

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTIONALIZING THE HUMAN DOMAIN: ACHIEVING
CROSS DOMAIN SYNERGY FOR “EVERY DAY” MISSIONS

by

Gregory L. Jones, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Mr. Thomas Minehart, Central Intelligence Agency

6 April 2017

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government, the Department of Defense, or Air University. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.



Biography

LtCol Jones graduated from The Citadel and was commissioned as a 2nd Lt in the United States Marine Corps in 1997. In 1998, he became an Infantry Officer and was assigned to the 2nd Marine Division. Lt Col Jones' operational assignments were with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) and with the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions. LtCol Jones deployed with the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom on three separate occasions. LtCol Jones served overseas in Hanoi, Vietnam, where he participated in the Defense Department's efforts to repatriate the remains of service members declared Missing in Action from the Vietnam War. LtCol Jones' assignments within the supporting establishment include The Officer Candidates School; the Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station, Cleveland, Ohio; and the Commanding Officer, Infantry Training Battalion, School of Infantry-East. LtCol Jones is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Infantry Captain's Career Corps and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. His personal awards include the Bronze Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and the Meritorious Service Medal with three Gold Stars. LtCol Gregory L. Jones is currently assigned to the Grand Strategy Seminar, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Abstract

Establishing an additional doctrinal domain, the Human Domain, will enhance Joint Doctrine, place socio-cultural factors within the operational environment at the forefront of military planning, and will ameliorate limitations within current doctrine. While much was written on the topic, the Department of Defense has yet to codify this concept into Joint Doctrine. However, in 2015 the U.S. Special Operations Command published *Operating in the Human Domain* which sought to establish a new doctrinal domain alongside the traditional domains of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace. As a result, the Joint Staff is currently drafting the *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations*. This paper reviews the future operating environment to establish the importance of socio-cultural factors to success in future military operations. Then, weaknesses within current Joint Doctrine are assessed to demonstrate the need for doctrine that will elevate the human domain within military planning. Next the paper reviews efforts by the U.S. and the U.K. to adapt current doctrine to codify lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. A brief review detailing how cyber became a domain provides insight into the practicality and necessity of adding the human domain. This paper also seeks to demonstrate that the Department of Defense must ensure the Joint Force retains the capabilities to operate within the human domain. Finally, the paper concludes with recommendations that will ensure socio-cultural factors are codified in doctrine thereby enabling the U.S. military to successfully plan for and operate in future conflicts.

Introduction

The United States Military has a long history of involvement in operations short of full-scale, conventional conflict. This trend will not change. In the complex, future operating environment where non-state actors pose a significant threat to regional stability, the United States Military's involvement in these types of conflicts will most likely increase.¹ In fact, military operations designed to influence human behavior in a manner that facilitates the accomplishment of American foreign policy is not a skill set routinely practiced within our military. As such, this paper seeks to highlight the need to codify those skills required for the U.S. Military to succeed in everyday missions.

Despite some attempts to elevate the importance of human behavior in military planning since the outset of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Military traditionally demonstrates an aversion towards inculcating lessons learned from irregular conflict. As outlined in Appendix A, the U.S. Military tends to incorporate technological and operational lessons that enhance warfighting performance during conventional conflict at the expense of skills required to succeed in everyday missions. This trend was recently demonstrated after the Vietnam War when we eschewed counter-insurgency as an operating concept and re-focused the force towards conventional warfare. The United States Military is on the verge of repeating this trend in spite of significant lessons learned during the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.²

Current editions of Joint Publications, such as Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability*, incorporate attempts to elevate the importance of human behavior within military planning for everyday missions. Moreover, in the 2013 white paper titled *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Will*, Generals Odierno and Amos, and

Admiral McRaven espouse the importance of influencing human behavior within the “human domain” to succeed in future conflicts, but four years later the DOD has made little progress toward this end.³ Currently, the Joint Staff is preparing a conceptual document titled *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO)*, but that document is not yet signed or published. In this paper I will argue that because conducting military engagement, security cooperation, stability operations, and counterinsurgency (defined as everyday missions herein) inherently requires our military to engage with the citizens of our partners and allies to shape and contain conflict, the DOD should institutionalize the concept of the “Human Domain” as a doctrinal operating domain to facilitate the synchronized execution of the Joint Force as it relates to these missions. Briefly, the Human Domain can be defined as “the people (individuals, groups, and populations) in the environment, including their perceptions, decision-making, and behavior.”⁴

First, this paper will demonstrate how conflict is trending away from total, conventional war. Next, this paper will focus on the importance of the Human Domain as it relates to success within every day missions of the U.S. Military and demonstrate how current Joint Doctrine is insufficient to facilitate success within the Human Domain. Specifically, the paper will focus on the “Joint Force Prioritized Missions” of “Military Engagement and Security Cooperation” and “Stability and Counterinsurgency” because they epitomize those missions where the U.S. Military will engage with indigenous populations to forward U.S. policy objectives.⁵ Then, the paper will analyze three alternative concepts that provide more applicable foundations to achieve success within the Human Domain. Finally, the paper will review the difficulties with and importance of institutionalizing a new operating domain.

The Future Operating Environment and the Importance of Human Factors

The future “operational environment ... will be affected by nonmilitary variables influenced by local populations.”⁶ In order to achieve outcomes beneficial to U.S. foreign policy in this environment, the U.S. military will require the ability to “coerce within the international arena ... to deter war and meet the nation’s strategic goals.”⁷ Central to this ability to influence local populations and attain U.S. foreign policy objectives are the human beings of the local populations themselves and their associated behavior. The document titled *The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*, otherwise known as the Joint Operating Environment 2035 (JOE 2035), acknowledges the importance of human beings and their behavior to the future operating environment. Specifically, JOE 2035 defines this phenomena as “*Human Geography*” and states that “a range of social, economic, environmental, and political pressures will push states past the breaking point, spilling over borders, and creating wide-ranging international problems.”⁸ Both JOE 2035 and Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, (JP 3-0) enumerate the importance of Joint Operations designed to “shape” the environment prior to conflict and thereby limit the risk of conventional hostilities.⁹ The JOE 2035 takes the concept of shaping the environment further and states the Joint Force should play a role to “contain ... the spread of adversary influence ... or halt the negative consequences of state failure.”¹⁰ In order to successfully shape and contain conflict JOE 2035 goes on to espouse that the Joint Force must exert “*Global Influence*” designed to “understand and blunt adversary use of ideas, images, and violence designed to manipulate the United States and its allies.”¹¹ Clearly, the ability to understand, coerce, and influence human behavior is central to the U.S. Military’s role in achieving our foreign policy objectives through 2035.

What operations then are critical to shaping and containing conflict in a future operating environment where pressures exerted on the human geography create disorder within the

international system? JP 3-0 and the unsigned, unpublished JC-HAMO both state that military engagement, security cooperation, stability operations, and counterinsurgency operations will allow the Joint Force to shape and contain conflict.¹² The importance of these missions is further codified by the National Military Strategy (NMS) of 2015 which lists them as two of the twelve “Joint Force Prioritized Missions.”¹³ Moreover, these missions are historically of vital import in attaining U.S. foreign policy objectives. While “America’s armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over two centuries, they have, during the same period, engaged in several hundred military undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations.”¹⁴

In order to properly plan operations that account for human geography the Joint Force Commander (JFC) must establish an understanding of the “operational environment” which is “the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”¹⁵ It is clear then, that socio-cultural or human factors are vital to establishing an understanding of the operational environment. Moreover, this understanding will allow the Joint Force to conduct military operations that influence local populations in a manner that shapes and contains conflict and thereby facilitates U.S. foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, the Joint Publications associated with the Joint Force Prioritized Missions of military engagement, security cooperation, stability, and counterinsurgency each espouse the importance of socio-cultural factors in creating an understanding of the operational environment.¹⁶ In fact, the JC-HAMO document states that “Insight into real or potential sources of instability and conflict is essential during military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, to help prevent, mitigate, and/or contain armed conflict.”¹⁷

Current Joint Doctrine Insufficiently Assesses Human Factors

Joint Doctrine and associated publications, military history, the future operating environment, and many academic studies espouse the importance of socio-cultural, human factors, or human geography to achieve success within the everyday missions. These missions are vital to shaping and containing conflict to achieve the National Military Strategy and U.S. foreign policy objectives. While the importance of human factors is certainly not ignored within Joint Doctrine, they are of secondary importance to the doctrinally defined domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) and traditional military concepts aligning with conventional conflict. Furthermore, the primary method to assess human behavior within the operational environment, the PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems) analytical framework, is not sufficient to understand why humans behave in context and focuses instead on targeting human action vice the causes of their behavior.

The remainder of this section will review some aspects of current Joint Doctrine to demonstrate that more effort is required to enable the Joint Force to successfully navigate human geography and shape and contain conflict through the everyday missions of military engagement, security cooperation, stability, and counterinsurgency. As previously mentioned, the publications associated with these military operations do pay attention to the importance of human factors. However, to acquire an in-depth understanding of how these human factors influence the operational environment, each publication refers the reader to Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (JIPOE).

The JIPOE process is designed to facilitate an understanding of the operational environment.¹⁸ One element within this process results in the development of a “geospatial perspective” and “a systems perspective ... through the analysis of relevant socio-cultural factors

and system nodes and links.”¹⁹ In order to develop a geospatial perspective, the JIPOE process instructs the military planner to analyze the environment through the physical domains (Land, Maritime, Air, and Space) and the Information Environment, which is further sub-divided into relevant actors and Cyberspace.²⁰ However, only about 2 pages are dedicated to the analysis of relevant actors within the Information Environment out of the roughly 31 pages that discuss the development of a geospatial perspective. Notably, the Cyberspace portion of this section directs the reader to Joint Publication 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*, for further reference.

Unfortunately there is no such publication for further reference pertaining to socio-cultural or human factors within Joint Doctrine.²¹ Clearly this portion of JP 2-01.3 does not provide the doctrinal depth that allows a Commander and his staff to develop an understanding of human behavior in the operational environment.

The JIPOE does significantly elevate the importance of human factors on military operations when instructing the military planner to create a systems perspective of the operational environment.²² However, JP 2-01.3 is overly reliant on the singular analytical framework of PMESII to establish the systems perspective.²³ The purpose for using this analytical framework is to template a system of human interaction within the operational environment that will allow the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to direct military action against nodes within that system.²⁴ In his work *Challenging the Application of PMESSII-PT in a Complex Environment*, Maj Brian Ducote clearly describes the backward construct of the PMESII framework within military doctrine. Ducote’s central point is that doctrine should seek “To ascertain the *why* and not simply the *what* of an environment and subsequently gain a holistic understanding.”²⁵ Through his exhaustive research and discussions with an Army officer possessing insight into how the PMESII construct was developed, Ducote contends that the

PMESII framework was developed to analyze the human system and identify nodes for targeting in a traditional military sense.²⁶ Clearly then, the linear nature of the PMESII framework inhibits the ability to develop a holistic understanding about why humans behave the way they do in the operational environment. The drive to establish nodes of action settles for an assessment of what humans do and drives military effort towards the targeting of these human actions vice changing their behavior. Lacking an ability to understand human behavior in the context of their environment will make it difficult for the U.S. Military to positively influence human behavior designed to shape and contain conflict. Attempting to influence behavior without understanding why that behavior occurs is akin to simply monitoring a road plagued by Improvised Explosive Device (IED) strikes without attempting to attack the network that coordinates and directs the implementation of the IED.

Another confusing twist within the complicated labyrinth of Joint Doctrine as it relates to the importance of human factors in military operations occurs within the *Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations, Planner's Guide*. This guide defines each domain (Air, Land, Maritime, Space, and Cyberspace) and “describes important characteristics, how the DOD organizes and operates within that domain, and the key implications staff officers need to understand.”²⁷ In the section pertaining to the Land Domain, the importance of human factors to operations within this domain are highlighted. Unfortunately these factors are sandwiched among considerations pertaining to the physical aspects of operating within the land domain.²⁸ Admittedly, this guide pertains to achieving cross-domain synergy to ensure the efficacy of military operations via the Joint Operation Planning Process of which the JIPOE is subordinate. However it is important to note that without its own domain, human factors routinely take a back seat in planning to those domains already established in Joint Doctrine.

The Need to Institutionalize the Human Domain

Given the current flaws in Joint Doctrine pertaining to the analysis of human factors, the next portion of this paper will discuss methods designed to enhance our ability to conduct operations that influence human behavior and shape and contain conflict via the everyday missions. As with any problem, more than one solution exists. One option is to create a Human Domain which seeks to place socio-cultural factors on par with the other doctrinal domains. A second option, currently codified in the military doctrine of the United Kingdom, seeks to develop a nuanced understanding of the operational environment where human behavior plays a significant role, but is not equated with the physical domains and cyberspace. A final option under consideration by the Joint Staff seeks to elevate human factors within military operations and build the capability to operate in this environment, but stops short of creating a separate doctrinal domain.

Option 1: Adding a Human Domain


At the 2015 Maneuver Warfighter Conference General Votel stated: “Future confrontations will defy our traditional views of war. They will also require us to invest time and effort in ensuring we prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities, capacities, and authorities to safeguard U.S. interests. With these significant changes in the environment, there must be corresponding shifts in our planning paradigm.”²⁹ General Votel’s solution involves both changing the planning paradigm and developing a force optimized to operate within the Human Domain. His plan to enact these changes is encapsulated in the conceptual document titled: *Operating in the Human Domain* (OHD). This document, drafted by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and signed by General Votel, “describes the necessary

approach and capabilities for SOF to understand, anticipate, and influence the decisions and associated behavior of relevant individuals, groups, and populations.”³⁰

First, the OHD concept will elevate human factors within the planning process and “focus campaign design on creating desired effects among individuals in the environment to achieve success across all domains.”³¹ The OHD document also recognizes that “Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence shape the environment to enable the success of crisis response and major operations and campaigns.”³² Elevating socio-cultural factors into a Human Domain will facilitate a JFC’s ability to first understand the behavior of relevant actors in the context of their environment and then influence that behavior via the aforementioned military operations.


Critical to elevating socio-cultural factors within campaign design and to facilitate cross-domain synergy designed to influence relevant actor behavior, the OHD document argues for the addition of a Human Domain to the existing doctrinal domain construct. A specific definition of the proposed domain is provided: “The Human Domain consists of the people (individuals, groups, and populations) in the environment, including their perceptions, decision-making, and behavior.”³³ The five elements of the Human Domain (social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological) are addressed in the subsequent section of this paper. Additionally, adding a Human Domain to the doctrinal domain construct “Provides a new primacy and context for influence activities, stressing the need to prevail in a contest with adversaries for legitimacy, dominance, and control” and “Elevates human factors ... to a central consideration during planning, execution, and assessment.”³⁴ In contrast, current Joint Doctrine espouses the importance of socio-cultural factors in word, but then fails to elevate these factors to a level

equal to the physical domains either in planning or execution. The OHD document provides a graphic depiction of how the Human Domain will supplement the existing doctrinal domains.³⁵



The five elements of the Human Domain are critical to understanding how the OHD concept seeks to elevate the Human Domain within the planning paradigm. It is significant to note that these elements (social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological) are critical to “shaping the behavior of actors in the environment” and occur as the first step in this revised planning paradigm.³⁶ Unlike current Joint Doctrine, this concept does not subordinate the analysis of socio-cultural factors into sub-steps of the JIPOE. The purpose of conducting this analysis up front “*is to comprehend how these elements shape the unique perspective of individual actors.*”³⁷ In closing, the five elements of the Human Domain clearly address the need to understand why humans behave in their environment vice simply understanding what relevant actor actions are targetable by the JFC.³⁸ Complete definitions of the five elements are listed in Appendix B. The holistic nature of the Human Domain as it relates to the planning and

execution paradigm is reflected in the graphic below.³⁹



USSOCOM's OHD concept also states that the Human Domain "Strengthens the application of operational art—aligning military 'ways and means' more effectively with desired policy 'ends' ."⁴⁰ The OHD document demonstrates how the Human Domain concept drives more than just the planning process. SOCOM requires forces with the capability to operate successfully within the Human Domain (i.e., aligning ways and means with ends) and the OHD concept provides the direction required to link desired effects within the Human Domain to capabilities within the organization. Therefore, the document seeks to "Clearly articulate desired effects [that] will provide necessary direction to all efforts, ensuring deliberate and unified action."⁴¹ Finally, the OHD concept reviews DOTMLPF-P solutions designed to fully

institutionalize the Human Domain within USSOCOM.⁴² In closing, USSOCOM's concept for operating within the Human Domain intends to transform how that organization plans operations by placing human factors on co-equal footing with the other doctrinally established domains. Additionally, USSOCOM states that establishing a Human Domain will ensure a thorough and unified effort to establish core capabilities within the force that will allow their subordinate organizations to successfully shape and contain conflict.⁴³


Option 2: Developing Understanding

The United Kingdom's (UK) Ministry of Defense recently published a Joint Doctrine Publication titled *Understanding*. The concept of understanding is defined as "*the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making.*"⁴⁴ While the OHD concept seeks to understand human factors to develop campaigns that successfully navigate the human geography and accomplish the assigned mission, the UK publication encourages the commander to develop a broad and deep understanding of the situation so that the commander can make wise decisions. Central to this broad and deep understanding are human factors that are influenced via the context of the situation. The UK publication goes on to state that "understanding involves the acquisition and development of knowledge to such a level that it enables insight (*knowing **why** something has happened or is happening*) and foresight (*being able to identify and anticipate what **may** happen*)."⁴⁵ The purpose of understanding then provides one with "the context for making better decisions ... Achieving influence ... [and] Developing an appreciation of the actors within an environment."⁴⁶

Understanding adopts the human domain as a competing framework designed to analyze socio-cultural or human factors, vice attempting to adopt the concept as another doctrinal

domain. An important aspect of this framework is that it seeks to investigate “the human domain using groupings that local people consider important, rather than our own ... classification based primarily in terms of their relationship to us.”⁴⁷ Additionally, the human domain analytical framework correlates the levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) to the level of socio-cultural analysis. The purpose of this stratification is to provide varying degrees of analytical granularity for different levels within the chain of command. However, the publication acknowledges that the understanding of human behavior at the tactical level must be nested with the understanding of human behavior at the strategic level.⁴⁸ This recognition of the non-linearity of the human condition is important. Therefore, the UK publication also averts the missteps of the JIPOE and places the appropriate focus on determining why human behavior occurs in order to anticipate and influence that behavior. This process also elevates the socio-cultural factors to a position of pre-eminence that is required to operate successfully in the complex, future environment. The below graphic depicts how the human domain framework facilitates understanding.⁴⁹

In closing, *Understanding* adopts the Human Domain as a competing framework to analyze socio-cultural or human factors, vice attempting to adopt the concept as another doctrinal domain. Additionally, there is little discussion about systematically developing capabilities to operate within the Human Domain. Rather the UK publication encourages the commander to consider certain conditions, capabilities, and enablers that will allow him and his subordinates to maintain understanding in a complex environment.⁵⁰



Option 3: Enhanced Planning and Capabilities Without a Human Domain

Lastly, this paper will review the draft *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations* (JC-HAMO) which also seeks to elevate and institutionalize human factors within doctrine. While the JC-HAMO document was clearly influenced by the USSOCOM OHD document, the Joint concept does not espouse the creation of a Human Domain. Instead, the Joint Concept seeks to take the analytical framework dealing with human factors and add them within current doctrine.⁵¹ Therefore the JC-HAMO document states that “The central idea imperatives [from the Operational Framework] complement and depend on the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process, including sociocultural analysis (SCA).”⁵² Conversely, the OHD document clearly forwards a more radical and deep change to the current doctrinal planning methodology. While the OHD concept does not specifically state it is attempting to supplant the JIPOE process, it is evident by the diagram in Appendix C that

the OHD concept sees the JIPOE process as one of many tools used within the “Human Domain Conceptual Framework” that will “improve understanding of the environment while considering the elements that shape human decision-making behavior.”⁵³

The JC-HAMO document, USSOCOM OHD concept, and the UK Joint Doctrine Publication all share some important similarities. All three discuss the need to provide an approach that enhances the understanding of human behavior in the context of the environment. All three documents describe how the understanding achieved through this new approach to planning will lead to operations that influence human behavior and facilitate the attainment of foreign policy goals.⁵⁴ While all three documents lead the military planner to similar ends, the USSOCOM OHD document clearly influenced, and hence is very similar to the JC-HAMO document.⁵⁵

Further similarities between the two U.S. documents revolve around the developing capabilities “required to operationalize the concept.”⁵⁶ Both documents espouse how their associated concepts are used across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) starting with military engagement designed to shape and contain conflict.⁵⁷ Even the basic constructs utilized to understand human behavior are very similar and actually contain the same sub-elements.⁵⁸ See Appendix D for JC-HAMO elements of Human Behavior. Lastly, the Operational Framework listed in Appendix C and described in the JC-HAMO document is very similar to that documented in the OHD concept.

In closing, the UK *Understanding* document adds the Human Domain as a complimentary analytical framework that allows for nested and nuanced analysis of socio-cultural factors at different levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) within the chain of command. The JC-HAMO document seeks to change the Joint planning paradigm at the front

end to better incorporate socio-cultural factors and to develop capabilities that facilitate operations dealing with human aspects of military operations. The USSOCOM OHD concept seeks to measurably change the fabric of joint doctrine to place human factors on even footing with the existing doctrinal domains, while also focusing on the creation of capabilities to facilitate operations within the Human Domain. While the aforementioned documents acknowledge the need to elevate socio-cultural factors within military operations, they all forward slightly different courses of action designed to achieve similar ends. What then is the right answer to elevating socio-cultural factors and maintaining the capability to operate within the Human Domain?

Operations within the Human Domain

The USSOCOM OHD concept offers the most detailed plan to both elevate human factors during the planning process and to develop the capabilities required for service members and JFCs to execute the everyday missions, actually influence human behavior, and ultimately shape and contain conflict. A recent report by the RAND Arroyo Center titled *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War* highlights a decline in capability to conduct stability operations and build partner capacity as the Iraq war concluded and the footprint in Afghanistan was dramatically reduced. See Appendix E for a graphic depiction of this declining capability. Even more alarming is the fact that much of the funding for these capabilities “is not in the services’ base budgets but rather in Overseas Contingency Operations funding, which is declining.”⁵⁹ Additionally, a 2009 Defense Science Board report also noted a lack of coordination within the DOD pertaining to capabilities that facilitate operations within the Human Domain.⁶⁰ Clearly, then the Department of Defense must re-examine how it plans to incorporate the lessons learned from more than a decade of war. Past and future conflict

demonstrate the need to change the planning paradigm and develop capabilities associated with operations in the Human Domain.

The World is not Perfect: Impediments to Adding a Human Domain

As demonstrated to this point in the paper, many segments within the U.S. Military, the U.K. Military, the DOD, and others clearly espouse the importance of socio-cultural factors within the operational environment. The importance of developing concepts and capabilities that allow the military to plan and execute operations within this environment were also thoroughly documented, but a seminal change to Joint Doctrine is not yet forthcoming. What then are the impediments to accepting USSOCOM's OHD concept and creating a Human Domain?

The JC-HAMO and the USSOCOM OHD concepts both discuss risks pertaining to the implementation of their proposed courses of action.⁶¹ First and foremost, both documents discuss how these concepts may introduce the risk of paralysis through analysis. Significant focus on human factors may also confuse the need for decisive and direct, traditional, military action when the situation dictates the need for such action. Next, developing capabilities that allow for successful operations in the human domain may run the risk of pulling resources away from capabilities that allow for the traditional application of military power. Lastly, a major risk in adopting these concepts relates to other U.S. Government agencies outside of DOD who traditionally operate within the human domain. Adopting this concept could create the perception that "the Joint Force is encroaching on their areas of responsibility and local relationships."⁶² One can easily presume that organizations such as the Department of State or the Central Intelligence Agency would understandably see the implementation of this concept as an encroachment into their traditional areas of responsibility.

In relation to the risks mentioned above, a thorough analysis of missteps taken in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Iraq or the unintended consequences of the U.S. involvement in Libya during the Arab Spring should provide enough evidence to easily negate the worries about excessive analysis of socio-cultural factors at the operational and strategic levels. In turn, a thorough analysis of the Human Domain conducted at the strategic and operational levels would prevent analytical paralysis at the tactical level and, in turn, would provide the appropriate context in which to plan and conduct decisive operations designed to shape and contain conflict. Additionally, adding the Human Domain to current doctrine and developing associated capabilities to operate within this domain is certainly cheaper than any new airframe currently underproduction and will undoubtedly position the U.S. military to succeed in the everyday missions required to succeed in the future operating environment. Finally, there is clear merit to the argument that adding the Human Domain may cause others within the inter-agency to balk at this concept. However, the ability to better understand socio-cultural factors may lead the U.S. Military to first consider non-military options and may even facilitate enhanced planning within the inter-agency. When implementing this new doctrine the DOD should develop a message for inter-agency consumption explaining how the Human Domain will accomplish the above.

With the risks associated with adding a Human Domain easily dismissed, then why hasn't the Human Domain concept taken root? A clear threat and significant political pressure were the catalysts for the rapid creation of the cyberspace domain. Unfortunately for the Human Domain concept, these elements are lacking. William Lynn cites a 2008 cyber-attack on the U.S. Central Command as the seminal "wakeup call" and the response to this attack as a "turning point in U.S. cyber-defense strategy."⁶³ Interestingly, the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review

(QRM) Report discussed the growing interest in cyberspace dating back to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).⁶⁴ Additionally, this report stated that during the 2009 QRM process the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy along with U.S. Strategic Command “addressed cyberspace issues related to developing, structuring, and employing the cyberspace force.”⁶⁵ Obviously, the creation of the cyber domain and Cyber Command was preceded by a real threat to U.S. interests within cyberspace and to counter this threat DOD generated the political and bureaucratic support required to justify the establishment of this new domain and the associated infrastructure. As previously documented in this paper there is some support across DOD and academia to elevate socio-cultural factors within the U.S. Military. However, it does not appear that political appointees within DOD, recent Secretaries of Defense, or the DOD bureaucracy has supported the creation of a Human Domain.⁶⁶ Moreover, the 2012 QRM notes the need to incorporate requirements from the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, but those requirements pertain to “information operations, and to detention and interrogation, giving particular attention to their role in counter-terrorism (CT) operations.”⁶⁷ Lastly, the 2014 QDR states that DOD will seek to retain the expertise gained in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there is no mention of major initiatives to create a Human Domain.⁶⁸

While both the JC-HAMO and USSOCOM OHD documents discuss the need to develop capabilities required to operate effectively within socio-cultural aspects of the operating environment, a separate domain is not required to develop these capabilities. In fact, the document outlining the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) does not even mention the word domain.⁶⁹ This fact combined with those mentioned previously in this section may explain why the JC-HAMO document lifts many concepts from the USSOCOM

OHD document, but omits the creation of the Human Domain. Simply put it appears that the political and bureaucratic impetus for the creation of a Human Domain may not exist.

Recommendations

The addition of the Human Domain, as depicted in the USSOCOM OHD concept, is the best way to elevate socio-cultural factors in the planning and execution of military operations. Specifically, the Human Domain concept will have an additive effect on Joint Doctrine and will ameliorate the aforementioned limitations of the JIPOE as it relates to socio-cultural factors. Instead of determining nodes within the human system to target for action, this concept seeks to develop an understanding “of the Human Domain to better recognize levers, both positive and negative, with which to persuade or compel relevant actors and achieve desired ends.”⁷⁰ Moreover, a separate Human Domain will facilitate the retention and development of the capabilities required to operate in a challenging future operating environment. Ultimately, the Human Domain concept places appropriate emphasis on understanding relevant actor behavior and, once codified in doctrine, will help the U.S. Military avert an inability to learn from past conflict.

While the JC-HAMO document does not discuss the creation of a separate domain, it does link doctrinal concepts for planning to the capabilities required to execute operations in socially complex environments. Therefore, this author concludes that the current Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations is the most feasible, albeit sub-optimal, direction for the U.S. Military to undertake. Adoption of the JC-HAMO methodology will reduce some of the risks mentioned previously in this paper, provide a more holistic understanding of socio-cultural factors than currently found in Joint Doctrine, ensure capabilities to address human aspects of military operations are retained, and, most importantly, rectify a failure to codify these lessons

learned from the post-Vietnam War era. At a minimum, the U.S. Military must incorporate a document similar to the U.K.'s *Understanding* doctrinal publication. While this is the least preferred course of action in the mind of this author, codifying the U.K.'s approach properly aligns human aspects of the operational environment to military operations and would provide the JFC with the insight and foresight required to achieve his desired ends.

Conclusion

Joint Doctrine, planning, and service organization are all clearly domain centric. Adding a Human Domain will congeal planning and execution around this important concept and properly place socio-cultural factors within the current domain centric construct of military thinking and planning. More importantly, a Human Domain will provide the tools required to successfully execute the Joint Force Prioritized Missions of military engagement, security cooperation, stability, and counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, the Human Domain concept clearly does not enjoy the political and bureaucratic support that facilitated the creation of a cyberspace domain. It is also difficult to directly correlate the Human Domain to a clear and significant threat to U.S. national security akin to the 2008 cyber-attack on U.S. Central Command. However, even in a fiscally constrained environment, the Joint Staff and DOD must ensure the U.S. Military maintains the doctrine and capability to achieve desired ends in a socially complex environment. History demonstrates that the U.S. Military has and will continue to conduct these every day missions amongst the citizenry of the world. History has also shown the U.S. Military's inability and lack of desire to thoroughly inculcate lessons from past irregular conflicts into our doctrine. In an era of reduced funding and desire to maintain a technological

edge against near-peer adversaries, the U.S. Military is on the verge of committing the same mistakes of the post-Vietnam War era.



Appendix A, Challenges to Institutionalizing Human Factors in Joint Doctrine

To fully appreciate the need to elevate socio-cultural factors within Joint Doctrine, it is important to first review the traditional view of war held by the U.S. Military. In general, the U.S. Military demonstrates a pre-occupation with preparing for conventional war. Unfortunately this pre-occupation has come at the cost of preparing for “every day” conflicts in which our armed forces are utilized to shape and contain conflict. In his exhaustive study titled *The U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*, Lawrence Yates stated, “Because the Army did not generally perceive stability operations as integral to war, such operations were belittled for diverting essential resources away from the service’s principal mission of warfighting.”⁷¹

A more recent study conducted by the RAND Cooperation’s Arroyo Center focused on how well the U.S. Army learned lessons from post-World War II conflicts in general, but specifically focused on the incorporation of lessons learned from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their findings demonstrated that “the Army (and most of the joint force) has found it more difficult to make bigger-picture, strategic changes, particularly those that require capabilities other than those needed for conventional warfare.”⁷² The RAND study goes on to state that “Without some degree of understanding of the countries in which U.S. forces were operating (Iraq and Afghanistan), they were hard pressed to carry out these activities [non-kinetic operations] successfully.”⁷³


This phenomena is not new. The Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* of 1940 noted that “There is a sad lack of authoritative texts on the methods employed in small wars.”⁷⁴ While espousing the importance of socio-cultural aspects to the future operating environment, JOE 2035 provides an alarming warning about how the Joint Force should develop an understanding

of the operating environment. “However, rather than expensive and potentially risky investments by the Joint Force in cultural expertise, containing violent ideologies might better rely on the fusion of U.S. technical capabilities with the human and cultural expertise provided by foreign partners.”⁷⁵ History should show the U.S. Military that this statement is misleading.⁷⁶



Appendix B, Human Domain Elements from USSOCOM OHD

1. “The social element focuses on how a society, its institutions, and key relationships influence people. Social network theory (SNT) provides methods of understanding the relative power of some actors over others and the comparative cohesion of one group over another. SNT provides a means to evaluate overall network qualities. Social power comes in many forms, but it is often related to the volume and quality of information an actor can access—and the strength and reach of his or her connections.”⁷⁷
2. “The cultural element considers the way a society’s beliefs, customs, and way of life affect the manner in which people behave. The cultural element can contribute to markedly different perceptions of fear, honor, and interest. While there are commonalities in human nature (e.g., all humans want to safeguard their lives and property, etc.), differences among cultures (e.g., concepts of guilt, shame, honor, family, tribe, etc.) affect human perceptions.”⁷⁸
3. “The Physical element looks at geography, topology, urbanization etc, but purpose to is understand how the environment impacts human behavior. “For example, a desert people will prioritize access to water differently than those who live in a rain forest.”⁷⁹
4. “The informational element centers on the sources and availability of data—as well as the pathways and modes of its transmission. While modern communications and media accessibility have transformed many societies, others rely on more primitive and traditional sources of information or are characterized by strong central government censorship. Technology can play a key role in shaping the informational element.”⁸⁰
5. “The psychological element influences how people perceive, process, and act upon information. An individual actor, for example, can have a distinct pattern of how he or she analyses a situation, exercises judgment, and applies reasoning skills in response to available facts. Theories of behavior can help explain how—in general—attitudes, perceptions, and cultural norms influence intentions and guide decision-making.”⁸¹



82

Appendix C, Operational Frameworks

From USSOCOM OHD





Figure 7: The Operational Framework for the Human Domain applies the “ways and means” to operate and achieve desired “ends” in the Human Domain

83

Appendix C, Operational Frameworks

From JC-HAMO




84

Appendix D, Elements that Shape Human Behavior, JC-HAMO

1. “The **social element** focuses on how a society, its institutions, and key relationships influence people. The social element is often distinguished by the competing influence of groups and institutions, each seeking to impose its own priorities and perspective. A traditional contest among soldiers and diplomats within an adversary regime, for example, may result in dissimilar policies, depending on which side imposes its views.⁹ Religion will continue to play an important role in the environment. Religious beliefs can influence political will and motivate actors to struggle and fight—often with greater zeal than a secular ideology. Faith-based organizations and congregations can form an important social component, while religious customs and traditions often exert a powerful cultural influence.”⁸⁵
2. “The **cultural element** considers the way a society’s beliefs (including religious and spiritual principles), customs, and way of life affect the manner in which people behave. The cultural element can contribute to markedly different perceptions of “fear, honor, and interest.”¹¹ While there are commonalities in human nature (e.g., the desire to safeguard families and property), differences among cultures (e.g., concepts of guilt, shame, honor, and loyalty) affect human perceptions.”⁸⁶
3. “The **physical element** includes environmental aspects that shape the choices, outlook, values, and behavior of groups and individuals. For example, a desert people will prioritize access to water differently than those who live in a rain forest. An area’s topography, climate and weather, hydrography, vegetation and soil, land use (farming, ranching, mining, etc.), population density, urbanization, physical infrastructure, and other aspects of development can be part of the physical element. Furthermore, the material capability and capacity of friendly, neutral, and adversary actors in the environment are also part of the physical element.”⁸⁷
4. “The **informational element** centers on the sources, availability, and uses of data. While modern communications and media accessibility have transformed many societies, others rely on more primitive and traditional sources of information or are characterized by strong central government censorship and the manipulation of news outlets. Perceptions of legitimacy and authenticity will influence an actor’s decision to rely on one media source over another. Adversary and neutral actors will possess propaganda capabilities that can distort or negatively shape the perceptions and behavior of various actors, unfavorably impacting the Joint Force and its partners across the ROMO.”⁸⁸
5. “The **psychological element** is complex, difficult to understand and assess, and, in some instances, potentially the most important element of human decision-making and behavior. This element influences how people perceive, process, and act upon information. An individual actor, for example, can have a distinct pattern of how he or she analyzes a situation, exercises judgment, and applies reasoning skills in response to perceptions and beliefs. Individual life experiences, emotions, and mental health can play a strong role in shaping behavior. The intelligence community has for many years conducted clinical analysis of key figures in the environment that can inform Joint Force actions.”⁸⁹
6. “The **temporal lens** allows the Joint Force to examine the above listed elements over time. It enables scrutiny of relevant actors and their interactions through the course of various events and under different circumstances. The temporal lens provides a historical

Appendix D, Elements that Shape Human Behavior, JC-HAMO

perspective that can help the warfighter identify and visualize pattern-of-life events over time. The Joint Force must evaluate how the passage of time shapes changes in the elements that influence behavior. The examination of an actor's past deeds and actions is key to developing predictive insights. Circumstances will change rapidly and relevant actor decision-making will evolve over time. These dynamics require a continual assessment of the elements that shape behavior.”⁹⁰



91

Appendix E, Declining Capabilities for Operations in the Human Domain

Selected Joint and Interagency Capabilities

Program	Status
Civilian Response Corps (CRC)	Likely Canceled
CRC predeployment training	Canceled
CRC interagency participation	Reduced
Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG)	Intact
USMC Advisory Training Group	Absorbed into MCSCG
Marine Corps Regional Culture and Language Familiarization Program (RCLF)	Intact
U.S. Air Force Air Advisor Academy AFA	Canceled
Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCAST)	Canceled
Human Terrain Teams	Under Review
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)	Under Review
U.S. Army 162nd Brigade	Reduced
U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group	Unknown
U.S. Army 85th Civil Affairs Brigade	Likely Canceled
Cultural Support and Female Engagement Teams	Unknown
U.S. Army IW Fusion Center (formerly COIN Center)	Canceled
Building Partnership Functional Capabilities Board	Canceled
Center for Complex Operations (NDU)	Reduced

SOURCE: RAND interviews with Joint Staff J-7, July–August 2014, and additional research.

Notes

¹ The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015, *The United States Military's Contribution to National Security*, June 2015, 4,

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf .

² Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwillie, Raphael S. Cohen, *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), 36, 57, 58, and 65.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR816/RAND_RR816.pdf

. The study's basic premise is that the US military, specifically the U.S. Army tends to adequately incorporate technological and operational changes pertaining to conventional war. The trend of warfare since World War II is moving away from conventional, total war and traditionally, the U.S. Military has inadequately incorporated lessons in these areas.

³ Gen James F. Amos, ADM William H. McRaven, Gen Raymond T. Odierno, *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills*,

<http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20Paper.pdf> . The concept of the human domain is central to this document and mentioned throughout the white paper.

⁴ United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain Version 1.0*, 03 August 2015, 15, <https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/b/weblog/archive/2015/08/11/ussocom-concept-operating-in-the-human-domain-ohd> .

⁵ The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015, *The United States Military's Contribution to National Security*, 12-13.

⁶ Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) March 2009, 24, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA495025.pdf> .

⁷ Amos, Odierno, McRaven, *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills*, 6.

⁸ Joint Operating Environment 2035, *The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*, 14 July 2016, ii, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joe/joe_2035_july16.pdf .

⁹ Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 11 August 2011, V-8, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf . Joint Operating Environment 2035, *The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*, 41.

¹⁰ Joint Operating Environment 2035, *The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*, 42.

¹¹ Joint Operating Environment 2035, *The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*, 42.

¹² Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, V-1, V-36 Figure V-4. Gen Paul J. Selva. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9*, 15. Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 22 November, 2013, 22-23, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf .

¹³ The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015, *The United States Military's Contribution to National Security*, 11.

¹⁴Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 2, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/yates.pdf>.

¹⁵ Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, xvi.

¹⁶ Joint Publication 3-20, DRAFT, *Security Cooperation*, 04 Feb 2016, 98, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jel/ddrraafftt_pubs/3_20fc.pdf. Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability*, 03 August 2016, x, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf. Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, I-4, IV-3, IV-4.

¹⁷ Gen Paul J. Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9, XX*, August 2016, 15.

¹⁸ Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, 21 May 2014, page I-1, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp2_01_3.pdf. JP 2-01.3 states the 4 steps of the JPIOE process are: “(1) Define the operational environment (OE). (2) Describe the impact of the OE. (3) Evaluate the adversary and other relevant actors. (4) Determine the course of action (COA) for adversary and other relevant actors, particularly the most likely COA and the most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment.”

¹⁹ Ibid, III-1. While the subsequent steps of the JPIOE discuss relevant actor behavior based on possible COAs, step 2 is where the actual analysis of relevant actor behavior occurs. If an inaccurate assessment of relevant actor behavior is made in step 2, then it is reasonable to believe that these inaccuracies will impact further stages of the JPIOE process.

²⁰ Ibid, III-2 – III-33, the physical domains and Information Environment are discussed.

²¹ LtCol Douglas G. Vincent, *Being Human Beings: The Domains and a Human Realm* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013), 9, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwjJhqvXwtPPAhUFKiYKHY7tA30QFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA590280&usg=AFQjCNGQB2IEumsDFkrhNFT_7S1J3S6O8w&sig2=Q0zWph1gJM_lqQXNP4Ndw. LtCol Douglas G. Vincent makes similar observations pertaining to the dearth of information about human factors in Joint Doctrine in his research paper titled *Being Human Beings-The Domains and a Human Realm*. In this paper Vincent details how JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 enumerate the importance of human factors to the conduct of military operations, but then woefully subjugates a detailed discussion of these factors to the physical domains. On page 9 of his paper he states the following pertaining to JP 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*, “joint doctrine has already defined the operating environment as consisting of numerous factors of the five domains and the information environment, but the planning publication fails to give the human component a central role in its doctrinal considerations. It isn’t until the chapter on operational art and design, over one hundred pages into the publication, that the importance of the human component in determining centers of gravity is discussed. Like the joint operations publication and the joint planning publication, the bulk of joint doctrine does not include a single chapter or heading dedicated solely to the crucial human component in conflict.”

²² Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, III-3.

²³ Ibid, III 38-40, lists out PMESSII elements. Even JP 2-01.3 discusses the limitations of this framework on pages III-38-49: “Because the relevance of PMESII factors and characteristics will depend upon the specific situation associated with each mission, there can be no definitive listing of all characteristics appropriate under all circumstances.”

²⁴ Ibid, III-39, 40.

²⁵ Maj Brian M. Ducote, *Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, May 2010), 81, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a523040.pdf> .

²⁶ Maj Brian M. Ducote, *Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment*, 6. “[T]he author of the monograph [Ducote] ascertained at least one explanation in an interview with Mr. Mark DeMike, who was a former Deputy Chief of the PMESII Division of the Battle Command Training Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.” “According to DeMike, PMESII was never intended originally to understand an environment but rather ‘...to simply identify systems in an operational environment to target.’ According to DeMike, the impetus for creating PMESII was twofold. First, just as the military would target systems like tanks and air assets in a conventional conflict to achieve victory, creators of PMESII wanted to target the systems involved with nation building to achieve success. ... DeMike insinuated that PMESII was restructured later to accomplish a task that it was not originally designed to achieve. Founders of PMESII sought knowledge to untangle the complicated aspects of a system. Then, they wanted to use their findings in the targeting process. However, they did not necessarily seek in depth meaning and understanding about the complexity of a system.”

²⁷ United States Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), *Future Force Development, Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations, Planners Guide*, 14 Jan 2016, 33, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/cross_domain_planning_guide.pdf .

²⁸ United States Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), *Future Force Development, Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations, Planners Guide*, 37-38.

²⁹ Gen Joseph L. Votel, “Operating in the Human Domain”, Address, 2015 Maneuver Warfighter Conference, Ft. Benning, GA, 16 September 2015, 9. Provided by AFSOC Sponsor to this research paper.

³⁰ United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain*, pg 5. This page goes onto state: “The goal [of the OHD Concept] is to enhance stability, prevent and mitigate conflict, and, when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries.”

³¹ Ibid, 5-6.

³² Ibid, 10.

³³ Ibid, 15.

³⁴ Ibid, 15.

³⁵ Ibid, 29, Figure 8.

³⁶ Ibid, 12.

³⁷ Ibid, pg 12.

³⁸ Maj Brian M. Ducote, *Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment*, 81. Maj Ducote introduced this author to the idea that current Joint Doctrine seeks to identify the “what” behind the action vice the “why” behind the action. USSOCOM’s *Operating in the Human Domain* clearly attempts to understand the “why” behind relevant actor behavior.

³⁹ United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain*, 19, Figure 7.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 15.

⁴¹ Ibid, 21.

⁴² Ibid, 1. DOTMLPF-P: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy. Pages 37-41 contains the discussions about using the DOTMLPF-P to convert capabilities into reality within USSOCOM.

⁴³ Ibid, 5-6.

⁴⁴ Joint Doctrine Publication 4, *Understanding*, December 2010, Shrivenham, UK: Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, 2-1, <http://www.dcdc.dii.r.mil.uk> .

⁴⁵ Joint Doctrine Publication 4, *Understanding*, 2-1.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 2-2.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 3-10.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 3-11.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 3-20.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 1-4 to 1-5 and 3-18 to 3-19.

⁵¹ Gen Paul J. Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9*, XX, 13. “Figure 3 [Operational Framework] depicts how U.S. military forces will continuously enhance their campaign, while building up U.S. and partner strength and effectiveness. The figure depicts how the four central idea imperatives (identify, evaluate, anticipate, and influence) align with the existing commander’s decision cycle.” Footnote 28 on page 14 states: “The four actions of the commander’s decision cycle are: Monitor, Assess, Plan, and Direct. For a complete explanation see: JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, 30 July 2012, IV-15 and IV-16.”

⁵² Ibid, 15.

⁵³ United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain*, 18. The OHD concept clearly sees the JIPOE as a subordinate process to the overall Human Domain Concept Framework. Footnote 14 on page 18 of the OHD document lists the “analytical tools” that are used to develop understanding. The JIPOE and PMESII-PT methodologies are listed as but a few tools available to develop understanding.

⁵⁴ Gen Paul J Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9*, XX August 2016, DRAFT, 3, 13.

⁵⁵ United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain*, 5. “The OHD Concept provides input, from the USSOCOM perspective, for the *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (HAMO)*, which is currently in development in collaboration with the Joint Staff, the Military Services, and other stakeholders, both internal and external to the Department of Defense.”

⁵⁶ Gen Paul J Selva , *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9*, XX August 2016, 3.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 4, 15.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 5-8.

⁵⁹ Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwillie, Raphael S. Cohen, *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), 117, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR816/RAND_RR816.pdf.

⁶⁰ Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, March 2009), ix-x, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA495025.pdf> .

⁶¹ United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain*, 40-41. Gen Paul J Selva, *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9*, XX August 2016, 42-43.

⁶² Gen Paul J Selva, *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9*, XX August 2016, 43.

⁶³ William J. Lynn III, "Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy", September/October 2010, http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/lynn-article1.aspx.

⁶⁴ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*, Washington DC, January 2009, 15, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf.

⁶⁵ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*, Washington DC, January 2009, 16.

⁶⁶ It is important to note that the draft *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations* document is a product of the Joint Staff, whereas the QDR and QRM reports are much higher level documents and subject to Congressional Review. Moreover, the 2012 QRM does state that DOD will conduct "a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad" that "contribute to building the capacity of and competence of ... partner forces" and that DOD will "support institutions that provide training and education for counterinsurgency and Stability Operations in order to maintain capability". Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*, Washington DC, January 2012, 9, 11, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf.

⁶⁷ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*, 2012, 12.

⁶⁸ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington DC, March 2014, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

⁶⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01I, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)*, 23 January 2015, <https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/722172/file/80079/CJCS%20-%20Instruction,%20CJCSI%203170.01I,%20JCIDS,%2023%20Jan%202015,%20Errata,%20%205%20May%202015.pdf>.

⁷⁰ United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain*, 9.

⁷¹ Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*, 2-3.

⁷² Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwillie, Raphael S. Cohen, *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*, 30.

⁷³ Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwillie, Raphael S. Cohen, *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*, 60.

⁷⁴ Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-15, *Small Wars Manual*, 22 December 1990, 8.

⁷⁵ Joint Operating Environment 2035, *The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*, 42.

⁷⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security during the Cold War*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005). In *Strategies of Containment* by John Lewis Gaddis, he explains how George Kennan developed the idea of containing communism. With respect to the Soviet Union, Gaddis states that Kennan

developed this concept because he understood the history, ideology, and psychology of Soviet Leaders. “Moscow’s antipathy for the West, Kennan argued, grew out of both historical and ideological circumstances.” Previous quote from page 32. Additionally Gaddis states that “Because Kennan saw the Soviet challenge as largely psychological in nature, his recommendations for dealing with it tended to take on a psychological character as well.” Previous quote from page 35. David Patrick Houghton, *The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 236-237. In *The Decision Point*, Patrick Houghton relates how Iraqi exiles like Kanan Makiya and Ahmed Chalabi created an impression within the Bush 43 administration that invading U.S. troops would receive a welcome greeting by the local Iraqi population. The point here is that information pertaining to an operational situation is available through many means, but it is the responsibility of the U.S. Military to analyze and assimilate this information to create an accurate socio-cultural understanding of the situation. A reliance on technology and the opinions of foreign partners (who may have ulterior motives for U.S. involvement) does not preclude the Joint Force from establishing viable doctrine and capabilities towards this end.

⁷⁷ United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain*, 13.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 13.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 13.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 13-14.

⁸¹ Ibid, 14.

⁸² Ibid, 13.

⁸³ United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain*, 20.

⁸⁴ Gen Paul J Selva , *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9*, 14.

⁸⁵ Gen Paul J Selva , *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9*, 6.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 7.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 7.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 7.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 7.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 7-8.

⁹¹ Ibid, 6.

⁹² Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwillie, Raphael S. Cohen, *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War* , 118.

Bibliography

- Amos, Gen James F., ADM William H. McRaven, Gen Raymond T. Odierno, *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills*, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20Paper.pdf> .
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01I. *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)*, 23 January 2015. <https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/722172/file/80079/CJCS%20-%20Instruction,%20CJCSI%203170.01I,%20JCIDS,%2023%20Jan%202015,%20Errata,%20%205%20May%202015.pdf> .
- Defense Science Board. *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics*. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, March 2009. <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA495025.pdf> .
- Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*. Washington DC, January 2009. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf .
- Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*. Washington DC, January 2012. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf .
- Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review*. Washington DC, March 2014. http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf .
- Ducote, Maj Brian M. *Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment*. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, May 2010. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a523040.pdf> .
- Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-15. *Small Wars Manual*, 22 December 1990.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security during the Cold War*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Galula, David. *Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.
- Hoffman, Frank G., and Michael C. Davies. "Joint Force 2020 and the Human Domain: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?" *Small Wars Journal*, (June 10, 2013):

<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/joint-force-2020-and-the-human-domain-time-for-a-new-conceptual-framework> .

Houghton, David Patrick. *The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Joint Doctrine Publication 4. *Understanding*, December 2010. Shrivenham, UK: Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre. <http://www.dcdc.dii.r.mil.uk> .

Joint Operating Environment 2035. *The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*, 14 July 2016. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joe/joe_2035_july16.pdf .

Joint Publication 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 08 November 2010, as amended through 15 June 2015, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf .

Joint Publication 2-01.3. *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, 21 May 2014. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp2_01_3.pdf .

Joint Publication 3-0. *Joint Operations*, 11 August 2011. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf .

Joint Publication 3-07. *Stability*, 03 August 2016. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf .

Joint Publication 3-20, DRAFT. *Security Cooperation*, 04 Feb 2016. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jel/ddraafftt_pubs/3_20fc.pdf .

Joint Publication 3-24. *Counterinsurgency*, 22 November, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf .

Lynn III, William J. "Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy." September/October 2010. http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/lynn-article1.aspx .

Metz, Dr. Steven. *Strategic Landpower Task Force Research Report*. Strategic Studies Institute, October 2013. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/STRATEGIC-LANDPOWER-TASK-FORCE/2013/10/3> .

Nye, Joseph S. *The Future of Power*. New York, New York: Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group, 2011.

Robinson, Linda, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwillie, Raphael S. Cohen. *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR816/RAND_RR816.pdf .

Selva, Gen Paul J, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations Version 0.9*, XX August 2016. Draft conceptual document provided to this author by AFSOC, the sponsor of this research paper.

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015. *The United States Military's Contribution to National Security*, June, 2015.
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf .

Tyson, Ann Scott. "Gates Warns of Militarized Policy." *Washington Post*, 16 July 2008.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/15/AR2008071502777.html> .

United States Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), Future Force Development. *Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations, Planners Guide*, 14 Jan 2016.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/cross_domain_planning_guide.pdf .

United States Special Operations Command. *Operating in the Human Domain Version 1.0*, 03 August 2015. <https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/b/weblog/archive/2015/08/11/ussocom-concept-operating-in-the-human-domain-ohd> .

Vincent, LtCol Douglas G. *Being Human Beings: The Domains and a Human Realm*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013.
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwjJhqvXwtPPAhUFKiYKH7tA30QFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA590280&usg=AFQjCNGQB2IEumsDFkrhNFT_7S1J3S6O8w&sig2=Q0zWph1gJM_lqQXNP4Ndw .

Votel, Gen Joseph L. "Operating in the Human Domain." Address, 2015 Maneuver Warfighter Conference, Ft. Benning, GA, 16 September 2015. Text version of address provided by AFSOC sponsor of this research paper.

Yates, Lawrence A. *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*. Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/yates.pdf> .