2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War: a Fight of Operational Synchronization
Abstract
Over the course of 34 days in July 2006, the Shi'a-Muslim, paramilitary force of Hezbollah fought the Israel Defense Force (IDF) to a standstill and delivered the first Arab Victory over the IDF. Hezbollah armed, advised, and funded by Iran and Syria synchronized efforts of conventional and irregular forces employing nation-state capabilities and denied Israel its objectives. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) failed to achieve its objectives during the 2006 war with Hezbollah due to ineffective operational synchronization relative to its adversary. The conditions and circumstances of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war make its study valuable for operational level planners and commanders as it demonstrates the complex problem of state-supported hybrid threats. This state-support enables the proliferation of high-end capabilities like armed drones, advanced anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, and sophisticated protection systems. To meet the unique challenges posed by increasingly capable hybrid-threats, operational planners and commanders must focus on synchronization of multiple punches from the right mix of domains and functions to achieve victory.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 13, 2016
- Accession Number
- AD1045435
Entities
People
- James R. Vance
Organizations
- Naval War College