

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

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Strategic Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS, by LCDR Jeffrey A. Ross, 84 pages.

The U.S. military conducts foreign humanitarian assistance in accordance with Title 10 authority to promote: (1) the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and (2) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities. These are not the only benefits to humanitarian assistance operations such as foreign disaster relief. Foreign disaster relief is a subset of foreign humanitarian assistance and the U.S. military has conducted numerous such operations in recent years. Increases in population density will bring about further risk to natural disasters and a potential increase to the need for foreign humanitarian assistance. In an era of budget constraints, Department of Defense activities are under increasing scrutiny to demonstrate the effectiveness of activities and money spent.

This study investigates the lasting contribution to bilateral partnership from the conduct of U.S. military humanitarian assistance, to include disaster relief. This is done through the study of two natural disasters in the Western Pacific and the resulting U.S. military response effort. Emphasis is placed on the bilateral cooperation and public opinion of the United States.

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ACRONYMS

CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DOD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DOS	Department of State
FDR	Foreign Disaster Relief
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
IMET	International Military Education and Training
JP	Joint Publication
NMS	<i>National Military Strategy</i>
NSS	<i>National Security Strategy</i>
QDR	<i>Quadrennial Defense Review</i>
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In an era when allied cooperation is essential in the war against terrorism, we cannot afford to shrug off negative public opinion overseas as uninformed or irrelevant. The governments of most nations respond to public opinion, whether it is demonstrated in the voting booth or in the streets.

—Senator Richard Lugar, quoted in Kay Lena, “Indonesian Public Perception of the U.S. and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy”

On 11 March 2011 at 2:46 p.m., three massive earthquakes struck approximately 250 miles northeast of Tokyo. Altogether, the earthquake measured 9.0 magnitude on the Richter scale and caused the floor of the Pacific Ocean to move by sixty-five feet. The shaking lasted for six minutes and could be felt across the Pacific from Alaska to Chile. The once in a 1000-year event exceeded the building and safety standards of Japan and caused widespread damage. If the destruction had stopped there it would have been a memorable event involving a near record setting earthquake (as of April 2017, it was the fourth largest earthquake ever).¹ Twenty-six minutes after the earthquake stopped, a tsunami struck Japan. It measured up to sixty-five feet tall and swept inland as far as six miles in places. Along with the buildings damaged by the tsunami were six nuclear reactors and associated spent fuel rod storage ponds at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The tsunami swamped the emergency generators cooling the reactors and storage ponds, removing any chance of preventing meltdowns in three reactors. As of March 2017, over 20,000 Japanese died, were wounded, or still missing. U.S. military units stationed in Japan quickly dispatched teams to aid in the search and recovery operations, including the aircraft carrier USS *Ronald Reagan*, which arrived on 13 March. American military personnel conducted search and rescue operations, evacuation

of survivors, delivered supplies, and transported Japanese Self Defense Force personnel. Soldiers and Marines helped remove rubble from Sendai Airport in order to use it as a logistics hub and then moved on clearing rubble and cleaning schools in time for the next term. Japanese and American military personnel rescued over 25,000 people from the affected area.² The Japanese Defense Minister visited the *Ronald Reagan* to deliver a message of thank you to American military personnel and declared that the mutual cooperation in the relief efforts would enhance the U.S.-Japan alliance. Figure 1 is a picture taken on 6 April 2011 of a Japanese girl waving goodbye to members of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit after they spent six days cleaning up debris on Oshima Island.³



Figure 1. Marines Depart Oshima Island

Source: Lance Cpl. Garry J. Welch, “Operation Tomodachi,” Defense Video Imagery Distribution Center, posted 30 March 2015, photo by 94th Airlift Wing, III Marine Expeditionary Force, Oshima, Miyahi, Japan, 6 April 2011, accessed 16 May 2017, <https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1844368/operation-tomodachi>.

The immediate reaction in Japan to the American military relief efforts was largely positive. Did the relief efforts positively change the Japanese perception of the United States? Is there a noticeable improvement in relations with the United States after the American military conducts these operations? This study aims to see if disaster relief operations conducted by American military personnel are effective in influencing host nation opinion beyond the immediate aftermath of humanitarian operations.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Humanitarian assistance is any action taken designed to relieve human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Joint doctrine uses the term foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) as an umbrella term for humanitarian type operations. The joint publication governing FHA for the U.S. military is Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. FHA activities range from ongoing programs to support the geographic combatant commander's objectives, such as security cooperation, to limited contingency operations in support of U.S. government agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Foreign disaster relief (FDR) is an activity within FHA that is meant to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. This can include the rescue and evacuation of victims, the provision of food, water, and other supplies, as well as the provision of medical capabilities and essential services.⁴ The terms humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and foreign disaster assistance are all terms used interchangeably, by different U.S. government agencies, in the context of providing assistance and relief to those in need from manmade and natural disasters. In this study, the U.S. military definitions of FHA and FDR (given above) will be used.

Disaster relief operations are conducted around the world by multiple agencies and militaries. Title 10 of the U.S. Code states that the armed forces are authorized to carry out humanitarian assistance operations in conjunction with military operations if the activities will promote: (1) the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and (2) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.⁵ Title 10 of the U.S. Code authorizes the president to direct “the Secretary of Defense to provide disaster assistance outside the United States to respond to manmade or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of lives or serious harm to the environment.”⁶

According to the United Nations, in 2015 more than seventy-six million people from thirty-one nations required humanitarian assistance and the number of people affected by humanitarian crises has doubled in the past decade.⁷ The U.S. Navy specifically has been diverted from regular operations to FHA missions more often than for combat. Between 1970 and 2000, the U.S. Navy conducted FHA missions 366 times compared to twenty-two combat missions.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief not only alleviate human suffering but is also a key element of the U.S. military’s ability to provide national defense.⁸ President Barack Obama included humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as a reason for why the U.S. military is globally postured, under the heading of “Strengthen Our National Defense.”⁹ Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.01, Subject: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, lays out the broad operations and activities required to achieve the strategic objectives of the *National Security Strategy* (NSS). Listed under “Common Military Service Functions” is the requirement to

“Organize, train, equip forces to conduct support to civil authorities . . . abroad, to include support for disaster relief, consequence management.”¹⁰ The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) of June 2015 further expounds on this concept by stating that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts are conducted to provide stability and hope to populations at risk of violent extremist organizations.¹¹ The global presence of the U.S. military is a potent deterrence for conflict but it also allows military assets to respond quickly when natural disasters occur.

This study will focus on two of the largest natural disasters since 2000: the 2004 Indonesia earthquake and tsunami, and the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami. The 2004 earthquake and tsunami happened in the Indian Ocean and therefore affected the countries on the periphery, to include Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Maldives, Malaysia, Madagascar, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and South Africa. While the U.S. military assisted to Thailand and Indonesia, this study focuses on Indonesia and will use the term 2004 Indonesia earthquake and tsunami. FHA operations can be conducted for all types of natural disasters but tsunamis are among the deadliest type of natural disaster. This is due to the sudden nature of tsunamis caused by earthquakes and the growing number of people living close to shore. The sudden nature of these natural disasters means warnings are in the worst case nonexistent and in the best case usually only a couple of hours prior to the event, leaving little time for people to move out of danger. As shown in figure 2, the expected total number of deaths and people affected by tsunamis between 2016 and 2030 is projected at 13,295,871, a 16 percent increase from the previous fifteen years.¹² The population density close to shore can lead to a high number of affected persons that can overwhelm the host nation’s capability to manage the disaster

without foreign assistance. The U.S. military worldwide operational and logistics capability has proven a compelling reason to commit U.S. military assets to FHA. Therefore, the need for FHA operations due to tsunamis will likely increase, resulting in increasing frequency and size of U.S. commitments to conduct FHA operations.

World regions at risk from tsunamis & tsunami-like events		No of disasters 2001-2015	No of countries affected	Total deaths & numbers affected		Projected % increase deaths & affected
				2001-2015	2016-2030	
African regions	East Africa	1	4	110,225	159,208	44%
	North Africa	1	1	212,527	272,417	28%
	Total Africa	2	5	322,752	431,625	34%
American regions	North America	1	1	3,529	3,964	12%
	South America	6	2	4,876,086	5,646,830	16%
	Total America	7	3	4,879,615	5,650,794	16%
Asian regions	East Asia	6	2	470,302	453,294	-4%
	South East Asia	9	5	3,987,191	4,728,619	19%
	South Asia	2	4	1,753,126	1,999,290	14%
	Total Asia	17	11	6,210,619	7,181,203	16%
European regions	Eastern Europe	1	1	7,514	7,450	-1%
	Total Europe	1	1	7,514	7,450	-1%
Oceanian regions	Melanesia	4	2	11,375	15,377	35%
	Polynesia	1	3	8,782	9,422	7%
	Total Oceania	5	5	20,157	24,799	23%
Global Total		32	25	11,440,657	13,295,871	16%

Figure 2. All Tsunami-Related Losses: Deaths and People Affected, 2001-2015 and Regional Projections, 2016-2030

Source: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, *Tsunami Disaster Risk 2016: Past Impacts and Projections* (Brussels, Belgium: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 2016), 5, accessed 5 May 2017, <https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/50825>.

Providing humanitarian aid to nations affected by natural disasters is certainly noble and ethical, but does it also contribute to the partnership between the United States and those nations supported by the military? Does the U.S. military contribution to those countries affected by natural disasters lead to increased bilateral cooperation? Do the citizens of those affected countries come to view the United States in a more favorable light?

To answer those questions, this thesis will analyze the FHA operations conducted by the United States following the earthquakes and tsunamis that devastated Indonesia in 2004, and Japan in 2011. Not only were these disasters traumatic to their respective countries, they were also completely unexpected. This allows for analyzing the U.S. response on short notice, utilizing only the pre-existing plans for disaster relief. In addition, Japan is a key and long-standing ally of the United States, while Indonesia is certainly a friend of the United States, but not in an official alliance. This allows an analysis of FHA operations by the United States for countries with somewhat different population viewpoints of the United States. Additionally, operations in Japan benefited from pre-existing military security relationships between the United States and Japan, thereby allowing one to see the difference in conducting this operation with other, more traditional, joint military operations.

Background of Security Cooperation

The purpose of security cooperation is to encourage and enable countries and organizations to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.¹³ JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, states that security cooperation:

involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to an [host nation].¹⁴

Security cooperation is listed in DoDD 5100.01 along with military engagement to prevent conflict.¹⁵ This is a requirement of the secretaries of the military departments to ensure that the individual departments provide forces for security cooperation activities around the world. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the principal DOD organization responsible for security assistance and security cooperation.¹⁶ According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency website, FDR/emergency response and humanitarian assistance are programs involved in developing international security cooperation.¹⁷ Through security cooperation around the world, the United States seeks to develop relationships and partnership capabilities to increase the ability of the military to operate. This, in turn, builds cooperative networks for the United States to ensure global stability and peace. As a part of developing security cooperation abroad, humanitarian assistance conducted by the U.S. military influences global stability and peace.

Research Question

The primary research question of this study is: do FHA operations contribute to bilateral partnerships between the United States and those nations with whom the military provides assistance? In answering the primary research question, this study will analyze U.S. efforts to assist Indonesia following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami as well as to Japan following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. In answering the primary research question, this study will address several secondary questions. First, did the public opinion of the United States in Japan and Indonesia change following the assistance operations

conducted? Second, did the United States reach any new or substantive agreements with Japan or Indonesia when assistance operations concluded? Third, did the U.S. military perform more or fewer joint operations or exercises with Japan or Indonesia after assistance operations concluded?

Measures of Effectiveness

In order to determine the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts conducted by the United States this study will analyze the change in public opinion polls concerning the attitudes towards the United States in Indonesia and Japan before and after the relief efforts. This study will look at public opinion immediately after the disaster and as long after the disaster as possible to determine the longevity of the increase in public opinion. Furthermore, this study will look at the level of cooperation between the United States and other countries involved in the FHA operations.

Significance of the Study

Military forces are routinely called on to conduct FHA operations around the world. The policy documents of the United States attest that the purposes of these operations include being in line with the nation's core values and ethos, a tool of projecting power and winning decisively, and a partnership-building tool with other nations and multinational organizations. This study will examine this last element of why FHA operations are conducted and regardless of the findings, conducting FHA operations will still be important given their link to U.S. values. However, this study will determine if FHA operations should be given more weight as a partnership-building tool or identify why these operations are not effective and what could be done to improve them.

Assumptions

This study assumes that the U.S. military will continue to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations at similar or greater levels of effort. The study also assumes that U.S. support to humanitarian relief operations conducted in Indonesia and Japan were known and publicized throughout those countries.

Scope and Delimitations

This study will be limited to humanitarian operations conducted after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami that affected the Japanese island of Honshu. Furthermore, this study will compare public opinion polls in Indonesia and Japan before and after the United States conducted relief operations.

International relations are extremely complex systems and many events shape how two countries interact and cooperate. While this study attempts to analyze the impact to international partnership and cooperation from just one event, it is impossible to say definitively that one FHA operation will completely change the relationship between countries. Therefore, this study recognizes that FHA operations are just one of many factors in international relationships.

¹ U.S. Geological Survey, “20 Largest Earthquakes in the World,” accessed 14 April 2017, <https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/browse/largest-world.php>.

² Tomonori Yoshizaki, *The Military’s Role in Disaster Relief Operations: A Japanese Perspective* (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2012), 79,

³ LCpl Garry J. Welch, “Operation Tomodachi,” Defense Video Imagery Distribution Center, posted 30 March 2015, photo by 94th Airlift Wing, III Marine Expeditionary Force, Oshima, Miyahi, Japan, 6 April 2011, accessed 16 May 2017, <https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1844368/operation-tomodachi>.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), I-1-I-4.

⁵ U.S. Code, Title 10. § 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, accessed 5 May 2017, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title10/pdf/USCODE-2010-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap20-sec401.pdf>.

⁶ U.S. Code, Title 10. § 404, Foreign Disaster Assistance, accessed May 2017, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title10/pdf/USCODE-2010-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap20-sec404.pdf>.

⁷ United Nations, “Humanitarian Assistance,” accessed 16 May 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/priorities/humanitarian-assistance/>.

⁸ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (NSS) (Washington, DC: The White House, 2015), 7, accessed 5 May 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 27-29, accessed 5 May 2017, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510001p.pdf>.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015: The United States Military’s Contribution to National Security* (NMS) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 8, accessed 5 May 2017, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/National_Military_Strategy_2015.pdf.

¹² United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, *Tsunami Disaster Risk 2016: Past Impacts and Projections* (Brussels, Belgium: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 2016), 5, accessed 5 May 2017, <https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/50825>.

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010, as amended through 15 February 2016), 212.

¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), I-10.

¹⁵ SecDef, DoDD 5100.01, 26.

¹⁶ Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5105.65, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 1, accessed 5 May 2017, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510565p.pdf>.

¹⁷ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Defense Trade and Arms Transfer,” accessed 16 May 2017, <http://www.dscamilitary.com/programs>.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The U.S. military is experienced with conducting disaster relief operations. In fact, the U.S. military has conducted these types of operations earlier in the country's existence when the Army responded to epidemics and insect infestations in civilian populations in the 1870s. Between 1990 and 2000, the U.S. military conducted sixty-one humanitarian missions.¹ The U.S. Navy illustrates positive public opinion for FHA operations on its website with this recruitment line: "You too can be a part of this great mission to serve the needs of others and to provide care in times of human suffering."² The good-feeling, moral aspects of rendering humanitarian assistance are well known.

Recently, international organizations have been collecting information on natural disasters to better inform the global community. Much of this information is directed at preparation for natural disasters from a protection of loss of life to rescue efforts. Military organizations are generally called upon for the rescue and the literature is focused on how to accomplish that mission. However, the trend towards globalization and the sharing of ideas has resulted in the expansion of information relating to the effects of humanitarian operations. For instance, previous research focused on how the military conducts these operations and what impact they had, such as the article "The Role of US Navy Hospital Ship Humanitarian Assistance Missions in Building Partnerships." Research has also been done on how military forces have been used in disaster relief operations, such as a Wilton Park Conference report titled "The Use of Military Assets in the Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters."

This study will focus on the strategic, political, and military effects of U.S. military FHA operations following the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and the 2011 tsunami in Japan. This chapter reviews the current literature pertaining to the following categories: (1) security cooperation; (2) FHA; (3) policy documents; (4) 2004 Indonesia earthquake and tsunami; and (5) 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami.

Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is any DOD activity with foreign defense establishments to build relationships designed to develop capabilities between the United States and partner nations during peace and war. Security cooperation activities include education and training activities, foreign military sales, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure projects. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, categorizes the different aspects of security cooperation. Foreign internal defense and security assistance are broad concepts within security cooperation for how the United States builds relationships and partnerships with other nations.

Starting around 2015, the U.S. Congress increased discussions concerning the money spent on U.S. overseas security commitments. Stemming from the Budget Control Act of 2011, which included sequestration, the U.S. military saw significant reductions in operating budgets starting in March of 2013.³ These reductions caused delays in maintenance and training that impacted deployments and unit readiness. To emphasize the point, in a budget request to U.S. Congress on 3 March 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter stated, “parts of our nation’s defense strategy cannot be executed under sequestration.”⁴ Discussions concerning the value of U.S. overseas security commitments focused on the impact of those commitments and the resulting worth for the United

States. This led the RAND Corporation to attempt to quantify the value of overseas security commitments. As stated on their website, “the RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis.”⁵ In 2016, RAND published a research brief titled *Economics Benefits of U.S. Overseas Security Commitments Could Far Outweigh Costs* based on a study titled *Estimating the Value of Overseas Security Commitments*. In the study, the RAND Corporation looked at the benefit to bilateral trade from overseas security commitments against the savings from the reduction in overseas security commitments. Given a certain set of assumptions, the study found that “U.S. overseas security commitments have a positive, statistically significant effect on U.S. bilateral trade.”⁶ The study further broke down the economic losses from a 50 percent reduction of U.S. overseas security commitments, also known as retrenchment, and is shown in figure 3.




Figure 3. Comparison of Economic Impact Between Engagement and Retrenchment

Source: RAND Corporation, “Economic Benefits of U.S. Overseas Security Commitments Could Far Outweigh Costs” (Research Policy Brief, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2016), 3, accessed 5 May 2017, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RB9900/RB9912/RAND_RB9912.pdf.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, describes U.S. policy and authorities for FHA, to include FDR. It also provides an overview and planning guidance for U.S. military forces in conducting FHA. JP 3-29 is useful for providing broad information concerning how and why the U.S. military conducts FHA, including disaster relief. FHA is conducted by the U.S. military in support of other federal agencies and is complementary to the host nation’s capabilities. Figure 4 illustrates the types of foreign disasters and the humanitarian assistance conducted by the United States.




Figure 4. FDR

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), I-5.

JP 3-29 also lays out the legal authorization for U.S. military forces to conduct FHA. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 described the statutory authority for the U.S. government departments and agencies to conduct FHA. It is codified in U.S. Code under Title 22. The USAID or the Department of State (DOS) is usually the lead federal agency for FHA operations. DOS is also the lead federal agency for the foreign policy of the United States. U.S. military FHA operations support U.S. foreign policy objectives

provided by the president and DOS. The types of FHA assistance provided by U.S. military personnel range from steady-state, long-term efforts, to short-term, crisis action disaster relief operations. All operations conducted by the U.S. military conform to the four principles of humanitarian assistance meant to establish and maintain access to civilian populations: (1) humanity, protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings; (2) neutrality, members must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies; (3) impartiality, humanitarian action is carried out on the basis of need alone; (4) independence, autonomous from the political, economic, military, or other objectives. These principles are endorsed by the United Nations.⁷

In 2012, the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) commissioned a study to examine the U.S. Navy's humanitarian assistance chaired by former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral (ADM) Gary Roughead, USN (RET). The central question to the study was whether planned humanitarian assistance can and should continue in increasingly constrained defense budgets.⁸ The 2013 CSIS report titled *U.S. Navy Humanitarian Assistance in an Era of Austerity* concluded that proactive humanitarian engagement delivers strategic benefits by contributing to foreign policy goals and enhancing readiness for the U.S. Navy ships and personnel. The contributions rest on three pillars. The first pillar, U.S. strategic engagement, is based on how humanitarian missions expand U.S. access and influence, improve foreign opinion of the United States, and strengthen relationships with other countries and partner organizations. The 2013 CSIS report specifically mentions that the size and visibility of U.S. Navy vessels sends a strong message to the host nation with Vietnam cited as an example, illustrating that humanitarian relief can turn past enemies into future partners.⁹ The second pillar,

readiness and professional enrichment, asserts that humanitarian missions improve the U.S. Navy's readiness. This is done in three ways. One, humanitarian engagement enhances the skills of military personnel by placing them in real-world environments where they can use their training and experience to problem solve and operate thereby increasing their skills for future operations. Two, humanitarian engagements provide a "boon to morale" for personnel by fulfilling personal motivations to "see the world" and the Navy's mantra of "Global Force for Good." Three, humanitarian engagements provide opportunities to establish working relationships with host countries and build stronger partnerships with humanitarian non-governmental organizations by placing personnel in situations of working together for a common good.¹⁰ These relationships and partnerships are often expandable for future cooperation. Overall, the 2013 CSIS report states that U.S. Navy humanitarian missions are valuable and should be sustained, but to be more effective with scarce resources, greater integration is needed between the Navy, embassy country teams in countries affected by disaster, and humanitarian non-governmental organizations.¹¹

Policy Documents

The 2015 NSS states that the U.S. military will be postured globally to deter and defeat potential adversaries, but will also be positioned to mitigate the effects of natural disasters through humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the 2015 NSS acknowledges that humanitarian relief is a partnership-building tool that needs to be developed with the United Nations and other multi-national organizations.¹²

Published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 2015 NMS, outlines the DOD's blueprint on how the military forces of the United States will be employed to

“protect and advance our national interests.”¹³ FHA, including disaster relief, is a way to counter violent extremist organizations, a priority for the United States. This is made obvious from the first page of the 2015 NMS, which states that it “addresses the need to counter revisionist states that are challenging international norms as well as violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that are undermining transregional security.”¹⁴

Therefore, the 2015 NMS is focused on armed conflict as the destabilizer of human society. The 2015 NMS describes that the purpose of disaster relief is to alleviate human suffering and restore hope to counter violent extremist organizations by addressing the root causes of conflict.¹⁵ Furthermore, the 2015 NMS lists “Conduct Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response” as a mission for the U.S. military and states that “taking action to relieve suffering reflects our professional ethos and the values in which we believe.”¹⁶

The 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (2014 QDR) lists the three pillars of the DOD strategy as: (1) protect the homeland; (2) build security globally; and (3) project power and win decisively. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are listed as an integral part of how the U.S. military and government projects power and wins decisively.¹⁷

DoDD 5100.01, Subject: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, describes the core mission areas of each military branch as well as requirements common to all branches and the DOD. The functions common to all military branches that pertain to this study are: (1) organize, train, and equip forces to the joint force commander to conduct “building partnership capacity/security force assistance operations;” and (2) organize, train, and equip forces to “conduct support to civil

authorities in the United States and abroad, to include support for disaster relief and consequence management.” Furthermore, the Army is assigned as the principal land force and “promotes national values and interests by conducting military engagement and security cooperation.” The Navy’s function has listed “strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships.” Security cooperation and military engagement are also listed under the functions of the Air Force and the Coast Guard; only the Marine Corps does not have security cooperation or military engagement specifically listed.¹⁸

The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) commander, ADM Harry B. Harris Jr., presented the most recent USPACOM Posture Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 27 April 2017. In the posture statement, ADM Harris acknowledges the probability that natural disasters will occur in the Pacific Ocean region, by highlighting that the 75 percent of Earth’s volcanoes are in the Pacific region and that 90 percent of earthquakes occur in the Pacific. ADM Harris describes building humanitarian assistance/disaster relief capability as a key element of the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan and that cooperation in FDR is “an effective means to deepen and strengthen relationships.”¹⁹ Furthermore, ADM Harris states that “strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships are top USPACOM priorities,” and points out that the United States, Japan, and India launched a trilateral FDR working group in 2015 as an initial cooperation mechanism that is building into a broader maritime cooperation arrangement.²⁰

The 2017 Posture Statement continues to recognize the importance given disaster relief cooperation operations in partnership building articulated in the 2016 Posture Statement. In the 2016 Posture Statement, ADM Harris further reinforced the positive

impact of humanitarian assistance activities by pointing out that the U.S. Army's Pacific Pathways program puts small units in multiple countries for training, but also allows them to respond rapidly to humanitarian emergencies. In addition, ADM Harris highlights the U.S. Navy's Pacific Partnership program is an annual disaster response preparedness mission that also improves cooperation and understanding between partners. In ADM Harris' conclusion, he requests the continued support from the Senate Armed Services Committee on "efforts to reinforce and enhance alliances and partnerships."²¹ The importance of disaster relief as a strategic approach to security is also evident in ADM Harris' one-page document outlining his guidance for USPACOM as it is listed within the four core elements of USPACOM's strategic approach.²²

The DOS publishes an annual report on the treaties and international agreements to which the United States has become a party to and are in force as of 1 January. This report lists bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties still in effect, therefore providing information on the agreements between the United States and Japan and the United States and Indonesia. The 2017 report has not yet been posted on the DOS website, so the 2016 report is the most recent.²³

2004 Indonesia Earthquake and Tsunami

The 2004 earthquake and tsunami struck the Aceh area of Indonesia on 26 December 2004. Large parts of the northern portion of the island of Sumatra were destroyed or heavily damaged. The vast devastation prompted an equally vast international relief operation. Due to the large international effort, several studies and articles have been completed since 2004. One such article from Australia titled "Indonesia and Tsunami: Responses and Foreign Policy Implications" published in 2006

by Rizal Sukma in the *Australian Journal of International Affairs* proposes that the level of international assistance changed the perceptions of the Indonesia people towards the countries that provided aid.²⁴ From an outside perspective, the U.S. assistance in Indonesia reopened engagement between the United States and Indonesia and concluded that the “post-tsunami environment provides a new opportunity for mutual re-engagement for Indonesia and the U.S., and opens a new chapter in their relations.”²⁵

The Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (Pacific Forum CSIS), based in Honolulu, is the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the CSIS based in Washington, DC. In August of 2005, Pacific Forum CSIS published a report titled *Indonesian Public Perceptions of the U.S. and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* that “aims to analyze influences on public opinion among Muslims so that U.S. foreign policymakers can identify actions to win the hearts and minds of Muslims in Indonesia as a way to weaken support for terrorism.” The report also states, “Indonesian approval of the U.S. has doubled since the tsunami relief operation, it still lags pre-2001 levels.”²⁶ In the policy recommendations, the author listed three key recommendations: (1) increase dialogue; (2) increase aid; and (3) increase capacity.²⁷ In conclusion, the author stated that the U.S. humanitarian efforts after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami created a favorable image of the United States among Muslims in Indonesia by showing that “the U.S. cares.”²⁸

Terror Free Tomorrow is a non-partisan, not-for-profit, organization that researches extremist attitudes around the world. Terror Free Tomorrow conducts polls in countries to determine how actions by the United States have affected the opinions of those people. Specifically, Terror Free Tomorrow conducted surveys in Indonesia before

and after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami that addressed that nation's opinion of the United States. On 26 October 2006, they released a report on the overall effectiveness of the U.S. aid to Indonesia to include the visit in 2006 by the USNS *Mercy*. To conduct the study, Terror Free Tomorrow partnered with Lembaga Survei Indonesia, a non-partisan public opinion research firm in Indonesia, to conduct the polling in Indonesia in February 2005, January 2006, and August 2006.²⁹ This information was combined with other public opinion polls conducted before 2004 and gives a view of the public opinion of the United States in Indonesia before and after the U.S. assistance following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami.

The Pew Research Center also conducts polls to determine public opinion towards the United States around the world. Between 2002 and 2016, the Pew Research Center has conducted over 450,000 interviews in sixty-four countries with questions ranging from people's assessment of their own lives to their views about the current state of the world.³⁰ Specifically for Indonesia, the Pew Research Center conducted interviews from 2002 through 2015, except for 2004 and 2011.³¹ 2002 and 2003 were not considered national samples and were predominantly urban interviewees. In 2003, the Pew Research Center published a report on the surveys done in 2002 and 2003 showing that the "favorable ratings for the U.S. [had] fallen from 61 percent to 15 percent in Indonesia."³² In June 2006, another study was published based on surveys done earlier in 2006 that showed public opinion of the United States in Indonesia had increased to 38 percent in 2005, but declined to 30 percent in 2006.³³ Additionally, the Pew Research Center asked Indonesians their opinions of Americans from 2002 through 2013, except 2004 and 2012. Again, the surveys from 2002 and 2003 were considered not national samples as they

primarily interviewed urban areas. In 2003, 56 percent of Indonesians rated Americans favorably and in 2005, that number dropped to 46 percent.³⁴ The favorable rating of the United States in Indonesia from 2002 to 2015 is displayed in figure 5. A study in June 2005, based on a survey in 2005, from the Pew Research Center also showed that 79 percent of Indonesians had a more favorable view of United States because of the tsunami relief efforts in 2004 and 2005.³⁵




Figure 5. Indonesian Favorable Rating of the United States and Americans

Source: Created by author using data from Pew Research Center, *Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post-9/11 Torture* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015).

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a branch of the Library of Congress providing research and analysis on a wide variety of issues facing the U.S. Senate and

House of Representatives. While these reports are not automatically released to the public, the Federation of American Scientists endeavors to provide public access to many non-confidential CRS reports.³⁶ The CRS reports concerning Indonesia provide information on the amount of financial support given by the United States. The most recent CRS report on Indonesia is from 2011 and outlines the current relationship between the United States and Indonesia. The 2011 report emphasizes the improvements in the relationship between the United States and Indonesia, especially in the military-to-military relationship highlighted by the restoration of International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs for Indonesia in 2005 by the administration of President George Bush.³⁷ Another CRS report from 2005 immediately following the tsunami summarizes the extent of the disaster and relief efforts and describes the U.S. assistance efforts. It also acknowledges that the U.S. response to the tsunami was “unlikely to reverse the decline in the U.S. image abroad since the September 11 attacks, because this decline primarily is due to American policies in the Middle East. However, the scale and scope of U.S. assistance could provide a positive example of U.S. leadership and military capabilities.”³⁸ This report also states that then Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, was able to certify that Indonesia was cooperating in the death of an American teacher in 2002, allowing the U.S. Congress to lift a restriction on Indonesian participation in the IMET program.³⁹

The U.S. Navy also conducted a study on its response to the Indonesia earthquake and tsunami with the Naval War College issuing a paper in 2007 titled *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*. This report provides a

detailed description of the effects of the earthquake and resulting tsunami. For example, the earthquake measured 9.15 on the Richter scale and led to fifteen smaller earthquakes that altogether lasted ten minutes. The energy released was equivalent to 23,000 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs.⁴⁰ Additionally, the study provides a detailed look into the U.S. military's response when USPACOM commander, Admiral Thomas Fargo, set up an operational planning team on 26 December 2004. By 5 January 2005, there were twenty-five ships, forty-five fixed wing aircraft, and fifty-eight helicopters providing relief efforts to Indonesia and by that point had delivered 610,000 pounds of food, water, and other supplies.⁴¹ The study goes on to point out that most of the U.S. Navy assets involved in the operation were already in the southeast Asia area. Additionally, the Naval War College study goes on to discuss the lessons learned and recommendations from this operation. In the lessons learned section, the study discusses the use of an aircraft carrier, USS *Ronald Reagan*, at six million dollars a day, for disaster relief operations and quoted ADM Fargo, "you have already paid for the fixed costs, like fuel for the nuclear reactor" to point out that Navy ships are operating whether conducting disaster relief or not.⁴² Additionally, an aircraft carrier provided a symbol of American resource commitment to the area as well as a hub for logistics, decision-making, and communications that would have been impossible for many other ships, and allowed American military units to base at sea rather than ashore and thereby reduce cultural sensitivity to American military presence.⁴³ Finally, the Naval War College study provides an overview of the political benefits of Unified Assistance. The study used a variety of sources to show that the FHA operation "dramatically improved" relations between the United States and Indonesia.⁴⁴

2011 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

Given the existing military relationship between Japan and the United States, there are articles focused on how that relationship affected the humanitarian assistance operation. For instance, an article out of The National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan titled *The Military's Role in Disaster Relief Operations: A Japanese Perspective* examines how the military conducted Operation Tomodachi and the use of existing military organizations.⁴⁵ The Japanese perspective primarily focuses on the use of the Japanese Self-Defense Force operations but includes a section on the impact the FHA operation has on the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The author states that the “HA/DR operations by the U.S. forces became a symbol of the *kizuna* (bonds of friendship) that the bilateral alliance represented.”⁴⁶ The U.S. and Japan military commanders likened the disaster to a war and carried out bilateral cooperation from decision making to execution for the first time in the Japan-U.S. security agreement. U.S. military units transported 280 tons of food, approximately two million gallons of water, 12,000 gallons of fuel, and 3,100 tons of cargo. In addition, equipment and personnel from the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force were transported by the amphibious assault ship USS *Essex*. Approximately 300 U.S. Marines cleared and restored the runway at Sendai Airport in five days so that relief supplies could be delivered. The study concludes by stating that Operation Tomodachi highlighted the benefits of the U.S.-Japan alliance and strengthened the bonds of friendship.

The CRS provided reports to U.S. Congress on the Japan earthquake and tsunami. One report, from 2 June 2011, details the U.S. DOD contributions to the relief efforts in Japan. Units were deployed to the disaster area within twenty-four hours and eventually

totaled 24,000 personnel, 189 aircraft, and twenty-four U.S. Navy ships and, at the time of the report, DOD committed \$88.5 million to the assistance effort.⁴⁷ For a comparison of military operations, in April 2017, the U.S. Navy used two ships to launch fifty-nine Tomahawks at a Syrian airbase in response to the use of chemical weapons.⁴⁸ The 2017 U.S. Navy budget request lists the per unit cost of Tomahawks at \$1.498 million.⁴⁹ Therefore, the cost to strike the Syrian airbase was \$88.38 million, roughly equal to the DOD commitment for relief efforts in Japan.

Like the relief efforts in Indonesia, the CRS report highlights the contribution of a U.S. aircraft carrier as a hub for logistics, communications, and coordination between Japan and U.S. military units. However, unlike Indonesia, there already existed a robust military-military cooperation and communication capability within Japan that took on the ability to coordinate large-scale operations.⁵⁰ Figure 6 is a map of the U.S. military bases in Japan.



Figure 6. Map of U.S. Military Bases in Japan

Source: Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, *The Japan-U.S. Alliance* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2016), 16, accessed 5 May 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf>.

ADM Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations in 2011, published a message of thanks to the Navy team, declaring: “The compassion demonstrated by our Sailors serving on our ships, flight crews, and forces on the ground to locate, rescue, and bring supplies and relief to the Japanese people, was extraordinary. The timely, devoted, and professional aid provided to our longtime ally epitomize that special relationship.” Along with that message, the United States Pacific Fleet Public Affairs released the photograph in figure 7. The picture shows the crew of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter destroyer JDS *Hyuga* on 4 April 2011 as the ship did a pass and review with the USS *Ronald Reagan*.⁵¹



Figure 7. Sailors Aboard JDS *Hyuga* Wave as a Sign of Friendship

Source: U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, “CNO Praises Operation Tomodachi Effort,” U.S. Navy, 27 April 2011, accessed 10 January 2017, <http://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/000457>.

In April 2012, President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda made a joint statement at the White House praising the alliance between the two nations and announced a joint vision for the alliance. The four points of the joint vision were: (1) the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance as a cornerstone of regional peace and security; (2) a commitment to deepening trade and investment; (3) the desire that adherence to international rules and norms were the standard in the Asia Pacific region; and (4) the reaffirmation of Japan and the United States as global partners bound by shared values. Additionally, President Obama reaffirmed America's support of Japan as they rebuilt from the earthquake and tsunami and spoke of the unbreakable bond of solidarity between the United States and Japan. Prime Minister Noda followed President Obama by thanking the American people for the support provided following the earthquake and tsunami. He also recounted meeting with members of a local search and rescue team and stated that the "unshakeable" bilateral alliance is the "lynchpin of Japan's diplomacy."⁵²

A website titled Watching America tracks foreign newspapers to gauge the opinion held by foreign populations of the United States. In 2014, Watching America posted an article from Sankei News in Japan describing the U.S.-Japan relationship titled "Restoring Japan and the US with 'Operation Tomodachi'" The article describes strong positive opinions in Japan for Operation Tomodachi three years later but that recent events had caused confusion and even suspicion of the U.S. in Japan. The trouble arose from negotiations taking place between the United States and China coupled with confusion from President Obama's rebalance to the Pacific. Overall, the author of the article articulated a strong relationship between the United States and Japan, even

highlighting joint military operations conducted in the Philippines following a typhoon. Operation Tomodachi increased the strength of the relationship but three years later, new political events were influencing this author's opinion of the relationship.⁵³

Another CRS report from February 2016 summarizes the U.S.-Japan alliance. This report provides additional information on the effects of the 2011 humanitarian assistance, named Operation Tomodachi. It also details the development of the U.S.-Japan agreements since 2011.⁵⁴ The 2016 CRS report describes the U.S. partnership with Japan as struggling “to sustain itself politically in the late 2000s” due to a softer position towards North Korea by President George W. Bush and the breakdown in implementation of a 1996 agreement to relocate a Marine Corps air base on Okinawa.⁵⁵ In September 2009, Japan hinted at a shift away from the U.S. partnerships in favor of a greater focus on Asia. In 2012, President Barack Obama's rebalance to the Pacific coincided with newly elected leadership in Japan interested in improving the security of Japan and the alliance with the United States. In 2015, Japan and the United States updated the bilateral Mutual Defense Guidelines, the first time since 1997; the culmination of a process began in 2013. The 2015 update to the Mutual Defense Guidelines expanded the security cooperation of the alliance and included Japanese contributions to U.S. military operations outside of East Asia, a first for the alliance. The 2015 update also improved alliance coordination by establishing the Alliance Coordination Mechanization for cooperation during any contingency, involving participants from agencies in the U.S. and Japanese governments. Previously, the Alliance Coordination Mechanization would only be activated for wartime.⁵⁶ The 2016 CRS report further outlined the integration between the U.S. military and the Japanese

Self Defense Force. In 2006, a Bilateral Joint Operations Command Center was established at Yokota Air Base for increased coordination and data sharing between U.S. and Japanese air and missile defense units. Furthermore, the efforts of U.S. military units during Operation Tomodachi resulted in an increased appreciation for the alliance amongst the Japanese public and helped restore alliance relations that had become strained by the efforts to relocate the Futenma Air Base on Okinawa. Overall, Operation Tomodachi was very well received by the Japanese public and led to exceptionally high approval ratings of the Japanese Self-Defense Force and the U.S. relief efforts.⁵⁷

Just as with Indonesia, the Pew Research Center conducts public opinion polls in Japan that ask the opinion of the United States and of Americans. The earliest surveys are from 2002 and go to 2015. There are no results from 2003 through 2005 and the surveys from 2014 and 2015 did not include the favorable ratings of Americans. Figure 8 shows the favorable rating that the Japanese have had of the United States and Americans.




Figure 8. Japanese Favorable Ratings of the United States and Americans

Source: Created by author using data from Pew Research Center, *Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post-9/11 Torture* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015), 13.

The survey from 2011 took place from the end of March through May, during the same time as Operation Tomodachi. In a report released that year based on the 2011 poll data, the Pew Research Center found that while many in Japan had a mediocre opinion of the Japanese government’s handling of the earthquake and tsunami, there was considerable praise for the U.S. effort with most respondents saying the United States had done a “great deal to help with relief efforts in Japan.”⁵⁸ In 2015, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey in Japan and the United States and released a report examining the attitudes of Americans and Japanese towards each other and their allies seventy years after the end of World War II. The report revealed that 75 percent of Japanese trust

Americans and that 20 percent of respondents felt the response to the 2011 earthquake and tsunami was the most important event shaping the relationship between Japan and the United States. The 2011 earthquake and tsunami were ranked second for most important event for Japanese respondents. The first was the U.S.-Japan military alliance since World War II, which 36 percent of Japanese said was the most important event. Sixty-eight percent of Americans trust Japanese and a tie for the most important event in the shaping the relationship went to World War II and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami at 31 percent each.⁵⁹

On 16 November 2014, the leaders of the United States, Japan, and Australia met for a U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral summit meeting in Brisbane. It was the first time in seven years that the leaders of the three countries had met. The parties released a joint statement after the summit expressing the purpose of the trilateral summit as a commitment to ensuring a peaceful, stable, and prosperous future for the Asia-Pacific region. Since then, the trilateral security relationship has become one of the most robust cooperative relationships that the United States has with its allies.⁶⁰ Another result of this trilateral agreement is the development of the bilateral cooperation between Japan and Australia, almost to the point of the level of cooperation enjoyed by the United States with each country. Prior to the trilateral meeting in 2014, during the relief efforts after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, Australia provided assistance in the form of C-17 transport capability to aid the movement of Japanese personnel as well as relief supplies.⁶¹ The operations revealed deficiencies in policy and cooperation between all three countries. Multilateral exercises, such as the biennial Rim of the Pacific exercise, provide opportunities to improve upon the cooperative capabilities of the nations involved.

Cooperation in FHA training has become increasingly multilateral; in July 2014, twenty-two countries, including the United States, Japan, and Australia, participated in FHA exercises as part of Rim of the Pacific. The U.S.-led annual multilateral disaster relief preparedness exercise, Pacific Partnership, used a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ship as the mission's primary platform for the first time in 2014. These "community-building" efforts offer the United States, Japan, and Australia to develop cooperation capabilities while also providing effective forums for engaging other regional actors.⁶²

In summary, the literature shows that public opinion of the United States in foreign countries increases following FHA operations. The duration of that increase was different for Indonesia and Japan. The public opinion of the United States in Indonesia continues to be higher than it was before the 2004-2005 FHA operation. Meanwhile the public opinion of the United States in Japan in 2014 had returned to the level that existed prior to the 2011 FHA operation. The reason for the difference in duration of positive impact is not addressed in the surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center or by Terror Free Tomorrow. The FHA operation conducted in Indonesia provided the opportunity for the United States and Indonesia to reengage diplomatically, building agreements and cooperation that continue today. FHA operations put U.S. military personnel interacting with host nation civilian populations, therefore directly impacting the population's perception of the United States. Meanwhile, the cooperation with the host nation necessary for the FHA operations develops relationships between the U.S. military and government agencies with the host nation. The degree and duration of these relationships are difficult to quantify, but FHA operations certainly contribute to developing the relationships necessary in an interconnected world. Conversely, when the

United States already enjoys a strong bilateral relationship with the host nation, such as Japan, the FHA operations exercise and build on the existing relationships. The FHA operations can allow for bilateral cooperation that had not existed previously.

While the literature shows that the FHA operations in Indonesia and Japan improved the public opinion of the United States, there is also evidence that the FHA operations improved the bilateral cooperation. The prior existing relationship with the host nation influenced the magnitude and duration of impact to the public opinion. The improvement in Indonesia differed from the improvement in Japan. The improvement in Japan was in the form of increased integration between U.S. and Japanese military units while the improvement in Indonesia was in the form of increased military interaction. The difference in improvement is a reflection of the difference in the nature of the relationship between the United States and Japan and the United States and Indonesia.

Studies on the impact to the U.S.-Japan relationship due to the 2011 operation were less prevalent than the studies on the 2004 operation in Indonesia. This is likely due to the already strong relationship that existed between the United States and Japan, whereas the relationship between the United States and Indonesia had more room for improvement. In addition, due to the length of time since the operation in Indonesia, more literature exists on the impacts from that operation. This study will still attempt to draw conclusions from the U.S. operations in Japan, but acknowledge that given more time, more information could be available for study.

¹ Frank N. Schubert, *Other Than War: The American Military Experience and Operations in the Post-Cold War Decade* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), 31, accessed 5 May 2017, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Other_Than_War.pdf.

² U.S. Navy, “Humanitarian Work and Disaster Relief,” accessed 8 November 2016, <https://www.navy.com/about/mission/humanitarian.html#who>.

³ U.S. Congress, Budget Control Act of 2011, Public Law 112-25, 112th Cong., 2 August 2011, accessed 5 May 2017, <https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ25/PLAW-112publ25.pdf>, 6.

⁴ Ash Carter, “Secretary of Defense Testimony: Submitted Statement – Senate Armed Services Committee (Budget Request),” Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 3 March 2015, accessed January 23, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606647/submitted-statement-senate-armed-services-committee-budget-request>.

⁵ RAND Corporation, “Mission and History,” accessed 16 May 2017, <http://www.rand.org/about/history.html>.

⁶ RAND Corporation, “Economic Benefits of U.S. Overseas Security Commitments Could Far Outweigh Costs” (Research Policy Brief, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2016), 1.

⁷ JCS, JP 3-29, I-3.

⁸ ADM Gary Roughead, USN Ret., J. Stephen Morrison, RADM Thomas Collison, USN Ret., and Seth Gannon, *U.S. Navy Humanitarian Assistance in an Era of Austerity* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), v, accessed 5 May 2017, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130226_Roughead_NavyHumanitarianAssist_Web.pdf.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹² U.S. President, NSS, 23.

¹³ JCS, NMS, i.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁶ JCS, NMS, 13

¹⁷ Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 12, accessed 18 May 2017, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study will use a meta-analysis of studies conducted before and after the Indonesia earthquake and the Japan earthquake. The focus of the meta-analysis is on studies concerning the impact of the U.S. military operations conducted in those countries. This will aggregate the various perspectives on those operations to determine an underlying result.

The 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan were unexpected events necessitating short notice disaster relief operations by the United States. The difference in the two operations was in the nature of the U.S. military's relationship with the host country. Prior to 2004, the U.S. military had very little interaction with Indonesia and the Indonesian military. IMET, FMF, and FMS had been suspended with Indonesia prior to 2004 and the opinion of the United States in Indonesia was very low; 15 percent in 2003. Conversely, the U.S. military had a long, well-established relationship with Japan and the Japanese military prior to 2011. This included almost 40,000 U.S. military personnel based in Japan. The similarities in the disasters but differences in relationships allows this study to compare how the relationship between the United States and a nation affected by a natural disaster changes based on the U.S. military response and the prior existing relationship between countries.

This study will also examine public opinion polls conducted in Indonesia, Japan, and the United States before and after the events. The purpose is to discover changes in attitude towards the United States after conducting the humanitarian relief operations.

This study recognizes that there are many variables involved in the public opinion of

countries and that humanitarian relief operations are not the only factors involved; however, the scope of the disasters ensured that the effects and scale of operations garnered international visibility as well as the attention of most of the citizens of Indonesia and Japan. Therefore, this study assumes that while there are many factors involved in public opinion, the disasters and ensuing operations would have had the most substantial impact in the immediate future.

Additionally, this study will examine relevant studies of economic benefits from U.S. overseas security commitments. The purpose will be to determine a correlation between the presence of U.S. armed forces overseas and economic changes between host countries and the United States.

To determine the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance operations, this study will compare the U.S. relationship to Indonesia before and after 2004 and the U.S. relationship to Japan before and after 2011. Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country and not a treaty ally of the United States. Indonesia has no permanent U.S. military presence. Japan is a predominantly secular country (the largest practiced religion is Shinto but the percentage of followers ranges from 30 percent to 90 percent) and is a treaty ally of the United States since 1951.¹ Today, Japan is home to approximately 104,000 U.S. military and their dependents as well as eighteen ships and approximately 200 aircraft from all branches.² Due to the nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship, there exist long-standing bilateral exercises that established a working relationship between the militaries. Conversely, there was no existing military relationship between Indonesia and the United States prior to 2004. By using these two events, this study will attempt to discern the effects of humanitarian assistance with a country that had little prior

coordination with the United States and one that did have a well-established military relationship.

To determine the effects of humanitarian assistance efforts, this study will look at public opinion of the United States in Indonesia and Japan before 2004 and 2011 respectively, and compare that to the opinion of the United States in Indonesia and Japan after those events. Furthermore, this study will look at military cooperation between the United States and Indonesia before and after 2004, and military cooperation between the United States and Japan before and after 2011. Additionally, this study will determine if any new bilateral agreements came into existence after the humanitarian assistance operations.

In conclusion, this study will consider humanitarian assistance operations to be effective at building partnership capacity if the opinion of the United States increases after the operation; there are new agreements between the countries, or an increase in military cooperation between the countries. If the presence of U.S. armed forces assets have a positive economic impact, then the assumption will be that U.S. armed forces used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief will also have a positive economic impact. Figure 9 graphically depicts the methodology.




Figure 9. Research Methodology

Source: Created by author.

¹ U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements,” accessed 16 May 2017, <https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/>.

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Is there a Positive Economic Impact to a U.S. Military Presence Overseas?

Military presence overseas is a key component of U.S. government foreign policy and FHA operations are part of that overseas presence by providing cooperation and interaction with partner nations. Military presence overseas positively impacts the economic system and contributes to the U.S. economy by providing security and stability for international commerce. As a part of military presence overseas, particularly in disaster relief, FHA operations also contribute to the U.S. economy. The importance of military presence is articulated in numerous policy documents and the benefits to the U.S. economy is detailed in a RAND Corporation study.

The policy on U.S. military presence overseas is outlined in several policy documents such as the 2015 NSS, the 2015 NMS, the 2014 QDR, DoDD 5100.01, DoDD 5100.46, and various joint publications. Furthermore, the benefits of overseas military presence are reaffirmed by operational commanders, such as USPACOM commander, ADM Harry Harris in 2016. This military presence includes humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, building partnership capacity, and security force assistance as these activities promote the interests of the United States as directed by a geographic combatant commander as parts of a security cooperation program. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* and JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* provide U.S. military units with further details on the importance of military presence overseas.

The 2016 RAND Corporation study on the economic benefits of U.S. military presence overseas reinforces the positive aspect of an overseas presence by putting a dollar amount on the benefit of this presence and justifies the forward presence of the U.S. military since World War II. The study, titled *Economics Benefits of U.S. Overseas Security Commitments Could Far Outweigh Costs*, showed that the U.S. overseas security commitments have a positive effect on U.S. bilateral trade. The study determined the economic effects that would occur due to a decrease in U.S. overseas security commitments, known as retrenchment. It also determined the effects that would occur due to an increase in overseas security commitments. One key finding in the study is that “the economic losses from retrenchment are conservatively estimated to be more than three times any potential gains.” In detail, the study found that a 50 percent retrenchment would reduce U.S. trade in goods and services by approximately \$577 billion per year. Conversely, doubling U.S. troop commitments overseas would expand U.S. trade by 15 percent.¹

2004 Indonesia Tsunami

On 26 December 2004, an earthquake occurred in the Indian Ocean off the west coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This earthquake measured 9.1-magnitude, the third largest earthquake ever recorded as of 2016 and triggered a tsunami with heights between fifty and one hundred feet tall.² The resulting disaster caused the death of over 200,000 people and over one million more left homeless. The Aceh region of Indonesia was also home to an ongoing conflict between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian Defense Forces, further complicating civilian and foreign military humanitarian assistance. Given this humanitarian need, the USAPACOM stood up Joint

Task Force 536 to plan and execute Operation Unified Assistance. Eventually, Joint Task Force 536 became Combined Support Force 536 to reflect the international contributions from Sri Lanka, Thailand, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Russia, France, and Malaysia.³ The U.S. military assets involved included the USS *Abraham Lincoln* carrier strike group and the USS *Bonhomme Richard* amphibious readiness group. The USS *Abraham Lincoln* carrier strike group was visiting Hong Kong and was directed to proceed to the disaster area instead of heading to the coast of South Korea for a planned exercise. The USS *Bonhomme Richard* amphibious readiness group ceased exercises in the vicinity of Guam to proceed to the vicinity of northern Indonesia. The DOD activated USNS *Mercy*, which left San Diego, California on 8 January 2005. During her time in Indonesia, the medical staff on board USNS *Mercy* treated more than 9,500 patients in Indonesia, East Timor, and Papua New Guinea. USNS *Mercy* returned to San Diego on 8 June 2005 having completed its first deployment since Operation Desert Storm thirteen years prior.⁴ The success of USNS *Mercy* during Operation Unified Assistance led the United States Pacific Fleet to establish Pacific Partnership, an annual humanitarian mission to remote areas in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The annual mission has grown to become the largest multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and in 2016 included members from nine countries.⁵ The nine countries were the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Singapore, Republic of Korea, and Japan. This demonstrates the enduring partnerships built out of the FDR response to the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia.

Did the Opinion of the United States
in Indonesia Improve after 2004?

The opinion of the United States in Indonesia improved after 2004. That improvement continues to at least 2017, but other events impacted the U.S.-Indonesia relationship, such as the U.S. led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to polling by the Pew Research Center and Terror Free Tomorrow, the opinion of the United States has not fallen to the 2003 level. Furthermore, a report from Pacific Forum CSIS also stated that the assistance effort by the United States in 2004 improved relations between the United States and Indonesia.

The Pacific Forum CSIS report from 2005 incorporates humanitarian aid to Indonesia as well as developing or increasing the capacity of Indonesia as steps towards building positive relations between the United States and Indonesia. The report also acknowledges that the assistance provided by the United States following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami increased positive attitudes towards the United States by the people of Indonesia. The recommendations in the report acknowledge that the actions taken by the United States, notably the humanitarian aid and assistance in building capacity in health and medical services, by stating those as two of the three recommendations for enhancing positive attitudes in Indonesia.

The Terror Free Tomorrow study from October 2006 provides a look at the public opinion of the United States in Indonesia before and after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami. The study showed that in August 2006 favorable opinion of the United States among Indonesians was at 30 percent, down from a high of 44 percent in January 2006 but still double the number of 15 percent in May 2003.⁶ The survey also showed that the impact in public opinion from American assistance to Indonesia following the 2004

earthquake and tsunami declined from a high of 63 percent in 2005 to a low of 54 percent in January 2006 and back up to 57 percent in August 2006.⁷ In addition to studying the effects on public opinion towards the United States, the 2006 Terror Free Tomorrow study also took Indonesians' opinions on the U.S. led efforts to fight terrorism, opinions on Osama Bin Laden, and opinions on suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets. In 2003, 72 percent of Indonesians opposed the U.S. led efforts to fight terrorism and in 2005, only 36 percent were opposed. By August 2006, that number had risen to 45 percent but remained significantly below the 2003 level. In 2003, 58 percent of Indonesians had confidence in Osama Bin Laden to do the right thing regarding world affairs and in 2005, 23 percent had confidence in Osama Bin Laden. In August 2006, that number had further decreased to 12 percent. In 2003, 27 percent of Indonesians felt that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets was justified. In 2005, only 9 percent felt it was justified, and by August 2006, that number further decreased to 5 percent.⁸ Overall, Operation Unified Assistance contributed to a change in the public opinion in Indonesia of the United States.

The Pew Research Center polls conducted surveys in Indonesia between 2002 and 2016 that determined the public opinion of Indonesians towards the United States and towards Americans. The surveys listed in chapter 2 show that Indonesians were more favorable of the United States after the humanitarian assistance operation in 2004 and 2005. Of note from the Pew Research Center data is the drop in the favorable opinion of Indonesians towards Americans following the assistance given by the United States. In 2005, 46 percent of Indonesians had a favorable opinion of Americans, down from 56 percent in 2003. This number further declined in 2006 to 36 percent before increasing

again in the years between 2007 and 2013.⁹ The Pew Research Center surveys show that Indonesians distinguished their opinions of Americans from their opinions of the United States in general, hence the drop in positive opinion of Americans but increase in positive opinion of the United States following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami. It is possible that Indonesians judged the United States in general based on the actions of the agents of the U.S. government, that is the military and government organizations such as USAID. Meanwhile, Indonesians' did not consider the actions of the U.S. military in Indonesia to be indicative of Americans at large. In addition, important in these findings is that drop in favorable opinion of the U.S. after the initial increase in 2004. The positive impact from FDR operations is tempered by other events, in this case, Indonesia strongly opposed the U.S. led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and that opposition could have offset the positive gains from the FDR operation.

Since 11 September 2001, the opinion of the United States around the world has been heavily influenced by actions taken in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of these actions have been viewed as anti-Muslim even here in the United States. The CRS acknowledged this fact in 2005 in their study on the effects of American aid to Indonesia and advised U.S. Congress that the “large-scale U.S. response to the tsunami is unlikely to reverse the decline in the U.S. image abroad since the September 11 attacks.”¹⁰ The same report does mention other possible positive outcomes to assistance from the United States to include a positive example of leadership and military capability. Unfortunately, to date there are no CRS reports on the effectiveness of the U.S. aid to Indonesia in 2004 to 2005.

Did the United States and Indonesia Conduct
more Military Cooperation after 2004?

Overall, U.S. and Indonesian military-to-military cooperation increased as a result of the FHA operations conducted in 2004 and 2005. The annual humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission Pacific Partnership developed out of the success of USNS *Mercy* in Indonesia in 2005. The 11th Pacific Partnership in 2016 was led by a U.S. Navy command element embarked on USNS *Mercy* and revisited Indonesia in addition to Timor Leste, the Republic of the Philippines, and Vietnam to “improve capacity, enhance regional partnerships, and increase multilateral cooperation for HA/DR preparedness.” Additionally, Pacific Partnership has grown to the largest annual multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster preparedness mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by partnering with military and civilian units from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Singapore, Republic of Korea, and the United States.¹¹ The 2017 Pacific Partnership, conducted in March 2017, included stops in Sri Lanka (another country affected by the 2004 earthquake and tsunami), Malaysia, and Vietnam.¹²

In 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, “this year alone, the United States is conducting more than 150 activities, exchanges and visits with the Indonesian military.”¹³ This was quoted in a CSIS report from 2013 describing the opportunities for greater cooperation between the United States and Indonesia. The report continues by saying that the United States and Indonesia were building on a decade’s worth of cooperation. In 2005, U.S. Congress approved \$6 million in grants and loans for military equipment to Indonesia as well as maritime security training for the Indonesian Navy.¹⁴

An article in *The Economist* in 2012 reported that Indonesia increased its defense

spending from \$2.6 billion in 2006 to \$8 billion in 2012. A portion of that spending went to buy American F-16 fighter jets and parts for its C-130 transports.¹⁵

Did the United States and Indonesia Conduct
more Bilateral Agreements after 2004?

The United States and Indonesia have conducted numerous bilateral agreements since 2004; most notably agreements previously suspended were restarted as a result of the increased cooperation from the 2004 FHA operation.

The CRS report from 2011 details the increase in cooperation between the United States and Indonesia. In 2011, CRS reported to U.S. Congress the increased cooperation in the form of the IMET, FMF, and FMS programs for Indonesia that occurred in 2005. The CRS report also connects the restoration of these programs to the progress in cooperation made during Operation Unified Assistance.¹⁶

In 2010, the United States and Indonesia initiated a Comprehensive Partnership “to foster high-level engagement on democracy and civil society, education, security, climate, maritime, energy, and trade issues.”¹⁷ In October 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama, and the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, issued a joint statement saying, “The two Presidents recognized that the ties between their two countries are stronger than ever, dynamic, and firmly based on shared principles of democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, and the promotion of peace, stability, and economic well-being.”¹⁸ The joint statement continued by saying that the two countries intended to build on the 2010 Comprehensive Partnership to strengthen a long-term partnership. This long-term partnership would include: (1) maritime cooperation; (2) defense cooperation; (3) economic growth and development; (4) energy

cooperation; (5) increasing cooperation on global and regional issues; and (6) people to people contacts. The joint statement concluded by listing the joint agreements/arrangement:

(1) Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation between the Government of The Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America.

(2) Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation.

(3) Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on Energy.

(4) Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Aviation Administration Department of Transportation of the United States of America and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) of the Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia on the Promotion of Sustainable Aviation Alternative Fuels and Renewable Energy.¹⁹

The DOS 2016 report on Treaties in Force lists fifty-eight treaties and international agreements in force with Indonesia on 1 January 2016. Twenty-two of the fifty-eight treaties and bilateral agreements were signed after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, two of which related to defense cooperation.²⁰ The United States bilateral cooperation with Indonesia improved after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami relief efforts conducted by the United States.

2011 Japan Tsunami

On 11 March 2011, 250 miles northeast of Tokyo, three earthquakes caused shaking that lasted for six minutes, caused the floor of the Pacific Ocean to move sixty-five feet horizontally, the main island of Japan to move thirteen feet east, and shifted the Earth on its axis by 6.5 inches.²¹ The resulting magnitude measured 9.0 on the Richter scale, becoming the fourth most powerful earthquake in the world as of April 2017. Less

than thirty minutes after the shaking stopped, a tsunami struck Japan that in some areas reached as high as sixty-five feet and as far inland as six miles. Between the earthquake and tsunami, over 400,000 buildings were totally or partially collapsed.²² The tsunami also swamped the emergency generators at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, removing the ability to cool the nuclear reactors and spent fuel in holding ponds. Three nuclear reactors melted down causing a nuclear disaster. The nuclear disaster diverted resources from search and rescue to evacuate people still in the area. Additionally, a restricted zone was established around the nuclear plant, thereby delaying search efforts. The earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster made this event a complex disaster and the largest major disaster in Japanese history.²³ The Japanese government continues to update the International Atomic Energy Agency on the status of Fukushima Daiichi. The latest report from March 2017 states that radiation concerns necessitated agricultural restrictions in the area and that those restrictions were just lifted in January 2017.²⁴ Japan mobilized 100,000 personnel by 18 March. Japanese Self-Defense Forces rescued approximately 19,000 disaster victims, but over 20,000 people were killed, wounded, or missing. The vast majority of victims were the result of the tsunami. In March 2011, there were approximately 40,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan, with an additional 50,000 dependents and DOD civilians.²⁵ Figure 10 shows the location of the earthquake in relation to the nuclear plants and U.S. military bases in Japan.




Figure 10. Map of Japan, Select U.S. Military Bases, and Nuclear Facilities near the Earthquake

Source: Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery, *Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Response* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2011), 3, accessed 5 May 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41690.pdf>.

At the peak of U.S. military participation, there were 24,000 personnel, 189 aircraft, and twenty-four Navy vessels, including the USS *Ronald Reagan* strike group. The U.S. government committed \$95 million, including \$88.5 million from the DOD.²⁶ U.S. and Japanese military forces worked closely together including operating Japanese Self-Defense Force helicopters from the USS *Ronald Reagan*, the first-time Self-Defense Force helicopters had operated from a U.S. aircraft carrier. The amphibious assault ship,

USS *Tortuga*, transported 300 Self-Defense Force soldiers and ninety vehicles to the disaster area. U.S. and Japanese personnel worked together to re-open airfields and ports to allow relief supplies to arrive. On one airport, Sendai, over 5,000 cars had washed onto the runways. For the nuclear disaster, the United States provided two water barges that provided 500,000 gallons of fresh water for the effort to cool the reactors. A Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force deployed to the area to train and advise the Japanese personnel operating in the area of the damaged reactors. Most U.S. military operations were concluded around the end of April, with some continuing later in the year due to the basing of American units in Japan.

Did the Opinion of the United States
in Japan Improve after 2011?

The Pew Research Center data shows the favorable rating of the United States in Japan changed from 66 percent in 2010 to 85 percent in 2011. The favorable rating of Americans changed from 75 percent in 2010 to 87 percent in 2011. The studies from the Pew Research Center also show that the 2011 earthquake and tsunami was a very important event in shaping the relationship between the United States and Japan, the second most important for Japanese and tied for the first most important for Americans. Twenty percent of Japanese respondents consider the 2011 earthquake and tsunami to be the most important event in the U.S.-Japan relationship, while 36 percent of Japanese respondents consider the U.S.-Japan military alliance to be the most important event in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Overall, the results of the Pew Research data show an improvement in the public opinion of the United States in Japan. The improvement also

appeared to only last approximately two years as the rating of the United States in 2014 was the same as the rating in 2010.

The Japanese perspective on the disaster stated that the resulting FHA developed greater bonds of friendship between the United States and Japan. Additional comments by the Japanese Prime Minister in 2012 reinforce the analysis that Operation Tomodachi had a positive impact on the public opinion of the United States in Japan. An article from Sankei News in Japan posted on the website Watching America, a website designed to track opinions of the United States around the world, provides an insight into the Japanese perception of the United States. The article titled “Restoring Japan and the US with ‘Operation Tomodachi’” from the Japanese newspaper in 2014 discusses the positive impact on Japanese society from Operation Tomodachi, but points out that other political and diplomatic issues are currently impacting the opinion of the United States. The article argues that the United States and Japan have an opportunity to build on the good favor from the FHA operation.

Based on the Pew Research data and statements in other studies of the disaster and FHA operations, the public opinion of the United States improved in Japan. This improvement lasted approximately two to three years before the opinion of the United States in Japan returned to the level prior to 2011, according to the Pew Research data.

Did the United States and Japan Conduct more
Military-Military Cooperation after 2011?

The United States and Japan have enjoyed a long history of close coordination going back to 1952 when the two countries signed a security agreement. In 1960, the two countries signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and U.S. military

personnel have been based on Japan since 1945. Therefore, the U.S. military disaster relief efforts after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami is an example of the level of cooperation that already existed between the militaries of Japan and the United States. It is significant though that Operation Tomodachi was the first time the two countries exercised a bilateral command and control system from planning to execution. Operation Tomodachi was also the first time Japanese Self-Defense Force helicopters used an American aircraft carrier as a base of operations. Japan Self-Defense Force units were embarked on an American amphibious assault ship. In 2015, Japan and United States updated the Mutual Defense Guidelines, expressing increased military to military partnership. The disaster relief operations forced the American and Japanese military units to work together at all levels and lessons learned will influence future cooperation and coordination.

Did the United States and Japan Conduct
more Bilateral Agreements after 2011?

Similar to military cooperation between the two countries, the United States and Japan have a long history of political cooperation since relations were normalized in 1952 following the end of World War II. President Barack Obama's rebalance to the Pacific in 2012 was welcomed by the Japanese as a reaffirmation of American commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.

The DOS 2016 report on treaties and international agreements in force list 159 such commitments between the United States and Japan in force on 1 January 2016. Of the 159, six relate to defense cooperation issues including the assignment of Japanese Self-Defense Force personnel to the U.S. military.²⁷

Overall, Operation Tomodachi provided the United States and Japan with an opportunity to improve the integration and cooperation of the two countries. The demonstrated capability of the U.S.-Japan alliance reassured the citizens of Japan to its continued importance.

¹ RAND Corporation, “Economic Benefits of U.S. Overseas Security Commitments Could Far Outweigh Costs,” 1.

² Kenji Satake and Brian F. Atwater, “Long-Term Perspectives on Giant Earthquakes and Tsunamis at Subduction Zones.” *Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences* 35 (30 May 2007): 351.

³ Elleman, 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁵ Task Force 73 Public Affairs, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “11th Pacific Partnership Mission Prepares to Enhance Cooperation, Strengthen Ties in Southeast Asia,” U.S. Pacific Fleet, last modified 1 May 2016, accessed 3 April 2017, <http://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130015>.

⁶ Ballen, 4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 25-26.

⁹ Pew Research Center, *No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China. America’s Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, Hamas*, 31.

¹⁰ Margesson, summary.

¹¹ Task Force 73 Public Affairs, “11th Pacific Partnership Mission Prepares to Enhance Cooperation, Strengthen Ties in Southeast Asia.”

¹² LTJG Emily Wilkin, “Pacific Partnership 2017 Makes Inaugural Mission Stop in Sri Lanka,” U.S. Navy, 7 March 2017, accessed 16 May 2017, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=99207.

¹³ Murray Hiebert, Ted Osius, and Gregory B. Poling, *A U.S.-Indonesia Partnership for 2020: Recommendations for Forging a 21st Century Relationship* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2013),

accessed 5 May 2017, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130917_Hiebert_USIndonesiaPartnership_WEB.pdf, 1.

¹⁴ Ibid., 7.

¹⁵ The Economist, “Military Spending in South-East Asia: Shopping Spree,” 24 March 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21551056>.

¹⁶ Margesson, 7.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Indonesia,” Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Fact Sheet, 17 January 2017, accessed 5 May 2017, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm>.

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia,” Washington, DC, The White House, 26 October 2015, accessed 5 May 2017, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia>.

²⁰ Treaty Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State. *Treaty Affairs Staff, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2016*, 200-203.

²¹ Alan Buis, “Japan Quake May Have Shortened Earth Days, Moved Axis,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 14 March 2011, accessed 30 April 2017, <https://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/japanquake/earth20110314.html>.

²² Emergency Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, National Police Agency, Government of Japan, “Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures,” National Policy Agency, updated 10 March 2017, accessed 21 April 2017, http://www.npa.go.jp/news/other/earthquake2011/pdf/higaijokyo_e.pdf.

²³ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Special Feature: Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake*, 2011, accessed 23 January 2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/04SpecialFeature.pdf, 2.

²⁴ Government of Japan, “Events and Highlights on the Progress Related to Recovery Operations at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” Report to International Atomic Energy Agency, updated February 2017, accessed 3 May 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/events_and_highlights_feb_2017.pdf.

²⁵ Feickert and Chanlett-Avery, 2.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Treaty Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State. *Treaty Affairs Staff, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2016*, 228-237.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) spends \$693 billion annually and commands global forces that are unprecedented in their relative size compared with other forces through the world. It is the ultimate expression of the military might of America as a superpower and undergirds much of U.S. influence in the world.

—Michael J. Meese and Isaiah Wilson III,
“The Military: Forging a Joint Warrior Culture”

Conclusions

This study sought to answer three general questions: (1) do FHA operations contribute to the partnership between the United States and those nations supported by our military; (2) does the U.S. military contribution to those countries affected by natural disasters lead to increased bilateral cooperation; and (3) do the citizens of those affected countries come to view the United States in a more favorable light? To answer these questions, this study examined the FHA operations in Indonesia and Japan. If the answer to these three questions is yes, then FHA operations are effective.

First, the FHA operation in Indonesia improved the partnership between the United States and Indonesia. The United States and Indonesia now enjoy a growing and robust military partnership, as articulated by then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in 2011. Additionally, Indonesia is investing in American military hardware, such as C-130 transports. Another visible and enduring result of the FHA operation in 2004 is the annual exercise Pacific Partnership, in which the U.S. military has returned to Indonesia several times. While the actual FHA operation improved the partnership between the United States and Indonesia, Pacific Partnership continues to improve the partnership

between the United States and several nations, including Japan. The United States and Japan enjoyed a strong partnership prior to 2011 and the FHA operation improved the integration of military units between the two countries, thereby increasing the partnership. Japanese military units used American ships as refueling stops and transports, demonstrating an important capability in joint operations.

Second, the FHA operations in Indonesia improved the bilateral cooperation. The United States and Indonesia have restarted bilateral agreements suspended before the 2004 earthquake and tsunami and the relationship continues to improve. The 2010 Comprehensive Partnership attests to the growing bilateral cooperation on issues from maritime and energy cooperation to economic growth and development.

The U.S. military FHA operations are possible due to the continuous overseas presence of the military. American military units are usually close enough to a disaster to arrive on station in time to save lives. The study of public opinion of the United States in Japan and Indonesia resulted in two conclusions:

1. FHA operations positively impact the relationship between the United States and the affected country.
2. The amount that FHA operations impacts the relationship between the United States and the affected country is dependent on the nature of the relationship between the two countries prior to the disaster. A country in which the United States enjoys a deep relationship with prior to the disaster will, in some ways, expect the United States to contribute efforts to save lives. This reduces the impact of the operation.

Furthermore, as demonstrated by policy documents and a RAND Corporation study, FHA operations are part of the U.S. military presence overseas and such operations have a positive influence on the global economic system and improves the economy of the United States.

The expense born on the United States to conduct FHA operations is a target for cost cutting when discussing budgets. For cost comparisons, this study showed the cost to the DOD for conducting relief operations in Japan and the cost of striking a Syrian airfield. The cost for the two operations are the same, but the FHA operation involved twenty-four ships and 24,000 personnel while the Tomahawk strike involved two ships. While the main purpose of the U.S. military is to fight and to defend America, there are diplomatic and economic benefits to spending the money for FHA operations. As ADM Fargo pointed out, the military units are already operating overseas and can conduct these operations for relatively small amounts of money. Additionally, as ADM Roughead points out in the CSIS study and recognized by the U.S. Navy's website, FHA operations improve the morale of military members, which could lead to increased retention and performance.

This study sought to determine the effectiveness of FHA operations to influence public opinion of the United States. The two case studies did show an improvement of the public opinion in both countries. While a generalization is made that FHA operations will usually result in improved public opinion, it is impossible to separate all other events and interactions that influence how people view other countries. FHA operations should be viewed as a chance to improve the lives of affected people and opportunities to work with non-typical partners. As the world becomes more interconnected, relationships among

nations and cultures is becoming increasingly important. The more nations work together in peacetime, either in traditional military exercises, port visits, exchange programs, or in FHA operations, the more nations will be able to work together in crisis situations.

Recommendations

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations should not be seen as political tools since that would violate the principle of independence accepted by humanitarian organizations and the United Nations. Humanitarian relief operations must be conducted for the purpose of improving the lives and well-being of those affected to ensure that the conduct of operations is not manipulated for political gain. However, it is impossible to ignore that FHA operations have diplomatic and political ramifications. To recognize and assess those ramifications provides context to the expenditure of time and resources.

The United States should continue to conduct FHA operations and seek out opportunities to assist foreign countries in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The improvement in the lives of those affected justifies the cost of these operations. The improved relations resulting from these operations should further encourage the commitment of assets and resources. The resulting improvement in diplomatic relations also serves to protect the appropriation of money towards the planning and exercises. The United States Pacific Fleet's annual humanitarian exercise, Pacific Partnership, is a great example of leveraging disaster relief preparation exercises to promote international partnerships. Exercises focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations make easier the information sharing associated with other international exercises by minimizing the potential use of classified information.

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