

A New Strategy for Peace Enforcement: The Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

A New Strategy for Peace Enforcement: The Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo, by MAJ Chad P. Lewis, 46 pages.

With the introduction of MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the United Nations (UN), for the first time in its history, began unilateral targeted offensive operations. The purpose of this study is to examine how the intervention brigade, with its extended authorities, contributes to the UN's strategic objectives for stability in the DRC. This paper examines the intervention brigade through the lens of strategy using Lykke's model of ends, ways, means, and risk. According to Lykke, a successful strategy mitigates risk by balancing ends, ways, and means. The study concludes that the intervention brigade represents an imbalance of ends, ways, and means in MONUSCO's strategy. According to Lykke's model, the intervention brigade is a suitable strategy, but it is not feasible and may not be acceptable. The brigade's ends align with MONUSCO's, but its resources are insufficient and its methods may be counterproductive to MONUSCO's objectives. Further research is necessary to determine if MONUSCO can reduce risk by rebalancing its strategy or by separating the intervention brigade's offensive mission from MONUSCO's defensive one.

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Acronyms

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces. Armed group based in the DRC with the goal of overthrowing the government of Uganda
AU	African Union
CNDP	<i>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</i> [National Congress for the Defense of the People] Armed group that spawned the M23 group after a failed agreement with the DRC government on 23 March 2009
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC	<i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i> [Armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo]
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i> [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda] Armed group based in the DRC with the goal of overthrowing the government of Rwanda
FNL	<i>Forces Nationales de Libération</i> [National Liberation Forces] Armed group based in the DRC with the goal of overthrowing the government of Burundi
ICGLR	International Conference on Great Lakes Region
M23	<i>Mouvement du 23 Mars</i> [23 March Movement] Armed group in eastern DRC with the goal of integrating into the FARDC under favorable conditions in accordance with the failed agreement of 23 March 2009; capitulated in November, 2013
MONUC	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo</i> [United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo] 1999 – 2010
MONUSCO	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo</i> [United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo] 2010 – Present
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

Introduction

Just another army in a war with too many armies.

—Thanassis Cambanis, *Boston Globe*

Since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which prompted massive cross-border movements of refugees, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been embroiled in a destabilizing regional conflict. Regime change and two major wars drew in eleven nations as combatants, supporters, or mediators. Ungoverned spaces, especially in the country's northeast provinces, allowed outside actors and internal strongmen to impose their will unchallenged. Twenty years of state neglect, external influence, and displaced populations have introduced a mix of armed groups that severely impede the central government's ability to administer this region.¹

MONUSCO is the United Nations' (UN) mission in the DRC. The mission has lasted over 15 years, with an annual budget reaching \$1.4 billion to stabilize the country.² Despite a Chapter VII Peace Enforcement mandate, the UN military force was unable to prevent armed groups from disrupting UN stability activities and inflicting civilian casualties in the eastern provinces.³ In November 2012, the rebel group M23 seized the city of Goma, a provincial capital, for ten days; the UN needed a new approach. In March 2013, for the first time in its history, the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved an offensive force to combat the rising threat. The intervention brigade arrived with approximately 3000 troops from Tanzania, Malawi, and South

¹ Danielle Beswick, "The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case of Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo," *The Round Table* 98, no. 402 (June 2009): 335-336.

² "Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015," United Nations General Assembly, accessed August 19, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/69/17.

³ The Security Council invokes Chapter VII of the UN Charter to deploy military troops from member states into "volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order." United Nations, accessed September 1, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml>.

Africa, led by a Tanzanian officer. In a shift from traditional peace enforcement, the UN began offensively targeting armed groups that threatened civilian populations and government sovereignty.⁴ Under MONUSCO supervision, the intervention brigade initially targeted the M23 rebel group which capitulated eight months later in November 2013.⁵

The international community has questioned the legality of the intervention brigade, arguing that its mandate is no longer peace enforcement, but something else. The argument also states that the brigade's activities define it as a combatant, which threaten the rest of the UN mission by branding all MONUSCO a party to the conflict.⁶ But the UN continues to employ the intervention brigade against other armed groups across eastern DRC. It is now specifically targeting the FDLR, a Hutu armed group of former Rwandan military who use DRC as a base to target the incumbent Rwandan government. The UNSC has extended MONUSCO's mandate, including the intervention brigade, for another year to March 2016.⁷

Armed groups operating in ungoverned spaces in DRC prevent MONUSCO from achieving its mandate. MONUSCO's intervention brigade seems to be a successful method with sufficient means to defeat these groups, but to what end? The United Nations must measure the brigade's success by how it supports MONUSCO's strategic objectives. The UN also risks losing legitimacy as the international community scrutinizes the brigade's legality and precedent for future peace enforcement operations.

⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098 (March 2013): 6-7, accessed August 19, 2015, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098\(2013\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098(2013)).

⁵ Lansana Gberie, "Intervention brigade: End game in the Congo?" *Africa Renewal Online* (August 2013): 1, accessed August 19, 2015, <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/intervention-brigade-end-game-congo>.

⁶ Scott Sheeran and Stephanie Case, "The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *International Peace Institute* (November 2014): 9-10.

⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2211 (March 2015): 5-6, accessed August 19, 2015, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2211\(2015\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2211(2015)).

The purpose of this study is to examine how the intervention brigade, with its robust authorities, contributes to the UN's strategic objectives for stability in DRC. This study anticipates that the UN established the intervention brigade to help balance ends, ways and means within MONUSCO's strategy. The use of the intervention brigade is unprecedented in UN history. Its success, or failure, may change the nature of future UN peace enforcement operations. This research evaluates how the intervention brigade fits into the greater MONUSCO strategy.

There are distinct limitations to studying the intervention brigade. It is a new concept, still in its first deployment, with end results yet to be proven. There is limited primary source material available on the topic. The researcher has no access to classified documents from the brigade itself, such as mission orders, after action reports, or rules of engagement. This research does not include field study; it uses official, unclassified UN documents that are open to the public.

This research remains focused primarily on the United Nations' perspective of the intervention brigade. It examines what the UN claims the intervention brigade is meant to do and then evaluates if or how the brigade supports MONUSCO's strategic objectives. It limits the scope to the brigade's activity in eastern DRC, specifically against the M23 and FDLR rebel groups. It is not an assessment of the brigade's tactical performance, but rather its directives and outcomes to test if its employment supports MONUSCO's larger strategy.

This study assumes certain conditions that establish a framework for the argument. First, MONUSCO has employed the intervention brigade according to its published directives. The researcher has no way of confirming whether the brigade's employment is in line with its mandate. Second, there are no other documents outside publicly available official UN documents that significantly change the brigade's nature or purpose. The documentation available provides an accurate account of the reality on the ground.

The research began with a literature review to determine the conceptual and empirical works related to the intervention brigade in the DRC. The paper then describes the methodology

for testing the hypothesis through the lens of military strategy. It presents a case study on the intervention brigade in eastern DRC from March 2013 to December 2015, using specific criteria to evaluate its contribution to MONUSCO's strategy. The paper concludes with findings and analysis, including recommendations for further study.

Literature Review

This section places the study in context by creating a framework for the research to provide a common language and determine where this paper fits into the larger body of knowledge on the topic. First it provides the theoretical lens through which the problem is examined. It then describes the key concepts related to the theory, including terminology and the criteria used to test the hypotheses. Following is a review of works published on the intervention brigade to consider other researchers' analysis and conclusions and to determine gaps in research. The section concludes by presenting this study's principal hypothesis and placing it within the general body of knowledge.

This paper examines the UN's intervention brigade through the theoretical lens of strategy. Defining strategy for the purpose of this research is necessary to establish a common language for discussion. Strategy in its simplest form is "the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives."⁸ Conceptually, strategy exerts power to gain control to achieve objectives. Strategy, therefore, has an end in mind that provides direction. It then exerts the necessary power to gain control over competing actors who may have opposing ends in mind. By this simple definition, anyone can have a strategy: states, organizations, even individuals.

At the state level, a strategy is "the employment of the elements of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, information) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives."⁹ In this definition, all the elements of the simple definition exist as they relate to the state. The government exerts

⁸ Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 48.

⁹ Harry R. Yarger, "Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 43.

national power to maintain control within the state against internal and external actors who have opposing ends in mind.

A state's military strategy is one component of its national strategy. Arthur F. Lykke at the US Army War College developed a model for a military strategy that remains in US Joint Doctrine today. Lykke defines strategy as the sum of ends, ways, and means. By his definition, "ends" are the objectives, "ways" are the methods of applying force to gain control, and "means" are available resources. Lykke stressed that a military strategy must support a national strategy to have any meaning, so ultimately the military strategy seeks to achieve national objectives. But within the military strategy there are military objectives, achieved through military concepts, supported by military resources.¹⁰

Lykke developed a model where national security rested on the three-legged stool of military strategy. Its three legs were objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and resources (means). All three legs of the military strategy must be balanced to provide a stable base for national security. Unbalancing these three elements increases risk to national strategy. If the risk is too great, the strategy is no longer acceptable to policymakers. Risk increases with the level of imbalance, so limitations to any one component without compensating for the others increases overall risk.¹¹ For example, limiting resources without limiting objectives increases risk. Likewise, limiting methods increases the risk even if objectives and resources remain the same. Lykke's model for military strategy conforms to the previous definitions of strategy at the state level and strategy in its simplest form.

While Lykke provided an organized structure to analyze a strategy, David Jablonsky warned that strategy is principally art more than science and that it "does not always obey the

¹⁰Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Defining Military Strategy," *Military Review* 69, no. 5 (May 1989): 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

logic of [Lykke's] framework.”¹² Jablonsky recognized that strategic priorities are necessary because there are never enough resources to reduce risk everywhere. More so, a state must balance the “legs” of strategy between foreign and domestic policies differently during war and peace.¹³ Essentially, a strategy is a discourse between purposive beings, and all solutions in the dynamic affairs of humans and nations are temporary.

With this warning in mind, Lykke's model is still useful, but it may be necessary to apply additional rigor to its results, especially when considering the human dimension. For example, certain ways may be perfectly balanced with ends and means, but one party or population in the conflict considers those ways to be immoral or otherwise unacceptable. Even though they are balanced operationally, they may be catastrophic to the strategy. Political will at home may change the nature or condition of resources on the ground, especially troops. Religious or ethnic differences may unbalance an otherwise sound strategy. These human considerations are not static, but change throughout a conflict making analysis more difficult. Lykke's model can still account for these factors, but it takes additional rigor and continual appraisal of each leg with a view to the human dynamic.

Within this context of strategy, the United Nations is an international organization that behaves like a state. In some cases, a sovereign state may not have sufficient means or effective ways to achieve its national objectives. The UN employs the elements of national power from other member states to execute operations that achieve those objectives. UN intervention relies on member states for a given time to pursue the same objectives, operate in a particular manner, and provide resources. Applying Lykke's strategy model, the UN mission must balance these ends, ways, and means in a complex, multinational environment.

¹² David Jablonsky, “Why is Strategy Difficult?” in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 3.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 9.

The UN has been unable to achieve its desired ends in the DRC for the past fifteen years. When the UN established the intervention brigade within MONUSCO, their military objectives did not change. The UN increased MONUSCO's means with the addition of one more brigade of ground troops and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance. The UN also increased MONUSCO's ways by authorizing the intervention brigade to use unique methods that are unprecedented in UN operations. According to Lykke's model, this significant addition to "means" and "ways" should contribute to achieving MONUSCO's "ends" and reduce risk by balancing a previously unbalanced strategy. The purpose of this paper is to determine if or how the intervention brigade balances MONUSCO's strategy.

A review of the current literature on this topic outlines the key arguments and conclusions that others have made. It also illuminates gaps in research that offer opportunities to contribute to the body of knowledge. Most literature analyzing the intervention brigade focuses on the legal aspects of this fundamental difference in ways, or methods, that the UN adopted. Legal arguments are important to analyzing MONUSCO's strategy because they contribute to the discussion on risk to legitimacy and acceptability.

Amid the legal debate, there is a lack of clarity on the legal authorities and ramifications of the intervention brigade's offensive mandate in the DRC. The dispute mainly concerns the legal status of the armed conflict in the DRC and the legal status of MONUSCO peacekeepers. For the legal review, this research relied heavily on the core arguments presented by Devon Whittle, Carina Lamont, and Scott Sheeran. All three analyzed the intervention brigade through the lens of international law to highlight the legal issues and assess the brigade's impact on peacekeeping.

The status of the conflict in the DRC is unclear, which affects how international law applies. In general, international human rights law (IHRL) covers the use of force in peace time and it applies to governments protecting state authority and civil security. International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict, covers the use of force in war.

Armed conflict may be defined as international (IAC) if the conflict is between states or non-international (NIAC) if the conflict is internal to a state.¹⁴

Applying these definitions to the conflict in the DRC presents some challenges. Most of the armed groups in the DRC are Congolese, but the most significant are international, including the FDLR from Rwanda and the ADF from Uganda. Also, some of the Congolese armed groups, such as M23, received significant aid from across the border. The larger armed groups meet the standards establishing a NIAC such as organized command, territorial control, and sustained military operations. But their international origins and support may suggest an IAC. The smaller local armed groups may not meet that standard for armed conflict at all, constituting a law enforcement problem under IHL.¹⁵ Adding to the international nature of the conflict, MONUSCO's mandate enforces an international political agreement, and the intervention brigade itself includes military units from three countries.¹⁶ Legal analysts do not agree on the status of the conflict in the DRC or how international law applies.

Within this uncertain operational environment, analysts also debate the status of MONUSCO peacekeepers. IHL is unclear about the status of peacekeepers in general, especially in cases of internal armed conflict.¹⁷ According to IHL, civilians are protected unless they participate in hostilities. Peacekeepers traditionally enjoy protection under IHL as civilians. Under a Chapter VI mandate, this makes sense and aligns with the basic principles of

¹⁴ "War and Law," International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed January 21, 2016, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/overview-war-and-law.htm>.

¹⁵ Devon Whittle, "Peacekeeping in Conflict: The Intervention Brigade, MONUSCO, and the Application of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Forces," *Georgetown Journal of International Law* 46, no. 3 (Spring 2015): 852.

¹⁶ Gberie, 1.

¹⁷ Dieter Fleck, "The Legal Status of Personnel Involved in United Nations Peace Operations," *International Review of the Red Cross* 95, no. 891/892 (December 2013): 613-636.

peacekeeping: consent of the parties involved, impartiality between parties, and non-use of force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate.¹⁸

A Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate presents additional problems because peacekeepers take part in the conflict. The UN argues that peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties in a conflict. In the DRC, MONUSCO operates under a Chapter VII mandate without the consent of the armed groups, while explicitly supporting the sovereignty of the Congolese government.¹⁹ The intervention brigade conducts targeted offensive operations against armed groups which, Sheeran argues, goes beyond peace enforcement, and perhaps falls outside of the UN Charter altogether.²⁰ Under IHL, civilians are protected unless they participate in hostilities. Peacekeepers traditionally enjoy treatment as civilians, but the intervention brigade's activities meet the criteria for hostilities and identify the unit as a combatant. Based on the brigade's actions, Lamont and Whittle argue that the armed groups can lawfully target the brigade as combatants under IHL.²¹

There is further debate on whether the intervention brigade makes all of MONUSCO a party to the conflict and, therefore, a lawful target. Their activities differ, from humanitarian aid at one end to offensive operations at the other. Lamont argues that the intervention brigade should have a different legal status than MONUSCO based on their different activities.²² But the intervention brigade looks no different from the other brigades in MONUSCO. They wear the

¹⁸ "Chapter VI," United Nations, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml>. Chapter VI of the UN Charter outlines the UN's involvement in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

¹⁹ UNSCR 2098, 6-7.

²⁰ Sheeran, 19.

²¹ Carina Lamont and Emma Skeppstrom, "The United Nations at War in the DRC? Legal Aspects of the Intervention Brigade," Report to the Swedish Ministry of Defence, (December 2013), 20; Whittle, 861.

²² Lamont, 21.

same uniforms and emblems, including the blue helmet. They drive the same vehicles, resupply from the same logistics, operate from the same bases, and report to the same commander. Operationally they are the same. Sheeran states that this lack of distinction makes MONUSCO party to the conflict as well. Lamont, Whittle, and Sheeran agree that the two should be operationally distinct to protect MONUSCO's status and legitimacy.²³

In summary, the legal framework surrounding Chapter VII peace enforcement operations is already unclear, and the intervention brigade in the DRC compounds the problem. Legal analysts agree that the UN should make a clear distinction between the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission and the intervention brigade's offensive targeting mission.²⁴ The UN, however, seems to be doing just the opposite, noting a need to "remove the distinction between the Intervention Brigade and the framework brigades" as all MONUSCO military units are pursuing the same objectives, specifically the protection of civilians.²⁵ If MONUSCO loses legitimacy as a result of the intervention brigade's authorized methods, it could affect the mission's support from troop contributing countries and have a negative impact on MONUSCO's objectives.

While much debate occurs on the legal authorities of the intervention brigade, there is very little on its strategic or operational aspects. Touko Piiparinen in *Global Governance* provided some connection between ends and ways. He argued the intervention brigade represents a paradigm shift in peacekeeping from state building to sovereignty building. According to its mandate, the intervention brigade was employed to create space and time for a strengthened

²³ Lamont, 32; Whittle, 862-866; Sheeran, 9-10.

²⁴ Bruce Oswald, "The Security Council and the Intervention Brigade: Some Legal Issues." *American Society of International Law* 17, no. 15 (June 2013): 1; Lamont, 21; Whittle, 862-866.

²⁵ "Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo," United Nations Security Council, (December 30, 2014), 8.

Congolese army (FARDC) and reduce the threat posed by armed groups to state authority.²⁶ Both of these tasks focused on increasing power and control of the central government, or sovereign. Piiparinen argued that MONUSCO's goal was to restore sovereign power over the state. The intervention brigade was instrumental in supporting this objective, as the FARDC was unable to do it and MONUSCO troop contributing countries (TCCs) were unwilling.²⁷ While his article connected the brigade as a new method to achieve MONUSCO's objectives, Piiparinen's primary goal was to demonstrate a shift in peacekeeping ends altogether.

In an *International Peace Institute* Issue Brief, Major General Patrick Cammaert, a former Eastern Division commander in MONUSCO, provided the most comprehensive discussion of MONUSCO's overall strategy concerning the intervention brigade. His main argument placed the intervention brigade within the wider national strategy. Cammaert agreed with Piiparinen that the brigade was necessary because TCCs in MONUSCO were unwilling to implement the mandate to its fullest extent, allowing armed groups to act with impunity at the cost of greater civilian casualties.²⁸ Even if the brigade were successful in its mission, Cammaert warned that it must form a part of a wider strategy that included security sector reform for the FARDC and the implementation of a regional political agreement. He concluded that peacemaking in the DRC was not a military problem and therefore required more than a military solution. He suggested the brigade might provide an additional way for the military to support the political process.²⁹ Cammaert offered a practitioner's view of the greater MONUSCO strategy.

²⁶ UNSCR 2098, 6.

²⁷ Touko Piiparinen, "Beyond the Technological Turn: Reconsidering the Significance of the Intervention Brigade and Peacekeeping Drones for UN Conflict Management," *Global Governance* 21, no. 1 (January – March 2015): 149-150.

²⁸ Patrick Cammaert and Fiona Blyth, "IPI Issue Brief: The UN Intervention Brigade in DRC," *International Peace Institute* (July 2013): 2, accessed August 15, 2015, http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_un_intervention_brigade_rev.pdf.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

He stressed the linkage between the intervention brigade and MONUSCO's overall end state, but he did not go into detail on how the brigade fits into the overall strategy.

There is a gap in strategic analysis of MONUSCO's intervention brigade. Much has been written about the new developments in peacekeeping that the brigade represents, but there is no systematic review of how the brigade fits within the broader MONUSCO strategy for the DRC. Piiparinen argued that the brigade was an essential part of a greater strategy of sovereignty building. But his work only referenced the brigade regarding how it supported his concept. Cammaert explained MONUSCO's need for the brigade while at the same time warning of the risks it incurred. His work focused on the greater problem at the political level. Legal analysts discussed at length the legal implications of the brigade's expanded authorities. Their debate highlighted the risks involved that the UN may not have thoroughly examined. What remains is a need to scrutinize the brigade in light of MONUSCO's strategy for the DRC.

This research applies Lykke's strategy model to test how the intervention brigade fits into the greater MONUSCO strategy. According to the model, a strategy reduces risk by balancing ends, ways, and means. After fifteen years in the DRC employing standard peacekeeping practices, the UN adopted the intervention brigade which introduced additional ways and means to achieve the same ends. This study anticipates that the UN established the intervention brigade to help balance ends, ways and means within MONUSCO's strategy. To that end, this paper submits three hypotheses.

The first hypothesis proposes if the intervention brigade's ends support MONUSCO's ends, then the brigade balances MONUSCO's strategy. The intervention brigade forms part of the military strategy for MONUSCO. The mandate provided specific military objectives for the intervention brigade. This hypothesis asserts that these objectives must support MONUSCO's overall military and national objectives. If they do, then the brigade's objectives contribute to balancing MONUSCO's strategy.

The second hypothesis suggests that if the intervention brigade's ways support MONUSCO's ends, then the brigade balances MONUSCO's strategy. The UN provided unprecedented authorities to the brigade that allowed it to employ methods never used before in peacekeeping. These methods seemed to work in the field, but they have caused increased international scrutiny over the direction of peacekeeping. In this unfamiliar territory, the intervention brigade's ways must support MONUSCO's ends, both in the DRC and within the international community. If so, the intervention brigade's ways contribute to balancing MONUSCO's strategy.

The third hypothesis submits that if the intervention brigade's means support its methods, then the brigade balances MONUSCO's strategy. MONUSCO directed additional methods for the intervention brigade. It follows that it must also provide the means necessary for the brigade to accomplish its objectives using those methods. If so, the intervention brigade's means support its ends and it contributes to balancing MONUSCO's strategy.

In summary, this section developed a framework and set the context for research. It introduced the theoretical lens of strategy through which this paper examines the UN's intervention brigade. Exploration of available literature on the topic revealed a heavy concentration on the legal aspects of the brigade, but a significant gap in strategic analysis. This paper aims to contribute to the body of work in the area of strategy. Most helpful in this pursuit was Major General Cammaert's work that places the intervention brigade in the broader national and regional context. This section concluded with three hypotheses to test how the intervention brigade fits into the greater MONUSCO strategy. The next section details the study's methodology.

Methodology

This section outlines the methodology behind the research. It describes the structured focused approach to the problem using a single case study. It follows with the research questions based on Lykke's strategy model and explains their significance in the study, specifically how they can test the three hypotheses. Finally, it identifies the sources of data and describes the method for data analysis.

The research methodology in this paper follows a structured focused approach. It uses a single case study focused on the UN's employment of the intervention brigade in the DRC from March 2013 to December 2015. It examines the historical case of the UN's intervention brigade as a new phenomenon in the context of UN peace enforcement operations. It applies questions to the case study that are "structured" to guide and standardize data collection. The questions support the research objective which is "focused" on a limited aspect of the historical case. The study may be replicated using the same questions on other aspects of the case, or by comparing additional historical cases.³⁰

Using Lykke's strategy model of ends, ways, means, and risk, this paper asks eight focused questions to determine if the intervention brigade balances the greater MONUSCO strategy. The goal is to determine if the intervention brigade helps MONUSCO balance ends, ways, and means consistent with the risk it is willing to accept.³¹ The first question asks, why did MONUSCO implement the intervention brigade? This question uncovers the nature of conditions before the change to MONUSCO's strategy. This is important because a change in strategy suggests that MONUSCO was previously unable to attain its desired ends. It discovers if MONUSCO's strategy before the intervention brigade was unbalanced. This step is necessary to

³⁰ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2005), 67-69.

³¹ Yarger, 48.

analyze the brigade's effects on the strategy. This study anticipates that MONUSCO implemented the intervention brigade because its old strategy was not sufficiently balanced to reach its national objectives, or the old strategy was not acceptable within the timeframe required.

The second question is, what military objectives did MONUSCO give to the intervention brigade? This question examines what MONUSCO expects the brigade to accomplish. It compares the intervention brigade's objectives with the other MONUSCO military objectives to discern any change in the overall strategy. This question is important to determine what MONUSCO expects from this additional brigade that is different from every other brigade assigned. This study anticipates that MONUSCO's strategic and military objectives have not changed with the arrival of the intervention brigade.

The third question is, do the intervention brigade's ends support MONUSCO's ends? This question applies Lykke's suitability test to the strategy.³² It assumes the brigade will achieve all it is meant to achieve, then asks if it still accomplishes the desired effect. The answer will determine if there is a logical link between the brigade's objectives and MONUSCO's end state. This study anticipates that the intervention brigade's military objectives support MONUSCO's national objectives for the DRC.

The fourth question is, what methods did MONUSCO authorize for the intervention brigade? There is much controversy over the new authorities granted to the brigade. It is critical to examine the specific ways the brigade was authorized to achieve its ends. These are compared to the methods employed by the other military units within MONUSCO that did not get special authorities. This question explores specific written directives, the application of those directives in the field, and the interpretation of those directives by the parties involved and the international community. This study anticipates that the intervention brigade's methods represent a significant shift from standard peacekeeping methods.

³² Yarger, 48.

The fifth question is, do the intervention brigade's methods support MONUSCO's ends? First it examines the specially authorized methods to determine if they support the brigade's military objectives. Then it considers the broader implications of the human dynamic surrounding these methods that may affect MONUSCO's national objectives. This question applies Lykke's acceptability test to the strategy to determine if the consequences of the brigade's methods are justified by the importance of their desired effects. The brigade's methods are so unique in peacekeeping that they have called into question MONUSCO's legitimacy in the DRC and even the UN's legitimacy as an organization. This analysis determines if the outcome of the brigade's methods warrants the risk to MONUSCO's legitimacy in the DRC. This study anticipates that the brigade's methods support MONUSCO's operational goals but may compromise MONUSCO's strategic end state for the DRC, or even the United Nations as a whole.

The sixth question is what resources are available to the intervention brigade? If all legs of Lykke's strategy must be balanced, it is important to know what resources were added to the equation. This question examines the allocation of resources specifically for the intervention brigade by type and quantity to determine their significance. An increase in types of resources may be more significant than an increase in the quantity of the same resource. Another consideration specific to the UN is that their resources are volunteered from member states. The resource provider may also be significant to the study. This study anticipates that MONUSCO increased both type and quantity of resources for the intervention brigade from multiple member states.

The seventh question asks, do the intervention brigade's means support its ends? This question applies Lykke's feasibility test to the strategy.³³ It analyzes what the brigade is expected to achieve with the resources it was given to achieve them. If they are balanced, the means

³³ Yarger, 48.

contribute to a stable strategy. This study anticipates that the intervention brigade was provided limited means commensurate with the brigade's limited objectives.

The final question is, do the intervention brigade's means support its methods? Given the new and robust methods authorized by the UNSC, does the intervention brigade have the means to conduct operations in accordance with their directive? This question compares provided resources with directed methods. The brigade should have sufficient resources to fulfill its robust mandate. This study anticipates that the brigade's means are adequate to accomplish its ends using the methods directed.

Data for this study was collected from official UN documents, professional journals, and other secondary sources. UN documents provided annual directives for MONUSCO as a whole with specific guidance for the establishment and employment of the intervention brigade. Specifically they account for the ends, ways, and means for the brigade as well as the overall MONUSCO strategy in the DRC. Military journals provided definitions and context for the theoretical lens of strategy. Legal journals presented an external interpretation of the UN's actions in the DRC, specifically related to the intervention brigade. They also informed how the broader international community considers MONUSCO's strategy. Secondary sources provided the background for the case study.

This section provided the methodology for this research. It outlined the structured focused approach to the problem using a single case study analyzed through specific criteria charted in Lykke's strategy model. It introduced the research questions to test the hypothesis and explained their significance to the study. Finally, it identified the sources of data and method of analysis. The next section presents a case study on the intervention brigade in the DRC and applies the focused questions to test the hypotheses.

Case Study

This section provides a case study where the eight focused questions are applied to test the hypotheses. The intervention brigade is a new and unique concept in UN peacekeeping and, according to its mandate, it does not set a precedent for future use.³⁴ Consequently, this research is limited to a single case study. However, the structured focused approach used in this study may be applied to similar situations to test a changing strategy. It may be especially applicable if the UN adopts a similar mandate elsewhere in the future. This section applies the focused questions to elicit detailed responses with supporting evidence. It concludes with an analysis of each question to determine if the evidence supports the hypotheses, does not support the hypotheses, or presents a mixed outcome.

A brief historical overview is necessary to establish the political context and events leading to the intervention brigade's implementation in the DRC. This overview covers the UN presence in the DRC, the rise of the M23 rebel movement, and the regional political discussions that ultimately led to the intervention brigade under MONUSCO. The UN established its mission in the DRC, designated MONUC, in 1999 to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Six countries signed this agreement to end the war in the DRC with oversight from three international organizations.³⁵ MONUC was primarily an observation mission with approximately 500 personnel acting as military observers and liaisons.³⁶ Armed groups in the eastern provinces continued to be a security problem outside the government's influence and

³⁴ UNSCR 2098, 6.

³⁵ "Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement," United Nations, accessed December 3, 2015, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_990710_LusakaAgreement.pdf. This agreement was signed by Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. It was witnessed by Zambia, the UN, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Organisation of African Unity (predecessor to the African Union).

³⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279 (November 1999): 2-3, accessed August 19, 2015, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1279\(1999\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1279(1999)).

political agreements failed to establish a lasting peace. In 2010, in light of a deteriorating security situation, continued humanitarian crisis, and local and international threats to DRC state authority, the UN established MONUSCO, a Chapter VII mandated mission with a military force of approximately 20,000. MONUSCO's goals were to minimize the threat of armed groups on civilians, improve the DRC military's ability to handle the security situation, and expand state authority.³⁷ MONUSCO remains the UN's mission in the DRC with a mandate extended through 2016.

The M23 rebel group was the primary threat to government sovereignty when the UN established the intervention brigade. M23 sprung from a failed agreement between the DRC government and another armed group, the CNDP.³⁸ On March 23, 2009, the government signed a peace agreement with the CNDP. In an attempt at reconciliation, the government agreed to reform, the CNDP agreed to resolve differences diplomatically as a political party, and CNDP rebels were integrated into the DRC's national army. Three years later, former CNDP members who were unsatisfied with the implementation of the 2009 agreement started an offshoot rebel group called M23, a reference to the date of the failed agreement. As the M23 group gained momentum, it became a serious threat to the DRC's national security and it enjoyed cross-border support from Rwanda. In November 2012, M23 seized Goma, the capital of North Kivu province. This dramatic military success in the face of regional political agreements, and a UN military presence in Goma, prompted a new approach from the regional powers and the UN.

³⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925 (May 2010): 3-4, accessed August 19, 2015, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010)).

³⁸ Jason Stearns, *From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo* (Nairobi, Kenya: Rift Valley Institute, 2012), 25-38. CNDP: French acronym for National Congress for the Defense of the People, a mainly Tutsi armed group that began as a militia under Laurent Nkunda in 2003 initially fighting with the DRC government troops. In 2006 the CNDP began fighting the government until they reached political settlement in 2009. The M23 uprising was initiated by Bosco Ntaganda, a former commander in the CNDP.

As early as July 2012, two international African organizations, the ICGLR³⁹ and the SADC⁴⁰ began discussions on deploying an offensive force to defeat rebel groups in eastern DRC, specifically the M23. The ICGLR considered a “neutral International Force (NIF) to eradicate M23, FDLR and all other Negative Forces in the Eastern DRC and patrol and secure the Border Zones.”⁴¹ However, its deployment was stalled due to funding requirements and political disagreements over which countries would provide forces and whether the unit should be mandated by the African Union (AU) and the UN.⁴²

In January 2013, the United Nations, African Union, ICGLR, and SADC developed the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region (PSC Framework). This agreement committed the DRC to internal reform, the region to facilitate the peace process respecting each state’s sovereignty, and the international community to remain engaged. It provided an oversight mechanism that included all four international organizations.⁴³ A month later, the UN passed a resolution supporting the PSC Framework which

³⁹ ICGLR: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region is a UN prompted conference of 12 African countries dedicated to promoting peace, stability, and development in the Great Lakes Region of central Africa. Members include **Angola**, Burundi, CAR, Republic of Congo, **DRC**, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, **Tanzania**, and **Zambia**. Accessed August 20, 2015, <http://www.icglr.org>. Countries in bold are members of both ICGLR and SADC.

⁴⁰ SADC: Southern African Development Community is an international organization that seeks to achieve economic development, peace and security, and enhance the quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa. Members include **Angola**, Botswana, **DRC**, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, **Tanzania**, **Zambia**, and Zimbabwe. Accessed August 20, 2015, <http://www.sadc.int>.

⁴¹ “Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the Security Situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)”, ICGLR, Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 July 2012.

⁴² Lamont, 9-10.

⁴³ “Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region,” (January 2013), 2-4, African Union, accessed August 15, 2015, <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/peace-security-and-cooperation-framework-for-drc-and-the-region-signed-in-addis-ababa>.

extended MONUSCO another year and established the Force Intervention Brigade.⁴⁴ The brigade combined military forces from three SADC member countries, operating under the UN's mandate for MONUSCO.

This brief historical overview covered the UN's mission in the DRC, the rise of the M23 rebel group, and the regional political agreements that established a basis for MONUSCO's intervention brigade. In summary, the brigade was an ICGLR idea, formed from SADC forces, and incorporated into the existing UN framework in the DRC, with AU oversight. It was a response to the continued cycle of violence from armed groups mainly in eastern DRC, which reached a tipping point when M23 seized Goma. Within this historical context, this research now poses eight structured focused questions to analyze the intervention brigade as part of MONUSCO's strategy in the DRC.

The first question is why did MONUSCO implement the intervention brigade? MONUSCO implemented the intervention brigade in response to a regional call to defeat the myriad armed groups operating in eastern DRC that were threatening regional stability. The ICGLR and the SADC provided regional impetus and troops for the brigade while MONUSCO provided additional support and international legitimacy in the form of a mandate. Explicitly, MONUSCO implemented the brigade to defeat the armed groups, specifically the M23, until the DRC's armed forces (FARDC) were capable enough to replace the brigade. The resolution called for a clear exit strategy for the intervention brigade once a Congolese Rapid Reaction Force was capable of assuming their responsibilities.⁴⁵

Implicitly, MONUSCO implemented the intervention brigade because the FARDC was not only incapable, they were also part of the problem. In the same Resolution that established the brigade, the UN condemned the FARDC for mass rapes earlier in the year and their complicity in

⁴⁴ UNSCR 2098, 6.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

the recruitment and abuse of children in the armed forces.⁴⁶ MONUSCO's primary mission was to protect civilians, including sexual violence and violence against children. The FARDC was implicated in both along with the various armed groups they were meant to defeat.

Another implicit reason that MONUSCO implemented the intervention brigade was because UN troop contributing countries were unwilling to employ their forces in a necessary manner to protect civilians from the armed groups. Not only were there 7,500 FARDC soldiers in the vicinity of Goma when M23 rebels seized it, but there were also 1,500 MONUSCO troops.⁴⁷ The UN's strategic review following the brigade's implementation stressed the need for "a change in the behavior of certain troop-contributing countries. All contingents must be ready and willing to use armed force against those who pose a threat to the civilian population, and to do so proactively."⁴⁸ Under its original 2010 mandate, MONUSCO was authorized to use "all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection [of civilians] mandate."⁴⁹ Some troop contributing countries failed to implement the mandate because of the risks to their troops.⁵⁰ The volunteer troops from the SADC countries that formed the intervention brigade were willing to conduct offensive operations against the armed groups.

In summary, MONUSCO implemented the intervention brigade as part of an international solution involving three other organizations that had comparable goals for the DRC, namely to defeat the armed groups that were threatening stability. MONUSCO explicitly stated that the intervention brigade would defeat armed groups until a similar Congolese force could

⁴⁶ UNSCR 2098, 3, 9.

⁴⁷ Cammaert, 2.

⁴⁸ UN Report of the Secretary General, 17.

⁴⁹ UNSCR 2098, 4.

⁵⁰ Sheeran, 18-19.

replace it and maintain security. But implicitly, MONUSCO implemented the brigade because the FARDC had become part of the problem and some troop contributing countries were unwilling to place their forces at risk to protect civilians from the armed groups. The UNSC recognized that MONUSCO's strategy was unbalanced. The ends were not commensurate with the ways and means. The UN implemented the intervention brigade to provide MONUSCO additional ways and means to achieve their ends.

The second question is what military objectives did MONUSCO give to the intervention brigade? The MONUSCO mandate gave two military objectives to the intervention brigade: 1) contribute to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and 2) make space for stabilization activities.⁵¹ It is important to note that both objectives explicitly support the DRC government. The first military objective recognized that other MONUSCO forces and the FARDC were also reducing the threat posed by armed groups. The intervention brigade was a contributor to that effort. While MONUSCO as a whole was looking holistically at threats to state authority and civilian security, the intervention brigade was to contribute by dealing specifically with armed groups in eastern DRC.

The second military objective referenced other MONUSCO stabilization activities that needed space to occur. MONUSCO conducted 16 stabilization activities throughout the DRC including civil affairs, justice support, military and police reform, political affairs, human rights protection, and humanitarian aid. Most of these activities could only take place in areas free from the threat of armed groups. MONUSCO recognized the problematic eastern part of DRC where armed groups created a "security and humanitarian crisis" that was inaccessible to UN peacekeepers.⁵² The second military objective created space by preventing armed groups from interfering with other MONUSCO stabilization efforts necessary to promote the peace process

⁵¹ UNSCR 2098, 6.

⁵² Ibid., 1-2, 8-9.

and expand government control. In summary, the intervention brigade's objectives were no different from MONUSCO's military objectives.

The third question asks do the intervention brigade's ends support MONUSCO's ends? Yes, the intervention brigade's objectives directly support MONUSCO's objectives. The intervention brigade's ends are stated above. It is necessary then to examine MONUSCO's stated objectives. MONUSCO's first objective was a "reduction of the threat posed by Congolese and foreign armed groups, including through the operations by the Intervention Brigade, violence against civilians, including sexual and gender-based violence and violence against children to a level that can be effectively managed by the Congolese justice and security institutions."⁵³ MONUSCO's second objective was "stabilization through the establishment of functional state security institutions in conflict-affected areas, and through strengthened democratic order that reduces the risk of instability, including adequate political space, observance of human rights and a credible electoral process."⁵⁴

The intervention brigade's objectives directly support MONUSCO's objectives. The brigade's first objective nests with MONUSCO's first objective to reduce the threat posed by armed groups against civilians. The brigade's second objective sets conditions for MONUSCO's second objective. The brigade is meant to make space for functional state security institutions, specifically in eastern DRC, the most conflict-affected area.

While the intervention brigade's directive has been consistent with MONUSCO's objectives, it is important to note a subtle change in MONUSCO's second objective from its mandate in 2013 to the latest in 2015. The second objective now includes "stabilization through the establishment of functional, professional, and accountable state institutions, including security

⁵³ UNSCR 2098, 6.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

and judicial institutions.”⁵⁵ This new language recognizes a need for reform within the DRC government to achieve lasting stability.

This research intentionally focused on the intervention brigade’s ability to support MONUSCO’s activities, not on the effectiveness of those activities. This subtle change of language in the mandate suggests that MONUSCO recognized a root cause of the conflict rested on the state authority it had committed to protect. The intervention brigade’s first objective did not change; it is to “reduce the threat posed by armed groups to state authority.”⁵⁶ This objective still supports MONUSCO’s second objective. But it is important to note that MONUSCO has expanded the scope of its second objective to stress further a need for internal reform within the DRC government.

The fourth question asks what methods did MONUSCO authorize for the intervention brigade? The MONUSCO mandate authorized the intervention brigade to conduct unilateral and joint targeted offensive operations to “prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them.”⁵⁷ This directive has not changed through the most current mandate. It marked the first time a UN force was directed to conduct offensive operations against specific parties in a conflict, so it is necessary to examine the language in detail.

The intervention brigade was authorized to conduct unilateral or joint targeted offensive operations. MONUSCO authorized the brigade to conduct unilateral operations in cases when the FARDC was complicit in the problem. In some areas in eastern DRC, elements of the FARDC actively supported certain rebel groups.⁵⁸ In other areas, the FARDC failed to protect civilians or

⁵⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2147 (March 2014): 6, accessed August 19, 2015, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2147\(2014\); UNSCR 2211, 5](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2147(2014); UNSCR 2211, 5).

⁵⁶ UNSCR 2211, 5.

⁵⁷ UNSCR 2098, 7.

⁵⁸ UN Report of the Secretary General, 5.

actively violated human rights against citizens.⁵⁹ In these cases, joint operations could be problematic because the FARDC in the area counteracted MONUSCO objectives.

But in most cases, MONUSCO preferred joint operations between the intervention brigade and FARDC troops. Joint operations provided the brigade better intelligence and a greater capacity to hold ground once they removed rebels from an area. Joint operations also increased mission ownership and determination among the FARDC while decreasing their human rights violations.⁶⁰ Finally, joint operations supported MONUSCO's goal to build FARDC capacity, specifically their Rapid Reaction Force which was meant to assume the intervention brigade's responsibilities.⁶¹

These unilateral and joint operations were intended to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and disarm them.⁶² The mandate does not specify an expansion in size or space, but it is reasonable to consider both. Localized *Mai-Mai*⁶³ rebel groups rarely have the capacity to expand in size or space based on their support structure and limited aims, but they have occasionally combined into larger forces or joined larger rebel groups.⁶⁴ The large groups are most worrisome. M23 remains the most obvious example of how a rebel group expanded quickly in size and seized significant territory. The FDLR and ADF remain the greatest threat to

⁵⁹ UN Report of the Secretary General, 7.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., 12; UNSCR 2098, 8.

⁶² UNSCR 2098, 7.

⁶³ Mai-Mai (or Mayi-Mayi) are community based militia groups in eastern DRC originally formed to defend local villages against foreign rebel groups in areas where the DRC government cannot control. The word is a transliteration from the Swahili for *water*, a reference to an animistic belief that spiritual forces would protect the militia members by turning the enemy's bullets into water after they were fired, rendering them ineffective.

⁶⁴ "Briefing: Crisis in North Kivu," Integrated Regional Information Networks, accessed November 19, 2015, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/95836/briefing-crisis-in-north-kivu>.

expansion. Simply put, the directive to prevent expansion is one of containment that stops growth and influence.

Interpreting the directive to “neutralize” these groups is more problematic.⁶⁵ The mandate does not provide a definition of the term, but it does provide clues to its meaning. The Oxford dictionary says to “neutralize” is to “render (something) ineffective or harmless by applying an opposite force or effect.”⁶⁶ US Army doctrine defines it as “a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation.”⁶⁷ Both of these definitions support a goal short of destroying the armed groups. The object is to render them ineffective, or at least prevent their interference with MONUSCO stability operations.

The third task, to disarm these groups, further supports this limited aim. Though a destroyed rebel group is easily disarmed, this task implies removing the group’s combat capability. MONUSCO has two programs that further support this claim. Their Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program supports the peaceful integration of Congolese rebels back into society. The Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) program does the same for foreign rebels with the support of neighboring governments in the rebel homelands. Additions to the 2015 mandate also support the claim that destruction is not the end goal. The newer mandate states that the above tasks will be completed “in accordance with the standing operating procedures applicable to persons who are captured or who surrender.”⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Oswald, 3.

⁶⁶ Oxford Dictionary, s.v. “neutralize,” accessed November 19, 2015, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/neutralize.

⁶⁷ Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 1-02, Operational Terms and Military Symbols* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 1-26.

⁶⁸ UNSCR 2211, 6.

In summary, the UN authorized the intervention brigade to use specific methods, or ways, to achieve their objectives. First, and most prominent, was the directive to conduct unilateral and joint targeted offensive operations. This was the first time the UN provided such a robust authorization. Second, the three follow-on tasks can be understood as sequential. The UN directed the intervention brigade to stop the expansion of the armed groups, render them ineffective, then remove their combat capability. MONUSCO's mission provides programs that support this process for both Congolese and foreign armed groups.

The fifth question is, do the intervention brigade's methods support MONUSCO's ends? The brigade's methods directly support MONUSCO's ends from an operational perspective. But from an external legal perspective, these methods may hinder MONUSCO's objectives. The intervention brigade's methods were examined above. To review, MONUSCO's first objective was to reduce the threat of armed groups and violence against civilians to a level that Congolese justice and security institutions can manage. Its second objective was stabilization through established functional, professional, and accountable state security institutions and strengthened democratic order that reduces the risk of instability.⁶⁹

From an operational perspective, the intervention brigade's methods support MONUSCO's objectives. Neutralizing and disarming armed groups directly contributes to reducing their threat and prevents their violence against civilians. Also, joint operations with FARDC troops further protects civilians and supports the host nation security institution. The brigade's offensive operations create space for stabilization activities in areas under armed group control. Legally, the other MONUSCO brigades could accomplish the same objectives without the additional methods, under the protection-of-civilians mandate. But troop contributing countries have been unwilling to employ their units to the full extent of the mandate. The

⁶⁹ UNSCR 2211, 5; UNSCR 2098, 6.

intervention brigade's additional methods provide MONUSCO another option to achieve their objectives.

But from an external perspective, the intervention brigade's methods may hinder MONUSCO's objectives, and possibly the United Nations' legitimacy. The purpose of UN peace enforcement operations is to use military force to compel disputing parties to conform to a peace agreement.⁷⁰ When the UNSC established MONUC, the predecessor to MONUSCO, it was to enforce the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which was signed by three international organizations, seven countries, and two rebel groups. In contrast, the PSC Framework currently guiding MONUSCO was signed by four international organizations, 11 countries, and no rebel groups.⁷¹ With over 70 armed groups operating in the Kivu provinces alone who are not signatory to the framework, it suggests that the UN is not concerned about impartiality between the DRC government and the armed groups.⁷² It is concerned, however, about impartiality between the regional states that have an impact on the conflict.

While the DRC conflict was at one time a conflict between regional states, it is now chiefly a conflict between the DRC government and armed groups in the DRC. The intervention brigade has been tasked to neutralize these groups. The brigade's actions, then, are not enforcing the PSC Framework or any other peace agreement; they are specifically targeting the threat to Congolese civilians and Congolese government authority.⁷³ The UN mandate explicitly supports the DRC government and their military against the armed groups.

⁷⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the UN," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992-1993): 93.

⁷¹ Lusaka Agreement, 9-10; PSC Framework, 6-8.

⁷² Gerrie Swart, "The DRC Peace Process: Rebels Without Pause, A Peace Agreement with an Escape Clause?" *South African Peace and Security Studies* 2, No 1 (2013): 80.

⁷³ Sijuade Koyode "'Intervention Brigade' for the Congo: A Precedent for UN Peace Enforcement?" *Review of International Law and Politics* 10, no. 38 (August 2014): 113.

This lack of impartiality is problematic for MONUSCO's success and robust UN peacekeeping missions in general. Other UN missions in high-threat environments, such as Mali and the Central African Republic, may also become party to the conflict in support of the sovereign state.⁷⁴ If the intervention brigade in the DRC sets a precedent, despite assurances that it will not, UN forces may be called to crush armed rebellion in other states as well, which may complicate the UN's standing protection-of-civilians mandate. UN member states may intervene to prevent peacekeeping missions from overstepping their traditional bounds. Russia has already expressed concern for the UN mission in Mali, citing their similar authorities to the intervention brigade in DRC with "unpredictable and unclear consequences" for the future.⁷⁵ Ultimately, UN member states have the power to limit or prevent UN missions, including MONUSCO. If voting members consider the intervention brigade's authorities to be too robust, they could move to limit them which could, in turn, prevent MONUSCO from achieving its goals.

The intervention brigade's methods may also limit MONUSCO's success by influencing DRC leadership to rely on a military rather than diplomatic solution. After the brigade's approval, "the government seemed disinterested in peace talks" facilitated by the ICGLR.⁷⁶ Both the CNDP and the M23 rebel groups reached a political agreement with the DRC government, the latter due to the intervention brigade's initial military successes. A robust military force such as the intervention brigade may persuade the DRC government to pursue immediate military success rather than long-term political resolution with the armed groups. In this case, the intervention brigade may detract from MONUSCO's objective of long-term stability.

In summary, the unique methods authorized for the intervention brigade directly support operational success against the armed groups, but may hinder mission success in the long term.

⁷⁴ Sheeran, 19.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Cammaert, 12.

MONUSCO military units were always authorized to use force to protect civilians and for self-defense. Troop contributing countries to the MONUSCO mission were either unwilling or unable to protect civilians within the standing mandate.⁷⁷ The UNSC authorized the intervention brigade to conduct targeted offensive operations to protect civilians and state authority. This new method supports MONUSCO's goals for the DRC, but may risk international legitimacy to MONUSCO and other robust UN peacekeeping missions. In the long term, the method may hinder MONUSCO from achieving its objectives and compromise the mission if UN member states decide it oversteps UN authority.

The sixth question is what resources are available to the intervention brigade? The intervention brigade's resources come from the SADC troop contributing countries and from the greater MONUSCO mission. SADC countries, include Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa, contributed a total of 3,069 troops for the intervention brigade.⁷⁸ All three provided an infantry battalion. The South African battalion was already a part of the MONUSCO mission, it was simply allocated to the intervention brigade. The Malawi battalion arrived from a previous UN peacekeeping mission in the Ivory Coast. Tanzania provided an additional infantry battalion along with a field artillery company and the brigade headquarters, to include the brigade commander. Both Tanzania and Malawi contributed Special Forces troops to constitute a Special Force and Reconnaissance company.⁷⁹

The three SADC countries chosen to provide troops for the brigade were ideal considering the regional dynamics. All three are UN member states. Tanzanian troops speak Kiswahili, a language widely spoken in the DRC. None of the countries took part in the Congo

⁷⁷ Sheeran, 19.

⁷⁸ Gberie, 1.

⁷⁹ "South Africa and the UN Intervention Brigade," Institute for Security Studies, accessed November 14, 2015, <https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africa-and-the-un-intervention-brigade-in-the-drc>.

wars preceding the intervention. Other countries in the SADC and ICGLR, such as Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, had been involved on one side or the other during the wars. Deploying troops from those countries as part of the offensively tasked intervention brigade may have increased distrust between the DRC government and its neighbors.⁸⁰ The three SADC troop-contributing countries were well suited to the mission.

Since the regional organizations agreed that the intervention brigade should align under the MONUSCO mission, the brigade gained access to additional resources from the UN. The intervention brigade received support from the existing MONUSCO support channels, but specifically benefited from engineer assets and rotary wing lift and attack capabilities. The intervention brigade established a base in Sake, on the border between North and South Kivu provinces. MONUSCO support from North Kivu included an engineer company, a lift aviation company and attack aviation company from South Africa and a Ukrainian rotary lift company. South Kivu provided a Bangladeshi engineer company, Pakistani rotary lift company, and Ukrainian rotary attack company.⁸¹

While these assets did not belong to the intervention brigade, they were paramount to its mission. Engineers were especially helpful in establishing a defensible base. Rotary lift and attack assets provided maneuverability and air support which allowed the brigade to conduct operations as directed, in a “highly mobile and versatile manner.”⁸² In summary, resources for the intervention brigade came from the SADC troop contributing countries and from the existing MONUSCO support structure. These additional UN resources improved the brigade’s ability to achieve its objectives.

⁸⁰ “Africa’s Seven Nation War,” International Crisis Group, accessed November 14, 2015, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/004-africas-seven-nation-war.aspx>.

⁸¹ “Map of MONUSCO,” United Nations, accessed November 14, 2015, <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/MONUSCO.pdf>.

⁸² UNSCR 2098, 7.

The seventh question asks if the intervention brigade's means support its ends. The brigade's resources are listed above. In review, the intervention brigades objectives were 1) contribute to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC, and 2) make space for stabilization activities. No, the intervention brigade's resources are insufficient to achieve its ends. The first objective is vague. The intervention brigade has already contributed to reducing the threat of armed groups to state authority with the destruction of the M23 movement.⁸³ But this objective is easily achieved. Any additional military resources can contribute to reducing this threat. There are no specified metrics.

Conversely, the intervention brigade may increase the threat posed by armed groups to civilian security through collateral damage and reprisals. Intensified military operations in already volatile regions increase the risk to civilians caught in the crossfire. The brigade's limited resources also prevent them from remaining in cleared areas to prevent armed groups' return and reprisals against civilians.⁸⁴ This limitation also affects the second objective.

The intervention brigade is insufficiently resourced to make space for stabilization activities. The brigade can seize ground from even the strongest armed groups in the DRC, but it does not have the capacity to hold ground.⁸⁵ FARDC forces are necessary to consolidate the brigade's achieved gains. Ultimately, the intervention brigade can only help the FARDC make space for stabilization activities. The brigade does not have the resources to achieve its objective alone.⁸⁶

⁸³ Christoph Vogel, "Islands of Stability or Swamps of Insecurity? MONUSCO's Intervention Brigade and the Danger of Emerging Security Voids in eastern Congo," *Africa Policy Brief* no. 9 (February 2014): 1, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/APB9.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Cammaert, 1.

⁸⁵ Vogel, "Islands," 6.

⁸⁶ Christoph Vogel, "Without Precedent or Prejudice? UNSC Resolution 2098 and its Potential Implications for Humanitarian Space in Eastern Congo and Beyond," *The Journal of*

The final question is, do the intervention brigade's means support its methods? No, the intervention brigade does not have sufficient means to employ its directed methods. The intervention brigade has been tasked to "prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and disarm them" using unilateral or joint targeted offensive operations.⁸⁷ There are over 70 armed groups in the Kivu provinces alone. One brigade is simply insufficient to compel all armed groups to disarm.⁸⁸ In fact, MONUSCO's entire military mission may be too small for the task.⁸⁹

Even if the intervention brigade successfully deters some armed groups from actively attacking the DRC government or Congolese civilians, it is unlikely to compel or convince all of them. Historically, offensive operations have deterred some armed groups from actively fighting the government.⁹⁰ But other groups, such as M23, increased attacks and attempted to intimidate troop contributing countries after the UNSC authorized the intervention brigade.⁹¹ While intervention brigade troops could seize ground, Congolese troops are required to hold it. With the current state of the FARDC, that outcome is unlikely and any gains would be temporary.⁹² The intervention brigade itself is not sufficiently equipped to act according to its directed methods.

This section presented a case study of the UN mission in the DRC. It reviewed MONUSCO's history in the DRC and applied eight structured focused questions to test the hypotheses. The questions elicited detailed responses with supporting evidence. The next section

Humanitarian Assistance (January 2014), accessed on December 15, 2015, <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2032>.

⁸⁷ UNSCR 2211, 7.

⁸⁸ Vogel, "Islands," 4.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 6-7; Kayode, 112; Cammaert, 8.

⁹⁰ Cammaert, 8.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 9.

concludes with an analysis of each question to determine if the evidence supports the hypotheses, does not support the hypotheses, or presents a mixed outcome.

Findings and Analysis

This section reviews the three hypotheses presented in this paper. It analyzes the answers to the structured focused questions to determine if the evidence supports or does not support the hypotheses, or if it presents a mixed outcome. This section then applies Lykke's criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to determine how the intervention brigade affects MONUSCO's strategy.

The first hypothesis proposed that if the intervention brigade's ends support MONUSCO's ends, then the brigade balances MONUSCO's strategy. The evidence supports this hypothesis. MONUSCO has two primary objectives: reduce the threat of armed groups to a level that Congolese justice and security institutions can manage, and stabilization through the establishment of functional state security institutions in conflict-affected areas.⁹³ The intervention brigade's objectives are to contribute to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security, and to make space for stabilization activities.⁹⁴

The objectives are essentially the same. MONUSCO's collective emphasis remains on improving the Congolese government institutions. The intervention brigade is focused offensively on the armed groups specifically to create conditions suitable for MONUSCO to achieve its objectives. The intervention brigade brings no additional objectives to the UN mission, but it increases methods and resources. According to Lykke's model, the brigade contributes to balancing MONUSCO's overall strategy and decreasing risk.

The second hypothesis suggested that if the intervention brigade's methods support MONUSCO's ends, then the brigade balances MONUSCO's strategy. The evidence presents a

⁹³ UNSCR 2098, 6.

⁹⁴ UNSCR 2211, 7.

mixed outcome for this hypothesis. MONUSCO authorized additional methods for the intervention brigade to include targeted offensive operations aimed at preventing the expansion of all armed groups, neutralizing these groups, and disarming them.⁹⁵ These methods have proven successful against the M23 rebel group when other primarily defensive methods have not. Though the brigade is struggling to get a similar outcome against the FDLR rebel group, the methods do directly contribute to MONUSCO's objectives. There is also evidence that the brigade may not need to physically defeat every armed group, but that some may voluntarily disarm rather than face a UN offensive force.⁹⁶ The alignment of methods with objectives and the initially swift success against the M23 suggest that the intervention brigade's additional methods help to balance MONUSCO's strategy.

In contrast, the robust offensive mandate is a departure from traditional peacekeeping that has members of the UN Security Council and other international actors questioning its legitimacy.⁹⁷ If the intervention brigade threatens MONUSCO's legitimacy, it may impede the UN's ability to achieve its objectives in the DRC. If this is the case, the intervention brigade's methods do not support MONUSCO's ends. Two primary arguments highlight how the brigade's methods threaten MONUSCO's legitimacy.

The first argument is that targeted offensive operations against the rebels make the intervention brigade, and possibly all MONUSCO, a party to the conflict and a legitimate target under international law.⁹⁸ This compromises UN legitimacy and may prevent MONUSCO from achieving its desired ends. The second argument is that the intervention brigade's methods may encourage the DRC government to focus more on a short-term military solution, compromising a

⁹⁵ UNSCR 2098, 7.

⁹⁶ Cammaert, 6, 12.

⁹⁷ Sheeran, 19.

⁹⁸ Cammaert, 1; Oswald, 1; Lamont, 24; Koyode, 112; Whittle 853-854.

desired long-term political one.⁹⁹ In this case the methods support a short-term military solution rather than a long-term political solution that MONUSCO desires. The outcome for this hypothesis is mixed because operationally, the brigade's methods support MONUSCO's ends, but they also threaten UN legitimacy which may ultimately impede MONUSCO's ends.

The third hypothesis submits that if the intervention brigade's means support its ways, then the brigade balances MONUSCO's strategy. The evidence supports this hypothesis, but inversely. The brigade's means do not support its methods and, therefore, unbalance MONUSCO's strategy and increase risk. The intervention brigade is insufficiently resourced to address all armed groups as directed, protect civilians' security, and make space for stabilization activities.

There are over 70 armed groups in the Kivu provinces alone. A single brigade cannot prevent their expansion, neutralize and disarm them. As an offensive unit, the intervention brigade may create more civilian casualties from collateral damage during an operation and rebel reprisals.¹⁰⁰ Their activities may contribute to the humanitarian problem rather than a solution.¹⁰¹ Finally, the brigade can conduct initial clearing operations but requires the FARDC to hold the ground for further MONUSCO stabilization activities. A single brigade is insufficient to address all the armed groups and make space for MONUSCO's stabilization activities.¹⁰²

In summary, the first and third hypotheses were supported, while the second hypothesis presented a mixed outcome. The intervention brigade can contribute to MONUSCO's objectives, but not to the scale explicitly directed by the mandate. The additional brigade does not include

⁹⁹ Cammaert, 12.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 1; Swart 82.

¹⁰¹ Vogel, "Precedent," 1; Swart, 83.

¹⁰² James Verini, "Should the United Nations Wage War to Keep Peace?" *National Geographic* (March 27, 2014): 1, accessed January 22, 2016, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2014/03/140327-congo-genocide-united-nations-peacekeepers-m23-kobler-int/>; Cammaert, 8; Vogel, "Islands," 4; Swart, 83.

enough resources to match MONUSCO's ambitious objectives. According to Lykke's model, MONUSCO increased resources and methods without increasing objectives, which helped to balance their strategy. But the analysis on how the intervention brigade was directed to achieve those objectives reveals that their resources are still insufficient. Means are not balanced with ways or ends, which increases risk.

The final step in Lykke's model applies three metrics to analyze a strategy: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.¹⁰³ To conclude, this section applies these metrics to the intervention brigade as part of the greater MONUSCO strategy. Suitability asks if the intervention brigade achieves its goals, will it accomplish the desired effect? Essentially, does it have the right objective? This research concludes that the strategy is suitable. The intervention brigade's objectives are aligned with MONUSCO's objectives. If the intervention brigade achieves all its goals by neutralizing and disarming all armed groups and making space for stabilization activities, it will accomplish the desired effect for MONUSCO. MONUSCO has broader political goals for the DRC, but if the intervention brigade can achieve its military objectives, it sets the conditions for other MONUSCO activities to occur unhindered by armed groups, which are the greatest current threat.

Feasibility asks if the action can be completed by the means available. Essentially, can it achieve the objective? This research concludes that the strategy is not feasible. The intervention brigade does not have sufficient resources to neutralize and disarm all armed groups or to make space for stabilization activities. Both goals require the FARDC to take the lead, which it is currently unprepared to do.¹⁰⁴ Improving feasibility involves either increasing resources or decreasing objectives. MONUSCO is already the largest and most expensive UN mission. The

¹⁰³ Yarger, 50.

¹⁰⁴ UN Report of the Secretary General, 5; UNSCR 2211, 9.

UNSC has been laying out an exit strategy, so it is unlikely that the brigade will receive additional resources.¹⁰⁵

Acceptability asks if the importance of the desired effect justifies the consequences of the cost. Essentially, is the objective worth it? This research suggests the strategy is not acceptable. The intervention brigade's offensive measures threaten MONUSCO's legitimacy. Risk can be measured in terms of procedural legitimacy weighed against outcome legitimacy. How does the legitimacy of the method compare to the legitimacy of the result? If one decreases, the other must increase.¹⁰⁶ According to many in the international community, the brigade's new methods have decreased MONUSCO's procedural legitimacy. Therefore, MONUSCO's outcome legitimacy must increase. Long-term stability in the DRC would be a compelling outcome in favor of the brigade's robust methods. But this does not appear to be the happening. Discussions for an exit strategy for the brigade and for MONUSCO have amplified since the brigade's implementation. After fifteen years of instability, despite the largest and most expensive UN mission, the results are less compelling. But, even if MONUSCO achieves a positive outcome in the DRC, the debate will continue on whether the intervention brigade's methods constitute legitimate peacekeeping. The UN will face the dilemma of employing a similar construct in other missions while facing increased scrutiny on its claim as an international arbiter.

The intervention brigade does not balance MONUSCO's strategy. It provides additional resources and methods, but the resources are insufficient and the methods perhaps counterproductive to MONUSCO's objectives. According to Lykke's strategy model, this means MONUSCO acquires more risk to achieving its objectives. The next section concludes with a review of this study focused on how the intervention brigade fits in MONUSCO's strategy and provides recommendations for further research.

¹⁰⁵ UNSCR 2211, 13; UN Report of the Secretary General, 15.

¹⁰⁶ Alan C. Lamborn, "Theory and the Politics in World Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (June 1997): 193.

Conclusion

The intervention brigade cannot solve the problem there. But it is better than not being there. I felt the pressure to do something. The word I heard most was *something*. You have to do *something*. So now this is something.

— Martin Kobler, *National Geographic*¹⁰⁷

The purpose of this study was to examine how the intervention brigade, with its extended authorities, contributes to the UN's strategic objectives for stability in DRC. This study anticipated that the UN established the intervention brigade to help balance ends, ways and means within MONUSCO's strategy. By actively pursuing armed groups in ungoverned spaces in the DRC, the intervention brigade was meant to allow time and space for MONUSCO to achieve its mandate while accepting risk of losing international legitimacy. This research suggests that the intervention brigade is insufficiently resourced to achieve its objectives, and its methods incur an unacceptable risk to MONUSCO and the UN.

This research concludes that according to Lykke's model, the intervention brigade does not balance MONUSCO's strategy. Its ways and means do not support its ends, which increases risk. This study offers three recommendations to balance MONUSCO's strategy and reduce risk. The first recommendation is to improve feasibility by increasing resources. Since additional external resources are unlikely, a way to increase resources internally is to improve the FARDC's capability to unilaterally set conditions for stabilization activities. The brigade's mission should be more focused on improving the FARDC's ability to defeat the armed groups. It is already one of MONUSCO's stated goals, it is tied to criteria for the brigade's exit, and the brigade has

¹⁰⁷ Martin Kobler was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Head of MONUSCO from June 2013 to October 2015.

already demonstrated the ability to do it.¹⁰⁸ More focus on improvement and reform in the military provides a lasting resource and contributes to stability. Until that occurs, the intervention brigade's successes remain interim and insufficient.

The second recommendation to decrease risk is to balance methods with objectives. One way is to separate the intervention brigade operationally from the rest of MONUSCO. The intervention brigade's controversial methods possibly place MONUSCO's objectives at risk. A different model of peace enforcement could achieve similar operational results without the risk to UN legitimacy. An example is MINUSMA, the UN mission in Mali. MINUSMA is also a robust Chapter VII mandate, but the UN mission conducts standard peace enforcement operations. There is a French "parallel force" which conducts targeted offensive operations, much like the intervention brigade, but it remains operationally separate from the UN mission and does not compromise MINUSMA the way that the intervention brigade compromises MONUSCO.¹⁰⁹ Further study is required to determine if a similar construct would be a valid option for the DRC.

The third recommendation to decrease risk is to improve MONUSCO's legitimacy through transparency in its mandate. International law is already confusing when applied to peacekeeping operations. IHL and IHRL can be interpreted differently, depending on the situation. The UN could improve transparency by clarifying how it defines the conflict in the DRC and how international law applies to the peace enforcement mission and to the intervention brigade, specifically. There would still be disagreements over the interpretation, but at least the UN would present a clear argument. Clarifying the language in the mandate would also force the UN to truly consider and explain what the intervention brigade means for peacekeeping.

¹⁰⁸ UN Report of the Secretary General, 7.

¹⁰⁹ Christoph Vogel, "Thin-Skinned Quarrels: MONUSCO and Humanitarian Action in the Congo," *African Arguments*, July 18, 2013, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://christophvogel.net/2013/07/12/thin-skinned-quarrels-monusco-and-humanitarian-action-in-the-congo/>.

The majority of the responsibility to improve stability in the DRC lies with the Congolese government. MONUSCO's intervention brigade may be effective in the short-term against certain armed groups, but the Congolese military is not prepared to capitalize on those gains. A more effective and acceptable approach may be to target the "security dilemmas" that foment these armed groups rather than the groups themselves.¹¹⁰ A long-term solution to the problem requires a Congolese military capable of defeating foreign armed groups and addressing local armed groups, in an environment where citizens do not feel the need to take up arms for self-defense or to settle their grievances. The intervention brigade plays a small role in achieving that end, while incurring great risk to the UN's legitimacy in the Congo and future peacekeeping missions.

¹¹⁰ Vogel, "Islands," 8.

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