The Soldier Must be Trained Not to Fight the Jungle: Preparing the U.S. Army for Future Operations in a Jungle Environment
Abstract
Since the closure of the United States Army Jungle Warfare Training Center (JWTC) at Fort Sherman, Panama in 1999 the United States Army has not possessed an organic jungle warfare capacity. In addition, FM 90-5, Jungle Operations, the Army's jungle doctrine, is over 35 years old and is not reflective of changes in military technology, enemy capabilities, or the operational environment. Increased global instability and forward presence initiatives such as regionally aligned forces (RAF) increase the risk that U.S. Army forces may be called upon to conduct operations in a jungle environment with limited preparation. In order to decrease this risk, it is necessary to ask how the United States Army should prepare to conduct future operations effectively in the jungle. This examination should be informed by history, past and current doctrine, and stakeholder considerations. Once this is determined, gaps may be identified, and short and long-term solutions proposed to fill them.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 09, 2017
- Accession Number
- AD1038757
Entities
People
- Jonathan C. Leiter
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College