Combating Terrorism: North American Aerospace Defense Command Versus Asymmetric Threats
Abstract
This paper's purpose determines what changes will better enable the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to deter, detect, and defeat low radar cross-section (RCS) technologies targeting U.S. citizens and U.S. infrastructure. Despite NORAD changes since September 11, 2001, evidence shows low RCS technologies are still penetrating their airspace. Consequently, this paper employs the problem solution methodology to discern NORAD vulnerabilities. In addition, the paper explores possible U.S. policies and U.S. intelligences organizational changes that would better support NORAD in defending the homeland. The papers key findings deduce that sensor settings are not optimized to detect low RCS technologies. Additionally, NORAD is not the lead government agency managing airspace or aerial domestic terrorism within its area of responsibility. Also, certain U.S. policies restrict military forces during homeland defense operations because of legal penalty and jurisdiction barriers. Moreover, intelligence organizations are keeping secrets from one another and not sharing data efficiently. This paper's key recommendations include designing an operational toggle switch for NORAD and the Federal Aviation Administration to quickly manage sensor thresholds and mission displays. Furthermore, Posse Comitatus Act amendments allowing NORAD forces to legally operate during domestic aerial attacks. Finally, intelligence organizations collect data via social media sources too.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 2016
- Accession Number
- AD1045774
Entities
People
- Joseph W. Stevens
Organizations
- Air Command and Staff College