Iraq: A Case Study in Building Civil-Military Capacity, 2007-2010
Abstract
The United States is currently facing a wide range of complex threats that require a combination of unique resources and responses beyond those that a single U.S. Government department or agency can provide. Despite the wealth of capabilities and expertise spread throughout the government, its departments and agencies generally do not plan and execute together to achieve the best effect. Lessons from multiple U.S. operations point to this core deficiency, described as the inability to apply and focus the full resources and capabilities of the [United States] in a concerted and coherent way. The combined differences in organizational structure, mandates, authorities, culture, and overall purpose provide collective challenges that can cause missed opportunities and disjointed efforts in operations that have an adverse impact on the Nations security and interests. Operations in Iraq from 2003 through 2006 illustrate this problem. While relationships between senior military and civilian leaders generally improved over time, the different U.S. departments and agencies struggled to bring their respective strengths and resources to bear on the counterinsurgency (COIN) challenges faced in Iraq. The historical competition for leadership between the Department of State and Department of Defense (DOD), as well as the inefficiencies, operational gaps, duplications, and conflicting efforts, were challenges. By late 2006, the coalitions chance of success in Iraq appeared bleak. Violence against the coalition and different sectarian groups was spiraling out of control, and Iraq seemed on the brink ofor perhaps already engaged incivil war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- AD1042741
Entities
People
- Bradford Baylor
- Bradford Davis
- Jeanne Burington
- Russell Goehring