

AU/ACSC/AY2012


AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

APPEASING THE DRAGON: AN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES TO TAIWAN AS AN INDICATOR OF CHINESE
INFLUENCE ON US FOREIGN POLICY

By

Ms. Lisa M. Kensinger



A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. Dennis Duffin

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

June 26, 2011

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Disclaimer	ii
ABSTRACT.....	v
I. Introduction	1
Research Question.....	2
Background	2
Thesis	5
II. Differing Perspectives - Literature Review.....	7
Asian- Pacific Perspective.....	7
The United States	13
III. Analysis	15
Introduction	15
Limitations	15
Foreign Policy Considerations of President George H. W. Bush (1990 – 1992).....	16
Foreign Policy Considerations of President William (Bill) Clinton (1993 – 2000).....	18
Foreign Policy Considerations of President George W. Bush (2001 – 2008).....	21
Foreign Policy Considerations of President Barack Obama (2009 – 2011)	24
IV. Conclusion	28
Conclusions	28
Recommendation.....	29
Summation	29
V. Concerns for the Future	33
Appendix A.....	34
Appendix B.....	39
Notes	47
Bibliography	49

FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of Taiwan	9
-------------------------------	---

TABLES

Table 1: Taiwan FMS Authorization Values, 1990 – 2010.....	16
Table 2: Major US Arms Sales as Notified to Congress	34
Table 3: 2006 Ground Force Balance	39
Table 4: 2006 Air Force Balance	40
Table 5: 2006 Naval Force Balance.....	41
Table 6: 2006 Chinese Missile Capabilities.....	42
Table 7: 2010 Ground Force Balance	43
Table 8: 2010 Air Force Balance	44
Table 9: 2010 Naval Force Balance.....	45
Table 10: 2010 Chinese Missile Capabilities.....	46

ABSTRACT

The realities of East Asia have significantly changed since the 1970s when the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was enacted. Improvements in China's military posture and economic standing offset the balance of power that the TRA sought to maintain, yet China, Taiwan, and the United States continue to adhere to the provisions set forth by the decade's old foreign policy. China's strengthening in the global market and direct investment in the US correlates distinctly with the size and scale of US foreign military sale (FMS) authorizations to Taiwan. The possibility that economic drivers could cause the United States to subjugate established goals for supporting and spreading democracy throughout the world drove an exploration of US foreign policy as it relates to Taiwan and China. The results of this case study verify the reality of China's influence on US foreign policy and recommend redefining American responsibilities and involvement in Eastern Asia. Resetting the tipped scales of democracy and globalization will result in enhanced regional peace and will re-establish US foreign policy that speaks from a US perspective.

I. Introduction

[W]e shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.¹

President Woodrow Wilson
Address to Congress, April 2, 1917

At the end of the Cold War the United States became the sole global superpower. With the title came the self-identified responsibility of leading the charge for world peace. To that end, the United States relied on the democratic peace theory, the foundation of US foreign diplomacy in which democracies fought together against the specter of tyranny. This approach to foreign relations attracted the suspicion and distrust of non-democratic nations, particularly communist China who responded by searching for ways to gain equal footing with the United States. As China grew in economic strength, the American and Chinese economies began to blur, crossing national borders as businesses in both countries recognized the potential for new markets. The small island democracy of Taiwan watched the United States attempt to establish trade agreements and open dialogue with China while China continued to edge closer to the United States in global power.

The results of globalization are typically viewed as positive; however, America's interest in China as an untapped trade partner may be the Achilles' heel to the US democratic support of Taiwan. Understanding the intricate relationships involved is essential if the United States hopes to reap the benefits of friendship with China while remaining the protector of a democratic world peace.

Research Question

This paper examines changing US support for Taiwan as demonstrated through foreign military sales (FMS) case authorizations and related trends from 1990 to 2010. The FMS process is the means by which the United States transfers military defense products to foreign countries. Chronological analysis of FMS cases to Taiwan was used to identify key socioeconomic influencing factors of US priorities, and detail their effect on US policy with regard to China and Taiwan. The analysis ultimately provides insight into the amount of influence the desire for financial growth, and thus Chinese appeasement, has on US foreign policy and how that influence impacts the global security of the United States. Ultimately, the United States must implement a foreign policy which balances the spread of democracy and globalized financial interdependence.

Background

President Woodrow Wilson was a strong advocate for the democratic peace theory in which like-minded nations joined together militarily to maintain peace. Wilson supported the creation of the League of Nations whose charter was “to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security.”² The concept for the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), two organizations in which the United States continues to actively participate, has direct ties to the League of Nations; multiple countries linked by democratic peace. The United States continues to be “vigorously engaged in all corners of the globe, acting as a force for peace and prosperity.”³ While critics of the democratic peace theory abound, the effect of the theory on US foreign diplomacy cannot be ignored. USAID tracking shows the democratic transition of 14 African countries since 1991; multiple Eastern-bloc countries turning to democracy since the end of the Cold War; continued US support of democratic Indonesia,

Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; and most Latin American countries welcoming democratic ideals.⁴

At the conclusion of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson envisioned a world in which every nation was given the opportunity to self-govern and determine their own destinies. To bring about such a reality, the United States took on the responsibility for the growth of democracy, vowing with “...regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.”⁵ President Wilson’s vision ignited the Western practice of supporting and defending democracy to foster peace. This ideal stood as a basis for US policy through the end of the twentieth century. As recently as George W. Bush’s presidency, the belief that democracy helped build a peaceful world order held prominence within the United States government. “We are led by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.”⁶ With democratic peace as the bedrock of US foreign policy, the impact of China’s rising economic influence must be understood.

In 1949 the Republic of China’s government formally split, creating mainland China and the island government of Taiwan. “Over the next five decades, the ruling authorities [in Taiwan] gradually democratized and incorporated the local population within the governing structure. In 2000, Taiwan underwent its first peaceful transfer of power from the Nationalist to the Democratic Progressive Party.”⁷ President Woodrow Wilson’s idealism, through the auspices of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), led the United States to support the struggling democracy of

Taiwan, promising to stand beside Taiwan should a battle with China occur. In 1979 the United States ceased to officially recognize the nation of Taiwan, thus beginning a US foreign relations tug-of-war between democracy and financial growth which still exists today. The United States remains outwardly committed to the TRA as the foundation of official interaction between the US and Taiwan. The TRA states US policy toward Taiwan is “to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area.”⁸ However; the 1979 policy may not be comprehensive enough to support US efforts to build both a democratic and globalized Asia.

As the twenty-first century unfolds, the belief in the peaceful powers of democracy appears to be taking a second seat to economic concerns. China’s emergence from self-containment is apparent as the world market explodes within China’s borders. With an estimated 1.3 billion citizens, China creates a large draw to US corporations who in turn lobby the US government to establish a friendly nation relationship in order to tap into the demographic offerings of China.⁹ Over the last year, China has surpassed the United States as the largest consumer of GM automobiles with “[a]utomakers... looking to China to offset weak demand in traditional markets and to drive future growth. Last year, China overtook the United States as the biggest auto market with a 48 percent jump in sales.”¹⁰ This economic and popular growth provides China a large amount of economic persuasion to wield over US actions. US foreign policy recognizes the influence of economics on national relationships; the 2010 National Security Strategy cites “Asia’s dramatic economic growth ... [as a] connection to America’s future prosperity... The United States has deep and enduring ties with [Asian] countries... including trade and investment that drive growth and prosperity on both sides of the Pacific.”¹¹

Such recognition places the United States in a unique position when the foreign government providing the promise of financial growth to America and her citizens is built upon a communist foundation actively attempting to suppress the establishment of a democratic society and the liberties it represents. The shared history of China and Taiwan increases the tension amongst the three governments, creating the political tightrope on which the United States is currently balanced. In order to move forward diplomatically and economically in East Asia, the United States must clearly identify their goals for the region, implicitly defining their intentions toward both China and Taiwan.

Thesis

China, a growing marketplace rich in both population and resources, is drawing US economic interest as both an investor and an investment. As an investor, China holds the largest amount of US securities growing from the tenth largest national investor in 2000 (\$92 billion) to the largest national investor in June 2010 (\$1.6 trillion).¹² As an investment, US global economic interests have a direct impact on foreign policy decisions. The doctrine of Woodrow Wilson began the US practice of spreading democracy and self determination to increase US security within the international community. Current US foreign policy decisions indicate that global economic success may have a stronger influence on policy than the creation of a democratized world.

China has long proclaimed ownership of Taiwan, refusing to recognize the island as anything other than the mainland's province. China's "one China" view creates a political quagmire as the United States provides Taiwan with military arms necessary to defend the young democratic government. The establishment of China as an economic interest area resonates within the US-Taiwan relationship; degraded FMS support is one of the results. This paper

chronicles US efforts to strengthen the US-China relationship while continuing to support the fledgling democracy of Taiwan. Attempts by the United States to support both sides of the Taiwan Strait stand in the way of a true partnership with either government; the emotional and political sensitivity of the Taiwan question places the United States in a tenuous position. Identifying trends in the US support of Taiwan may illustrate the growing influence of foreign government interests on US support of democracies around the globe.

US support to the island of Taiwan changed between 1990 and 2010. Interests in growing US investments abroad and foreign investment in the United States are driving a new US stance for Taiwanese support and Chinese appeasement. The chronological view of FMS case approvals documents a clear shift in US ideals, from Wilson's democratic world order to US economic growth and stabilization of US-China relations. This research paper provides insight into US foreign policy determinations in order to better understand the political conundrum of East Asia and the potential for armed conflict in the region. A loss of balance between democracy and economic interests portends to a shift in military planning and focus. China's economic growth and regional dominance drive a need for the US to reassure both China and Taiwan of their intentions to honor previous commitments without sacrificing US economic or foreign policy goals.

II. Differing Perspectives - Literature Review

Asian- Pacific Perspective

At the end of the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-Shek and his followers fled mainland China resulting in a politically fractured and geographically separated Chinese population. Mao Zedong, the first ruler of the communist People's Republic of China (PRC or China), and Chiang Kai-Shek, leader of the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan), both believed the territory of China, including the island of Taiwan, was only temporarily divided; they refused to recognize the opposing government as a separate nation. As the twenty-first century unfolds, the PRC remains a communist nation staunchly supportive of its "one China" policy which proclaims "there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China."¹³ Per this belief, China takes an aggressive posture toward any government attempting to recognize Taiwan's sovereign status, including Taiwan herself. The government of Taiwan remains democratic and strongly opposes China's threat of forceful unification, instead remaining comfortable with the "one China" policy status quo of "no unification, no independence and no use of force."¹⁴ Taiwan, however, defines "one China" as a society with a unique relationship of shared history, culture, and family. The status quo Taiwan desires is one in which sovereignty is maintained without independence. The slight variations in definition allow a cross-strait relationship to exist; yet both sides wearily anticipate the time when discussion breaks down and aggression becomes unavoidable.

The people of Taiwan are proud of their democratic existence. Although Taiwan's population is divided on the issue of the cross-strait relationship, the idea of unifying with China and assuming the Chinese communist lifestyle is far from the populace's desired future. "Most Taiwanese ... hope China can promote democracy and freedom of speech to reduce the cross-strait differences in political systems, social values and cultures. They think the move will be the

best guarantee for long-term interactions, mutual trust and prosperity.”¹⁵ Until China adopts a democratic governing style, the possibility of unifying peacefully will remain only in the minds of the minority. Maintaining the “one China” approach to the cross-strait relationship provides the least amount of turmoil for the people of Taiwan; however, it also poses risk should China decide it is time for forceful unification. The immediate declaration of independence is also an option for Taiwan. The greatest risk to this approach is diplomatic fallout where cultural sharing, travel, and trade are rapidly shut down from one or both sides. Should such events occur, military engagement would follow. Results from an April 2011 survey of Taiwan citizens revealed that, “53.5 percent [of those surveyed] preferred to maintain the status quo, while 27 percent favored Taiwan independence, and 7.5 percent [desired] unification with China... When asked about the eventual unification with China, 15.7 percent were supportive of the proposal, while 69.6 percent voiced opposition.”¹⁶ These survey results predict a future in which the “one-China” policy remains intact. Taiwan citizens continue to feel a connection to China, yet are unwilling to sacrifice their prosperous democracy for the unification of a politically divided country.

China outnumbers Taiwan in military size and strength. At their nearest point, Taiwan and China are separated by less than 200 miles. Such close proximity is frightening when confronted with the arsenal of Chinese missiles currently pointed at Taiwan. The amount of time necessary for a missile to reach Taiwan is so short, even the Ultra High Frequency Long Range Early Warning Radars Taiwan procured from the United States in 2004¹⁷ will not allow enough time for mass movement of Taiwan citizens and defense equipment to safer ground. China’s focus on increasing the size, depth, and capabilities of her military drove Taiwan’s government to search for ways to contain the threat of China diplomatically and militarily. “[M]ost of the

Figure 1: Map of Taiwan



*Reprinted from: Central Intelligence Agency.
“The World Factbook- China.” July 2009.*

people in Taiwan are pragmatic enough to understand the need to maintain security ties with the United States. And that not only means purchasing arms, but also, for other security, cooperation.”¹⁸ In the face of China’s devastating military potential, Taiwan continues to pursue a globally recognized, non-communist government, sending a clear statement to the world concerning the strength of their desire for democracy.

In order to peacefully choose their own future, Taiwan recognizes the need for an ally willing to support Taiwan through economic, diplomatic, and military engagements with China. The United States foots the bill as a powerhouse on the world stage, capable of influencing international politics and containing China’s threats of force. President Ma explained to John Hamre, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the important role the United States holds in the cross-strait relationship.

[T]he US must help Taiwan level the playing field. Negotiating with a giant like the Chinese mainland is not without its risk. The right leverage must be in place. Otherwise, Taiwan cannot credibly maintain an equal footing at the negotiating table. This is why I continue to urge the US to provide Taiwan with necessary defensive weaponry, such as the F-16 – and diesel-powered submarines to keep its aerial and naval integrity intact, which is key to maintaining a credible defense.

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote in *Foreign Affairs* last year, the US can best help itself by helping others defend themselves. At the same time, American presence in the very system it helped create decades ago is crucial to that system's survival. In the end, only a strong US commitment, backed by its credibility in East Asia, can guarantee the peace and stability of this region.¹⁹

Taiwan's objective is to peacefully maintain separation from China while establishing a strong global position. "The Taiwanese people want to be constructive members of the global village but so far they have been unfairly excluded. They have much to contribute to the world; their expertise in democratic politics, economic development, international commerce, social reforms, environmental protection and health care to any corner of the world, but they are not allowed to do so under the name of Taiwan."²⁰ Toward this end, the focus of Ma Ying-jeou's presidency is to "build three lines of defense for the ROC's [Taiwan] national security so as to ensure its longevity for many more centuries to come. These three lines of defense are institutionalizing the Cross-strait rapprochement, enhancing Taiwan's contribution to international development and aligning defense with diplomacy."²¹ In strong support of these principles, Taiwan has significantly contributed to almost every recent world disaster, "whether in providing international aid to help rebuild homes in Sichuan or giving life-sustaining medical aid to Haitian children ... [Taiwan was] also one of the first to arrive with emergency relief supplies and rescue teams when Japan was struck by the triple disaster of an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear incident."²² The unbiased support of countries in need of humanitarian assistance spotlights Taiwan's desire to increase their presence in international politics.

Effectively done, the relationships will turn into the recognition that has been a long-standing goal of the government of Taiwan.

The three principles Ma Ying-jeou espouses as his presidential focus align well with America's democratic peace strategy. Taiwan's drive for democracy while threatened by a dominant, communist nation conveys the overall strength of will democracies require to prosper; however, they remain dependent of the United States to provide the support that a small island population and economy are ill-prepared to provide for themselves. The majority of Taiwan citizens hope to maintain the status quo with China, continuing to exist as a separate entity without the undesired guidance of the nearby giant. For this to work, the United States must stay committed to the cause in a time of economic uncertainty.

While Taiwan has long recognized a future affected by the actions of the PRC, the truth of this understanding could be even greater than originally realized. Any overt Chinese military attack on Taiwan will ignite retaliatory actions by Taiwan, in-turn drawing the strength and power of the United States into the fray. The consequences of a globalized Chinese economy that draws the interest of US businesses and ties the economies of both great nations together will result in an isolated Taiwan vulnerable to forced unification. The democratic government in Taiwan will be the victim of an unbalanced application of US foreign policy.

Like Taiwan, China's cross-strait dialogue has changed significantly since 2000. The PRC shifted from an aggressive, unification-demanding neighbor to a more flexible and open-minded contemporary. People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Chen Bingde, equivalent in status to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told an American audience, "[W]e only have garrison deployment across (from) Taiwan, and we do not have operational deployment, much less missiles stationed there."²³ While the lack of Chinese transparency in military matters

makes such a statement difficult to verify in an unclassified setting, skepticism remains a strong barrier between cross-strait and US-China alliances. “The study of PLA views on strategy remains an inexact science, and outside observers have few direct insights into the formal strategies motivating China’s force build-up, the leadership’s thinking about the use of force, the contingency planning that shapes the PLA’s force structure or doctrine, or the linkages between strategic pronouncements and actual policy decisions, especially in [a] crisis situation.”²⁴ While China’s near-term unification strategy is vague, two things are clear. The unification of the mainland and the island of Taiwan remains a top Chinese priority, and China recognizes that globalization significantly increases their international power. “China has become an important member of the international system and the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China.”²⁵

Chinese security documents continue to proclaim a desire for peaceful unification with Taiwan, but they refuse to remove the threat of military strikes in the event diplomacy ceases to work. The continued promises of military engagement create both a hope for a better future and the fear of deadly reaction in the event Taiwan oversteps the Chinese-imposed limits of the status quo. The United States attempts to mediate any disagreements between China and Taiwan without “interfering or infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.””²⁶ Forging a path to a peaceful future is a tight-rope act; it must be approached quietly and carefully with the realization that should any one of the three players give in to reactionary antics, the East Asian region could become a war zone reminiscent of World War II.

The United States

The spread and support of democracy, economic growth through the opening of remote markets, and political stabilization of the region are just a few areas of interest the United States holds for East Asia. Relationships with both China and Taiwan are critical to achieving US goals; each important for significant, yet different, reasons.

China's large and powerful government has extensive influence in Asia. The alliance of US and Chinese interests would result in a stable environment, neutralizing malcontents such as North Korea and ultimately securing a better future through peaceful means. The United States is also interested in China from an economic perspective. The steady growth rate of the Chinese economy and their vast, untapped markets make China irresistible to US businesses.

“Multinational corporations are pouring billions into China to meet demand from the rapidly growing Chinese middle class... YUM brands, owner of fast-food chains like KFC and Pizza Hut, reported \$1.2 billion in Chinese sales in its most recent quarter, surpassing its declining US sales for the first time.”²⁷ The United States and Chinese economies are also tied together through foreign held US securities. Since the normalizing of relations, China's investments in the US have steadily risen from \$5 million in 1978 to \$1.6 trillion in June 2010.²⁸ Politically and economically China has opened to the United States in a way that cannot, and more importantly should not, be ignored. The friendship between the United States and China is young, hesitant, and contains mistrust that will take years of continued goodwill to overcome; yet the investment opportunities coupled with the political strength gained through cooperation pushes the United States to recognize China as a critical ally.

US interests in Taiwan are centered primarily on shared security concerns and democratic values. “The US commitment to democracy, its history of relations with and support for

Taiwan, and Taiwan's importance as a US "defense and intelligence partner"... significantly raise the stakes of a US policy "failure." If US officials are seen as unable to manage the cross-strait issue in a way that avoids a coercive PRC approach to Taiwan, then US regional leadership might be questioned and support for it undermined."²⁹ The US status as sole international superpower requires the United States to maintain their visible support of democratic values. To do otherwise risks losing the region to another powerful government, most probably China. As a US-backed democratic government, the small island of Taiwan holds strategic importance for US goals in the entire Asian region. While the friendship of China remains a top US priority, it cannot be realized at the expense of the democratic government of Taiwan.

The foreign policy documents that provide the framework for the three-way relationship between China, Taiwan, and the United States are clear in their intent and provide a firm foundation for building solid international relationships which satisfy all three governments. There are five documents outlining the relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan: the TRA, the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the 1979 Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, the 1982 Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan, and the 1982 Six Assurances to Taiwan. The last updates to foreign policy to meet all three governments' stipulations for peaceful interactions in East Asia were authored in 1982; the China-Taiwan-United States relationship defined in the late 1970s and early 1980s remains unchanged today, yet the political and social environments within which all three nations interact have changed dramatically.

III. Analysis

Introduction


Determining trends in foreign policy by reviewing FMS authorizations requires dividing the timeframe into blocks of years by a variable which affects foreign policy equitably throughout the time spanned. Foreign policy is set by the president, as the senior diplomat of the United States; therefore, the blocks of time reviewed below are defined by president and span the years correlating the stated president's time in office. Additional consideration must be given to the inherent limitations of this analysis.

Limitations

The identified program values are not in constant year dollars; they reflect the amount identified to the US Congress during the congressional notification process. The values reflect the amount of money the sale cannot exceed without requiring an additional congressional notification. The final outcome of the program and final program value were not identified in this research paper.

This paper sought to identify trends between foreign policy as defined by presidential terms as well as the number and dollar amount of FMS authorizations approved by Congress. The analysis first determined the issues within the Pacific region and foreign policy concerns facing a president, and then identifies the number of FMS sales authorized to Taiwan during the stated block of time. The analysis does not consider elements internal to Taiwan which would affect military arms requests to the United States. Such issues range from financial and budgetary to the support Taiwan receives from other nations. For each block of time, cross-strait actions are identified; attention is drawn to those actions which influenced US support to Taiwan and interactions with China.

Table 1: Taiwan FMS Authorization Values, 1990 – 2010



Foreign Policy Considerations of President George H. W. Bush (1990 – 1992)

President Bush responded to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait by calling for a new world order in which “the rule of law... [would] govern the conduct of nations” to bring about peace and security.³⁰ In his address to the nation, President Bush spoke of the atrocities Saddam Hussein had already committed in Kuwait, among them the damage “done to the fragile economies of the Third World, emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world, including to our own economy.”³¹ Such a statement, on the heels of an emotional decision by the American people to send their sons and daughters to the Middle East, illustrated the importance democracy and economics held for the United States when the country was testing her wings as the sole superpower. In defining US foreign policy following the fall of the Soviet

Union, Secretary of State James Baker also tied the two together as essential elements of US foreign policy. “[D]emocracy does not stand alone. Geometry teaches us that the triangle is the most solid configuration. The political geometry of successful democracy should teach us that a free society must be upheld by economic progress and basic security.”³² The words shared by the men who forged the trail for US foreign interactions in the early 1990s provide the environmental context necessary to understand the feelings and desires of the United States at that time. As the world’s most powerful nation, the United States sought to foster peace by focusing on individual freedoms, the right to choose one’s own government, and the right to build personal futures under the umbrella of economic prosperity. The blending of democracy and economics was seen as the way forward; a sure way of ensuring the continued survival of a world fashioned after the US vision.

In this world shaped by democracy and economics, the United States strongly supported the fledgling democracy of Taiwan through FMS sales. Most of the arms transferred to Taiwan easily fell within the scope of defense, as mandated by the TRA; however, the sale of F-16 aircraft was not acceptable by China’s definition of the TRA and “one China” policies. Each FMS approval of defensive weapons to Taiwan aroused the ire of China; providing \$5.8 billion worth of weapons that could be used offensively pushed China to respond in a way commensurate to the perceived US breach of US-China agreements. “After President George H. W. Bush approved the sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters to Taiwan in September 1992, the PRC ended its participation in the “Arms Control in the Middle East” talks ... Some critics argued that the sale in 1992 of F-16 fighters violated the 1982 Joint Communiqué on reducing arms sales to Taiwan and that continuing arms sales to Taiwan would harm U.S. ties with a rising China with greater wealth and influence.”³³ The disparity of US interests was clear; support of democracy

was in direct conflict with the economic offerings of China's vast marketplace. The US desire for normalized relations with the growing powerhouse of China was also clear. The foreign policy documentation created during a different world order remained the guiding principle for US relations with Taiwan, while the normalization of US-China relations was open to the trends of the day. As a staunch believer in the power of democracy, President Bush supported the defense requirements of Taiwan; however, China's political response to the sale of F-16 aircraft to Taiwan could not be ignored, nor could the potential for a breakdown in the US-China relationship. Deliberately or not, China had discovered a means of influencing US foreign policy regarding Taiwan. The interests of the United States in the Asian region were tempered by the disapproval of China regarding US FMS sales to Taiwan.

Foreign Policy Considerations of President William (Bill) Clinton (1993 – 2000)

President Bill Clinton brought a new concept on the role of the United States in world politics to the White House. The Clinton Doctrine focused on the protection of human rights. While the foundation of this doctrine is democracy and President Clinton was a proponent of the democratic peace theory, his presidency is remembered for economic and military actions wielded in protection of global human rights. However, China posed a significant problem for the Clinton Doctrine; economic interest groups within the United States anticipated the potential windfall of an open Chinese economy, the United States needed China's help managing growing global security issues, and other foreign governments were not supportive of economic sanctions against China (military actions were not considered).³⁴ President Clinton's 1993 Executive Order 12850 required China to make "significant progress toward specified human rights improvements or risk the continuation of the most favored nation (MFN) status China held with the United States."³⁵ Over the course of the next year, China made few, if any, changes regarding

human rights violations; yet, in 1994, President Clinton announced the continuation of the MFN, stating:

The Chinese did not achieve overall significant progress in all the areas outlined in the executive order relating to human rights, even though clearly there was progress made in important areas... [In order to] best advance the cause of human rights and the other profound interests the United States has in our relationship with China... I have decided that the United States should renew Most Favored Nation trading status toward China... I am moving, therefore, to delink human rights from the annual extension of Most Favored Nation trading status for China.³⁶

While the qualification of best advancing US interests in China should not be considered anything less than important in a “big picture” perspective, it must also be noted that China was once again able to influence US foreign policy through their economic potential. While President Clinton threatened the use of economic sanctions should China not improve their human rights record, such a threat held little power when considered with respect to the damage such sanctions would impose on the US economy. It is prudent to consider that China was aware of the backlash economic sanctions would have against the United States and decided to confront the challenge to their government instead of caving to US demands.

During 1993, the US Congress approved nine FMS sales to Taiwan totaling \$2.2 billion; in 1994 Congress approved only two FMS sales to Taiwan which totaled \$171 million. While there are many potential reasons for this significant drop in approved sales, there remains a large possibility that the number was influenced by the change in the US approach to their relationship with China. The PRC’s strong reaction to the 1992 sale of F-16 aircraft was recent enough to be remembered by President Clinton’s staff; the determination to focus on the MFN status of China at the risk of continued human rights infractions hints at the determination of President Clinton to build a strong economic bond with China. While the ripple effects of such a decision were not ignored, they were, in the case of human rights and perhaps Taiwan, considered less important.

Adding weight to the possibility of economics playing a factor in the MFN decision, public interest became the target of media campaigns which portrayed the inextricable link between MFN and American jobs. In 1993:

[O]ne of every six aircraft produced ... [by Boeing went] to the PRC... In April, more than 400 California companies in the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade wrote to the President saying that revoking MFN for the PRC might well jeopardize California's \$1.7 billion worth of exports to the PRC and the 35,000 jobs that depended on them... Less than two weeks later, nearly 800 representatives of large and small businesses, farm organizations, trade associations and consumer groups wrote to Clinton telling him that a failure to renew MFN for China would "jeopardize over 180,000 high-wage jobs."³⁷

The publicized American interest in maintaining an open trade relationship with China conveyed the strong public opinion that economic interests were of greater importance to the American population than human rights or the spread of democracy.

While there is no doubt economics played a part in the US determination to continue China's MFN status, President Clinton did not abandon Taiwan. True to the TRA, defensive capabilities, cultural ties, and social interactions continued between the United States and Taiwan. In 1994, the TRA was cosmetically revised; official government-to-government meetings were again allowed and Taiwan's unofficial office in the United States changed from "The Coordination Council for North American Affairs" to "The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States."³⁸ The revision did not change the basis of the US relationship with Taiwan; the United States continued to recognize only one China while supporting Taiwan through defensive arms sales. US commitment to the TRA was put to the test in 1996 when China "conducted military exercises and ballistic missile tests in the Taiwan Strait... [The United States responded by sending] two carrier battle groups to the Strait."³⁹ China's actions had a direct impact on US FMS authorizations to Taiwan. In 1996, President Clinton and the US Congress agreed to slightly over \$1 billion in FMS sales to Taiwan including

almost 1300 Stinger surface-to-air missiles. Within the United States, China's "show of strength" acted as a reminder of the US's responsibility to Taiwan; FMS authorizations to Taiwan increased through the latter years of Clinton's presidency, even with renewed attempts to normalize the US relationship with China. The military posturing China displayed in 1996 renewed American interests in defending the spread of democracy in Taiwan. The choice of timing added to the affect; the increase in military activity was launched as Taiwan's first presidential elections were drawing near. China's threatening actions in response to a purely democratic process distracted the defender of democracy from meandering down an economic path with China, at least enough for the defense of Taiwan to stand as an equal consideration in US foreign relations in Asia. While the markets of China continued to entice American businesses and President Clinton granted permanent Normal Trade Relations (NTR; formerly MFN) to China in 2000, FMS authorizations to Taiwan were higher than they had been since 1993.

Foreign Policy Considerations of President George W. Bush (2001 – 2008)

Foreign policy under President George W Bush will forever be remembered for the quick and decisive response to the atrocities perpetuated against the United States on September 11, 2001. While the "global war on terror" consumed the world's attention, issues in Asia continued to demand a level of awareness and interaction from the US government. In Taiwan, the presidential election of President Chen Shui-bian ignited independence movements while also creating deep concern for the continued peace of Asia and cross-strait relations. President Chen's push for independence placed the United States in a difficult position; continuing to be "supportive of Taiwan and more resolute in deterring China from using growing military power to coerce, intimidate, or attack Taiwan...risked US confrontation and military conflict with

China.”⁴⁰ In an attempt to curtail the pro-independence activities of President Chen, the United States attempted to influence Chen’s constituency by publicly reprimanding the Taiwan president and issuing statements “that highlighted clear differences between US policy and the positions of President Chen and his administration... The statements had the effect of warning Taiwan public opinion and voters that US support for Taiwan was not unconditional and that the United States opposed what it saw as unwarranted Taiwan provocations against China’s interests.”⁴¹ The US reminder served its purpose, resulting in a much subdued independence movement. China responded to the Taiwan’s pro-independence stirrings with the Anti-Secession Law, which states, “Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country... In the event that... peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”⁴² While this proclamation strengthened world resolve to continue the economic sanctions which had been in place since the gross violation of human rights in Tiananmen Square (1989) and increased Taiwan popular support of President Chen Shui-bian’s politics, it did not translate to a decrease in US-China relations. In an attempt to maintain US interests in the region, the US continued on the path of supporting democracy in Taiwan under a “one China” policy. The US tight-rope act of maintaining relations with both Taiwan and China continued.

President George W. Bush began his administration intending to support Taiwan during China’s military growth. FMS authorizations to Taiwan in 2001 support this foreign policy motive with over \$1 billion worth of arms approved for transfer to Taiwan through four different program sales. As President Chen’s independence movement gained support in 2003 and 2004, US approval of arms for Taiwan were reduced in number of programs; only one program per

year was approved from 2003 – 2005. With the exception of the support required for the controversial F-16s purchased in 1992, FMS approvals were defensive in nature. With no FMS notifications, 2006 continued the decreased support trend; however, media reports and congressional inquiries to the executive branch unveiled a request from Taiwan for 66 new F-16 C/D fighters not presented to Congress. In 2007 and 2008, the number of FMS congressional notifications for Taiwan returned to levels not seen since President Chen’s independence activities began. In addition to the number of authorizations increasing, the value of each requested program also rose; authorizations in 2007 totaled \$2.9 billion while the 2008 value grew to \$6.5 billion. This increase can be traced to Taiwan’s 2005 goal of “increasing the defense budget to three percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 2008” as a demonstration of their commitment to the defense of democracy.⁴³

Taiwan’s 2006 request for F-16 aircraft and continued insistence that defense of the island’s government depended on advancement of F-16 technology instigated congressional research reports which testified to the unbalanced defense capabilities between China and Taiwan. The clearly depicted strength of China’s military capabilities were shown to be well within range of Taiwan (refer to Appendix B for details). The unacknowledged F-16 request prompted congressional inquiries to the State Department, National Security Advisor, Department of Defense, and the President; it also indicated a growing concern for US policies and actions in East Asia.

The TRA subjugates determination of the type and quantity of arms transferred to Taiwan to the President and Congress “based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan.”⁴⁴ Further assurances issued by the United States to Taiwan state that the “US would not consult with China in advance before making decisions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.”⁴⁵ Taiwan’s

2006 request for F-16s raised the question of US compliance with these sections of foreign policy. As of the 110th session of Congress, the 2006 request was unresolved. “Ms. Ros-Lehtinen ... questioned the President’s compliance with the “Six Assurances” policy, suspecting that the U.S. officials have discussed China’s objections and “while Congress has been left in the dark... the Chinese leadership has been kept fully abreast of our Nations’ intention.””⁴⁶

Regardless of the reasons the executive branch had for not responding to Congress or Taiwan concerning the request, the implications of Chinese pressure affecting US foreign policy are profound.

A review of the potential Taiwan FMS programs’ notifications to Congress reveals a Congressional request occurred in October 2005. Following the 2006 solicitation for F-16s which was not presented to Congress, there were five requests for FMS authorization in 2007; the last reported in November. The next notification occurred almost a year later, along with five others, for a total of six authorization requests in one day. The 2008 notifications were “only half of the \$12 billion in sales pending at the State Department.”⁴⁷ Following the six notifications, China politicized the US-China military relationship by withdrawing from upcoming military-to-military exchanges in what was viewed as a missed opportunity for furthering the collaboration between the two countries.⁴⁸ China’s strong reaction could be interpreted as a possible attempt to manipulate US foreign policy; at the very least it was a warning of what the continued support of Taiwan’s defensive needs could unearth between the United States and China.

Foreign Policy Considerations of President Barack Obama (2009 – 2011)

During the first two years of his presidency, Barack Obama focused on stabilizing both the US-China relationship and the Asian region. In November 2009, President Obama visited

President Hu Jintao in China where they issued a joint commitment which recognized “that in the 21st century, global challenges are growing, countries are more interdependent, and the need for peace, development, and cooperation is increasing. The United States and China have an increasingly broad base of cooperation and share increasingly important common responsibilities on many major issues concerning global stability and prosperity.”⁴⁹ The governments agreed that Taiwan was an important element of their relationship; one on which their continued rapport hinged. China emphasized the importance of the US recognition of the “one China” policy. Both sides recognized that mutual respect based on US-China agreements would continue as the hand-guide to their relationship.⁵⁰ In January 2011 these same sentiments were expressed following President Jintao’s visit to America; China requested the United States respect China’s position on Taiwan and the United States offered assurance of their continued observance of the “one China” policy. With President Obama’s focus on strengthening the American-Chinese relationship, FMS authorizations to Taiwan suffered. During the first year of the Obama presidency, no Taiwan FMS requests were presented to Congress. The F-16 debate that started during the Bush administration continued to rage. President Bush’s late 2008 submission of only half of the total pending military transfers to Taiwan did not resolve the tug-of-war within Congress concerning the nature of US defense support to Taiwan. Congress wanted an explanation on the perceived freeze of arms transfers to Taiwan. In 2010, President Obama submitted requests for authorization to transfer military assets worth \$6.4 billion to Taiwan, including some of the controversial items President Bush failed to submit to Congress in the last years of his presidency. As the F-16s were not part of the notification, Taiwan’s requirement for fighter aircraft remained high. A 2009 congressional report warned “that the modernizing PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has continued to shift the cross-strait military balance in its favor

and that it was no longer the case that Taiwan's air force enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the strait."⁵¹ Significance could be placed on the value of FMS authorizations in 2008 and 2010, but the circumstances and missing elements of the notifications reflect a US foreign policy greatly influenced by China. From all appearances, the political and economic giant found a way to corral the United States' desire to spread democracy.

As the relationship between China and the United States grew more solid, the issue of Taiwan was repeatedly professed by both nations to be an important matter, yet the agreed upon solution was to maintain the status quo set forth between 1972 and 1982. While continuation of the "norm" relates to increased dialogues and social relationships between China and Taiwan, the US agreement to not interfere has not met with a similar concession on the part of China. Instead, "Chinese reactions to past US arms sales to Taiwan followed a pattern. If Beijing believed a final decision had not yet been made, it aggressively threatened the US government with grave consequences hoping to influence the decision. Once a sale was announced, it took measured and firm but temporary actions to register its displeasure... [including] withdrawing from US-China military interaction and postponing high-level defense visits."⁵² The buildup of China's military posture along the Taiwan Strait created a reciprocal need within Taiwan for additional defensive weaponry, yet the US responded to China's threats by decreasing the amount of arms offered to Taiwan. The TRA specifically identifies "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability... The President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan."⁵³ While Taiwan's defensive requirements were documented independently by congressional research organizations, the United States has

not authorized the sale of F-16 aircraft or any other offensive airframe to Taiwan since 1992. Previous backlashes following arms notifications and continued pressure from the Chinese appear to have guided US foreign policy toward appeasement of the Chinese instead of the democratic peace that was long the foundation of US diplomacy.



IV. Conclusion

Conclusions

The analysis shows a decided shift in US support of Taiwan's defensive posture. While there are a myriad of possible reasons for this shift, the correlating increase in Chinese held US securities and the opening of Chinese markets provides insight into one possibility that should not be ignored. The desire for US economic growth into the untapped reality that is the Chinese market is a testament to American entrepreneurship, but also presents risks to US interests related to Taiwan. While US democracy was created in an effort to foster individual pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness, the US government must balance these pursuits with national interests. In the case of Taiwan and China, the US government cannot pursue economic interests and appeasement of the top US securities holder without placing equal focus on the support of Taiwan. To do so would be a detriment to the realization of democratic peace. Economic growth and democratic stability are equally important in this pursuit; the US federal government must closely monitor these conjoined elements and adapt to changing circumstances in a way that balances the scales. Any other response will result in an increased vulnerability to US foreign policy interests.

Since 1979, the United States has based relations with Taiwan on the TRA and with China on three Joint Communiqués. Beginning in the 1980s, the US government spoke of the ambiguity of the agreements as well as the changing interpretations and policy stance of the governments involved. In 1982, Senator John Glenn wrote, “[I]n 1972, we acknowledged that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained that there was but one China. Today it is U.S. policy that there is but one China. Despite this remarkable shift over time, the State Department, at each juncture, has assured us that our policy remained essentially unchanged.”⁵⁴

Additional statements from the US government point to continued confusion in the relationship between the United States and China and the United States and Taiwan. Since President Jimmy Carter set the TRA in motion, each US president's foreign policy has maintained the "one China" status quo. Yet, the changing political environment, the desire for open global trade, and the hope for a peaceful resolution to the China-Taiwan question remain encapsulated in the agreements set forth in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Recommendation

The shift in the United States' economic interest toward China is pushing the policy question to a head. United States policy for the Asia-Pacific region must be clear. New agreements between China and the United States, and Taiwan and the United States are necessary. In order to prepare updated agreements, the governments involved will be required to discuss the status quo, differing interpretations, and the current world environment. While significant changes to the 1979 – 1982 agreements may not be required, the discussions and resulting reconfirmation of intent on all sides will strengthen the relationships of the three governments. The United States must continue to acknowledge that any action toward unification does not require US involvement; however, the need for clear direction on the US role in the region is necessary. As such, the defined US role must balance the pursuit of democracy and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Summation

With the fall of communism, the United States became the sole superpower and took on the mantle of protector of the innocent, guardian of human rights, and supporter of democracy. To achieve these goals, the United States sought to garner the power of the individual's desire for freedom, their hope and right to self-govern, and their search for economic stability. As key

tenants driving mankind to adapt to the reality of world circumstance, democracy and economic growth and stability are important elements in the US attempts to achieve greater world harmony and peace.

Taiwan is an economically stable fledgling democratic state and was used in this paper to represent similar governments around the world. Democracy spreads by example; success creates a desire in the population of neighboring states to follow the path of democracy in an attempt to achieve the same degree of economic and cultural riches as the country next door. As such, Taiwan is an important US ally; the success of their democratic government will echo through Asia, strengthening US influence in the Pacific Rim region. The TRA stands as a testament to the US commitment to Taiwan's defense. While stating the US agrees with the "one China" policy, these agreements also lay claim to the promotion of peace, security, and stability; the United States specifically states they will "provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and... [will] maintain ... [their capacity] to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."⁵⁵ During discussions with China and the resulting *Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan*, Taiwan "presented the United States with six points that it proposed the United States use as guidelines in conducting United States-Taiwan relations." The six points state:

1. The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan.
2. The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act.
3. The United States would not consult with China in advance before making decisions about US arms sales to Taiwan.
4. The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China.

5. The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China.
6. The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.⁵⁶

These agreements between the two governments clearly encourage FMS sales for the purpose of establishing a Taiwan's self-defense. Perhaps more importantly, the agreements show a level of solidarity between the governments and people.

While the United States attempts to balance economic interests and democratic goals, the balance can become tipped. As US and European economies struggled at the beginning of the twenty-first century, China's economy remained unscathed, allowing her to step up her presence in the global economy. China's large population and strong economic standing resulted in greater spending power which caught the attention of US capitalists. China also stepped up to help the US economy by buying securities; essentially becoming the biggest bank supporting US government debt. The draw of China as a marketplace and their return investment in US securities has influenced the US desire to support democracy in Taiwan. Over the last ten years, as China has increased her military standing and broadened her capabilities to include a greater global reach, Taiwan's need for a strong defensive posture has grown; however, the United States has not responded to this need with increased FMS sales. Instead, the United States asked Taiwan to increase the percent of their gross domestic product spent on defense measures

and has used the resulting bureaucratic stumbling within Taiwan to slow-roll US FMS Congressional approvals.

The unbalanced scales of economics and the support of democracy evident in US relations with China and Taiwan have brought the question of foreign policy's future to the forefront. The US military must closely observe and understand the struggle. They must decipher the trends of influence in statesmanship as an indicator for capability planning and preparation. As the future unfolds, the US military must be ready to support the foreign relationships defined by the Department of State. In the case of China and Taiwan, the military must be prepared to employ the appropriate regional defensive measures and capabilities.



V. Concerns for the Future

While this case study focused on Taiwan, the insight provided applies to US support of other fledgling democratic nations. The future of Iraq and Afghanistan could be impacted by the desires of petroleum rich states such as Saudi Arabia or UAE. Should US economic interests become focused on the populations of these nations, our economic interests could be used to derail US support of the newly born democratic governments of Iraq and Afghanistan. The withdrawal of US support could ultimately result in the inability of these young democracies to survive attempts to subsume their territory into Sharia governed states, or territorial incursions from unfriendly neighbors. The volatile nature and shifting desires of nations around the world make it imperative for the US to balance the pursuit of economic growth with the building of democratic governments. Correctly balanced and documented through strong foreign policy, the world can move toward a stable democratic peace.

Appendix A

Table 2: Major US Arms Sales as Notified to Congress

Date of Notification	Major item or service as proposed (usually part of a program with related support)	Value of program (\$ million)
1990		
07/26	Cooperative Logistics Supply Support	\$108
09/06	(1) C-130H transport aircraft	\$45
1991		
01/07	(100) MK-46 torpedoes	\$28
07/24	(97) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles	\$55
09/13	(110) M60A3 tanks	\$119
11/18	Phase III PIP Mod Kits for HAWK air defense systems	\$170
1992		
05/27	Weapons, ammunition, support for 3 leased ships	\$212
05/27	Supply support arrangement	\$107
08/04	(207) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles	\$126
09/14	(150) F-16A/B fighters	\$5,800
09/14	(3) Patriot-derived Modified Air Defense System (MADS) fire units	\$1,300
09/14	(12) SH-2F LAMPS anti-submarine helicopters	\$161
1993		
06/17	(12) C-130H transport aircraft	\$620
06/25	Supply support arrangement	\$156
07/29	(38) Harpoon anti-ship missiles	\$68
07/30	Logistics support services for 40 leased T-38 trainers	\$70
08/	(4) E-2T Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft	\$700
09/08	Logistics support services for MADS	\$175
11/04	(140) MK-46 Mod 5 torpedoes	\$54

Date of Notification	Major item or service as proposed (usually part of a program with related support)	Value of program (\$ million)
11/09	Weapons, ammunition, and support for 3 leased frigates	\$238
11/23	MK-41 Mod Vertical Launch Systems for ship-based air defense missiles	\$103
1994		
08/01	(80) AN/ALQ-84 electronic counter measure (ECM) pods	\$150
09/12	MK-45 Mod 2 gun system	\$21
1995		
03/24	(6) MK-75 shipboard gun systems, (6) Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems	\$75
06/07	Supply support arrangement	\$192
1996		
05/10	Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment communications system	\$188
05/10	(30) TH-67 training helicopters, (30) sets of AN/AVS-6 night vision goggles	\$53
05/23	(465) Stinger surface-to-air missiles, (55) dual-mounted Stinger launcher systems	\$420
06/24	(300) M69A3TTS tanks	\$223
08/23	(1,299) Stinger surface-to-air missiles, (74) Avenger vehicle mounted guided missile launchers, (96) HMMWVs (high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle)	\$420
09/05	(110) MK-46 MOD 5 anti-submarine torpedoes	\$66
1997		
02/14	(54) Harpoon anti-ship missiles	\$95
05/23	(1,786) TOW 2A anti-armor guided missiles, (114) TOW launchers, (100) HMMWVs	\$81
07/24	(21) AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters	\$172
09/03	(13) OH-58D Kiowa Warrior armed Scout helicopters	\$172
11/09	Pilot training and logistics support for F-16 fighters	\$280
11/09	Spare parts for various aircraft	\$140
1998		
01/28	(3) Know-class frigates, (1) MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System	\$300

Date of Notification	Major item or service as proposed (usually part of a program with related support)	Value of program (\$ million)
06/01	(28) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting pods for F-16 fighters	\$160
08/27	(58) Harpoon anti-ship missiles	\$101
08/27	(61) Dual-mounted stinger surface-to-air missiles	\$180
08/27	(131) MK 46 Mod 5(A)S anti-submarine torpedoes	\$69
10/09	(9) CH-47SD Chinook helicopters	\$486
1999		
05/26	(240) AGM-114KS Hellfire II air-to-surface missiles	\$23
05/26	(5) AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS radio systems, (5) Intelligence Electronic Warfare systems, (5) HMMWVs	\$64
07/30	Spare parts for F-5E, C-130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft	\$150
07/30	(2) E-2T Hawkeye 2000E airborne early warning aircraft	\$400
2000		
03/02	Modernization of the TPS-43F air defense radar to TPS-75V configuration	\$96
03/02	(162) Hawk Intercept guided air defense missiles	\$106
06/07	(39) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting pods for F-16 fighters	\$234
06/07	(48) AN/ALQ-184 ECM pods for F-16s	\$122
09/28	(146) M109A5 howitzers, (152) SINCGARS radio systems	\$405
09/28	(200) AIM-120C AMRAAMs for F-16 fighters	\$150
09/28	(71) RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles	\$240
09/28	Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE) communication system	\$513
2001		
07/18	(50) Joint tactical Information Distribution Systems (JTIDS) terminals (a version of Link 16) for data links between aircraft, ships, and ground stations	\$725
09/05	(40) AGM-65G Maverick air-to-ground missiles for F-16s	\$18
10/26	(40) Javelin anti-tank missile systems and (360) Javelin missiles	\$51
10/30	Logistical support/spare parts for f-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft	\$288

Date of Notification	Major item or service as proposed (usually part of a program with related support)	Value of program (\$ million)
2002		
06/04	(3) AN/MPN-14 air traffic control radars	\$108
09/04	(54) AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles	\$250
09/04	Maintenance and spare parts for aircraft, radars, AMRAAMS, other systems	\$174
09/04	(182) AIM-9M-1/2 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles	\$36
09/04	(449) AGM-114M3 Hellfire II anti-armor missiles to equip AH-1W and OH-58D helicopters	\$60
10/11	(290) TOW-2B anti-tank missiles	\$18
11/21	(4) Kidd-class destroyers	\$875
2003		
09/24	Multi-functional Information Distribution Systems (MIDS) (for Po Sheng)	\$775
2004		
03/30	(2)U Ultra High Frequency Long Range Early Warning Radars	\$1,776
2005		
10/25	(10) AIM-9M Sidewinder and (5) AIM-7M Sparrow air-to-air missiles; continued pilot training and logistical support for F-16 fighters at Luke AFB	\$280
2007		
02/28	(218) AMRAAMs and (235) Maverick air-to-ground missiles for F-16 fighters	\$421
08/08	(60) AGM-84L Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles	\$125
09/12	(144) SM-2 Block IIIA Standard air-defense missiles for Kidd-class destroyers	\$272
09/12	(12) P-3C maritime patrol/ASW aircraft	\$1,960
11/09	Patriot configuration 2 ground systems upgrade	\$939
2008		
10/03	(330) Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile defense missiles	\$3,100
10/03	(32) UGM-84L sub-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles	\$200
10/03	Spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, IDF aircraft	\$334
10/03	(182) Javelin anti-armor missiles	\$47

Date of Notification	Major item or service as proposed (usually part of a program with related support)	Value of program (\$ million)
10/03	Upgrade of (4) E-2T aircraft (Hawkeye 2000 configuration)	\$250
10/03	(30) AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters	\$2,532
2010		
01/29	(114) PAC-3 missile defense missiles	\$2,810
01/29	(60) UH-60M Black Hawk utility helicopters	\$3,100
01/29	(12) Harpoon Block II anti-ship telemetry (training) missiles	\$37
01/29	(60) MIDS (follow-on technical support for Po Sheng C4 systems)	\$340
01/29	(2) Osprey-class mine hunting ships (refurbished and upgraded)	\$105

Reprinted from: Shirley Kan's "Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990." Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, February 24, 2011, 64-67.



Appendix B

Table 3: 2006 Ground Force Balance

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces			
China			Taiwan
	Total	Taiwan Strait Area	Total
Personnel (Active)	1.4 million	400,000	130,000
Group Armies	18	8	3
Infantry Divisions	25	9	0
Infantry Brigades	33	12	13
Armor Divisions/Brigades	9	4	0
Armor Brigades	11	4	5
Artillery Divisions	3	3	0
Artillery Brigades	15	5	3+
Marine Brigades	2	2	2
Tanks	7,000	2,700	1,800
Artillery Pieces	11,000	3,200	3,200
<p>Note: The PLA active ground forces are organized into Group Armies. Infantry, armor, and artillery units are organized into a combination of divisions and brigades deployed throughout the PLA's seven Military Regions (MRs). A significant portion of these assets are deployed in the Taiwan Strait area, specifically the Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan military regions. Figures for the Taiwan Strait area do not include the 15th Airborne Corps and garrison units. In 2004, Taiwan began transforming motorized rifle and armored infantry brigades to mechanized infantry. Taiwan has seven Defense Commands, three of which have Group Armies. Each Army contains an Artillery Command roughly equivalent to a brigade plus.</p>			

Reprinted from: Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006." *Annual Report to Congress*, March 30, 2007, 44.

Table 4: 2006 Air Force Balance

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces			
China			Taiwan
Aircraft	Total	Within Range of Taiwan	Total
Fighters	1,525	425	330
Bombers	775	275	0
Transport	450	75	40

Note: The PLAAF and PLANAF have a total of around 2,300 operational combat aircraft: air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers. An additional 470 older fighters and bombers are assigned to PLA flight academies or R&D. The two air arms also possess approximately 450 transports and over 90 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with photographic, surface search, and airborne early warning sensors. The majority of PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft are based in the eastern part of the country. Currently, more than 700 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling.

Reprinted from: Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006." *Annual Report to Congress*, March 30, 2007, 46.

Table 5: 2006 Naval Force Balance

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces			
China			Taiwan
	Total	East and South Sea Fleets	Total
Destroyers	25	16	2
Frigates	45	40	22
Tank Landing Ships	25	22	12
Medium Landing Ships	25	20	4
Diesel Submarines	50	28	4
Nuclear Submarines	5	0	0
Coastal Patrol (Missile)	45	34	50

Note: The PLA Navy has a large fleet that includes 75 principal combatants, 55 submarines, some 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift ships, and about 45 coastal missile patrol craft. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, both fleets would be expected to participate in direct action against the Taiwan navy. The North Sea Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coasts, but could provide mission critical assets to support the other fleets. Taiwan most likely decommissioned its remaining Gearing-class destroyers before the arrival of replacement KIDD-class destroyers. Two of the four in-bound KIDDs arrived in December 2005 and are not yet operational. The remaining KIDDs are scheduled for delivery in 2006-2007.

Reprinted from: Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006.” *Annual Report to Congress*, March 30, 2007, 48.

Table 6: 2006 Chinese Missile Capabilities

China's Missile Forces		
China's Missile Inventory Total	Launchers/Missiles	Estimated Range
CSS-4 ICBM	20/20	8,460+ km
CSS-3 ICBM	10-14/20-24	5,470+ km
CSS-2 IRBM	6-10/14-18	2,790+ km
CSS-5 MRBM Mod 1/2	34-38/19-50	1,770+ km
JL-1 SLBM	10-14/10-14	1,770+ km
CSS-6 SRBM	70-80/275-315	600 km
CS-7 SRBM	100-120/435-475	300 km
JL-2 SLBM	DEVELOPMENTAL	8,000+ km
DF-31 ICBM	DEVELOPMENTAL	7,250+ km
DF-31A ICBM	DEVELOPMENTAL	11,270+ km
<p>Note: China's SRBM force has grown significantly in the past few years. China's Second Artillery maintains at least five operational SRBM brigades; another brigade is deployed with the PLA ground forces garrisoned in the Nanjing Military Region. All of these units are deployed to locations near Taiwan.</p>		

Reprinted from: Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006." *Annual Report to Congress*, March 30, 2007, 50.

Table 7: 2010 Ground Force Balance

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces			
China			Taiwan
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Taiwan Strait Area</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Personnel (Active)</i>	1.25 million	400,000	130,000
<i>Group Armies</i>	18	8	3
<i>Infantry Divisions</i>	19	6	0
<i>Infantry brigades</i>	25	11	8
<i>Mechanized Infantry Divisions</i>	4	1	0
<i>Mechanized Infantry Brigades</i>	5	1	3
<i>Armor Divisions</i>	9	4	0
<i>Armor Brigades</i>	8	3	4
<i>Artillery Divisions</i>	2	2	0
<i>Artillery Brigades</i>	17	6	5
<i>Airborne Divisions</i>	3	3	0
<i>Amphibious Divisions</i>	2	2	0
<i>Amphibious Brigades</i>	3	3	3
<i>Tanks</i>	7,000	3,100	1,100
<i>Artillery Brigades</i>	8,000	3,400	1,600

Note: PLA active ground forces are organized into Group Armies. Infantry, armor, and artillery units are organized into a combination of divisions and brigades deployed throughout the PLA's seen MRs. A significant portion of these assets are deployed in the Taiwan Strait area, specifically the Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs. Taiwan has seven Defense Commands, three of which have Field Armies. Each Army contains an artillery Command roughly equivalent to a brigade plus.

Reprinted from: Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010." *Annual Report to Congress*, August 17, 2010, 60.

Table 8: 2010 Air Force Balance

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces			
China			Taiwan
<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Within range of Taiwan</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Fighters</i>	1,680	330	388
<i>Bombers/Attack</i>	620	160	22
<i>Transport</i>	450	40	21

Note: The PLAAF and the PLA Navy have approximately 2,300 operational combat aircraft. These consist of air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers. An additional 1,450 older fighters, bombers and trainers are employed for training and R&D. The two air arms also possess approximately 450 transports and over 100 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with intelligence, surface search, and airborne early warning capabilities. The majority of PLAAF and PLA Navy aircraft are abased in the eastern half of the country. Currently, 490 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling. However, this number could be significantly increased through any combination of aircraft forward deployment, decreased ordnance loads, or altered mission profile.

Reprinted from: Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010.” *Annual Report to Congress*, August 17, 2010, 62.

Table 9: 2010 Naval Force Balance

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces			
China			Taiwan
	<i>Total</i>	<i>East and South Sea Fleets</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Destroyers</i>	25	15	4
<i>Frigates</i>	49	40	22
<i>Tank Landing Ships/Amphibious Transport Dock</i>	27	25	12
<i>Medium Landing Ships</i>	28	23	4
<i>Diesel Attack Submarines</i>	54	32	4
<i>Nuclear Attack Submarines</i>	6	2	0
<i>Coastal Patrol (Missile)</i>	85	65	61

Note: The PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia. After years of neglect, the force of missile-armed patrol craft is also growing. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the East and South Sea Fleets would be expected to participate in direct action against the Taiwan navy. The North Sea Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coast, but could provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets.

Reprinted from: Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010.” *Annual Report to Congress*, August 17, 2010, 64.

Table 10: 2010 Chinese Missile Capabilities

China's Missile Force			
<i>China's Missile Inventory</i>	Ballistic and Cruise		<i>Estimated Range</i>
	<i>Missiles</i>	<i>Launchers</i>	
CSS-2	15-20	5-10	3,000+ km
CSS-3	15-20	10-15	5,400+ km
CSS-4	20	20	13,000+ km
DF-31	<10	<10	7,200+ km
DF-31A	10-15	10-15	11,200+ km
CSS-5	85-95	75-85	1,750+ km
CSS-6	350-400	90-110	600 km
CSS-7	700-750	120-140	300 km
DH-10	200-500	45-55	1,500+ km
JL-2	Developmental	Developmental	7,200+ km

Note: China's Second Artillery maintains at least five operational SRBM brigades; an additional two brigades are subordinate to PLA ground forces – one garrisoned in the Nanjing MR and the other in the Guangzhou MR. All SRBM units are deployed to locations near Taiwan.


Reprinted from: Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010." *Annual Report to Congress*, August 17, 2010, 66.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. Woodrow Wilson, "Address to Joint Session of Congress."
2. "The Versailles Treaty," Introduction.
3. USAID, *Democracy and Governance*.
4. Ibid.
5. Woodrow Wilson, "14 Points," conclusion.
6. George W. Bush, "Second Inaugural Address."
7. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook – Taiwan*.
8. US Congress, "Taiwan Relations Act," Section 3301 (b)(1).
9. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook- China*.
10. Associated Press, *GMs China Sales Up 51 Percent*.
11. Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, 43.
12. US Department of the Treasury, "Foreign Portfolio Holdings."
13. United States of America and the People's Republic of China, "Joint Communiqué of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations."
14. Ma Ying-jeou, "US-Taiwan Relations in a New Era," 4.
15. Global Views Survey Research Center, "Survey After First Year of Direct Flights," 2.
16. Global Views Survey Research Center, "Survey on Approval Rating and Unification-Independence Issue," 2.
17. Shirley A. Kan, "Major US Arms Sales Since 1990," 66.
18. Ma Ying-jeou, "US-Taiwan Relations in a New Era," 14.
19. Ibid., 8.
20. Li-Pei Wu, "Full Recognition of Taiwan," 1.
21. Ma Ying-jeou, "US-Taiwan Relations in a New Era," 4.
22. Ibid., 7.
23. Robert Burns, "We're No Match for U.S."
24. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010," 13.
25. China's State Council Information Office, "China's National Defense in 2008," Preface.
26. United States of America and the People's Republic of China, "Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan," number 5.
27. Chris Isidore, "US companies Dump Billions into China."
28. US Department of the Treasury, "Foreign Portfolio Holdings."
29. Kerry, Dumbaugh, "Underlying Strains in Taiwan-US Political Relations," 7-8.
30. George Bush, "Announcing War Against Iraq."
31. Ibid.
32. James Baker, "Democracy and Foreign Policy."
33. Shirley Kan, "Major US Arms Sales Since 1990," 64.
34. David Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister," 599.
35. Ibid., 602.
36. Ibid., 603.
37. Ibid., 605.

-
38. Embassy of the United States in Beijing, China, *Chronology of Bi-Lateral Relations*.
 39. Ibid.
 40. Robert Sutter, "The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration," 418.
 41. Ibid., 419.
 42. Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress. *Anti-Secession Law*.
 43. Shirley Kan, "Major US Arms Sales Since 1990," 31.
 44. US Congress, "Taiwan Relations Act," Section 3302 (b).
 45. Taiwan Government, "The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan."
 46. Shirley Kan, "Major US Arms Sales Since 1990," 54.
 47. Ed Ross, "The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Defense Cooperation."
 48. New York Times, "China Rebuffs United States Over Taiwan Arms Deal."
 49. Office of the Press Secretary, *US-China Joint Statement*.
 50. Ibid.
 51. Shirley Kan, "Major US Arms Sales Since 1990," 20.
 52. Ed Ross, "Taiwan's Needs Should Govern US Arms Sales."
 53. US Congress, "Taiwan Relations Act," Section 3302 (a) and (b).
 54. Shirley Kan, *Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act*, 306-307.
 55. US Congress, "Taiwan Relations Act," Section 3301 (a).
 56. Taiwan Government, "The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan."



Bibliography

- Agence France-Presse. *Taiwan Renews Call for U.S. F-16 Sale*. May 12, 2011.
<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6486801&c=POL&s=TOP> (accessed May 13, 2011).
- Associated Press. *GMs China Sales Up 51 Percent in February*. March 3, 2010.
<http://www.abcmoney.co.uk/news1/GMs-China-sales-up-51-percent-in-February----->
(AP),197783.htm (accessed March 9, 2010).
- Baker, James. "Democracy and Foreign Policy." *World Affairs Council*. March 1990.
<http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/democrac/61.htm> (accessed May 22, 2011).
- Burns, Robert. "Chinese General: We're No Match for US." *Air Force Times*. May 18, 2011.
<http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/05/ap-chen-says-china-no-match-for-us-051811/> (accessed May 23, 2011).
- Bush, George. "Announcing War Against Iraq." *The History Place*. January 16, 1991.
<http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/bush-war.htm> (accessed June 1, 2011).
- Bush, George W. "Second Inaugural Address." *Bartleby.com*. January 20, 2005.
<http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres67.html>. (accessed May 9, 2011).
- Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook - China*. March 19, 2010.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html?countryName=China&countryCode=ch®ionCode=eas&rank=1#ch> (accessed March 19, 2010).
- . *The World Factbook - Taiwan*. March 19, 2010.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tw.html> (accessed March 19, 2010).
- China's State Council Information Office. "China's National Defense in 2008." *China.org.cn*. January 20, 2009. http://www.china.org.cn/government/central_government/2009-01/20/content_17155577_2.htm (accessed June 7, 2011).
- Distance from Taipei to...* May 10, 2011.
<http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/distances.html?n=241> (accessed May 10, 2011).
- Dumbaugh, Kerry. "Underlying Strains in Taiwan-US Political Relations." *Congressional Research Service*. April 20, 2007. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33684.pdf> (accessed June 7, 2011).
- Embassy of the United States in Beijing, China. *Chronology of Bi-Lateral Relations*.
<http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/bilateral.html> (accessed May 31, 2011).
- Global Views Research Center. "Survey on President Ma Ying-jeou's Approval Rating and People's Views on the Unification-Independence Issue." April 25, 2011.
<http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/eng/index.asp> (accessed May 17, 2011).
- Global Views Survey Research Center. "Survey on President Ma Ying-jeou's Approval Rating and Cross-Strait Relations After First Year of Direct Flights." June 24, 2009.
<http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/eng/index.asp> (accessed May 17, 2011).
- Hou, Elaine. *President Ma Outlines ROC National Security Strategy*. May 13, 2011.
<http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=163794&CtNode=413> (accessed May 15, 2011).

- Isidore, Chris. "US Companies Dump Billions into China." *CNNMoney*. January 20, 2011. http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/20/news/international/us_business_chinese_investment_boom/index.htm (accessed June 9, 2011).
- Kan, Shirley A. "Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990." *Congressional Research Service*. February 24, 2011. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf> (accessed April 13, 2011).
- Kan, Shirley, In Statement of Hon. John Glenn, US Senator from Ohio, on China-Taiwan Policy, July 22, 1982, in Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon. *Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act*. New York: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982.
- Lampton, David. "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage." *The China Quarterly*. September 1994. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/655132> (accessed June 1, 2011).
- New York Times. "China Rebuffs United States over Taiwan Arms Deal." October 7, 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/world/asia/07iht-military.1.16744766.html> (accessed June 15, 2011).
- Obama, Barack. "National Security Strategy." May 2010.
- Office of the Press Secretary. *US-China Joint Statement*. November 17, 2009. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement> (accessed June 8, 2011).
- Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010*. Annual Report to Congress, Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2011.
- Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Military and Security Developments Involvoing the People's Republic of China 2010*. Annual Report to Congress, Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2010.
- Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006*. Annual Report to Congress, Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2007.
- Ross, Ed. "Taiwan's Needs Should Govern US Arms Sales." *DefenseNews*. April 4, 2011. <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6135996&c=FEA&s=COM> (accessed June 8, 2011).
- . "The Future of US-Taiwan Defense Cooperation." *The Jamestown Foundation*. October 22, 2009. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35634&cHash=7b6b1ac2ae (accessed June 1, 2011).
- Sutter, Robert. "The Taiwan Problem in the Second Geroge W Bush Administration - US Officials' Views and their Implications for US Policy." *Journal of Contemporary China*. August 2006. http://www.morris.umn.edu/~joos/us/Readings/2_US%20in%20NE%20Asia/Taiwan%20problem.pdf (accessed June 2, 2011).
- Taiwan Government. "The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan." *Taiwan Documents Project*. July 1982. <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/assurances.htm> (accessed April 18, 2010).
- Taiwanese Government. "Transcript: Post's Inerview with Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou." *Washington Post*. February 17, 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/17/AR2011021702519.html> (accessed February 18, 2011).

- "The Versailles Treaty, Part I: The Covenant of the League of Nations." *The Avalon Project, Yale Law School*. June 28, 1919. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp> (accessed May 9, 2011).
- Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress. *Anti-Secession Law*. March 14, 2005. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm> (accessed June 2, 2011).
- United States of America and the People's Republic of China. "Joint Communiqué of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations." *Taiwan Documents Project*. January 1, 1979. <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique02.htm> (accessed April 18, 2010).
- . "Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan." *Taiwan Documents Project*. August 17, 1982. <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique03.htm> (accessed April 18, 2010).
- US Congress. "Taiwan Relations Act." *Taiwan Documents Project*. April 10, 1979. <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/tra01.htm> (accessed April 18, 2010).
- US Department of the Treasury. "Foreign Portfolio Holdings of US Securities as of 6/30/2010." April 29, 2011. <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx> (accessed May 21, 2011).
- US Treasury Department. *Cross Border Portfolio Holdings Historical Data*. April 29, 2011. <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/shlhistdat.html> (accessed June 2, 2011).
- USAID - From the American People. *Democracy and Governance*. March 14, 2011. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/ (accessed May 9, 2011).
- Wilson, Woodrow. "Address to Joint Session of Congress Asking for a Declaration of War." *Wilson Center*. April 2, 1917. <http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.woodrow#quotes> (accessed March 20, 2010).
- . "Transcript of President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points (1918)." *Our Documents.org*. January 8, 1918. <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=62&page=transcript> (accessed April 3, 2010).
- Wu, Li-Pei. "Full Recognition of Taiwan: Dismantling the Fallacy of the "One-China" Policy." *Formosa Foundation*. March 22, 2007. <http://www.formosafoundation.org/aboutus/documents/FullRecognitionofTaiwan.pdf> (accessed May 7, 2011).
- Ying-jeou, Ma. "US-Taiwan Relations in a New Era." *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*. May 12, 2011. http://csis.org/files/attachments/110512_transcript_ma.pdf (accessed May 14, 2011).