

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

COORDINATING MILITARY RESPONSE TO DISASTERS

by


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Section I

Introduction

The attacks by terrorist on September 11, 2001, prompted the Department of Defense (DoD) to formulate a new set of capabilities support to civilian authorities during natural disasters and emergencies. In April 2002, the DoD created a new geographic combatant command Northern Command (U.S.NORTHCOM).¹ The Unified Command Plan (UCP) established the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide command and control of the department's homeland defense efforts and to coordinate Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).² The need for the DoD to adapt to the changing environment requires a more prudent response. The action and response efforts of the past are to upgrade to meet the challenges of disasters and emergencies within the homeland. While key steps in planning, preparation, funding, and training in support of civil support occurred, identification of a dedicated force to respond to the U.S. territories remains a challenge. In reviewing the required capabilities for support of civil authorities, it is clear the majority of the assets are located in the Army National Guard. They are geographically and organizationally dispersed throughout the National Guard. The DoD needs to identify a tailored response force of Army National Guard Soldiers as the optimal solution for disaster response specifically to the territories of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Determining the right mix for of forces to preempt an incident on U.S. soil as well as defining the optimal disaster response force is a challenge for NORTHCOM. Moreover, it is a definite challenge for NORTHCOM to respond quickly and effectively outside

¹ "Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Handbook", Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit 2011, pp. 8

² Scott Shepherd and Steve Bowman, "Homeland Security: Establishment and Implementation of the United States Northern Command," CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006): 1, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesecc/RS21322.pdf>

the United States mainland. With this role, should the DoD and specifically USNORTHCOM create a force structure to support the DSCA requirements in the territories of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands? Yes, NORTHCOM must create a force to respond effectively to disasters in the territories because of their location outside the mainland U.S. Kristina Emmons in her book *Specialized Regional National Guard Brigades- The Army's Federal Disaster Response Force* in 2012, she argued the federal government suitable response to response to disasters and emergencies is through National Guard specialized brigades.³ With this concept, I recommend two options for DoD to select the Army National Guard as the dedicated response force under NORTHCOM. The two options include using the disaster stricken state's National Guard units in federal status, or using a FEMA regionally located tailored National Guard brigade in support. The analysis will show the option of a tailored National Guard brigade as the most effective solution and answer to the disaster response problem in the territories based on training, structure and resources.

In order to react with a response nationally to catastrophes, DoD should look at modifications to the current response force when there is a disaster in the territories to ensure a capable response within the affected areas. To support my argument, section one outlines the roles and responsibilities of the DoD and other governmental agencies. Section two outlines the DoD initiatives to improve disaster relief response. Section three examines current DoD frameworks and a comparison of response of two noted natural disasters. Section four analyzes the two options of the affected area National Guard forces and the tailored regional located

³ Emmons, Kristina, *Specialized Regional National Guard Brigades – The Army's Federal Disaster Response Force*, BiblioScholar, November 2012, pp.iii.

brigade for responsiveness and capabilities. Section five will display the recommendations and conclusions.

Title

Coordinating Military Response to Disasters

Thesis

Military response to natural disasters is a critical aspect to securing the homeland which requires a collaborated effort of all agencies to respond quickly and effectively. The United States Department of Defense, Northern Command, must identify a tailored response National Guard Brigade package that is trained and resourced with the capabilities to assist the US territories.

United States Northern Command Role

Northern Command (U.S. NORTHCOM) geographic area of responsibility consists of the 48 continental U.S. states, Alaska, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Canada and Mexico.⁴ Of note, DoD delegated the same set of responsibilities to U.S. Pacific Command in order to provide assistance to U.S. areas outside USNORTHCOM's area of responsibilities such as Hawaii, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. The assigned responsibilities fall into two broad categories: Homeland Defense—the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats as directed by the president.⁵ The second category is Defense Support of Civil Authorities—is DoD support, including federal military forces, the department's career civilian

⁴“Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Handbook”, Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit 2011, <http://www.survivablebooks.com>, pp.8

⁵ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, D.C., February 2010), 10-1.

and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and components assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.⁶

USNORTHCOM's specific missions as defined in the UCP are to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests, within its assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the president or the secretary of defense, provide defense support to civil authorities, including immediate crisis and subsequent consequence management operations. The secondary mission, defense support to civil authorities, also known as civil support, held a lower priority and emphasis.⁷

USNORTHCOM's geographic AOR for the conduct of normal operations includes North America, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida; the Caribbean region inclusive of the U.S. Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos Islands, including Cozumel. DSCA response, per CONPLAN 3500, conducts support within the domestic portion of the USNORTHCOM AOR; to include the 48 contiguous States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.⁸

United States Southern Command Role

SOUTHCOM is responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation in its assigned Area of Responsibility which includes: Central America, South America and the Caribbean (except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions).⁹ The

⁶ Ibid., pp.7.

⁷ Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington D.C: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2005),pp. 1-5.

⁸ CONPLAN 3500-14, DSCA Response, 17 July 2014, pp.9.

⁹ "United States Southern Command Partnership for the Americas", About Main - US Southern Command, www.southcom.mil/.../About-Us.aspx, (Accessed November 27, 2015).

command is also responsible for the force protection of U.S. military resources at these locations. SOUTHCOM is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal.

National Guard Role

The National Guard are the only forces that can serve in three different categories as a force. These categories are substantial to the governor and DoD during catastrophes and emergencies. The National Guard under Title 32 U.S.C. 502(f) authorizes federal funding of the Guard for Department of Defense approved operations.¹⁰ It was also the authority cited for the National Guard's participation in the civil support. Because the missions executed in Title 32 status serve a federal purpose, the federal government funds it. Typically, this is the duty status for Guardsmen during their training and other federally authorized operations. This status is significant to the states' vantage point, because Title 32 is the preferred status for the employment of their National Guard in civil support. It gives the governors the edge for the governor to remain in control of the National Guard with federal funding.¹¹

The second category is National Guard forces in a State Duty role. The State Duty calls to National Guard units that are not under federal control. The governors of states and territories Guam, Virgin Islands and the commonwealth of Puerto Rico remains as commander-in-chief of their respective forces.¹² When the governor calls up the National Guard to respond, it is in state active duty. This is typically the National Guard's status in response to disaster events or

¹⁰ Lowenberg, Timothy, J., *The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security*, Vol. 2006 (Washington, DC: National Guard Association of the United States, 2005), pp.2, <http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000457/primer%20fin.pdf> (Accessed November 27, 2015).

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Army National Guard, National Guard "Fact Sheet," http://www.arng.army.mil/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publications/News%20Media%20Factsheets/ARNG_Factsheet_May_06%20ARNG%20fact%20Sheet.pdf, pp.4, (accessed October 2015).

civil unrest. In state active duty status, they have no command connection to DoD or the federal government. The governor is their commander in chief, the state funds their operation and they operate according to state laws and the state's constitution and statutes. This is the authority under which governors activate and deploy National Guard forces in response to natural disasters and man-made emergencies such as riots or terrorist attacks.¹³

The third role is federal duty. Title 10 service means full-time duty in the active military service of the United States or federalized. Title 10 is federal service that DoD controls and funds. It removes the governor and the state Adjutant General from the National Guard chain of command and replaces them with the President and the Secretary of Defense. The President can federalized National Guard forces by ordered to active duty in their National Guard status.¹⁴

Governmental Agencies

Various federal agencies also have a role during disasters and emergencies. In the wake of a disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) plays a critical role in meeting the needs of affected populations in the United States. FEMA is the government agency charged with supporting U.S. citizens and first responders "to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards."¹⁵ FEMA's emergency support functions (ESFs) range from transportation and communications to logistics management and public safety and security. But effective disaster preparedness requires more than FEMA alone can provide.

¹³ Robinson, Spencer, pp. 2

¹⁴ Army National Guard, National Guard Fact Sheet, pp.3.

¹⁵ "Center for Disaster Philanthropy", The Role of FEMA in Disasters, www.disasterphilanthropy.org/the-role-of-fema-in-disasters, (accessed October 2015)

Other DoD organizations such as the Army Corp of Engineers and the Defense Logistics Agency support FEMA during disasters and major emergencies with power generation and logistics capabilities.

Statutes and Policies

These incremental legislative changes assigned roles and responsibilities for incidents or events at the state and federal level. The Stafford Act of 1974 which is most critical to my argument authorizes the President to issue major disaster declarations and direct federal agencies including DoD to provide assistance to states overwhelmed by disasters.¹⁶ There are three categories of assistance, fire management assistance, emergency declarations, and major disaster declarations. The Stafford Act gives the President authority to deploy federal military forces into the states or territories for defense support of civil authorities missions when the governors request it. DoD assets for emergency work may be provided on a limited basis prior to the presidential declaration.

The National Emergencies Act provides procedures for Presidential declaration of national emergencies. The Presidential declaration of a national emergency under the act is a prerequisite to exercising any special or extraordinary powers authorized by statute for use in the event of a national emergency.¹⁷ This coordinated National Response Framework (NRF) defines roles and responsibilities as well as the common language of emergency management for a national response program. The NRF is a guide as to how the nation responds to an all hazards

¹⁶ McCarthy, Francis, X., "Federal Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declaration, Eligible Activities and Funding", June 7, 2011, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/.../RL33053.pdf>, (accessed October 2015)

¹⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: 2004), 80, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf (accessed October 30, 2015).

response.¹⁸ Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) is intended to galvanize action by the federal government; it is also the center of facilitating an all-of-nation approach to emergency preparedness. This national approach is the catalyst for a program that seeks to reduce the impact of catastrophes before the incident through preparation of the infrastructure and planning the response.

DoD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), addresses the responsibility of DoD agencies. The Army is given primary responsibility for coordinating and planning and rendering of military assistance to civil authorities during domestic emergencies.¹⁹ The emphasis in this type of support is placed on protection of the civilian population and critical infrastructure to exclude support to civil law enforcement.

Section II

Initiatives

The United States military has provided support to civil authorities dating back to President Truman's era.²⁰ Defense Support of Civil Authorities, (DSCA), is support provided by federal military forces, DoD civilians and contract personnel, DoD assets and the National Guard forces when the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests the use of the National Guard forces on a Title 32 status.²¹ Another initiative for the disaster support is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a congressionally ratified organization that provides a framework for interstate mutual aid. EMAC acts as a

¹⁸ Joint Publication 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 July 2013, pp.viii.

¹⁹ DoD Directive No.3025.1, April 23, 1963, pp.10.

²⁰ Buchalter, Alice, Library of Congress: "Military Support to Civil Authorities: The Role of the Department of Defense in Support of Homeland Defense", 2007, pp. 2.

²¹ Joint Publication 3-28, pp. vii.

complement to the federal response disaster system, providing timely and cost effective relief to states through a governor-declared state of emergency.²² The EMAC legislation solves the problems of liability and responsibilities of cost, since the affected state will be responsible for reimbursement of the cost of the response.²³

Current National Guard Detailed Supporting Forces

The National Guard currently has trained forces to respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction and other threats. Visualizing incidents that require the activation of CSTs and/or CERFPs from multiple states, the Secretary of Defense directed the National Guard Bureau to design an additional force model –one that would be optimized to provide command and control (C2) of these CBRNE– from multiple states. The Homeland Response Force, HRF, is responsible for command and control of those elements. Each HRF is located in a FEMA region. It is apparent that DoD has recognized that a C2 force is needed for the CSTs and CERFPs, then it should also be evident a similar framework must be established to respond effectively to numerous disasters and emergencies.

Current DoD Framework and Responses to Disasters

United States Southern Command geographic AOR encompasses the Caribbean Islands outside of the U.S. territories. I will examine SOUTHCOM's response to the earthquake in Haiti 2010 to show the lack of an effective and timely response to the island. In a report conducted by the RAND corporation, it revealed the earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010 collapsed 100,000 structures, damaged 200,000 more, killed more than 316,000 people, injured 300,000 others, and

²² Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Overview for National Response Framework, <https://www.fema.gov/.../emerg...> (accessed November 2015), pp. 1.

²³ Ibid., pp. 2.

displaced more than one million people.²⁴ From the request of the Haitian government, President Obama directed a whole government response with SOUTHCOM in the lead with Operation Unified Response. The findings outlined SOUTHCOM had a quick deployment and response to the disaster, however, they lacked established plans for the mission.²⁵ The process to push resources quickly were inefficient. Also important for SOUTHCOM to have met success was the establishment of a National framework for foreign assistance. Additionally, consideration for a standing organization to help develop humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) doctrine and facilitate HA/DR planning, training, and exercises to fully meet the mission.²⁶ It is critical that a responding force is trained and resourced to respond to HA/DR immediately following the incident in foreign nations and in the case of NORTHCOM to U.S. territories, preemptive assets should be staged before the noticed incident.

USNORTHCOM's Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy

Hurricane Katrina in 2005 exposed the weaknesses of coordination and early movement of NORTHCOM in the event of a notice incident. NORTHCOM was well aware and tracked Hurricane Katrina prior to landfall. Nonetheless, deployment of resources and manpower were not on-hand to prevent the chaos after the hurricane hit landfall. An identified National Guard Disaster – Emergency Response Force on site would have alleviated extended suffering, loss of life and other law breaking activities that occurred. USNORTHCOM began its alert and coordination procedures significantly before Katrina's landfall and the subsequent levee breaches. It is not exactly clear when DHS/FEMA first requested DOD assistance or what was

²⁴ Cecchine, Gary, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael A. Wermuth, Timothy Jackson, Agnes Gereben Schaefer and Matthew Stafford. The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army Leaders. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR304.html.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

specifically requested. Press releases and reports to date, show that DOD made its own assessments of what resources would be useful and began moving towards deployment before or shortly after Katrina's landfall. However, many military deployments did not begin not until after the presidential declaration of a federal emergency on August 30, and the declaration of an Incident of National Significance on August 31 and did not reach the affected area until days after.²⁷ The role of the National Guard in these incidents is significant for maintenance of civil order, providing logistical support and relief efforts.²⁸ A number of issues caused a slow response to the relief efforts in Louisiana. The EMAC agreements assisted from other states, but the control of forces due to federalized control may have added to the neglect of quick deployment of forces.²⁹ Deployment of forces were already laid out for Louisiana, but the official order to begin support was the failing factor for support. The order for support of the deployed forces needed to be activated from date of deployment instead of after the incident. It was clear the hurricane was on the path of destruction to Louisiana, therefore, activation of an identified force on ground to respond prior to August 29, was never enacted.³⁰ A great factor is affected deployments must be kept out of the path of the storm to avoid damage. This observation definitely supports my argument to have an identified force which is activated prior to the hurricane to react upon the H-hour of the disaster. The CRS Report for Congress gives support to this idea with the findings that an earlier and phased deployment could have brought assets closer to the affected region in a more timely fashion.³¹ During disaster the affected areas have their own challenges of closed airports, unsettled waterways and destruction to ports that also

²⁷ Belascoe, Amy, Bowman, Steve, Kapp, Lawrence, "CRS Report for Congress, Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response", September 19, 2005, pp.1.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 5.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 13.

slow the arrival of resources and manpower. Only a force on ground alleviates this additional obstacles.

Hurricane Sandy

In the anticipation for the arrival of Hurricane Sandy, the National Guard in New York and surrounding states on October 27, 2012, six days prior to the landfall of the hurricane, activated the troops in their states.³² With this proactive approach of activated troops, New York received a large National Guard response under the direction of a Dual Status Commander.³³ Having an identified response force, the chaos of who is responsible for activation and late deployment of troops did not arise during the landfall or the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. Army General Charles Jacoby Jr. commented one of the lessons identified during the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005 and reinforced during Hurricane Sandy last year is the importance of preparation of forces and resources.³⁴ FEMA administrator, Craig Fugate, confirmed another lesson from past disasters, is the importance of pre-positioning assets where they are expected to be needed, also benefited the Hurricane Sandy response.³⁵ Fugate emphasized the importance of having support to the governors early in the event of a bad situation, so response efforts are not overwhelming.³⁶

³² Burke, Ryan, McNeil, Sue, "Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander", US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College Press, April 2015, pp. 28.

³³ Ibid., pp.30.

³⁴ Mills, Donna, "Northcom, FEMA Build on Hurricane Sandy Response Lessons", American Forces Press Service, January 24, 2013,

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

Failures in Support of Initiatives and Other Disaster Responses

The EMAC agreement among states have faced challenges in supporting the affected states within their compacts. During a disaster, states within the same region are usually affected and the compacts cannot support other states because their equipment may be damaged or needed in the lending state. This compact is only leverage for states not in the same region. As for the territories under NORTHCOM, EMACs are with the state of New York. This traveling distance is some 3,000 plus miles to lending area. The response time after a disaster is slow and leads way to chaos and suffering. The intent of EMACs and responding to alleviate suffering and save lives are hard to accomplish from a distance with no prior forces on ground. Therefore, the tailored brigade activated prior to the disaster is the viable answer.

With Hurricane Katrina, DoD failed to alleviate suffering and save lives due to inability to preposition forces and resources prior to the disaster. While this slow moving storm allowed for the ability to move resources and evacuate populations before landfall, the failure of the response effort to save lives and protect property played out for almost three weeks on national television.

As discussed earlier I outlined the support to DSCA using National Guard forces which responds to emergencies and threats. The forces of the CST and CERFPs are tailored for specific roles and tasks during an emergency. None of these forces receive specific training for civil support missions, as well as the requirement for these forces to be equipped and able to respond to support civil support demands. The change is a focus on a tailored brigade framework for military support to civil authorities. The support response forces, a National Guard identified framework, would receive training on their civil support role in preparation to

respond timely and effectively to disasters.³⁷ Once trained, these forces will be ready to respond within 72 hours, provide command, control and communications and augment the local civil authorities. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) latest report on the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, as well as the RAND Corporation report, Hurricane Katrina, Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, have recently called for a restructuring of military capabilities to meet these civil support missions.³⁸ The idea of a preempted response force to support the territories during civil support activities will require specific training for civil support activities.

Section Four

DoD Response Force Package Analysis

Given the significant numbers of brigade organizations in the National Guard, it is definitely possible to believe that these forces can provide a federal disaster response force in support of the territories outside the mainland. There are two options to consider supporting the charge for a response force. The first option in responding to any disaster is using the disaster stricken territory National Guard forces in a Territorial Active Duty status. These units perform their wartime mission as well as training for civil support missions during monthly trainings. To fully meet the civil support missions, additional training throughout the year is needed. This requires additional funding for the National Guard forces.

On the other hand, these forces may be rendered incapable after the disaster because of damage to facilities or equipment needed for the civil support activities. The equipment needed

³⁷ Wormuth, Christine, et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report, Washington, DC: CSIS, July 2006, pp. 71

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 74.

to support the agencies maybe part of the destruction on the islands. This limits the use of vehicles, equipment and facilities for immediate support. As for responsiveness, Soldiers may be delayed reporting to duty if their homes are damaged and families displaced.³⁹ Most often, Soldiers will ensure the affairs at homes are stable prior to reporting for duty that may not indicate a time of return. This raises serious concern on the safety and welfare of the citizens and the alleviating suffering within the affected areas. Therefore, an off-island response force is mandatory for responding to disasters in these areas.

The second option is the construct of a tailored National Guard brigade from FEMA geographically aligned supporting regions.⁴⁰ The process for the tailored brigade would take place prior to the disaster. Upon a notification of a natural disaster, a federal declaration through the process of DoD and NORTHCOM, alerts and then mobilizes the tailored brigade from New York in FEMA region II. The tailored brigade then deploys to the territories by internal airlift support or pre-arranged TRANSCOM lift. Once on ground, the tailored brigade will set up command and control in conjunction with the Dual Status Commander in support of any other military and civil agencies. The establishment of a tailored response brigade size force that could be implemented and refined to better serve the Army's purpose of civil support to an affected area.

³⁹ Emmons, Kristina, Specialized Regional National Guard Brigades- The Army's Federal Disaster Response Force, November, 2012, pp. 30.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 46.

Section Five

Recommendations

Serious considerations must be taken for a new role for the National Guard to meet the DoD's mission of responding to catastrophes to the US territories. These National Guard forces are within all states and territories, and possess the assets or have compacts with other states to generate the support required for a state emergency. They are usually the first responders who arrive to support the initial local fire and police personnel during civil support. In a notice catastrophe, an identified military force should be on ground within the affected area at a minimum of 72 hours prior to the disaster. In the event of a no-notice event, the force should be deployed after 24 hours of the event dependent on sea and port availability. DoD will be challenged to identify the capabilities, alert, and move them to the area.⁴¹ Since many of the DSCA implied missions for DoD are rapidly evolving into specified tasks, a top priority should be to review capabilities by location. Design an Army National Guard tailored response brigade structure as the lead for DoD in a national response to complex catastrophes. The only purpose-built units for DSCA are in the National Guard. The National Guard, requires a dedicated, trained, resourced force to respond to its territories for disaster response. During a disaster, the country needs a force that can respond already trained and certified to support citizens and the territories that are not adjoined or separated from the continent. The National Guard must be able to support the Governors' requirements on an immediate basis, and respond with the right capabilities, location, at the right time. To meet these requirements, the

⁴¹ USNORTHCOM COMMANDERS Estimate for Defense Support of Civil Authorities in Complex Catastrophes. (Draft) 30 Oct 2012, pp. 5.

National Guard established the following list of 10 essential capabilities. These capabilities include aviation assets, engineering, Military Police, medical, transportation, maintenance, logistics, and a command element.⁴² Every incident is local until it requires additional support. This force can deploy in short notice and not hamper the response effort from the start, providing the community with a sense of security with Boots on Ground prior to the disaster fulfills the question for a responsive and capable force. According to James Miskel in *Disaster Response and Homeland Security*, a positive feature of the system is to deploy and respond effectively.⁴³

With this ability, DoD can do this by establishing the correct organization, force structure, and training programs to deploy a force prior to a natural disaster. FEMA Region II National Guard units in New York and New Jersey agreement supports both Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Figure 1 depicts the aligned FEMA regions. New York National Guard is located within this FEMA region and can meet the agreement for the tailored response force to support the territories. To do so effectively, it is imperative USNORTHCOM provide the training, equipping and increase manning to support the DSCA missions. The National Guard distribution of resources across the 54 states and territories at 3200 armories make it a reliable responding force to any disaster within hours from the moment of the incident or activity. In addition, providing support to civil

⁴² National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and Beyond, October, 2005, pp. 11.

⁴³ Miskel, James F., *Disaster Response and Homeland Security, What Works, What Doesn't*, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford University Press, 2008, pp. 124.

authorities is a distinct “state” mission of the National Guard within their states and territories.⁴⁴

A tailored regional brigade is the suitable construct to respond to the territories in support of civil support because the brigade structure is needed for a quick response to minimize the effects of a catastrophe. Also, the construct of this brigade would have Soldiers prepared with training and certification for disaster response from annual requirements. As National Guard units civil support and civil disturbance training are annual requirements, so a cost factor would not be significant. Besides the training, this force will be able to respond effectively because of training, equipment and ready leadership.



FIGURE 1. FEMA Aligned Regions, Picture depicts Region II that includes Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.⁴⁵ Both areas are supported by the states of New York and New Jersey for Emergency Response.

⁴⁴ Robinson, Spencer W., “The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century; Peacekeeping Vs. Homeland Security,” The National Guard Association of the United States, <http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/pdf/primer%20fin.pdf> (accessed October 2015).

⁴⁵ Federal Emergency Management Agency Internet Site. Available at <http://www.fema.gov/regions>.

TRAINING


An organized program to conduct certification and training will be coordinated with and from outside sources prior to the hurricane season, the months of June to November and in preparation for other disasters. Since the National Guard units already conduct yearly training, slight modification of training and identification of units will be required. The training to meet the civil support preparedness requires monthly company and battalion training and battalion and brigade exercises during an annual training or additional days identified. The education and training preparation need to include not only the military but the civilian leaders so all the players can be prepared for augmentation during and after the disaster. There are currently several FEMA Level I and II DSCA courses conducted through the military and civil organizations to prepare all leaders for support of civil agencies in Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief. Additionally, table top exercises to walk through the response measures with identified units of the brigade, civil agencies and the units within the territories to have a firm grasp on area and players in the agencies.

With the idea of the tailored brigade for civil support missions, NORTHCOM or DoD must identify specific funding to allow leaders full access to FEMA two week courses and any additional certifications to meet this challenge. Identified funding for all Sergeant First Class and above and at a minimum three civilian representatives from first responders to other key agencies to develop a greater understanding for civil support and Homeland Security. The multi-trained National Guard is technically and tactically prepared to be flexible and ready to execute civil support missions with additional training and resourcing. These support soldiers have responded successfully providing support for domestic relief, Homeland Security, and civil

disturbance. This support is short term until the affected area is stable and control returned to the civil authorities. To support this a structure must be in place.

STRUCTURE

The current brigade force structure will be tailored to suit a Sustainment Brigade structure minus to meet the common requirement of territories affected from disasters. The structure with reflect three battalions consisting of a Brigade Support Battalion, Military Police, an Engineer battalion, Maintenance company, Supply company, a signal slice, a Medical company, a Transportation company and an Aviation Support Battalion minus with lift assets. ⁴⁶



Conclusion

DoD will need to respond rapidly and start generating critical capabilities desired by civil authorities within hours⁴⁷ Sustainment of the population and the responding DoD forces in the affected area will be a critical task. Synchronizing actions with local, state and federal partners

⁴⁶ New York Army National Guard 53rd Troop Command Units, <https://dmna.ny.gov/arng/53tc/>

⁴⁷ USNORTHCOM COMMANDERS Estimate for Defense Support of Civil Authorities in Complex Catastrophes. (Draft) 30 Oct 2012, 5.

will be a key to insure effective use of critical resources.⁴⁸ All of these events are not normal tasks for DoD. Leaders, staffs organizations need to be trained in how to support civil authorities.

I have outline the responses of USSOUTHCOM to the Haiti earthquake and USNORTHCOM responses to Katrina and Sandy. In both Haiti and Katrina, eventhough executed by two different commands, the response and execution to these disasters were slow causing extensive destruction, suffering and loss of lives. Lessons learned from Katrina jumped start the responses for Hurricane Sandy alleviating much suffering and loss of life. It clearly confirmed a pre-empted, deployed force to the targeted area is what is needed allowing a support force on hand and ready to respond in the role of civil support to the local authorities. With the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico detached from the continental United States, it is only fitting that such a support force be identified dy DoD, trained, equipped and manned to be deployed 72 hours prior to any natural disaster.

The identified two options of use of National Guard soldiers to respond in the affected area compared to deploying a tailored National Guard brigade leaves only one clear solution for DoD. A constructed force of a tailored brigade to respond to the Governor of a territory when his military assets cannot support the devastation in his area. It then requires NORTHCOM to authorize the deployment of the tailored brigade.

⁴⁸ Ibid.