Wartime Transitions: Historical Case Analyses Applied to the US Campaign in Afghanistan (2001 to Present)
Abstract
For the past seventeen years the United States has been at war in Afghanistan and has committed significant resources in developing the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Is the US transition of security responsibilities to the ANSF politically driven? This question is examined as the US campaign in Afghanistan is compared to three other wars in which superpowers trained local security forces: the British Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), the US War in Vietnam (1963-1975), and the Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979-1989). This study tests four hypotheses: (1) more time is required to develop and transition responsibilities to a local security force in a host nation with weak infrastructure; (2) several interrelated transitions occur at the tactical, operational and strategic levels before local security forces are able to operation independently without external nation support; (3) a custom approach is necessary in security forces development based on political requirement established by the external nation; and (4) host nations with a heterogeneous population take longer to transition than nations with a homogenous population. Further, the security dilemma is analyzed to discern if rival groups arm as a host nation builds its security force. This paper concludes that time spent on an advisory mission is much longer than what is generally recognized. As the United States continues to develop and transition responsibilities to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the ANSF, a long-term US commitment of at least 30-years is recommended to achieve a full transition.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 25, 2017
- Accession Number
- AD1039898
Entities
People
- Mathew A. Randolph
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College