The Art of Limited Warfare: Operational Art in the 1970 Cambodian Campaign
Abstract
This monograph analyzes the 1970 Cambodian Campaign and deduces lessons which help military scholars and practitioners understand the current US military doctrine of operational art. By looking at all three levels of war- strategic, tactical, and operational- three important lessons emerge regarding ends, means, and ways linked by operational artists in wars of limited aims. These points are not solely relevant to that campaign of the past, but are also informative regarding the future. In future wars, operational artists could benefit from the lessons discovered to better translate military operations into political results. Section One outlines the political and strategic context surrounding the campaign, concluding that ends (policy and strategic aims) can change over time, which requires the operational artist to reframe the operational approach. Section Two provides an overview of the battles and engagements within the campaign and finds that the tendency in limited warfare toward restricting means (resources) affects the translation of tactical actions into enduring advantages. Section Three looks at the way (operational design) the campaign implemented to link means with ends and concludes that the tools used to develop operational approaches should differ depending on the type of warfare being waged.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 16, 2017
- Accession Number
- AD1039891
Entities
People
- Ian C. Pitkin
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies