Crisis, Criteria, and Coercion - Beyond Half Measures: The US Marine Corps and Mass Atrocity Response Operations
Abstract
Scholars assert that preventive diplomacy is the preferred and most effectual approach to ending genocides, but empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Indeed, not a single genocide was ended through diplomacy, sanctions, or third-party intervention since the United Nations adopted the Genocide Convention in 1948. Several bureaucratic impediments have ensured the survival of genocide as a policy choice for despotic governments, including strict interpretations of international law, inability to generate international will, and a general unwillingness to fight fire with fire. When intergovernmental bodies fail to generate consensus for intervention and response, the United States must reserve the right to take unilateral action, with or without international approval, when its interests are at stake. Genocidal regimes do not wait for approval to begin operations, and neither should those who wish to stop genocides. Early intervention can deter genocides before they reach the point of no return, and one US military organization is specially constructed for this role. The US Marine Corps is purpose-built for crisis response. This study examines a role for the Marine Corps in Mass Atrocity Response Operations. The Marine Corps is task-organized, highly mobile, and constructed to shape the operational environment and set conditions for follow-on operations. The analysis suggests the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, designed for threat deterrence, crisis response, and power projection, is Americas most qualified and capable genocide response force.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 25, 2017
- Accession Number
- AD1039938
Entities
People
- Jefferey L. Starr
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College