

INDIVIDUAL FACTORS MOTIVATING PEOPLE TO
JOIN ORGANIZED VIOLENT MOVEMENTS

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

INDIVIDUAL FACTORS MOTIVATING PEOPLE TO JOIN ORGANIZED VIOLENT MOVEMENTS, by CW3 Jaime Mannings, 111 pages.

A guerilla-style opponent is one of the toughest missions conventional military forces will ever face. Political violence is difficult to stop in any country. These conflicts last years, sometimes decades. This is the case in Colombia, where the government has been fighting *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (FARC-EP) since 1965; in Peru, where the government has been fighting *Sendero Luminoso* since 1980; and in Mexico, where the government has been trying to defeat the *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* since 1994. Why are these movements so difficult to quell? Is it because of the governments' inability to design suitable defeat mechanisms? Is there failure to understand what motivates people to join an organized violent movement (OVM)? This study addresses this problem by focusing on identifying the individual motivational factors causing people to join an OVM using a qualitative multiple-case study comparative analysis. This investigation analyzes a plethora of literature placing special emphasis on documented interviews of former combatants to extrapolate the true reason why they chose to fight.

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ACRONYMS

COG	Center of Gravity
CR	Critical Requirements
CV	Critical Vulnerabilities
EZLN	<i>Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional</i> (Zapatist National Liberation Army)
FARC-EP	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo</i> (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army)
JP	Joint Publication
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
OVM	Organized Violent Movement
PCC	<i>Partido Comunista de Colombia</i> (Communist Party of Colombia)
SL	<i>Sendero Luminoso</i> (Shining Path)
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

They didn't give much agency to the enemy. They neglected war as political. They neglected the human dimension of war—why people fight. People fight, I think, fundamentally for the same reasons that Thucydides identified 2,500 years ago: fear, honor, and interest. So, if you don't understand the causes of violence, if you're not acting really to affect what is driving the violence, you're just treating symptoms.¹

—LTG Herbert R. McMaster, “A Conversation with LTG H.R. McMaster”

The Problem

There is a problem with the current approach to defeating unconventional threats. In irregular warfare, the ends, ways, and means are much more difficult to align to achieve an effective strategy. It is extremely important to understand the causes of violence to develop effective strategies. For centuries, war theorists and philosophers emphasized war as a contest of wills.² In a contest of wills, individual motivation is extremely important. Therefore, it is necessary to study the individual motivational factors inspiring people to join organized violent movements and implement it more efficiently in military doctrine.³ There is a gap in the knowledge of individual motivating factors and their level of importance. The approach to resolving these types of conflicts has historically been violent in nature. If more violence erupts, there will be more troops on the ground. There is a failure to understand motivation as a cause of violence.

The United States and many other countries have a long history of interventions in foreign countries to quell rebellions and bring peace to the region without understanding the people. Some were successful while others were not. LTG Herbert R. McMaster emphasizes how important it is for soldiers to understand the history of the

population and their social and religious dynamics at the micro level.⁴ Intra-state conflicts are a complex matter and it is imperative to analyze carefully each case to understand it before any type of intervention, whether this is military, economic, diplomatic, or informational. Experts suggest, “understanding combat motivation in non-state armed groups is essential for defeating such groups.”⁵ However, “the combat motivation of an [Organized Violent Movement] is in general less well understood than that of combat motivation in conventional militaries.”⁶

The military adapted many theories, models, and frameworks to understand and visualize extremely complex operational environments. One of the most effective methods is offered in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*. The joint manual offers approaches to understand the environment using a systems perspective.⁷ It is a very effective approach to understanding and visualizing the operational environment at the macro level. The interconnected operational environment, as described in JP 3-0, includes an understanding of the relationships, connections, and interactions in six domains: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational.⁸ This framework works best at the operational level planning process. The information acquired at this level helps planning efforts at the tactical level. Organizing and categorizing information using this framework helps one understand the operational environment. However, this framework and many others similar in nature do enable the level of detail necessary to understand the causes of violence at the individual level.

Michael O’Hanlon wrote some scolding words about this issue:

For most of its history, the United States has been mediocre in such activities—if not actively hostile to the idea that it should even bother worrying about them. There were perhaps some exceptions in the early 20th century. But most U.S.

history including the Indian wars of the 19th century as well as the Vietnam and post-Vietnam experiences of more recent times—to say nothing of the first 4 years of the Iraq war and first 4 or 5 years of the Afghanistan conflict—have demonstrated American inefficiency and incompetence in this realm of warfare.⁹

Understanding the causes of violence is key to resolving conflicts and military leaders must be ready to provide solutions to this type of complex problem. “The dominance of cultural and demographic factors [presents] leaders with complex challenges that will require increasingly complex solutions.”¹⁰ To add complexity, as the conflict elongates, motivation hides in the existence of organized crime, racial or political feuds, government corruption, and other violent activities fostered by instability and lack of security. This level of hyper-complexity causes leaders to treat the symptoms and not the causes of the conflict.

Understanding Causes of Violence

In a recent interview, LTG McMaster pointed out a significant problem the U.S. military faces when engaged in war—especially unconventional warfare. Despite being the most powerful military in the world, the United States has not been able to decisively defeat the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The intervention failure in Vietnam in 1968 is still a vivid memory in the minds of policy makers and military leaders.¹¹ Why is such a powerful military incapable of defeating a weaker force?

The U.S. military proved to be the most powerful and technologically advanced force in the world after driving the Iraqi Army (the third largest army in the world at the time) out of Kuwait in less than one hundred hours.¹² Then again, in 2003, they defeated the Iraqis in their own country in approximately two weeks.¹³ Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom made it seem as if there was no match for such a powerful

military capable of completely and simultaneously dominating land, air, and sea. In fact, many scholars argue the U.S. military is currently experiencing a Revolution in Military Affairs.¹⁴ They claimed the new “American way of war,” far more technologically superior in nature, can certainly dominate any full-spectrum operation for the foreseeable future.¹⁵ When LTG McMaster addressed what was wrong with that claim, he recognized that this school of thought failed to acknowledge “the very complex human and political problem of war,” and it did not give much thought to the fact that “war is a contest of wills.”¹⁶

The U.S. military and allies proved they could dominate the air, land, and sea in conventional warfare. A war against any adversary would be quick and decisive to avoid getting involved in a quagmire. The United States built the best ground military force, the best Navy, and the best Air Force. No conventional army can stand in its way. However, fighting armed civilians (non-state actors), is a totally different conflict which can only be won by affecting it at the root cause—the motivation of people to join violent organizations and carry out violence. Only by understanding the causes (drivers, motivators) of violence, can one affect what is causing the violence and resolve conflict rather than just treating the symptoms.¹⁷

The U.S. military, along with coalition partners, have demonstrated they are capable of defeating any conventional force in the world quickly and decisively.¹⁸ However, they faced significant challenges when involved in irregular warfare. The United States is not alone in this dilemma. Many powerful nations discovered it is not easy to defeat a militarily weaker opponent, especially on their own land. It was a challenge for Napoleon Bonaparte in the Peninsular War when he fought against “second

category Spaniards, irregular troops, recruited mainly from the local population . . . under experienced military leaders” in the early 19th century.¹⁹ It is a challenge in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Syria, Israel, and many more countries. It remains a challenge now for the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.

History foreshadows how long small wars can last. It is as simple as looking as far back to 1568 when the Dutch revolted against the Spanish rule—the war lasted eighty years. Concurrently, there was the Thirty Years War, from 1618 to 1648, one of the bloodiest and most horrific conflicts with thousands of civilian casualties and property damage.²⁰ There are plenty more examples in central and eastern Europe in the 17th and 18th century. The American Revolutionary War of 1775 is a great example; it lasted over twelve years. The Mexican struggle for independence from Spain lasted eleven years, from 1810 to 1821. All of these conflicts exhibited some form of organized violent movement where the people, widely considered an inferior force, emerged victorious. Fast-forward to the 21st century and there are still organizations trying to capitulate governments utilizing the same or a similar strategy.

The conflict in Mexico with *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (Zapatist National Liberation Army, abbreviated EZLN) is ongoing. It changed from guerrilla warfare to a “social Netwar.”²¹ However, it undermined the established government for over twenty-five years. *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path or abbreviated SL) is also now a less dangerous movement. It morphed into a political movement using psychological operations rather than lethal weapons. However, that was not the case in the 1990s. They were responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians and hundreds of military forces. SL “reached a crescendo of power in 1989-1992” immediately following

the end of the Cold War.²² SL began to reinforce their political and financial structure after losing military power due to a very successful offensive campaign launched by the Peruvian government.²³ SL has existed for over three decades and it still poses a risk to the country's overall security. It is not yet defeated.²⁴ To date, *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army abbreviated FARC-EP or FARC) is considered "the longest insurgency" in modern history and one with a large military capacity.²⁵ It has lasted over five decades. Why are these movements so difficult to defeat? Carl von Clausewitz understood this type of war, the "people's war," or "*Landsrurm*," was long, treacherous, and bloodier than most wars.²⁶ But, he never did not provide much insight about this subject. However, as Beatrice Heuser suggests, Clausewitzian theories and principles of war apply not only to conventional warfare, but also to guerrilla warfare.²⁷ One of the key Clausewitzian concepts is the center of gravity (COG).

COG and Critical Factors

U.S. doctrine dictates all military action be employed directly or indirectly against the enemy's COG; this is imperative.²⁸ Historically, the U.S. military has a relatively good record of identifying the enemy's COG. However, in low intensity or guerrilla style conflicts, it is much more difficult to identify the critical requirements, and even the critical vulnerabilities. This is mostly due to the nature of the complex operational environment. Additionally, the current doctrinal method of analyzing the COG is ambiguous at best. JP 3-0 states the COG is "the source of power that provides moral o physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act."²⁹ It gets confusing when doctrine

states the “source of power can be a set of characteristics [or] capabilities.”³⁰ In essence, the description of the COG can include the critical requirements (CR) also.

The critical factors are the critical vulnerabilities (CV) and Critical Requirements (CR) of the COG. “Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a critical capability to become fully operational,” and “critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack.”³¹ The description of the critical factors can be confusing. In simple terms, doctrine says the way to attack a COG is by attacking the CV of the CR needed to perform its critical capability. To do this, one must have sufficient operational reach, combat power, or other relevant capability to achieve the desired effects on the CV and ultimately on the COG.

There is another layer of complication. Joint doctrine suggests there is more than one COG; one at the operational level of war and another at the strategic level.³² It is easy to see how this definition of a COG can pose a significant challenge to military leaders. Especially because the success of every military operation depends on the successful identification of the COG and this can be different depending on time and space; that is, the geographic location of the area of operations and the phase of the operation.

Assistant Professor in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Mr. Dale Eikmeier recognized this ambiguity and provided a more practical approach. He proposed using the ends, ways, and means framework. This is a more objective approach, easier to understand, and overall, it provides a less ambiguous definition of the COG. Mr. Eikmeier suggested to

determine the COG by analyzing the goal or objective of the enemy, the ends. Then, determine the ways, which he identifies as actions expressed the form of a verb. Eikmeier says the means are the resources and requirements “required to execute the way.”³³




Figure 1. A Method of COG

Source: Dale Eikmeier, *From Operational Art to Operational Plans* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Department of Joint and Multinational Operations U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012), 40.

Based on Eikmeier’s description of the COG, suppose the overall objective (ends) for FARC is to establish a new socialist government in Colombia.³⁴ To accomplish this, they must overthrow the current capitalist government and its supporting infrastructure.

They can do this by waging irregular warfare against the government, destabilizing the government infrastructure, undermining security efforts and killing government leaders (ways). Lastly, to carry out these actions, they need a military force, they need economic support, political support, but most importantly, they need soldiers—the guerrilla. These are the means. If the guerrilla (the means) is capable of conducting the actions necessary to create the conditions (ways) to establish a new socialist government (ends), then the guerrilla is the COG.

In the end, this analysis confirmed all military actions should be directed against the guerrilla; something already obvious to a military analyst. Deciding where to direct military actions, within the guerrilla movement, is the most difficult. This is where it is crucial to identify the CR. The CR to a guerrilla movement is the recruits. These people will join the movement and conduct operations under the leadership of the organization. Eventually, they will develop into leaders themselves.

If the theory of the COG is correct, where the COG is the source of the strength or will to fight, then it is crucial to understand the CR of the source. Clearly identifying the CR is paramount to direct actions against it. Although it would be ideal the CR would also be vulnerable, this condition must not become a discarding factor. One must develop solutions or actions to affect the CR. Only then, there is hope of planning a successful campaign designed to deny the enemy's the COG access to the CR. The most important CR is people. People will participate if they are motivated. Therefore, countering the motivational factors (those driving people to join a violent movement) is the key defeat mechanism.

Primary Research Question

The primary research question is: what factors motivate people to join an organized violent movement? This research thesis studies the different violent movements, which have taken the form of insurgencies in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. These organized violent movements have terrorized the populations for decades, killed thousands of innocent civilians, and cost billions of dollars. The governments of these three countries, superior in numbers and weaponry, attempted to fight them, appease them, and even negotiate with them. The government's efforts, despite their superiority, did not yield the necessary results to completely dismantle the movements. Although as of recently, there are some promising efforts underway to disarm the longstanding militia, FARC.³⁵ This research question focuses on the underlying motivational factors leading civilians to join violent movements and organizing, arming, and conducting paramilitary operations against a more superior adversary.

The purpose of this research is to contribute to a greater understanding of people who join armed groups and to shed some light on what is, for the most part, a mysterious phenomenon. This knowledge can then be used for developing focused recruitment prevention programs. It also seeks to contribute to the expanding literature that investigates the meaning and character of violent movements. Although many of the motivational factors can be identified using macro-level environment analysis, this study focuses on identifying the motivational factors at the individual level, in the economic, ideological, and socio-psychological domain.³⁶

Secondary Research Questions

1. What political, social, or economic conditions do Organized Violent Movements (OVMs) exploit to recruit people?
2. Which motivational factor is more important?
3. Are motivational factors a CR the military can affect?

Assumptions

Due to the nature of irregular warfare conflicts, it is difficult to understand the motives of each individual. This study assumes that violent movements are similar at the core and that members of an OVM are motivated to join without any mental impediments. In other words, the study assumes that, regardless of the level of education of the members of an OVM, they are fully capable of making legitimate decisions on their own accord.

Some of the literature is translated from Spanish to English. The information used for this study is not verified through any vetting mechanism; hence, the reason to utilize mostly printed materials. This study assumes the translations are accurate and without a known political agenda. A method of enriching the data was through consultation with International Military Students from Peru, Mexico, and Colombia.

Some of the available literature was written by fairly unknown writers some of whom claim to have had close relationships or encounters with the Organized Violent Movements. The author will only use these sources if they seem to be legitimate. However, there is a possibility some of the information although published, may not be legitimate. Command and General Staff Officers Course international military students from Peru, Mexico, and Colombia will help in the filtering process.

Limitations and Delimitations

The three cases of this research have been ongoing for decades and some of the information is translated, revised, and published in English. However, there is a significant amount of material published only in Spanish, which needed to be translated. Although fluent in Spanish (writing, readings, and speaking), the author is not a certified translator. Additionally, the Spanish language uses slang and does not translate accurately to English. Nevertheless, translation was in the most professional and proficient manner possible to ensure the information is accurate.

The study is mostly limited to secondary sources of information. It does not include telephone or personal interviews. There is information obtained from interviews conducted by other authors. Some of the people interviewed were incarcerated at the time; therefore, their answers may have been influenced by their mental state while in prison. They may have thought that answering question in a less rebellious manner showed good conduct while in prison possibly leading to an early release. For that reason, their responses may be biased.

Qualified medical personnel legitimately understand the psychological factors of motivation. The findings are purely observational in the analysis of the available literature. Although the author has personal experience interacting with members of violent organizations, this occurred over thirty years ago while still a teenager. The observations coincide with what was expected, but again, this was several years ago and there is a chance that passion for the topic biased the author's memory.

To obtain a more accurate focus on individual motivational factors and avoid digression, the author did not review or analyze religion-based motivational factors.

Religious-based motivational factors can be a motivational and deterrent factor. It was an impossible feat to complete this study without mentioning religion at all. However, the author avoided the topic intentionally to keep the focus on the less discussed but equally important motivational factors. This allowed the research to focus on the individual economic, ideological, and socio-psychological motivational factors.

The political environment is also a very relevant point in conducting these types of studies. However, details about the political realm will intentionally be avoided to gain a deeper understanding of the individual motivational factors. Studying the political environment could cause the study to divert into discussion of macro-level motivational factors and not the individual.

The ancient history of Mexico, Colombia, and Peru can also be considered a motivational factor. The three countries are rich in history dating back hundreds of years. It is important to look at history to understand current conflict. Although this a valid approach to understand the violent movement as a whole, this investigation does not go into the history of these countries in detail. It does however, reference historical facts when necessary to provide an understanding of the genesis of the conflict. It is an important factor because it provides context about the situation. However, in order to get a better understanding on the current motivational factors, it is necessary to avoid lengthy discussions about the history of Mexico, Colombia, and Peru prior to the initiation of the violent movement.

Definitions

Organized Violent Movement: OVM encompasses several other definitions for an organization involved in an irregular warfare where the organization does not have

international recognition as a state. This term is not included in any U.S. doctrine. However, the term accurately describes a phenomenon which occurs somewhere in the middle of peace and war; one that takes place in peacetime, but it transforms the environment into a war zone. It excludes formally declared war between states. To emphasize the extension of ideological, sociological, and economic support bases, the author uses the word movement rather than extremist.

Violent Extremist Organization (VEO): There are more than fifty violent extremist groups (the term is interchangeable) around the world. The three case studies were, at one point, named terrorist organizations by the U.S. government. One of the strongest VEOs is FARC. EZLN and SL are in the same category.

Significance of Study

There is value in understanding individual motivational factors causing people to join OVMs. The U.S. Army Operating Concept highlights the need for military forces to develop the necessary technical, tactical, and cognitive capability to fight and win in a complex world.³⁷ The next armed conflict will be against a resilient highly adaptable, highly effective, and deeply motivated adversary. Perhaps it will be a network of adversaries cloaked under an insurgency movement, political turmoil, natural disaster, or some type of human-caused disaster such as the explosion of a nuclear plant. This study will help fill the knowledge gap in the understanding of the importance of individual motivation of the members of OVMs. If one understands what motivates them, one can develop new tools or methods to stay ahead of determined enemies and accomplish the mission.

As the world's population continues to rise above the current 7.5 billion, resources will turn scarce and more people will be hungry, desperate, poor, and angry.³⁸ Despite exponential advances in technology and the globalization of information, not all will get the privilege to obtain an education and there will be millions of vulnerable people who would easily be persuaded into joining a violent movement. The distinction between conventional and unconventional forces will be nearly invisible. There will be competing factions, all capable of becoming the genesis of an OVM. They will do whatever it takes to obtain the support of the people and recruit new members to fill their ranks. They will exploit human emotion to drive their agenda and impose their will on others.

People have been and always will be the most CR of an OVM. There is always someone willing to join for various reasons. The people provide the foot soldiers and safe heaven. OVMs can become experts in exploiting instability, weak, fragile, and corrupt governments, and a real or perceived deprivation of resources in the population. OVMs will continue to rise and they will become more difficult to defeat. There is a need for new defeat mechanisms not previously used. There needs to be a different approach to defeating these types of threats. The defeat mechanism needs a foundation of detailed knowledge of the intricacies of the causes of violence. Only then is there hope to cut the lifeline of the movement, the people. To do so, one must understand why people join OVMs.

Thesis Organization

Chapter 1 is an introduction to the problem the military forces face when engaging in irregular warfare conflicts against an OVM. The problem conventional

military forces and governments face when trying to defeat an OVM is rooted in the need to understand the causes of violence—specifically, the motivation of people to join violent movements. This chapter presents the foundation to study three cases, all in the western hemisphere, whose governments have not yet been able to defeat them. This chapter introduces the EZLN in Mexico, which has been active for over twenty years; the FARC in Colombia, considered the longest insurgency in modern history; and SL in Peru, active since 1980.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the topic of the three case studies. The studied literature includes newspaper and journal articles, video recorded interviews, books, research papers, U.S. government doctrinal manuals, and online news sources. It reviews contributions from prominent authors such as Marcella Ribetti, Ted Gurr, Paul Collier, and Roy Krover as well as their significant literature and why such work is noteworthy for this study. This chapter separates the literature review by case study. First, there is a review of some experts on EZLN, FARC, and SL in that order. In the same order, there are also reviews about articles and other important documents, sources, and websites.

Chapter 3 explains the research method and design. The first part of this chapter introduces the research as a qualitative case study and explains why this design is best suited for this type of study. The second part of this chapter includes a small review of a book written by Max G. Manwaring, and an article by Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack. The book and the article are about qualitative research. This is necessary to help focus the research. The third part of chapter includes a short introduction of the three case studies and it defines the criteria analyzed in chapter 4.

Chapter 4 details the research findings for each of the three case studies and describes the analysis leading to the results. This chapter searches for individual motivational factors in four categories causing people to join violent movements. The first category is individual motivation caused by economic gain. The second deals with ideological factors. The third category is more extensive; it is about socio-psychological factors. The fourth category indicates motivational factors not categorized under the any of the other three.

Economic gain is one of the principal motivators for people. It is the potential of obtaining financial gain or access to economic goods. It may not necessarily be about cash, but in general, the goal is to achieve some type of reward, which, can eventually turn into a better economic situation to address economic-based grievances.³⁹ This study analyzes the economic-based motives within each of the case studies to see how much it influences someone's decision to join an OVM. The indicators to search for are income, extreme poor living conditions, access to goods and natural resources, and risks of losing their livelihood.

Ideology is an important motivation because it is the binding fabric of an OVM. Without an ideology, the movement is likely to diminish or fall apart. Ideology is what allows the organization to progress. A spontaneous uprising is by definition unorganized, whereas a strong movement is bound by a common vision and ideology.⁴⁰ This study looks for evidence of ideological-based motivational factors such as the promoted ideologies in the three case studies. Next, it analyzes the compatibility with the people, and the capability of the people to comprehend and adopt them as their own.

The socio-psychological factors are the most difficult to analyze because the indicators are much harder to observe. The individual motivational factors to look for in this category include a perceived or real need for protection, arms, and vengeance.⁴¹ The three incentives fall more in the psychological domain as the participant believes joining will protect him from death or injury as he or she will become part of a group. Another motivational factor is the social-pressure factor; those who decide to join based on the need to feel part of a group, or to avoid been looked upon as cowards.

Chapter 5 presents the conclusions derived from the analysis. It reviews the purpose of the study to research the individual motivational factors pushing people to join OVMs. Chapter 2 highlights key pieces of literature and authors who contributed significantly to the study. It includes a review of chapter 3, a description and review of the qualitative research method used in the study and its effectiveness. It also includes a review of the criteria evaluated within each of the case studies and a summary of the results found in chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with recommendations to address the gap and suggestions for future studies.

¹ Herbert R. McMaster and Martin L. Cook, "A Conversation with Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster," Carnegie Council, December 4, 2014, last modified December 4, 2014, accessed November 16, 2016, <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20141204/index.html>.

² Michael Howard, *Clausewitz, (Past Masters)* (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1983), 75.

³ The definition of Organized Violent Movement (OVM) is described in the definitions in chapter 1. It is related to the more commonly known term Violent Extremist Organization (VEO).

⁴ McMaster and Cook.

⁵ Rune Henriksen and Anthony Vinci, “Combat Motivation in Non-State Armed Groups,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 1 (December 28, 2007): 89.

⁶ Ibid., 87.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 96.

⁸ Ibid., 97.

⁹ Michael O’Hanlon, “America’s History of Counterinsurgency,” Brookings Institution Paper Series No. 4, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2009, accessed March 24, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_counterinsurgency_ohanlon.pdf.

¹⁰ Chief of Staff of the Army, “Adapting Our Aim: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy,” U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, White Paper, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, April 7, 2009, accessed March 9, 2017, http://asc.army.mil/docs/divisions/rm/CSA_White_Paper.pdf, 4.

¹¹ McMaster and Cook.

¹² MAJ Jason K. Kamiya, *A History of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team During Operation Desert Storm: The Attack to Free Kuwait (January through March 1991)*, accessed February 28, 2017, http://24thida.com/books/books/24th_desert_storm_Kamiya_OPT_CMB.pdf, 1-5.

¹³ Jarrett Murphy, “‘Mission Accomplished’ Whodunit,” *CBS News*, October 29, 2003, accessed January 11, 2017, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mission-accomplished-whodunit/>.

¹⁴ MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 190.

¹⁵ McMaster and Cook.

¹⁶ Ibid. LTG McMaster is quoting Clausewitz when he referred to “war as a contest of wills.”

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Knox and Murray, 190.

¹⁹ Beatrice Heuser, “Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People’s War,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 1 (February 2010): 152.

²⁰ Ibid., 141.

²¹ David F. Ronfeldt and Arroyo Center, eds., *The Zapatista “Social Netwar” in Mexico* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1998), 3.

²² James Francis Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 3.

²³ Gustavo Gorriti Ellenbogen, *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 232.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Garry M. Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency Rebels* (NY: Zed Books, 2011), 3.

²⁶ Heuser, 155.

²⁷ Ibid., 140.

²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 100.

²⁹ Ibid., 132.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 102.

³² Ibid., 133.

³³ Dale Eikmeier, *From Operational Art to Operational Plans* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012), 36.

³⁴ Leech, 132. The goal of FARC was published by rebel commanders Iván Ríos and Fernando Caicedo in a joint communiqué in the late 1990s. In the document, their argument was that FARC wanted to establish a socialist based government, whether it was going to be communist or not, was to be decided later.

³⁵ David L. DeAtley, “Illicit Drug Funding: The Surprising Systemic Similarities Between the FARC and the Taliban” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2010), 6, accessed January 18, 2017, <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA525726>.

³⁶ The cognitive capability of a person can influence their ability to process information and cause them to make faulty decisions. However, the primary focus of this

study is the individual motivational factors and not their ability to make wise decisions. This would be a study of a different kind requiring interviews and intelligence evaluations.

³⁷ Department of the Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040*. (Ft. Eustis, VA: Government Printing Office, 2014), 10.

³⁸ George W. Casey Jr, “The Army of the 21st Century,” *Army Magazine* 59, no. 10 (2009): 2-4.

³⁹ Marcella Ribetti, “The Unveiled Motivations of Violence in Intra-State Conflicts: The Colombian Guerrillas,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18, no. 4 (December 2007): 699.

⁴⁰ Eric Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 76.

⁴¹ Ribetti, 711.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The trickster government sends us the aluxob. The liars who fool our people and make them forgetful. This is why we became soldiers. This is why we remain soldiers. Because we want no more death and trickery for our people, because we want no more forgetting. The mountain told us to take up arms so we would have a voice. It told us to cover our faces so we would have a face. It told us to forget our names so we could be named. It told us to protect our past so we would have a future.

—*Subcomandante* Marcos, quoted in Kerry Appel,
“Interview with Subcomandante Marcos of the EZLN”

What Has Been Said

Political scientists, sociologists, and other analysts have researched the reasons people join insurgent and other violent groups, such as gangs and criminal organizations, while developing complementary and sometimes conflicting theories.¹ The most common theories suggest violent movements, such as insurgencies, are a cause of socio-economic pressure caused by governmental policy changes, which in some form, affect the livelihood of those who rebel.²

There have been studies about why individuals make a choice to fight. There may be as many reasons as there are conflicts. Perhaps one of the most telling pieces of literature in this subject is an article written for the *Small Wars and Insurgencies* journal by Marcella Ribetti in 2007. In it, she describes some “unveiled motivations” of violence in intra-state conflicts by studying the FARC.³ Literature about VEOs focused mostly on the environment as opposed to the individual. Denoeux and Carter discuss poverty and economic conditions, as the macro-level as underlying causes leading to violent extremism.⁴ The factors that motivate a person to pick up a weapon and fight against a

more potent adversary are still debatable. Where do they get the courage to take action? Do they do it because of ideology? Do they fight because they have no choice? Are they initially pressured or coerced? What are the perfect storm events people go through that push them to a point where they become committed to a cause—a cause they may not completely understand?

The causes of violence have been the subject of many studies and there are many scholars who, over the years, produced very relevant and worthy information. Much of the literature used for this study is written with military focus. Some, however, is completely unrelated to anything military. The information required for the analysis in this study needs to be carefully extracted using analysis techniques such as pattern matching, linking data to propositions (where feasible), explanation building, logic models, and cross-case synthesis across multiple variables or markers.⁵ More of this will be discussed in chapter 3. The bottom line is, the information is subjective and not entirely empirical.

The U.S. Army Special Operations community produced several reports, white papers, and doctrinal manuals aimed at trying to understand the nature of irregular warfare and how to best deal with it. One white paper addresses the need to understand, what are referred to as gray zones; a conflict not in war, nor in the peace range of military operations, but somewhere in the middle.⁶ Most of the special operations literature focuses more on macro-level factors leading to an OVM rather than the micro-level individual push and pull factors that motivate individuals to join a violent movement.

This chapter reviews the most significant literature currently available, first, discussing prominent authors and their respective books. There is a review of articles,

newspapers, theses, documents, and websites. The literature is not reviewed in chronological order, but by OVM. It begins with EZLN, and then FARC, and lastly, SL. Additionally, there are other miscellaneous sources of information about the three chosen case studies in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru.

Influential Authors

Four authors must be considered. All of them are subject matter experts in their field and are highly regarded as credible sources by the military community, more particularly, in the military science community. Their contributions in the political science field of study are, without a doubt, a key ingredient in most schools of thought in regards to counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, or any other type of low intensity conflict involving collective violence against a more potent adversary.

Ted Robert Gurr authored and coauthored more than forty books since the late 1980s. His focus always revolved around violence, rebellions, instability, and conflicts in America and abroad. Several of his books were award winning.⁷ More importantly, Gurr has been working with Barbara Harff, a U.S. Naval Academy professor since 1988 on the early identification of potential ethnic groups susceptible to becoming part of a violent movement.⁸ Gurr knows, possibly better than anyone does, the search for the root causes of violence is a very difficult assignment. One of the common arguments in his writings is that “in order to understand grievances, we must first examine where people stand in society and what goods and bads they experience from governments.”⁹

Current research by Stathis Kalyvas includes the dynamics of polarization and civil war, ethnic and non-ethnic violence, and the formation of cleavages and identities.

He is the author of several books related to violent movements. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* is a book that “explores the causes and dynamics of violence in civil war,” and “demonstrates that there is logic to [violence in civil war] and that it has much less to do with collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures than currently believed.”¹⁰

Some classic texts are still relevant today in the continuous search of the origin of conflict. Classic books by authors such as Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Hobbes are still important to recall. Each of these timeless pieces offers a significant input to the importance of motivation whether it is influenced by consent or by coercion.¹¹ To explain the causes of war, Thucydides referred to *aitiai* to expand upon the motives under which war was justified. Additionally, he introduced *alethestate prophasis* as an “underlying cause deeply rooted in the nature of things.”¹²

Robert Barret provides an easier way to understand the different types of combatants. Barret conducted interviews with combatants from Africa. The types of combat motivation he discovered can apply globally. His findings are relatively irrelevant to the demographics of the fighters. He proposed six types of people who fight, each of them motivated by different factors: “the ideologue, the pragmatist, the basic needs (combatant), the soldier, the criminal, and the follower combatant.”¹³ Each of them also varies in their primary motivation, but they do coincide in the social-psychological motivation argument which suggests that a key motivator for combatants is heavily influenced by a relative or friend who is already part of the violence movement. In many of the interviews, he received a common response which implies that those who “elected not to join the fight bore an insufferable social burden that included demeaning names and labels.”¹⁴

James F. Rochlin is the author of *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. In this book, he provided some critical insight into all three cases discussed in this research. Rochlin's purpose is not to answer the question of why people rebel, but rather of how the rebellion is executed. He discusses success, failures, and longevity of EZLN in Mexico, FARC in Colombia, and SL in Peru. As a key insight into his research, he wrote "in the economic realm, [motivating] factors include poverty and profound economic inequity, unemployment, and underemployment, the failure of a country to adapt to dominant economic trends, and the onset of a general economic crisis."¹⁵

Rune Henriksen and Anthony Vinci provide a detailed analysis about the complexity of what it entails to analyze the "combat motivation of non-state actors."¹⁶ One of their main arguments is that "understanding combat motivation in non-state armed groups is essential for defeating such groups."¹⁷ Henriksen and Vinci suggest a two-dimensional approach is necessary to allow a more accurate approach to understand combat motivation. They propose to "conceptually distinguish two inter-related dimensions that help explain why people fight; these are the context (structure) dimension and the motivation (agency) dimension."¹⁸

Books—EZLN

Mexico has had its fair share of armed conflicts. The struggle for independence against the Spanish began in 1810 with a priest who galvanized the indigenous oppressed peasants.¹⁹ In the late 1800s, Mexico had its first civil war. The *Guerra de Reforma*, or Reform War was a fight between liberals and conservatives.²⁰ In 1910, Mexico plunged into another eleven-year-long civil war claiming the lives of hundreds of thousands and

pushing Mexico to economic crisis. This war, today, continues to galvanize the indigenous populace against the government.²¹

Mexico Under Siege by Donald Hodges and Ross Gandy, among other factors, examines the history of Emiliano Zapata. Zapata was one of the most prominent fighters who brought many victories in southern Mexico against the government in the early 1900s. He was assassinated and was therefore considered a martyr. Among many peasants, his legacy still lives on as many still quote him directly by stating, “it is better to die on your feet, than to live a long life on your knees.”²²

The EZLN has its origins (hence the term Zapatist), in the deep-rooted belief it is better to fight the oppressor and die in the process than to live a miserable life. This motto provides a deep insight into the emotional psyche of EZLN fighters. Most importantly, Hodges and Gandy determined it was the galvanizing of the people of Chiapas, by the social, political, and economic isolation, which led to the formation of the EZLN. *Subcomandante Marcos*, the *de facto* EZLN leader often remarked during many of his interviews, the reason he wore a mask was that the people of Chiapas did not have a face, referring to the complete disregard of the indigenous people by the Mexican government.²³

The book *Chiapas: La Guerra de las Ideas* (Chiapas: The War of Ideas) explores a similar perspective about EZLN. Jaime Ramirez Garrido, one of the authors, characterizes the movement as delirious. He describes the indigenous fighters as people who fail to realize the era in which they are living. They believe the same struggle against the bad government, which began over one hundred years ago, is still going. Many of the indigenous people view the Mexican Revolution, which ended in 1921, as a recent event.

Some of the EZLN fighters still conduct actions such as kidnappings and assassinations (or at least attempt to) in revenge for acts, which happened during the Mexican Revolution. In their mind, the government has always been the bad ones and they, the Zapatistas, have always been the good ones.²⁴

Books—FARC

Garry Leech, in his book, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, examines the origins of guerrilla movements. Leech is an expert on FARC who reported for many years from the front lines in Colombia.²⁵ He was held captive by FARC operatives for several years. Leech claims FARC tried to indoctrinate him. With this experience, he provides an unparalleled personal insight into the FARC.

Leech argued that FARC took a different approach to build its foundation. “Rather than acting as a revolutionary vanguard that sought to motivate the peasantry into engaging in armed [conflict], FARC was formed by an already politicized peasantry . . . seeking to defend itself against state repression.”²⁶ In a period of twelve years from 1970 to 1982, the FARC grew from an estimated five hundred combatants to approximately three thousand. Leech claimed their recruiting efforts were very successful because FARC was united by a socialist ideology, which was rooted in the communist socio-economic beliefs.²⁷

Eduardo Pizarro Langomez examined the origins of the FARC exploring the causes of the revolution. He argued FARC was not a planned effort and peasant resistance was a byproduct of the mere need to survive.²⁸ Pizarro argued that the offensive miscalculated military actions of the Colombian government generated new-armed groups. One of these operations took place on May 27, 1964, when seven

Colombian Army battalions supported by the Air Force, sought to isolate the communist forces in the *Marquetalia* area.²⁹ The indiscriminate targeting of the indigenous people led to a larger FARC formation as the victims of the operations sought refuge in FARC columns.³⁰

Books—SL

Gustavo Gorriti is one of the most distinguished journalists in Peru. He first covered the SL's violent movement in the 1980s and over the years created an extensive collection of first class documents about the SL leadership. His material is directly related to hundreds of interviews with SL members, more specifically, the now imprisoned leader, Abimael Guzmán Balaunde.³¹ He is considered a legend because he was a prisoner of SL. This experience gave him exclusive access to information he otherwise would not have been able to obtain.³²

In his book, *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru*, he provides close accounts of what it was like to be part of the violent movement and what motivated people to join the fight. Gorriti stated, “the assault on the Ayacucho Public Prison is described with grand hyperbole as a heroic action, marking a historic milestone . . . it pulled our comrades and combatants from the dungeons of the Peruvian reactionary state.”³³ This insight is the type of information necessary to get to the root causes that are necessary to analyze.

Steven J. Stern published original accounts of the beginning of SL in his book *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995*. He studied the violent movement from its inception in 1980 to 1995.³⁴ Stern and a team of Peruvian and U.S. historians, social scientists, and human rights activists explored the emergence of SL and

their decision to go to war. Moreover, Stern and his team provided some detailed information about some of the failed attempts to defeat the violent movement in urban and rural areas. Most of these failures were, in part, due to the lack of analysis of the motivation, which drove SL militants to carry out acts of violence. In one case, Stern provided some insight on the level of influence that money had in the motivation of SL combatants to fight. He recounted “in Lima’s Shantytowns and rural areas . . . Shining Path played on long-standing resentments and promised to return control of the money to the people.”³⁵

Articles—EZLN

Early reports about the EZLN activities was carried by many international news organizations. In 1994, Mexico once again was in the spot light after the EZLN “rocked a leaky boat.”³⁶ Mexico’s political parties were deeply engaged in a struggle for power giving the EZLN an opportunity to seize the initiative to advance their agenda.³⁷ The year prior to EZLN’s first appearance was a period of heavy political unrest. “Throughout all of 1993, the [Mexican] Army was in the middle of a great debate over the brutality and illegality of its acts during the student massacre . . . in Tlatelolco. On October 2, 1993, close to 100,000 people demonstrated.”³⁸

The Mexican population was growing worried. Many political assassinations and the corrupt reputation of the government became the popular rhetoric amongst many of the news networks. Canadian news sources, amongst other global news organizations were quick to point out the “[Mexican] army practiced genocide: bombings of civilian populations, assassinations of peasants, torture of prisoners, restricted access to information for journalists and other violations of human rights.”³⁹

Saul Lindau wrote an article of significant importance for *The Progressive* in 1996. After an interview with *Subcomandante* Marcos and some random meetings with a few villagers in deep Chiapas, he concluded indigenous people were:

Driven to the inhospitable terrain by progress, cattle ranchers, timber barons, and coffee-estate owners, by hydroelectric projects and oil drilling, by corrupt and venal political bosses who fostered division inside the Indian communities, by the laws of capital as they have operated for five centuries, these people now face the ultimate threat of annihilation thanks to NAFTA.⁴⁰

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was perceived by many, particularly the indigenous populace, as an enemy policy, which only benefited the rich and completely disregarded the poor. The *World Policy Journal* published an article, which elaborates on the results of NAFTA in Mexico. The article corroborates the perceptions of the poor Mexican people. They believe Mexico's poor population would not benefit from the agreement and the country would grow poorer – particularly the indigenous people.⁴¹ Moreover, Chiapas is among the states with the highest indigenous population who generally do not consume or buy industrial products, electronic or mechanical, but their land and natural resources are needed for the production of such products. EZLN supporters refer to these policies as neoliberal economic policies, which completely isolate and further exploit the already poor *Indios*.⁴²

Articles—FARC

Brent Buxton, an American journalist, wrote about the individual motivation of the people who joined *FARC*. In 2007, he wrote an article for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and posed the question of whether the organization was fighting due to grievances or just plain greed. He also commented that it is very difficult to pin the real motivations behind the FARC's actions and pointed out that the motivations are personal

in nature.⁴³ He argued that part of the difficulty in narrowing down the motivations of the organization is because of diversity. There are members who profess democratization while others are still rooted in the original Marxists-Leninist beliefs.⁴⁴ In addition to this, Buxton made the following interesting observation:

The motivation of many of the guerrillas may be a feeling of social exclusion. This is not simply a desire for better material standards, or even a sense that they have been unjustly relegated to poverty, although these elements may be part of the picture . . . many guerrillas . . . feel that they are not properly respected by the urban elite, and that they have not been sufficiently included in the social and political life of the country.⁴⁵

This statement underscores the social aspects of motivation. Buxton accurately points out the need to understand social structures and how these affect the way of thinking. Earning the respect of others is a potential individual motive to join a violent movement.

In 2002, the Colombian government began a militant demobilization program, which has been successful to a point since its inception. The program aims to motivate militants to lay down their arms and turn themselves in to the authorities. Since then, over 21,000 militants have been accepted into the program, of which 12,000 are former FARC fighters. Some were interviewed several times. A group of researchers from the Center for Strategic Studies, Center for Naval Analysis in Alexandria Virginia, led by Roman D. Ortiz and Natalia Herrera embarked on a journey to use the archived interviews to provide some insight on “why they join, why they fight, and why they leave.”⁴⁶

Natalia Herrera and Douglas Porch explored the role of women in FARC. Herrera concluded women are important contributors to FARC but their motivation to join is different from men. She proposed women, who have been providing about 20 percent of the fighting force, joined the FARC mostly to flee violence and sexual abuse at home.⁴⁷

In a journal article published in 2008, “‘Like Going to a Fiesta’ - the Role of Female

Fighters in Colombia's FARC-EP," Herrera pointed out FARC's emphasis on recruiting young *campesinas* from the countryside. Their recruitment efforts are far more successful as these young girls are vulnerable to persuasion under false promises of a better and more meaningful life.⁴⁸

Senior Research Analyst, Marcella Ribetti, explored the socio-psychological motivations at the individual level. She suggested personal socio-psychological pressure is a key factor in the decision to join a violent movement. Her research has contributed to a greater understanding of those who consciously make a decision to join armed resistances.⁴⁹ She also provides deep insights to counter the recruiting propaganda, which often targets vulnerable people. In her efforts to fight violent movements, Ribetti conducted dozens of interviews and studied a plethora of literature. Ribetti contributed greatly to the study, exploration, and understanding of people who join armed groups and the "true meaning and character of insurgencies, and possibly terrorist organizations."⁵⁰

Articles—SL

There are many international news sources with information about the Peruvian government's operations against SL and how these were a potential force pushing people to join SL. The *Globe and Mail* from Canada tracked the number of dead and wounded since the beginning of SL in Ayacucho in 1980.⁵¹ Their reports on offensive operations against SL, in the jungle and urban areas, allude to a chain reaction effect. Family and friends of peasants who died by actions of the Peruvian police and military forces ended up in the ranks of SL. The newspaper source shed some light on how potential external actions pushed some people into SL. They reported that since the emergence of SL in May of 1980, "more than 6,000 people have died in the conflict, including 200

policemen, 40 soldiers and 60 municipal officials,” giving credit to the claim that people continue to join SL based on revenge feelings and not an ideological agenda.⁵²

Another source reported the re-emergence of SL in Peru in early 2003, twenty-three years after its beginning. Abimael Guzman, the leader of SL, had been in captivity since 1992 after a successful offensive against SL deep in the jungles. In *Weekend Edition Saturday*, a National Public Radio news correspondent interviewed Juan Forero from Bogota, Colombia, an expert on the conflict. Forero asserted SL was re-emerging and that Abimael Guzman, the former leader who was responsible for 69,000 deaths, still had influence in the operations of SL even from his jail cell.⁵³

¹ Ribetti, 549.

² Ibid., 700.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Guide to Drivers of Violent Extremism* (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2009), ii.

⁵ Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers,” *The Qualitative Report* 13, no. 4 (2008): 550.

⁶ Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, *Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2016), 102, accessed November 2, 2016, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq-80_101-109_Votel-et-al.pdf.

⁷ E-International Relations, “Why Men Rebel Redux: How Valid Are Its Arguments 40 Years On?” accessed January 21, 2017, <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/11/17/why-men-rebel-redux-how-valid-are-its-arguments-40-years-on/>. Why men rebel was awarded the American Political Science Association’s Woodrow Wilson Award as the best book of 1970 in political science and international relations. It is amongst one of the most widely used books to understand the human psychic in a rebellious mindset.

⁸ Minorities at Risk, “About MAR: Ted Robert Gurr,” accessed January 20, 2017, <http://www.mar.umd.edu/bio.asp?id=2>.

⁹ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishing, 2011).

¹⁰ Peter Rozic, “Sathis Kalyvas: The Logic of Violence in Civil War,” *Perspectives* 16, no. 1 (2006): 115-116.

¹¹ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 266.

¹² Perez Zagorin, *Thucydides: An Introduction for the Common Reader* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 43.

¹³ Robert S. Barrett, “Interviews with Killers: Six Types of Combatants and Their Motivations for Joining Deadly Groups,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34, no. 10 (October 2011): 753.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 754.

¹⁵ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 2.

¹⁶ Henriksen and Vinci, 87.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 88.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹⁹ Miguel Hidalgo was a priest of Spanish descent. According to most historians, he was the person who united all Mexicans to rise in arms against the occupiers. On September 16, 1810 he initiated the fight which ultimately led to Mexico’s independence from Spain in 1821.

²⁰ Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, “La Guerra de Reforma,” last modified May 31, 2012, accessed April 13, 2017, <http://portalacademico.cch.unam.mx/alumno/historiademexico1/unidad5/lareformaliberal/guerradereforma>.

²¹ Donald Clark Hodges and Ross Gandy, *Mexico under Siege: Popular Resistance to Presidential Despotism* (New York: Zed Books, 2002), 188.

²² Edgar Acata-Panigua, “The Rebellion of Zapatistas” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996), 92.

²³ Kerry Appel, “Interview with Subcomandante Marcos of the EZLN,” YouTube, April 21, 2012, accessed March 22, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3pHmHbqqTk>.

²⁴ Héctor Aguilar Camín and Raúl Trejo Delarbre, eds., *Chiapas: La Guerra de Las Ideas*, 1. ed. (México: Editorial Diana, 1994), 262.

²⁵ Leech, 1-4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez and Ricardo Peñaranda, *Las FARC (1949-1966): De La Autodefensa a La Combinación de Todas Las Formas de Lucha*, 1. ed., Sociología y política (Bogotá, Colombia: UN, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, 1991), 43.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 191-193. The *Marquetalia* Republic was the unofficial name of a rural area south of Medellín, which was heavily dominated by guerrillas linked to FARC operatives.

³⁰ *Las FARC: De la Autodefensa a las Combinaciones de Todas las Formas de Lucha* is a book written in Spanish and therefore, it is translated.

³¹ Gorriti.

³² *Ibid.*, xi.

³³ *Ibid.*, 172. The assault on the Ayacucho Prison was one of the first military actions conducted by Shining Path militants on May 17, 1980. It marked the beginning of this organized violent movement, *Sendero Luminoso*.

³⁴ Steve J. Stern, ed., *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 291.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Alejandro Alvarez Bejar, "Zapatistas Rock a Leaky Boat: The Depth of Mexico's Political Crisis," *Canadian Dimension* (March-April 1994): 11-14, accessed January 21, 2017, http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A15146459/OVIC?u=cfsc_remote&xid=4ea40313.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 12. The actual student massacre happened on October 2, 1968. On October 2, 1993, there was a massive protest remembering the massacre of 1968 and demanding answers from the government officials. News sources like National Public Radio speculated that as many as three hundred students died at the hands of the Army on that day.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Saul Landau, "In the jungle with Marcos," *The Progressive* (March 1996): 25-30, accessed January 21, 2017, http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A18049702/OVIC?u=cfsc_remote&xid=f2608003.

⁴¹ Christian Stracke, "Mexico--the Sick Man of NAFTA - Opposing Viewpoints in Context," *World Policy Journal* 20, no. 2 (2003): 29-31, accessed January 21, 2017, EBSCO.

⁴² Ibid., 29.

⁴³ Brent Buxton, *The Multiple Motivations of the FARC and Prospects for Peace in Colombia* (Washington, DC: The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2007), 3.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ William Rosenau, Ralph Espach, Román D. Ortiz, and Natalia Herrera, "Why They Join, Why They Fight, and Why They Leave: Learning From Colombia's Database of Demobilized Militants," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 2 (April 2014): 277-285.

⁴⁷ Natalia Herrera and Douglas Porch, "'Like Going to a Fiesta' - the Role of Female Fighters in Colombia's FARC-EP," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 19, no. 4 (December 2008): 610.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 611. *Campesinas* is the term by which most women who are born and raised in farmlands in the far country side or in the jungles. It is also considered by many as a derogatory term. "Like Going to a Fiesta" tries to illustrate the tactics used by FARC to recruit women by telling them joining *Las FARC* was like going to a party.

⁴⁹ Ribetti, 699-720.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 699.

⁵¹ The Globe and Mail, "Rebel Offensive Penetrates Lima," May 20, 1985, accessed January 21, 2017, http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/NewsDetailsPage/zNewsDetailsWindow?disableHighlighting=false&displayGroupName=News&currPage=&scanId=&query=&source=&prodId=OVIC&search_within_results=&p=OVIC&mode=view&catId=&u=cfsc_remote&limiter=&display-query=&displayGroups=&contentModules=&action=e&sortBy=&documentId=GALE%7CA165623125&windowstate=normal&activityType=&failOverType=&commentary=.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ “Shining Path’s Return Raises Violence In Peru [DP],” *Weekend Edition Saturday*, November 15, 2008 accessed January 21, 2017, http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A189005866/OVIC?u=cfsc_remote&xid=f9efaf6b.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In any violent conflict, the social composition of the victims will not, by itself, reveal much about the social and political character of the struggle. Let us suppose a revolution breaks out in a country where the government is under the control of the wealthy. Let us suppose further the army is made up mostly of peasant conscripts and one section breaks off and joins the rebels who seek to overthrow the government and establish a communist regime. After a few battles, the statistician would no doubt find that the casualties on both sides were mainly peasants. To conclude that the main split in this case was a vertical one, to deny that class conflict was the key to the political struggles would be patently absurd. It is not only who fights but also what the fight is about that matters.

—Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy:
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*

This research contributes to a greater understanding of people who join armed groups and sheds some light on what is until now, for the most part, a seemingly mysterious phenomenon. This knowledge can be used for developing focused recruitment prevention programs. It also contributes to the expanding literature investigating the meaning and character of violent movements. Although many of the motivational factors can be identified using macro-level environmental analysis, this study focuses on identifying the motivational factors, at the individual level, in the economic, ideological, and socio-psychological domain.

This study uses a qualitative multiple-case studies analysis utilizing mainly secondary sources of information in the form of literature such as published books, papers, and articles. It examines three OVM cases in three countries of Latin American and compares them, using as reference, three categories motivation. The intent is to determine individual motivational factors (see figure 2) and the level of importance they play in each of the OVM cases; hence, the need for a multiple-case study analysis.

As a design and implementation strategy, the qualitative multiple-case studies approach offers a feasible method of finding those few, sometimes minor, contrasting instances to produce a wealth of new insight, which can lead to an enhanced understanding of complex phenomenon such as those dealing with small, complex, irregular wars.¹ This method uses analytic techniques such as pattern matching, linking data to propositions (where feasible), explanation building, logic models, and cross-case synthesis across multiple variables or markers to analyze.²

This investigation is purposely less structured to allow focus on the particular study of complex phenomena among individuals in different settings. This type of research requires “uniquely tailored methods.”³ This approach is permissive for understanding the ideas, points of view, tactics, modes, and techniques used by EZLN, FARC, and SL to recruit fighters. This research is a qualitative study used to extrapolate the individual motivational factors in three cases similar in nature and close geographically. It is methodologically based on inductive activities because it is necessary to know more about the case studies.⁴

Multiple-case Study Analysis				
Individual Motivational Factors				
OVM	Economic	Ideological	Socio-psychological	Other
EZLN				
FARC-EP				
SL				

Figure 2. Multiple-case Study Comparison Method

Source: Created by author.

Data Collection

The data collection of this investigation focuses mainly on written sources. There are, however, a few recorded interviews available from open source internet sites. Information is extracted from written sources such as books, magazines, journals, and reputable internet sites. The majority of the sources are published within the time of the existence of each OVM in each of the countries. Because this is a study focused on the individual level, the type of data to capture from the literature is observational in nature. The researcher focuses on passages describing the behavior of the people participating in OVMs. This data can be in a narrative from a news report, a personal experience from one of the authors, or recorded interviews.

Site Selection: Latin America

Latin America has been in constant conflict since the arrival of the Spanish *Conquistadores* in the late 1500s and early 1600s.⁵ In the last few decades, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Argentina, and many more Latin American countries experienced, or are experiencing, irregular warfare conflicts which devastated their economy and, in most cases, required some type of military intervention. The Latin American people experienced guerrilla warfare again in the early 1900s during the *Banana Wars*, and more recently in the multiple revolutions fueled by the Cuban revolution led by Fidel Castro and Ché Guevara and supported with Soviet influence. The conflicts in Latin America provide suitable depth and breadth of information to conduct this type of research. Some of the unique civil conflicts have taken place there.

Latin American has experienced more than fifteen armed conflicts in since 1982.⁶ It also saw the creation of more than twenty OVMs during the same time.⁷ Most of the conflicts appear rooted in socio-economic, political, and ideological differences amongst the local population. The western hemisphere theater produced extensive literature to conduct a study on individual motivation. The three case studies chosen for this study are in different countries and they are different in size and scope. All are still ongoing: EZLN in Mexico, FARC in Colombia, and SL in Peru.

The Case Studies

EZLN

EZLN is a guerrilla style OVM that has deep roots embedded in ideologies over five hundred years old when the native Mexican people were torn from their land. The

first public EZLN manifestation was in 1994 although some of their members claim it was established in 1983.⁸ They mostly operate in south Mexico in Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca.

FARC

FARC is a guerrilla movement that has kept the Colombian people engulfed in a bloody armed conflict for more than fifty years.⁹ This OVM is characterized as a terrorist group, and for decades has managed to drive an agenda by employing a variety of conventional military attack and defensive tactics mixed with unconventional methods, including kidnappings, seizure of properties, and extortions.

SL

SL is a terrorist organization with an insurgent agenda, which started their campaign in the remote rural areas of the Andes. Its first attack took place in 1980 during a presidential election. SL sacked and burned the election ballot boxes in a remote town named Ayacucho.¹⁰ Since then, SL conducted assassinations, bombings, and other terrorist attacks in several urban and rural areas where they have political influence.¹¹ Even though it was a relatively small OVM, SL seized control of some poor rural and urban population centers in southern Peru in the central region of the country.¹²

The Motivational Factors

Economic Motivational Factors

One of the principal motivators for people is the potential for financial gain or access to economic goods. It may not necessarily be about cash, but in general, the goal is to achieve some type of reward, which eventually can be translated into a better

economic situation to address economic-based grievances.¹³ The next chapter analyzes the economic-based motives within each of the case studies to see how much of a factor they play in someone's decision to join an OVM. To analyze this variable, the author will search for indicators such as the people's individual income, access to goods and natural resources, and risks of losing their livelihood.

Ideological Motivational Factors

Ideology is an important motivation because it is the fabric, which binds an OVM. Ideology can be interpreted as the nuts and bolts needed to keep an engine together and functioning. Without a bonding ideology, the movement is likely to diminish and die. Ideology is what allows the organization to exist. In fact, "spontaneous uprisings are by definition unorganized," whereas strong movements are bound by a common vision and ideology.¹⁴ Most of the ideology behind the modern revolutions in Latin America are based in Marxist ideology galvanized by some of the most famous revolutionary figures in the world, Cuban Fidel Castro and Argentinian Ché Guevara. Are the ideologies really understood by the average recruit? This study will look for evidence of ideological-based motivational factors such as the promoted ideologies of the OVM, their compatibility with the people, and the capability of the people to comprehend and adopt them as their own.

Socio-Psychological Motivational Factors

The socio-psychological factors are the most difficult to analyze because the indicators are much harder to observe. The author followed the same variables Ribetti used while studying FARC. Ribetti breaks down these motivating factors into three

different types of incentives: protection, arms, and vengeance.¹⁵ The three incentives fall more in the psychological domain as the participant believes that joining will protect him from death or injury as he or she will become part of a group. Access to arms is also an incentive to people. Owning a weapon provides instant gratification, a sense of power and superiority—as well as a way to protect themselves. Ribetti found a deep desire for revenge against an organization or someone, who has wronged them in the past. Another pattern is the social-pressure factor; those who decide to join based on the need to feel part of a group, or to avoid being looked upon as cowards.

Other Motivational Factors

Other motivational factors cannot be directly categorized into any of the previously discussed categories. These motivational factors are important and should be considered when analyzing an OVM. These factors can be categorized as forced motivation or perhaps even false motivation. The study will look at coercion as motivation. Coercing someone into joining an OVM means the individual did not have a free choice. Nevertheless, it is a choice. Another factor could be the cognitive ability of individuals to process information. This study will look at indicators such as the quality of the person's education or their ability to make a wise decision based on the information available. Coercion is a very effective recruiting technique used by many violent organizations. It is a valid motivational tool.

¹ Max G. Manwaring, *The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 5.

² Baxter and Jack, 550.

³ Joseph A. Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 88.

⁴ Adrian Holliday, *Qualitative Research: Doing and Writing*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2016), 1.

⁵ Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1990), 4.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Radu and Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries*.

⁸ Acata-Panigua, 7.

⁹ Rochlin, 103.

¹⁰ Stern, 13.

¹¹ Rochlin, 103.

¹² Gorriti 238.

¹³ Ribetti, 699.

¹⁴ Selbin, 76.

¹⁵ Ribetti, 711.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In many cases, what brings violent extremists together is their shared dedication to a particular vision of how society ought to be organized, and/or their strong questioning of the foundations upon which their societies are presently organized.

— Guilain Denoux and Lynn Carter, *Guide to Drivers of Violent Extremism*

Chapter Organization

This chapter analyzes information utilizing the methodology and analysis techniques described in chapter 3. There are three case studies to be analyzed across three specific criteria to help determine the individual motivational factors pushing or pulling people to join the OVMs. This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section provides necessary background information and context about the geographical area where the three cases happened. The second section is the analysis of the economic, ideological, and socio-psychological factors in the three cases. The third section presents the results and interpretation of the investigation.

Latin America Background

Latin America has been the bed of many revolutionary struggles in the past 120 years. The first successful insurgency uprising happened in Mexico in 1910 when the Mexican populace, thousands strong, under the leadership of several key figures such as Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata, and Alvaro Obregon, took up arms to end the oppression brought upon them by the 30-year dictatorship under Porfirio Díaz.¹ This was the first successful insurgency in Latin America to date. The revolution officially ended in 1921. In addition to this revolution, there had not been another anywhere in Latin America,

until more than forty years later, in 1953, when the Cuban Revolution shook the world and brought a new era of revolutionary upheavals in the region.²

Twenty years later, in 1978, the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front or *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* overthrew the government to build a socialist state.³ The Cuban Revolution initiated a chain reaction of violent movements in more than thirteen central and south American nations. Since then, more than forty-five organized violent movements with all sorts of ideologies have been created. Three of these in particular are still ongoing: EZLN, FARC, and SL.

On Motivation

When violence erupts, it generates a chain reaction among the population. Violence incites more violence, because unfortunately, many people live through tragic experiences leading them into difficult situations. From 1961 to 1968, 114 of the 121 larger nations and/or colonies experienced some form of OVM.⁴ Not only have there been numerous OVMs around the world, but they also proved to be the deadliest to the people and most destructive to the established political systems.⁵ Currently, there are over one hundred small, irregular, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars still ongoing around the globe.⁶ It is an astonishing figure.

Ted Gurr proposed, “motivational factors are relevant to political violence, but many of them can be subsumed by the deprivation concept.”⁷ The deterrent to participate in an armed conflict is the danger associated with it. There is an inverse relationship between the deprivation concept proposed by Gurr and the danger of participating in an armed rebellion—the higher the danger, the less likely someone will participate. The deprivation factor must far outweigh the danger for people to make the choice to fight.

Those deprivations can be summarized in three categories: economic, ideological, and socio-psychological.

Robert Barret separated fighters into six categories: the “ideologue, the Pragmatist, the Basic Needs (combatant), the Soldier, the Criminal, and the Follower combatant.”⁸ In this categorization, he encompasses the leadership, the supporters, and the fighters themselves. One can deduce that the ideologue, most likely to be a leader, is motivated by ideology. The pragmatist and criminal are more likely to be motivated by personal gains, while the follower and the combatant are more likely to be motivated by socio-psychological factors.

The Cases

This section describes the three cases with more detail. The cases are all in the western hemisphere in countries where the government has not completely defeated them. The EZLN in Mexico, which has been active for over twenty years; the FARC in Colombia, considered the longest insurgency in modern history; and SL in Peru, active since 1980. SL is arguably one of the bloodiest insurgencies Latin American ever experienced.

Case Study 1—EZLN

This case begins with the uprising of the EZLN on January 1, 1994. EZLN has been operating in the southern Mexico, mostly in the state of Chiapas. The movement has been in existence during five presidencies: Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), Vicente Fox (2000-2006), Felipe Calderon (2006-2012), and Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-present). Three of the presidencies were under the *Partido Revolucionario*

Institucional and two under the *Partido de Acción Nacional*. These are the two most widely supported political parties in the nation.

EZLN was relatively a small and impotent guerrilla group in the beginning. It was under armed and poorly organized. It started with approximately two thousand fighters in 1994. Since then, it has increased its strength to more than three thousand fighters. Although there are estimates of up to forty thousand supporters in various roles.⁹ This organization continues to threaten Mexico's security, and by default, the national interests of the United States, as this instability creates a vacuum creating the proper conditions for human trafficking along the porous southern Mexican border.

This case is special in particular because it was one of the first, if not the first, to capitalize on the availability of the commercial internet.¹⁰ EZLN leadership recruited not only peasant fighters, but also technical experts to exploit the advantages and easy access to mass media. The infamous *Subcomandante* Marcos, leader of the EZLN was not shy of the camera, and he used every opportunity to get the necessary attention, and used the media to carry the message across Mexico and the world.

On January 1, 1994, Mexican *indigenas* (male, female, young kids, and adults) took up arms and seized seven municipalities in the highlands of the southern state of Chiapas.¹¹ They suffered some casualties while combating the local authorities. They did not fight against the Mexican Army because it was not present at the time. After taking over the towns, they declared war on the Mexican government and threatened to seize Mexico City and defeat the Mexican Army if the government did not meet their demands. The exact number of people who participated in the initial attacks with EZLN varies depending on the source. Some estimates range from five hundred to two thousand

people. Humanitarian groups operating in the area estimated its total support base at about twelve thousand people—most of them noncombatants. Each one of these people, regardless of their role in supporting EZLN, made the decision to join the movement, all motivated by different factors.

EZLN Economic Motivational Factors

One of the most significant events in the early 1990s was the signing of NAFTA. Mexico named it *Tratado de Libre Comercio*. NAFTA would go into effect on January 1, 1994.¹² It was no coincidence that this was the exact day when EZLN attacked and seized the six municipalities already mentioned. At first sight, the uprising could be interpreted as a violent protest to deny or prevent the Mexican government from maintaining the trade agreement with the United States and Canada. The Mexican government promoted NAFTA as a way to launch Mexico into a first world economy. They promised widespread Mexican prosperity and a significant reduction in illegal immigration into the United States.¹³ It was a win-win situation for both the United States and Mexico.

Chiapas is the southernmost state in Mexico. It is very rich in fertile land, oil, and natural resources. The state boasts a large workforce, willing and able to work for low wages as most of the population is composed of indigenous people who are humble, and to a certain degree, not greedy. Between 1915 and 1988, Mexico enforced an agrarian reform, which enabled peasants to title land, as long as they were willing and able to produce. The government redistributed over 104 million hectares of land, but the land distribution was uneven. Many of the wealthy people began to appropriate the fertile land in mass quantities.¹⁴ In Chiapas, there were smaller farms. Therefore, there were more

landowners than the rest of the country, about 148,000 by 1970.¹⁵ The smaller farms were the less fertile and harder to access.

Mexico's modernization and industrialization between 1960 and 1980 led to the isolation and expulsion of many indigenous people further into the jungle and into ungoverned and mostly unfertile lands. By 1994, at the dawn of the emergence of EZLN, only twenty-four families controlled the majority of the country's wealth.¹⁶ In 1992, over 57 percent of the Mexican population lived in extreme poverty conditions. Chiapas was even worse.¹⁷ Between 1972 and 1990, the government allowed gigantic lumber companies, and some peasants, to deforest over 585,000 hectares of land.¹⁸ For the EZLN, one of the catalyst events was an amendment to Article 27 of the constitution introduced in 1992, which officially ended the distribution of land in Mexico.¹⁹

A few years after the attacks of EZLN in 1994, one-third of the participants confided to news sources, their rejection of "too much exploitation and too much injustice" and their unwillingness to bear it any longer. One of the interviewees said the people "had no choice but to take up arms and fight because the land belongs to those who labor it."²⁰ It is clear then, two thousand extremely poor people, from a pool of about twenty-five million, decided to join the EZLN. This does not mean the rest of the poor did not become violent in some form. There is also evidence of other OVMs and an increase in criminal activity in Mexico and Chiapas during this period.

EZLN's attacks in Chiapas caused the collapse of Mexico's central bank and led to a financial crisis.²¹ Immediately following the Salinas presidential term, Mexico was hit with the Peso Crisis from 1994 to 1995.²² The devaluation caused the prices of necessities to soar well beyond the purchasing power of the Mexican people earning the

minimum wage; it was a crippling event to the Mexican economy. Additionally, there was a 7 percent decline in Mexico's gross domestic product and a 20 percent decline in the worker's wages.²³ Overall, Mexico's economy was terrible for the average agrarian, industrial, or commercial worker. In Chiapas, the situation was even worse.




Figure 3. Peso Devaluation

Source: Joseph A. Witt, Jr., "The Mexican Peso Crisis," *Economic Review* 81, no. 1 (January-February 1996): 4, accessed March 22, 2017, <http://search.proquest.com/openview/8d431f2352e4c32d0f77e724fd727488/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=34496>.

EZLN Ideological Motivational Factors

EZLN was the first modern revolution of its kind as it exploited the availability of the internet. It is considered the "first revolution of the internet era."²⁴ Largely with the internet, EZLN revealed volumes of official documents presenting the clear ideology of the insurgent group.²⁵ In 1992, *Subcomandante* Marcos wrote an article titled "Chiapas:

The Southeast of Two Winds – A Storm and a Prophecy.” The content of this piece was mainly focused on drawing attention to the deforestation, exploitation of natural resources with complete disregard for the indigenous wellbeing, and the extremely poor conditions of the Chiapas indigenous population. He wrote, “80 percent of highland residents suffered from malnutrition” and claimed Chiapas had the highest mortality rate in the country. Many of the deaths could have been prevented with a simple over-the-counter vaccine.²⁶

Some believe EZLN’s ideology is rooted in Marxism. However, there is a fundamental difference between Marxism and EZLN ideology. EZLN is deeply concerned with the conservation of the environment. They both coincide in their views on the management of natural resources. EZLN believes the proceeds of the sales of natural resources should go directly to the people.²⁷ They are also extremely critical of neo-liberal economic policies and uneven or unfair distribution of wealth.²⁸ Marcos’ cunning ability to communicate in an educated and poetic manner attracted sophisticated people from the cities, countries, and even continents, including Europe.²⁹ Equality and fair treatment was also part of the EZLN rhetoric. Marcos calculated he would garner more national and international support by using the oldest living generation of natives in Mexico, the descendants of the Mayan people, who according to him, had been oppressed by the rich for more than five hundred years.³⁰

Since 1970, prior to the creation of EZLN, various activists taught these ideological principles to the indigenous people of Chiapas, before Marcos introduced himself into the *Lacandona* jungle.³¹ Priests and other influential educated people, mostly university professors and humanitarian rights activists, Maoists philosophers and priests

had been clandestinely inculcating these ideas to the indigenous populace. Much of the ideological groundwork was practically done for Marcos.³² He continued the indoctrination process by teaching the people they did not have to succumb to the system. They had the right to rise and demand equality and fair treatment.³³ Marcos educated people about the historical Mexican revolutionary spirit. They told people the stories of Miguel Hidalgo and José Maria Morelos, two Catholic priests who took up arms with the oppressed people and fought for independence against the Spanish in 1810. They also educated people about the Mexican Revolution in 1910. This revolution epitomized the need for armed conflict in a situation far too grave to continue.³⁴

Key evidence of Maoist philosophy embedded within the EZLN movement comes from a critical analysis of the origin of the weapons. Marcos credited the *Campesinos* with acquiring the weapons, either by donating whatever weapons they had in their own homes, donating funds to purchase additional weapons, or donating and selling their land's produce to accomplish the same objective.³⁵ This is a well-known technique of Maoist philosophy. By requiring the peasants to sacrifice something to acquire their own weapons, it reinforces their commitment to the struggle and they develop a personal emotional attachment to the organization. It also ensures they take good care of the weapons so that when they are needed, they function properly.³⁶

Roy Krover offers a good explanation of the Zapatista ideology, or the lack thereof, in a 2010 article titled "Anarchism, The Zapatistas, and The Global Solidarity Movement."³⁷ Krover's article describes the Zapatista movement as a unique phenomenon of modern times, and as such, it cannot be clearly aligned with common ideologies like Socialism or Marxism-Leninism, or Maoism. In fact, many Marxists

involved in the early stages of the formation of EZLN left the organization because of disagreements.³⁸ The Zapatista movement, more than anything else, is a movement against neoliberalism. It can be interpreted as counter-neoliberalism or *Contra-neoliberalismo*.³⁹ However, as the title of the article suggests, Krover also classified Zapatista as a pro-anarchist organization.



Figure 4. EZLN Mural: Liberty, Equality, Land

Source: Deborah A. Greebon, "Civil Society's Challenge to the State: A Case Study of the Zapatistas and their Global Significance," *Journal of Development and Social Transformation* 5 (November 2008): 73.

Socio-Psychological Factors

To provide some context about the socio-psychological aspects of the EZLN, it is necessary to review Mayan culture. Most EZLN fighters were descendants of one of the oldest and most intact indigenous populations in Mexico, the Mayans. EZLN is composed largely of five Mayan descendent tribes: the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Tojobal, Chol, and Zoque. The rest of the tribes formed civil bases of support but did not, for the most part, form part of the fighting force of EZLN.⁴⁰ The Mayans were the last ethnic group to be conquered by the Spanish in 1703. The Spanish had conquered the rest of Mexico in the early 1600s. It took the Spanish almost one hundred years to subdue the Mayans. However, very soon, the Mayans rebelled again in 1712.⁴¹ The EZLN ancestors were the toughest to conquer because they did not want to give up their identity or moral dignity, and they valued their ethnic way of life.⁴²




Figure 5. *Lacandona Jungle Indigenous Population Map*

Source: Esther Miranda, “El Movimiento Zapatista: La Lucha Contra El Neoliberalismo Global,” *El Orden Mundial En El S.XXI*, March 23, 2016, accessed February 23, 2017, <http://elordenmundial.com/2016/03/23/el-movimiento-zapatista-la-lucha-contra-el-neoliberalismo-global>.

The Mexican Revolution also provides a glimpse of the socio-psychological motivational aspects of the EZLN. The term *Zapatista* is derived from the name of the legendary revolutionary fighter Emiliano Zapata, the *Caudillo* (leader) who fought against an oppressive government all over central and southern Mexico. He was accompanied by a guerilla army constituted mostly of indigenous people named *Ejército Libertador del Sur* (Liberation Army of the South). The popular folk songs and poems about his feats still dominated the local radio stations. Jaime Ramirez Garrido described the indigenous fighters as people who fail to realize the era in which they are living. They believe the same struggle against the bad government, which began over one hundred years ago, is still going.⁴³

EZLN participants are religious and superstitious people. They are very much like the majority of the rest of the country. They are Catholics who believe in Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and Saints. They are community friendly people, but reject outsiders and foreigners because they perceive them as racists.⁴⁴ Interestingly, Marcos did not use religion as a way to gather the people. However, he did as Emiliano Zapata during the Mexican Revolution, he portrayed himself as the hero who would bring prosperity and progress, land and freedom, dignity and respect for the extremely disenfranchised twenty million indigenous people of Mexico.⁴⁵

Case Study 2—FARC

This case begins with the rise of the FARC in 1966, although some sources claim FARC debuted as far back as 1964. FARC's leader, at the time, was an educated man named Maraundula Velez. That was not his real name.⁴⁶ Marandula was a liberal who was forced to join the armed struggle because he was being persecuted by the conservative government. He was in FARC's leadership position for nearly three decades until 1991.⁴⁷ At the dawn of the 21st century and under Marandula's leadership, "FARC stood as the largest and most militarily powerful leftist guerilla group in the Americas."⁴⁸

FARC is a product of Marxist-Leninist ideologies and advocates for the agrarian communities. It is also extremely anti-imperialist. It started out with approximately 350 fighters in 1963 and, at one point in 2001, it reached upwards of twenty thousand.⁴⁹ Its current strength is not exactly known, although some humanitarian activists estimate about ten thousand members.⁵⁰

FARC was a very potent guerilla force in 1990. The rebellion included dozens of small guerrilla groups, some only hundreds strong, in more than half of the 1,071

municipalities of the country. They were estimated at about 16,500 strong in early 2001. Some sources estimated over thirty thousand armed members; many of them were children and young teenagers. One significant aspect of this OVM is the guerrilla's striking resemblance to a full-time professionalized army.⁵¹

Economic Motivational Factors

Much of the mass media coverage about FARC has included the term narco. The relationship between the rebels and drug production, as well as drug trafficking has reached a point where it is indissoluble. Before the mid-1980s, FARC was a "weak guerilla movement."⁵² By 2002, it had grown into a highly potent rebel movement; the biggest factor for its growth is the funding. "The funding has come almost exclusively from the group's participation in crime [such as] narcotrafficking, kidnapping, and extortion."⁵³ Some sources consider FARC to be "the world's wealthiest guerrilla movement, with estimates of its annual income ranging from 300 to 700 million U.S. dollars, 65 percent of which comes from 'taxation' of the drug trade, and the remainder from robbery, kidnapping, and extortion."⁵⁴

Colombia is the only country in the western hemisphere with an ongoing-armed struggle of this large magnitude. EZLN and SL have transformed into less violent movements. EZLN morphed into a social net-war and SL into a political movement. FARC proved to be a different type of organization still leaning towards armed struggle. What is different about Colombia and why is the insurgency still strong? Perhaps the drug industry provides the necessary financial support to keep fighting. The fact is, in the last five decades, the fighting has caused six million displaced civilians living in extreme poverty.⁵⁵ Paul Collier is a research analyst who conducted an analysis of empirical data

over a period of more than thirty years. His study of several world-wide civil conflicts concluded “popular perceptions see rebellion as a protest motivated by genuine and extreme grievance . . . economic analysis sees rebellion as . . . the ultimate manifestation of organized crime.”⁵⁶

Additionally, Colombia is a country stricken with unemployment in all sectors of society. The agrarian community perceived that cultivating traditional produce leads to more debt, and there are dangers of persecution in the business of growing coca. This was due to the large financial investment necessary to grow produce and the cheap prices of the produce. The peasants had no real alternatives. If they grow regular products, they will not make money. Instead, they will sink more into debt. If they grow illegal products, they will be chased by the authorities and other organized criminal groups because they represented competition.⁵⁷

Land distribution in Colombia presents yet another challenge. Similar to Mexico, land distribution is one of the most unequal in the world. A study conducted by the United Nations found 52 percent of the farms controlled by less than 2 percent of the landowners.⁵⁸ The average Colombian agrarian worker did not make enough to survive, especially with the soaring costs of basic products. However, is this primarily what drives them into the ranks of the FARC? Eduardo Pizarro Langomez examined the revolution. He argued the peasant resistance was caused by a mere need to survive.⁵⁹

Ideological Motivational Factors

FARC has publicly announced solidarity with other leftist-socialist movements in Latin America such as those in Cuba and Nicaragua.⁶⁰ The origins of FARC are rooted in communism. In fact, the Southern Bloc was the muscle behind the Communist party of

Colombia or *Partido Comunista de Colombia* (PCC) in 1960. In just a few months, the Southern Bloc was transformed into FARC.⁶¹ Undoubtedly, the FARC and the PCC were interlinked. The communist party leader once said, “the party and the guerrilla detachments [meaning the FARC] are as one, they interweave and are interdependent.”⁶²

In addition to communist-based ideologies, FARC is extremely anti-imperialist. They perceive the United States as an imperialist power, a diseased hegemony towards which they are extremely hostile.⁶³ However, some Colombians as well as international supporters perceived the organization’s ideology as outdated conceptions of Marxism. They proclaimed the movement followed Bolivarian concepts as its ideological platform. Simon Bolivar emerged as the new face of FARC. The main reason why Bolivar was so popular is that he was directly linked to anti-US imperialism.⁶⁴ Additionally, the term “*Bolivariano*” connoted an unofficial link to Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez whose career was built on constant defiance of U.S policy.⁶⁵ It is also no secret that FARC’s ultimate political objective is to overthrow the government.




Figure 6. FARC versus the Colombian Army—an Effective Force

Source: The Economist, “Colombia’s Peace: A Chance to Clean Up,” October 1, 2016, accessed March 23, 2017, <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21707921-all-its-imperfections-and-complexities-agreement-between-government-and-farc>.

Socio-Psychological Motivational Factors

To get a glimpse of the socio-psychological experience of the participants of the FARC, it is necessary to look at some statistical data. The violence in Colombia has caused three hundred thousand deaths and thirty-five thousand kidnappings. Some of the victims were peasants, innocent civilian bystanders, and combat casualties. FARC and the Colombian Army have committed questionable actions against the population.⁶⁶ At first, it is quite simple to conclude, the deaths and kidnappings directly or indirectly pushed many people into the hands of the FARC guerillas. The chances of becoming affected by FARC or the Colombian Army are quite significant. As one United Nations

report puts it, “in the last eight years almost 1,500,000 people have been displaced. This number corresponds to almost 4 per cent of the Colombian population and to around 15 per cent of the rural population.”⁶⁷

One of the reasons FARC has survived for such a long time is their robust ability to conduct information operations. As with EZLN in Mexico, they took advantage of the internet to publish expressive written concepts, photography, and videos to instill fear and to condemn cowardly people.⁶⁸ They invested heavily to recruit new forces and in retention as it had proven to be a difficult task. In 2007, the Colombian government counted approximately twelve thousand defectors.⁶⁹

Although one of the main causes of the uprising is agrarian reform, the majority of the FARC soldiers are not indigenous people. During interviews with news sources like Cable News Network, they learned to share the jungle with the natives and established a relationship of mutual support. This is important because FARC members have a sense of reciprocal friendship if they feel supported. However, one of the key common characteristics of the FARC members’ character is their significant dependence on possession of weapons. This information coincides with one report to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “the main motivating factor of the FARC is an ideology of self-defense.”⁷⁰

Case Study 3—SL

In March of 1983, SL had a total membership of approximately two thousand to three thousand fighters; these were the armed militants. The support base was estimated in tens of thousands. In September 1983, only six months after the SL debut, the Peruvian government launched an offensive killing or capturing more than half of SL participants.

The actions of the government spurred collective action and by 1987, SL's total numbers were estimated at approximately ten thousand armed militants, most of them very young adults.

When Abimael Guzman (SL leader) was arrested, the Peruvian government confiscated his computer. In it, they discovered that Guzman's "People's Guerilla Army" was at 23,430 strong.⁷¹ The authorities believed only about six thousand had the capacity to conduct paramilitary operations.⁷² There were reports of militants at the age of fifteen and some as young as ten. A unique characteristic about SL was the fact they recruited and trained an unusual number of women to be cadre.⁷³ This was a way of expressing equal rights.

Economic Motivational Factors

Peru suffered from a crisis of extreme poverty. The rural areas as well as the shantytowns of metropolitan areas were overwhelmed with necessity.⁷⁴ In fact, Cynthia McClintock stated, "the revolutionary spark in Peru was economic crisis."⁷⁵ This is when SL acquired most of its support at the height of their existence in the 1980s. As of 1970, it was practically impossible for a poor Peruvian to move up in society.⁷⁶ The elitist government and other institutions imposed obstacle after obstacle to keep the poor from establishing a better way of life. It was extremely difficult to start a new business or to legalize the status of claimed or inherited lands. The general perception of the local poor people was Peru's problem was "bad government."⁷⁷

Even those who served in the government were denied the opportunity to move up the social ladder. For example, one SL member served his time in the Peruvian Army, completed his university education, and job-hunted for over a year. He was unable to find

a job because his parents were peasants and still lived in a poor neighborhood. Shining Path offered a way to work and to feel equal because they did not promote social classes. Consequently, there was no distinction between commanders and the troops.⁷⁸

Of the thirty-three *Senderistas* interviews McClintock conducted, they all cited socio-economic misery as the key factor in their decisions to join the revolution and they blamed the government for the situation.⁷⁹ *Senderistas* were tired of being hungry, malnourished, and the conditions in which they lived and died. For them, it was a hopeless situation. People felt compelled to do something about the situation and SL offered a good opportunity.⁸⁰

Ideological Motivational Factors

SL's goal is the seizure of power to implement communism in Peru. To this end, it used revolutionary violence (terrorism, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare).⁸¹ Its leader, Abimael Guzman, considered himself the "Fourth Sword of Marxism" (following sword number one, Marx; two, Lenin; and three, Mao).⁸² He was a philosophy professor and respected by many intellectuals.⁸³ SL is responsible for thousands of deaths, and until the late 2000s, it was known for recruiting and indoctrinating small children in their ranks.

SL published videos and photographs using the internet to draw attention to the movement. The organization is now a less dangerous movement; it morphed into a political branch. Nonetheless, it was an extremely violent movement which "reached a crescendo of power in 1989-1992," immediately following the end of the Cold War.⁸⁴ SL began to reinforce their political and financial structure after losing military power due to a very successful offensive campaign launched by the Peruvian government.⁸⁵

The extreme lethality of SL was not just a tactic. Violence was at the core of their ideology, a “vital element of strategy itself.”⁸⁶ They published many documents declaring armed violence as the primary means to achieve their goals. In one such statement, SL declared, “revolutionary violence is, therefore, the very essence of our historical process.”⁸⁷ In a different document, SL asserted the communist party position: “the party cannot be developed more but through the use of arms, through armed struggle. That is the hard lesson we have learned in 50 years, a great lesson that we should never forget: We have no power because we have no guns. Like Chairman Mao has written, whoever has more guns has more power.”⁸⁸ Guzman always maintained life was cheap and if it were necessary, he would sacrifice one million lives. His rhetoric attracted thousands of people. Among them, the poorest and most violent; the ones with nothing to lose and much to gain.⁸⁹

SL is an orthodox Maoist group. It leaned heavily towards extreme communism. Their ideology, based on Mao Zedong, was built on two main tenets: total destruction of the market economy, and “the creation of an exclusively rural and collectivist economy of small cooperative and collective village.”⁹⁰ One of SL’s outlandish goals was to establish small self-sufficient villages free of currency and trade. Like the Chinese, they wanted to eliminate the industrial sector and external trade. Hence the targeted attacks on commercial establishments.⁹¹

Socio-Psychological Motivational Factors

The socio-psychological motivational factors differ for the educated and undereducated. The situation in Peru affected these two groups differently. During the rise of SL, poverty, criminal activity, terrorism, and overall violence plunged Peru into

chaos. This dire situation was needed for SL to grow stronger and more powerful. Their individual interpretation of the situation led them to make decisions to join. The poor uneducated people wanted to join, in part, to become members of a team. The young educated professionals wanted to join because of a deep desire to make a difference.

Cynthia McClintock interviewed thirty-three SL members. Five of them were teachers (to include one university level professor). Three were professionals (an OBGYN doctor, an architect, and a government official). The rest of the group was composed of eight students, six factory workers, and two vendors. There were only three young people who were unemployed.⁹² This is not a proportional representation of their total force, but it provides some insight about the ability to get members to recruit people of all kinds. Teachers were among the top participants. By 1990, there were thirty thousand teachers, almost 15 percent of all teachers in Peru.⁹³

A 23-year-old law student *Senderista* expressed his motivation to his mother while he was in prison as she confronted him in his jail cell. Neither of them noticed the guard was watching and listening closely as they were having the conversation. She complained about his relationship to SL accusing him of going around killing people. He responded, “Mother, the system [referring to the government] kills people with hunger;” then he continued, “sixty thousand children die before their first birthday each year in Peru. What’s going to help them?”⁹⁴

McClintock’s interviews also unveiled socio-psychological motivation in SL. It is not uncommon to hear an SL participant refer to their companions as *Compas*. It is a term of endearment used in SL. It meant everyone was equal, there is no social class. One member said, “the central problem is not race. It’s economics. It’s class.”⁹⁵ This

particular school of thought became a powerful tool to recruit new members. The word *compa* acquired a more powerful meaning than brother, father, or countryman. It was a brilliant way of building cohesion in the ranks and instilling fear in those who wanted to leave. The poor people of Peru felt isolated and abandoned by their government. They always felt impotent, inferior, with low self-esteem. SL offered a way to work and feel equal because they did not promote social classes and or even a rank structure. In the team, everyone was equal.⁹⁶

Comparative Analysis

At this point, the case studies reached a level of detail necessary to conduct a comparative analysis. The following section analyzes the criteria set in chapter 3 across the three cases: EZLN in Mexico, FARC in Colombia, and SL in Peru. The literature introduced various indicators of individual motivational factors in three categories: motivation influenced by economic gain, ideological drivers, and/or socio-psychological pressure. The next section outlines the key findings pointing to motivational factors. The last section of this chapter interprets the results and weighs the level of importance that each motivational category played in the cases.

Economic Motivational Factors

In EZLN, the majority of the fighters were indigenous people living well below the national poverty line, unable to make ends meet. When interviewed about their motives for choosing armed struggle, some EZLN fighters cited there was just “too much exploitation and too much injustice” they could not bear any longer.⁹⁷ They “had no choice but to take up arms and fight because the land belongs to those who labor it.”⁹⁸

The recurring theme in the EZLN was the desire to own land and end oppression. There is evidence of individual motivation based on an economic gain. The fighters made a choice to join the armed struggle because they wanted land and the benefits of the nation's natural resources to achieve a better way of life for them and their families. With more land, they could become farmers instead of day-to-day laborers as they had always been.

Collier summarized best the economic motivational factors of FARC's fighters. From an economic perspective, the rebellion is a manifestation of organized crime.⁹⁹ Colombia is a country stricken with unemployment in all sectors of society. However, the data reveals the agrarian community is more susceptible to recruitment. The hardships of the agrarian businesses gave the peasants no real alternatives but to join FARC and enter the illegal drug market.¹⁰⁰ This problem and the unfair land distribution in Colombia created the conditions for the rural people to feel the need to fight just to survive.¹⁰¹ While the drug industry certainly provided supplies and personnel, it is important to remember FARC came before the drug industry. Therefore, the illicit drug industry cannot be blamed for the creation of FARC.

Eduardo Pizarro Langomez examined the origins of the FARC exploring the causes of the revolution. He argued FARC was not a planned effort and peasant resistance was a byproduct of the mere need to survive.¹⁰² The hardships of the rural communities and unfair distribution of land pushed the people to the insurgency. There was no other choice. The Colombian government could not establish presence and rule of law in the far rural communities where FARC was able to reach. The people who could not feed or clothe their families saw FARC as the only option to achieve a better way of

life even at the risk of losing their lives. For them it was a dire situation. Without a means to make a living, they would certainly die.

In SL, of the thirty-three *Senderistas* McClintock interviewed, most cited socio-economic misery as the key factor in their decisions to join the revolution and they blamed the government for the situation.¹⁰³ *Senderistas* were tired of being hungry, malnourished, and the conditions in which they had to live and die. For them, it was a hopeless situation.¹⁰⁴ In their view, the government was responsible to feed the people. In this case, hunger drove most people to join SL. Low class Peruvian people who joined SL, cited hunger as the main cause.¹⁰⁵ The word *hambre* (hunger) had a deeper meaning to the *Senderistas*. It was a way of expressing the lack of their ability to survive in a country where a handful of people owned the nation's wealth. One peasant expressed his true motive for joining the movement. He stated his purpose was "to take from the rich to give to the poor and needy."¹⁰⁶ Here, there is a clear link to motivation by economic gain.

Ideological Motivational Factors

Subcomandante Marcos was an ideologue who had a cunning ability to inspire people and a brilliant way of handling mass media.¹⁰⁷ He was a university philosophy professor who was not afraid to express his leftist ideals. He used these ideals to attract people into the movement. It is likely that the educated people who were attracted to him were influenced by his ideals. However, the vast majority of two thousand EZLN fighters were extremely poor undereducated people incapable of understanding ideologies. For them, it was more about the oppression rather than changing the entire society. Some argue EZLN people were against a capitalist government because they adamantly opposed NAFTA, as they launched their very first attack on the day the treaty was

signed. However, EZLN opposed NAFTA because they perceived it as a threat to their way of life. They thought the treaty would ultimately push them further into the uninhabitable jungle and deeper into poverty to a point.

Garry Leech, who was a prisoner of the rebels, stated FARC was united by a socialist ideology rooted in the communist socio-economic beliefs.¹⁰⁸ These ideological motivations, especially in the case of the FARC, are often complemented by greed-based motivations for conflict, spurred by Colombia's abundance of exploitable natural resources, especially in the drug industry, which proved to be the most profitable.¹⁰⁹ FARC's relationship with the PCC, and their solidarity with other socialist movements in Latin America such as the ones in Cuba and Nicaragua, reveals a strong ideological base.¹¹⁰ The origins of FARC are rooted in communism. In fact, the PCC was the political wing of FARC, which pushed the communist message to the potential recruits. However, there was also another strong sentiment FARC would use to attract people, "*Bolivarianism*."¹¹¹ This ideology rallied the people who were anti-United States. Those who opposed any type of U.S intervention certainly joined the rebellion to show, not their support for FARC, but their hatred towards the U.S.¹¹²

SL fighters also joined for their ideology. Much of the SL leadership was composed of highly educated people who were concerned about the poor people of Peru. Their ability to recruit and indoctrinate professionals was a key effort in the daily operations of SL. McClintock interviewed thirty-three SL members. Of those, the majority were professional.¹¹³ SL recruited many of their professional supporters from universities while they were in the early stages of their studies. People like the 23-year-old law student who was very passionate about the cause. In his mind, he was fighting to

stop the government from killing young kids.¹¹⁴ SL's ultimate goal was to seize power to implement communism.¹¹⁵ Abimael Guzman was a well-spoken university professor with an ability to recruit other professors and intellectuals.¹¹⁶

Socio-Psychological Motivational Factors

Donald Hodger and Ross Gandy revealed the most telling clues about the personal motivations of EZLN fighters, socio-psychological motivation. The status of Emiliano Zapata as an idol to the Chiapas indigenous population played a significant role in recruiting. EZLN leadership and spokespeople present Zapata as a martyr not afraid to die. He was a sort of superhero to the poor people; someone brave, unafraid, and willing to face the oppressive government. They used his story to demonize the government and galvanize the people's deep desire to take revenge against a government that isolated them for so long. Zapata's famous battle cry still lives on in many of the *Zapatista* fighters. "It is better to die on your feet, than to live long on your knees."¹¹⁷

The socio-psychological motives are evident in FARC members. The continuous fighting between rival guerrillas and the government, the period of the *violencia* (violence) during the 1950s, and the drug wars created the conditions for people to feel the need to join. Many of the victims of the fighting were innocent civilian bystanders and honest agrarian people who, when victimized by the government's offensive operations in the rural areas, sought revenge.¹¹⁸ Very large numbers of people were affected, directly or indirectly, by the death or kidnapping of a family member or someone close. The chances of anyone living in Colombia (especially in the rural areas) becoming affected by FARC's or government's actions are quite significant. The casualties of the conflict and the violent-leaning culture the country developed over the

last six decades certainly give the people strong motives to join. They want to protect themselves or become someone who matters. Others join for vengeance purposes.¹¹⁹ Many people are drawn in by the appeal of a military lifestyle or the status and power associated with wielding a weapon. Often joining is a form of escapism from the drudgery of daily existence. Some become members under force and others are attracted by false promises, often related to economic benefits. Issues of revenge also come into play. Finally, there are those that are motivated by 'conviction;' sometimes, but not always, linked to ideology.¹²⁰

The socio-psychological motivation in SL is evident. Members of SL were all *Compas*. By addressing each other this way, it meant they were all equal and there was no social class. This particular school of thought became a powerful tool to recruit new members. The word *compa* acquired a more powerful meaning than brother, father, or countryman. It was a brilliant way of building cohesion in the ranks and instilling fear in those who wanted to leave. The poor people of Peru felt isolated and abandoned by their government. They always felt impotent, inferior, with low self-esteem.

Results

The data reveals a distinct relationship between the type of motivational factor and the individuals based on their role within the organization. Those in leadership roles are more likely to be persuaded by ideology because they tend to be the more educated and sophisticated people influenced by their studies.¹²¹ The vast majority of supporters of the OVM seem to be motivated by economic reasons or by a socio-psychological motivational factor. The analysis of the data shows a significant, and almost equal, level of importance in these two categories. However, the economic gain motive seems to be

more evident in EZLN and SL (see figure 7). In FARC, economic gain appears to be below socio-psychological motivation in terms of importance. The majority of the people who decided to join FARC did so because of selfish goals, some economic, but also socio-psychological.¹²²

In all three cases, there is evidence that ideological factors play a more significant role in the more educated people, those who have studied or were indoctrinated. However, most people who join make a desperate decision. The people who make the decision based on ideological matters usually take time; they go through a process. There is a keen difference between making a decision to join a violent movement because of experiencing hunger and/or witnessing hunger. Those who experience hunger make decisions based economic factors. In contrast, those who witness hunger make decisions based on ideological factors. An arrested SL political commander said he joined the movement because “it’s a way to make sure all Peruvians get everything they need.” A 15-year-old peasant said he joined because he felt miserable, hungry, exploited, and abused.¹²³ The same pattern is dominant in all three cases.

There are also other motivational factors pushing people to join OVMs; the most common other factor is coercion. In all three cases, there were people who claimed they had been forced into the OVMs. This was more evident in FARC as well as in SL. However, it was far less evident in EZLN. Nevertheless, this motivational factor still played a significant role in feeding political violence. Another motivational factor evident, at least in FARC, was domestic violence. People who joined the organization because they were lured, they wanted to get away from the persecution and abuse of

family and friends. Natalia Herrera found recruiting young girls in the countryside was easy. They could be lured into FARC persuaded by false promises of a better life.¹²⁴

Multiple-case Study Analysis				
OVM	Individual Motivational Factors			
	Economic	Ideological	Socio-psychological	Others
EZLN	Primary (Land, wages)	Supplemental (Marxist, Anarchists)	Secondary (Tribal, indigenous abandonment, heroism)	Supplemental (Coercion, false promises)
FARC-EP	Secondary (Land, wages)	Supplemental (Communists, hatred for U.S.)	Primary (Weapons, Protection vengeance)	Supplemental (Coercion, escape from violence)
SL	Primary (Government benefits)	Supplemental (Communists)	Primary (Comradery, indigenous cohesiveness)	Supplemental

Figure 7. Individual Motivational Factors and Level of Importance in OVM

Source: Created by author.

Recommendations

The first action before intervention is to study the OVM in depth. The study must include the history of the region as well as the culture of the people and the conditions under which the OVM began. When the commander and the staff develop a strategy, the end state must be as important as the causes of the problem. Focusing on the end state

will guide what actions to take. Understanding the causes of the problem will enable the commander to treat the problem and avoid treating just the symptoms. To do this, commander needs the advice of experts on the region, the people, and the culture. Experts can help the commander see the situation from a different perspective and to understand the situation through critical and creative thinking. A commander must not develop, much less implement, a defeat strategy, if the conditions of the operational environment are not clearly understood.

In addition to Chiapas, there are other poorly governed areas where another OVM can erupt. EZLN was a relatively small movement with big consequences. The timing of the first EZLN paramilitary operation in Chiapas caused grave consequences to the Mexican economy. It also caused civilian and military casualties. However, most importantly, it created civil unrest within the population and harnessed international support from across the globe. The Mexican government acted without knowing the root causes of the problem and began persecuting EZLN in the *Lacandona* jungles where its actions generated more problems than solutions. FARC and SL were much larger violent movements with heavier casualties on both sides, the guerrillas and the government. However, the reaction of the Colombian and Peruvian governments were the same. They began persecuting the guerrillas into their territories without completely understanding the movement or any regard for second and third order effects. The government must dedicate the necessary resources to understand the movement. This includes hiring the linguists, experts, scholars, historians, political scientists, philosophers, economists, and other think tanks necessary to build a team designed to understanding the OVM.

As a second recommendation, there must be a concerted effort, by the military and local authorities, to deter people from joining the movement. The counter propaganda must be more effective than the propaganda of the enemy. The first resource to tap must be the same people who decided to join and have since defected. The former enemy soldiers can provide a wealth of knowledge about the way the OVM is recruiting and access to this information is an opportunity that must not be bypassed. Ambassador Alberto Fernandez recently proposed this method as a way of countering Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant propaganda when he stated, “there is a wealth of credible voices of people who have firsthand knowledge of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant violence that have not been fully tapped.”¹²⁵ This also means tapping into the civilian sector to build a network capable of defeating the OVM. Often times, the military relies only on military personnel or related agencies to counter the enemy’s message. Military personnel are not always the best choice and the civilian sector, the home front, is also a potential tool.

Although EZLN and SL have morphed into less violent movements and FARC seems to be in the process of disarming, they still have the potential to rise up in arms if they foresee their political non-lethal efforts not paying off, or if they feel betrayed. It is important to continue to deter people from joining the violent movements with effective anti-recruiting messaging utilizing mass and social media. Social media seems to have the upper hand in information operations as of today and this presents a good opportunity to exploit. The governments must harness the power of social media and create vast anti-OVM networks to discredit those who advocate or support them. Ambassador Fernandez

also proposed this as a campaign against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant when he stated:

It takes a network to fight a network. Despite some steps to ramp up the volume of our counter-propaganda efforts, we still lack the volume necessary to be able to compete in this space. Volume has value. And the Islamic State—either itself or with its networks—still has the advantage in numbers, and it’s managed to create an echo chamber that gives its messages a life of their own.¹²⁶

In offensive operations, the friendly force must seek a three-to-one force ratio to conduct an attack. That is, the attacking force must have three times the relative combat power of the defending force (see figure 8).¹²⁷ The same concept needs to be applied in information operations. If the adversary’s network has twenty thousand followers on Twitter, the friendly force must build a network three times as big. Only then will the adversary’s network of followers be ineffective and allow the friendly force to exploit any gains. As long as the enemy’s volume of followers is larger, the friendly force will always remain on the defense never able to assume the offense.

<i>Friendly Mission</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Friendly: Enemy</i>
Delay		1:6
Defend	Prepared or fortified	1:3
Defend	Hasty	1:2.5
Attack	Prepared or fortified	3:1
Attack	Hasty	2.5:1
Counterattack	Flank	1:1

Figure 8. Planning Ratios

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, *Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), B-17.

To ensure the OVM does not erupt again, it is necessary to change the operational environment conditions, which led to it in the first place. The first condition to be changed is the ungoverned space. In all three of the cases, the OVM began in an area where the government did not have a well-established presence. In Chiapas, the townships and cities had a relatively weak police force and governmental representatives. SL initiated in Ayacucho. At the time, Ayacucho was a small town with virtually no government presence. FARC was not so different. The ungoverned space in Colombia provided a safe haven for the guerilla forces to gather, train, and plan operations. If any government is to prevent the emergence of an OVM, it is necessary to address the ungoverned space and ensure representation of the population in government agencies.

Changing the political, economic, and social conditions will require tremendous effort and a long time. This is not a recommendation to change the operational environment over night to appease the people. Change must happen. However, the government must change the bad one-sighted perception of the people that everything is going terribly. NAFTA generated such anger within the Chiapas indigenous populace, yet a simple information program could have placated the anger. The political conditions of the area must accommodate the lives of the people living in the region as best as possible. In areas where the government cannot compromise, there must be an effort to inform the people about the political situation and what they are doing to address political grievances. The political questions of the indigenous people must be addressed. This can be done by establishing a relationship with the powerful figures of the region and using them to push the message. This effort must be executed in concert with unceasing information operations to broaden the perspective of the population at risk. As was

observed in all three cases, Marcos, Marandula, and Abimael were able to push their views of the system to the people virtually unopposed. EZLN, FARC, and SL, were only exposed to one view particular; the view of the ideologues.

¹ Hodges and Gandy, ix.

² Daniel Castro, ed., *Revolution and Revolutionaries: Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, Jaguar Books on Latin America no. 17 (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1999), xi.

³ Radu and Tismaneanu, 291–296.

⁴ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 3.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Manwaring, 3.

⁷ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 9.

⁸ Barrett, 753.

⁹ Ronfeldt and Arroyo Center, 1.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ronfeldt and Arroyo Center, *The Zapatista “social Netwar” in Mexico*, 1.

¹² James Francis Rochlin, *Redefining Mexican “Security”: Society, State and Region under NAFTA* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).

¹³ Christian Stracke, 29.

¹⁴ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 173.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 181.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 182.

¹⁹ Ibid., 187.

²⁰ Vice, “The Zapatista Uprising (20 Years Later),” January 3, 2014, accessed March 23, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/the-zapatista-uprising-20-years-later.

²¹ Joseph A. Whitt Jr, “The Mexican Peso Crisis,” *Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta* 81, no. 1 (1996): 2.

²² Christian Stracke, 30.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ronfeldt and Arroyo Center, 9.

²⁵ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 188.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Nick Henck, *Subcommander Marcos: The Man and the Mask* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 28.

²⁸ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 188.

²⁹ Ibid., 190.

³⁰ Camín and Delarbre, 3.

³¹ Henck, 67.

³² Ibid., 62-63.

³³ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 180.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Henck, 102.

³⁶ Ibid., 103.

³⁷ Roy Krover, “Anarchism, The Zapatistas and the Global Solidarity Movement,” *Global Discourse* 1, no. 2 (2010).

³⁸ Ibid., 11.

³⁹ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁰ Esther Miranda, “El Movimiento Zapatista: La Lucha Contra El Neoliberalismo Global,” *El Orden Mundial En El S.XXI*, March 23, 2016, accessed February 23, 2017,

<http://elordenmundial.com/2016/03/23/el-movimiento-zapatista-la-lucha-contra-el-neoliberalismo-global/>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Camín and Delarbre, 262.

⁴⁴ Acata-Panigua, 7.

⁴⁵ Mentinis Mihalís, “Towards a Revolutionary Psychology: On the Vicennial of the Zapatista Insurrection,” Dorsetchiapassolidarity, March 15, 2014, accessed March 7, 2017, <https://dorsetchiapassolidarity.wordpress.com/2014/03/15/towards-a-revolutionary-psychology-on-the-vicennial-of-the-zapatista-insurrection/>.

⁴⁶ Radu and Tismaneanu, 149.

⁴⁷ Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez and Ricardo Peñaranda, *Las FARC (1949-1966): De La Autodefensa a La Combinación de Todas Las Formas de Lucha* (Bogotá, Colombia: UN, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, 1991), 1.

⁴⁸ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 130.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 98, 132. In a desperate attempt to survive, *Las FARC* combined forces with *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, an organization it had considered a foe. The majority of the forces were from *Las FARC*.

⁵⁰ Summer Newton, ed., *Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgency Strategies: Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Columbia (1964-2009)* (Ft. Bragg, NC: U.S. Special Operations Command), accessed November 2, 2016, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.737.3455&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, 151.

⁵¹ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 137.

⁵² Ibid., 135.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Katharina Röhl, “Greed or Grievance—Why Does the FARC Keep Fighting?,” *University for Peace and Conflict Monitor* (2003), accessed January 23, 2017, <http://www.monitor.upeace.org/Colombia.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Gerardo Lissardy, “Colombia Y Las FARC: ‘No Se va a Acabar La Violencia; Se va a Acabar El Conflicto Armado Interno,’” *BBC Mundo*, June 26, 2016, accessed March 2, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-36611757>.

⁵⁶ Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 144.

⁵⁷ Röhl, 12.

⁵⁸ The Economist, “Peace, Land and Bread,” November 24, 2012, accessed March 2, 2017, <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21567087-hard-bargaining-starts-peace-land-and-bread>.

⁵⁹ Leongómez and Peñaranda, 43.

⁶⁰ Radu and Tismaneanu, 151.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 150.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 132.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 135.

⁶⁶ Newton, 380.

⁶⁷ Ribetti, 707.

⁶⁸ Newton, 151.

⁶⁹ Ribetti, 708.

⁷⁰ Buxton, 11.

⁷¹ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 39.

⁷² Cynthia McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 74-75.

⁷³ Radu and Tismaneanu, 325.

⁷⁴ McClintock, 287.

- ⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid., 272.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid., 273.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid.
- ⁸¹ Gorriti, 107-108.
- ⁸² McClintock, 63.
- ⁸³ Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano and John B. Reuter, *Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism*, The Washington Papers 144 (New York: Praeger, 1990), xvi.
- ⁸⁴ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 3.
- ⁸⁵ Gorriti, 231.
- ⁸⁶ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 57.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid., 57-58.
- ⁹⁰ Radu and Tismaneanu, 328.
- ⁹¹ Ibid.
- ⁹² McClintock, 272.
- ⁹³ Ibid., 273.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid., 276–277.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid., 280.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid., 272.
- ⁹⁷ Vice.

- ⁹⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹⁹ Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 144.
- ¹⁰⁰ Röhl, 12.
- ¹⁰¹ Leongómez and Peñaranda, 43.
- ¹⁰² Ibid.
- ¹⁰³ McClintock, 273.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 277.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 278.
- ¹⁰⁷ Henck, 232–233.
- ¹⁰⁸ Leech, 22.
- ¹⁰⁹ Newton, 55.
- ¹¹⁰ Radu and Tismaneanu, 151.
- ¹¹¹ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America*, 135.
- ¹¹² Ibid., 132.
- ¹¹³ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America*, 272.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid., 276–277.
- ¹¹⁵ Gorriti Ellenbogen, *The Shining Path*, 107–108.
- ¹¹⁶ McClintock, 63.
- ¹¹⁷ Acata-Panigua Edgar Acata-Panigua, “The Rebellion of Zapatistas” (Command and General Staff College, 1996), 92.
- ¹¹⁸ Newton, 137.
- ¹¹⁹ Ribetti, 716.
- ¹²⁰ Frances Thomson, “The Agrarian Question and Violence in Colombia: Conflict and Development,” *Journal of Agrarian Change* 11, no. 3 (2011): 321-356.

¹²¹ Ribetti, 707.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ McClintock, 279.

¹²⁴ Herrera and Porch, 611. *Campesinas* is the term by which most women who are born and raised in farmlands in the far country side or in the jungles. It is also considered by many as a derogatory term. *Like going to a fiesta* tries to illustrate the tactics used by FARC to recruit women by telling them joining *Las FARC* was like going to a party.

¹²⁵ Alberto Fernandez, “Four Ways to Counter ISIS Propaganda More Effectively,” Brookings, last modified 2015, accessed February 26, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/11/16/four-ways-to-counter-isis-propaganda-more-effectively/>.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 117.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I thought then and I still think that one cannot understand conflict behavior and root until one knows what is in people's minds...what their grievances and their hopes are. Structural factors, of course, are crucial in shaping that. But, how do they respond? How do people interpret and react to the circumstances? If you don't understand that, then your explanation is partial.

— Ted Gurr, quoted in interview on MindFields

Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to identify individual motivational factors causing people to join OVMs. The Latin American theater provided many suitable cases to carry out this investigation. Latin Americans experienced more than fifteen armed conflicts since 1982.¹ There were more than twenty guerrilla movements during the same time.² This study contributes to a greater understanding of people who join armed groups and sheds some light on the complex dynamics of political violence. The results can be used to develop strategy against guerrilla-like organizations or focused recruitment prevention programs. It also contributes to the expanding literature investigating the true meaning and character of violent movements. This investigation focused on individual level motivation factors in the economic, ideological, and socio-psychological domain while still considering the underlying conditions of the operational environment.³

Chapter 1 set the stage for this investigation. It posed the question: what are the individual motivation factors causing people to join an OVM? It addressed the importance of understanding the causes of violence to develop effective strategies against political violence. LTG McMaster discussed what war theorists and philosophers have

said for centuries. No matter how powerful the army, one thing cannot be forgotten—“war is a contest of wills.”⁴ This thought must be kept in mind when designing strategies.⁵ Governments tend to send more troops against rebellions. This strategy initiates a chain reaction of offensives on both sides. Ultimately, it leads to more deaths, discontent, and larger rebellions.

Chapter 2 reviewed existing literature. Ted Gurr’s, *Why Men Rebel*, written in 1971, is one of the most revealing pieces of literature. Its relevancy during this investigation can speak to the timelessness of his findings. James Rochlin is another author whose work contributed significantly to this study. Rochlin focused on how rebellions formed and his findings provided a wealth of knowledge on how individuals interpreted and reacted to the social, political, economic, and ideological conditions. Marcella Ribetti’s work corroborated Gurr’s findings. That is, socio-psychological motivation is perhaps the most significant reason for joining a violent movement.⁶ She provided key socio-psychological motivators such as protection, access to weapons, and vengeance in FARC.

Chapter 3 contained the research methodology and design. This study used a qualitative comparative-case studies analysis utilizing mainly secondary sources of information in the form of literature such as published books, papers, and articles. It examined three OVM cases in three Latin American countries, and compared them using three categories of motivation. The intent was to determine individual motivational factors and the level of importance they played. The research was qualitative it needed to extrapolate individual motivation factors from passages, stories, and individual experience accounts of participation.

Chapter 4 was broken into two sections. It explained the case studies across three grouped motivation categories and one other, to help determine the individual motivational factors pushing or pulling people to join the OVMs. The first section provided background information and context about the geographical area where the three cases (EZLN, FARC, and SL) took place. The second section of chapter 4 examined examples of economic, ideological, and socio-psychological factors.

The study revealed EZLN fighters were primarily motivated by economic gain. In interviews, the common theme was the need to own land as well as the distribution of wealth. Socio-psychological motives were also evident. People felt isolated, abandoned, and oppressed by the government and this caused a sense of duty to stand up against the oppressor. The history of the Mexican Revolution, more specifically, the history of Emiliano Zapata influenced rallying the indigenous people to arms. Ideology was more evident in the leaders of EZLN, and their educated support base. Other motivational factors such as coercion played a part in the movement, but this was not common.

FARC shared similar findings. In this case, socio-psychological motives ranked higher than any other did. Violence pushed peasants to search for a way to protect themselves. Many expressed their desire to own a weapon and reach a higher status in the social hierarchy. Many others joined FARC to seek revenge. The next most common evidence of motives was the desire to make a better living while others stated they joined because it was the only way to survive. Ideological motives appeared to be significant in the leadership and the educated support base of the movement. Lastly, there was also evidence of coercion and desire to escape abusive and violent homes.

Economic and socio-psychological motives were equally evident in the case of SL. Extreme poverty pushed people to choose violence. Peer pressure and the common belief of the *compass*, that everyone not on their team was the enemy frequently appeared frequently as a motive. The separation of social classes, isolation, and disenfranchisement of the poor indigenous people was just as a powerful a motive as economic gain. In SL, the leadership and educated people played supporting roles and were more influenced by ideology than other motives.

Across the three cases, motivational factors were similar but not equally influential across the population. Undereducated people were influenced by economic gain or socio-psychological need while educated people were influenced by ideology. The primary motivational factor in EZLN and SL was economic gain. The primary motivational factor in FARC was socio-psychological. Ideology was the chief motivational factor for the leadership of each of the OVMs. Without ideology, the OVM never would have materialized. In these cases, motivational differences were not extreme. This could be due to the geographical and cultural proximity of the cases. Nevertheless, the individual motivational factors were different. Each OVM must be understood within its context to develop an effective strategy to defeat it.

Recommendations

The goal is to reduce the number of people who join an OVM by implementing measures to reduce the effectiveness of individual motivational factors. Political, social, and economic conditions of the operational environment (macro-level) must be addressed. There must also be focus on the individual (micro-level). Governments could implement three strategies. First, educate the friendly force about OVMs. Second, expose

the OVM's true agenda and propaganda. Third, change the conditions enabling the motivational factors. The first two strategies can be implemented at the tactical level, by the local authorities, local government, or a military force. The third recommendation requires governmental policy change. These recommendations can be expressed in a simple three-step strategy to confront an OVM, that is understand, deter, and change.

Issues for Future Study

Comparing the individual motivational factors in other OVM cases to those in this investigation will confirm, disconfirm, or provide additional insights. This study focused on three similar cases within the Latin America: Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. The geographic and cultural proximity of the cases enabled a relatively simple case study comparison. The next step would be to study and compare cases outside of the immediate region such as in the islands of the western hemisphere such as Grenada, Haiti, or Dominican Republic. Other cases, not so similar, can be included such as Uruguay's *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional*, Brazil's *Ação Libertadora Nacional*, and Ecuador's *Alfaro Vive Carajo*.⁷

This study revealed an information gap on the mental capacity of the people to process information efficiently to make decisions. Another investigation should explore if the people who decide to join an OVM have the mental capacity to make important consequential choices. Does the education level make a difference? In the case of the educated people, do the ideologists have mental traumas pushing them or pulling them into violence? A study of their mental capacity and their history would shed some light.

This study did not address the upbringing of the fighters. What were they exposed to while attending school, church, or other gatherings? At what age is the mind most

easily influenced by individual motivational factors? Do cultural traditions such as music, poetry, or other past times play a role in motivating someone to join an OVM? These are questions beyond the scope of this study. The answer to these questions may provide additional useful information.

¹ Radu and Tismaneanu, 156.

² Ibid.

³ The cognitive capability of a person can influence their ability to process information and cause them to make faulty decisions. However, the primary focus of this study is the individual motivational factors and not their ability to make wise decisions. This would be study of a different kind requiring interviews and intelligence evaluations.

⁴ Howard, 75.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ribetti, 700.

⁷ Selbin, 5.

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