Signaling the End of Deterrence Afforded by Dual Capable Aircraft

Abstract

For more than 60 years, the USAF relied on fighter aircraft capable of performing conventional and nuclear strike missions in Asia and Europe as part of the US extended nuclear deterrence strategy. Known as dual capable aircraft (DCA), these aircraft were the first line of defense against a numerically superior enemy. However, the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 radically changed the regional and global security contexts these aircraft (and their weapons) were intended for. Since 1991, the USAF and NATO have allowed the DCA mission to atrophy. While US and NATO policy makers continue to advocate the need for the DCA mission, a combination of neglect, fiscal constraint, and public opinion have undermined the deterrent value of these systems. This paper articulates the current state of US and NATOs tactical nuclear capability. Using a simplified equation of deterrence as a function of technical capability and political credibility, this paper argues that the DCA mission no longer serves as a credible deterrent.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 06, 2017
Accession Number
AD1038233

Entities

People

  • Richard P. Carver

Organizations

  • Air War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Counter WMD
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Air Power
  • Aircrafts
  • Airframes
  • Cold War
  • Department Of Defense
  • Deployment
  • Electronic Warfare
  • Fighter Aircraft
  • Military Organizations
  • Nato
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Procurement
  • Security
  • Ussr
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • Aerospace logistics and air mobility.
  • International Relations and European Studies
  • Strategic Security Studies