United States 1st Armored Division and Mission Command at the Battle of Faid Pass
Abstract
The primary research question of this historical case study was, "How did the 1st Armored Division (AD) build mutual trust, create shared understanding, use mission orders, and exercise disciplined initiative prior to the Battle of Kasserine Pass?" This monograph posits as its thesis that the US 1st AD was unable to establish mutual trust with Major General Fredendall, the US II Corps Commanding General, prior to the Battle of Faid Pass. This prevented its creation of shared understanding, use of mission orders, and exercise of disciplined initiative during and immediately following that series of actions. It also set conditions for the 1st ADs subsequent, more calamitous defeats during the initial phases of the Battle of Kasserine Pass. The findings of this study point to the need to establish mutual trust across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) team in times of peace to enable early success in war. Based upon these findings, this monograph recommends the future study of how to increase National Guard and Reserve above-the-line, and below-the-line force participation in already resourced training events. It also proposes the study of the use of prescriptive measures such as decision point, vice synchronization, focused orders and rehearsals to enable the exercise of mission command. Lastly, it recommends the examination of the flexible and massed employment of battalion and company mortars in a manner similar to the use of division artillery.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 13, 2017
- Accession Number
- AD1039141
Entities
People
- Don Y. Kim
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College