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**DEFENSE REFORM:
SUPPORTING THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH IN
TOMORROW'S CRISIS**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master's of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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ABSTRACT

Strategic integration and global synchronization in the face of today's trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional conflicts is paramount to meet the challenges of the future. For the past 30 years, the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) has pushed transformation across the Department of Defense (DOD) and facilitated the development of a Joint force. However, the GNA no longer supports today's Warfighter in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional global security environment. Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other violent extremist organizations (VEO) are all aware of the U.S. competitive advantages in waging modern warfare. These actors intend to utilize an asymmetric approach to reduce and degrade the U.S. ability to collectively integrate and aggregate across all the components of the military force and whole-of-government domains and functions. Defense experts are now calling this military competition short of traditional armed conflict. This thesis will focus on reform of the GNA, including analysis in the following key areas: 1) traditional use of authorities under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation; 2) potential options for defense reform; 3) implementation and effectiveness of past defense reform proposals; 4) proposed new Joint Staff structure; and 5) implementation of the new structure within the Joint Operating Environment (JOE). Empowering the Joint Staff, under law, to act in the capacity of a General Staff with all authorities and responsibilities under U.S. code will more effectively enable strategic integration and global synchronization in the DOD and foster a whole-of-government approach to combat global instability in tomorrow's global security environments.

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Introduction

President Harry S. Truman in his December 1945 address to Congress stated, “it is now time to take stock, to discard the obsolete organizational forms, and to provide for the future the soundest, the most effective, and the most economical kind of structure for our armed forces for which this most powerful nation is capable.”¹ Since his signing of the National Security Act of 1947, President Truman’s words have never been more applicable than in today’s dynamic global security environment. For the past 30 years, the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) has pushed transformation across the Department of Defense (DOD) and facilitated the development of a Joint force. However, the GNA no longer supports today’s Warfighter in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional global security environment.² The act is nearly three decades old and few significant defense reforms have been undertaken to update the legislation or align it to today’s rapidly changing threat environment. Adversaries of the U.S. and its allies intend to exploit gaps and seams in the current Combatant Command (CCMD) structure. Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other violent extremist organizations (VEO) are all aware of the U.S. competitive advantages in waging modern warfare. These actors, as well as any future adversary of the U.S., intend to utilize an asymmetric approach to reduce and degrade the U.S. ability to collectively integrate and aggregate across all the components of the military force

¹ President Harry S. Truman, *Special Message to the Congress Recommending the Establishment of a Department of National Defense*, December 19, 1945, p. 1, <http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=508>.

² *Environment* or the *Global Security Environment* is a term currently used by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford. In other words, the *Global Security Environment* encompasses the wide-range of military and diplomatic measures the U.S. can implement to facilitate safety and security in the global commons.

and whole-of-government domains and functions. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Work, in his address to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Conference in October 2016 warned, “Russia effectively employed cross-domain fires using a variety of long-range, guided munitions from air, sea, and under the sea and has improved the accuracy and responsiveness of their already formidable indirect fire skills using artillery and rockets guided by UAVs, cyber, signals intelligence, and electronic intelligence.”³ Mr. Work’s words, as well as the current and future dynamic global security environments, validate the need for comprehensive Defense Reforms, and necessitate maximum flexibility for combatant commanders (CCDRs), while providing the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the President of the United States (POTUS) a common understanding with which they can make strategic level decisions to achieve political and military objectives. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Joseph Dunford noted in his address to The Center for the National Interest, “While we [U.S.] tend to have a binary perspective of the security environment -- that is, we’re either at peace or at war -- state actors like Russia, China and Iran have a much more nuanced view. They operate in a manner that avoids our strengths and takes advantage of our weaknesses.”⁴ Defense experts are now calling this military competition short of traditional armed conflict. The “commander/warrior/diplomat” required in the current trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional global security

³ Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Work, *A Glimpse of the Pacing Competitor*, October 5, 2016, Journal of the Air Force Association: Daily Air Force Magazine.

⁴ Jim Garamone, *Global Security Environment Has Implications for Joint Force*, DOD News, Defense Media Activity, December 1, 2016, p. 1, <http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1017146/dunford-global-security-environment-has-implications-for-joint-force>.

environment “will find themselves in an environment in which [they] have minimal authority... certainly no authority over the interagency group [they] are trying to influence; thus [the] task is to try to achieve unity of effort in the absence of unity of command.”⁵ While there are multiple avenues of Defense Reform to address, this thesis will focus on reform of the GNA, including analysis in the following key areas: 1) traditional use of authorities under the current Goldwater-Nichols legislation; 2) potential options for defense reform; 3) implementation and effectiveness of past defense reform proposals in today’s environment; 4) proposed new Joint Staff structure; and 5) implementation of the new structure within the future Joint Operating Environment (JOE). Empowering the Joint Staff, under law, to act in the capacity of a General Staff with all authorities and responsibilities under Title 10 U.S. code will more effectively enable strategic and vertical integration and global synchronization in the DOD and foster a whole-of-government approach to combat global instability in today’s and tomorrow’s global security environments.⁶

⁵ James Q. Roberts, *Need Authorities for the Gray Zone?*, PRISM 6, No. 3, Washington, D.C., 2016, p. 26.

⁶ The Joint Staff Joint Task Force proposed in this thesis is not a “professional” General Staff, whose members leave their respective services and permanently join the General Staff. These personnel, just like today’s Joint Staff personnel, would fulfill their required tenure and then return to their respective service. This concept is further expanded in **Area 5**.

According to current laws reflected in Title 10, U.S. Code. Section 155 – Joint Staff, para (e) – “The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority. The Joint Staff may be organized and may operate along conventional staff lines.” The proposed updates to Title 10 U.S. Code will be addressed in **Area 3**.

Definitions

This thesis will provide definitions to set the context for arguing in support of Defense Reform to support today's Warfighter and a whole-of-government approach in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional global security environment.

Trans-regional – Command and Control (C2), plans, and operations spanning multiple regions across the globe.¹ Furthermore, trans-regional also refers to an adversary's ability to project power across multiple geographic regions and/or globally.

Multi-domain – Strategic integration across the various spectrums of conflict to include, but not limited to air, land, sea, space, cyberspace, interagency, and whole-of-government. Additionally, *domains* can include non-traditional areas such as the "Gray Zone," "Hybrid Warfare," Russia's "New Generation Warfare," and military competition short of traditional armed conflict.²

Multi-functional – The broad, general, and enduring roles for which an organization and/or organizations are designed, equipped, and trained.³ A true multi-functional approach includes the whole-of-government's array of capabilities.

¹ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has produced a classified definition of a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional environment, but for classification purposes of this paper the author has provided an unclassified definition of each term.

² Colonel J.B. Vowell, *Maskirovka: From Russia, With Deception*, The Brookings Institute, October 31, 2016, p. 2, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/10/31/maskirovka_from_russia_with_deception_110282.html.

Howard Altman, *Gray Zone Conflicts Far More Complex to Combat*, TBO.com, November 28, 2015, <http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/gray-zone-conflicts-far-more-complex-to-combat-says-socom-chief-votel-20151128/>.

³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Joint Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, February 15, 2016, p. 102.

Joint Staff – The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force (JTF), or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), that includes members from the several Services comprising the force. The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) that assists the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in carrying out their responsibilities.⁴

“4+1” – China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state VEOs.⁵

Strategic Integration – The integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the homeland and United States (U.S.) national interests, protect the joint force, and enable freedom of action.⁶

Vertical Integration – The merging together of two businesses that are at different stages of production – for example, a food manufacturer and a chain of supermarkets.⁷ In military terms, this would mean merging C2 (unity of command) under one commander above the Combatant Commander (CCDR) level to streamline trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional operations and facilitate strategic integration and global C2.

⁴ *Department of Defense Joint Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, p. 138.

⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *2015 National Military Strategy*, June 2015, p. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁷ The Economist, *Vertical Integration*, March 30, 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/13396061>.

Area 1: Framework

The current C2 structure, as codified in law under the GNA and represented in *Figure 3 (p. 33)*, is not responsive to today's challenging global security environment.¹ Today's threats span multiple geographic combatant commands (GCC) and functional combatant commands (FCC) and current Title 10 authorities do not support the trans-regional operational lines of effort (LOE).² Both the DOD and Department of State (DOS) recognized as early as the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) the requirement for greater coordination and collaboration between agencies.³ In order to effectively synchronize a whole-of-government approach to fulfill national objectives, Defense Reform must occur. Retired U.S. Marine Corps General James L. Jones noted in his report as the Chairman of the Atlantic Council's Combatant Command Task Force, "To deal effectively with long-range global trends and near-term security challenges, the U.S. requires a broader application of all instruments of national power or risks disjointed

¹ A historical example of tensions in the lines of C2 authority existed in the C2 structure between the GCCs, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the theater special operations commands (TSOC). Prior to 2013, the TSOCs were COCOM (combatant command authority) to the GCCs. USSOCOM had no command authority over TSOCs and were limited in their ability to synchronize special operations forces (SOF) across the globe. However, in 2013 the Forces Forward agreement realigned special operations forces and now the TSOCs are COCOM to USSOCOM and OPCON (operational control) to the GCCs. Now that USSOCOM maintains COCOM over the TSOCs, the USSOCOM has the ability to truly fulfill Title 10 U.S. Code responsibilities (reference footnote 2 below for existing U.S. Title 10 Code authorities) over their forces. Furthermore, the GCCs and TSOCs have desk officers in the SOCOM Enterprise Ops Center to facilitate the global synchronization of SOF. This is a way in which to empower the Joint Staff, under law, to act in the capacity of a General Staff with all authorities and responsibilities under Title 10 U.S. code to effectively enable strategic and vertical integration and global synchronization in the Department of Defense (DOD) and foster a whole-of-government approach to combat instability in today's and tomorrow's global security environments.

² U.S. Title 10 code establishes the authorities of the DOD, outlining the role, mission, and organizational structure of the U.S. military under the authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF. Title 10 code is organized into seven categories including: provisions on force structure, personnel, procurement, supply, training, service, and education.

³ James L. Jones, General (Retired), *All Elements of National Power*, Atlantic Council, July 2014, p. 1.

efforts in U.S. global engagement. A transformed interagency balance is a hedge against uncertainty in a dramatically changing world.”⁴

U.S. government and DOD leaders have demonstrated their lack of Joint and interagency coordination in the on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The point here is not to argue the validity of the decision to conduct operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, but to highlight the initial lack of interagency coordination and whole-of-government approach to planning operations in both theaters. Mary Kaldor, in her book *New and Old Wars* stated, “The failure of the U.S. to understand the reality on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq and the tendency to impose its own view of what war should be like has been immensely dangerous.”⁵ As Kaldor notes, one of the dangers of imposing one’s own view of what war should be has led to protracted war, new conflicts and most importantly, “carries the risk of being self-perpetuating.”⁶ Opinions of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan aside, it is arguable if the U.S. and its coalition partners truly understood the cultural and ideological influences inside the two countries prior to conducting operations. This lack of understanding and inability to accurately frame the problem sets more than likely exacerbated both conflicts and resulted in cascading effects that are irreversible.

In an effort to prevent misaligning force structures and provide a framework to build military preparedness, the 2016 National Military Strategy (NMS) and the

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era 3rd Edition*, Stanford University Press, 2012, p. 152.

⁶ Ibid.

JOE 2035 outline the “4+1” as potential sources of future conflict facing the U.S.⁷

Conducting an effective military campaign against a potential adversary such as Russia, listed in the “4+1,” would prove to be one of the more challenging trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional conflicts the U.S. has confronted in recent history.

From a geographical standpoint alone, Russia spans nine time zones and more than 6.6 million square miles, making it the world’s largest land mass country.⁸ Additionally, due to the massive expanse of land and multiple bodies of water encompassing a notional Russian theater of operations, strategic integration and global C2 across the battlespace would be extremely challenging. Russia expertly employs an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2AD) strategy as they have demonstrated in combat operations in Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria. The Russians are well aware of U.S. military capabilities and have built a synchronized air, land, naval, and cyber force to challenge almost any adversary in any domain. Likewise, the Russians and other adversaries alike, plan to exploit gaps and seams in the current geographic CCMD structure. Deputy SECDEF Robert Work stated in his January 2015 address, “Russia poses a different challenge. Its [Russia] modernizing military was in steep decline throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Its naval and air units are operating at a pace and an extent that hasn’t been seen in quite some time, to include a large increase in trans-oceanic and global military operations.”⁹

⁷ 2015 *National Military Strategy*, p. 2.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JOE 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*, July 14, 2016, p. 28.

⁸ The World Atlas, *Russia*, <http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/europe/ru.htm#page>.

⁹ Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, *The Third Offset Strategy and its Implication for Partners and Allies*, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2015, p. 2.

Not only is Russia rebuilding a robust conventional force, but they are rapidly rejuvenating “Maskirovka.” In short, “Maskirovka” is the art of deception. As Colonel J.B. Vowell stated in his article, “[Maskirovka to Russia is] to elevate the complete set of actions and conditions that fall short of war that enables battlefield victories to be decided before tanks and infantry close in battle...and the complementary technological changes to the character of warfare now and in the future.”¹⁰ The issues most germane in a potential conflict with Russia are the fact that Russia intends to use a synergistic effect across all domains to shape the battlespace, create an asymmetric effect, exploit gaps and seams, and then defeat the enemy. Colonel Vowell summarizes Russian doctrine in the following remarks.

[Russian] doctrine accounted for the many enabling conditions of warfare: psychological operations, manipulation of media and the population through propaganda, electronic warfare, counterintelligence operations, use of unconventional warfare through partisans and Special Operations Forces, and many forms of physical deception. The intent was to win not only the physical fight but the fight of the mind: to ensure that the will of the adversary was compelled to accept the outcome, even before the first shots were fired. As OPFOR [Opposition Forces], *Maskirovka* in application would change the calculus of combat in our favor against technically superior western forces.¹¹

Based on the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) unclassified intelligence assessments, Russia possesses the ability to easily deny access across multiple combat domains. DIA Director Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Vincent Stewart testified before Congress:

Moscow continues to devote major resources to modernizing its military forces, viewing military power as critical to achieving key strategic objectives: acknowledged great power status, dominating smaller regional states, and deterring NATO [North Atlantic Treaty

¹⁰ Vowell, p. 2.

¹¹ Ibid.

Organization] from military action in Eur-Asia. Russian leadership considers a capable and survivable nuclear force as the foundation of its strategic deterrent capability, and modernized, agile general purpose forces as vital for Eurasian and limited out-of-area power projection.¹²

Synchronized planning efforts and a vertically integrated global C2 structure are merely two keys to success against a potential war with Russia, as well as any near-peer adversary that exists in today's trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional global security environment.

Of particular note, DOD and interagency planners must remember that the "4+1" is only a guide. The U.S. military and political leaders have a long history of failing to accurately predict the next conflict. If senior military leaders and policy makers only focus on the "4+1" construct, the potential exists for another "Pre-9/11" style conventional military with the misapplication of military resources, current and future force structures, and comprehensive readiness. It is imperative U.S. government leaders, commanders, and planners build an effective and agile military and interagency composite force structure that is capable of responding to a myriad of global conflicts and crises. Thomas Ricks warns in his book *The Gamble*, the U.S. doctrine of rapid decisive operations is obsolete, or more descriptively he states:

[The] U.S. techno-centric notion...that U.S. forces, taking advantage of advances in sensors, communications, computer technology, and long-range weaponry and precision logistics, all areas in which it excelled, would fight so quickly and adeptly that the enemy would never have a chance to catch up and understand what was happening. Blinded, confused, and overwhelmed, the enemy's will would break, U.S. forces would triumph, and everyone would live happily ever after.¹³

¹² DIA Director Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart, *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment*, February 9, 2016, <http://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/653278/statement-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-assessment/>.

¹³ Thomas Ricks, *The Gamble*, Penguin Random House, 2009, p. 161.

Ricks believes that the rapid decisive operations doctrine divorces itself from the “political, human, and psychological dimensions,” of warfare.¹⁴ Other post-World War II military defense structures and schemes of maneuver are also obsolete. Concepts such as the AirLand battle, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and Defense Transformation all involve as Kaldor states, “A combination of aerial bombardment at long distances and rapid offensive maneuver.”¹⁵ DOD and interagency leaders, as well as military and civilian planners must take into account current military structures, both inside and outside the “4+1” construct of threats to ensure an effective whole-of-government approach to trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional threats.

In addition to keeping military and political focus on broader problem sets than the “4+1” model, the U.S. must ensure strategic integration across all domains, regions, and functions. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning Draft*, June 2016, incorporates strategic integration into the Joint Planning Process (JPP).¹⁶ Indeed (or as the JP 5-0 clarifies), conducting planning in a vacuum or unilaterally in a functional or geographic CCMD could produce catastrophic results. A complete fusion across all functions and domains, with a singular commander of forces above the CCCR level, is an integral piece to the achievement of national objectives.¹⁷

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Kaldor, p. 155.

¹⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0*, DRAFT, June 2016.

¹⁷ The “singular commander of forces” concept will be expanded upon in **Area 3, Option 5**.

Area 2: Traditional Use of Authorities in the Current Goldwater-Nichols Legislation

Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, in consonance with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act outlines the following delineation of duties to the SECDEF:

SECDEF is responsible to the President for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities. SECDEF is the link between the President and the CCDRs, and provides direction and control of the CCDRs as they conduct military activities and operations. SECDEF provides authoritative direction and control over the Services through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. SECDEF exercises control of and authority over those forces not specifically assigned to the combatant commands (CCMDs) and administers this authority through the Military Departments, the Service Chiefs, and applicable chains of command.¹

Furthermore, the following roles are assigned to the CJCS:

The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the NSC (National Security Council), and SECDEF and functions under the authority, direction, and control of the President and SECDEF. The CJCS assists the President and SECDEF in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. Communications between the President or SECDEF and the CCDRs are normally transmitted through the CJCS.²

The DOD defines the Unified Command Plan (UCP) as the following:

The document, approved by the POTUS, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified CCDRs; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical AOR [area of responsibility] for geographic CCDRs; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional CCDRs.³

The UCP is a classified executive branch document prepared by the CJCS and reviewed and updated at a minimum of every two years. While the UCP is normally

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1*, March 25, 2013, II-2.

² Ibid.

³ Andrew Feickert, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Institute, January 3, 2013, p. 8, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf>.

published on a two-year cycle, it can be updated at the discretion of the SECDEF and with approval from the POTUS based on changing strategic, political, and budgetary requirements. As noted, the UCP assigns missions, planning, training, operational responsibilities, and geographic AOR to CCMDs. Under guidance from the SECDEF and as outlined in the UCP and JP 1, CCDRs are assigned the following responsibilities:

CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and SecDef for the preparedness of their commands and performance of assigned missions. GCCs have responsibility for a geographic AOR assigned through the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The UCP establishes CCMD missions and responsibilities, delineates the general geographical AOR for GCCs, and provides the framework used to assign forces.⁴

Under the current legislated command and control (C2) authorities and responsibilities contained in Title 10 U.S. Code and as stated in JP 1, “When significant operations overlap the boundaries of two GCCs’ AORs, a JTF will be formed. Command of this JTF will be determined by [the] SECDEF and forces transferred to the JTF commander through a CCDR, including delegation of appropriate command authority over those forces.”⁵ However, the C2 lines quickly become opaque and the competition for “high-demand/low-density” assets, as well as assets in other domains will lead to resource constraints and unnecessary risks for all commanders.⁶

⁴ Feickert, p. 9.

Ibid., II-2.

⁵ Ibid., p. IV-1.

⁶ The author recognizes CCDRs compete for forces on a regular basis, both in planning and execution requiring the SECDEF to make judgments regarding force allocation, risk management, and operational prioritization. The argument will be made in the following paragraphs as to “why” this responsibility should be delegated to a commander above the CCDR level, but below the SECDEF

For example, if a conflict arises in India, the commander of Pacific Command (PACOM) can request assets across the military forces and whole-of-government assets to support operations. However, the global security environment is rapidly altering, including a drastic decrease in traditional indications and warnings (I&W). General Dunford warned, “In today’s strategic environment decision space has collapsed, and so our decision-making processes have to keep pace with the speed of war today.”⁷ Most operations against state and non-state actors, including the “4+1,” would require reallocation of forces from multiple geographic and functional CCMDs. Furthermore, all of the five actors addressed in the “4+1” span multiple geographic and functional CCMDs. This not only results in a competition for “high-demand/low-density” assets, but all DOD assets, driving the need for a centralized global C2 structure with Title 10 U.S. code authorities written in law that do not task the SECDEF to adjudicate risk or arbitrate between CCDRs. However, the SECDEF retains final arbitration and adjudication authority in accordance with Title 10 U.S. code. The compressed decision space is the forcing function for consolidation of the global C2 structure and reallocation of Title 10 U.S. code authorities.⁸

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report highlighting deficiencies within the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The report cited, “USSTRATCOM has not developed a command-wide strategy to

with the SECDEF retaining final authority as the civilian in charge of the military under the POTUS in accordance with Title 10 U.S. code.

⁷ Garamone, p. 1.

⁸ Reallocating Title 10 U.S. code authorities is not to diminish the roles and authorities of the SECDEF, but to ensure the SECDEF maintains the ability to provide a strategic-level understanding to the POTUS during steady-state operations, as well as during periods of conflict. Civilian control of the military underpins the enduring national interests of the U.S. and it is not the intent of this thesis to advocate for reducing or diminishing civilian control of U.S. military forces.

effectively manage and coordinate its external outreach [support] activities.”⁹

Command *support* relationships can be identified by the SECDEF or requested by a specific CCDR. In accordance with JP 5-0, “the *supported* commander has the authority to exercise general direction of the *supporting* effort [including] the designation and prioritization of objectives, timing, and duration of the supporting action.”¹⁰ Additionally, the supporting commander’s duties as outlined in JP 5-0 are to “advise and coordinate with the *supported* commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of support [and] assist in planning for the integration of support into the *supported* commander’s effort as a whole.”¹¹ Due to the *supported versus supporting* nature of GCCs, and STRATCOM’s diverse mission sets, effective relationships and communication are essential. However, the report also highlighted that “consistent outreach to other DOD organizations, such as CCMDs, has become more difficult since STRATCOM has established separate subordinate organizations.”¹² Instead of globally integrating across the functional and geographic CCMDs, STRATCOM has further diluted the C2 structure with more subordinate commands and less multi-domain and multi-functional integration, or in this case, vertical integration. Relying on relationships or “effective communications” between CCDRs, CCMD planners, and their interagency partners is far less preferable than conferring authorities to a Joint Staff with “General Staff-like” functions under Title 10 U.S. code with a centralized global C2 structure.

⁹ U.S. GAO, *Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed By USSTRATCOM to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many Missions*, Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, HASC, September 2006, p. 5, GAO-06-847.

¹⁰ *Joint Publication 5-0*, p. 14.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Area 3: Potential Options for Defense Reform

There are various options in which Defense Reform could be enacted to better support a whole-of-government approach to tomorrow's crises. Listed below are five different options for Defense Reform.

Option 1 – In order to facilitate a more effective use of forces and maximize human capital, one option is to consolidate the CCMDs. One proposed geographic and functional CCMD consolidation structure would be as depicted below in *Table 1*.

Table 1. Proposed Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands

GEOGRAPHIC	FUNCTIONAL
AMERICASCOM (Americas Command)	STRATCOM
EUR-AFRICOM (European-Africa Command)	TRANSCOM (Transportation Command)
CENTCOM (Central Command)	SOCOM
PACOM (Pacific Command)	CYBERCOM (Cyber Command)

Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michèle Flournoy, supported CCMD restructuring based on unnecessary CCMD staff growth stating in December 2015, “CCMD staffs have grown to 38,000 people, that is nearly three divisions worth of staff in just the CCMDs alone. We have to ask if this is truly necessary and whether it is improving our warfighter capabilities.” She went on to say, “it is necessary to examine if there are duplicate functions in the Joint Staff, CCMDs, and subordinate commands that can be streamlined.”¹ In today's resource constrained environment,

¹ Michele Flournoy, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, *Increasing Effectiveness of Military Operations*, Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony, December 10, 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com:80/congressional/docview/t65.d40.12100003.u47?accountid=12686>.

excess overhead only creates a greater strain on the force and dilutes global C2 and strategic integration.

Option 2 – Another possible change to the 1986 GNA is to update and specifically delegate global C2 responsibilities by outlining in the UCP the CCMD which has the majority of assets participating in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional crisis as the overall theater CCDR, relieving the SECDEF from assigning the *supported versus supporting* delegation of duties. This CCDR, with the majority of forces, would be assigned OPCON over all assets, including Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Cyber operations, in order to facilitate a cohesive, multi-domain, interagency, and whole-of-government crisis response. As previously stated, the CCDRs' primary function is to accept combat ready forces and win the nation's wars. However, strategic level decisions on force allocations and risks must reside with the SECDEF. The SECDEF's decision matrix is primarily based on the advice provided by his/her Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, military advisors, including the CJCS/JCS/Joint Staff, and the Services' senior civilian leadership.² Codifying under law in Title 10 U.S. code the CCDR with the numerical superiority of forces or the CCDR with overall superior weight of effort as the *supported* CCDR would more effectively eliminate bias, potential points of friction, and/or the potential to ineffectively prioritize "high-demand/low-density" assets.

Option 3 – Authorizing the CJCS in Defense Reform legislation to act in the capacity as the overall commander of forces in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and

² Michael B. Donley, Former Secretary of the Air Force, *Warfighter Support*, SASC Testimony, December 3, 2015, p.7, <http://congressional.proquest.com/80/congressional/docview/t39.d40.12034203.d37?accountid=12686>.

multi-functional crisis is another feasible option. However, this can lead to concerns about delegating too much authority to one individual and will be expanded upon later in this thesis.

Option 4 – Realign the current DOD, DOS, and NSC regional boundaries into a common geographic AOR map to enhance the whole-of-government approach to global crises. *Figure 1* depicts the DOD, DOS, and NSC regional boundary maps. According to a recent study conducted by General Jones and the Atlantic Council, “A common [geographic] alignment would facilitate a whole-of-government approach and would lay the foundation for effective interagency collaboration.”³ Without question, cultural practices between the different agencies could create artificial barriers, but for the betterment of the nation and in order to pursue the enduring national interests of the U.S., increased interagency collaboration is absolutely necessary. President Barack Obama outlined in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23 the importance for interagency cooperation and set-forth policy guidelines to ensure, “transparency and coordination across the United States Government (USG).”⁴ Implementing a common system of geographic AORs would further facilitate a whole-of-government approach and response to a global crisis.

³ Jones, p. 8.

⁴ Office of the President of the United States, *PPD 23*, April 5, 2013, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy>.





Figure 1. 2016 DOD, DOS, & NSC Regional Boundaries

Option 5 – Authorize the SECDEF under Title 10 U.S. code, after consultation with the CJCS, to appoint a standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (HQ). *Option 5* is the option this thesis will support in **Area 5**. The Joint Staff JTF HQ, CJTF (Commander Joint Task Force) and staff component would permanently reside on the Joint Staff and remain postured and ready to assume the duties as the overall joint forces commander (JFC) in order to facilitate a cohesive, trans-regional, multi-functional, multi-domain, and interagency crisis response. The proposed C2 construct when activated by the POTUS and SECDEF is depicted below in *Figure 2*.

Figure 2. Proposed Joint Staff – CJTF C2 Structure⁵



Using the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator’s C2 authorities codified in Title 6 U.S. code as a framework, when the POTUS and the National Command Authority direct the SECDEF to activate the Joint Staff JTF, the Joint Staff CJTF now reports directly to the SECDEF.⁶ When the Joint Staff JTF is activated, the CJCS assumes the traditional advisory role and the supporting geographic and functional CCDRs report directly to the Joint Staff CJTF as the overall JFC.

One example of the roles and authorities the Joint Staff JTF would possess is exemplified by the DHS in the event of a Presidential declaration of a national disaster and when POTUS directs FEMA as the lead support agency. When a national emergency is declared and POTUS directs FEMA to assume the lead role

⁵ Following activation or when not activated by the POTUS and/or SECDEF, the C2 lines and Title 10 U.S. code authorities would refer back to Figure 3.

⁶ Title 6, U.S. Code, Section 314, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/314>.

under Title 6 authorities the FEMA Administrator reports directly to the POTUS, and the DHS Director no longer holds OPCON over the FEMA Administrator. As outlined under Title 6 U.S. code, the FEMA Administrator possesses the full authority to task assets as required, assumes all C2 authorities, and maintains responsibility for the strategic integration of all assets involved in responding to the national emergency until the crisis is resolved or POTUS deems necessary.⁷

Currently, Title 10 U.S. Code directs the SECDEF to appoint a CCDR as the overall JFC and the corresponding GCCs and FCCs assume the *supporting* role. As the JFC, the *supported* CCDR assumes all roles and responsibilities for operations within the respective AOR. In accordance with Title 10 U.S. code, as stated in the JP 1, and referenced in **Area 2**, operations that overlap the boundaries of two or more GCCs require the SECDEF to form a JTF and appoint a CJTF.⁸ Under current legislation, the *supporting* GCCs and FCCs assist the CJTF with forces, planning, logistics, etc., but the *supporting* CCDRs do not answer directly to the CJTF. In **Area 5** this thesis will highlight the issues in the current C2 construct in Title 10 U.S. code and why the proposed C2 construct of empowering a Joint Staff CJTF with a civilian deputy facilitates effective C2, strategic integration, and global synchronization in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional global security environment.

⁷ The FEMA administrator assumes roles and authorities similar to the combatant command (COCOM) roles and authorities delegated in Title 10 U.S. Code. Under the proposed *Option 5*, the CJTF would assume the roles and authorities similar to the existing COCOM Title 10 authorities and depicted in *Figure 2*. The POTUS and SECDEF would retain their current roles and authorities as delegated in the U.S. Constitution and Title 10 U.S. Code, however, under the proposed C2 structure, when activated, the Joint Staff CJTF would assume global COCOM authorities below the POTUS and SECDEF.

⁸ Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 155, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/155>.

Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), stated, “Our nation confronts the most diverse and complex array of crises since the end of World War II, from ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and Al Qaida to North Korea and Iran to Russia and China. What all of these threats have in common is that they are not confined to a single region of the world.”⁹ These actors span multiple regions and domains of military and interagency activities, but our CCMDs are still predominantly arranged geographically with distinctions from the geographic boundaries used by other government agencies. In order to maximize the ability of the U.S. to operate in the new global security environment, it is imperative to ensure the defense organization has regional and functional flexibility to address a trans-regional, multi-functional, and multi-domain conflict. To further facilitate interagency and whole-of-government global C2 integration and appropriate command authorities, the deputy CJTF would be a civilian government official appointed by the SECDEF in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁰ Interagency coordination, through the appointment of a Civilian Deputy CJTF, provides the critical link between the DOD and the other instruments of national power. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Ms.

⁹ Chairman Senate Armed Services Committee Senator John McCain, *Supporting the Warfighter of Today and Tomorrow*, SASC Testimony, December 3, 2015, p. 3, <http://congressional.proquest.com:80/congressional/docview/t65.40.12030003.u40?=12686>.

¹⁰ The intent behind placing a civilian as the Deputy CJTF is not to de-legitimize interagency participation or capabilities. Likewise, placing a government civilian as the Deputy CJTF is not meant to expand military control over U.S. government activities. *Footnote 13* offers several different options which place the appointed government civilian in charge of the Joint Staff JTF. Another construct to facilitate more effective strategic integration and global synchronization in order to foster a whole-of-government approach is to operationalize the National Security Council. This construct should be a catalyst to drive change within the executive branch to facilitate true unity of effort and unity of command across all U.S. government activities.

Kimberly Field highlighted the current deficiencies in the military and civilian command structures outlining the USG's need to, "develop an inter-operable and deployable capability across State, Defense, and USAID, [as well as,] issue an Executive Order or PPD to codify the above efforts and describe what it [C2 structure, roles, and authorities] will look like."¹¹

This proposal is a dramatic shift in both the civilian and military C2 paradigms. Civilian and military leaders alike attend Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) together, work side-by-side during Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations, perform Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR) missions, conduct on-going stability operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, across the continent of Africa, etc., and exist as cells within CCMDs and Joint Staffs across the globe. The military and its interagency partners work together on a daily basis and are becoming more knowledgeable with each other's intricacies. Now is the time to empower and synchronize the full spectrum of U.S. government activities with authorities under U.S. Code.

The Atlantic Council Combatant Command Task Force published a report in 2014 advocating a similar idea in which each GCC would have an ambassador-level civilian deputy.¹² This thesis takes the idea one step further in giving the civilian deputy in the Joint Staff JTF the authority under Title 10 U.S. Code to act in the

¹¹ Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kimberly Fields, "Sustainable Stability": A Feasible Future for U.S. Stabilization Efforts, November 2016, p. 2.

¹² Jones, p. 4.

capacity as deputy commander solidifying the interagency relationships at the both CCMD and CJTF levels.¹³

The GNA drove the force to become Joint, now it is time to drive the force to become whole-of-government. In 2010, SOUTHCOM dual-roled their civilian political advisor (POLAD) into a Civilian Deputy to the Commander. Deputy

¹³ The existing Title 10 U.S. code does not stipulate requirements for the Deputy JFC. Appointing a civilian as the Deputy JFC and Deputy CJTF requires changes to existing Title 10 code. First, this thesis recommends codifying in law, the requirement for a civilian appointed by the SECDEF, Secretary of State, and the Director of USAID, in coordination with the CJCS, as the Deputy JFC as proposed under the Joint Staff JTF construct. Second, this thesis recommends codifying in law the actual roles and responsibilities including assuming overall JFC duties in the event the JFC is incapacitated during operations.

These new authorities would be an amalgamation of current Title 10 and Title 22 U.S. Code authorities including: the command authority to direct subordinate commands and forces, prescribe the chain of command for the forces and elements within the command, organize and employ commands and forces within the command, coordinate and approve aspects of administration and support necessary to conduct operations within the command, and exercise the authority to select subordinate commanders, relieve subordinate commanders, select staff, convene courts martial, represent the interests of the United States in relation to foreign countries and international organizations, and perform the functions relevant to their appointments and assignments, provide guidance for the formulation and conduct of programs and activities of the Department and other agencies which relate to the foreign relations of the United States, and perform functions on behalf of any agency or other Government establishment (including any establishment in the legislative or judicial branch) requiring their services. (Title 10 U.S. Code Section 164, Subsection C & Title 22 U.S. Code Chapter 52, Subchapter I, Section 3904)

Another nuance to this proposal would be to reverse the roles and authorities by appointing a civilian as the Joint Staff CJTF/JFC and placing a military officer as the Deputy CJTF/JFC. This would ensure civilian control over the military and potentially promote greater unity of command across all U.S. government activities in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional crisis. However, there are several current issues keeping a civilian from commanding fielded combat forces. First, not all civilians are career professionals in their area of expertise. Some senior-level civilian officials are politically appointed and come from various career fields outside of the normal whole-of-government activities. On the contrary, senior military officers appointed as a CJTF, a JFC, and/or a CCDR are career military officers with more than 30 years of military experience. This is not to say that in the future a civilian cannot act in the capacity as a CJTF, a JFC, or CCDR, but professionalization similar to that of uniformed officers in the DOD would be paramount to ensure success. Another approach would be to put a civilian as the CJTF during different phases of the operation. Using Phase 0 through Phase 5 as an example, during steady-state or Phase 0 operations, a civilian could fill CJTF and/or JFC duties. Likewise, at some point during Phase IV and/or Phase V, depending on the security situation on the ground, a civilian could assume COCOM authorities as the CJTF/JFC. This is similar to how the C2 structure exists in the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I).

The third option would be to appoint a civilian as the Joint Staff CJTF/JFC and have two deputies. One Deputy CJTF/JFC would be a civilian with the appropriate authorities under Title 10 and Title 22 U.S. Code to facilitate unity of command within the interagency. The other Deputy CJTF/JFC would be a military officer with the appropriate authorities under Title 10 and Title 22 U.S. Code to facilitate unity of command within the DOD.

Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman stated, “appointing Ambassador Paul Trivelli, as the senior diplomat, with considerable regional and political expertise enabled SOUTHCOM to take into account a broader range of cross-cultural factors in its planning and implementation activities.”¹⁴ AFRICOM has followed suit and appointed a Civilian Deputy. Appointing a Civilian Deputy is not revolutionary within a CCMD. However, it is a necessary evolution to align resources and capabilities behind policies and activities between the other agencies of government and DOD.

Although USAID participates in the development and review of the DOD’s Guidance for Employment of Force (GEF) and is creating efforts to become more involved in building CCMD theater campaign plans, it is time to work towards legitimizing interagency efforts and placing them in the direct chain of command.¹⁵ The civilian agencies and their personnel, who work along-side DOD personnel on a daily basis, bring an immense level of knowledge and unique capabilities. Likewise, the DOD brings a vast array of capabilities and resources to a crisis. Appointing a civilian deputy with Title 10 U.S. code authorities gives the CJTF and his deputy the ability to “reach back” for additional interagency support, as well as project forward the interagency involvement in the pursuit of integrating all elements of national power in order to achieve national interests and objectives. James Roberts, retired U.S. Army Special Forces operator and subject matter expert at the College of

¹⁴ Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman, *National Security and Interagency Collaboration*, House National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee Testimony, July 28, 2010, p. 2, <http://congressional.proquest.com:80/congressional/docview/t39.d40.072862.d33?accountid=12686>.

¹⁵ Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator U.S. AID Susan Reichle, *National Security and Interagency Collaboration*, House National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee Testimony, July 28, 2010, p. 8, <http://congressional.proquest.com:80/congressional/docview/t39.d40.072861.d33?accountid=12686>.

International Security Affairs, National Defense University, stated “as enemy actors evolve further, and hone their Gray Zone doctrines, our interagency national security mechanisms will continue to require longer term, flexible, and rapidly adaptable authorities [Title X] and capabilities.”¹⁶ The days of “unilateral” military operations without interagency involvement are over.

Two important caveats exist in the proposed CJTF and staff component structure in this thesis. First, the proposed C2 structure in *Figure 2* is not applicable in all conflicts. The existing Title 10 authorities for CDRs would not change. In the event of a regional crisis not requiring cross-CCMD integration or global integration, and after consulting with the NSC and CJCS, the affected CDR would retain authority and execute according to Title 10 authorities and the UCP. However, appointing a civilian deputy in each CCMD, similar to the model in U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), with authorities in law under Title 10 is still a necessity to foster global integration in today’s environment. Second, the author recognizes existing budget limitations and personnel shortfalls within the DOS and USAID that make filling the proposed civilian deputy CJTF and civilian deputy CDRs difficult. In order to ensure properly resourced civilian capabilities, budget priorities within the DOD would need to be realigned and reallocated to facilitate increased DOS personnel billets to meet the proposed C2 structure. Special Assistant to the CJCS Mr. Matthew Cordova in his 2009 article *A Whole-of-Government Approach to Stability* stated, “There is no single agency or country solution and no

¹⁶ Roberts, p. 31.

single strategy that will endure over time to solve these challenges.”¹⁷ Today’s dynamic global security environment requires a true whole-of-government approach to effectively execute in a trans-regional, multi-functional, and multi-domain crisis.

¹⁷ Matthew Cordova, *A Whole of Government Approach to Stability*, U.S. State Department Blog, June 10, 2009, p. 1, www.blogs.state.gov/stories/2009.

Area 4: Implementation and Effectiveness of Past and Present Defense Reform Proposals in Today's Environment

Defense Reform is not a new concept. Since passing the GNA in 1986, Defense Reform proposals have been reviewed and at varying times implemented, but none have specifically altered the DOD landscape or postured the Warfighter and the interagency partners for future successes. Several useful concepts for Defense Reform can be found as additions to the 1986 GNA, but each has limitations that prevent it from serving as an adequate foundation for the development of a comprehensive set of reforms which effectively enable the U.S. defense organizations to operate in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional environment.

JTFs have become the operational arm of CCMDs. Senator John McCain stated, “every time there is a major contingency, emergency, or some challenge [the U.S.] forms a JTF, and they [the JTF] address it rather than the CCMDs.”¹ The JTF construct in its current form is not capable of synchronizing efforts in a trans-regional and multi-functional crisis due to shortfalls and limitations under existing Title 10 U.S. Code authorities.

In October 2009, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration in coordination with the DOD Chief Information Officer published a report highlighting JTF and CCMD deficiencies. The report noted, “A CCDR’s ability to sustain the readiness of Service operational headquarters (HQ) designated as “JTF Capable” Headquarters (HQ) is constrained by a combination of manpower, equipment, and training issues, as well as shortfalls in

¹ Senator McCain, p. 22.

readiness reporting guidance and tools/systems.”² The report went on to say that a JTF commander’s ability to globally coordinate and integrate military operations with non-DOD organizations, including coalition and allied partners, other government agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, are constrained by “technical and policy based information-sharing issues and a lack of understanding and knowledge of non-DOD organizations.”³

During a recent House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing, Chairman Mack Thornberry (R-TX) stated the DOD needed to be more “agile and adaptive to the ever-changing and dynamic global security environment.”⁴ Furthermore, leading DOD experts, Dr. Charles Hamre, Chief Executive Officer for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Dr. Dov Zakheim, former DOD Chief Financial Officer, and U.S. Army General (Retired) Carter Ham, former commander AFRICOM, unanimously agreed the GNA was outdated and Defense Reform should remain a top priority for the U.S. Congress.⁵ The three defense experts contend that the GNA has had many positive impacts on the DOD and has shaped today’s force into the world’s most formidable military. However, 30 years is a significant period of time to pass without enacting legal revisions to more effectively conduct C2 and changes to command structures. The necessity for Defense Reform is widely recognized by current and retired military and civilian

² Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, *DOD Command & Control Implementation Plan Version 1.0*, October 1, 2009, para. 3.1.2.

³ Ibid.

⁴ U.S. House Armed Services Committee (HASC), *HASC Hearing – Defense Reform*, Representative Mack Thornberry, July 7, 2016, <https://armedservices.house.gov/legislation/hearings/full-committee-hearing-goldwater-nichols-reform-way-ahead>.

⁵ U.S. House Armed Services Committee, *HASC Hearing*.

leaders, however, few proposed courses of action have been implementable or executable.

As stated in **Area 3, Option 3**, one popular proposal is to elevate the CJCS in the chain of command. In the current CCMD structure under Title 10 U.S. Code, the CCDR reports directly to the SECDEF. Many lawmakers have proposed placing the CJCS above the CCDR. Under this construct the CCDR reports to the CJCS and the CJCS reports to the SECDEF, who in turn reports to the POTUS. Although a valid option, opponents argue it is unacceptable to give one individual such levels of authority. Neither the administration under President Barrack Obama, nor lawmakers in the House and Senate were in favor of placing the CJCS in the direct chain of command. According to the Goldwater-Nichols Working Group Memo, addressing the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Administration recommended: “Strengthen the Chairman’s capability to support the Secretary in management, planning, and execution across the CCMDs. This could be achieved without placing the chairman in the chain of command.”⁶ This is a noteworthy argument, but the more important issues include potential conflicts of interest. Referencing the definition of CJCS duties and authorities under Title 10 U.S. Code and in JP 1, it is feasible to say a conflict of interest could occur between the current force structure, manning requirements, and future requirements in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional conflict. This does not mean the two are mutually exclusive, but shaping the force for one on-going conflict may not be the proper force structure to conduct a separate on-going conflict or a future conflict. Retired

⁶ Kathleen J. McInnis, *Fact Sheet: FY2017 National Defense Reform Authorization Act DOD Reform Proposals*, June 30, 2016, p. 4, Congressional Research Service, <http://www.crs.gov/R44508.pdf>.

EUCOM Commander General Wesley Clark warned, “It is the responsibility of the Chairman to use his influence to deal with what is in some respects a natural tension between Service Chiefs, who are responsible for a longer-term view, and the regional commanders [CCDRs] who are responsible for the immediate response to crises.”⁷

One tragic example and an additional reason to keep the CJCS out of the operational chain of command occurred during Operation EAGLE CLAW, more commonly known as Desert One. During the planning for Desert One, the CJCS, U.S. Air Force General David C. Jones, took on the responsibility as the overall JTF 1-79 Commander. General Jones ordered initiation of the development of an OPLAN within the Joint Staff and elected to not involve or delegate any other associated commands. Furthermore, General Jones bypassed the applicable Unified Commands and failed to incorporate the related GCCs and FCCs in the planning process.⁸ The result was a complex and compartmentalized OPLAN that was developed in a vacuum. Ultimately, the lack of coordination between the POTUS, CJCS, functional CCDRs, and geographic CCDRs potentially led to the overall failure of the mission, unnecessary risks, and loss of life. Keeping the CJCS out of the direct CCMD chain of command, but in a direct advisory role, relieves the individual of potential conflicts of interest based on the current duty authorities as previously outlined in JP 1 and allows the CJCS to act as an arbiter between the civilian leadership, JCS, CCDRs, and/or CJTF.

⁷ Wesley K. Clark, General (Retired), *Waging Modern Warfare*, Public Affairs, 2002, p. 452.


⁸ John E. Valliere, *Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change*, p. 72, https://ndu.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-855979-dt-content-rid-1849147_2/courses/JAWS6611_02_201701_SEM_02/Desert%20One.pdf.

Area 5: Proposed New Joint Staff Structure

There are many on-going debates on how to define “threats”, how to define “ends” (political or military objectives), and what “ways” (strategy) the DOD must pursue in order to achieve the goals set forth in the Commander in Chief’s National Security Strategy (NSS). The DOD is the only government agency currently capable of rapidly mobilizing its forces, even in peacetime, to meet the POTUS’ national security objectives. The opinion of some leading defense experts and Former Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Rosa Brooks is that the U.S. military has been America’s “on-call solution” for over 150 years.¹ This has never been more evident than in the post-9/11 era. The military has been asked to perform in capacities well outside its traditional boundaries, but time and again, the U.S. military demonstrates its ability to adapt and overcome. Even in the face of adversity, the U.S. military has maintained its capacity to mold itself at the tactical and operational levels to meet Commander’s intent. However, the rapidly changing global security environment poses significant threats to the U.S. military’s ability to effectively conduct combat operations against threats with trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional capabilities. The adversary of the future is unpredictable, but the JOE 2035 outlines several potential geographic areas of conflict where the U.S. military and its interagency partners must be prepared to operate. Under the current UCP, as legislated by the GNA, the CCMD structure in a potential Russian theater of operations is as follows:

¹ Rosa Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales From the Pentagon*, Simon & Schuster, New York, NY, 2016.

Figure 3. Existing CCMD Structure and Chain of Command.²



Under the recommended C2 structure in this thesis as previously stated in **Area 3, Option 5**, the Joint Staff CJTF reports directly to the SECDEF who in turn reports directly to the POTUS. The Joint Staff CJTF and their headquarters (HQ) staff, acting in the capacity as a General Staff, would have all the authorities and responsibilities listed under Title 10 U.S. code as a Unified Commander and global integrator of U.S. government activities. Each of the functional and geographic CCDRs would fall under the overall global C2 of the Joint Staff CJTF. The CJTF, the civilian deputy CJTF, and their staff would lead the overall global planning efforts in the event of a crisis, as well as assemble force structures and movements with the close advisement of the CJCS, CCDRs, CCMD planners, and interagency staffs. (Refer to Figure 2. *Proposed Joint Staff – CJTF C2 Structure*, p. 20)

Although using the term General Staff may hold a negative connotation from historical examples, such as the Prussian General Staff, the model in this thesis illustrates that the proposed Joint Staff structure is not representative of historical General Staffs. Many western military leaders and theorists have viewed the Prussian

² Feickert, p. 11.

General Staff as, “one of those *dark forces*, which was weaving the threads of the destiny of nations behind the scenes.”³ The Joint Staff JTF proposed in this thesis is not a “professional” General Staff, whose members leave their respective services and permanently join the General Staff. These personnel, just like today’s Joint Staff personnel, would fulfill their required tenure and then return to their respective service.

There are some individuals who believe a complete overhaul of defense legislation is not required and reforms can be made within the existing construct of the GNA. For instance, under the current CCMD structure, a CDR reports directly to the SECDEF. In the event of an internal conflict over “low-density, high-demand assets,” force allocation, or engaging across established geographic CCMD boundaries, the SECDEF has the ability, under law, to act as the arbiter between CDRs. However, the SECDEF, as stated by a top senior ranking military official, “does not have the time, nor the capacity, to arbitrate on-going conflicts of interest between CDRs.” Furthermore, the SECDEF must continuously stay abreast of the entire spectrum of operations where the DOD is currently engaged. Constantly requiring the SECDEF to arbitrate conflicts between CDRs could potentially have detrimental consequences.

The SECDEF, as the lead DOD civilian who reports directly to the POTUS, should not be forced into the position of continuously arbitrating between CDRs, nor should they be required to divert attention towards a single conflict. The SECDEF must preserve the ability to maintain a global view of all DOD interests and

³ Colonel Christian Millitat, German Army, *Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System*, U.S. Army War College, p. 5, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a249255.pdf>.

not just those of a certain conflict or area of operations (AO). Rupert Smith, a retired General Officer in the Army of the United Kingdom, highlighted a personal example of this exact situation when he was the Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). General Smith witnessed a theater operation in Bosnia for which he was the commander of troops, but the United Nations (UN) had troops deployed to Macedonia and Croatia. With forces in three different geographic AOs, the UN needed a central commander. The UN commander, based in Zagreb, found “himself in limbo: neither a strategic commander nor able to command the three theaters simultaneously.”⁴ The same situation could apply to the SECDEF if placed in the role as the overall theater commander. In order for the DOD to function effectively, it is imperative that the SECDEF maintain macro-level situational awareness across all CCMD AORs. They must never divert attention toward a singular area for fear of strategic overlook in another. This could lead to oversight in other critical areas resulting in catastrophic effects across the DOD, other agencies of government, and U.S. interests world-wide.

One example of the effective use of the joint task force employment model is the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF). The NJTTF, headquartered in Washington, D.C., encompasses over 48 various local, state, and national agencies to combat terrorism at home and abroad. For instance, the NJTTF fuses intelligence and operations between the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), DOD, DOS,

⁴ Rupert Smith, General (Retired), *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, First Vintage Books Edition, February 2008, p. 17.

U.S. Secret Service (USSS), U.S. Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), state and local law enforcement, and specialized agencies, such as railroad police.⁵

Under the recommended Joint Staff JTF structure in this thesis, the POTUS and/or National Security Council (NSC) would identify the need to conduct global integration of operations against an adversary. The SECDEF, in coordination with the CJCS, would activate the Joint Staff JTF under the single C2 structure as depicted in *Figure 2*. The Joint Staff CJTF and the Civilian Deputy, whose staff and planners are already in place on the Joint Staff, would develop or expand upon an existing campaign plan, and then execute the campaign plan in concert with the representatives from the respective *supporting* CCMDs.

For instance, in a notional Russian theater of operations the *supporting* GCCs, FCCs, and interagency partners would include, but not necessarily be limited to, NORTHCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, CYBERCOM, STRATCOM, SOCOM, TRANSCOM, and a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The timeline or spectrum of urgency would determine whether the team was conducting crisis action planning or a deliberate planning effort. At a minimum, the players listed above would comprise the planning team. Together the team would globally synchronize and integrate all movements, across all domains and functions, in order to fulfill political and military objectives. At the discretion of the CJTF, they could appoint subordinate commanders in accordance with the existing construct in JP 3-33, assigning a Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander (C/JFACC), Combined/Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (C/JFMCC),

⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Protecting America: National Task Force Wages War on Terror*, August 19, 2008, p. 1, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/august/njtf_081908.

Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander (C/JFLCC), Combined/Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (C/JFSOCC), Combined/Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (C/JCMOTF), and Combined/Joint Military Information Support Operations Task Force (C/JMISTF).⁶

Unlike today's current structure, the civilian deputy Joint Staff CJTF would ensure close coordination and facilitate a C2 forcing function with the civilian agency counterparts. Most importantly, the civilian deputy Joint Staff CJTF would ensure the Ambassador's Country Team Assessment and Integrated Country Strategy are reviewed, analyzed, and incorporated into the JPP. These two documents, along with the interagency regional and country expertise, would help shape campaign plan development and ensure the planning efforts are resource informed and accurately articulate risk.

JP 5-0 highlights the need for close coordination between the military and its civilian counterparts. It states that a "shared understanding includes leaders (both civilian and military) identifying expected contributions from other USG departments and agencies and how they could affect military and strategic success. Interagency planning should ensure these expectations are shared by all agencies and are realistic based on agency capabilities and capacity."⁷ Although this is solid guidance to facilitate interagency cooperation and the whole-of-government approach to a multi-domain, multi-functional, and trans-regional crisis, following JP 5-0 is not compulsory. The proposed global integration of all U.S. government activities with a civilian deputy CJTF who has the appropriate authorities should be written in Defense

⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-33*, July 30, 2012, p. III-6.

⁷ *Joint Publication 5-0*, p. 18.

Reformation law under Title 10 U.S. code. Furthermore, JP 5-0 illustrates the critical nature of ensuring effective interagency collaboration and coordination by stating:

Effective collaboration and coordination with interagency partners can be a critical component to successful operations and campaign activities, as well as during transitions when JFCs may operate in support of other USG departments and agencies. JFCs and their staffs must consider how the capabilities of DOD and these departments and agencies can assist each other in accomplishing the broader national strategic objectives. [Geographic CCDRs] should coordinate directly with interagency representatives within their own command and in the AOR during planning to obtain appropriate agreements that support their plans (such as supporting the Department of State [DOS] joint regional strategy and individual integrated country strategies as well).⁸

JP 5-0 clearly encourages interagency collaboration and recognizes the necessity of a whole-of-government approach and although formalized by the CJCS is not statutory under Title 10 U.S. Code. Part of a true multi-functional and multi-domain approach is merging the civilian expertise with the military expertise in the pursuit of national interests and objectives.

Another reason to incorporate DOD and interagency collaboration into Defense Reform and codify it in law under Title 10 U.S. Code is highlighted in JP 5-0's short-sided view of true interagency collaboration. JP 5-0 states, "CCMDs *should* seek OSD approval for full releasability of this [JP 5-0 JPP Annex] to all affected agencies during the development to ensure inputs are considered and incorporated at the earliest stage practicable."⁹ Asking the CCCR and CCMD planners to seek OSD approval for "releasability" of the JP 5-0 JPP Annex versus incorporating interagency partners into the JPP can result in an incomplete understanding of the problem or

⁸ *Joint Publication 5-0*, p. 24.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

crisis, ineffective time management due to inducing additional layers into the campaign plan approval processes, and limiting interagency exposure to the overall concept of operations (CONOP), which they will inevitably be required to take over at some point during or immediately following combat operations. Placing a civilian as the deputy Joint Staff CJTF and codifying their authorities and responsibilities in law under Title 10, will provide a forcing function to ensure the DOD and interagency execute more effectively in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional threat environment.

Another obstacle confronting the current JPP paradigm and hindering cross-CCMD authorities is highlighted in the JP 5-0. The JP 5-0 addresses trans-regional threats or threats that span multiple CCMDs. More succinctly, the JP 5-0 states, “The President or SECDEF may designate one CCCR as the global synchronizer to lead the planning effort, with execution accomplished across multiple CCMDs,” recognizing the need for CCCRs to ensure global C2 coordination and integration from a whole-of-government perspective across geographic combatant command lines.¹⁰ However, the JP 5-0 goes on to say:

The phrase “synchronizing planning” pertains specifically to planning efforts only and does not, by itself, convey authority to execute operations or direct execution of operations. Unless directed by SECDEF, the CCCR responsible for leading the planning effort for a global campaign or problem set is responsible for aligning and harmonizing the plans. Execution of the individual plans remains the responsibility of the GCC or FCC in whose UCP authority it falls.¹¹

This clearly highlights the need for a delineation of authorities in law under Title 10 regarding cross-CCMD operations. Relying on *supported versus*

¹⁰ *Joint Publication 5-0*, p. 78.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

supporting or *executive agency* coordination relationships can ultimately lead to ineffective cooperation, potentially jeopardizing national security interests. Formalizing a global C2 structure to facilitate strategic integration and a whole-of-government approach under Title 10 U.S. Code is instrumental in ensuring effective operations in a trans-regional, multi-functional, and multi-domain global security environment.

Conclusion

Defense reform has been at the forefront of the agenda of U.S. lawmakers for more than a decade. During its tenure, the GNA has facilitated the development of the World's most lethal and Joint fighting force. However, after three decades, it is time to meaningfully address and enact defense reforms in order to set in motion the Warfighters' and their interagency partners' future successes on the battlefield. Retired U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) General James L. Jones, former Commandant of the USMC, Commander of EUCOM, and National Security Advisor to President Obama recommended, "The U.S. must move forward with a synchronized and coordinated interagency approach from initial planning to execution in order to confront the vast array of challenges and threats in the twenty-first century."¹ The adversaries of today and tomorrow require a unique blend of effective global C2, strategic and vertical integration, and the whole-of-government approach to meet a trans-regional, multi-functional, and multi-domain threat. Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein highlighted this in his speech to the AUSA Annual Conference in October 2016 stating, "we must be able to conduct regional C2, pull together all of the capabilities and domains, and optimize all of the components to be able to do this business of trans-regional warfare."² He called the interaction at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), which includes space, personnel recovery, coalition nations, and other U.S. agencies, "magical, but it was too slow for the future

¹ Jones, p. IV.

² U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein, *Taking Multi-Domain Integration to the Next Level*, October 5, 2016, Journal of the Air Force Association: Daily Air Force Magazine, p. 1.

of warfare” and suggested vertical integration as a solution.³ Empowering the Joint Staff JTF and civilian deputy, under Title 10 U.S. code, to act in the capacity of a General Staff with all authorities and responsibilities needed to facilitate synchronization across all of the whole-of-government activities will more effectively enable global integration between the Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID, and the other interagency partners. After 30 years of existence, the Goldwater-Nichols Act does not address the challenges of today’s Warfighter in a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional crisis. Defense Reforms to update the current legislation and align it to today’s rapidly changing global security environment must be a top priority. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (Retired) John Shalikashvili’s words are a fitting conclusion: “Yet we cannot retreat, we must go forward. I am confident that we will triumph in these revolutions and that our Armed Forces will remain the most formidable in the world.”⁴

³ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴ “Quoted from,” Margaret M. Polski, *Strategy 2.0: The Next Generation*, Joint Forces Quarterly 81, 2nd Quarter 2016, p. 25.

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Lt Col Gallemore entered the Air Force in 1999 after graduating with a B.S. in Agriculture Business from Texas A&M University. He holds a Master's degree in Military Strategy from the Marine Corps University and an M.B.A. in International Business from Touro University International. Lt Col Gallemore graduated from Joint Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training in 1999 and is a command pilot with more than 3,700 flying hours including over 190 combat hours. He has had numerous F-16 operational assignments, flown in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ATLANTIC RESOLVE and was a member of the United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron, the Thunderbirds. He served as the Director of Operations, 480th Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem AB, Germany and prior to his current assignment as the Commander of the 80th Fighter Squadron, 8th Operations Group, 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea. His military awards include the Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters and the Air Medal with one oak leaf cluster.

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