure 8 some conscience adherents will not benefit directly from activities, as McAdam and Snow explain.¹³⁴ They also explain most adherents are from the constituency (or resource base), and only some are *very active*. Some of the constituency members do not provide direct support to the adherents, and not all constituents will benefit from the movement. Finally, McAdam and Snow explain that there are many free-rider protagonists.

Antagonists are the adversaries and opposition of the movement or change. They are “unsympathetic to the movement’s objectives” and “perceive the movement’s interests as antithetical.”¹³⁵ Counter-movements are likely to emerge in an attempt to stop or neutralize the social movement. There is no rule that says true antagonists cannot be turned to support the social movement, but this seems a very difficult undertaking and probably includes a transformative experience. However, according to McAdam and Snow, while bystanders are initially uninterested and indifferent to the issues at stake, it is possible to activate their interest and lead them to be active in the movement. For example, bystanders may orient toward the issues when their routines are disrupted. Then, through an information mechanism, they can be transformed into constituents or adherents.

Social movements are just one practice of collective action, which is explained by McAdam and Snow as “any goaldirected activity jointly pursued by two or more individuals.”¹³⁶ Collective action overlaps some with collective behavior, which is when people team together to solve problems, so “just as social movements are a form of collective action, so they also constitute a species of collective behavior.”¹³⁷ Figure 9 illustrates the nesting of social movements. Key to social movement activity is that it is often outside legal institutional means, while collective action is usually institutional.

¹³⁴ McAdam and Snow, *Readings on Social Movements*, 5–6.

¹³⁵ Ibid. It is also possible, but not discussed in this thesis, that some groups oppose situations with sympathetic understanding.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 7.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

Social movements also pursue goals to change something in society, while collective behavior is about continual activity without collective goals.

Figure 9. Distinguishing Social Movements¹³⁸





Figure 10 displays a conceptual plan of how ideological social movement stakeholders shift via a social movement resonance recruitment scheme. Antagonists are high-impact actors opposing the efforts of the social movement. They can be legitimate governments or other actors. Little effort should be directed at shifting these non-believers who are highly non-resonant with the protagonist cause. However, especially with natural disasters, humanitarian opportunities should always be considered in order to win antagonists over or at least try to persuade them to be neutral. It is economical to think of non-believer recruitment efforts last (if at all); I represent this by using a smaller arrow for those efforts. Bystander frequency would look at least one harmonic higher or lower than social movement protagonists and antagonists. To move them into the constituent category, a disruptive event or message is likely required to synchronize the

¹³⁸ Adapted from McAdam and Snow, *Readings on Social Movements*, 6–7. My interpretation of description.

two different oscillators. The social movement can attempt to drop to the bystander harmonic and then eventually bring the whole group's oscillation into tune with the social movement's original frequency. Believers live within the same harmonic range as the social movement, and the oscillation effort of the movement's recruiters and leaders is high in this category to move them to supportive action. Social movement effort toward believers can result in direct support to the cause and members or turn them into adherents. The most committed block of true believers is in the high-impact category for the social movement's goals, and little energy is required by the organization to gain action here.

Figure 10. Shifting Stakeholders¹³⁹




Different movements, of course, have different goals. The visible outputs of a social movement's recruitment strength are subordinate to the movements' organizational goals and those of the relevant ideology. Visible recruitment outputs include the slight chance of turning non-believers into bystanders or isolating non-believers. At the same

¹³⁹ Adapted from Deborah Gibbons, "Stakeholder Map" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 12 May 2016). Lecture offered shifting stakeholders, degree of impact, and level of support.

time, movements may attempt to activate bystanders into constituents. They may also seek to turn these constituent supporters into adherents who at least participate a little. Even better for movements is recruiting busy activists. Aside from looking at recruitment numbers in certain groups or the activities conducted to support or execute movement goals, the ultimate category for movements are the adherents who are willingly violent, if necessary. These outputs entail recognizable behaviors and population numbers. Figure 11 shows a slight variation from Figure 10—instead of considering opportunities to shift non-believers, social movements can attempt to isolate them.

Figure 11. Isolating Antagonists



A social movement may create a recruitment scheme in order to diffuse an ideology. However, in the absence of planning it may happen naturally. Sean Everton argues that social formations result from repeated interactions among actors. Such formations, “take on a life of their own, follow their own logic, and cannot be reduced to or explained by their constituent parts even though they remain dependent on those parts.”¹⁴⁰ This is analogous to hydrogen and oxygen, which do not share the wetness characteristic

¹⁴⁰ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 22.

but combine to create water.¹⁴¹ Water is something beyond its components, but dependent on them. Similarly, social movements depend on ideology and action from constituents and adherents for survival.

E. CONCLUSION

Ideologies will resonate with an interpretation agent depending on his subjective views of the world. Before determining many of the factors that influence thoughts and behaviors, this chapter describes features of antennas as an analogy that can be applied to humans to determine if receivers are temporarily resonant to senders and their messages.

After deeper research into the concepts of ideology, some of my preliminary claims deserve amendment. Regarding claim one, the transformation of consciousness as evidenced by new behavior does not seem to be a way ideology is operationalized but perhaps a result of operationalizing ideology. After consideration, transformation of consciousness seems an effect of offering competing ideas, and both may cause action. It seems backwards to think people's consciousness transforms to get ideas to work for them. It is similar with the second preliminary claim: identifying totally with a cause seems to be a result of operationalizing ideology, not, as I once thought, a way ideology is operationalized.

Nothing in the literature for this research reverses claims three and four that individuals are more inclined to act after a transformation of consciousness and they are more willing to act violently after total identification to the cause. However, claim three should be refined to a more restricted claim. To wit: individuals are more inclined to act if a transformation of ideology moves them from bystanders to the constituency and even more likely if these believers become adherents. The changing of someone's consciousness about the world does not mean that she will act for a movement or an ideology. Also, claim four seems correct: individuals are more inclined to act violently after total identification with the social movement cause, though a detailed account of violence would include discussion on psychological factors beyond the scope of this project. Finally, claim five, about understanding a culture at the grassroots level to be

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 23.

able to influence mass behavior, subtly suggested a divergence between narrative and ideology within culture. However, this study suggests they are closely linked, so I now modify this claim: in order to shape mass behavior, one must have a grassroots understanding of a culture, its history, its place of audience, and the logic of its ideological narrative. I discuss narratives in Chapter V, but first, the next chapter depicts the environment for viable ideological competition.

IV. THE IDEOLOGY COMMUNICATION PATHWAY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the first half of this thesis's main argument, namely, that viable ideologies compete through a communication pathway between senders and interpretation agents. The second half of the argument will be covered in the next chapter. Understanding the communication pathway for ideologies can inform policy makers, strategy analysts, and decision makers about how ideologies diffuse from one person to the next. It does not, however, completely answer the operationalizing question driving this thesis's main research question. This chapter seeks to establish the environmental limitations on viable ideologies, the three roots of ideologies, four strategies of ideological messaging, and the five pathway processes that social movements can choose in an attempt to send resonant ideology. Briefly stated, the chapter explains that before movements can effectively operationalize ideologies, they must first understand the communication environment, the three types of ideological competitors, the offensive and defensive critiques about older worldviews, and five decision points to create influential messages. All of these elements combine to describe how viable ideologies compete in the real sociopolitical world.

If ideologies are not born from nothing, then they emerge from and are constrained by society and other factors. Within that framework, ideologies can be transmitted whole or in fragments. A social movement has many options with which to compete with pre-existing ideologies that are floating and passing through the population in a given society. Developing social movements rebuild, modify, create, and discredit ideologies by communicating political ideas through a selective pathway to resonate with intended audiences.

B. LIMITATIONS

The real sociopolitical world of competing ideologies is limited by four factors: history, culture, place, and partial logic. To start, the environment for viable ideologies is constrained by history and culture. This is a significant point for competitors. In the

process of understanding, there are two fused yet tense time horizons: the enquirer and the historical situation of the enquirer.¹⁴² According to Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, a “test for a propensity to think in terms of time is thus the frequency with which one reads or hears about some alleged change, pauses to recall the past, and says, ‘But that is nonsense!’”¹⁴³ Additionally, culture is transmitted through the Internet, television, newspapers, radio, and articles.¹⁴⁴ Ideologies, argues Freeden, “acquire meaning not only through historically transferred traditions of discourse, and not only through the pluralist disparities of culture, but also through their particular location within a constellation of other political concepts.”¹⁴⁵ The extent to which a movement can change the expectation of an audience is limited by the audience’s cultural predispositions.¹⁴⁶ No radical idea of a utopian perfect society in which all people live peacefully and without political competition is going to be accepted by many people. People will think such solutions are infeasible, and therefore they will eliminate them as non-viable parts of the ideology. Historical continuity has an important organizing role, since ideologies appear as “lived traditions of political thought.”¹⁴⁷

The third boundary is place, which is not necessarily geographically specific. A prison is the type of place in which grievances can breed and develop, depending in part on inmate treatment and privileges as well as the reasons for incarceration. In many cases, local placement is more significant than the surrounding geography—there are certain similarities between prisons regardless of geographic setting. The place in which people find themselves will have incredible influence on the perceived possibility of ideas. A person living in a slum is not primed to accept advanced urban solutions and will therefore take longer to convince. If a person does not believe that a political solution is

¹⁴² Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 113.

¹⁴³ Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1986), 259.

¹⁴⁴ Wilbur Schramm, “How Communication Works,” in *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, ed. Wilbur Schramm (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1954): III-I-20.

¹⁴⁵ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 54.

¹⁴⁶ Daniel Lerner, “Effective Propaganda: Conditions and Evaluation,” in *Propaganda in War and Crisis: Materials for American Policy*, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: Stewart, 1951), 347.

¹⁴⁷ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 52.

within the confines of his placement on earth, he will not hold it as a viable option in his ideology. Place is similar to history in this sense—a person from a time in which a given solution is not recognized as an option will not quickly accept that solution.

Partial logical consistency is the fourth constraining element. Logic can support an ideology, but illogic does not destroy it. However, a degree of logic is required. The failure of most ideologies to maintain perfect internally consistent logic does not tend to make them worse political thoughts.¹⁴⁸ This is one of Freeden's most significant points. Ideologies are understood by "appreciating the interaction between logic, culture, and emotion or, put differently, between form and meaning."¹⁴⁹ Freeden's thesis "is that rigorous, pertinent, and challenging political analysis can be the outcome of identifying the basic features and units of political thinking as they appear to us. We require more subtle and sophisticated means of examining the contents and forms of political thought" than pure logic.¹⁵⁰ Freeden explains that ideologies do not deal with objectivity and certainty, they deal with subjectivity and interpretation. What all this means for the model developed here is that cultural adjacency restricts logical adjacency within given ideologies, as will be discussed in the following sections.¹⁵¹ However, an ideology cannot be completely illogical to its adherents if it is to survive.

C. THE ROOTS OF IDEOLOGIES

Throughout the communication pathway are three roots of ideologies: the pre-existing, the intended, and the unintended meanings. A new ideology starts at the beginning of the pathway, while old ideologies can be found floating around at different points. Within the environment of viable ideologies are two primary distinct roots of sociopolitical ideas of one's world: the pre-existing (or old) and the competing varieties (or new). In 1971, Antonio Gramsci would have used the terms *organic* and *nonorganic*,

¹⁴⁸ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 37.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 39, 47.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 85.

and George Rude in 1980 would have used *inherent* and *derived*.¹⁵² The point here is that potential constituents do not have a blank slate on which new ideas can be written. These two roots are the competitor archetypes, but as will be explained later, there is one more subtype of competitor. The pre-existing ideology root has an inertia of its own for many people. This is the way that all people view the world before someone shares a new insight (problem, solution, or strategy) with them. Pre-existing ideologies are both free and controlled. They are free in the sense that they float at different points in the pathway, beyond total observation of many people, operating naturally; they are controlled in the sense that humans maintain a degree of oversight over their messages and the mechanisms (natural or created) they use to deliver those messages.

The second root of ideology, intended meanings, emerges in social movement organizations, and its members' shared ideology begins to compete with the pre-existing ones. Competing groups can discover and recommend a variety of solutions, so even billions of ideologies are possible. However, most individualized ideologies will gravitate to one of the major families for complete solutions to the world's problems, though they may have minor differences. The social movement organization (SMO), or the cadre that sets the direction for the movement, can survey the people to understand closely what variety of grievances they hold and work to synthesize the issues, or alternatively, it can assume it knows the people's issues and begin to represent and dramatize the constituency without surveys. Meanwhile, though the pre-existing ideology is locked and loaded to influence current audiences, it will also be working against the emerging social movement's new ideas. Depending on the competing ideology imagined by a social movement, the message will have one of two typical ideology strategies: offensive or defensive. An offensive strategy will be one of three varieties: to rebuild a previous ideology—to return the world order to the way it was in the past; to modify a previous ideology with a new factional interpretation; or to innovate a new ideology. The defensive strategy involves discrediting the SMO's ideology competition. While offensive strategies will always have an element of discrediting competition, it is possible

¹⁵² David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988), 204.

for an SMO to have a purely defensive strategy message that seeks only to discredit without offering solutions to the issue (although receivers may fabricate implied solutions).

The third root of ideology, a derivative of a social movement's competing view, is unintended meanings. This, like drifting pollen, is naturally radiated by a social movement's political messages. An ideological tradition includes various statements by the movement's contributors, and as a consequence the profile of that ideology will have various arrangements. A social movement is formed by "separate individual consciousnesses."¹⁵³ This brings up two points. First, the ideas themselves can have multiple open-ended connotations. Second, people interpret ideas in different ways, although in ideology they will not be able to stretch these interpretations beyond the limits of their historical and cultural understandings of the world. This is not to claim, for example, that Albert Einstein was just as limited as any other. But Einstein was anchored, as brilliant as he may have been, by his past and culture. This third root is demonstrated in two ways. First, all ideas are open to multiple interpretations, because all people have personal identity, self-consciousness, private emotions, and personal biases and they make sense of the world by drawing on unique experiences. Second, all ideologies have multiple ideas about grievances and helpful solutions on the three different layers of periphery, adjacent, and core concepts. Therefore, all ideologies will always be open to multiple interpretations.

The discussion thus far helps illuminate that there are three analytical pieces in the categorical logic of an ideology: First, it has limitless forms and a singular meaning is impossible, explains Freeden. Second, culture, history, and place constrict the range of meanings for a given ideology. And third, ideologies attempt "to behave as if meaning could be made determinate."¹⁵⁴

If this argument is not convincing, consider that according to Freeden ideologies have at least 41 different functions or roles. To list just a few of these functions,

¹⁵³ Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 122.

¹⁵⁴ Freeden, *Ideology*, 50.

ideologies order the social world and historical time, decontest competitive meanings of concepts, recruit based on the language employed, direct political understanding, and emerge among competing groups.¹⁵⁵ According to Freedon, “ideologies perform a range of services, such as legitimation, integration, socialization, ordering, simplification, and action-orientation, without which societies could not function adequately, if at all.”¹⁵⁶ The numerous roles of ideologies cannot be completely controlled by a single group. For this reason, when a social movement sends an ideological message through the communication pathway, an unintended meanings root is also planted.

Another analogy is that an ideology is like a tree seed. With fertile soil and the right amount of nutrients and energy, the idea blossoms into something unrecognizably different from the seed it once was. Each tree grows in unique leaning and twisting ways due to many conditions. The branches will vary so much that no two trees look exactly the same. Additionally, like pollination, other unintended ideas will spread beyond the original ideas. All three roots of ideology are different types of vehicles for ideologies to compete and reach potential audiences.

D. COMMUNICATION AND RESPONSE

In this section I describe how ideologies successfully pass from one person to the next. As with the principles of resonance, Wilbur Schramm describes communication as “commonness with someone.”¹⁵⁷ It attempts to share not just information but ideas and attitudes.¹⁵⁸ According to Schramm, communication passes through someone and is changed by his or her interpretations, habits, abilities, and capabilities; the essence of communication is the sender and receiver being tuned together with particular messages.¹⁵⁹ The three minimum elements of communication are source, message, and destination: Sources can be individual people “speaking, writing, drawing, gesturing” to one another, or organizations such as newspapers, publishing houses, television stations, or movie

¹⁵⁵ Freedon, *Ideology*, 42, 54, 70, 77, 79.

¹⁵⁶ Freedon, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 22.

¹⁵⁷ Schramm, “How Communication Works,” III-I-1.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, III-I-6.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, III-I-1.

studios.¹⁶⁰ A message is any “signal capable of being interpreted meaningfully.”¹⁶¹ The destination can be an individual using her senses, a member of a group like an audience, crowd, or mob, or a mass audience such as television viewers.

1. Encoding and Decoding

In Wilbur Schramm’s model, which I follow here, the source and encoder are one person, while the decoder and destination are another.¹⁶² Encoding can also happen within groups. Decoding, however, involves individual interpretation. Schramm compares encoding to a microphone and decoding to an earphone. “The source... tries to encode in such a way as to make it easy for the destination to tune in the message—to relate it to parts of his experience.”¹⁶³ The nervous system provides mediatory responses that recognize learned signs.¹⁶⁴ These mediatory responses are the *meaning* the sign has for someone. Figure 12 illustrates how a source encodes an ideology before sending to a destination, who decodes the information.

Figure 12. Ideology in the System of Human Communication¹⁶⁵



2. Effective Messages

Knowing how ideas go from sender to receiver and how they are interpreted, it is clear that messages must be crafted carefully in order to have their intended effect.

¹⁶⁰ Schramm, “How Communication Works,” III-I-1.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., III-I-1, III-I-2.

¹⁶² Ibid., III-I-2.

¹⁶³ Ibid., III-I-4, III-I-2-III-I-3.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., III-I-5.

¹⁶⁵ Adapted from Schramm, “How Communication Works,” III-I-3. Added ideology reference.

Schramm discusses effects and expectations in communication. He claims when “we insert an advertisement in a newspaper, put up a sign, explain something to a class, scold a child, write a letter, or put our political candidate on radio or television, we are making a prediction about the effect communication will have.”¹⁶⁶ Our predictions are not always correct. People can identify the ideological meanings intended by the social movement, but they also interpret things that were unintended.

Schramm argues that there are four “conditions that must be fulfilled if the message is to arouse its intended response.”¹⁶⁷ First, it must be crafted to capture someone’s attention; second, it must refer to experiences common to the source and receiver to transfer meaning; third, it must “arouse personality needs in the destination and suggest some ways to meet those needs”; and finally it must offer a way to achieve the needs suitable for the destination’s situation.¹⁶⁸ According to Schramm, using the lens of this “interaction of message, situation, personality, and group” is the only way to attempt to predict effects in mass communication.¹⁶⁹

Knowing one’s audience is a priority.¹⁷⁰ What they are scanning for in the environment affects the process of gaining their attention. Social movements select messages for which the impression fits the needs or interests of certain people.¹⁷¹ Successful messages arouse a driving force in people. They make them feel that an action can satisfy a need or tension.

Each of the three roots of ideologies passes through a mostly invisible system which transfers ideas from one interpretation agent to another. Ideologies can go through this process artificially or naturally—with or without human intention and control. The process can last a fraction of a second or take years to reach and convince intended audiences. Often, we think of ideologies as emanating from written documents, but

¹⁶⁶ Schramm, “How Communication Works,” III-I-10.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., III-I-11.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., III-I-21.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., III-I-11.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

proximate verbal communication in social relationships is far more influential, trusted, and likely to produce feedback. An ideological message intended to resonate with its audience is configured such that it can pass through the system without being disrupted or blocked.


E. THE IDEOLOGY PATHWAY

As previously discussed, the three roots of viable ideologies are constrained by four environmental factors: history, place, culture, and partial logical consistency. Recall that ideologies can arise from any of the three roots (the pre-existing, the social movement's intended ideology explanation, and the social movement's unintended mixture of its explanation with other ideas). Pre-existing ideology messages float in society and can be found waiting to be operationalized at any of five stages in the communication process discussed in Figure 13. A social movement's competing ideology is formed as individuals with collective grievances connect. It has four intended input critiques or strategies that it can employ to compete with the pre-existing ideology. Three of them are offensive: rebuilding an old ideology, offering a new factional interpretation or modification of the pre-existing ideology, or innovating a new ideology. The remaining strategy is defensive: attempting to discredit the pre-existing ideology or its adherents. The third root type of ideology, the unintended ideology, arises due to a lack of control when a social movement does not know exactly how interpretation agents will interpret messages or how unforeseen problems, solutions, and strategies may mix with those messages.

As seen in the following model (Figure 13), social movements send these competing ideology roots and strategies through a communication pathway toward intended audiences. The five stages these ideas will pass through are what I call (1) attribution menu, (2) deception junction, (3) channel menu, (4) influence mechanism, and (5) message form (see Figure 13). Each of these stages are discussed in detail following the model. Once through the communication pathway, ideologies impact interpretation groups or individuals. The result is one of the three different visible outputs: inaction, violence, or non-violent recruitment and action. These outputs were described in the "shifting stakeholders" recruitment scheme.

Figure 13. The Ideology Environment

- The three roots of competing ideologies:
- 1) Pre-existing inertia
 - 2) Social movement's intentions
 - 3) Unintended mixture



1. Attribution Menu

Beginning at the left side of the model, the attribution menu represents a decision point for the social movement. It is the phase in which an idea originator or sender decides how overt the message should be. To borrow terms from Frank Goldstein and Daniel Jacobowitz's discussion of propaganda, the message can be white, gray, or black. White, or overt, communication is when ideas are sent in the open and the sender is readily apparent; it is when "the source takes responsibility for it."¹⁷² In gray and black communications, the sender is not acknowledged. Gray attribution is an idea "that is distributed without an identifiable source";¹⁷³ black attribution is an idea "produced by one source that purports to have emanated from another source."¹⁷⁴ Therefore, the perceived credibility and degree of trust in the sender or claimed sender affects how trusted the idea will be—but only if receivers can figure out who they believe authored the message.

2. Deception Junction

The second stage, the deception junction, involves a decision about whether or not to deceive the intended audience. It is structured much like attribution menu, but instead of ownership of the message, it deals with the truth or falsity of the idea itself. The first option is a message the sender believes to be true; however, people can deceive themselves, so deception remains a possibility even with honest ideas. With a white idea, the sender *intends* a completely and objectively truthful message. This does not necessarily extend to all truth details beyond the context of the message. Usually, white ideas are facts and observations, though they can be honestly described feelings or projected emotions too. As Carnes Lord argues, "conveying of purely factual information

¹⁷² Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations: An Introduction," in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Frank L. Goldstein (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing Company, 1996), 6. Concept adopted from white propaganda to white attribution using the same definitions.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

under certain circumstances can have powerful psychological effects.”¹⁷⁵ The sender intends white ideas to be honest. Richards Heuer says intended white ideas imply a causal link between evidence and the explanation.¹⁷⁶ The sender expects the receiver to understand this connection.

As defined by Walter Jajko, “Deception, ultimately, is the misrepresentation of the operative meaning of critical information by the manipulation of the adversary’s perceptions through the management of his expectations.”¹⁷⁷ A risk in choosing the deception route is that one’s own policy makers and intelligence assets can be fooled as well. Jajko explains that deception substitutes a purpose-driven idea for the truth. A gray idea is one that is partly true, intentionally withholding some elements of the whole truth that matter in context. A gray idea discloses half-truths supported by proof signals.¹⁷⁸

A black deception idea is one that is intentionally a lie, partly or wholly, but is offered as truth. Abram Shulsky claims, “Deception depends, ultimately, on implanting in the target’s mind a view of reality that is at odds with the truth.”¹⁷⁹ Walter Jajko agrees, adding, “Deception can be based on truth or falsehood or truth and falsehood.”¹⁸⁰ Finally, and perhaps obviously, the greater the realism required to support a deception, the more time and effort is needed to set it up and continue to fool people for the long term.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁵ Carnes Lord, “The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,” in *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach*, ed. Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989): 23.

¹⁷⁶ Heuer, “Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception,” 54.

¹⁷⁷ Walter Jajko, “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning,” *Comparative Strategy* 21 (2002): 355.

¹⁷⁸ Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, no. 1 (1982): 133–134.

¹⁷⁹ Abram Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” in *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (Washington, DC: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 15.

¹⁸⁰ Jajko, “Deception,” 354.

¹⁸¹ Charles A. Fowler and Robert F. Nesbit, “Tactical Deception in Air-Land Warfare,” *Journal of Electronic Defense* (June 1995): 39.

Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig offer two deception efforts: “ambiguity-increasing” and “misleading.”¹⁸² To them, deception encompasses lying (making untrue statements), artifice (manipulating context), and concealing a truth. It only needs to sustain a lie long enough to benefit the deceiver. They claim the three aims of deception are first to condition someone’s beliefs; next, to influence her actions; and ultimately for the intended audience to act in favor of the deceiver’s goals. This suggests that if the ideology alone does not gain adherents to the social movement’s cause, a deceptive hook may be an initial step to gaining compliance.

3. Channel Menu

The third stage involves the social movement selecting a certain channel to carry an ideological message to its intended audience. A channel is a way information reaches an audience.¹⁸³ The channel menu includes but is not limited to the Internet, television, radio, face-to-face interaction, events (staged, natural, or imagined), cell phones and other handheld devices, papers and printing presses, satellites, schools, churches, the Justice Department, the media, tradeshow, families, other institutions, etc. Just as with people, trust is required of channels. People do not accept information at a church if they do not trust the minister or the institution itself. Some will not trust certain frequencies on a radio or programs on a television. Face-to-face interaction remains the leading influencer and can be accomplished by politicians, regular citizens, and spies.¹⁸⁴ A channel carries many signals in parallel from source to destination.¹⁸⁵ Even weapons can channel a violent and often lethal message. Secondary meanings can be conveyed with sarcasm, humor, or doubt.

¹⁸² Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” in *Strategic Military Deception*, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 5, 6.

¹⁸³ Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 19. The full scope of the Internet as a major channel of information is beyond this thesis, yet it includes anything from fiber-optic cables to emails, blogs, news agencies, social media, and display screens.

¹⁸⁴ Daniel and Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” 9.

¹⁸⁵ Schramm, “How Communication Works,” III-I-8.

Of particular importance is that an event can be staged, such as asking a celebrity to speak at a gathering or when the president speaks behind a podium. More subtly, a staged event can be a preplanned encounter made to look coincidental and natural; think of figuring out the frequency with which someone goes to a coffee shop and then using that information to decide when and where to “bump into” them. Ideological events can also occur without any prior planning, such as when two civilian strangers are genuinely relaxing at a bar and then share their views about the world. Imagined events may include a hypothetical scenario presented by a professor in a philosophy or economics class.

Channels can also be denied to people. Denial is an attempt to block information channels with truth signals to an adversary in order to delay reactions.¹⁸⁶ Closed societies, like North Korea, regulate as many channels as possible.¹⁸⁷ So, denial blocks channels that transmit signals describing the true situation. Successful denial forces people to rely on other channels, which are more likely to be vehicles of deception.¹⁸⁸


Figure 14 displays different ways messages can travel through channels. Possibility A (along the left side of the figure) shows an ideology received practically intact; here, the interpreted or decoded message is very similar to the one intended. However, with B, a completely different idea is decoded—one that shows practically no resemblance to the one intended. In instance C in the figure, an ideology is received, partly or wholly, but so are so many other competing ideas that the receiver decodes a scrambled message. The ideology is embedded in this confusion, and it is difficult to then encode the original message to pass it on to others. Next, in D, an ideology impacts the receiver and is totally dismissed, as is expected with non-believers. Finally, in E, the ideology never reaches its intended audience, perhaps because the channel has been destroyed or the ideology is somehow diverted into a different direction. I do not see any reason to believe any of these possibilities is universally more likely than the others, since reception of an ideology always hinges on the relevant history, culture, acceptable logic, and place in which the interpretation agent is sitting.

¹⁸⁶ Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 15.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 19–20.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

Figure 14. Transmission and Reception Possibilities of Ideology¹⁸⁹



4. Influence Mechanism

The next stage, in the model depicted in Figure 13 is the Influence Mechanism. This stage involves selecting schemes on how to enhance the effectiveness of ideological messages. This means before a social movement sends a message direct to an intended audience, it can instead decide to send the message to someone else or leverage an influence technique to pressure another's behavior. Influence is underlined by relationships, but when it comes to ideology messaging, relationships can be unreliable—most people do not know the loyalties of an “agent of influence.”¹⁹⁰ In this section, in order to better explain what is occurring at this juncture in the model, I briefly discuss Robert Cialdini's six influence principles or tactics, which “can be employed for good or for ill.”¹⁹¹ This means that these six principles can be employed in the negative as well. For example, the liking principle says that a person who is well liked has a higher chance

¹⁸⁹ Adapted from Daniel and Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” 11. Slight ideology modification.

¹⁹⁰ Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 25.

¹⁹¹ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, 5th ed. (Boston: Pearson Education, 2009), 86.

of influencing others. To think of this in the negative, consider a person who is disliked—he has a smaller chance of influence and can create opposite effects. So, a social movement can leverage the liking technique in the negative as well by having disliked people send messages. In fact, a social movement may try to discredit the reputation of someone who was once liked in order to alienate his or her followers. Influence shortcuts prepare people for compliance decisions.¹⁹² Modern-day automaticity, as Cialdini explains, facilitates decision without considering all the relevant available information in an increasingly information-rich world. This is one avenue through which, as Cialdini warns, people can be “exploited by clever others.”¹⁹³

The positive versions of Cialdini’s six influence techniques are reciprocity, authority, liking, scarcity, social proof, and commitment and consistency. First, the reciprocity rule demands repayment in kind for what someone else has provided.¹⁹⁴ This can be a gift in exchange for movement activity. Second, Cialdini explains the principle of authority, which an influencer can use to manipulate others, is ingrained obedience to a perceived higher power. He notes, “The very first book of the Bible, for example, describes how failure to obey the ultimate authority resulted in the loss of paradise for Adam, Eve, and the rest of the human race.”¹⁹⁵ Obedience is highly valued in many cultures. Third, liking is a rule of influence which states that people prefer to comply with others they know and like, especially but not exclusively friends.¹⁹⁶

Fourth, the scarcity principle shows that “people assign more value to opportunities when they are less available.”¹⁹⁷ Cialdini explains that one reason scarcity works so well is that people hate to lose freedoms as opportunities decrease. When it comes to ideology messaging, this means people come to believe more in information that is denied to them. This suggests an opportunity for social movements to simply

¹⁹² Cialdini, *Influence*, 229.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 228.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 180.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 142. Liking is seldom an either / or phenomenon, so this principle is about the degree one is liked or disliked.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 225.

inform people that they are trying to get information to them, but their repressive government is blocking that information.

Cialdini's fifth technique is social proof: "one important means that people use to decide what to believe or how to act in a situation is to look at what other people are believing or doing there."¹⁹⁸ A behavior seems acceptable if others are doing it. Social proof led to the death of the 910 People's Temple followers who intentionally poisoned themselves in an isolated jungle at Jonestown, Guyana, South America. In cases such as these, influential leaders of movements arrange social conditions to allow this principle to work.

Finally, the commitment principle states, "people are more willing to agree to requests that are in keeping with [a] prior commitment."¹⁹⁹ Commitments can start small but then build into compliance. Commitment sets the stage for future consistency. The consistency principle is the desire to appear consistent in word, attitude, and action.²⁰⁰ The ideological messages a social movement sends through the communication pathway will attempt to leverage at least one of these six influence techniques, in the positive or its opposite, to gain compliance or participation of intended audiences.

5. Message Form

The final step along the communication pathway depicted in Figure 13 involves the selected form of the message that impacts the ideology receiver's senses. Messages can take the form of verbal speech (including rumors), pictures, gestures, texts, bullets, walls, etc. So, messages can be received by all the senses. In information operations, these are all called symbols. In speech, the primary message is in the sound waves, while other messages are sensed in relation to past messages as the receiver filters ideas through

¹⁹⁸ Cialdini, *Influence*, 138.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 95.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 53, 59.

his or her experiences.²⁰¹ The forms are the packaged ideas that impact interpretation agents—the things, sometimes visible, that are sensed and perceived by audiences.

6. An Example

Operationalization of an ideology is as simple as a father pointing to a Civil War poster to gain the attention of his daughter and saying: *You see, that is why this nation is so great.* This statement has white attribution, since the father is owning its origin. The poster itself is also operationalizing ideology; it may be labeled by a publisher (white), unlabeled (gray), or incorrectly labeled (black). In this instance, the father is conveying a white idea, because he intends to be completely honest about the effects of the violent struggle and how the nation is somehow better for it. He is not attempting to withhold important truths from his daughter or create a lie. The channel is face to face, since the father and daughter are speaking. The poster is another channel in and of itself, and it may have influenced the girl even if the father did not draw attention to it or speak about it, but since he did, one can expect that the combination of the father and the poster is now taking a significant amount of the daughter's attention. The predominant influence mechanism is authority—if *Dad* says this is true, then it must be true. Finally, the message forms are visual gesture and verbal, since the father pointed and spoke about his sociopolitical worldview. Depending on what the poster's creator intended about the goodness of the Civil War, the father may be attempting to rebuild the thin ideology of nationalism.

F. CONCLUSION

Resonance operations are already at work in the world. The findings in this thesis create a view of the real sociopolitical world in light of viable competing ideologies that transmit from social movements to intended audiences through communication pathways. With information saturation in the modern world, it is up to interpretation agents to determine what is retained in their ideologies and what is eliminated. However, deception

²⁰¹ Schramm, "How Communication Works," III-I-7. This project does not focus on other senses like taste and touch, although a good case can be made that slight portions of ideologies can be unwittingly transmitted in these forms too. At least, it is feasible to think food can be exploited by another form by using memory of the taste or certain experiences with it.

and influence techniques can be used in conjunction with ideology resonance to gain support or action for the social movement.

To resonate with an intended audience, social movements can send offensive or defensive ideological messages through the communication pathway. The entire process can occur within seconds or take years to convince someone to join the cause. However, viable ideas that are absorbed by a receiver are constrained by the four environmental factors.

Neither truth nor pure logic is essential for ideologies to spread. However, the competition of ideologies does involve ethics. Since ideologies deal with thoughts and behaviors, they produce a tough battle between right, wrong, and how people actually think and act. The goal of an ideology is maximum acceptance by people and control over political language. Cialdini's six influence tactics show how ideological ideas can be leveraged in the negative, since the influence tactics can all be employed for good or evil. Ideology resonance has to do with selecting viable ideological messages within the environmental constraints, selecting a believable input critique, beating pre-existing and unintended ideology messages, and selecting five suitable choices along the communication pathway to reach and influence the intended audience.

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V. THE IDEOLOGY OPERATIONALIZING SEQUENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the second half of this thesis's main argument: developing social movements operationalize ideologies by executing external and internal considerations which leverage the ideology communication pathway. The chapter begins by covering the external and internal operationalizing factors for the social movement organization. It then discusses narratives, frames, and memes in order to illustrate the actual techniques employed in information warfare—information warfare's munitions. Operationalizing ideology may have seemed abstract until this chapter, but in this chapter I intend to demonstrate how these ideas go to war.

A social movement organization has countless decisions to make in order to compete for influence and control in society. In this chapter, I identify 11 external and two internal considerations that a social movement can plan for and execute to optimize its resonance operations' successes. Narratives, frames, and memes are specific tools that a social movement or a special operations force can send through a communication pathway to compete for ideology influence. The operationalizing steps can happen simultaneously and are dependent on resonating ideologies, intended audiences, and effective ideology communication pathway factors. Based on the observation of problems, solutions, and strategies, social movement organizations choose resonating ideas, the ideology pathway, and the intended audience, while adjusting to strengthen the credibility of the messages and organization to ultimately transform adherents into action agents before the political ideas are lost, distorted, or blocked.

B. OPERATIONALIZING FACTORS

The ways ideologies compete through the communication pathway to intended audiences only illuminate the environment necessary for ideas to be operationalized. The solution to the research question itself—how can developing social movements operationalize ideology?—demands further investigation into the operationalizing steps necessary to achieve social movement outputs.

If the ideology pathway is valid, another conditional process is required to show how social movements operationalize political ideas. The perpetual opportunity to explain how the world is structured suggests the nature of ideology competition. With differences throughout the world in culture, environmental conditions, available resources, and spiritual beliefs, politics remains a constant fixture for social power. Operationalizing ideologies has to do with improving life.

Social movements operationalize ideologies using a backwards planning model, in which they begin by first determining what the objectives are and the expected effects, then planning the necessary actions to achieve those goals in reverse order. This is how to resonate ideology with an intended audience—know what makes people tick before attempting to send resonant messages. There are external and internal activities that occur simultaneously. Many concepts and actions are generated within social movements and then moved out into the environment, but movements also have internal considerations, in which they look inward and make adjustments to their own organizations. Table 2 summarizes the 11 external steps, as well as the two internal considerations, for successfully operationalizing an ideology. Each of these are discussed following the table.

Table 2. How Developing Social Movements Can Operationalize Ideologies

Operationalization to maximize effectiveness	
The social movement organization's external considerations:	
1)	Determine strategic objectives
2)	Diagnose and illuminate problems with the existing ideology
3)	Identify external conditions that affect intended audiences' (IA) passions
4)	Determine IA inspirations and motivations
5)	Determine IA susceptibility to new ideas and accessibility via channels
6)	Determine IA probability to participate
7)	Select resonating ideas and the pathway to the IA
	1) Decide on a particular message channel and form
	2) Decide on attribution of the sender and whether to deceive
	3) Decide on influence mechanisms
8)	Build credibility of social movements and/or erode credibility of competitors
9)	Build survivability around messages
10)	Gain feedback by monitoring and evaluating output indicators
11)	Constantly tune ideology resonance
Internal considerations:	
1)	Synchronize new political ideas and solutions
2)	Constantly self-tune

While grievances can be unique to the social movement, the organization will still want to survey the local population to determine how naturally resonant its concerns are with those of others. The methodology of Military Information Support Operations (formerly called Psychological Operations) within U.S. Army Special Operations Forces reveals a template for how to influence ideas drifting through the communication spectrum. Important to this section is that the actions and points of view are those of the social movement, while ideology is what is operationalized.

1. External Considerations

Before attempting to influence behavior with ideas, social movements must first determine its strategic objectives and the tactical objectives of each audience. Potential success is maximized when they begin by identifying strategic wants or needs and then plan activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels with those goals in mind.²⁰² If there is no strategic objective for a specific audience, operationalizing ideology directed at that audience becomes a questionable or even risky endeavor to the movement's other goals—and, of course, influencing behavior of any sort can lead to unintended consequences.

As for diagnosing the problems in the existing ideology, Step Two, it is important to understand and illuminate places where the ideology is insufficient, the local grievances, and those who are to blame for the problems. Through multiple intelligence and information sources, social movements must conduct intended audience (IA) analysis.²⁰³

The next four steps can happen rapidly and often simultaneously. In Step Three, social movements can benefit by identifying conditions that affect IA passions, such as lifestyle, competing ideologies, and the advice, trust, and communication networks. According to the MISO field manual, the task is to determine why people are behaving

²⁰² Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations Process: Tactics, Techniques, and Principles* (FM 3–05.301) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Headquarters, 2007), 1–26–1–27. The name of this organization changed to Military Information Support Operations. The names are exchangeable in this text. FM stands for Field Manual.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 2–1.

the way they do, working from the assumption that all behavior serves some purpose.²⁰⁴ The manual assumes that behaviors are a result of cost-benefit analysis, and if this process is observed and understood, the chances of determining an effective influence mechanism increase. Externally, social movements assess the audience's environment and social situation. Internal to the audience, their attitudes, values, and beliefs are researched to help gauge why they respond the way they do. Both external and internal to the audience, critical analysis can focus on how factors such as politics, military, economics, society, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and history influence behavior.

There are several relevant networks in which audiences are connected. In order to develop a powerful image of how individuals or organizations relate to others, examining the advice, trust, and communication networks can illuminate connections and vulnerabilities that would otherwise go unnoticed or be taken for granted. David Krackhardt and Jeffrey Hanson explain, "The advice network shows the prominent players in an organization on whom others depend to solve problems and provide technical information."²⁰⁵ They explain that these networks reveal those behind political conflict and the most influential members of a group, while "The trust network tells which [members] share delicate political information and back one another in a crisis."²⁰⁶ Finally, communication networks show those who discuss the movement's issues. They "can help identify gaps in information flow, the inefficient use of resources, and the failure to generate new ideas."²⁰⁷

Illuminating these networks provides information on issues such as whether the formal structure of an organization is different than the informal one, whether or not people go to certain leaders for help, or where communication bottlenecks. Having this information leads to better-informed solutions. A significant challenge with this type of

²⁰⁴ Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations Process*, 2–9, 2–12.

²⁰⁵ David Krackhardt and Jeffrey R. Hanson, "Informal Networks: The Company," *Harvard Business Review* (July–August 1993): 105.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 105.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 106.

work is that gathering the data depends on engaging people and surveying them face to face or electronically.

In Step Four, social movements determine IA inspirations, such as an effective motivational frame, the audience's needs, attitudes, pride, and other arousal triggers and causes. They also seek to determine audience wants, desires, achievements, and shared visions, as well as understand the motivations and psychological factors of each intended audience such as safety and sustenance.²⁰⁸ If those needs are met for the audience in question, according to the field manual, secondary and learned social motivations will instead drive its action, such as power, status, achievement, revenge, money, and education. Not being able to satisfy motivations leads to frustration, which can be exploited by movements and counter-movements. Some additional psychological factors include attitudes, fears, opinions, norms, loves, and hates. All of these motives and factors can be viewed as vulnerabilities for an audience.

Next (Step Five), it is critical for movements to determine the IA's susceptibility to new ideas and accessibility via channels. Social movements can determine how likely an audience is to buy into a persuasion scheme. Non-susceptibility to certain influences and ideas can totally rearrange the prioritization of audiences and strategies. Using a scale of high to low susceptibility, following analysis and rating, social movements can become more aware of which channels and which messages are most likely to succeed and fail.²⁰⁹ They must determine consistency with the audience conditions and inspirations they identified earlier. They must also understand how the intended audiences evaluate the risks and rewards of the behavior the social movements desire from them. The greater the audience perceives the rewards and the lower the risks, the greater the likelihood of the behavior.²¹⁰

One way to determine susceptibility is to look at how past or contemporary ideas diffuse in the society. Social movements can determine how the audience receives

²⁰⁸ Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations Process*, 2-17-2-18.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 2-20.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

information regularly. According to the field manual, this includes an audience's accessibility to information and how frequently they reach sources, their patterns of discovery, and the degrees of active and passive learning. Understanding susceptibility, in other words, involves determining audience access to channels and the potential risks people take when using them. This means that social movements attempt to understand the type of radio signals the audience listens to, the typical length of newspaper columns it reads, and even what colors the audience responds to.²¹¹ The field manual considers the communication pattern to be more valuable if more people use the channel more often; movements should also know whether given channels are used merely for entertainment or for serious political information. It is expected to be easier to gain and maintain an audience's attention if she is actively looking for information. Radio or television may be background noise while audiences are doing other tasks, making it harder to get their attention and ensure they absorb messages. It is also important to know if intended individuals digest their information in groups, which can lead to discussion and debate about ideology. Social movements may consider introducing new channels; in that case, they must evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of unfamiliar channels versus old ones.²¹² However well a new channel may be received, movements must gauge how hard it will be to ensure the messages are the focus and not the channel itself.

Step Six, determining the IA's probability of participation, demands qualitative analysis and forecasting. It is a matter of observing current audience behavior and deciding whether those natural functions will fit the movement's strategic actions or desired functions.²¹³

The seventh step is necessary for operationalizing ideology. It includes the selection of explanatory resonating ideas (using narratives, frames, and memes) as well as the pathway to selected audiences. These themes will be primarily delivered by appeals, arguments, and evidence in order to achieve the desired behavior response, according to the manual. These three elements—idea, pathway, and intended audience—are essential

²¹¹ Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations Process*, 2–22.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 2–21–2–23.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 2–6.

to the operationalizing process. To be clear, ideologies may take a different pathway and tempo than intended; they can also impact unintended audiences, but then a given social movement is no longer in control of the ideology's operative power. If social movements do not determine ideas, the pathway, and the intended audience, they are not conducting resonance operations.

Movements must then choose a channel and form for their message. Narratives, frames, and memes are ways messages can be organized and packaged to be sent through the communication field; I cover this in greater detail in the next section. Social movements use information from the assessments and analysis to align a susceptible audience to an effective pathway. There are many combinations available to a social movement for consideration.

Aside from consciousness and influence, which I have already discussed, there are numerous other ways to influence audiences. According to the MISO field manual, an argument is the guiding framework to persuade the IA to act in accordance with a social movement's goals.²¹⁴ It is the summary an audience member reaches that compels participation. According to the manual, an appeal is the way in which the argument is presented to gain and maintain attention. Common appeals include legitimacy (e.g., authority, reverence, tradition, or loyalty), fear, dividing groups, companionship, the conformity bandwagon, nostalgia, and individual self-interest. The manual also lists several persuasion techniques: emotional generalities, transferring qualities to others, lesser of evils, name calling, the ordinary citizen image, reputation testimonials, insinuation, simply right vs. wrong or good vs. bad, comparing and contrasting, illustrations, specifics, statistics, and explanations. All of these techniques can be leveraged in conjunction with an ideological message. In addition to Cialdini's influence tactics, the manual lists several others: punishments and rewards, expertise, calling in on debts owed, appeal to morals, and promising positive or negative feelings.

In Step Eight, social movements build their own credibility and/or erode the credibility of their competitors. Their perceived credibility depends on how consistent

²¹⁴ Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations Process*, 2-24-2-28.

their message is with the expressed social solutions and segments of society identified as intended audiences. Other ways to determine credibility include trustworthiness, fallacies, contradictions, and hypocrisies.

Movements that represent modification of a pre-existing ideology are expected to reflect a different organizational or societal structure than that of the pre-existing society. In fact, while social movements compete for physical survival, their organization may look very different from how they want society structured, which can lead to problems of credibility. The greater the difference between a social movement's organizational design and the future good societal design it seeks, the weaker its perceived credibility is expected to be. Credibility matters, and matching organization-behavioral designs improves credibility for social movements, though depending on the image of the good society, this may not be viable for a small movement. It is beyond the scope of this project to illustrate how a social movement can organize itself to project a credible face.

To remain optimal, in Step Nine, social movements can build survivability around messages by tests, coordination, and dissemination according to sequencing. They can also prolong the life of their ideas through optimal timing, duration, repetition, placement, and quantity. Pre-testing an idea involves taking a small sample of the intended audience, surveying them, and evaluating whether they understand and accept the explanations.²¹⁵ Once exposed to the message, the sample group can be asked what a message means or what actions it implies. If there are unintended discrepancies at this point, movements can change the messages before employing major influencing mechanisms and perhaps mass media channels.²¹⁶ Prepared messages will be distributed to their launch points, except where computers render this unnecessary. After distribution, dissemination of messages takes the local situation into consideration before launch. This is not just the political situation or the channel infrastructure, but also the credibility of the dissemination platform itself, as with certain broadcasting agencies.²¹⁷ If the circumstance permits, post-testing can be done to see if the messages are reaching

²¹⁵ Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations Process*, 4–21.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3–8, 4–23, 4–27.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 6–9.

the intended audiences, whether or not they are resonating, and if the desired action is occurring.²¹⁸

In Step 10, social movements can gain feedback by monitoring and evaluating output indicators such as observable numbers of recruited constituents, adherents of seldom activity, busy activists, and willingly violent adherents.²¹⁹ Additionally, movements can determine who is a good ideology repeater agent, something which can be surveyed during post-testing by determining where the ideas have diffused outside of the social movement organization's direct influence. Finally, movements must continually determine the audience's risk-reward or cost-benefit calculus for joining the social movement and transmitting messages.

With feedback, in Step 11, social movements are in a position to fine tune their ideology resonance. Blocks of messages can be cancelled if it appears the intended audience is not resonating with the explanation.²²⁰ Messages that seem to gain more traction leading to transmission of ideas or growth in the movement can be moved to a higher priority for broader dissemination.

2. Internal Considerations

With prognosis, social movements synchronize new political ideas and solutions between their organization and intended audiences. The two will never be totally aligned, however. As soon as movements begin to form a consistent explanation and rationale of their ideology, they begin to lose touch with the ever-evolving culture and therefore with some people. Social movements then have options: resolve grievance generalities emerging from the people; rebuild some past notion of the good society; attempt to disseminate a new, modified interpretation; explain more problems existing in society to discredit the competition; or create a completely distinct ideological solution. This step

²¹⁸ Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations Process*, 6–7, 6–10–6-18.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 7–2. This is a change from the impact indicators sought by Military Information Support Operations forces, but still recognizes the desired behavior of joining the movement.

²²⁰ Ibid., 3–8.

can happen simultaneously with the external considerations, but unlike those factors, these solutions are responses to perceived problems.

Social movements, at least successful ones, will constantly self-tune. This does not mean they will always conform to their audience; sometimes the self-tuning will highlight potential divergences from the audience. Formally, the organization considers decision rights such as governance forums; motivators such as rewards, careers, and talent processes; information flow and knowledge management; and responsibility structure to manage movement tasks like resourcing, security, and messaging.²²¹ Informally, the organization considers norms like typical values, expectations, and behaviors; commitments like shared visions, individual goals, or pride; mindset of identity, beliefs, assumptions, and biases; and networks of communication and influence, as explained by Gary Neilson et al. The purpose of the organization dictates any organizational redesign, which means the social movement organization takes a shape different from its competitors.²²² The design of the organization will assist or hinder its ability to operationalize ideologies as audiences evaluate the movement's consistency with the projected good society.

C. FRAMES, NARRATIVES, AND MEMES FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENT IDEOLOGY RESONANCE

Social movements construct meaning and tell stories to support themselves. By packaging these messages through framing, narratives, and memes, they can send their stories through chosen channels to their audience in ways that will affect them on a deeply personal level.

1. Framing Processes

Framing processes are the mechanisms by which social movements send resonant messages. Social movements actively frame events and conditions in order to produce

²²¹ Gary L. Neilson, Jaime Estupinan, and Bhushan Sethi, "10 Principles of Organization Design," *Strategy+Business* no. 79 (Summer 2015): 2.

²²² *Ibid.*, 5.

meanings and ideas.²²³ Framing assigns meaning to events with the goal of mobilizing the in-group, gaining the neutrals' support, and demobilizing the out-group.

Frame alignment is “the linkage of individual and [social movement organization] SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary.”²²⁴ David Snow and his colleagues claim that many analysts overlook how individuals within a social movement interpret their group grievances. Framing is about resonating with the interpretation of problems. People will only participate in a social movement if they align well with at least one of its frames.²²⁵ Snow et al. also note that frame alignment is constantly reassessed by audiences.²²⁶ To them, a factor that determines whether or not a frame is working is the resonance of its content with the expectations of potential recruits. In that case, the framing effort is expected to be more successful with greater resonance.

In an early paper on framing, Snow and his colleagues identified four methods to mobilize individuals: “frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation.”²²⁷ These and their extensions are presented in Table 3 and discussed subsequently.²²⁸

²²³ Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 198, 213.

²²⁴ David A. Snow et al. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (August 1986), 464, <http://links.jstor.org/sici=0003-1224%28198608%2951%3A%3C464%3AFAPMAM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2>.

²²⁵ Ibid., 467.

²²⁶ Ibid., 476.

²²⁷ Ibid., 464.

²²⁸ If a term is listed as v1, this indicates it is the first version of the frame concept listed above it; for example, belief amplification is version two of frame amplification and has five varieties itself.

Table 3. Frame Alignment Processes²²⁹

Frame Alignment	Explanation
Frame bridging	“the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” or “the linkage of an SMO with... unmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters”
Frame amplification	“the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events”
v1 Value amplification	“the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action”
v2 Belief amplification	presumes a relationship with things or a thing and its feature, such as “God is beautiful”
v1 Grievance	“a cause of distress (as an unsatisfactory working condition) felt to afford reason for complaint or resistance”
v2 Causality and blame	“the relation between a cause and its effects” and “to find fault with... to place responsibility for”
v3 Antagonists	adversary targets of influence are symbolized as evil and become the focus of negative attention
v4 Efficacy	“change is possible but that it will not happen automatically, without collective action”
v5 Standing up	generates “a sense of necessity” or moral obligation to be counted instead of not being involved
Frame extension	“extend[s] the boundaries of its primary framework so as to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents”
Frame transformation	the dropping of old meanings and understandings, the planting of new values, and reframing the misframed to gain support and participants
v1 Specific domain	“fairly self-contained but substantial changes in the way a particular domain of life is framed, such that a domain previously taken for granted is reframed as problematic and in need of repair, or a domain seen as normative or acceptable is reframed as an injustice that warrants change”
v2 Global domain	when one’s foundation is changed by displacing previous worldly discourse with new grammar and rules
Interpretive frame	“cognitively align[s] structural/material conditions with latent mobilizing strands of ‘folk’ (inherent or organic) ideologies or transform[s] the meaning or significance of those conditions for the aggregations effected by them”

²²⁹ Adapted from Snow, et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 467, 469, 469, 469; *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, s.v. “grievance,” accessed 08 October 2016; *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, s.v. “causality,” “blame,” accessed 08 October 2016; 470, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475; Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 212. Pages listed in reference order. The lower portion of the table is expected to demand more effort than frames at the top.

Frame bridging and amplification mechanisms link personal interests and existing adherent sentiment to movement support. To understand frame bridging, think of sentiment pools (or groups of people that share similar opinions and attitudes about a situation) that share grievances but lack the organization to express their discontent and act to achieve their interests.²³⁰ Social movements, however, bridge their grievances with another sentiment pool. According to Snow and his colleagues, social movements usually lean on frame bridging more than all other alignment mechanisms for mobilization and diffusion of ideas. However, using something like a cell phone list assumes most people share ideological views. Generalizing grievances in this way turns subjective participation and orientation into a constant, mechanistic outreach process, which runs the risk of market oversaturation and running a wide variety of impersonal appeals.²³¹ The framing conventions in Table 3 offer social movements ways to package ideological messages as they attempt to convince their intended audiences of their validity.

There are two types of frame amplification—value and belief amplifications. Snow and others explain that values are protectable and promotable modes of conduct.²³² Value amplification becomes an available framing mechanism when values are suppressed or lack expression opportunities. The goal of this amplification is to mobilize sentiment groups. According to Snow et al., value-based examples that movements typically amplify include “family, ethnicity, property, and neighborhood integrity... justice, cooperation, perseverance, and the sanctity of human life... [and] equality and liberty.”²³³ In the context of a repressive authority, movements can recruit and mobilize potential constituents by elevating relevant values. According to Snow and others, it is a reactive frame used by dominated groups. As movements choose different frames to increase recruitment numbers for the cause, they attempt to never contradict a value frame.

²³⁰ Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 467.

²³¹ Ibid., 467–477.

²³² Ibid., 469.

²³³ Ibid., 469.

Beliefs support or disrupt action that pursues desired values.²³⁴ Action depends on belief about something, but the link between beliefs and action is never totally clear or unclear, and sometimes belief and action are contradictory.²³⁵ As an example Snow et al. illustrate how antagonist belief amplification can leverage threatening beliefs about transients to make homeless people look bad. They explain that efficacy leverages optimism that collective action, even at the grassroots level, will improve the probability of change. At the same time, this frame is pessimistic about others being able to accomplish certain objectives. Finally, a call to stand up to be counted in the movement leverages the belief that nobody else will do it. Belief amplification can cause movement activity.

Next is frame extension, which is evident when certain programs seem outside the “existing sentiment or adherent pools.”²³⁶ The enlarging of the pool involves the movement grafting and aligning nearby interests and values with those who are already in. Frame extension is not a primary long-term strategy to keep members participating in the movement, but a hook for initial attendance. Snow and colleagues explain that this can encompass auxiliary interests such as bringing in popular bands at rallies. Recruiters may not try to sell the movement at all but simply try to persuade people to attend one meeting. Frame extension can use music or sex as the initial step to eventual movement activity. A risk with this mechanism is losing adherent support, because some may only be persuaded by long-term frames.

Frame transformation is an even more time- and energy-consuming mechanism, because “The programs, causes, and values that some SMOs promote... may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames.”²³⁷ The two variants of this mechanism (specific domain and global domain, as listed in Table 3) involve reframing time. Additionally, these frames redefine activities that hold meaning. The situation does not change, but its

²³⁴ Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 470.

²³⁵ Ibid., 470.

²³⁶ Ibid., 472.

²³⁷ Ibid., 473.

definition does, resulting in a different experience—a situation may be tolerable at first, only for it later to be recognized as inexcusable. The transformation frame is about developing and adopting a sense of injustice but must correspond with an attributional orientation shift, such as blaming.²³⁸ This frame seeks societal change and may be leveraged heavily at the beginning of a movement. To reiterate, ideological messages can be packaged with these different framing conventions for recruiting members into the social movement.

Domain-specific interpretive frames are about perceptually bracketing certain aspects of life, as often seen in “single-issue movements.”²³⁹ These types of frames may be necessary for movements seeking dramatic identity change. They may only achieve a nominal increase in movement participation because they focus on limited groups, such as children, women, those with disabilities, prisoners, ethnicities, and races.²⁴⁰ They are at work in causes like redefining how negative a drunk driver is. There is a risk here if the movement is not prepared to adapt to sudden recruitment successes. By contrast, the global interpretive frame is a broader master frame about conversion to a new paradigm or experiencing the world “in a new key.”²⁴¹ Snow et al. explain this type of transformation is when everything, at least slightly, has new meaning. Recruited adherents will feel like new people and see the world completely differently. Global transformation reduces uncertainty about life.

A few years after Snow and his colleagues formulated their theory, Snow and Robert Benford added the interpretive frame, which stresses that movements emerging late in the cycle of protest are constrained by the earlier, and now master, frame.²⁴² They propose that mobilization failure in the context of ripe structural conditions might be due to a lack of resonant frames. Table 4 is a continuation of Table 3, focused on three ideology-based framing tasks.

²³⁸ Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 474.

²³⁹ Ibid., 474.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 475.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 212.

Table 4. Framing Tasks²⁴³

Framing Tasks	Explanation
Diagnostic frame	“identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality”
Prognostic frame	“solutions to the problem but also to identify strategies, tactics, and targets”
Motivational frame	“elaboration of a call to arms or <i>rationale for action</i> that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis”

Snow and Benford also discuss three main framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. They claim that “The more the three tasks are robust or richly developed and interconnected, the more successful the mobilization effort.”²⁴⁴ They had the problem-solution-strategy definition of ideology specifically in mind when they added these frames.

These three frames offer additional encoding options for a social movement’s messages. Diagnostic framing is not just about problem identification. To Snow and Benford, this frame determines and prioritizes problematic causal factors and attributions for the social movement.²⁴⁵ However, different wings of a movement might prioritize different causes. The prognostic frame often corresponds directly with the diagnostic frame, but this is not required. One risk of the prognostic framing convention is that it focuses on solutions, and despite the definition in the table, it does not always offer clear strategies. Snow and Benford warn, “The unintended consequence is that guidelines for action are unclear.”²⁴⁶ A risk to both diagnosis and prognosis framing is using elitist jargon as opposed to clearly demanding grassroots participation. Snow and Benford thought about (with the prognosis frame) but did not offer a specific frame for the social movement’s strategy.

²⁴³ Adapted from Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 200, 201, 202. Pages listed in reference order. *Italic* in original.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 199.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 200.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 203.

Snow and Benford highlight a critical point: framing and even gaining consensus on problems and solutions do not necessarily mobilize people.²⁴⁷ They claim participation demands some sort of force for action, as described by the last frame in Table 4. Snow and Benford explain the motivational frame is all about trying to convince specific audiences of the need and utility of going active. From the resource mobilization perspective, this can include status, material, and moral incentives. However, there are risks with this frame—it can neutralize other operating frames and can paint a doomsday image in which people feel no use in participating at all. In short, then:

mobilization depends not only on the existence of objective structural disparities and dislocations, the availability and deployment of tangible resources, leaders' organizational skills, political opportunities, and a kind of cost-benefit calculus engaged in by prospective participants but also on the way these variables are framed and the degree to which they resonate with the targets of mobilization.²⁴⁸

Snow and Benford discuss several anchoring factors for ideologies—not external environmental constraints but internal anchors to the ideas themselves. They argue that ideologies (which they call belief systems) hold central values for the movement and are highly salient in successful mobilization.²⁴⁹ As far as what is relevant to intended audiences, narrative constraints include empirical credibility (or fit between frame and worldly events); experiential commensurability (or the credibility of frames based on experience-based interpretation, considered the most important element for mobilization potency); and narrative fidelity (or the degree that frames resonate with a culture's narrative).²⁵⁰ These constraints mean that framing is not the only reason people resonate with ideas.

2. Narratives

Although narratives can be combined with frames, narratives offer a different way to create resonance with intended audiences. Snow and Benford define narratives as

²⁴⁷ Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," 202–204.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 213.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 205–206.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 208–210.

“stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural heritage and that thus function to inform events and experiences in the immediate present.”²⁵¹ Joseph Davis, who argues the importance of narrative to carry messages, criticizes the frame-alignment process for overemphasizing cognitive factors, logical persuasion, and consensus of belief and underemphasizing the broader narrative. He argues that framing deals with arousing moral responses and focuses on emotions for mobilizing action, mostly looking at logical beliefs and personal efficacy. While he admits framing attempts to resonate with pre-existing meanings, he argues that it tends “not to systematically explore the pre-existing meanings.”²⁵² On the contrary, narratives, he believes, add value to resonance operations.

Davis claims narratives are different from purely descriptive communication—they are “a social act and form of explanation.”²⁵³ He argues that unlike philosophic truth or deductive arguments, which are testable and debatable, narratives invite imagination and emotion designed to control an audience’s responses and inferences. A verbal or written narrative is the primary form that creates meaning for human experience. Narratives influence time and place in that authors seek ways to connect people in history and the world. These stories communicate perspective on what happened.

The purpose of stories is to moralize events, and narrative is about leveraging events and individuals by highlighting features such as morals, emotions, movement culture, and identity. Davis considers the way there are different participation rules in court depending on whether the audience is a judge or a jury and how the accused has certain cultural rules to meet, such as expressing a need for self-help treatment in drug court.

Since narratives are a significant way to organize resonant ideological messages, I provide some additional information here. Narratives are more effective when an author understands her intended audience. They create meaning by organizing events and

²⁵¹ Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 210.

²⁵² Joseph E. Davis, “Narrative and Social Movements: The Power of Stories,” in *Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements*, ed. Joseph E. Davis (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 9.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 3.

actions and attributing significance to them—giving them a plot.²⁵⁴ Davis explains that plot takes an unconnected succession of events and brings them into a configuration with cause and effect. He argues that stories explain events retrospectively, since meaning depends on the results of the causal chain, and they generate that explanation through the order of the story. In other words, stories reshape the past with meaning and project a future.²⁵⁵

The power of a narrative is in the way it configures an experience by event selection and the timing of plot for significance. A second power source in stories is in the social relationship between narrator and audience—stories take on life in the minds of receivers:

By engaging the audience's narrativity, storytellers draw the audience into the story because the connections being made are the product of the reader/listener's mind and not simply a perception of what is written or heard. As a result, he or she can feel involved in events and care about characters even when they are, in fact, very far from his or her own experience (a point of obvious importance to social movements).²⁵⁶

The storyteller attempts to create a certain audience experience, and she stimulates recognition and empathy to create shared identity and sometimes a sense of purpose. Still, any given story can affect numerous audiences differently. This virtual dimension is the combination of imagination and text. With nonfiction narratives, the audience seeks a story that coheres with reality.

Individuals impose narratives on their own lives for self-understanding and self-representation. Identity hinges on one's evolving story, which emerges through the plot development of experiences. Self-narrative describes one's morals, purpose, and intentions. As a person's understanding of the good society is about orientation to moral space—the good, the worthwhile, or the meaningful—this self-narrative has a strong impact on which ideology a person will resonate with; as Davis says, “identity cannot be

²⁵⁴ Davis, “Narrative and Social Movements,” 11.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 12, 14.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

detached from the individual's beliefs about what things have significance, from his or her fundamental evaluations with regard to questions of the good in life."²⁵⁷

One's own narrative is anchored by the influence of pre-existing, public narratives like myths and family stories.²⁵⁸ "Culturally and institutionally embedded narratives with which we identify, then, shape the construction of our self-story. And interpersonal networks, moral communities, and public institutions, including, importantly, social movements, both sanction and supply such narratives."²⁵⁹ Participant narratives can have passing significance or become the basis of a biographical conversion, which can occur when a movement member goes active.²⁶⁰ If resonant, narratives actively shape meaning for intended audiences.

3. Memes

The final way to package ideological messages is through memes, which "are ideas, skills, habits, stories or any kind of information that is copied from person to person."²⁶¹ Blackmore explains that they include images of influential people, treaties, rules, eating habits, songs, fashions, dances, flags, and technologies. Almost like genes copying information in DNA, memes copy social interaction, though their fidelity is lower than DNA's.²⁶² Blackmore argues that like genes, memes carry evolutionary principles: they copy information, allowing for variation, and then there is a selection process. For example, books and jokes offer slight variations then compete to be retold. According to Blackmore, "Memes are copied by imitation, teaching and reading, and by photocopying."²⁶³ Variation occurs with imperfect copying, such as forgetting certain details, misremembering, and combining new memes. Blackmore describes humans as

²⁵⁷ Davis, "Narrative and Social Movements," 20.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 21.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 22.

²⁶¹ Blackmore, *Consciousness*, 2nd ed., 233.

²⁶² Ibid., 231.

²⁶³ Ibid., 233.

meme machines that copy, store, and recombine information.²⁶⁴ The only interest of a meme is self-replication. Some memes discriminately succeed if deemed useful, such as in technology, institutions, arts, and sciences.

Maajid Nawaz claims that in addition to narrative, the idea of a nation depends on leaders, alliances, and symbols—in other words, memes. Indirectly, Nawaz discusses the way memes sustain a collective and support its goals. He claims nations only progress when there is consensus on their fundamental direction.²⁶⁵ Without consensus, the only thing people do is respond to problems randomly. Aside from frames and narratives, memes are essential to move a holistic idea forward. Nawaz argues that leaders set direction and strategy for the ideas. Alliances such as diverse youth groups are required for an idea to take off. Symbols such as flags, architecture, and art give the idea a brand.

To illustrate how memes support a movement, Nawaz synchronizes leaders, alliances, symbols, and narratives. His example includes the leader Osama bin Laden, the global network of alliances in support of him, and an image of a Western Christian crusader. He explains al-Qaeda's narrative as "The sanctuaries, the assets and the wealth of the (Islamic) nation have been violated and spoiled by the heinous infidels and their agents in the apostate governments."²⁶⁶ Images of group leaders and flags are other ideas that can be transmitted through the communication pathway in support of a social movement and its ideology.

D. HOW IDEAS GO TO WAR

Ideas go visible, in ideological terms, when the ideological strategy demands action, and possibly violence, to achieve the good society. Violence appears to be a matter of degree in every major ideology strategy, varying according to how important people believe it will be to achieving the intended solutions. In this section, I shift from

²⁶⁴ Blackmore, *Consciousness*, 2nd ed., 230–231.

²⁶⁵ "TEDxLahore - Maajid Nawaz - Ideas, narratives, and social change," YouTube video, 16:41, from a discussion recorded by TEDx Talks, posted by "TEDx Talks," 31 August 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZ90zWa4RBw>. Nawaz does not mention memes; however, his mobilization symbols are neither frames nor narratives and fit the explanation of memes described in the section on consciousness. Richard Dawkins described the meme concept.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.* Original italicized.

discussing the perception of ideological debate into the ideological warfare that results from it.

Social movements can grow to lead countries, as seen with Hitler and Mandela. Until this point, this thesis has discussed ideology competition as a more or less non-violent phenomenon, perhaps like a marketing contest for political ideas. However, all major ideology strategies throughout human history have eventually included violence. Even the predominately pacifist movement led by Mahatma Gandhi, who urged arbitration before strikes, boiled over into violent outbreaks.²⁶⁷ There is nothing new or old about this finding—violence is part of human nature.

William Andrews, a retired Special Forces officer, provides us with the backdrop for this discussion on going visible. His remarks in *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province 1960–1964* succinctly describe how the communist North Vietnamese fought the war, one village and one mind at a time:

Party documents and testimony of Party members indicate that these killings were carefully planned and were influenced by prevailing local conditions.... assassination was a political instrument wielded only by the Party and, like all instruments, completely subordinate to Party political policies...

[T]he “liberated” zones had largely been “cleansed” of Government presence and the people in them had been properly indoctrinated, executions were minimal, and “re-education” was the first resort for elimination of wrong tendencies...

The Destruction of the Oppression was complemented by the Reduction of Prestige, a “special form of repression usually... reserved for local government officials whom the Viet Cong wish to debase before their fellow villagers.” A village leader marked for Reduction of Prestige was often kidnapped, isolated, and “re-educated” in a secret location. Usually, the “re-education” succeeded in intimidating the victim to the extent that he was ready to admit to specified crimes in order to escape with life and limb intact, whereupon he was brought before the assembled villagers, his crimes against the people were enumerated, and he was forced to recant...

²⁶⁷ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 377, 379.

A former Government official in the district of Cai Be described his kidnapping and “re-education” and their effects this way:

They treated me rather well and I was not beaten up by them. I was, however, blindfolded and tied up all the time. On the sixth day, they led me back to My Trinh and I had to stand up in front of the villagers gathered in meeting to acknowledge my errors and apologize to them. It was only then that they took off the blindfold... This was a reduction-of-prestige campaign aimed at me and I felt very ashamed when, from the villagers’ ranks, some people came out to curse me....

The advantage of Reduction of Prestige over Destruction of Oppression was that the former avoided stirring up unnecessary hostility against the Party.²⁶⁸

Andrews reminds us that ideologies and warfare are correlated and are all about control. Ideologies compete to control political language, and warfare is but one means to support this goal. In village wars, assassinations of high-profile political leaders were carried out discretely to minimize public disapproval of the Communist Party. However, in other contexts, assassination can be publicly recorded to demonstrate strong grievance.

Andrews also depicts the level of thought and planning that occurs in psychological and information warfare. The Communists were fixed on the social group as the unit of value. Their ideological critiques included offensive and defensive measures. The variant ideology of communist nationalism in Vietnam entailed a design like the socialism profile depicted in Appendix C (since communism is a totalitarian derivative of socialism) in which the self-determined, merged nation is the single legitimate political rule entity.²⁶⁹ Karen Armstrong raises an interesting point: “if the nation becomes the absolute value” there is good reason to violently defend it.²⁷⁰ This ideology did not compete simply with a limited goal of discrediting the pre-existing ideology but with intended revolutionary dominance and destruction of the South’s republic. The Viet Cong directly controlled and minimized the unintended mixture root

²⁶⁸ William R. Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province 1960–1964* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 59–62.

²⁶⁹ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 168.

²⁷⁰ Armstrong, *Fields of Blood*, 341.

by placing committee members in the villages for the long term, making sure their message was transmitting clearly.

This example displays gray attribution, in that the public was aware the Party was exerting some influence, but was unaware of the torture, threats, and preparation that went into the leadership's public confessions. At a minimum, this is an example of gray deception in which officials made true confessions but at the same time concealed the coercive efforts of the Communists, which mattered significantly in this context. Repetition of the reduction-of-prestige tactic built survivability and credibility around the messages, leaving a negative consistency image in the minds of Southern villagers about their own leaders.

The Viet Cong's channel was a staged event in which villagers were misled to believe that the confessions were genuine. The sender's most powerful microphone was the face-to-face channel of the victimized village officials who had to stand in front of their constituents and confess to petty yet culturally significant indiscretions.

The North Vietnamese employed many of the influence techniques to gain compliance in this war. First, they set up a disliking circumstance for local leaders, causing the masses to build grievance and hostility to their seemingly incompetent officials. The association principle with once-respected leaders forced people to think their system was actually inferior. No good leader was ever put on a platform to express how well things would be going if only the Viet Cong were gone. This created negative feelings toward the faded authorities of the community, opening a void, which was immediately filled by the perceived actual authorities of the North. Violence in the form of assassination and kidnapping pacified village resistance. Also, the expanding community of rivalry was avoided, since insiders were coerced to praise the newcomers. The North Vietnamese fiercely leveraged social proof. The public confessions were very controlled. Not only did villagers see their leaders admitting to social taboos, but they also noticed that all other citizens were compliant with the new social order in the village. Finally, inconsistency was a prime tactic: when officials explained their own indiscretions, many villagers refused to follow them any longer. As Andrews notes, the reduction-of-prestige messages took two perceivable forms, visual and verbal; the people

could see weak leadership and hear incriminating confessions, leaving them to fill in the narration that their old village system did not work.

A visible output of the Viet Cong movement was an increase in constituency, observed as the community members continued to shame the South's officials long after the confessions. This psychological pressure was also passive support for the Viet Cong's adherents and their goals. Poverty and exploitation are not the only ingredients for a revolution; a catalytic injustice must also be perceived in the social structure—either in the form of new demands or the feeling that old demands are no longer justifiable.²⁷¹ In the case of the Viet Cong, they successfully convinced the villagers not to resist the revolution; the villagers felt their own officials were unjust and therefore they rejected the demands of the old system.

Another war veteran highlights the ideological competition that Andrews is describing. Retired Major General Edward Lansdale concludes after serving as a military advisor in Vietnam and the Philippines that “Americans who go out to help others in people's wars must understand that these struggles are composed of the means that shape the ideological end. Essentially, they are conflicts between viewpoints on the worth of individual man.”²⁷²

Barrington Moore compares Western liberalism with communism as justifying and concealing numerous forms of repression. However, liberal repression “in the armed struggle against revolutionary movements” has been directed outward against others at times, while communist repression is directed at its own people.²⁷³ He describes the nature of violence as something that cannot be reduced to culture, saying that humans go to great lengths to influence their future through messaging:

The assumption of inertia, that cultural and social continuity do not require explanation, obliterates the fact that both have to be recreated anew in each generation, often with great pain and suffering. To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail,

²⁷¹ Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 220.

²⁷² Edward Geary Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 375.

²⁷³ Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 508.

thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology. To speak of cultural inertia is to overlook the concrete interests and privileges that are served by indoctrination, education, and the entire complicated process of transmitting culture from one generation to the next.²⁷⁴

E. CONCLUSION

The operationalizing sequence is a conditional answer to the main research question about how developing social movements operationalize ideology, because it depends on how ideologies compete through the communication pathway. The sequence consists of considerations external and internal to social movement organizations. By reviewing a MISO manual and understanding how ideologies are communicated, social movements can create a plan to influence and control their messages. This requires careful consideration, since as I demonstrated in the last chapter, sending messages through the pathway will always have unintended interpretations and lead to unintended consequences.

Ideological message forms consist of partial or robust narratives (meanings in stories), frames (meanings connected to social events), and memes that conduct all other idea replication. Additionally, as seen in the reduction-of-prestige strategy, face-to-face message forms are very powerful. This suggests the difficulty of fabricating messages in the absence of social movements to carry the political ideas forward into battle.

The goal of resonance operations is for political messages to reach their intended audiences and be interpreted as expected before being dismissed, diverted, blocked, or distorted. The operationalizing steps, frames, narratives, and memes offered in this chapter provide policy and strategy analysts and decision makers with ways to compete ideologically in this information war.

²⁷⁴ Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 486.

VI. POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters, I analyzed the main research question, concluding that by leveraging a communication pathway from ideological message senders to receivers and executing external and internal steps in the operationalizing sequence, a social movement optimizes its chances of increasing supporters and activists. To move from this model directly to theory-based policy recommendations, it is necessary to discuss some policy challenges. I shift here from discussing domestic ideological social movement competition to international competition, through the lens of information communicated within policy by Daniel Lerner. Since the American military continues to focus efforts in the Middle East against and with ideological movements, this chapter concludes with a recommendation for Special Operations Forces in the information warfare domain.

Measuring policy gains in America has a short time horizon. A potential problem in the U.S. military is that it is focused on measuring short-term, easily visible performances like deaths, violent episodes, dollars passed, or numbers of people and units trained. The hesitancy to measure long-term effective behavior like improved civil perception of governance or robust capacity of the civil society is a reflection of a vague national grand strategy that borders on disorganization.

Except during the Monroe Doctrine era and the Soviet Union's rise, "the United States has lacked a clear consensus about its relationship to the global system," as Walter Russell Mead writes.²⁷⁵ He also notes, "the single most-needed quality now in American foreign policy" is *strategic elegance*—a national grand strategy focused first on vital concerns and then on many secondary interests within economic and political constraints, "with the fewest risks and costs," serving American morals.²⁷⁶ A RAND monograph explains, "*Doing anything* on such to-the-left-of-the-boom matters would require whole-

²⁷⁵ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 313.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 333, 334.

of-government efforts with many attendant challenges.”²⁷⁷ Strategic elegance demands a blend of long- and short-term goals even while one’s military is at war. Are there better ways the military can think about ideology challenges or organize itself to compete effectively in information warfare?

While the right mix of special operations and conventional forces is key for optimum warfighting efficiency, within the special operations community, the training, organization, resources, and authorities for MISO units are ideal for creating foreign strategic resonance operations messaging. The doctrine of these units is the foundation of the ideology operationalizing sequence in the previous chapter. Key to this effort, Civil Affairs and Special Forces can support the message senders by collecting data on potential audiences.

B. POLICY COMMUNICATION

Policy is the expression of the sovereign’s collective goals. It “is a sequence of decisions governing the behavior of a person, group, nation, or world body politic,” which will be adapted over time in light of changing conditions.²⁷⁸ This means that policy is the master of information and other tools at a country’s disposal. Anything a government does based on policy is designed to promote that government’s goals. By overcoming threats, policy functions to maintain those goals long term.

Daniel Lerner discusses the four instruments used in policy to achieve certain goals: diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME). If the strategy is negotiation, then the dominant policy tool is diplomacy carried by contracts; if the strategy is persuasion, the dominant tool is information via symbols; if the strategy is coercive, the military is the tool with its implied threat of violence; and if the strategy is bargaining, then economics is the tool that dominates.²⁷⁹ Lerner explains that when diplomacy is the leverage tool, negotiation is the mode or strategy, and a contract is the

²⁷⁷ Paul K. Davis et al., *Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 170.

²⁷⁸ Lerner, “Effective Propaganda,” 344.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 346.

carrier of the idea. However, the persuasion mode for the information tool cuts across the sociopolitical world more than the other three modes; as Lerner puts it, if an audience is persuaded by symbols, then negotiation, bargaining, and coercion become easier.²⁸⁰

Diplomacy, military, and economics manipulate the material world; information manipulates the symbolic world, though material effects are still possible. Lerner explains, “What people believe about the future shapes their responses to present events. And it is these beliefs about the future—the structure of expectations—which propaganda [or information and influence] attempts to modify on behalf of policy goals.”²⁸¹ Information does not change the environment’s conditions but the beliefs about the conditions. The optimal tool with which a government can change its audience’s beliefs, thereby shaping the audience’s responses, is persuasion.

Carl von Clausewitz writes, “When whole communities go to war... the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.... political intercourse, carried on with other means.”²⁸² According to Clausewitz, war is another means to achieve a political objective—in other words, to compete ideologically. See Figure 15 for the trickle-down effect in the Clausewitzian perfect system. The concept is that the important political decisions are made at the beginning of war, at the top of government, and trickle down to aligned tactics. Then, it should be fair to claim that if the national interest, grand strategy, or a specific policy is not articulated clearly to the tactical units, the nested decision-making architecture is in jeopardy.

²⁸⁰ Lerner, “Effective Propaganda,” 346. I substituted *information* for *propaganda* and *military* for *war*. *Propaganda* in the military lexicon has taken on different technical meanings over time. Currently, the policy tool is called *information* because it is broadly defined, and this appears consistent with Lerner’s application. War is an engagement and condition for the military power. Since a group can force war on others, it is not the others’ tool. But each has a military tool.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 86–87.

Figure 15. Nested Decision-making Architecture²⁸³



Certain conditions discussed in the previous chapter allow persuasion to be effective. Lerner identifies four essential conditions for information to be used as an effective policy tool: it must gain the audience's attention; it must gain the audience's credence or trust; behavior modifications must be plausible given the audience's predispositions and expectations; and the audience's environment must permit the behavior modification.²⁸⁴ Lerner explains that if a sender has somebody's attention and credence, the sender can persuade him to believe his nation will lose a war. This belief can result in favorable long-term behaviors for the sender.

The goal of the information tool is to influence actions to shift the power distribution in ways favorable to the sender. In information competition, the goal is to persuade the audience that one's purpose is virtuous by the audience's standards and that the rival holds an immoral position, says Lerner. This requires engagement and

²⁸³ Adapted from Karl Walling, "Introduction to Strategy" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 09 July 2015). Also, Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), 2. Lists four enduring national interests. Not an all-inclusive list of American national interests. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, but I believe the upside-down pyramid is more realistically represented as an hourglass in which strategic ideas trickle down to tactical units, make impact in the world, and then begin a refinement process in reverse order until national level decision makers are challenged to adapt.

²⁸⁴ Lerner, "Effective Propaganda," 347.

communication through available channels. Information used this way must first modify the audience's expectations before it can achieve the ultimate goal of influencing behavior.²⁸⁵

A clear policy can assist effective political activity. If all governmental activities flow from policy (which is a suspect idealist presumption), the policy must be clear enough for a wide array of activities to align effectively. However, in a society that is largely individualistic in nature, a demand for competing policies arises, or worse, people are frozen because the bureaucrats must approve everything. Contradictory policies make it difficult for actions to be consistent with all policies all the time. By contrast, a society that is controlled by a central communist party is likely to produce a singular and more focused policy although maybe not one that is flexible.

Perhaps Clausewitz's claim that war is an extension of policy²⁸⁶ is incomplete. In the absence of overarching or singular policy, war becomes a means of survival, which is more consistent with Charles Darwin's theory of gradual evolutionary change. Warfare can emerge without a clear policy. When tactical units are waiting for clear higher instructions, the options for operationalizing ideology by these legitimate forces to compete in information warfare are severely confused. Warfare can also force policy to change. However, the pre-existing ideas can be slow to adapt.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

In the absence of a clear, overarching grand strategy, war can influence policies. However, in ideal circumstances, policy objectives regulate warfare. A policy objective sufficient for effective strategic and operational planning will include seven components. First, a thorough intelligence assessment must be conducted, and a clear directive or objective issued (which includes a decision on the scale of limited to unlimited objectives and expresses whether the target is low value or high value).²⁸⁷ Second, subordinate

²⁸⁵ Lerner, "Effective Propaganda," 348–349.

²⁸⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87–88.

²⁸⁷ Karl Walling, "Introduction to Strategy" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 09 July 2015). Many of the concepts in this paragraph are adapted from Walling's scales which illustrate the level of commitment to a cause.

objectives such as political demands or settlements are explicitly described. Third, the war termination guidance and strategic decision points are planned at the beginning of a war (including placement on a short- to long-duration scale and a long-term peace enforcement plan). Fourth, evaluation of the capabilities, limitations, effects, costs, and benefits of all national instruments of war is conducted before selecting the military solution. Fifth, significant constraints and requirements for strategies and operations are articulated to the military, to ensure that war plans do not contradict other policies. Sixth, explicit description of the national interest at stake or the cause of conflict and depth of commitment is described (including a decision on the partial to total effort scale). Seventh, unique partners, institutions, and resources that are available and unavailable to the military are explained so that the planners are clear on whom to leverage to optimize success. As with good strategies, the policy should be feasible, and it should be detailed only where necessary. This policy should be communicated to action agents. Once political objectives are achieved, the war valve should be turned off to assess the updated situation.

Suitable for a thesis on ideology, my recommendations revolve around communication. To avoid perpetual strategic information warfare against religious fundamentalism, it seems possible to open a dialogue with key movement leaders or the masses to determine what it will take to reduce lesser-jihad violence. Negotiation does not appear to be a tested policy in the current ideological competition. Every special operations company-level unit should have English-translation copies of the Quran, Hadith, *and* Sira to increase understanding of Islam, which is the current predominant religious fundamentalism competing on the world stage. I believe that communication of ideas through cell phones and face-to-face interaction in addition to through books will reduce uncertainty with this particular ideology competition.

All branches of government are implicated here. The United States should always consider the ethical implications of its actions. Careful ethical analysis may determine inaction to be more valuable in certain circumstances. Although this synthesis of research findings is intended to illuminate patterns and give a greater understanding of how


ideology functions in the world, intentional ideology influence should be discussed at the highest levels of responsibility—with politicians, diplomats, and general officers.

Resonance operations demand a streamlined process of approval and support to the forces within the U.S. government designed to compete using planned messages in information warfare. For a society that sees the world as individuals, mostly free and mostly equal, there seems to be too much concern about and control of U.S. MISO's messaging. If we are living in a world where a religious fundamentalist in a developing country in the Middle East can send messages through the Internet channel to influence violent action in Paris, then young U.S. officers and non-commissioned officers who have taken the democratic oaths should be given greater authority to send messages to foreign audiences too. The concern of accidentally negatively influencing Americans is on weak footing and falls for the slippery slope fallacy. Human rights and democratic themes are of little concern for spillage to American audiences. In the digital age, America must come up with a clear policy for competing with ideological messages and empower units designed to lead resonance operations.

Information warfare is a dominant form of social interaction and influence. Edward Luttwak explains, "All armed forces combine elements of attrition on the one hand and relational-maneuver on the other in their overall approach to war."²⁸⁸ The relational-maneuver side of the spectrum looks outward, identifies the adversary's weaknesses, and then can reconfigure capabilities quickly to exploit those weaknesses, all of which are essential to information warfare. Special Operations Forces such as MISO, Civil Affairs, and Special Forces are typically found on the relational-maneuver side and can therefore be useful in information warfare. See Figure 16 for an organizational and effects-driven recommendation for these three branches of service. In the figure, the term *supported* means the unit is receiving support from another unit.

²⁸⁸ Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," *Parameters* 13, no. 4 (1983): 13.

Figure 16. The Special Operations Trinity: An Information Warfare Recommendation



The adaptive capabilities of these three units optimize policies and strategies competing in the ideological arena. With secretary of defense approval, Civil Affairs forces can collect and manage open-source civil information, and Special Forces can do the same for closed-source systems. Civil Affairs are the ideal forces to engage and/or analyze civilian elements to determine grievances among subversive social movements, seeking suitable partnerships to support America's strategic messages.²⁸⁹ Civil Affairs and Special Forces together can support the MISO units, which need congressional approval for messaging content and audience selection. The MISO units are trained to assess the ideas in this thesis and accept feasible concepts to immediately compete with greater success in ideological warfare. Assuming they can gain access to social networks, Civil Affairs and Special Forces can also support the information warfare strategy with other tasks and capabilities essential to determining intended audiences and influencing them face-to-face.

American resonance operations can reduce the need for violent conflict by taking a different approach: supporting ideology messaging of partner nations and supporting social movements against antagonistic nations and groups. It is important to understand that warfare has never been strictly about violence. Violence is just one means to win in warfare. Warfare is actually much more about information domination and control. As such, social movements compete for political control. Without a willing adherent pool, a supportive constituency, and a warmer-than-antagonistic bystander constituency, the social movement will have a difficult time achieving its sociopolitical goals. As the Commission on Countering Violent Extremism recommends, "we must flood the zone with alternative narratives and ideas, allowing the strongest to win."²⁹⁰

This thesis is not suggesting that the government conduct immoral or deceptive behavior like propaganda against fellow citizens. However, it should be acknowledged that politicians, their supported and supportive constituents, diplomats, military leaders, and social movements already attempt to influence the ideological narrative. The

²⁸⁹ Doowan Lee, "Social Movement Theory" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 21 November 2016).

²⁹⁰ Green and Proctor, *Turning Point*, 10–11.

military's capabilities and creativity should be leveraged to support resonant ideas for the good society. A consensual unified effort is an efficient way to move a society, progressively or naturally, in a given direction. Failing to resonate with a unified ideology as a nation will make it difficult to craft an effective policy and can lead to infighting and potentially the dissolution of yet another empire.

Two suggestions for future research may enhance discussion on information warfare. While Sean Everton highlights many strategies in the non-kinetic information realm, such as creating distrust between subgroups, deception aimed at central actors, discrediting or isolating brokers, and disrupting communication networks, there may be another way to use social network analysis (SNA).²⁹¹ Within the communication network itself, it may be possible to tie actors to a specific idea, word, or symbol. This would display a web not of people who do things together, but of ideas which are heard, viewed, or expressed. This approach is different than linking actors to a religious site, for example. This is about networking what was said at a site and wherever else those ideas appear. To meaningfully compare ties between ideas, an analyst could draw lines from locations to a certain ideological component or an array of core ideological terms. This may be a good way to find the dissemination points of ideological messaging.

Using SNA to link word forms and meaning might provide deeper insights into the root causes of violent action. A suggested starting point for this type of network analysis research would be to ask the developers of www.worldvaluessurvey.org about their surveys and the limitations they've experienced over the years.²⁹² These surveyors can depict country groupings based on traditional, secular-rational, survival, and self-expression values based on their questionnaires. Their findings depict how different regions of the world have shifted their values over time. The suggestion to use SNA to depict idea networks would yield an interesting ideological map. However, SNA admits the difficulty of quantifying certain relationships and analyzing the sociograms objectively. The transmitting of ideas is likely even more difficult to observe (such as two

²⁹¹ Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 368.

²⁹² I do not claim the surveys on this website reflect complete ideologies, however, the belief trends and waves can be helpful. More importantly, speaking with the surveyors may be the most helpful action.

people discussing the democratic process at a café), except, perhaps, on cyber systems. This also might be an argument in favor of capture-and-interrogate over seek-and-destroy strategies, although either approach can violate ethics.


Finally, moral questions often arise in discussions on influencing human interaction. Often, different solutions emerge based on the normative theory that one resonates most closely with. It would be interesting to display the ideological profiles of the main normative theories and/or their authors. It should not be assumed that because an author wrote about an ideology he holds that ideology. Investigation into the author's behaviors and thoughts matter. For example, the "greater happiness for the greater good" principle is often associated with socialism, while treating each human as an end in itself seems like liberalism. Is there an issue if someone's moral code of thought-beliefs is socialistic and yet her ideology of thought-behavior is liberalism? That research could highlight a fundamental ideological bias in morality-based decision making.

In this thesis I reviewed current literature on ideologies to inform policy analysts of its relevance in today's information warfare. After providing background on communication resonance and social movement theory, I depicted how ideologies are transmitted through a communication pathway to the minds of intended audiences. After describing how ideologies compete to control political language, I outlined an operationalizing sequence of external and internal considerations for a social movement to maximize their potential successes in this environment. Armed with this information, this thesis supports the proactive "turning point" against non-resonant ideological violence as pleaded by the Commission on Countering Violent Extremism.

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APPENDIX A. ANOTHER LIBERALISM PROFILE

Figure 17. Reform to Ideal Liberalism by Thomas Hill Green²⁹³




²⁹³ Adapted from Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pages on core concepts 179–181, 183–185, 187–188, adjacent concepts 182–183, 186, and periphery concepts 189–191. My graphic interpretation of his description.

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APPENDIX B. CONSERVATISM PROFILE

Figure 18. Mirror Security Conservatism: A Snapshot Against Progressivism²⁹⁴




²⁹⁴ Adapted from Freedman, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, core concepts found on pages 333–336, 342, 344–345; adjacent on 333, 336, 339–340, 342, 382, 388, 391; and periphery on 334, 339, 344, 382–383, 391–392. My graphic interpretation of his description.

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APPENDIX C. SOCIALISM PROFILE

Figure 19. Diverse Socialism without a Permanent Centerpiece²⁹⁵



²⁹⁵ Adapted from Freedman, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, core concepts found on 423, 425–427, 433; adjacent on 343, 423, 427–431, 438–439, 445, 448–449; periphery on 429, 431–432, 434–436, 441–442, 445, 451, 454–455, 478, 480. These profiles are only an abstract snapshot of the ideology, not necessarily illustrative of current day. Black text in this particular profile indicates deliberately associating ideas.

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