Division Artillery: Linking Strategy to Tactics
Abstract
In 2016, with his initial message to the force, Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Mark Milley established readiness as the top priority for the US Army. Within the field artillery branch, the implication was how to achieve the highest level of readiness, while also preparing for ground combat against a near peer competitor. Additionally, the deterioration of the field artillery in the twelve years of persistent low intensity conflict created a sense of urgency within the Army that spawned the reestablishment of the division artillery. With the subsequent suspension of the reestablishment of the division artillery, there has been confusion on how to best achieve readiness and prepare for future combat. The monograph shows how the division artillery can achieve the Chief of Staff's strategic guidance, specifically the objective of readiness through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. The Battles of Kasserine Pass and Operation Desert Storm, show the evolution of doctrine, organization and employment of field artillery in two instances against near peer competitors. The case studies demonstrate several of the tenants of unified land operations, which describes the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power in campaigns and operations. Specifically, the elements displayed were flexibility, lethality, adaptability, and synchronization. The division artillery is the operational artist, while within modularity, there is no advocate for ensuring that subordinate field artillery units are getting the manning, training, and employment that prepares them for future conflict.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 25, 2017
- Accession Number
- AD1039970
Entities
People
- Lincoln R. Ward
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies