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A COLLECTION OF JPME OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT CASE STUDIES AND VIGNETTES

December 2016

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The objective of this project is to educate joint senior leaders on the importance of the strategic effects of operational contract support (OCS). Contracting for goods and services in the contingency operational environment is a mission-enabling necessity; however, analyzing the strategic effects of contracting is not well practiced and rarely understood by military leaders—from lieutenants to generals. Commanders in the field are taught to think of the costs literally, as tax dollars spent to enhance mission effectiveness. However, the less literal costs and the associated effects of choosing to contract for goods or services are largely ignored. This project explores the use of OCS in contingency environments, and the positive and negative effects OCS decisions have on the larger, strategic military mission, and on other instruments of power. The case studies and vignettes developed by this research examine how second- and third-order OCS effects impact the United States' military mission and general interests. The products developed during the course of this project consist of case studies and vignettes for use in Joint Professional Military Education coursework.

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this project is to educate joint senior leaders on the importance of the strategic effects of operational contract support (OCS). Contracting for goods and services in the contingency operational environment is a mission-enabling necessity; however, analyzing the strategic effects of contracting is not well practiced and rarely understood by military leaders—from lieutenants to generals. Commanders in the field are taught to think of the costs literally, as tax dollars spent to enhance mission effectiveness. However, the less literal costs and the associated effects of choosing to contract for goods or services are largely ignored. This project explores the use of OCS in contingency environments, and the positive and negative effects OCS decisions have on the larger, strategic military mission, and on other instruments of power. The case studies and vignettes developed by this research examine how second- and third-order OCS effects impact the United States' military mission and general interests. The products developed during the course of this project consist of case studies and vignettes for use in Joint Professional Military Education coursework.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANASOC	Afghan National Army Special Operations Command
AOR	area of responsibility
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
BOSS	Base Operating Support Services
CAAF	Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CLSPB	Commander Logistics Procurement Support Board
CM	Contractor Management
COA	course of action
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
CSA	Combat Support Agency
CSI	Contract Support Integration
CSOR	Contract Statement of Requirements
CSSM	Contract Support Synchronization Matrix
DFAC	dining facility
DOD	Department Of Defense
ECP	Entry Control Point
EFT	electronic funds transfer
FOB	forward operating base
GFS	government furnished service(s)
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HQ	headquarters
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IT	information technology
J-1	Manpower and Personnel
J-2	Intelligence
J-3	Operations
J-4	Logistics
J-6	Communications

J-8	Finance
J-9	Inter Agency
JAMMS	Joint Asset Movement Management System
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
JOPP	Joint Operation Planning Process
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JRRB	Joint Requirements Review Board
LN	local national
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LUA	Land Use Agreement
MOD	Ministry Of Defense
MOI	Ministry Of Interior
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
Non-CAAF	contractors not authorized to accompany the force
OCS	Operational Contract Support
OPLAN	operation plans
OPORD	operation orders
OCSIC	Operational Contract Support Integration Cell
OCSSD	Operational Contract Support and Services Division
PSC	private security contractor
RMC	Risk Management Consultant
ROE	rules of engagement
RSM	Resolute Support Mission
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOJTF-A	Special Operations Joint Task Force - Afghanistan
SPOT	Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USFOR-A	United States Forces in Afghanistan
Wi-Fi	wireless Internet

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this project are to develop OCS case studies and vignettes for use in intermediate, senior, and flag officer or general officer levels of JPME coursework (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions [CJCSI], 2015). These case studies and vignettes will explore the major functions of OCS: contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. The role of each joint staff function in planning and executing OCS will be studied and the potential positive and negative, second- and third-order effects of OCS on the strategic mission and on the instruments of national power will be assessed. Teaching guides are provided to facilitate student exercises and discussion. The lessons from these case studies and vignettes will educate and empower future operational commanders to use OCS effectively as an economic weapon in contingency environments.

B. BACKGROUND

OCS is a capability that has roots as far back as the Revolutionary War. Through time, OCS has morphed from providing support functions to fulfilling major portions of the strategic military mission. In more recent times, a spotlight on OCS has illuminated the potential of this capability while also highlighting potential pitfalls. This background will explore the history of OCS, how it evolved to its current form, and the role and effects of OCS today.

1. The Origins of OCS

Throughout the history of the U.S. military, contractors have been an indispensable part of the Total Force. During the American Revolution, the ratio of military personnel to contractors was 6:1 (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, n.d.b). Contractors were hired as wagon drivers, engineers; and were asked to supply weapons, beef, and clothing for soldiers. During the 19th century, contractors provided troop transport to Mexico for the Mexican-American War and throughout the continental

U.S. during the American Civil War. In the 20th century, local national contractors were used to provide supplies and services to Americans while abroad in Europe, Korea, and the South Pacific. Most recently, the ratio of contractors has grown to exceed military personnel. In the recent war in Afghanistan, there were 1.42 contractors to every military member (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, n.d.b). This large increase in the amount of contracted support on the battlefield fostered the OCS doctrine found today in Joint Publication (JP) 4–10 and in current legislation, regulations, and guidance.

2. OCS Gaining Momentum

OCS was initiated as a concept in October of 2007 when. Jacques Gansler, the chairman for the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, published a report suggesting urgent reform of the U.S. Army's expeditionary contracting due to issues and lessons learned from contracting activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shortly following, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2008 established a Commission on Wartime Contracting (COWC) to study federal agency contingency contracting and required the Department of Defense (DOD) to analyze the Gansler Commission recommendations to improve the DOD's acquisition workforce (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, n.d.a).

Following the implementation of Gansler's recommendations, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as well as Congress, kept the DOD OCS program under close review. In September 2012, the House of Representatives' Committee for Armed Forces of the 112th Congress held a hearing to identify and discuss several OCS capability gaps as a result of the CWOC and GAO investigations within Iraq and Afghanistan (*Operational Contract Support*, 2012). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), a requirements validation committee under DOD Acquisition, reviewed numerous reports, legislation, and commission findings during and prior to the hearing and identified an OCS education and training gap. Specifically, the DOD Acquisition Corps, and equally importantly, non-acquisition DOD personnel, did not possess the

required knowledge to properly plan, utilize, and manage contracted support as a part of the Total Force package.

As reliance on contracted support grew heavily during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the DOD found itself unprepared to plan for and manage such a large contractor community. This shortfall led to many of the issues identified in the COWC and GAO reports on OCS, such as fraud, cost overruns, poor contractor performance, and hindering mission success.

The congressional hearing and JROC findings ultimately led to legislative change codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2151(a), which made OCS a required part of the JPME curricula: "The subject matter to be covered by joint professional military education shall include at least the following: (1) National Military Strategy (2) Joint planning at all levels of war (3) Joint doctrine (4) Joint command and control (5) Joint force and joint requirements development (6) Operational contract support." In order to bridge the knowledge gap between contingency operations and OCS, and to meet the intent of the new law, the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4) OCS and Services Division (OCSSD) requested the development of OCS-specific case studies and vignettes to include in all JPME programs. Development of these case studies and vignettes is the main objective and deliverable of this MBA project.

3. Other OCS Initiatives

Since the September 2012 hearing, several other initiatives have surfaced to build a more robust acquisition knowledge base across all DOD personnel, ranks, and functions. The J4 created the Operational Contract Support and Services Division (renamed to the Operational Contract Support Division in 2016), which continues to develop and update Joint Publication 4–10, Operational Contract Support. In addition, the division provides joint training and exercise opportunities for both DOD acquisition and non-acquisition personnel; including the Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course for geographic combatant commander support staff, and the Operational Contract Support Joint Exercise for the larger joint workforce. Operational Contract Support Integration Cells (OCSICs) were also established to provide centralized points of contact for

integrating all OCS matters under geographic combatant commanders, joint task forces, and service components (JP 4–10, 2014). Other initiatives include Joint Knowledge Online courses, additional Defense Acquisition University courses, changes to regulations and instructions, additional training funds for acquisition and non-acquisition personnel for OCS classes, and requiring OCS topics in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Military Strategy, Operation Plans, and Contingency Plans (Adams, 2015).

4. The Role and Effects of OCS Today and Beyond

OCS is an economic weapon that must be planned for, used, and managed like any other tactical or strategic weapon. Between FY2007 and FY2016, the DOD obligated $220 billion worth of contracts for various supplies and services within Iraq and Afghanistan. This large sum of money acts as a powerful tool to either dramatically increase mission effectiveness, or drastically hinder operations. In terms of personnel, contractors accounted for over 50% of the battle space throughout both wars (Peters, 2016). The specific numbers comparing DOD personnel to U.S. and local national support contractors can be seen by referencing the Congressional Research Service's report, *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007–2016* (2016). In this report, the total number of contractors consistently outnumbered the number of troops on ground, and toward the end of each war, the ratio of contractors to troops increased from 1:1, to 2:1, and even to 3:1.

With contractors becoming the majority of personnel in these conflicts, and accounting for a large sum of the wartime budget, training DOD personnel to plan for, use, and manage contractor personnel and the subsequent contracts is paramount as the capabilities provided by these contractors leads to mission success or failure. Contractors are fulfilling more and more roles in U.S. military conflicts, and requirements are only growing in size and complexity. This trend is expected to continue in the future, stressing the need for a trained force to plan and manage contracted capabilities.

To maximize effectiveness, OCS should be included in the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP), in particular during the deliberate planning process. The planning, utilization, and management of OCS can be summed up in the three major

functions of OCS: contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. Operational commanders must understand how OCS touches all joint functions, not just the J4 (or the contracting function under the J4). Each functional has a hand in planning for their own contracted support (to include requirements development and managing the contract once awarded), and must integrate their requirements into the mission plan in order to be a fully effective force (i.e., to ensure there are no mission gaps).

OCS can be a strategic war-fighting capability when used properly, but can negatively affect the strategic mission if its effects are not appropriately analyzed beforehand. The first-order effects (e.g., contracted goods or services are/are not delivered as required) are often easy to identify and most commanders accept or mitigate any risks. However, there are numerous instances where secondary or tertiary effects surfaced that were not easily identified (or just not thought about), causing negative military, economic, political, and informational effects to the region as well as to U.S. interests.

For example, take the case of the Base Operation Support Services (BOSS) contract at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, Africa. The BOSS contract provided all life support activities for the personnel assigned. The scope of the contract included food, water, minor construction, showers, toilet facilities, etc. Hundreds of local nationals were employed to perform these services. When the contract was near the end of its performance period, a senior military official helped plan the next BOSS contract by adjusting the requirement and helping to renegotiating the cost of the contract. When the new contract was awarded, the number of local nationals required was much smaller than the previous contract. A Djiboutian diplomat heard of the new BOSS contract award and took exception to the number of local nationals that were laid off; efforts were made to contact the President of the United States to address the issue.

The situation resulted in the U.S. renegotiating the Status of Forces Agreement with Djibouti, to include a $20 million annual fee for the continued use of Camp Lemonnier. Prior to this situation, the Djiboutian government allowed the U.S. to use the camp free of charge. While the senior military official had the right intentions to save

money, the actions to reduce the contract had second- and third-order effects, which actually increased the amount of taxpayer dollars spent on the strategic mission in Djibouti. Further, the official's actions altered the diplomatic and economic relationship between the U.S. and Djibouti.

This story is one of many where military commanders and leaders utilize OCS, but do not fully understand the strategic effects of this multifaceted weapon, and how actions involving OCS can impact the instruments of power as well as U.S. interests (G. Broadwell, personal communication, October 12, 2015).

In an environment where the U.S. military relies more heavily on contractors than ever before, educating and training military leaders about the proper use of OCS is paramount to making informed decisions that will provide long-term benefits to the military and U.S. interests. This project will highlight the positive (negative) effects of planning (not planning) for OCS, the roles of joint functions in executing OCS, and will provide insights for current and future joint leaders to enhance strategic mission effectiveness by leveraging the nation's economic power.

C. OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

OCS is defined as the "planning, managing and integration of obtaining supplies, services and/or construction from commercial sources" (JP 4–10, 2014). The main principles from JP 4–10 that the case studies and vignettes will emphasize are below.

- OCS has three major functions: Contract Support Integration, Contracting Support, and Contractor Management.
- Every joint function has a role in OCS.
- The effects of OCS are not limited to just the military; rather they reach into the other instruments of national power and into overarching national strategic objectives.
- There are benefits, risks, costs, and considerations when including contractors as a part of the total force.

- Phase 0[1] activities and other OCS planning initiatives, or lack thereof, can have a significant impact on the mission and future OCS outcomes in later phases.

- These principles are weaved into the case studies and vignettes to ensure the students fully grasp the ideas presented within the JP 4–10 (2014) doctrine.

D. JPME OCS LEARNING OBJECTIVES

The JPME institutions have an OCS Curriculum Development Guide developed by the J4 OCSSD, which outlines the learning areas and objectives for each level of JPME: intermediate, senior, and flag officer or general officer (FO/GO). These objectives are derived from the CJCSI 1800.01E, dated 29 May 2015, and are further detailed by the J4 OCSSD.

1. Learning Objectives for Intermediate OCS JPME

- Explain Service, Service component, and joint force commanders' OCS planning and execution responsibilities and considerations for employment of contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF) and non-CAAF, to include discussing risk to mission and risk to force.

- Explain how commanders control OCS through requirements determination by establishing and executing OCS-related boards, centers, and cells.

- Comprehend the OCS implications within strategic and operational guidance, policy and procedures for planning (2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, Guidance for Employment of the Force, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Joint Operational Planning and Execution System and Adaptive Planning and Execution, CJCSM 3130.03).

- Explain contract support integration capabilities to integrate OCS requirements into operational plans and orders to include the role and function of OCS Integration Cells at the Combatant Commander, Service component, and Joint Task Force levels.

- Explain Service, agency, and joint force commander contractor management responsibilities for integrating contractors as an element of the Total Force to include theater entrance requirements, and in-theater accountability, oversight,

[1] Phase 0 refers to the six-phase model for the continuum of military operations. Per JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, Phase 0 is the shape phase of an operation, followed by Phases 1-5 which include deter, seize, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority (pp xxii-xxiv). See pages 19-22 for further descriptions of the phases.

visibility, and the provision of government furnished support (GFS) (G. Broadwell, personal communications, October 12, 2015[2]).

2. Learning Objectives for Senior OCS JPME

- Analyze the evolution, purpose, principles, and challenges of OCS in enabling joint force operations.
- Interpret strategic implications of substituting contracted capability for forces in national security missions across the full range of military operations and include an analysis of the benefits, risks, costs, and considerations (to include implications of "inherently governmental" as defined in Section 5 of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act) for the Total Force.
- Examine the strategic and operational planning and execution implications of using external versus theater support contracts.
- Examine how private sector capability has adapted to changing strategic and operational environments to include an analysis of how resourcing and prioritization affect national strategies and operational options.
- Examine a commander's options to achieve effects by considering resource management (e.g., integrated financial operations, formally known as "money as a weapon system") and efforts such as the commander's emergency response program (CERP) in OCS planning.
- Comprehend how to leverage joint, Service, and agency OCS capabilities to support commanders and staffs to enhance operational effects, manage the requirements determination process, and avoid unintended consequences.
- Assess the strategic effects of the infusion of large amounts of financial capital into a struggling economy (e.g., USFOR-A Task Force 2010) across the gamut of political, diplomatic, military, or economic power bases; include in the assessment OCS interagency implications (focus on the Departments of Justice [DoJ], State [DoS], and Commerce [DoC] in addition to DOD).
- Comprehend legal, oversight, ethical, and cultural issues related to use of contractors in an operational setting.
- Interpret the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and procurement integrity for the Department (G. Broadwell, personal communications, October 12, 2015).

[2] These learning objectives were obtained from Mr. Gary Broadwell of the J4, Logistics Directorate, Operational Contract Support Division. These objectives are in draft format and have not yet been published.

3. Learning Objectives for FO/GO OCS JPME

- Interpret the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and procurement integrity for the Department.
- Evaluate the strategic relevance of findings and shortfalls identified in various OCS related audit reports, commission findings, and legislation (Gansler, CWOC, and NDAA language).
- Analyze the strategic and operational challenges for OCS in an interagency or multi-national/coalition environment to include the integration necessary to manage potentially competing requirements.
- Assess the strategic effects of the infusion of large amounts of financial capital into a struggling economy (e.g., USFOR-A Task Force 2010) across the gamut of political, diplomatic, military, or economic power bases; include in the assessment OCS interagency implications (focus on the DOJ, DOS, and DOC in addition to DOD).
- Analyze the findings and shortfalls identified in various OCS-related audit reports, commission findings, and legislation (Gansler, COWC, and NDAA language) and their operational lessons and implications to an operational commander.
- Evaluate strategic implications of substituting contracted capability for forces in national security missions across the full range of military operations; include an analysis of the benefits, risks, costs, and considerations for the Total Force.
- Assess the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and procurement integrity for the Department.
- Assess cost consciousness and how to achieve effectiveness and economy of operation as they relate to employing OCS by considering the following:
    - Contracting related boards and theater business clearances
    - Achieving economies of scale by combining or coordinating requirements
    - Managing government-furnished support
    - Effects on other, less tangible costs of contracted support (e.g., contracting officer's representatives [COR], escorts, opportunity costs, increased risks, or loss of flexibility) (G. Broadwell, personal communications, October 12, 2015).

The case studies and vignettes developed during this project reflect these learning objectives and satisfy JPME curriculum requirements.

E. JPME AUDIENCES AND DELIVERABLES

The specific target in this project is educating all current and potential operational commanders. Operational commanders have staffs that oversee the contracting process, ensuring mission gaps are met through contracting; however, commanders are not viewing OCS holistically—they may not understand how their OCS-related decisions can have both positive and negative secondary or tertiary effects that go beyond meeting their capability gap (a primary effect). Further, they may not understand how those secondary and tertiary effects can affect achievement of their strategic mission objectives. It is important to note that this lack of understanding is not the fault of the commanders—it is highly likely they have received little to no OCS education, which prevents them from properly using the capability to meet their strategic objectives. This research aims to help rectify that problem.

There are five different levels of JPME. However JPME only encompasses the top three levels: intermediate, senior, and flag officer or general officer. The audience for intermediate JPME includes mid-grade officers and civilians (O-4 and GS-13). The curriculum typically focuses on war-fighting and leader development at the operational and tactical levels. For the intermediate JPME level, we developed a case study that focuses on the major functions of OCS, each functional's responsibility for planning and managing OCS, and the implications of OCS on the instruments of national power at the operational and tactical levels (CJCSI, 2015). The associated teaching guide provides guidance for classroom exercises that emphasize these topics.

The audience for senior JPME includes senior officers and civilians (O-5/O-6 and GS-14/GS-15). The curriculum for the senior level focuses on preparing students for strategic leadership, advisement, national security strategy, theater strategy and campaigning, civil-military relations, joint planning processes, joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and integration (CJCSI, 2015). For the senior JPME level, we developed a case study that focuses on the effects of OCS from an operational commander's perspective. The case also explores the lingering implications of poor OCS planning on the overall campaign strategy and civil-military relationships.

The teaching guide includes discussion questions to encourage critical thinking and thoughtful interactions.

The audience for the CAPSTONE and PINNACLE courses are FOs and GOs. The curriculum at this level focuses on preparing officers for high-level joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational leadership responsibilities, as well as grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, theater strategy, civil-military relations, and the conduct of campaigns and military operations in different environments to achieve national objectives and interests (CJCSI, 2015). For the FO/GO JPME level, we developed short vignettes that emphasize high-level joint challenges in planning for and executing OCS, and potential implications on military or national strategy. The teaching guide contains discussion questions to encourage thoughtful interactions.

This introduction identified the objectives of this MBA project and provided a comprehensive background on the subject at hand: OCS. OCS has always been a military capability, but has more recently outgrown its minor support role and is now a major player in U.S. military conflicts. As with any growing capability, proper planning and management is required to effectively utilize OCS. After identifying some dangers and the potential of OCS, Congress has included OCS into JPME curricula to ensure current and future operational commanders can harness the power of OCS and use it to successfully meet strategic mission needs. This is the main goal of this project, to produce products that can be incorporated into JPME for the purposes of educating the force. The next chapter will review the literature that supports the themes and doctrine incorporated in these educational products.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature related to OCS and the joint doctrine from which the themes of the case studies and vignettes are derived. First, we will cover the definition and scope of OCS, as defined by Joint Doctrine. Next, we will discuss joint operational planning and how OCS activities integrate into the planning process. Finally, we will review the instruments of national power and how OCS activities affect these instruments.

B. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

OCS is "the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations" (JP 4–10, 2014). According to JP 4–10, Operational Contract Support (2014), there are three major functions of OCS: contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management.

1. Contract Support Integration

Contract support integration (CSI) is the planning function, which involves balancing effectiveness with efficiency and addressing any associated risks in order to meet strategic goals. Proper planning allows the operational commander to understand how OCS can be a force multiplier that fills in where military support can no longer be supplied organically. Planning also allows the funding, mission, and procurement timelines to synchronize for effective and efficient outcomes that reduce the risks of cost overruns or poor performance. Finally, planning for OCS helps commanders meet their mission requirements. Properly planning for OCS during CSI is a theme found throughout all the case studies and vignettes for each JPME level (JP 4–10, 2014).

All staff sections participate in CSI to identify their individual contract support needs, and to determine how other staff sections are affected by those needs. For example, the Operations (J-3) section may decide to contract out a portion of base

security. If those contracted personnel will be afforded basic life support functions (e.g., housing, hygiene facilities, dining privileges) or medical support, then Personnel (J-1), Logistics (J-4), and Medical (Surgeon) staff sections all need to account for the additional personnel they are responsible for supporting. Collaboration among functional expertise is completed through boards, centers or cells, and working groups. Requirements for contracted support are also developed, validated, and prioritized during CSI with the assistance of many staff functions.

CSI also requires command and control structures to effectively outline the flow of communications and approvals (JP 4–10, 2014). The command and control structure is largely dependent on which service the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) designates as the lead service for contracting (LSC). The GCC could also designate the lead service for contracting coordination (LSCC) or a joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC), depending on the contingency (JP 4–10, 2014). Planning for how different services will fall in the command and control structure is crucial to meeting timelines efficiently and bridging gaps between different contracting processes.

The challenge of CSI is anticipating the range of potential effects of outsourcing on elements beyond the mission and exploring mitigation plans for these situations. For example, the DOD outsourced the transportation of supplies in Afghanistan to local truck drivers in order to move U.S. troops to other duties. The contract met its intent, but had the unanticipated effect of local truck drivers paying off the enemy (warlords and the Taliban) to move military supplies through hostile territories. Clearly, this unanticipated effect was counter to the strategic mission.

It is difficult to plan for these types of effects because planning for contracted support rarely takes into account the broader sociopolitical and economic environments. Commanders and their staffs have to learn to think through potential effects in the same way planners war-game different operational scenarios. It is easy to plan for the known factors, but much harder to plan for the unknowns, which often arise in the contingency environment. Due to information asymmetry, cross-functional planning and clear lines of communication are crucial to the success of CSI.

2. Contracting Support

The second function of OCS is contracting support (CS). During CS, in-theater contracting is planned and coordinated through various offices with adherence to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and applicable supplements, such as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and service-specific supplements. This phase is executed by trained contracting officers and contract management personnel, with input from the end user (i.e., customer). Requirements are translated into contractual documents and administered until close out (JP 4–10, 2014).

The customer's role in this function is to maintain communication with the contracting staff to ensure the contract fulfills the end user's intent and meets all their needs. Even when proper planning occurs, customer input throughout CS enables a consistent feedback loop to catch any discrepancies between the contract and the user's intent.

3. Contractor Management

The last function of OCS is contractor management (CM). This function "involves the control, support, and integration of contractor personnel and their associated equipment deploying and operating in the operational area" (JP 4–10, 2014). Since this part of OCS focuses on the contractor, planning and executing duties that support the contractor must be considered. These considerations include pre-deployment preparation of contractor personnel, deployment and reception, in-theater management, redeployment, force protection and security, and contractor-provided security. Contractor management includes all staff functions, from planning, through contract performance.

Just as the customer is vital to the success of CSI and CS, they are equally crucial to managing contractors effectively. The customer is the party receiving the goods or services, and is in the optimal position to monitor contractor performance. However, if the customer does not communicate contractor performance, the contracting staff cannot enforce standards or contract requirements. The customer has to initiate the feedback process during and throughout CM. In general, customer engagement is required throughout all functions of OCS: from the planning function of CSI, to contract development and execution in CS, and throughout post-award management during CM.

4. Joint Functionals' Roles in OCS

JP 4–10 emphasizes the fact that a multifunctional approach in planning for and executing OCS is vital to supporting the warfighter among all phases of military operations. Illuminating the functions of OCS is one of the main themes for the case studies and vignettes. Understanding the need for a multifaceted approach allows operational commanders to maximize effectiveness and minimize risk when it comes to utilizing OCS in contingency operations. The different joint staff positions provide key OCS-related duties while helping integrate contracted support. The duties by joint staff position, as listed in JP 4–10 (2014), are as follows:

- J-1: Maintain CAAF accountability, in-theater reception; postal, MWR support; coordinate/consolidate human resource-related contract support requires.
- J-2: Assist in collection and analysis of selected OCS related JIPOE information; contract company/personnel security vetting; OCS JIPOE information coordinate/consolidate intelligence related; contract support requirements (i.e., contracted interrogator/interpreter/translator support).
- J-3: Chair/advise JRRB; plan and coordinate force protection (of contractors) and security (from contractors); establish CAAF training requirements; coordinate PR actions; plan for use of private security contractors to include RUF; contractor arming (for self-defense) policy.
- J-4: Conduct logistic related planning/coordination; coordinate GFS; chair CLPSP.
- J-5: Develop constraints; risk analysis.
- J-6: Coordinate/consolidate signal contract requirements; contractor frequency allocation and management; IT security.
- Comptroller: Funding planning/oversight; ensure correct funding streams; financial management planning; JRRB advisor; IFO lead coordinator.
- Engineer: Coordinate land and facilities for contractors; construction classification/planning/quality surveillance oversight; coordinate /consolidate construction requirements.
- Surgeon: Plan/coordinate CAAF medical support; operational specific pre-deployment medical requirements.

- Staff Judge Advocate: Provide operational, contract, and fiscal law advice; advise as to the feasibility of asserting U.S. federal criminal jurisdiction over CAAF.
- Provost Marshal: Investigate allegations of trafficking in persons, fraud, CAAF criminal activity; develop contractor base access policy/procedures. (JP 4–10, 2014).

C. JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operational Planning (2011) describes the doctrine for conducting "joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the full range of military operations" (JP 5–0, 2011). Through joint operational planning, national strategic objectives are transformed into actual activities for joint forces to accomplish to meet desired end states. Joint Operational Planning should include OCS planning, from the CSI function through the CM function.

According to JP 5–0 (2011), there are six phases to joint operations, however, the six-phase model can be tailored to individual operations depending on the environment (e.g., the phases are not typically equal in length, and some phases may be skipped all together). The first phase is Phase 0, or the "shape" phase. During this phase, routine military activities are performed to deter potential threats and to maintain relationships with allies. In Phase I, the "deter" phase, a demonstration of capability is made and activities are undertaken to prepare forces for deployment in the event that the deterrence is not successful. The seize "initiative phase," Phase II, is initiated when JFCs apply joint force capabilities to seize the initiative. When in Phase III, or the "dominate" phase, JFCs attempt to break the enemy's will to resist, or control the operation. Moving into the "stabilize" phase, Phase IV, there is typically no legitimate civil governing body. The joint force may perform these activities or support other organizations or agencies in establishing a local functioning entity. Finally, during Phase V, the "enable civil authority" phase, joint forces support the new, legitimate civil authority (JP 5–0, 2011).

OCS needs should be considered during each Joint Operation Planning phase. During Phase 0, contract-related boards, cells and working groups are established, and the OCS environment is analyzed. OCS planning typically includes market research on the local vendor base and the business climate within the region of concern. Further,

planning efforts may examine how OCS can shape the local environment. OCS can be used in lieu of large military operations during Phase 0, in order to meet force management levels while quelling political and social unrest. For example, contracts can be awarded to support the local populace in a highly unstable area that serves as a breeding ground for terrorism. Money funneled into the area through contracts may help rebuild the region, employing hundreds or thousands of locals and preventing fighting-age males from resorting to terrorism/defecting to terrorist groups. Often times there are few to no military personnel present in these contracting-heavy operations.

Phase I OCS activities may take the form of support to special operations forces (SOF), or establishing specific sustainment capabilities like staging for follow-on phases. Typically, the funding for a declared contingency is not available in this phase for heavy OCS-related activities, however deterrence forces still require contracted support, typically from local sources (non-CAAF). When Phase II occurs, theater support contracting provides services and commodities to support military forces. CAAF forces are likely to be deployed during these operations to provide support to the increasing number of troops on the ground.

During Phase III, CAAF personnel continue to arrive to assist military forces in "dominating" the enemy. With the influx of CAAF personnel, there is an increased need for GFS to support and sustain those contractor personnel.

In Phase IV, as stabilization occurs, OCS efforts expand to non-forces support, like security force assistance and reconstructing local infrastructure. Increased use of external support contracts to augment staffs occurs, and a formalized requirements review, validation, and approval process will be implemented to control the flow of contracted support in theater. Further, during this time, OCS actions must be fully coordinated with interagency partners and other nations, to synchronize plans and strategies. The rise of external support contracts typically increases the number of non-CAAF personnel in the battle space. CAAF personnel, as described above start to arrive in theater as soon as Phase II, and continue to support boots on ground throughout the later phases. However, as the number of CAAF personnel increases, further external support from non-CAAF is typically required. Including non-CAAF for mission support

is more affordable than exclusively using CAAF personnel, and is less of a burden to support as the U.S. does not have to provide GFS for these contractors. However, affordability and ease of support must be balanced with security, as non-CAAF personnel are most often TCNs and LNs.

Finally, in Phase V, controls are more stringent for new requirements, and a reduction of OCS occurs as contracts are closed out or eliminated (JP 4–10, 2014). The new civil authority takes over responsibility for security assistance, infrastructure reconstruction, and any other needs previously supplied via OCS.

The marrying of Joint Operational Planning to OCS activities allows JFCs and operational commanders to understand what activities occur during different phases of military operations. Without understanding how OCS activities relate to Joint Operational Planning, or to the phases of military operations, it is difficult to utilize OCS effectively and efficiently. The activities planned or completed in one phase can drastically impact the outcomes of other phases. This theme is touched upon in the case studies and vignettes at all levels of JPME.

D. INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

As stated in JP 4–10 (2014), "OCS actions, whether intended or not, can produce both positive and negative effects on the civil-military aspects of the overall campaign plan." OCS affects both military operations and the environment in which the operations takes place, thus it is critical to understand the different implications of utilizing this powerful capability. More specifically, OCS can affect all of the instruments of national power, not just the military instrument. According to JP 1–0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2013), the "ability of the U.S. to advance its national interests is dependent on the effectiveness of the USG in employing the instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives." The U.S. can deploy diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power.

The diplomatic instrument is the primary means for engaging with other countries, states, or foreign entities. Through this instrument, U.S. values and interests are promoted. Due to the business-related nature of OCS, it can impact diplomatic relations

by supporting (or not) the local economies of other nations. OCS can also be used to support the interests of US-friendly leaders, while the absence of OCS can have the opposite effect. If the award and execution of a contract goes positively, it can promote positive diplomatic relations between the foreign entity and the USG. However, if there are issues, the diplomatic relationship between the foreign state and the USG could sour, making future negotiations less amenable.

The informational instrument of national power allows for communication and the extraction of information. OCS relates to this instrument, as a contract provides a medium for information exchange. Local contractors could pass on camp coordinates, facility locations, operational capabilities, etc., to adversaries of the USG. On the other side of the coin, OCS also allows the USG to "buy" information by supporting the local populace through contracts. For example, when a region is living in poverty, and the USG creates jobs in the area using contracts, the local population may start to sympathize with the USG. The benefit of these types of support contracts is that the local population may start to pass information to the U.S. to prevent attacks or issues with adversaries. Aligning U.S. interests with the interests of the local population enhances the flow of information to the benefit of the US.

The military instrument of national power is used to fight and win the nation's wars. While OCS is primarily associated with the military instrument of power, it has implications beyond just meeting military capability needs.

The economic instrument of national power is fundamental to the general welfare of the USG. This instrument includes interactions with other nation's economies and the international market. In a contingency environment, OCS can serve as an economic "weapon system" capable of producing both positive and negative effects. The contracts produced through OCS are a medium to pass large amounts of money (US dollar or local currency) to a local economy, thus creating jobs and enhancing money circulation. Depending on the US' goals for the region, OCS can produce positive (e.g., build up the local economy) or negative (e.g., inflate the local economy) effects.

The instruments of national power can be positively or negatively affected by OCS, and commanders need to be aware of the implications of OCS on other national objectives. Specifically, the potential implications should be discussed and coordinated with partner agencies, such as the Department of State (diplomatic), the CIA (informational), the Department of Treasury (economic), and similar partner nation agencies. This theme is apparent throughout all case studies and vignettes developed for this project.

The literature review explored themes derived from operational contract support doctrine, joint operational planning doctrine, and doctrine for the armed forces of the US. JP 4–10 (2014) outlines the major functions OCS, which include CSI, CS, and CM, and highlights how all staff functions are required to successfully implement OCS. The review of JP 5–0 (2011) demonstrates that operational planning should incorporate OCS. Just as military planners war-game scenarios, they should plan for how OCS will affect the battle space. Lastly, the instruments of national power from armed forces doctrine (JP 1–0, 2013) substantiates the influence OCS has on all instruments of power, not just the military instrument. This literature supports the themes and conclusions that are emphasized in the case studies and vignettes. The next chapter explains how the case studies and vignettes were developed.

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III. METHODOLOGY

A. CASE STUDY FORMAT AND PERSPECTIVE

The formats of the case studies and vignettes vary to enhance learning at each JPME level. The formats of the associated teaching guides also vary to match the exercises or class discussion commensurate with each command level. The information in the teaching guides is not all encompassing, rather the guides represent a sample of possible questions and potential student responses.

The intermediate JPME case study uses a format similar to a decision essay. The decision essay provides the decision options and criteria, as well as some critiques of other options and alternatives. Typically there will be substantial proof for the option recommended and an action plan will follow (Ellet, 2007, p. 136). The intermediate JPME case study, *Camp Moore to Camp Landale* (Appendix A), provides decision options and criteria, and many critiques of the alternative options. However, the recommendation and plan of action are left open-ended. This format helps the reader to view each alternative with equal consideration, which is a tactic staff officers and operational commanders should follow when making OCS decisions. Further, leaving the case study open-ended allows the audience to think critically about all potential consequences, without gaining any hindsight bias--this mimics how a commander would feel during a real world OCS scenario.

The senior JPME case study, *Funding the Enemy* (Appendix B), follows a problem essay format. In this format, the problem is defined and diagnosed, and then information is given to show proof of causing the problem. Finally, an action plan is produced (Ellet, 2007, p. 119). The benefit of this type of case writing is that it provides multiple effects and multiple causes, which helps to portray to the audience that OCS is multifaceted and can have multiple effects. However, the case for this command level does not include an action plan; instead, it allows the audience to think critically about their options and how they would personally react in the same situation. This is an important component, as the senior JPME audience is made up of O-5s and O-6s (GS-

14/GS-15s)—these leaders are often faced with making difficult decisions like the one presented in the case.

The FO/GO vignettes (Appendices C and D) did not follow a typical case study format. Instead, the vignettes provide a small story to illustrate a specific learning objective. This format is particularly effective for this level of command, because these senior officers rarely have time to review full length reports or audits. Often, these officers are simply briefed on a scenario before making a decision. Due to the nature of how these officers receive information and make analyses, this format is appropriate. Further, the expected time available for the FO/GO OCS lesson is 30 minutes--vignettes are specific enough to accommodate this time limit.

B. CASE STUDY THEMES AND SUPPORTING JPME LEARNING OBJECTIVES

The JPME OCS learning objectives published by the J4 OCSSD are tailored to challenge students at each level of JPME. In the paragraphs that follow, we outline the main themes of the case studies and vignettes derived from joint doctrine, and marry them to the JPME learning objectives. The deliverables for each level of command include OCS themes that the students are expected to internalize to enhance their effectiveness as operational commanders.

1. Intermediate Case Study Themes and Supporting JPME OCS Learning Objectives

The intermediate case study, *Camp Moore to Camp Landale*, has three doctrinal themes that connect to five JPME OCS learning objectives. These are not all the JPME OCS learning objectives for the intermediate level, rather the learning objectives that apply to the case.

- Doctrinal Theme 1: Contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management are the major functions of OCS that should be integrated into Joint Operational Planning to maximize OCS benefits and minimize risk to other tactical and strategic goals.
    - A.3. Explain Service, Service component, and joint force commanders' OCS planning and execution responsibilities and considerations for

employment of contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF) and non-CAAF to include discussing risk to mission and risk to force.

  - A.4. Explain how commanders control OCS through requirements determination by establishing and executing OCS-related boards, centers, and cells.
  - B.1. Comprehend the OCS implications within strategic and operational guidance, policy and procedures for planning (2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, GEF, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan [JSCP], Joint Operational Planning and Execution System [JOPES]/Adaptive Planning and Execution [APEX], CJCSM 3130.03).
  - B.2. Explain contract support integration capabilities to integrate OCS requirements into operational plans and orders to include the role and function of OCS Integration Cells at the CCMD, Service component, and JTF levels.
  - B.4. Explain Service, agency, and joint force commander contractor management responsibilities for integrating contractors as an element of the Total Force to include theater entrance requirements, and in-theater accountability, oversight, visibility, and the provision of government furnished support (GFS).

- Doctrinal Theme 2: Every joint function has a role in planning, integrating, and managing OCS.

  - Same as B.2. and B.4. above.

- Doctrinal Theme 3: OCS is a capability that can influence and create effects on the instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.

  - Same as B.1. above.

These themes, derived from JP 1–0, JP 4–10, and JP 5–0, illustrate to a mid-level officer how OCS activities go beyond meeting operational needs and how to effectively manage this capability.

2. Senior Case Study Themes and Supporting JPME OCS Learning Objectives

The senior case study, *Funding the Enemy*, has two doctrinal themes that connect to ten JPME OCS learning objectives. These are not all the JPME OCS learning objectives for the senior level, rather the learning objectives that apply to the case.

- Doctrinal Theme 1: There are benefits, risks, costs, and other considerations when including contractors as part of the total joint force.

- C.1. Analyze the evolution, purpose, principles, and challenges of OCS in enabling joint force operations.
- D.2. Examine the strategic and operational planning and execution implications of using external versus theater support contracts.
- E.1. Comprehend how to leverage joint, Service, and agency OCS capabilities to support commanders and staffs to enhance operational effects, manage the requirements determination process, and avoid unintended consequences.
- E.3. Assess the strategic effects of the infusion of large amounts of financial capital into a struggling economy (e.g., USFOR-A TF 2010) across the gamut of political, diplomatic, military, or economic power bases; include in the assessment OCS interagency implications (focus on the DoJ, DoS, and DoC in addition to DOD).
- G.3. Comprehend legal, oversight, ethical, and cultural issues related to use of contractors in an operational setting.
- G.4. Interpret the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and procurement integrity for the Department.

- Doctrinal Theme 2: OCS can affect strategic goals and outcomes; proper cross-functional planning should be incorporated during Phase 0, or as early as possible, to prevent unintended consequences.
  - C.3. Interpret strategic implications of substituting contracted capability for forces in national security missions across the full range of military operations and include an analysis of the benefits, risks, costs, and considerations (to include implications of "inherently governmental" as defined in Section 5 of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act) for the Total Force.
  - Same as D.2. above.
  - D.3. Examine how private sector capability has adapted to changing strategic and operational environments to include an analysis of how resourcing and prioritization affect national strategies and operational options.
  - D.4. Examine a commander's options to achieve effects by considering resource management (e.g., integrated financial operations, formally known as "money as a weapon system") and efforts such as the commander's emergency response program (CERP) in OCS planning.
  - E.1. Comprehend how to leverage joint, Service, and agency OCS capabilities to support commanders and staffs to enhance operational

effects, manage the requirements determination process, and avoid unintended consequences.

These themes depict to senior-level strategic thinkers how OCS can serve as a war-fighting capability that needs to be properly planned, managed, and maintained to achieve strategic outcomes.

3. The FO/GO Case Study Themes and Supporting JPME OCS Learning Objectives

The FO/GO vignettes have two doctrinal themes that connect to four JPME OCS learning objectives. These are not all the JPME OCS learning objectives for the FO/GO level, rather the learning objectives that apply to the vignettes.

- Doctrinal Theme 1: There are benefits, risks, costs, and other considerations when including contractors as part of the total joint force.
  - E.3. Assess the strategic effects of the infusion of large amounts of financial capital into a struggling economy (e.g., USFOR-A TF 2010) across the gamut of political, diplomatic, military, or economic power bases; include in the assessment OCS interagency implications (focus on the DoJ, DoS, and DoC in addition to DOD).
  - F.3. Evaluate strategic implications of substituting contracted capability for forces in national security missions across the full range of military operations; include an analysis of the benefits, risks, costs, and considerations for the Total Force.
- Doctrinal Theme 2: OCS can affect strategic goals and outcomes; proper cross-functional planning should be incorporated during Phase 0, or as early as possible, to prevent unintended consequences.
  - G.4. Assess the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and procurement integrity for the Department.
  - G.5. Assess cost consciousness and how to achieve effectiveness and economy of operation as they relate to employing OCS by considering the following:
    - Contracting related boards and theater business clearance (TBC)
    - Competition for scarce local resources
    - Achieving economies of scale by combining or coordinating requirements

- Managing government-furnished support
- Effects on other, less tangible costs of contracted support (e.g., CORs, escorts, opportunity costs, increased risks, loss of flexibility).

These themes illustrate to flag and general officers the criticality of early planning of OCS activities and the impact that OCS can have on high level strategic interests.

C. COLLABORATION

The case studies and vignettes were developed through research and collaboration with subject matter experts from the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4) OCSSD. Drafts of the case studies and vignettes were submitted to the J4 OCSSD staff for feedback in order to enhance the materials' effectiveness in the JPME environment. Further, feedback was sought on the teaching guides and on which learning objectives to address. This collaborative effort helped create end products designed to meet the intent of the JPME learning objectives and the CJCS guidelines.

The case studies and vignettes were developed in the style that best enhanced learning at each JPME level. Further, each case study and vignette had themes derived from doctrine that were supported by the learning objectives of each JPME level's required curricula. This methodology satisfies the JPME schools at a tactical level, as well as the DOD at a strategic level. Lastly, the case studies and vignettes as well as their teaching guides were reviewed by the J4, OCSSD to ensure the material encompassed the right lessons and critical thinking required to train current and future operational commanders on OCS. These methods created the actual case studies and vignettes for use in JPME curricula.

IV. RESULTS (CASE STUDIES AND VIGNETTES)

A. INTERMEDIATE CASE STUDY AND TEACHING GUIDE

The intermediate case study can be found in Appendix A and focuses on tactical and operational OCS execution. The associated teaching guide contains three exercises to emphasize the learning objectives for this level of JPME. The exercises are modular, and allow the instructor maximum flexibility to guide the discussion in ways that meet the learning objectives while taking into account time constraints. The first exercise focuses on the major functions of OCS: contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. The second exercise encourages students to brainstorm how different joint functions are integrated into OCS. The last exercise is more strategic in nature and is a discussion of how OCS can influence the instruments of national power.

B. SENIOR CASE STUDY AND TEACHING GUIDE

The senior case study, found in Appendix B, takes an operational commander perspective and focuses on the strategic effects of OCS. The senior case study teaching guide provides discussion questions that encourage students to think critically about how OCS can assist--or undermine—the achievement of strategic goals.

C. FO/GO VIGNETTES AND TEACHING GUIDES

The FO/GO vignettes, found in Appendices C and D, take specific events and emphasize associated learning objectives. The FO/GO teaching guide provides discussion questions that encourage students to think critically about how OCS can be an economic "weapon" in the nation's warfighting arsenal and should be taken into account in all phases of strategic planning and execution.

The results of this research were the actual case studies and vignettes developed for use in JPME curricula. Case studies were developed for the intermediate and senior JPME levels, while short vignettes were developed for the FO/GO level. In addition, teaching guides were created to facilitate the learning from these case studies and vignettes. While this research encompasses many themes and lessons of OCS, there is

still an opportunity to add to this collection of work and to provide a wide array of resources for future OCS JPME lessons.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. TESTING

The case studies and vignettes should be tested in an academic environment prior to full implementation in the JPME curriculum. Testing of the intermediate-level case study could occur at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, as the Naval War College offers JPME I certification at this location. This setting would provide a comparable range of students for the intermediate JPME case study, in terms of service and career-field diversity. Further, this testing would allow proctors to gauge how effective the material is, in terms of achieving the desired outcomes. The students would also be able to provide feedback to improve the cases, exercises, and class discussions. Testing of the senior-level case study and the FO/GO-level vignettes should be performed at other available JPME schools.

B. FUTURE PRODUCTS

Future case studies and vignettes should be developed to highlight OCS successes, best practices, and/or failures in current events to enhance applicability to real world changes in the operational environment. The case studies and vignettes are living documents that can and should be tailored to the changing landscape. The current case studies and vignettes can be modified, or new case studies and vignettes can be developed, to create a comprehensive collection of materials for JPME instructors to choose from, based upon their teaching goals.

C. FEEDBACK

Feedback is recommended throughout the useful life of the case studies and vignettes. Feedback from any user, student, instructor, observer, etc., is encouraged in order to update and further the academic integrity and effectiveness of the case studies and vignettes. Feedback may be sent to the Acquisition and Contracting Area Chair at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943.

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VI. SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS

1. Supplement. OCS Teaching Guide: Intermediate JPME

This supplement may be accessed by permission only. Access is restricted to JPME instructors, employees of the J4, Logistics Directorate, and U.S. Naval Postgraduate School faculty. To access this document please contact the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School library.

2. Supplement. OCS Teaching Guide: Senior JPME

This supplement may be accessed by permission only. Access is restricted to JPME instructors, employees of the J4, Logistics Directorate, and U.S. Naval Postgraduate School faculty. To access this document please contact the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School library.

3. Supplement. OCS Teaching Guide: FO/GO JPME Vignette 1

This supplement may be accessed by permission only. Access is restricted to JPME instructors, employees of the J4, Logistics Directorate, and U.S. Naval Postgraduate School faculty. To access this document please contact the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School library.

4. Supplement. OCS Teaching Guide: FO/GO JPME Vignette 2

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