

PEACE OPERATIONS IN MALI:
THEORY INTO PRACTICE THEN MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

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by

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ABSTRACT

PEACE OPERATIONS IN MALI: THEORY INTO PRACTICE THEN MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS, by Major Andrew K. Prewitt, 110 pages.

This research sought to measure the effectiveness of the international community's response along two broad lines of effort (LOE): Creating a Safe and Secure Environment and promoting Stable Governance. When seeking to achieve a Safe and Secure Environment, two objectives were measured. Objective #1 sought the Cessation of Large Scale Violence. Success was attained, as French military forces saved the Malian government from collapse and nominally regained control of Mali's territory from militants. In addition, on the diplomatic front, a ceasefire was negotiated between the Government of Mali (GoM) and armed groups, followed by an internationally sanctioned and robust deployment of an international Peacekeeping force to Mali. Objective #2 attempted to promote Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a method to incorporate local northern citizens into a legitimate security apparatus. Results have been ineffective: Joint patrols stalled, a legitimate local security force has not been created, and a troubling level of violence persists.

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ACRONYMS

ADM	Army Design Methodology
ATP	Army Training Publication
AU	African Union
CMA	Coalition Movement Azawad
CT	Counter Terrorism
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
GoM	Government of Mali
HCUA	High Counsel Unity Azawad
JP	Joint Publication
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	National Movement for Liberation of Azawad
MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
OCM	Operational Coordination Mechanism
OE	Operational Environment
PSPSDN	Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
U.S.	United States
USIP	United States Institute of Peace

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Peace is a daily, a weekly, a monthly process, gradually changing opinions, slowly eroding old barriers, quietly building new structures. And however undramatic the pursuit of peace, that pursuit must go on.

—John F. Kennedy

Since Mali's independence in 1960, four uprisings in the northern regions against the Malian nation-state have occurred, each directed against the central government in southern Mali. In each instance, peace agreements have failed to create lasting stability. The most recent rebellion began on January 17, 2012. Shortly after the northern rebellion was initiated, a military coup against the democratically elected government in the southern capital of Bamako occurred. The plotters were frustrated with the government's inability to suppress the rebellion in the north. The coup resulted in further deleterious effects and northern militants took advantage. On January 10, 2013, with militants 48 hours from Bamako, the French initiated Operation Serval and conducted a military invasion of Mali. The French militarily defeated the militants and recaptured much of Mali's territory. Since the French invasion, the international community has facilitated the election of a new government and authorized an international Peacekeeping force to stabilize Mali. Stability, however, remains elusive and violence persists. In 2017, a contingent of French forces remains, in addition to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The three previous rebellions concluded with fragile ceasefires and shaky peace agreements. Today the presence of the UN, the French, and several other international organizations presents an unprecedented

opportunity for stability. Will Mali and the international community capitalize on this opportunity?

Primary Research Question

The primary research question is, “Has the international community’s response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?”

Secondary Research Questions

In order to answer the primary research question, “Has the international community’s response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?” the answers to four secondary questions must be investigated first. Answering the secondary questions facilitates visualization of the desired outcome for this research—measuring the international community’s effectiveness towards achieving stability in Mali.

The secondary questions to be answered are:

1. What are the underlying and proximate causes of intra-state conflict?
2. What are prevailing accepted methods to resolve intra-state conflict?
3. What are the underlying and proximate causes of conflict in Mali?
4. What has the international community done to address conflict in Mali?

The secondary questions prompt a literature review of leading theories on the causes of intra-state conflict, followed by a review of prevailing responses for promoting stability. This background will be applied to both understand the causes of conflict in Mali and, ultimately, measure the effectiveness of the international community’s operational approach to creating conditions for stability in Mali. After answering the

primary research question, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations for future research will be made.

Assumptions

In order to frame this research, certain assumptions have been made. First, this research assumes the nation-state of Mali should maintain its internationally recognized border. In order to resolve intra-state conflict, in certain instances, it may be necessary to break up a nation-state and create one with newly recognized international borders, such as Kosovo or South Sudan. However, as recent events in South Sudan have illustrated, recognizing new borders may result in unintended negative consequences, for example, although South Sudan became independent, conflict between disparate groups in South Sudan has resulted in civil war within the new nation-state. Accordingly, given the variety of disparate factions in Northern Mali, this research assumes creating a breakaway state is not the most effective method for peace in Mali. If, for example, a new nation-state was created in northern Mali, conflict between several factions would remain, and potentially even increase amidst competition for power and resources within the new state. Second, this research assumes the UN's MINUSMA mission is the preferred platform for addressing instability in Mali. The French, having successfully invaded and dispersed militants, could remain. However, since Mali was once a colony of France, it is assumed an international mission under the auspices of the UN provides greater legitimacy. The African Union (AU) is another possibility, as it continues to bolster its peace operations capability. The AU, however, lacks capacity and resources. Conversely, the UN offers a more inclusive multidimensional capacity and can pool resources and expertise from the entire international community. Accordingly, this

research first assumes that Mali's current international borders should remain intact and, secondly, the UN is the preferred lead platform for peace operations.

Definitions and Terms

With the end of World War II and the subsequent period of decolonization, the creation of new nation-states has not occurred without conflict. In order to maintain peace and security the international community has found it necessary to conduct Peace Operations, most notably in Africa. As a result of the comprehensive nature of Peace Operations, the following definitions and terms bring context to this research. Political scientists Paul F. Diehl and Alexandru Balas, in *Peace Operations*, note the use of soldiers provides a third-party asset to conduct what is often described as peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, and peacemaking—these terms are often used interchangeably; as a result, “Discussions of peace operations are notorious for their conceptual muddles” (Diehl and Balas 2015, 3).

In order to bring clarity to the field of peace endeavors, the UN defines Peace Operations as “field operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce their occurrence” (United Nation 2008, 98). Department of Defense Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, offers further clarification by defining five subsets of Peace Operations. First, Peacekeeping is done with the “consent of all major parties to a dispute” and monitors agreements, such as a truce or ceasefire. Second, Peace Enforcement is the “application of military force or the threat of its use”; its purpose is to “compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.” Third, Peace Building is “stability actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and

institutions in order to prevent a relapse into conflict.” Fourth, Peacemaking is “the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or . . . settlements that arrange an end to a dispute.” Lastly, Conflict Resolution, is “a peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take action to prevent the occurrence . . . or resumption of hostilities” (Department of Defense 2012, viii).

After conflict, attaining peace can be an arduous and grinding endeavor, and may require all five of the aforementioned operations. In order to accomplish this, the UN recognizes that its field operations must consist of several dimensions. Therefore, when feasible, the UN deploys multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations forces, defined as “peacekeeping operations comprising a mix of military, police, and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace” (United Nations 2008, 97). The UN’s mission in Mali is titled the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). As such, the UN’s mission in Mali includes all five subsets outlined under the umbrella term of Peace Operations.

Limitations and Delimitations

Within this research paper, there are limitations and delimitations. An inherent limitation to this study is the researcher’s lack of proficiency in French. The national language in Mali is French, and much of the news reporting in West Africa is conducted in the French language. This study relies on English news sources and research conducted by institutions that provide English language reports. As a second limitation, no research was conducted pertaining to events or reports occurring after April 15, 2017. This

limitation allows for the analysis and synthesis of events leading to the measuring of effectiveness, as well as conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for further research. In addition to these limitations, self-imposed delimitations have been implemented as a method to focus research within certain bounds. For instance, peace operations theory offers end-states to be attained in five areas: Safe and Secure Environment, Rule of Law, Stable Governance, Sustainable Economy, and Social Well-Being. Although this research notes the importance of each, this study seeks to primarily measure the effectiveness of the international community's efforts in Mali within two of the five end-states: Safe and Secure Environment and Stable Governance.

Chapter Conclusion

Since Malian independence in 1960, recurring violence and episodic instability are the norm. In order to address the 2012 outbreak of hostilities in Mali that saw militants nearly topple the government, the French and UN intervened. The purpose of this research is to measure the effectiveness of this response. In order to accomplish this, the primary research question is "Has the international community's response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?" Prior to answering this question, in chapter 2, a literature review will be conducted to answer four secondary questions.

1. What are the underlying and proximate causes of intra-state conflict?
2. What are prevailing accepted methods to resolve intra-state conflict?
3. What are the underlying and proximate causes of conflict in Mali?
4. What has the international community done to address conflict in Mali?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Introduction

In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. But in practice, there is.

—Yogi Berra

In order to address the primary research question, “Has the international community’s response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?” a literature review must occur at the outset. The literature review consists of two sections, each with two questions. The first section seeks to outline theories pertaining to the underlying and proximate causes of intra-state conflict, and the methods, or practices that the international community utilizes to address such conflict. The second section conducts a case study on intra-state conflict in Mali; first by ascertaining the causes of intra-state conflict in Mali and, second, by outlining the international community’s response.

Secondary research questions to be answered in the literature review:

1. What are the underlying and proximate causes of intra-state conflict?
2. What are prevailing accepted methods to resolve intra-state conflict?
3. What are the underlying and proximate causes of conflict in Mali?
4. What has the international community done to address conflict in Mali?

Intra-State Conflict: Underlying and Proximate Causes

On October 24, 1945, the international community ratified the United Nations Charter. It promulgates a vested interest in maintaining “international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace” (United Nations 1945). If the UN is to successfully attain its stated objectives of “peace and security” and “take effective collective measures,” it is imperative that our international community’s peacebuilders first understand the causes of conflict.

What are the causes of intra-state conflict? A cause, according to Merriam-Webster, is “something that brings about an effect or a result” (Merriam-Webster 2017). The causes of intra-state conflict can be understood as either underlying or proximate. An underlying cause of conflict is a condition in the environment, or set of conditions, which increase the probability conflict may occur. For example, weak or discriminatory political or economic institutions, inter-group politics, or patterns of cultural discrimination all may set conditions for potential violent conflict. A proximate cause, however, is the trigger that sparks the flame—gasoline needs a spark to ignite. Intra-state conflict, therefore, occurs when a set of underlying conditions in an environment exists and subsequently sparks a trigger.

Michael E. Brown, Professor of Political Science and International Relations and former Dean of the Elliot School of International Relations at the George Washington University, in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” annotated in Table 1, outlines the underlying and proximate causes of internal conflict. The underlying and proximate causes of

conflict fall within the realm of the following factors: Structural, Political, Economic/Social, and Cultural Perceptual.

Table 1. Underlying and Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict		
Factors	Underlying Causes	Proximate Causes
Structural	Weak states Intra-state security concerns Ethnic geography	Collapsing states Changing intra-state military balances Changing demographic patterns
Political	Discriminatory political institutions Exclusionary national ideologies Inter-group politics Elite politics	Political transitions Increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies Growing inter-group competitions Intensifying leadership struggles
Economic/Social	Economic problems Discriminatory economic systems Economic development and modernization	Mounting economic problems Growing economic inequities Fast-paced development and modernization
Cultural/Perceptual	Patterns of cultural discrimination Problematic group histories	Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination Ethnic bashing and propagandizing

Source: Michael E. Brown, “The Causes of Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” in *The Internal Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, edited by Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1996), 577.

Levels-of-Analysis: Individual, Domestic, International

In order to effectively address intra-state conflict, one must know the underlying and proximate causes; in addition, however, researching causes of conflict through a system’s analysis provides greater clarity. Jack S. Levy, former President of the International Studies Association, in *Leashing the Dogs of War*, “International Sources of

Interstate and Intrastate War,” outlines a levels-of-analysis paradigm for understanding intra-state war. Levy first highlights that warfare with decisive battles conducted between great powers and nation-states, understood as inter-state warfare, has diminished since World War II. Conversely, however, intra-state warfare has increasingly become the norm. When seeking to understand the causes of inter-state conflict, traditionally, scholars have turned to the “Clausewitzian model,” that is “war is fundamentally *political*”; it is the use of violence to attain political objectives (Levy 2007, 20). Although some scholars question the validity of utilizing Clausewitz’s model for understanding intra-state warfare, Levy promotes that the “idea can easily be applied to other actors. Whether the actor in question is a state, an ethnic group, a rebel organization, or a terrorist group.” As with inter-state war, Levy notes scholars can understand intra-state war through the Clausewitz model of “war as one of several instruments or policies (diplomatic, economic, military, etc.) that actors have at their disposal to promote their interests” (Levy 2007, 20).

Given the understanding that war is conflict to attain political objectives, Levy then uses Kenneth Waltz’s seminal “levels-of-analysis,” framework for understanding intra-state warfare, which “classifies the causes of war in terms of whether they are located at the level of the individual, the nation-state, or the international system” (Levy 2007, 21). At the individual level-of-analysis, war may occur because of “human nature,” for example, causes may derive from leaders with “predispositions toward aggression and on individual political leaders and their belief in systems, personalities, and psychological processes” (Levy 2007, 21). At the nation-state, or domestic level-of-analysis, causes of conflict may reflect “the structure of the political system and the nature of the

policymaking process, and societal factors, such as the structure of the economic system, the role of public opinion,” or culture and ideology—all of which are friction points (Levy 2007, 21). In addition, other domestic level-of-analysis conditions may witness conflict resulting from weak institutions, lack of transparency, and unbridled or unregulated competition for resources (Levy 2007, 21). At the international system level-of-analysis, conflict is understood through a lens that focuses on the symptoms of anarchy. For example, the international system displays “anarchic” characteristics where nation-states compete for power, and do so without an international sovereign. Amidst this competition, conflict between nation-states can spillover across a region and affect the internal situation of neighboring nation-states.

Consequently, peace operations forces must first understand conflict is a means to attain a political end. Second, the causes of conflict are both underlying and proximate. Third, with this understanding one can then utilize the levels-of-analysis system as a framework for understanding the causes of intra-state conflict, so often casually expressed in daily news reports. For instance, amidst thirty-second sound-bite news coverage, war is often explained via the lens of religion, ethnic or sectarian differences, ancient animosities, resource scarcity and economic competition, as well as political ideology or failed institutions—each of these explanations offer some validity. Nevertheless, when anecdotal evidence is presented via an insular lens comprehensive understanding does not occur. Greater understanding occurs when conflict is understood as a means to attain a political end; is explained as a result of underlying conditions and proximate causes; and is filtered through levels-of-analysis. This process illuminates greater understanding of intra-state conflict. This research will now outline several

leading theories on the causes of intra-state conflict, but do so through the levels-of-analysis framework.

Individual Level-of-Analysis

Understanding of intra-state conflict weaves together individual motivations, a nation-state's structural characteristics, and the regional or international system's traits. As such, what are the underlying or proximate motivations that drive individual behaviors that create violent conflict within a nation-state? Scholars highlight two salient motivations: grievance and greed. Grievance is a popular narrative to explain individual motivations for conflict. Grievance explains conflict results from ancient animosities, cultural differences, resource deprivation, or ideological cleavages between ethnic or sectarian identities. Counter or coinciding with the grievance argument is the idea of greed, for instance, individuals promote their own economic or political agendas to advance financial gain and provide access to political power. Thus, grievance and greed often coalesce. For example, individuals vying for power may manufacture or leverage grievances in order to mobilize support for personal gain, or greed. Nevertheless, scholars disagree as to whether grievance or greed is the salient explanatory variable for understanding the individual motivations that cause intra-state conflict.

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, each Professors of Economics at Oxford University, outline an opportunistic individual cause of conflict in "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." Their theory is "an econometric model which predicts the outbreak of civil conflict" (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 563). According to Collier and Hoeffler, conflict is more likely to occur when individual "motive and opportunity" coincide (Collier and

Hoeffler 2004, 563). Their work focuses on the “initiation of rebellion” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 564). Their findings highlight the primary cause of rebellion as greed, not necessarily grievance. Amidst weak institutions, inadequate rule of law, and poor transparency, individuals vie for power by leveraging grievances, such as “ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 564). In other words, the grievances are secondary measures of analysis, and the primary explanatory variable, trigger, or proximate cause for conflict is the greed of individual leadership taking advantage of underlying conditions deriving from ineffective political or economic institutions, or other social realities.

Similarly, Paul Collier, in *Leashing the Dogs of War*, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy” argues that “social grievances, such as inequality, lack of democracy, and ethnic and religious divisions” are not the root cause of conflict (Collier 2007, 197).

For Collier,

Rebel organizations have to develop a discourse of grievance in order to function. Grievance is to a rebel organization what image is to a business . . . grievance will turn out to be neither the cause of conflict nor an accidental by-product of it. Rather, a sense of grievance is deliberately generated by rebel organizations. (Collier 2007, 199)

Conflict, therefore, often derives from individuals advancing their own economic, political, or ideological agendas—greed. The individual level-of-analysis describes how malign actors leverage underlying structural conditions, whether economic, political, or social, and do so in order to trigger a proximate cause of conflict with the intention of seeking personal gain. Furthermore, personal gain and greed, via the individual level-of-

analysis, can also explain why it may be difficult to halt conflict, as individuals in power seek to retain their position.

Greed and grievance can each explain the cause and continuance of conflict. For example, the existence of conflict, for some, is good for business. Frances Stewart and Graham Brown, in *Leashing the Dogs of War*, “Motivations for Conflict: Groups and Individuals” outline several theories explaining conflict, when discussing individual motivations, they note “Conflicts may persist because some powerful actors benefit through the manipulation of scarcity, smuggling . . . and have no interest in resolving conflict.” For example, they cite diamond wars in Sierra Leone and “private motivations” behind “persistent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where abundant natural resources offer big rewards to those who control them” (Stewart and Brown 2007, 224). Thus, according to Stewart and Brown, “leaders could be motivated by self-aggrandizement, while their followers may not follow maximizing logic but may be coerced into fighting, or persuaded to fight by leaders playing up religious or ethnic differences and grievances” (Stewart and Brown 2007, 225).

Not only is conflict initiated and driven towards continuance by leaders at the top, the individual level-of-analysis explains drivers of conflict from individuals at the bottom. For example, political sociologist David Keen, of the London School of Economics, cites several ways individuals benefit from conflict, as it “permits people, especially uneducated young men, to gain employment as soldiers; it offers opportunities to loot, to profiteer from shortages and from aid; to trade arms; and [to] carry out illicit production and trade” (Brown and Stewart 2007, 224).

The individual level-of-analysis is further expounded on by Dr. Phil Williams of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, “Transnational Criminal Enterprises, Conflict, and Instability,” as he notes individual criminal motivations are “an important factor in the continuation of ethnic conflicts or insurgencies,” for “the capacity of the warring parties to use criminal activities” is an imperative if they are “to fund the struggle” (Williams 2006, 98).

Consequently, the individual level-of-analysis is a valuable lens with which to understand the potential underlying or proximate causes of intra-state conflict. Both greed and grievance fuel conflict. Greed is linked to desire for political power or personal enrichment. For instance, individuals with personal agendas leverage grievances within society to mobilize popular discontent and promote their self-interest. The individual lens, therefore, is an important tool to understand not only how greed and grievance create underlying or proximate causes of intra-state conflict, but also how they make conflict resolution more intractable, as those in power seek to retain it.

Domestic or Nation-State Level-of-Analysis

The domestic level-of-analysis is a platform to understand the causes of conflict from the structural characteristics of a nation-state. Prior to this analysis, however, nation and nation-state must be defined. Political science professor and international relations scholar Karen Mingst defines a nation as “a group of people sharing a common language, history, or culture;” and a nation-state, in comparison, is “the entity formed when people sharing the same historical, cultural, or linguistic roots form their own state with borders,

a government, and international recognition” (Mingst 2014, A21-22). The people of Palestine, or the Kurds, for example, form nations, but are not universally recognized as nation-states.

Having defined the difference between a nation and a nation-state, what are the structural causes of conflict within a nation-state? Sumantra Bose, Professor of International and Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science in *Managing Conflict in a World Adrift*, “National Self-Determination Conflicts: Explaining Endurance and Intractability,” outlines a structural cause of intra-state conflict as occurring when “clashing perspectives and agendas” over “national self-determination” exist (Bose 2015, 169). Consequently, conflict occurs when one nation of individuals has competing interests pitted against another nation within a nation-state. Structural examples of intra-state conflict arising from clashing perspectives and self-determination rights include the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, Palestinians in Israel, or tribal cleavages in numerous nation-states in Africa. With this understanding, what are the potential “clashing perspectives and agendas” that create conflict?

Given the understanding that a cause of intra-state conflict is potentially buttressed structurally when a nation-state consists of a multitude of competing nations, what then are additional underlying conditions that increase probabilities for violent conflict? Although political scientist and Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington may ascribe conflict as clashing perspectives deriving from ethnicity and religion, “such differences are evidently an insufficient explanation; many multiethnic or multi-religious

societies live peacefully—for example, Ghana and Tanzania . . . In fact, the vast majority of multiethnic societies are at peace” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 202).

Abner Cohen, former Professor of African Anthropology at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at London University, says that:

Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre customs of men from other ethnic groups . . . But they do not fight over such differences alone. When men do, on the other hand, fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or both. (Brown and Stewart 2007, 202)

Ascribing this perspective, conflict may occur when structurally predisposed by the existence of multiple nations within a nation-state. However, tensions do not exist as a result of differences alone, but surface when differences between nations are exacerbated by other conditions, such as the “perspectives or agendas” outlined by Professor Bose, which often manifest in the form of the “distribution” and exercise of political or economic power as described by Professor Cohen.

Perspectives, agendas, and distribution cleavages are aptly described as causes of conflict by international relations professors Graham K. Brown and Francis Stewart in *Managing Conflict in a World Adrift*, “Economic and Political Causes of Conflict.” Brown and Stewart sum up four leading explanations for violent conflict: 1) Group Motivation; 2) Private Motivation; 3) Failure of the Social Contract (weak or ineffective institutions); and 4) Green Wars (economic scarcity).

Group Motivation: Although Brown and Stewart cite “individual motivation” as important, “group motivation and mobilization underlie many political conflicts” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 203). As outlined earlier, ethnicity, religion, and other “identities provide a powerful source of mobilization and unity,” and may provide a forum creating

conflict. In contrast, however, “many multiethnic and multireligious societies live relatively peacefully.” Therefore, Brown and Stewart promulgate “the need to look beyond religion or ethnicity to find the causes of what are commonly called ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’ conflicts” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 203).

Brown and Stewart cite Robert Ted Gurr’s work on “relative deprivation” as a source of conflict. Adding to this, Frances Stewart frames the problem as “horizontal inequalities,” (HI) as opposed to “vertical inequalities.” A vertical inequality exists when disparity between individuals are present. HIs, comparatively, are “multidimensional, involving access to a variety of resources along economic, social, and political vectors or dimensions” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 204-205). An economic HI may consist of access to employment, land, credit, or education. A political HI may constitute group access to power at the presidential, parliamentary, or cabinet level. In addition, it may include power throughout all levels of the bureaucracy, to include local levels, police, or military institutions. In the social realm, an HI may manifest itself as access to health care, water, housing, or other essential services. According to Brown and Stewart, HIs “give rise to the possibilities of political mobilization, but political exclusion is the most likely HI to trigger conflict by giving group leaders a powerful motive to organize in order to gain support” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 204). As evidence Brown and Stewart cite several examples; of note, are the contrast between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. In Ghana, persistent political inclusiveness has obviated civil war, despite the presence of other economic and social HIs. In contrast, in Cote d’Ivoire, although President Felix Houphouet-Boigny “avoided significant conflict for three decades” through inclusiveness, upon his death HIs from the political, social, and economic realm bubbled to the surface and groups

mobilized towards a “spiral of ethnicization, xenophobia, and, ultimately, civil war” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 205-206). Thus, “violent conflict is most likely when political and socioeconomic HIs exist at the same time” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 206). The nation-state level-of-analysis outlines the structural presence of HIs as a powerful indicator that conflict is likely.

Private Motivation: Brown and Stewart cite individual explanatory variables for conflict, to include greed, grievance, and self-aggrandizement, which were previously discussed in the individual level-of-analysis. Of note, however, they highlight the interwoven nature of greed and grievance as a means for group mobilization towards conflict. At the nation-state level-of-analysis, either discriminatory institutions, or ineffective institutions may provide ability for private motivations to obviate the greater good.

Failure of the Social Contract and Weak Institutions: Citizens of a nation-state live under the framework of a social contract “between the people and the government.” Accordingly, under this contract, “people accept state authority as long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions in terms of employment and incomes.” Consequently, when services breakdown or decline, “the social contract breaks down and violence results” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 208). “Conversely, political institutions that are able to channel and respond to socioeconomic discontents strengthen the social contract and reduce the risk of conflict” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 206).

Green War or Economic Scarcity: Nation-states abundant in natural resources can mitigate themselves from scarcity as a cause of conflict, so long as all groups meet basic needs. Conversely, nation-states suffering from “structural scarcity” of resources are

“more at risk because they are ‘less able to buffer themselves’ from environmental pressures” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 208). Structural scarcity, therefore, “arises from an unequal distribution of a resource that concentrates it in the hands of relatively few people” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 208). This condition, as a result, creates yet another flashpoint for conflict.

How does all this come together to explain the nation-state level-of-analysis for intra-state conflict? The nation-state of Sudan serves as a case study highlighting how all four of Brown and Stewart’s theories converge: group dynamics, private motivation, ineffective institutions, and structural scarcity are symbiotic and enhance the propensity of conflict. Political power in Sudan rested in the north at the expense of the south, and “southerners rebelled against their exploitation,” which manifested in a variety of HIs. In addition, the social contract failed, as “service provision in the south was grossly inadequate, there was no physical security, and no advantage to being part of the Sudanese state” (Brown and Stewart 2015, 209). Lastly, resource scarcity and environmental pressures led groups in the south to a breaking point—war between the north and south resulted and differing ethnic and religious groups mobilized. On the surface, news headlines described Sudanese conflict as a war of sectarian or cultural difference, which offers validity from a proximate perspective; however, as described, there is more to conflict than identity, for there were several other underlying structural causes to conflict in Sudan.

International System Level-of-Analysis

In addition to individual and domestic analysis, an international or regional level-of-analysis is a valuable lens to understand the causes of conflict. There are innumerable

amounts of strain the international system can place on a nation-state. Two salient explanations as precursors for intra-state conflict include, first, how a nation-state came into existence, for example, whether arising from internal state-making dynamics, or receiving independence as a result of events within the international community, such as decolonization after World War II. Secondly, nation-states do not operate in a vacuum, and destabilizing results occur from “spillover effects” pertaining to conflict within the international system.

The manner in which a nation-state came into existence has implications on its ability to mitigate intra-state conflict leading to civil war. Mohammed Ayoob, Professor of International Relations at James Madison University, in *Leashing the Dogs of War*, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” highlights that “the state-making process, lies at the root of most conflicts that the international system has witnessed since the end of World War 2” (Ayoob 2007, 95). Professor Ayoob argues, “The emergence of the modern sovereign state was the precondition for the formation of the nation,” for example, out of anarchic semblances of peoples and tribes in Europe, war consolidated a state’s ability to tax its citizens, mobilize resources, and create institutions. Charles Tilly, Professor of history and social science notes that

The building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods and labor . . . the fundamental reason for the high cost of European state building was its beginning in the midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. (Ayoob 2007, 98)

Henceforth, Ayoob notes this “has an uncanny resemblance to present conditions in many Third World societies” (Ayoob 2007, 98). The point, therefore, is which came first, the state or the nation? Many argue the state came first, as “centralized states . . . knit their people together in terms of historical memories, legal codes, language, religion,

and so forth”; the process, therefore, “was a precondition for the formation of the nation” (Ayoob 2007, 97). Moreover, in terms of sequencing, is a nation-state more resilient at preventing intra-state conflict if the process of state making and institution building occur prior to attempting inclusive modern nation-state democracy that protects minority rights? Professor Ayoob argues that scholars too often cite lack of democracy as a source of instability; however, according to Ayoob, “The root cause of disorder in the Third World is linked to the inadequacy of state authority and not to the excessive use of state power” and lack of democracy (Ayoob 2007, 111).

Comparatively, then, there is a vast difference between how nation-states were formed in Europe and how they came into being in Africa. In Europe, for example, “democracy emerged as the final stage of the state-building process and not at the expense of the state building process” (Ayoob 2007, 106). Conversely, former colonies in Africa and Asia, with decolonization shortly after World War II, instantly became sovereign; however, many, especially in Africa, lacked institutional capacity to govern. (Ayoob 2007, 100). In addition to becoming an instant nation-state, compounding the difficulty to govern, “The territorial boundaries of these states reflect those of European colonies they replaced, and European powers drew those borders for their own convenience, rather than to reflect ethnic, religious, or economic facts of life.” Moreover, “identity groups, cut off from their brethren in other states, were sometimes left too weak to provide for their security, too small to be economically viable, and incomplete in their identity” (Levy 2007, 29).

Furthermore, international norms, although well intentioned and valid for other international structural peace reasons, often compound structural difficulties within a

nation-state. For example, “international norms that discourage both territorial conquest and secession . . . mean that contemporary states, unlike modern Europe, cannot easily expand to incorporate displaced national minorities . . . to form ‘natural’ boundaries” (Levy 2007, 29). This structural circumstance is further compounded by fundamentally incompatible international norms that, on the one hand advocate for the right of “self-determination” of identity groups, but on the other promulgate the “sovereignty” of nation-states and their internationally recognized borders. As a result, it often takes creative solutions to manage conflict in the twenty-first century.

Unfortunately for Africa, it is difficult for one to construct an international scene setting up nascent nation-states for failure more so than decolonization in Africa. For instance, Jack Levy notes, all of these international structural difficulties thrust on newly formed nation-states, such as “The discrepancy between boundaries of formal territorial units and communal groups is particularly pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa” (Levy 2007, 29).

In addition to the structural difficulties new nation-states face resulting from circumstances within the international community, nascent nation-states also face obstacles mitigating conflict resulting from circumstances transpiring from present day transnational and regional events. Ted Robert Gurr, Professor of International Relations and the founder of the Minorities at Risk Project, in *Leashing the Dogs of War*, “Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists,” describes the dangers present from the “international spillover of communal conflict.” For example, “Islamists seek control of Muslim states and call for global Jihad” and this effect can spread with ease and affect nation-states with weak governing capacity. Today, Islamists may leverage connectivity

by way of “fax, phone, and internet exchanges,” in ways never imagined before. Islamists may now readily direct their ideology towards mobilizing indigenous movements, as they seek to leverage local communities’ grievances for autonomy, thereby straining the governing capacity of already ineffective nation-states (Gurr 2007, 149).

Bolstering the explanatory power of Ted Robert Gurr’s spillover thesis, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, in *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, highlight the contagion, or spillover effect, resulting from the Arab Spring. During the Cold War, the international community’s bipolar nature, argue realists, brought stability down to the regional level, as nation-states looked towards the U.S. and Soviet Union for economic, military, and diplomatic incentives. Since the end of the Cold War, however, multi-polarity places regions in an anarchic nature.

Amidst regional multi-polarity, when a 26-year old fruit vendor in Tunisia, named Mohamed Bouazizi, lit himself on fire rather than pay bribes to a corrupt bureaucracy, he sparked the Arab Spring which set off the ideological drivers of Islam and democracy against that of authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East and as far as sub-Saharan Africa. First came the democratic revolution, “which led to a relatively peaceful overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt . . . closely followed by the more violent demise of regimes in Yemen and Libya.” Secondly, and shortly thereafter, “came counter-revolution, as authoritarian regimes fought back – Saudi Arabia propped up the tottering regime in Bahrain, the Egyptian military overthrew the Islamist government of Morsi,” and Syria plunged into an epic humanitarian catastrophe. The “counter-counter revolution” came third, as Islamists fought back throughout the region as “the eruption

and horrific depredations of [the] Islamic State (IS)” became more pronounced and internationally recognized (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2016, 137-138).

Amidst this backdrop of crumbling regimes and instability, transnational crime and weapon’s trafficking flourished. For example, with the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, the ensuing power vacuum created Islamist militias that travelled across porous borders into Algeria, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and elsewhere, and each nation-state struggled to contain an influx of criminal and terrorist organizations infiltrating across porous borders.

When analyzing intra-state conflict, the international level-of-analysis offers keen understanding as to why a nation-state may be predisposed for internal conflict. First, the process of decolonization gave former colonies instant international recognition as independent nation-states. Unfortunately, however, this process often resulted in creating a nation-state with weak institutions and several competing nations within the state. Structurally, therefore, these nation-states are more prone to intra-state conflict resulting from the manner they achieved statehood on the international scene. Secondly, with the end of the Cold War bipolarity between the U.S. and Soviet Union ended and amidst multi-polarity the international system became more anarchic. In addition, nation-states with weak institutions are affected when neighboring nation-states collapse under the strain of religious, ideological, or authoritarian struggles.

The first secondary question for this research was “What are the underlying and proximate causes of intra-state conflict?” When addressing this question, first, as Clausewitz tells us, conflict is a method to achieve a political objective. Second, conflict manifests itself from underlying and proximate causes. Underlying causes are conditions

in the environment. Proximate causes are triggers that spark the underlying conditions. Furthermore, as Michael E. Brown annotates, underlying or proximate causes of conflict are categorized into four categories: structural security, political, economic/social, or cultural/perceptual (Brown 1996, 577). Third, greater understanding occurs when the underlying and proximate causes of conflict are filtered through a levels-of-analysis framework. In closing, the causes of intra-state warfare are complex, often chaotic, and multi-dimensional in nature.

Peace Operations: Theoretical End-States

Understanding theories behind the causes of intra-state conflict allows for practitioners of peace operations to develop methods to prevent, mitigate, or resolve intra-state warfare. Nonetheless, developing theoretical methods to address conflict is one thing, operationalizing successful practices is another. The question, therefore, is how can peace operations theory be effectively operationalized? To answer this, the next secondary research question will be explored, “What are the prevailing accepted methods to resolve intra-state conflict?”

Ben Ramalingam, scholar at the Institute of Development Studies, in his 2013 work, *Aid on the Edge of Chaos*, applies complexity theory to explore “a map for peace that lasts” (Ramalingam 2013, 251). He explains that human conflict occurs amidst incredibly complex human environments. As such, when attempting to resolve conflict, traditional linear and analytical approaches are not appropriate for conflict resolution. Why? He synthesizes work from Dr. Alberto Concha-Eastman, an official at the World Health Organization with extensive experience dealing with conflict in Latin America. Dr. Concha-Eastman proposes an “ecological approach” for conflict management, as

“risk factors for violence are interconnected across different levels of a social ecosystem”

(Ramalingam 2013, 252). For example, Dr. Concha-Eastman explains that

Because the roots and causes are found at different levels of the human interactions and relationships with the social and physical environment, it is not possible to define one intervention to solve the problem. A common error made by politicians is attempting to address violence with a single model or recipe, most frequently looking to establish consequences for violence rather than tackling the root causes. (Ramalingam 2013, 252)

The lesson promulgated by Ben Ramalingam is conflict resolution occurs amidst complex environments that “are not systems where one can intervene with only one effect . . . Unintended consequences are the result of the interconnected nature of the social, economic, and political system, and of course, people’s attitudes and beliefs” (Ramalingam 2013, 252). Therefore, in order to effectively respond to conflict, peace operations must understand that operations occur amidst complex environments that do not allow for pre-planned one-size-fits all approaches. Moreover, every action a peace operation takes to address conflict will have consequences throughout the environment. Lastly, given that each situation is different, peace operations may need to “take a more experimental approach, defining and testing approaches that work on different levels of the system, and to take account of the dynamic interactions that work to promote or inhibit violence” (Ramalingam 2013, 252). This approach, therefore, seeks to understand local drivers of conflict from the ground up and then test methods at building peace.

Ben Ramalingam proposes an ecological system approach that addresses local concerns and suggests experimental practices for each peace operation. Other approaches, although not prescriptive, outline end-states for achievement. Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson, both International Relations Scholars at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), in *Leashing the Dogs of War*, offer “A Framework for Success: International

Intervention in Societies Emerging From Conflict.” Serwer and Thomsen note that “military organizations worldwide organize, plan, train, and fight with clearly established objectives, doctrine, and . . . laws of war;” however, Serwer and Thomsen lament that “‘Peacefare’ is not as developed as warfare” (Serwer and Thomsen 2007, 369). Therefore, Serwer and Thomsen worked with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the RAND Corporation, and the Association of the U.S. Army to synthesize peace theory with doctrinal military planning expertise. The result of their efforts offer a platform for peace operations to operate from.

As “A Framework for Success,” Serwer and Thomsen offer a methodology that “starts with end-states—the ultimate goals of a society emerging from conflict . . . the end-states describe the place a society emerging from conflict ultimately wishes to be.” These end-states are “the strategic goals—the ultimate ambitions that anchor the plan” (Serwer and Thomsen 2007, 372). Serwer and Thomsen outline five end-states: “a safe and secure environment, the rule of law, a stable democracy, a sustainable economy, and social well-being” and within each end-state exists “a series of objectives. The objectives represent some of the key things that need to be accomplished in order to achieve the desired end-state” (Serwer and Thomsen 2007, 372).

As a framework, Serwer and Thomsen focus on end-states and then outline objectives. What they do not do is outline “ways” or “means,” as they leave the means to those in positions of “critical leadership” within the peace operation. What Serwer and Thomsen do offer, however, is critical leadership responsibilities. These responsibilities include: building unity of purpose; developing and executing integrated plans; ensuring involved players have authority and resources; building legitimacy; identifying and

addressing original drivers of conflict; collecting and managing intelligence; and managing transitions from military to civilian international to local control (Serwer and Thomsen 2007, 382). Figure 2 outlines end-states for “Peacefare” and specific objectives nested with each end-state.

Table 2. Framework for Success: Fragile States and Societies Emerging from Conflict				
End-States				
Safe and Secure Environment	Rule of Law	Stable Democracy	Sustainable Economy	Social Well-Being
Key Objectives				
-Prevent renewal of fighting -Protect civilians -Ensure freedom of movement -Protect key historical sites -Protect international borders -Build effective defense forces	-Establish legitimate and just legal frameworks -Build effective and independent courts -Build effective police, customs, and border forces -Protect human rights	-Develop legitimate systems of political representation at national, regional, and local levels (legislatures and executive) -Promote free and responsible media -Promote creation of political parties -Promote civic society	-Reconstruct infrastructure -Promote sound economic policy -Build effective regulatory environment -Create a viable workforce -Protect, manage, and equitably distribute natural resources -Limit corruption	-Ensure population is fed -Ensure population has water -Ensure population has shelter -Meet basic sanitation needs -Meet basic health needs -Build effective education system -Enable displaced persons right of return -Promote peaceful coexistence

Source: Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomsen, “A Framework for Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging from Conflict,” in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: USIP Press Books, 2007), 382.

The 2006 release of Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson’s “Framework for Success” sparked a conversation on stability and peace operations between scholars from the USIP, the Department of State, and the U.S. Army, which led to a partnership

between Daniel Serwer of the USIP, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Ambassador John Herbst, Coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization.

The capstone of this partnership resulted in the USIP and the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute publishing, in 2009, “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.” This work defines end-states and offers detailed objectives for attainment in order to stabilize a society after conflict. The end-states offered are “framed according to the perception of the host nation population, as they will be the final arbiters of whether peace has been achieved” (U.S. Institute of Peace 2009, 2-9). Guiding principles redefine the five end-states originally proposed from Serwer and Thomsen. Of note, stable democracy was changed from the original framework—it changed to stable governance. This change reflects Professor Ayoob’s state-making thesis, for example, the change offers flexibility for peace operations to orient and balance efforts between state-making and democracy building.

End-States:

Safe and Secure Environment: Ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.

Rule of Law: Ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds persons accountable, protects human rights and ensures their safety and security.

Stable Governance: Ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes, and enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.

Sustainable Economy: Ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law.

Social Well-Being: Ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2-9).

Peace Operations: Who Practices Theory?

There is consensus among peace operations scholars on the importance of understanding complexity and local drivers of conflict, as well as establishing end-states that address intra-state conflict. With that said, who can facilitate these ends? And, how will they do so? First, who can accomplish these ends? The international community's answer is UN led peace operations, which are legally sanctioned and operating throughout the world. How then can UN peace operations accomplish these ends? The answer lies within the five types of peace operations.

This research, as discussed in chapter 1, proposes delimitations that focus this study on two of the five peace operations' end-states: Safe and Secure Environment and Stable Governance. Each of these end-states nests with the causes of intra-state conflict. For example, when addressing the individual level-of-analysis, promoting a Safe and Secure Environment addresses unstable proximate causes or underlying conditions that result from powerful individuals who promote conflict for personal gain by exploiting grievances within society. This is accomplished by Peacekeeping operations conducted by military forces "undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute," or Peace Enforcement, which is the "application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance . . . or restore

peace and order.” In addition to the threat of military force, diplomacy is also a method to address the individual level-of-analysis and the causes of intra-state conflict. For example, Peace Making includes “the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arrange an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it” (Department of Defense 2012, viii).

The Stable Governance end-state addresses the nation-state level-of-analysis. For instance, promoting Stable Governance directly seeks to obviate the underlying causes of intra-state conflict, which include discriminatory institutions that favor one nation of people over another, such as political, economic, or social Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) that spark conflict between groups. These underlying causes of intra-state conflict are addressed by Peace Building, which promotes “stability actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Department of Defense 2012, viii).

As of April 1, 2017, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has “more than 118,000 military, police, and civilian personnel serving on 16 Peace Keeping Operations” deployed throughout the world (United Nations 2017a). UN peace operations are a salient method the international community utilizes to address and resolve the effects of intra-state conflict. The first two secondary research questions were addressed by developing an understanding of the causes of intra-state conflict and the theories behind addressing intra-state conflict. Additionally, the primary method for addressing intra-state conflict is peace operations conducted by the UN’s DPKO. This researcher will now utilize Mali as a case study to measure the effectiveness of the UN’s peace operations in Mali.

Mali: A Case Study in Intra-State Conflict

In order to measure the international community's effectiveness at addressing the root causes of Mali's intra-state conflict, this case study on Mali will answer two secondary research questions:

1. What are the underlying and proximate causes of conflict in Mali?
2. What has the international community done to address conflict in Mali?

Prior to answering the causes of conflict in Mali, a system's analysis on the nation-state of Mali will occur. The format for this analysis will utilize system's thinking from U.S. Army doctrine on interrelated operational variables. The following operational variables will be used: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and physical environment. System's thinking provides a method for understanding "What is going on in the environment?" (U.S. Army 2015, 3-2). The interrelated variable assessment will analyze the environment in Mali, as it existed at the outset of hostilities in January 2012.

Political: Mali, a former French colony, gained independence on September 22, 1960. Its current constitution was ratified on February 25, 1992: "Mali's constitution provides for a multi-party democracy, with the only restriction being a prohibition against parties based on ethnic, religious, regional, or gender lines" (U.S. Embassy of the Republic of Mali 2017). Similar to the U.S., Mali's government is divided into an executive, a legislative, and a judicial branch. Unlike the U.S., however, rather than a federal republic, Mali is a democratic unitary republic with a national assembly of 147 members elected by universal suffrage for five year terms. "Mali is divided into eight regions and the district of Bamako, each under the authority of an appointed governor. Each region consists of five to nine districts (or Circles), administered by commandants"

(U.S. Embassy of the Republic of Mali 2017). As a result of Mali's unitary structure that appoints governors from the capital, power is concentrated in the central government and local institutions often, first, lack a forum for decision making and, second, lack revenue to provide basic services, unless distributed by the Malian state.

Military: At the outset of the northern unrest in 2012, the Malian military, mainly army, totaled only 7,000 members and was internally divided, lacked capacity to project force, and was implicated in human rights abuses (Arieff 2013, 1). The internal divisions within the Army were along "political and ethnic lines, in particular between the pro-junta 'green berets' and the 'red berets' that formed the Republican Guard for former President Amadou Toumani Toure" (Janes 2016). In addition to internal divisions, the Malian Army, even by "regional standards," was insufficient and ineffectively modernizing its force, which consisted of "increasingly obsolete Soviet and Chinese hardware" (Janes 2016). Complementing its military forces, the state security apparatus consists of Gendarmerie and National Guard forces.

The practical relationship between the army and the state security forces is unclear. Although the 4,800-strong gendarmerie come under the control of the MoD for operations, daily control is exercised by the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection. The National Guard is under the control of the MoD, but not formally part of the armed forces. (Janes 2016)

At the time of the rebellion, the Malian security apparatus consisted of the armed forces, Gendarmerie, and National Guard. These forces possessed an ineffective command authority, lacked broad popular support and local knowledge, were ill-equipped, poorly trained, and as a result woefully ill-prepared to provide security against the northern internal rebellion and extremist militants pouring into Mali through its porous borders.

Economic: The World Bank describes Mali as “a predominantly desert country with a highly undiversified economy” that relies on subsistence farming (World Bank 2016). Amidst desert conditions, drought has “fueled food insecurity, poverty, and instability,” and the delivery of services in this large, sparsely populated territory is challenging and affects geographic equity and social cohesion” (World Bank 2016). Mali’s precarious economic situation is illuminated by the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 2013 Human Development Index (HDI) report. The HDI “is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living” (Malik 2013, 147). Among other factors, the HDI takes into account life expectancy, purchasing power parity, and gross national income. The UNDP’s HDI index for 2012 ranked Mali 182 out of 187 countries (Malik 2013, 143). In summary, Mali’s economic situation reflects “structural scarcity” that heightens resource competition and increases susceptibility to drought and famine.

Social: In 2012, the Malian nation-state had over 15 million citizens from several nations. There are over a dozen ethnic groups in Mali: the largest is the Bambara at 25 percent, followed by, Sonoufo 12 percent, Songhay 10 percent, Fula 9 percent, Malinke 8 percent, Soninke 8 percent, Dogon 6 percent, Moor 5 percent, Tuareg 5 percent, Bozo 5 percent and several others at 2 percent or below (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 35). The multitude of ethnic groups in Mali align and diverge with extensive complexity and create structural causes of conflict throughout Mali’s governance system. Nonetheless, the largest divide exists between the southern ethnic groups of traditional African descent and the northern groups including those of nomadic Tuareg origins and Arab background.

Historically, access to power and resources within the Malian state exists in the south at the expense of the north. Consequentially, given the northern populations sense of marginalization, several rebellions against the nation-state of Mali have occurred.

For centuries, religion has woven its way into the fabric of Mali's social consciousness. Traditional African tribal rituals have intersected with Islam to create unique circumstances in Mali. African traditions in southern Mali have espoused "religious tolerance and Islamic syncretism." Nonetheless, the spread of radical Islam in West Africa has challenged these customs, and the "Southern populations have indeed held northern tribes, especially the Arab and Tuareg, responsible for the growing influence of radical Islamic doctrines" (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 9). In summary, within the social fabric of the nation-state of Mali exists a north-south divide resulting from ethnic and religious differences. This divide is exacerbated by competition for political power and scarce natural resources.

Infrastructure: "Mali is landlocked and most of the infrastructure that does exist is located in the southern half of the country, where the vast majority of the population resides" (Janes 2016). Roads are in exceedingly poor condition and travel in Mali is difficult. Mali does have over 1,800 navigable waterways; however, population pressures continue to lower water levels, often making water travel difficult. What little infrastructure exists in Mali is in the south, as little investment in northern services has occurred. This condition further divides Mali along a north-south axis.

Physical Environment: Mali is a massive land-locked country in West Africa nearly twice the size of Texas. "Geographically, Mali is divided into two parts: a savannah southwest and a steppe-desert north . . . The south of the country is more fertile

and used for agriculture and livestock” (Janes 2016). Mali’s habitable geography is under threat from desertification. The Sahara Desert is encroaching south which “has particularly affected the north’s semi-nomadic population of Tuareg, Maurs and Fula/Peul, who have regularly been pushed out of the desert by drought and into conflict with the sedentary population” (Janes 2016). When analyzing Mali’s terrain, one witnesses a north-south divide, and the more habitable environment is in the south.

When synthesizing the interrelated variables that existed in 2012 within Mali’s political, military, social, economic, infrastructure, and physical environment, there existed an ecosystem that, first, facilitated southern access to power and resources and, secondly, this access to power and resources set up conditions for mobilization of northern nations protesting grievances along ethnic, religious, and sectarian cleavage lines.

With an understanding of the complex environment that existed in Mali in 2012, this research will now address the third research question: “What are the underlying and proximate causes of conflict in Mali?” This question will be researched by utilizing the levels-of-analysis framework starting with the international level, followed by the nation-state level, and concluding with the individual level. With that said, the levels-of-analysis framework offers a valuable lens, but the causes of conflict are multidimensional and overlap across the framework.

Underlying and Proximate Causes of Conflict in Mali: International Level

The underlying international level cause of the conflict in Mali results from its creation and subsequent independence from France. When Mali gained independence on

September 22, 1960, it had not evolved on its own, for it was not a homogeneous nation-state of Germanic, French, or English speaking peoples, akin to nation-states in Europe. Mali was an immensely diverse region with numerous ethnic groups, cultures, and social practices. Although Mali was recognized internationally as a nation-state in 1960, in actuality it was a geographic area with many nations and lacked state institutions and the capacity to govern.

Hannah Armstrong, researcher for the USIP, in *Crisis in Mali: Root Causes and Long-Term Solutions*, highlights that “Mali’s Tuaregs have been described as ‘a nation without a state’”; moreover, she explains the French colonial authorities employed a “strategy of exploiting inter-and intra-ethnic divisions of northern populations,” and further describes that Malian state officials have continued this practice today (Armstrong 2013, 3). Thus, Mali’s internationally recognized borders, which were former colonial borders, created a nation-state with several nations, thereby creating a state building process with underlying conditions for possible conflict over access to political power, natural resources, and cultural autonomy.

The international level proximate causes of conflict in Mali were twofold, the collapse of the Libyan state and the spread of Islamic extremism. Alex Arieff, analyst in African Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, in his January 14, 2013 report for Congress titled, “Crisis in Mali,” outlines how the spread of state fragmentation amidst the Arab Spring, combined with “the spread of violent extremist ideology” facilitated the entrance of three violent extremist groups into Mali: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al Dine (of Tuareg origin), and the Movement for Unity

and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Each of these groups had links between extremists, drug trafficking, and smuggling networks.

Furthermore, the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011 created a vacuum with thousands of “core combatants . . . [and] relatively sophisticated equipment obtained from Libya.” Amidst this proximate cause, extremist fighters swept south into Mali and “imposed harsh behavioral and dress codes on local residents in the north” (Arieff 2013, 2). Weak Malian state institutions could not handle the onslaught of foreign fighters and “Mali descended into statelessness and lost control of two-thirds of its territory with dizzying speed” (Armstrong 2013, 1). The underlying conditions for intra-state conflict in Mali were sown by its formation from colonial France—which resulted in a north-south divide with weak institutions, specifically in the north. Consequently, fragile underlying conditions were sparked by the “spillover effect” from the spread of Islamist extremism and the collapse of the Libyan state.

Underlying and Proximate Causes of Conflict in Mali: Nation-State Level

Gregory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme, of the *Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations*, in “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict: Moving Beyond the 2012 Crisis,” outline the causes of conflict in Mali as ineffective corrupt institutions and unequal access to political power and economic resources. As a result, the social contract between the Malian state and citizens in the north had disintegrated.

A timeline: How did Mali unravel? “On January 17, 2012, three years after the last north-south peace agreement in Mali, a fourth ‘Tuareg’ rebellion was launched through the attack on a Malian military garrison in the northeastern town of Menaka,”

The rebellion was orchestrated by the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a conglomerate of Tuaregs favoring independence from Mali. The MNLA, bolstered by “Tuareg exiles in Libya, succeeded in gathering all the rebellious factions.” By April 2012, virtually all northern cities “were under the control of the rebellion” (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 10). On April 6, 2012, the MNLA declared independence of the Azawad region, which encompasses the three northern most regions of Mali, Tombouctou, Kidal, and Gao (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 12). MNLA dominance and unity in northern Mali did not last long, as moderate MNLA members were usurped by violent extremists. For instance, Tuareg cohesion crumbled and Lyad ag Ghali, a prominent Tuareg leader, broke away from the MNLA and created a more militant group Ansar Dine, which subsequently aligned with AQIM and MUJAO. The three militant groups pushed aside MNLA leaders, spread chaos, and enforced harsh forms of Sharia law and subsequently usurped MNLA’s control of northern Mali (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 12).

The Malian state’s security apparatus did not perform well against the militants and rapidly lost territory. Amidst resentment spawned by the Malian military’s poor performance, “On 21 March, low and middle-ranked officers . . . mutinied.” Led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, the coup ousted President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT). The “*putschists* suspended all Mali’s democratic institutions, and even arrested some of the main political leaders” (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 12). The military coup in Bamako, Mali did little to increase the effectiveness of the Malian army against the militants as they continued to March south.

Gregory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme ask, “How did the political situation degenerate so quickly?” (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 13). Their research highlights conditions in the north included “unemployment, poverty, systematic inequalities, geographic isolation, and lack of political representatives” (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 13). The Malian state “promoted . . . constant marginalization in economic and political terms, of the north.” In addition, when the Malian state did provide resources to the north, it was via “divide-and-rule strategies”; therefore, “based on the political and economic subordination of the north, the post-colonial elites laid the foundations for northern rebellions and future state failure” (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 13). For instance, “when the 2012 crisis erupted, out of 147 deputies, only 12 Tuaregs were elected to the National Assembly while not a single representative of the Arab community (about 5 percent of the total population) occupied a seat” (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 18-19). Thus, the north had little representation in the central government.

In addition to central government marginalization, the northern regions lacked participatory governance forums at the local level. The Malian state utilized “patronage tactics” and “tried to unilaterally assert their presence all over national territory, especially in the north, by appointing loyal (i.e., southern) civil and military servants (prefects, governors) (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 20). In addition to political exclusion, the Malian state deliberately pursued a policy of “underdevelopment of the northern region,” so little in the way of infrastructure, basic services, or investment occurred in the north regions (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 20).

Given the literature review in this research on the underlying causes of intra-state conflict, which include theories on the failure of the “social contract,” “relative

depravation,” “economic scarcity,” and “Horizontal Inequalities (HI),” it would not have been difficult to predict a fourth uprising in northern Mali—grievances were abounded. Moreover, as also discussed in the literature review a vast majority of the World’s diverse ethnic groups live in peace with one another; however, when structural, political, economic, and social disparities exist, these underlying conditions are susceptible to proximate causes of intra-state conflict, such as the fall of the Libyan state and an influx of foreign fighters pouring into Mali.

There are several underlying causes of intra-state conflict in Mali as understood through the international and nation-state levels-of-analysis. In addition, there is an illuminating proximate cause of conflict in Mali that merges the domestic and international levels-of-analysis. Susanna D. Wing, Professor of Political Science at Haverford College, and coordinator of its African Studies program, in her 2013 *USIP: Special Report 331*, titled, “Mali’s Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict” asked why previous peace accords failed to prevent a fourth Tuareg uprising?

Professor Wing cites several causes of conflict similar to other scholars. In particular, however, she critically analyzes previous peace accords. She cites that,

Neither the National Pact (1992) nor the Algiers Accord (2006) realized the promise of increased autonomy [for the north]. Both agreements were designed to address the lack of economic development in the north and further increase limited Tuareg representation in military and civil state government institutions. (Wing 2013, 4-5)

Each of these peace agreements called for decentralizing power from the central government down to local levels, known as decentralization. The prior peace accords were supposed to “give communities a voice running local affairs” (Wing 2013, 7). What happened? First, “many of the weaknesses of decentralization can be blamed on the lack

of resource flows from south to north.” Second, the 2010 European Union’s Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali, (PSPSDN) failed. Why? The program was earmarked \$22 million dollars for security and development. How were the resources utilized? Professor Wing annotates that the PSPSDN failed because “the project was launched without properly consulting those living in the north . . . [and] the project was focused primarily on securing the north through increased military and police presence” (Wing 2013, 7). In addition, “it emanated from the office of the president without involving government ministers . . . [and] was administered in a vertical fashion” (Wing 2013, 8). Professor Wing describes analysis from the *International Crisis Group* (ICG) as donors perceiving the PSPSDN as a means for development, but the GoM leveraged the funds to “fight against the northern rebellion” (Wing 2013, 8). “As one diplomat noted, the PSPSDN did not cause the rebellion in the north, ‘but it undeniably contributed to its escalation’” (Wing 2013, 8).

As outlined in this research’s literature review, in particular, Ben Ramalingam’s *Aid on the Edge of Chaos*, international development projects are more apt to falter when failing to take into account local grievances, concerns, and local participation with execution of the aid. In summary, the underlying causes of conflict in Mali according to the nation-state level of analysis included a vast north-south divide, one where nearly all the power resided in the south. Additionally, there were several structural inequalities throughout the nation-state of Mali—these were the underlying causes of conflict. Proximate causes of conflict surfaced when the Malian state failed to live by assurances made during previous peace accords. As a result, it was only a matter of time before another uprising began.

Underlying and Proximate Causes of Conflict in Mali: Individual Level

The individual level-of-analysis provides keen insight into the causes of conflict from both northern and southern perspectives. In the south, President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) was once hailed as a “‘soldier of democracy’ when he toppled the corrupt military regime [in 1991] and then stepped aside when Alpha Oumar Konare was elected president” (Wing 2013, 3-4). Years later, in 2002, ATT was elected President of Mali. He presided over what was dubbed “consensus politics.” Professor Wing notes that “Dialogue and healthy democracy are rooted in vibrant opposition” and this had been the case during President Konare’s time in office. However, ATT was an independent and “was not aligned with any party,” for he sought unity, or “consensus politics.” What resulted, however, was patronage politics as the spoils of government were dished out to all political parties. The “fruits of government were too sweet to resist . . . While Mali held elections regularly, the political class appeared to be doing little more than enriching themselves at the expense of average citizens” and Mali became one of the most corrupt regimes in West Africa (Wing 2013, 5). Corruption led to popular discontent that boiled over and facilitated Captain Amadou Sanogo’s ouster of ATT—many average citizens supported the coup as “The political class was viewed as benefiting from donor support that was often linked to Mali’s privileged status as a democracy” (Wing 2013, 6). As a consequence of “patronage” and individual greed in the south, Mali’s democracy and institutions faltered, setting up underlying causes of internal conflict, not only between the north and south, but also between the privileged class and average Malian citizens.

From the northern perspective, amidst a security vacuum, “a rebel economy and the emergence of local entrepreneurs of violence” became the norm (Chauzal and van

Damme 2015, 29). Drug trafficking, smuggling, and illicit commerce flourished (Arieff 2013, 7). Militant leaders promoted personal agendas and mobilized popular support through citizens' grievances with the Malian state and an advocacy of Sharia Islam against the traditionally secular government in Bamako. "The rapid dominance of militant Salafist groups in northern Mali and the implementation of Sharia were unprecedented in this secular state" (Wing 2013, 1).

The individual level-of-analysis illuminates the causes of internal conflict in Mali by describing how individual patronage politics gradually weakened the central government to the point its legitimacy was questioned and a military coup resulted. In the north, weak institutions allowed for militant leaders to promote their own personal agendas by leveraging the population's grievances against the Malian state.

In order to address the third of four secondary questions, "What are the underlying and proximate causes of conflict in Mali?" a system's analysis of the OE in Mali was conducted, followed by research on the causes of conflict in Mali via the levels-of-analysis framework. The results are illuminating: Mali, in January 2012, was awash with causes of conflict. From an international perspective, Mali's borders were created with several nations competing for access to power and resources that played out along a north-south divide. Mali also became a victim of the "spillover effect" from the collapse of Libya. From a nation-state perspective, structural inequalities, corruption, and weak institutions lessened the ability of the government to fulfill its "social contract." Lastly, from an individual lens, militant leaders in the north advocated personal agendas by leveraging grievances of the population. In the South, "consensus politics" degenerated into patronage politics that catered to corruption rather than efficient, representative and

stable institutions. In conclusion, the causes of intra-state conflict in Mali were extensive and matched trends associated with scholarly literature on the causes of intra-state conflict.

Intra-State Conflict in Mali: An International Response

The international community was horrified at the scale and speed the Malian state disintegrated in 2012. In 2013, a broad-based mandate for action existed and the World acted in-kind. The fourth research question asks, “What has the international community done to address conflict in Mali?” This question will be addressed outlining specific actions taken in the order they occurred.

The international community’s response has occurred in three Phases: Phase 1 included a military operation followed by Peace Enforcement and counter-terrorism (CT); Phase 2 transitioned to elements of Peace Making and Peacekeeping; while Phase 3 has undertaken Peace Building and Conflict Prevention measures.

Phase 1: Military Operations and Peace Enforcement. December 20, 2012, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted chapter VII, UNSC Resolution 2085, which authorized the African-led International Support Mission Mali (AFISMA). “The Council authorized the Mission to take all necessary measures” to recover Mali’s territorial integrity (United Nations 2012, Res. 2085). AFISMA, however, was unable to materialize quick enough to deploy and address the rapidly deteriorating situation. On January 10, 2013, militants were closing in on Bamako. The French at the request of an interim Malian government initiated Operation Serval and conducted a military invasion of Mali.

Michael Shurkin, a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, in “France’s War in Mali,” outlines the performance of the French military, which was retroactively authorized by the UNSC. He quotes French President Francois Hollande as announcing on January 11, 2013 that France’s objectives were threefold: stop the terrorist aggression, secure the country in which there are many thousand French people, and permit Mali to recover its territorial integrity (Shurkin 2014, 8). When assessing the effectiveness of this task, Shurkin states “The French appear satisfied that Serval went as well as they had hoped . . . France saved Bamako and the Malian state from imminent danger and enabled all of Mali’s territory to come at least under nominal Malian control” (Shurkin 2014, 24). With roughly 6,500 servicemen, French reports from Operation Serval cite there were “an estimated 1,200 Islamists . . . of which 200 were now out of the game . . . [and] between 400 and 500 were ‘neutralized.’” Seven French servicemen were killed and 30 Chadian forces lost their lives in support of Operation Serval (Shurkin 2014, 24-25). On July 15, 2013, Operation Serval concluded; ultimately replaced by Operation Barkhane—primarily a CT mission. Under Operation Barkhane, as of April 15, 2017, 1,500 French Soldiers remain in Mali and 3,000 in Chad (Shurkin 2014, 8).

Phase 2: Peace Making and Peacekeeping. On April 25, 2013, UNSC resolution 2100 established MINUSMA. Its mandate is robust, with an aim to support the political process and stabilize Mali. The resolution condemned terrorist groups in Mali, welcomed the swift action of the French and stressed “the need to work expeditiously toward the restoration of democratic governance and constitutional order, including through the holding of free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections” (United Nations 2012, Res. 2085). On July 1, 2013, MINUSMA took the lead from

AFISMA. As of April 15, 2017, MINUSMA has over 13,000 military Peacekeeping forces from dozens of nations and 1,900 police forces.

With Peacekeeping forces arriving in Mali, the international community simultaneously sought diplomatic Peace Making measures as well. On June 18, 2013, the GoM and disparate groups representing the Tuaregs including the MNLA and the High Counsel Unity Azawad (HCUA) signed the Ouagadougou Accord. The accord did not include AQIM, Ansar Dine, or MUJAO. Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, both Political Scientists for the *Rand Corporation*, in “Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement,” describe past accords for peace in northern Mali as failing for the following reasons: participants from northern signatories only represented “a small portion of the northern population”; lack of consensus between the signatories as to what “democracy and decentralization” will look like and how it will be implemented; “Bamako’s limited perceived legitimacy in the north”; and “persistent insecurity” (Pezard and Shurkin 2015, xi). Recognizing past Peace Making failures, Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin conduct analysis on the prospects for durable peace in Mali.

Pezard and Shurkin describe how the Ouagadougou Accord was different from the first three peace accords in that it was a “preliminary agreement . . . limited to short-term issues,” to include “a cease-fire, preparation for a presidential election, the return of public services to the north, [and] the elaboration of a framework for broader and more substantive future peace talks” (Pezard and Shurkin 2015, 5). Pezard and Shurkin promulgate that if planned future comprehensive talks are to succeed, mechanisms to

promote “democracy must go forward”; however, promoting indigenous society members such as tribal chiefs are also important (Pezard and Shurkin 2015, 51).

After the Ouagadougou Accord was signed in June 2013, the international community prepared for national elections in Mali. The first round of presidential elections was conducted on July 28, 2013, followed by a run-off election between Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) and Soumaila Cisse on August 11, 2013. IBK won and became the democratically elected President of Mali.

Coming out of a severe political crisis that had encapsulated the country for almost a year and a half, Mali staged a remarkable comeback when it successfully completed presidential elections that were hailed by the entire international community, including observers from the Integrated UN Mission for the Stabilization of Mali and representatives of the African Union and European Union (EU). (Ba and Boas 2013, 2)

For Mali, nationally, turnout was relatively high at 48.9 percent. Although the elections were deemed free, fair, and securely held, in the three northern regions of Gao, Tombouctou, and Kidal, turnout was sparse, as many northern Malians sat out the presidential election.

A few months removed from presidential elections, in November 2013, Mali held elections for the 147 seats in the national legislature. In northern Mali, there were 630,000 registered voters, of which 350,000 voted, or 56 percent of registered voters. Results in northern Mali were diverse, for no particular caste, clan, or tribe dominated the outcome. In addition, incumbents represented fewer than half the victors. “These results suggest that democracy and the electoral process, though far from perfect, at least have given some expression to different portions of the community” (Pezard and Shurkin 2015, 49). Nevertheless, as a result of security concerns, elections did not take place in 58 of the 703 communes in northern Mali (U.S. Embassy, Mali 2017). In addition, although

participation in the northern regions of Gao, Kidal and Tombouctou was relatively high for this election, the architecture of the unitary Malian state did not translate into political power for northern representatives. For example, “when the crisis erupted in 2012, only 12 Tuaregs were elected to the National Assembly” (Chauzal and van Damme 2015, 18). After the 2013 legislative elections, this increased to only “16 members from historically marginalized pastoralist and nomadic ethnic minorities representing the eastern and northern regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal” (U.S. Embassy, Mali 2017).

Phase 3: With national elections complete, the international community continued diplomatic processes and moved towards Peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Nearly eight months after the national legislative assemblies, amidst sporadic violence in northern Mali, comprehensive peace talks in Algeria began. Talks were conducted between the GoM and a coalition of two armed groups: Coalition Movement Azawad (CMA) and the Platform Coalition of Armed Groups (Platform). The CMA included members of the HCUA and MNLA, while the Platform was a coalition of armed groups. “A distinction between them is that the CMA’s constituent movements have consistently pursued claims of self-determination for northern Mali, while the movements within the *Platform* have sought to resolve grievances within the unitary state of Mali” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 14).

In June 2015, peace talks concluded with the signing of the *Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali*, commonly referred to as the Algiers Agreement. The agreement sought to address reconciliation in four areas: Political and Institutional Matters; Defense and Security Matters; Cultural Development; and Reconciliation, Justice and Humanitarian Issues. These areas are strikingly similar to the USIP’s

“Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction.” Chapter 4 of this research will evaluate the effectiveness of the Algiers Agreement.

The fourth research question sought to outline the international community’s response to intra-state conflict in Mali. In 2012, with the Malian state collapsing, French military operations prevented this collapse and maintained Mali’s territorial integrity. The UNSC then authorized a stabilization mission in Mali, MINUSMA. In addition, a ceasefire between northern armed groups was secured and comprehensive peace talks resulted in the Algiers Agreement. However, the primary research question remains, “Has the international community’s response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?”

Chapter Conclusion

The literature review in chapter 2 addressed four secondary questions. The causes of intra-state conflict and the methods the international community utilizes to address such conflict were outlined first, followed by an exploration on the causes of intra-state conflict in Mali and the international community’s response. Chapter 3 will outline a research methodology for this case study.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter Introduction

This research will utilize several methods to answer the primary research question, “Has the international community’s response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?” The methods include a step-by-step approach to answer secondary research questions. The first two secondary questions were answered by conducting a qualitative literature review on the underlying and proximate causes of intra-state conflict and the theories and practices the international community utilizes to resolve intra-state conflict. The third and fourth secondary research questions were answered by exploring the causes of conflict in Mali and the international community’s response.

Upon completion of the literature review, this research will answer the primary research question: “Has the international community’s response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?”

The primary research question will be answered by utilizing U.S. Army Design Methodology (ADM), which is in line with the Department of Defense’s operational design outlined in JP 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*. Utilizing ADM, this research will develop a proposed operational approach for addressing the causes of intra-state conflict in Mali. The design methodology will outline the undesirable environment, or conditions, that existed in Mali on January 10, 2012, when militants controlled much of northern Mali and were a 48-hour drive from the capital city of Bamako, describe the desired

future conditions, and then outline an operational approach to achieve the desired conditions.

Following an examination of the undesirable environment that existed in Mali and the desired conditions the international community seeks to attain, based on design methodology, an operational approach for broad actions to transform conditions and resolve the intra-state conflict in Mali will be proposed. The operational approach, developed after exploring the causes of intra-state conflict in Mali, will then establish end-states that constitute a set of attainable and desirable conditions the operational approach seeks to accomplish. The operational approach will then develop lines of effort (LOE) meant to attain key objectives that link with the end-states associated with establishing a Safe and Secure Environment and Stable Governance.

In addition, in order to measure the effectiveness of the international community's response to conflict in Mali, a set of evaluation criteria will be developed. The evaluation criteria will evaluate effectiveness of peace operations in Mali by, first, exploring whether or not these operations are oriented towards the root causes of Mali's intra-state conflict and, second, by measuring progress towards key objectives established in the operational approach.

Once the secondary research questions are answered, the researcher will outline findings on the primary research question. Lastly, this study will draw conclusions and make recommendations for future research.

Design Methodology

In order to answer the primary research question, the researcher will utilize ADM. In July 2015, Headquarters, Department of the Army issued Army Training Publication

(ATP) 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (ADM). The primary purpose of this publication is to facilitate “framing an operational environment and associated problems . . . before developing ways to solve those problems.” Framing an Operational Environment (OE) allows planners “to understand what is going on and why and what the future operational environment should like” (U.S. Army 2015, 1-4). In simple terms, it is a method to develop better planners: “Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (U.S. Army 2015, 1-2). Accordingly, ADM “is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them” (U.S. Army 2015, 1-3). Key concepts in ADM are describing and understanding the OE, framing an operational approach, and developing evaluation criteria.

Operating Environment

“An *operational environment* is a composite set of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0)” (U.S. Army 2015, 3-1). In order to understand an environment, systems thinking is a useful construct. For example, U.S. Army doctrine outlines a set of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. Of note, many of these operational variables relate to and illuminate an understanding of the causes of intra-state conflict. By utilizing systems thinking one can evaluate questions such as “What is going on in the environment? Why has the situation developed? Who are the relevant actors? What is causing conflict among the relevant actors?” And, importantly, “Why is the situation

undesirable?” and “What future conditions need to exist for success?” (U.S. Army 2015, 3-2).

Operational Approach

Once planners describe the current undesirable conditions, as well as the desired conditions, an operational approach is developed. An *operational approach* is “a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at the end state (JP 5-0)” (U.S. Army 2015, 3-2).




Figure 1. Operational Approach

Source: U.S. Army, Army Training Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015).

In order to develop an effective “broad set of actions,” when designing an operational approach, planners must ask introspective open-ended questions, such as “How do we go from the existing conditions to the desired end state? What broad obstacles or tensions exist between the two? What broad actions help attain these conditions? What types of resources are required?” And, “What are the risks?” (U.S. Army 2015, 5-2). These questions, coupled with an understanding of the causes of intra-state conflict, and an understanding of the desired end-state, allow for planners to devise lines of effort.

The U.S. Army describes a line of effort (LOE) as “a line that links multiple tasks using logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic objectives (ADRP 3-0)” (U.S. Army 2015, 5-6). Similar to LOEs in U.S. Army doctrine, “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” outlines a planning framework described as “a comprehensive approach.” In this approach, short-term tasks are nested with long-term objectives. For example, an end-state for a society emerging from conflict is achieving a Safe and Secure Environment, which is defined as “the ability of people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence” (U.S. Institute of Peace 2009, 2-9).

This, therefore, is the end-state, and in order to achieve this goal, planners develop a LOE that includes several measurable linked tasks to achieve this goal. Tasks for this LOE could include defeating militants with an international military force, followed by securing the population with an international police force and, lastly, training local law enforcement to conduct security operations. These tasks linked together would

serve as a LOE to achieve a Safe and Secure Environment. Once the OE is defined, an operational approach consists of several LOEs to achieve your desired conditions.

Evaluation Criteria

Assessment is a critical element of ADM. An “assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0)” (U.S. Army 2015, 6-1). In order to conduct a proper assessment, evaluation criteria must be developed. “*Evaluating* is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists” (Department of Defense 2011, D-3). Evaluation criteria, first, addresses task completion and, secondly, measures whether task completion is making progress towards the desired end state (U.S. Army 2015, 6-2).

For example, if a peace operation develops a LOE that works towards Stable Governance, one of the tasks may include holding an election. An election may be conducted that is determined to be transparent, fair, and inclusive of all nation members within a nation-state; thus, task completion might indicate success. However, successful task completion may still result in failure to achieve Stable Governance; why? This could occur if the election was conducted in a winner-take-all system with few checks and balances, or the officials elected lack broad representation from all regions within a nation-state. Although the election was successfully conducted, a majority nation operating in a unitary state, one without federalism, may rule unjustly against a minority group, thereby fostering underlying conditions of instability. As such, an effective assessment plan serves as a method to craft a check on the operational approach.

Successful completion of tasks is important, but these achievements must be measured by their effectiveness towards attaining the desired end-state conditions.

Research Methodology

Outlined below is the step-by-step approach for this thesis:

Step 1: The first step in the research design is to conduct a literature review on intra-state conflict to answer the following two secondary research questions:

1. What are the underlying and proximate causes of intra-state conflict?
2. What are prevailing accepted methods to resolve intra-state conflict? This literature review occurs in chapter 2.

Step 2: The second step in the research design is to conduct a case study on intra-state conflict in Mali and answer the following secondary questions:

3. What are the underlying and proximate causes of conflict in Mali?
4. What has the international community done to address conflict in Mali? The case study is outlined in chapter 2.

Step 3: The third step in the research design is to analyze and synthesize the results of the intra-state conflict literature review with the case study results from Mali and then design an operational approach that seeks to measure the international community's effectiveness towards attaining a Safe and Secure Environment and Stable Governance in Mali. This occurs in chapter 4—data presentation and analysis.

Step 4: The fourth step in the research design is to compile the findings and apply evaluation criteria to evaluate the international community's response. This will enable the researcher to answer the primary research question. This occurs in chapter 4—data presentation and analysis.

Step 5: The last step in the research design will draw conclusions and make recommendations for future research. This occurs in chapter 5—conclusions and recommendations.

Threats to Validity and Biases

In this research, threats exist to validity and bias. Threats to validity may skew findings and affect results of the research and correctness of the findings. Threats to validity in this study exist in the realm of, first, identifying the exact causes of conflict in Mali and, secondly, effectively measuring the international community's response. In Mali, there are multiple competing underlying and proximate causes of intra-state conflict, each of which operate at the individual, nation-state, and international system level-of-analysis. Consequently, first, it is exceedingly difficult to aggregate all the causes of conflict in Mali and, secondly, it is also inherently difficult to measure which causes are most salient. A second threat to validity presents itself when measuring the international community's response. For example, "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction" defines success criteria as measuring the end-states by gauging the perception of the people within the nation-state. At present, in Mali, given the tenuous security situation and vast geography, it is inherently difficult to measure popular perception.

All researchers, whether consciously or not, have bias. Consequently, every researcher should make a concerted introspective effort to identify areas of bias. This researcher, having lived in Mali for nearly two-years, possesses bias. Thus, at the outset of this project, the researcher possesses predisposed thoughts on what has caused conflict in Mali and how the international community has performed in response. This researcher

will take care to keep threats to validity in mind when analyzing sources of evidence, evaluating success, and drawing conclusions.

Chapter Conclusion

The objective for utilizing this research methodology is to effectively answer the primary research question given threats to validity, bias, limitations, and delimitations. The literature review on the causes of intra-state conflict and accepted methods for executing peace operations provides a platform to analyze Mali as a case study for addressing intra-state conflict and answer the primary research question, “Has the international community’s response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?” The next chapter, chapter 4, data presentation and analysis, contains results from the researcher’s case study on Mali, as well as analysis of the international community’s response as evaluated through the researcher’s design methodology.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Chapter Introduction

This chapter contains an aggregate of qualitative research results attained in this study in order to answer the primary research question, “Has the international community’s response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?”

Step 1

The literature review led to addressing the first secondary research question directly. “What are the underlying and proximate causes of intra-state conflict?” The causes of intra-state conflict manifest in the form of underlying and proximate causes, and are illuminated utilizing a levels-of-analysis framework. At the international level, underlying causes of intra-state conflict include the manner in which a nation-state was formed. For example, intra-state conflict is most prevalent in Africa. Amidst decolonization, nation-states became sovereign almost overnight. These new states often consisted of several nations competing for power amidst “economic scarcity” and within ineffective and weak state institutions, thus an underlying cause of conflict. Proximate causes of conflict at the international level included the “spillover effect,” for example, when neighboring nation-states collapse instability may spread throughout a region. This may lead to the expansion of militant ideology and the proliferation of weapons, as people seek to establish their own secure environment.

At the nation-state level, underlying causes of conflict include weak institutions that promulgate discriminatory political, economic, or social policies. These circumstances, when coupled with “structural scarcity,” or “economic scarcity,” can lead to horizontal inequalities (HIs) that lend various factions, or nations of people to mobilize for conflict as the “social contract” within society breaks down. These underlying causes of conflict can set the table for a proximate cause of conflict within a nation-state, such as a strongman leading a military coup.

At the individual level-of-analysis, greed, particularly when operating amidst weak institutions or an unsecure environment, can lead to individual crime syndicates vying for economic and political power through drug smuggling, weapons trafficking, etc. Criminal leaders may leverage a population’s grievances against the state to mobilize in accordance with ethnic, cultural, or religious identities.

Step 2

The second step in the research design is to conduct a case study on intra-state conflict in Mali and address two secondary questions: First, “What are the underlying and proximate causes of conflict in Mali? The underlying causes of conflict in Mali include the manner in which it was formed. Independence was thrust on Mali on September 22, 1960. It possessed weak institutions, limited economic resources, and a vast geography that exacerbated inequality between the south, primarily of sub-Saharan African descent, and the north, primarily Arab and Tuareg nomads. These underlying causes of intra-state conflict were susceptible to proximate causes of conflict: The collapse of the Libyan state and the spread of extremist militias. In addition, weak, corrupt, and ineffective institutions led to a collapse of the “social contract,” and a military coup backed by

significant popular support toppled the government. Amidst this security backdrop, individual leaders promoted agendas based on greed, leveraged the population's grievances, and mobilized for conflict along ethnic, cultural, and religious identities. The second element of this researcher's case study on Mali asked, "What has the international community done to address conflict in Mali?" In response to the Malian crisis, France invaded Mali and nominally regained control of its territory.

Following the French invasion, the UN authorized a stabilization mission in Mali (MINUSMA) that included a robust Peacekeeping force and a mandate to pursue Peace Making and Peace Building. MINUSMA and the international community negotiated a ceasefire between the GoM and a coalition of Tuareg and Arab groups in the north that consisted of nearly all the armed groups that initiated the 2012 rebellion. Following the ceasefire, first, presidential elections were held and a new President of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) took office. Secondly, elections for a National Assembly were held and a new 147 member national legislature was sworn into office. Following elections, a comprehensive peace accord, the Algiers Agreement, was signed between the GoM, the Coalition Movement of Azawad (CMA), and the *Platform Coalition of Armed Groups (Platform)*. In summary, the international community responded to Mali's intra-state conflict, first with military force, and secondly with diplomatic measures that negotiated a ceasefire, a peace accord, and facilitated national and local elections.

Step 3

The third step in the research design is to utilize the results of the intra-state conflict literature review with the case study results from Mali and then design an

operational approach that seeks to measure the international community's effectiveness towards attaining a Safe and Secure Environment and Stable Governance in Mali.

The operational approach for this research seeks to address the undesirable conditions that existed in Mali on January, 10, 2012, and then define the desirable conditions the international community should seek to attain in Mali, through the conduct of peace operations. As a way for attaining the desirable conditions in Mali, two lines of effort will be developed that seek to achieve end-state conditions in the realm of establishing a Safe and Secure Environment and Stable Governance in Mali. Each LOE will include an end-state nested with two broad objectives to be achieved. The operational approach will address the root causes of intra-state conflict in Mali.

Operational Approach: Addressing Intra-State Conflict in Mali

The conditions that existed in Mali January 10, 2012 included: First, large scale violence; second, the nation-state of Mali lacked security forces that were legitimate, capable, and effective at securing the population, and; third, the citizens of Mali, particularly in the three northern regions, lacked effective methods to share, access, or compete for power through a nonviolent political process—the social contract between the Malian nation-state and its citizens broke down and anarchy resulted.

The desired conditions in Mali proposed by this operational approach emanate from the *Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction's* proposed end-states. The first endstate seeks to create a Safe and Secure Environment, defined as an “ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.” The second endstate of fostering Stable Governance provides that a

government possess an “ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state” (U.S. Institute of Peace 2009, 2-9).




Figure 2. Addressing Intra-State Conflict in Mali: An Operational Approach

Source: Created by author.

Safe and Secure Environment LOE

In order to achieve a Safe and Secure Environment, two broad objectives are proposed in the operational approach. Objective 1: Cessation of Large Scale Violence. Objective 2: Local Security Sector Reform (SSR). Diplomacy is the preferred method for ending violence; however, if diplomacy fails then military force and Peace Enforcement methods to “compel compliance . . . and restore peace and order” are required for success (Department of Defense 2012, viii). Following a cessation of large scale violence, SSR is

required to establish security forces that are legitimate and representative of local civil society. Accomplishing these two objectives promotes the “ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence” (U.S. Institute of Peace 2009, 2-9). In addition, successful Peace Enforcement is a prerequisite for Peace Making, which includes “the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arrange an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it (Department of Defense 2012, viii). Peace Enforcement provides breathing space to facilitate Peace Making.

In order to measure progress towards achieving the endstate of a Safe and Secure Environment, three evaluation criteria are established for each of the two objectives.

Table 3. Evaluation Criterion – LOE Safe and Secure Environment Objective #1: Cessation of Large Scale Violence			
Question	Ineffective (1 point)	Moderately Effective (2 points)	Effective (3 points)
1) Has Mali’s territorial integrity been reestablished?			
2) Has a ceasefire been negotiated?			
3) Have <i>Peacekeeping</i> forces prevented the resumption of large scale violence?			
Total			

Source: Created by author.

Table 4. Evaluation Criterion – LOE Safe and Secure Environment Objective #2: Local Security Sector Reform (SSR)			
Question	Ineffective (1 point)	Moderately Effective (2 points)	Effective (3 points)
1) Are joint patrols occurring?			
2) Have legitimate local security forces been established in northern Mali?			
3) Do legitimate security forces maintain a monopoly on violence?			
Total			

Source: Created by author.

Stable Governance LOE

Peace Making is a method to promote conditions that lead to Stable Governance. The Stable Governance LOE proposes two broad objectives. Objective 1: Comprehensive Peace Accord Signed. Objective 2: Comprehensive Peace Accord Implemented. In order to successfully address the root causes of intra-state conflict in Mali, unlike previous peace settlements, this peace accord must be comprehensive and must be implemented. The term comprehensive means the peace accord addresses the multi-dimensional root causes of Mali's conflict; for example, within the nation-state level in particular the accord must address the historical inequality of access to political, economic, and social power that exists between the more powerful southern sub-Saharan region and the northern Sahara Desert region. These structural inequalities between the north and the south are the root cause of Mali's conflict and create underlying conditions, or instability, that foster a malign actor's capacity to pursue greed, conduct criminal activity, and mobilize populations along national or sectarian divides by leveraging citizen's

grievances against the Malian state. Similar to the Safe and Secure Environment LOE, the Stable Governance LOE outlines three criteria for each of the two objectives.

Table 5. Evaluation Criterion – LOE Stable Governance Objective #1: Comprehensive Peace Accord Signed			
Question	Ineffective (1 point)	Moderately Effective (2 points)	Effective (3 points)
1) Did major parties to the intra-state conflict sign a comprehensive peace accord?			
2) Were the signatories to the peace accord representative of civil society?			
3) Did the peace accord address structural inequalities that exist between the Malian state and the northern nations of Mali?			
Total			

Source: Created by author.

Table 6. Evaluation Criterion – LOE Stable Governance Objective #2: Comprehensive Peace Accord Implemented			
Question	Ineffective (1 point)	Moderately Effective (2 points)	Effective (3 points)
1) Was a new government established in a fair and inclusive manner that is representative of all nations in Mali?			
2) Has decentralization of political power from the central government to northern regions of Mali been implemented?			
3) Has Mali's government allocated at least 30% of its revenue to northern Mali as outlined in the Algiers Agreement?			
Total			

Source: Created by author.

Each of the three evaluation questions associated within each of the objectives for the LOEs serve as indicators for measuring success toward attaining the objective and ultimately achieving the conditions desired for each. The evaluation questions will undergo qualitative analysis, and then receive a score of either ineffective, moderately effective, or effective. An ineffective result receives one point, a moderately effective result receives two points, and an effective result receives three points. The total score towards attaining each objective will then be tallied. If the objective receives a total score of three or four, the results towards attaining the objective are deemed ineffective. If an objective receives a total score between five and seven, the results towards attaining the objective are deemed moderately effective. If the total score is between eight and nine, the results towards attaining the objective are deemed effective.

Step 4

Step 4: The fourth step in the research design is to compile the findings and apply evaluation criteria to evaluate the international community's response. This will enable the researcher to answer the primary research question.

Safe and Secure Environment: LOE

When seeking to measure success towards attaining a Safe and Secure Environment Objective #1 is Cessation of Large Scale Violence. The first question for measuring success is, has Mali's territorial integrity been reestablished? In January 2012, militants were on the doorstep of Mali's capital, Bamako. Michael Shurkin, political scientist for the RAND Corporation, in "France's War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army," outlines that "France saved Bamako and the Malian state from

imminent danger and enabled all of Mali's territory to come at least under nominal Malian control" (Shurkin 2014, 24). Therefore, as a result of French actions and the subsequent mobilization and deployment of Peacekeeping forces, the international community has been effective at reestablishing the territorial integrity of Mali.

The second question for measuring success towards achieving a Cessation of Large Scale Violence asks has a ceasefire been negotiated? On June 18, 2013, six months after France initiated combat operations in Mali, the GoM signed the Ouagadougou Accord with the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the High Counsel Unity Azawad (HCUA).

The Ouagadougou Accord has a different status because it focuses on the cease-fire, the preparation of the presidential election, the return of public services in the north, and the elaboration of a framework for broader and more-substantive future peace talks. (Pezard and Shurkin 2015, xiii)

The Ouagadougou Accord effectively ended major hostilities between the GoM and leaders of the MNLA and HCUA. Therefore, the answer to the second question for measuring success towards achieving a Safe and Secure Environment is yes—the international community successfully negotiated a ceasefire.

However, as a cautionary tale, previous peace agreements between the Malian state and northern armed groups in Mali have come unraveled in every instance. Why? First, they were conducted between elites from both the north and south and lacked the participation of civil society. And second, they were ineffectively implemented. Peace agreements will not have lasting effects if they lack broad representation, legitimacy, and support from civil society. For instance, if the agreement, on one hand, is a hand-shake between militant leaders acting for their own self-preservation and, on the other hand,

leaders of the Malian state have little intention of fulfilling obligations listed, the agreement is likely to be tenuous and not effectively implemented.

The third question for measuring success towards achieving a Cessation of Large Scale Violence asks have Peacekeeping forces prevented the resumption of large scale violence? Large-scale violence is defined as the ceasefire becomes unraveled, and the majority of militant combatant leaders, once again, are directing violence against the GoM or against one another. In addition, large scale violence could resume if militant groups outside of the ceasefire, such as AQIM, Ansar Dine, or MUJAO take over population centers and mobilize mass violence against the GoM, MINUSMA, or against armed groups that participated in the ceasefire with the GoM.

By and large, the ceasefire has held between the GoM and the MNLA and HCUA. Nonetheless, northern Mali is not a monolith, and has a multitude of disparate factions operating throughout the region and, as an aggregate, a troubling level of violence remains as local, regional, and internationally sponsored militants such as AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO continue to target Malian security forces and peace operations forces from MINUSMA. For example, violence against MINUSMA is a regular occurrence. Between 2013 and 2016, 71 MINUSMA Peacekeepers were killed in Mali resulting from “malicious acts” (United Nations 2017a). Given the ceasefire has held, but substantive violence remains, the answer is Peacekeepers have been moderately effective at preventing the resumption of large scale violence.

Table 7. Evaluation Criterion – LOE Safe and Secure Environment: Aggregate Objective #1: Cessation of Large Scale Violence			
Question	Ineffective (1 point)	Moderately Effective (2 points)	Effective (3 points)
1) Has Mali’s territorial integrity been reestablished?			X
2) Has a ceasefire been negotiated?			X
3) Have <i>Peacekeeping</i> forces prevented the resumption of large scale violence?		X	
Total = 8	0	2	6

Source: Created by author.

If society is to address the root causes of intra-state violence, Objective #1, the Cessation of Large Scale Violence, is a precondition that must be met. How well has the international community performed? First, the international community has achieved success preventing the collapse of the Malian government and reestablishing nominal control of Mali’s territory. Second, diplomacy effectively achieved a ceasefire between the GoM and factions representing northern militant groups. Third, although a troubling level of sporadic violence exists, when responding to the intra-state conflict in Mali, the international community has been effective at mitigating large scale violence—see Table 7 above.

Objective #2 is Local Security Sector Reform (SSR). If the root causes of intra-state conflict in Mali are to be addressed, civil society from northern Mali must take part. GoM security forces have a poor track record for maintaining security in northern Mali. In many instances, Malian soldiers “have perpetuated torture, summary executions, and forced disappearances of Tuaregs and suspected Islamists” (Armstrong 2013, 3). As a

result, the GoM's security apparatus lacks legitimacy that can only come from SSR that incorporates local solutions to local problems.

The first question for measuring success with SSR is, are joint patrols occurring? On June 20, 2015, peace talks concluded with the signing of the *Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali*, commonly referred to as the Algiers Agreement. As outlined in the Mali case study, the CMA included members of the HCUA and MNLA, while the *Platform* was a coalition of armed groups. Historically, the HCUA and MNLA have sought self-determination, while the *Platform* has been more willing to negotiate with the GoM. The signing and implementation of the Algiers Agreement, as it pertains to governance issues, will be discussed when evaluating progress pertaining to the Stable Governance LOE. The Algiers Agreement, however, also included methods for attaining a Safe and Secure Environment—to include security reform. SSR in the form of joint patrols is a key confidence building element of the Algiers Agreement; therefore, it is important to analyze whether joint patrols have successfully occurred.

Cecilia Hull Wiklund and Claes Nilsson, of the *Swedish Defence Research Agency*, in a November 2016 report titled, “Peace in Mali? An Analysis of the Algiers Agreement and its Implementation,” outline both the importance and progress of SSR. Wiklund and Nilsson describe the importance of SSR successfully moving forward with “all parties to the peace agreement . . . involved” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 26). They describe how “the joint patrols play an important role in the peace process as they are intended to provide security in the north, including protection of interim authorities” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 25). Consequently, the failure of SSR “would allow old drivers of conflict to come back and haunt Malians” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 26).

The Algiers Agreement established an Operational Coordination Mechanism (OCM) between the GoM and northern armed groups. The OCM's intent is to serve as a platform for dialogue and coordinate joint patrols. "According to the Algiers Agreement, the OCM and the joint patrols were to be established within 60 days of signing. The deadline was not met." Several parties to the conflict submitted a total of 600 names to participate; however, "renewed fighting between the armed groups nevertheless postponed the joint patrols" (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 25).

The first joint patrol did not occur until February 23, 2017—nearly two years after the agreement. It occurred in Gao, Mali.

The long-awaited patrol is part of an initiative aimed at easing local tensions so that government forces can focus on fighting the militants. More such patrols are due over the next few weeks under the terms of a 2015 U.N.-brokered peace deal. Hundreds of soldiers from Mali's army, France's operation Barkhane, the U.N. peacekeeping mission, the Tuareg separatist Coordination of Azawad Movements and pro-government militias took part in the patrol. (Ag Anara 2017)

Given it took nearly two years to conduct the first official joint patrol between all major parties, when answering whether joint patrols are occurring, the results have been ineffective.

The second question pertaining to SSR asks whether legitimate local security forces have been established in northern Mali? Cecilia Hull Wiklund and Claes Nilsson outline that "Since no reconstitution of the security forces has yet begun, the redeployment of the security forces has been put on hold" (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 25). Sustained joint patrols were to bring security to northern Mali, followed by the establishment of a legitimate security apparatus. However, according to Wiklund and Nilsson, this has not occurred.

Further evidence is presented by the UN. On December 30, 2016, the UN issued a *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Mali S/2016/1137*. The report outlines “benchmarks for the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali” (United Nations 2016a, 1). In Defence and Security Issues, the report outlines an objective for the “Implementation and progressive functioning of inclusive defence and security forces that are accountable to citizens and comply with human rights and the rule of law” (United Nations. 2016a, 1). The report details a series of “indicators of achievement” and cites current status as either “In Progress” or “Achieved.” One critical indicator of achievement is, “The gradual redeployment of reconstituted defence and security forces throughout the entire Malian territory is effective and ensures the safeguard of security and public order” (United Nations 2016a, 1). According to the UN’s report, the December 2016 status of this objective is neither achieved nor in progress—it has not started. The report annotates that “the Malian defence and security forces have not yet completed their redeployment plan for the centre and the north of the country pursuant to which the Mission (MINUSMA) could assess its support” (United Nations 2016a, 8-29). Therefore, when answering whether effective and legitimate local security forces have been established in northern Mali the results have been ineffective.

The third question pertaining to measuring the success of SSR asks do legitimate security forces maintain a monopoly on violence? International Peacekeepers have been moderately effective at preventing large scale violence that topples the Malian state; in contrast, however, legitimate local security forces have been unable to maintain a monopoly on violence. First, as previously detailed, legitimately constituted security

forces have not been established to provide security in central and northern Mali;
secondly, violence is on the rise.

The *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali S/2016/1137* cites “Asymmetric attacks continued to target Malian, French and MINUSMA forces, using complex attack tactics, suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, roadside bombs and mortars/rockets” (United Nations 2016a, 8-29). For instance, in the last half of 2016, the UN reported “25 attacks were perpetrated against the Malian defence and security forces and 29 against MINUSMA” (United Nations 2016a, 7). Furthermore, two weeks after the issuance of this report, January 18, 2017, “Mali suffered one of the deadliest attacks since the start of the 2012 crisis . . . Nearly 80 people were killed and more than 100 wounded following the car bomb attack in Gao, Mali” (Maïga 2017). When answering the third question on SSR, legitimate security forces have been ineffective at maintaining a monopoly on violence.

Table 8. Evaluation Criterion – LOE Safe and Secure Environment: Aggregate Objective #2: Local Security Sector Reform (SSR)			
Question	Ineffective (1 point)	Moderately Effective (2 points)	Effective (3 points)
1) Are joint patrols occurring?	X		
2) Have legitimate local security forces been established in northern Mali?	X		
3) Do legitimate security forces maintain a monopoly on violence?	X		
Total = 3	3		

Source: Created by author.

The first LOE for addressing the root causes of intra-state conflict in Mali sought to attain a Safe and Secure Environment, which is defined as an “ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence” (U.S. Institute of Peace 2009, 2-9). Objective #1 for this LOE sought to achieve a Cessation of Large Scale Violence. First, the international community was effective, at least nominally, at maintaining the territorial integrity of Mali and achieving a ceasefire agreement. In addition, Peacekeeping forces have prevented the resumption of hostilities to a tipping point that causes MINUSMA’s withdrawal or the collapse of the Malian state; however, Peacekeeping forces have only been moderately effective at preventing the resumption of large scale violence. Overall, however, Objective #1 receives an effective result, or three points for each of the first two questions, and a moderately effective result, or two points for the third question. The results, therefore, conclude that when seeking to achieve Objective #1, the international community receives eight points for an effective result.

Objective #1 sought to achieve a bare minimum standard of achieving a Cessation of Large Scale Violence that existed in January 2012 as militant groups controlled nearly two-thirds of Mali and were marching towards Bamako. Comparatively, Objective #2, Security Sector Reform (SSR), was established to accomplish a more robust security atmosphere that addressed the root causes of conflict. As of April 15, 2017, SSR has been ineffective. All three criteria questions for Objective #2 established in the operational approach resulted in an ineffective result, for a total of the minimum three points possible. First, it took two years to accomplish a joint patrol between all parties. Second, legitimate security forces, tied to local citizens of northern Mali have not been

established. Third, legitimate local security forces do not possess a monopoly on violence—see Table 8.

In conclusion, the LOE for establishing a Safe and Secure Environment has mixed results. Objective #1 was achieved, as a Cessation of Large Scale Violence, although fragile, was attained. However, these results may prove to be palliative unless success is attained with Objective #2: Security Sector Reform—to this point SSR has been completely ineffective.

Stable Governance LOE

The Stable Governance LOE seeks to attain a government with an “ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state” (U.S. Institute of Peace 2009, 2-9). In order to accomplish this, two broad objectives are outlined in the operational approach: Objective #1: Comprehensive Peace Accord Signed and Objective #2: Comprehensive Peace Accord Implemented.

Objective #1 sought to, first, determine if a comprehensive peace accord was signed after the ceasefire was established and, secondly, answer whether the accord addressed the root causes of Mali’s intra-state conflict. The first evaluation question asked did major parties to the intra-state conflict sign a comprehensive peace accord?

Cecilia Hull Wiklund and Claes Nilsson’s analysis of the accord describe that “A considerable achievement of the Algiers process was the broad inclusion of the armed groups—including local allies, proxies and recent splinter groups—in the peace talks” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 15). According to Wiklund and Nilsson, previous peace agreements represented “only a small minority of separatists within small ethnic

minorities, leaving everyone else to regard themselves as not being a party to the Algiers Agreement” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 15). As such, the international community was effective at incorporating all major parties involved in the conflict to signing a Comprehensive Peace Accord.

The first question for Objective #1 sought to answer whether all parties involved in the conflict participated in the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord. The second question, however, looked to answer whether the signatories to the peace accord were representative of civil society? Wiklund and Nilsson describe that

While the inclusion of a broader set of actors in the agreement was a positive development, the process left little room for the Malian population. The Algiers Agreement remains an agreement between the Malian state and northern armed groups. Focusing merely on the armed groups reduces ownership of the peace process amongst the non-rebellious populations. Legitimate representatives of northern civil society were not included in the peace talks and their exclusion had led to protests and demonstrations, in particular from youth groups feeling excluded from the process. (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 15)

Thus, although the Algiers Agreement possessed broad inclusion of armed groups, it “did not include traditional leaders of local communities . . . the fact that no room was made for civil society is a concern for the future of Mali” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 17). If success is attained at addressing the root causes of intra-state conflict, when the Algiers Agreement is implemented it must seek to address the grievances of northern Mali’s citizens. Therefore, the answer to the second evaluation question concludes the international community was ineffective at ensuring the signatories to the agreement were representative of civil society in northern Mali—if past is prologue, this attribute will make it difficult to implement the accord.

The third question for Objective #1 asks whether the peace accord addressed structural inequalities that exist between the Malian state and the northern nations of

Mali? When describing the political and institutional reforms included in the Algiers Agreement, Wiklund and Nilsson outline these reforms “are intended to decentralize the governance system, including through transfer of authoritative power and financial revenues from state to regional assemblies” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 19). For example, “the Algiers Agreement calls for elected regional assemblies . . . Local communities will have governing bodies elected through universal suffrage and will be granted administrative freedom” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 19). These reforms seek to enhance local autonomy. In addition, the Algiers Agreement seeks to increase the power of northern communities within the national government and implement “A financial transfer mechanism, whereby 30 percent of national budgetary revenue is transferred to northern regions” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 19). The root causes of Mali’s intra-state conflict include the structural inequalities that exist between the north and south. Accordingly, the international community has effectively outlined mechanisms in the Algiers Agreement that address the structural inequalities existing in Mali.

Table 9. Evaluation Criterion – LOE Stable Governance: Aggregate Objective #1: Comprehensive Peace Accord Signed			
Question	Ineffective (1 point)	Moderately Effective (2 points)	Effective (3 points)
1) Did major parties to the intra-state conflict sign a comprehensive peace accord?			X
2) Were the signatories to the peace accord representative of civil society?	X		
3) Did the peace accord address structural inequalities that exist between the Malian state and the northern nations of Mali?			X
Total = 7	1	0	6

Source: Created by author.

In conclusion, Objective #1 sought to achieve a signed Comprehensive Peace Accord—one that addressed the root causes of Mali’s intra-state conflict. Answering the first question revealed that all major armed parties to the intra-state conflict had signed a comprehensive peace accord, so this effective result received three points. When answering the second question, however, it was determined that although the accord was signed by all parties to the conflict, the accord was not representative of all members within civil society; therefore, this evaluation question received an ineffective result and one point. Lastly, the third evaluation question sought to determine whether the accord addressed the structural inequalities that exist in Mali and serve as root causes of its recurring conflicts. The third question received an effective result, for three points, as the accord actively outlines methods to increase political, economic, and social autonomy in the northern regions of Mali.

When measuring the results of the international community’s effectiveness towards achieving a Comprehensive Peace Accord addressing the root causes of Mali’s conflict the first and third evaluation questions received three points for maximum effectiveness, but question number two received only one point for an ineffective result. As an aggregate, therefore, Objective #1 receives a total of seven points and achieves a moderately effective result—see Table 9.

Objective #2 for the Stable Governance LOE asks whether a comprehensive peace accord has been implemented? The first evaluation question asked if the new government was established in a fair and inclusive manner and representative of all nations in Mali. On November 20, 2016, after a two-year delay, elections for 703 municipalities were held. “The polls did not take place in 43 municipalities” and on

November 21, 2016 “the CMA issued a statement rejecting the legitimacy and results of the elections” (United Nations 2016a, 4).

The *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI) conducted analysis of the 2016 local elections in Mali. SIPRI detailed that a specific measure in the 2015 Algiers Agreement called for the “Malian Government and the signatory armed groups to set up temporary local authorities by bringing together actors from civil society, the private sector and some of the outgoing locally elected representatives” (Tobie 2016). Of note, however, “When the government [GoM] announced the list of interim authorities on October 14, 2016, it was immediately contested by various armed and political groups, each claiming that it had not been properly consulted and was not adequately represented” (Tobie 2016). The CMA, a major signatory to the Algiers Agreement, denounced the elections. This denunciation is a key indicator that a climate of distrust between the CMA and the GoM continues to exist.

Overall, election turnout nationally was under 30 percent. In Mali, structural factors play a role in low turnout, for example, 70 percent illiteracy and poor infrastructure are salient inhibitors to voting. However, in the three northern regions of Mali, local elections were marred by numerous challenges. In Kidal, “local elections were prevented from taking place by the CMA, one of the two coalitions of armed groups that signed the 2015 peace agreement.” In Gao, “only some communes could organize the elections. In Tombouctou, several groups of assailants stole and burnt election material, preventing voting from taking place, especially in rural areas” (Tobie 2016).

The first evaluation question asked if the new government was established in a fair and inclusive manner representative of all nations in Mali. The local elections held in

November 2016, a key feature of the Algiers Agreement, failed to achieve new local governance that was fair, inclusive, and representative of all nations in Mali. A climate of distrust between the GoM and signatories from northern Mali is continually inhibiting Peace Building efforts. Accordingly, the international community has been ineffective at facilitating local governance in northern Mali that is representative of local citizens.

The second evaluation question for Objective #2, asked has decentralization of political power from the central government to the northern regions of Mali been implemented? The institutional reforms in the political realm, as well as the transfer of revenue to northern regions were key elements of decentralization. In order for these reforms to be implemented, “the Algiers Agreement called for elected regional assemblies, preceded by interim authorities,” these measures were to serve as the platform for implementing decentralization (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 19). However, resulting from, first, the failure to appoint representative local interim authorities and, second, the subsequent inability to hold local elections in a secure and inclusive manner the international community has been ineffective at promoting decentralization.

Given decentralization is a key element of the Algiers Agreement, it is important to ascertain potential reasons why it has failed. The CMA is not the only group protesting the GoM’s selection of interim officials,

The establishment of the interim authorities has been met by a series of protests by civil society groups in the north, in particular youth movements . . . These civil society groups argue that due to their marginalization and exclusion from the peace process, too much power has been put in the hands of armed movements. (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 21)

The interim authorities are perceived as illegitimate by the CMA and large swaths of civil society. According to the international community, elections are ostensibly a

method to address the problem of illegitimacy. In contrast to this favorable viewpoint of elections, “In the past, traditional chiefs and community leaders have found democracy threatening and have sought to control elections and block democratization processes emerging as a result of peace agreements” (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 22). In addition, as the literature review revealed, armed leaders often have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, and thereby may seek to sabotage the electoral process.

Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin note that although decentralization is a central mechanism for conflict resolution in Mali “an acute lack of resources to an immature political culture in which electoral competition is seen as a zero-sum game that exacerbates, rather than relieves, intercommunal tensions” (Pezard and Shurkin 2015, xiv).

Pezard and Shurkin further expound that:

[M]any of northern Mali’s problems stem from the tension between traditional leaders and new ones, who clash in various arenas, including elections, with the result that the leaders resist democracy and old and new elites find themselves in conflict. Instead of having more democracy and more decentralization, the argument is in favor of supplementing the existing democratic mechanisms with some form of parallel institutions or councils that enable the tribal chiefs to participate without being in opposition to the state administration or elected officials. (Pezard and Shurkin 2015, 50)

Decentralization, by any measure, and local elections, in particular, as a method to enhance participatory governance in northern Mali has been ineffective. Why? First, the GoM has insisted on appointing interim leaders unrepresentative of northern society. Second, elections appear to be further exacerbating the conflict between tribal leaders, armed groups, and civil society.

The third evaluation question for Objective #2, asked has Mali’s government allocated at least 30 percent of its revenue to northern Mali as outlined in the Algiers

Agreement? In order to effectively distribute 30 percent of the GoM's national revenue the platform to accomplish this was proposed as interim government officials and locally elected representatives. The UN's 2016 report detailing governance progress in Mali outlined an indicator for achievement, as "Interim administrations responsible for the administration of municipalities, districts, and regions in the north are operational." The report graded the current status of this indicator as "In Progress" (United Nations 2016a, 1).

The security situation in northern Mali and the lack of progress towards decentralization has inhibited critical good faith development and infrastructure projects from occurring in northern Mali. The GoM "has not taken the opportunity presented by the ceasefire and the peace agreement to kick-start implementation of the peace agreement" (Wiklund and Nilsson 2016, 34). Consequently, the GoM has ineffectively allocated 30 percent of its resources to northern Mali.

Table 10. Evaluation Criterion – LOE Stable Governance: Aggregate Objective #2: Comprehensive Peace Accord Implemented			
Question	Ineffective (1 point)	Moderately Effective (2 points)	Effective (3 points)
1) Was a new government established in a fair and inclusive manner that is representative of all nations in Mali?	X		
2) Has decentralization of political power from the central government to northern regions of Mali been implemented?	X		
3) Has Mali's government allocated at least 30% of its revenue to northern Mali as outlined in the Algiers Agreement?	X		
Total = 3	3	0	0

Source: Created by author.

In conclusion, Objective #2 for the Stable Governance LOE sought implementation of a Comprehensive Peace Accord that addressed the root causes of Mali's intra-state conflict. The first evaluation question asked whether a new government was established in a fair and inclusive manner that is representative of all nations in Mali? The Algiers Agreement promulgated two steps to accomplish this: First, establishment of legitimate interim authorities and, second, elections as a method for representative local governance in northern Mali. The results were poor: First, many of the interim officials selected by the GoM were denounced by northern citizens as unrepresentative—therefore, illegitimate. Second, elections in northern Mali were marred by low turnout, violence, and outright protest. The international community and the GoM were ineffective at establishing new representative local governance in Mali, so this evaluation question receives an ineffective result for one point.

The second evaluation question asked has decentralization of political power from the central government to northern regions of Mali been implemented? Again, the international community and the GoM was ineffective in this realm, for elections and interim authorities were to serve as platforms to devolve power and increase participatory governance in northern Mali; however, these mechanisms failed, so the second question receives one point for an ineffective result. The third question pertaining to 30 percent of the GoM's revenue getting allocated to northern Mali was also ineffective and receives one point. As an aggregate, Objective #2 receives the absolute minimum score for effectiveness; the international community has failed to achieve stable governance in Mali—see Table 10.

Step 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

Lastly, the final step in the research design is to draw conclusions and make recommendations for future research. This is found in chapter 5—conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter Conclusion

After conducting a literature review on the causes of intra-state conflict and the theories behind the techniques the international community utilizes to address intra-state conflict, a case study on the causes of intra-state conflict in Mali and the international community's response was conducted. An operational approach was then proposed as a method to evaluate effectiveness. Thus, "Has the international community's response to conflict in Mali effectively addressed the root causes of its intra-state conflict?" At the outset of the response, which began in January 2013, the international community achieved some initial success. Nevertheless, when the evaluation criteria from the proposed operational approach are applied, on the aggregate, the international community's response to conflict in Mali has been ineffective at addressing the root causes of its intra-state conflict.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter Introduction

As a young Marine Sergeant stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Bamako, Mali, in February 1998, I travelled 600 miles from Bamako to Tombouctou with my then girlfriend now wife of 13 years, we did the trip in a Land Rover. During the trek, our Land Rover crossed the Niger River and went deep into the Sahara Desert. During the desert crossing at one point we were a bit disoriented, possibly lost, and a large Tuareg camel caravan stumbled on us and pointed the way to Tombouctou—we arrived safely and signed an enormous, dusty, leather bound visitor's book. We then proudly ensured our passports were stamped with the Tombouctou entrance seal. Maybe I was naïve, but at the time, Mali was at peace and recognized as stable. Years later, in January 2012, watching from afar I was disheartened by the destruction of historic artifacts in Tombouctou, and the subsequent success of armed militants advancing on Bamako.

I went back to Mali in 2013 as a U.S. State Department Diplomatic Security Special Agent. I participated in the international election observer mission for Mali's presidential election and then attended the inauguration of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita on September 4, 2013. Whether from the north or south, I have always been fascinated by the kind welcoming nature of the Malian people. My history with Mali drove me to research the causes of its conflict and the effectiveness of the international community's response—the results are troubling.

The causes of Mali's intra-state conflict are explained through the levels-of-analysis framework that includes the international system, domestic level, and individual

level. From an international level perspective, there are both underlying and proximate causes of conflict in Mali. Malian independence was achieved from France in September 1960. Within Mali's internationally recognized borders are tribes of African descent in the south, and Arab and Tuaregs in the north. Therefore, competition for political autonomy and economic resources between nations within the nation-state of Mali resulted in four uprisings in northern Mali since its independence in September 1960. These underlying conditions were exacerbated by a proximate cause of conflict—the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011. When Qaddafi fell, militant leaders awash with weapons swept south through Algeria and into Mali. These fighters aligned with the Movement National Liberation Azawad (MNLA) and Tuaregs in northern Mali and the fourth northern rebellion began in 2012.

From a domestic, or nation-state perspective, the underlying causes of conflict in Mali resulted from weak institutions. These institutions were discriminatory in nature and several structural inequalities existed, to include severe political, economic, and social disparities between southern and northern Mali, with power residing in the south. As a result, the social contract between the people of northern Mali and the Malian state broke down and northern grievances against the GoM mounted to a tipping point.

From an individual perspective, these underlying causes of conflict allow for individual leaders to leverage a society's grievances and mobilize citizens along ethnic, religious, or sectarian lines. Amidst a situation where the social contract in Mali has broken down, these underlying causes enable malign actors to promote conflict for personal gain.

Accordingly, in January 2013, all the aforementioned underlying and proximate causes of conflict came to the fore and militants nearly toppled the Malian government—only a French military invasion obviated this from happening. The international community responded with a legally sanctioned peace operations’ force led by the UN—Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

The purpose of this research was to answer a primary research question: Has the international community’s response to conflict in Mali been ineffective at addressing the root causes of its intra-state conflict? When aggregating results, the international community has been ineffective at addressing the root causes of conflict in Mali.

Conclusions

Prior to this research study, I was under the assumption the international community was doing well at addressing conflict in Mali. In conclusion, however, when critically applying evaluation criteria, the international community’s response to addressing the root causes of Mali’s intra-state conflict has been ineffective.

This research sought to measure the effectiveness of the international community’s response along two broad lines of effort (LOE): Creating a Safe and Secure Environment and promoting Stable Governance. When seeking to achieve a Safe and Secure Environment, two objectives were measured. Objective #1 sought the Cessation of Large Scale Violence. Success was attained, as French military forces saved the Malian government from collapse and nominally regained control of Mali’s territory from militants. In addition, on the diplomatic front, a ceasefire was negotiated between the GoM and armed groups, followed by an internationally sanctioned and robust deployment of an international Peacekeeping force to Mali. Objective #2 attempted to

promote Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a method to incorporate local northern citizens into a legitimate security apparatus. Results have been ineffective: Joint patrols stalled, a legitimate local security force has not been created, and a troubling level of violence persists.

As with the Safe and Secure Environment LOE, after initial success, the international community has been ineffective at creating Stable Governance in Mali. Objective #1 for creating Stable Governance sought to achieve the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord that addressed the root causes of Mali's intra-state conflict. The international community was moderately successful with this objective. The accord was signed by nearly all armed militant leaders and, in addition, the Algiers Accord outlined a plan for decentralizing power and enhancing the autonomy of northern Mali by promoting elections for local leaders and transferring 30 percent of Mali's revenue to the north—if implemented these measures would directly address many root causes of Mali's conflict.

However, a salient weakness of the Algiers Accord was this: It was an agreement between the government of Mali (GoM) and armed leaders. Subsequently, civil society youth groups and tribal elders in the north perceive the accord as illegitimate. For instance, past agreements between the GoM and armed leaders were thought of as patronage politics. This accord is perceived by many in northern Mali as the GoM buying off armed leaders to maintain the status quo. As such, the results for achieving a signed Comprehensive Peace Accord that addresses the root causes of Mali's conflict are mixed. Although the accord did include most of the armed militants, and did outline several measures to enhance political, economic, and social power in northern Mali, a detriment

to its effectiveness is the fact that many members of civil society in northern Mali are circumspect about the level of the accord's sincerity.

Objective #2 for Stable Governance attempted to implement the Comprehensive Peace Accord. Implementation has been ineffective, as local elections were marred due to low turnout, violence, and protest. For example, turnout in northern Mali was less than 30 percent. In addition, the Coalition Movement Azawad (CMA) boycotted the elections because the GoM, according to the CMA, had appointed interim local leaders without proper consultation as outlined in the Algiers Accord. As a result, local leaders have not been selected in a fair and inclusive manner, nor has decentralization of political power or economic revenue been implemented. In conclusion, the Algiers Accord's implementation has failed to substantively address the root causes of intra-state conflict in Mali.

Recommendations

As of April 15, 2017, Peace Building has stalled in Mali. Why? When reviewing the ineffectiveness of Peace Building in Mali, peace efforts from all four uprisings since 1960 have failed to comprehensively incorporate the legitimate grievances of citizens within northern Mali. To this point, peace attempts have been consistently between the GoM and northern elites. For instance, top-down handshake agreements and peace accords have been agreed to and signed between the GoM and militant leaders; however, tribal elders and civil society youth groups have lacked representation during both negotiation and implementation.

Recommendations for decision makers: Given the top-down peace process has stalled, a bottom-up approach nested with top-down efforts is required. In order for this to

be successful; first, better situational understanding of northern Mali must be developed; and second, legitimate local leaders must be empowered. Former U.S. Congressmen and Speaker of the House Thomas Tip O’Neill once famously quipped “All politics is local” (Gary Hymel 2017). In northern Mali in particular, “All politics is local.” The operating environment (OE) in northern Mali is complex and not well understood. Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou are vastly different OEs, yet peace efforts are attempting similar aims in each area, for instance, efforts include elections and interim officials appointed from the central government.

Although each of the three northern regions in Mali is different, in each instance, persistent insurgency against state authority continues ad infinitum. *Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, defines an insurgency as “The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.” (U.S. Army 2014, Glossary-3). A counterinsurgency is defined as “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes” (U.S. Army 2014, Glossary-2).

A counterinsurgency campaign is strikingly similar to stabilization and reconstruction efforts. FM 3-24 outlines legitimacy and control as imperative principles in a counterinsurgency, for example, “The population of a particular society determines who has legitimacy to establish the rules and the government for that society. A population’s values and cultural norms will determine who that society perceives as a legitimate authority” (U.S. Army 2014, 1-8). Thus far, peace efforts in Mali have attempted to impose top-down peace at the expense of legitimacy. If peace is to be

successfully attained, local grievances must first be identified and then successfully addressed by legitimate local leaders with local solutions.

Accordingly, peace efforts will only be successful in northern Mali by incorporating civil society youth groups, tribal leaders, and other indigenous populace institutions. However, little research has been conducted on northern Mali's OE. A bottom-up system's analysis must be conducted in northern Mali. Region by region, district by district, municipality by municipality, circle by circle, situational understanding of the interrelated operational variables (political, military, economic, infrastructure, social, etc.) must be developed. Who are the power brokers? Who do the people trust? What are the population's grievances? All these questions must be answered—locally.

Large Peacekeeping formations make for big targets, and each time a spectacular attack occurs the window of opportunity for peace wanes. Rather than deploying large formations and bulky joint patrols as a show of psychological force, small teams of military, police, diplomatic, and development experts should spread out and conduct systematic and continuous situational understanding of northern Mali. Once initial understanding has been better developed, bottom-up conflict resolution should occur locality by locality.

By identifying legitimate local leaders and documenting the population's grievances, peace operations should work to ensure legitimate interim leaders are in positions of power. Once legitimate leaders are established, grievances should be addressed, be it economic, infrastructure, basic needs or otherwise. Once short-term successes are attained by legitimate leaders in northern Mali, these efforts should be

nested with the current top-down approach. Unfortunately for peace, current top-down efforts have been between the GoM and northern armed elites, often not seen as legitimate representatives of northern society—unless this changes peace will not be attained.

In addition to developing situational understanding, empowering legitimate local leaders, and addressing local grievances, counterterrorism (CT) efforts must continue. The French must sustain Operation Barkhane. Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO pose grave danger to the peace process, stability, the population, and peace operations in Mali. In order for Peace Building to maintain momentum, these groups must be marginalized by robust CT efforts and not allowed to serve as spoilers in the peace process.

Lastly, the *U.S. Army's Capabilities Integration Center* (ARCIC) outlines several Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC). One such challenge is #2, Shape the Security Environment, which asks: “How does the Army influence the security environment and engage key actors and local/regional forces in order to consolidate gains and achieve sustainable security outcomes in support of Geographic Combatant Commands and Joint requirements” (ARCIC, AWFC #2). Peace operations and counterinsurgency campaigns are directly related to AWFC#2—Shape the Security Environment. U.S. military officers possess a wealth of counterinsurgency and campaign planning expertise. As a final recommendation, U.S. Army officers should increase their presence with peace operations. For example, they should serve as staff members for UN operations. In addition, U.S. Army Civil Affairs possess unique training, capabilities, and cultural expertise to conduct civil reconnaissance as a method to understand and assess operating environments. A relatively small increase in U.S. military officers and Civil Affairs

support to peace operations could add tremendous value towards situational understanding and planning expertise.

Final Thoughts

At the outset of this study, I was under the assumption that the 15,000 UN Peacekeepers deployed to Mali were marching towards success. Although Mali's government remains intact, unfortunately, the international community and the GoM have yet to address the root causes of its intra-state conflict. To this point, the top-down handshake approach to peace has been ineffective. In order to achieve lasting peace, the legitimate grievances of northern Mali must be addressed.

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