



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POST-CONFLICT
DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF
BURUNDI AND RWANDA**

by

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June 2017

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE June 2017	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDI AND RWANDA		5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S) Stephanie C. Lastinger				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines the political economy of post-conflict economic recovery in Rwanda and Burundi. These two countries, located in the Great Lakes region of East Africa, are commonly referred to as twins. They are relatively similar in size; are landlocked; have a similar topography, population density, ethnic composition, culture, and language; and share a colonial legacy as well as a tragic history of genocide. Despite the similarities shared by these two countries, Rwanda has been more successful in recovering economically from civil war, while Burundi has been in a cycle of civil strife mired with poverty. Why has Rwanda been more successful than Burundi in post-conflict economic growth and development? This thesis argues that the differences between Rwanda and Burundi's transition from conflict to peace, political elite dynamics, and center-periphery relationships are key in explaining the divergence in their post-conflict economic outcomes. These insights facilitate a better understanding of how politics influence the trajectory of post-conflict economic recovery.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS post-conflict, economic recovery, economic development, reconstruction, state-building, state-society, center-periphery, political elites, peace, conflict, Rwanda, Burundi			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 73	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

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COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDI AND RWANDA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)**

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the political economy of post-conflict economic recovery in Rwanda and Burundi. These two countries, located in the Great Lakes region of East Africa, are commonly referred to as twins. They are relatively similar in size; are landlocked; have a similar topography, population density, ethnic composition, culture, and language; and share a colonial legacy as well as a tragic history of genocide. Despite the similarities shared by these two countries, Rwanda has been more successful in recovering economically from civil war, while Burundi has been in a cycle of civil strife mired with poverty. Why has Rwanda been more successful than Burundi in post-conflict economic growth and development? This thesis argues that the differences between Rwanda and Burundi's transition from conflict to peace, political elite dynamics, and center-periphery relationships are key in explaining the divergence in their post-conflict economic outcomes. These insights facilitate a better understanding of how politics influence the trajectory of post-conflict economic recovery.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CNDD-FDD	<i>Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces de Défense de la Démocratie</i> [National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy]
CVL	Crystal Ventures Limited
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FRODEBU	<i>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</i> [Front for Democracy in Burundi]
GNU	Government of National Unity
NRA	National Resistance Army
Palipehutu-FNL	<i>Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu - Forces Nationales de Libération</i> [Hutu People's Liberation Party- Front for Democracy in Burundi]
PRSP-II	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II
RDF	Rwanda Defense Force
RIG	Rwanda Investment Group
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPRONA	<i>Union pour le Progrès National</i> [Union for National Progress]

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I. INTRODUCTION

Rwanda and Burundi, located in the Great Lakes region of East Africa, are commonly referred to as twins. They are relatively similar in size; are landlocked; have a similar topography, population density, ethnic composition, culture, and language; and share a colonial legacy as well as a tragic history of genocide. Despite the similarities shared by these two countries, Rwanda has been more successful in recovering economically from civil war, while Burundi has been in a cycle of civil strife mired with poverty. Why has Rwanda been more successful than Burundi in post-conflict economic growth and development? This thesis undertakes a comparative case study of Rwanda and Burundi to ascertain why growth is sustained in some post-conflict countries and not in others. It examines elite dynamics and center-periphery dynamics that emerged in Rwanda and Burundi after their respective transitions from conflict to peace. This thesis finds that the nature of post-conflict political settlements influence and incentivize political elites to deliver economic growth and development to the societies they serve. These insights facilitate a better understanding of the challenges facing economic recovery in post-conflict countries.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The second section outlines the significance of this thesis. The third section then provides an economic overview of Rwanda and Burundi. The fourth section summarizes existing empirical findings on post-conflict economic growth and development. The fifth section proposes a series of hypotheses. The sixth section lays out the research design and the last section maps out the rest of the chapters.

A. SIGNIFICANCE

Civil war is the most common form of war in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹ It destroys resources, diverts public expenditure to the military, causes social disorder, capital flight

¹ Ibrahim Elbadawi, and Nicholas Sambanis, "Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict," *Journal of African Economies* 9, no.3 (2000): 244.

(private investments and human capital), and diminishes the rule of law.² A typical civil war costs approximately \$60 billion; more than double the annual income of most Sub-Saharan countries.³ Furthermore, approximately 40 percent of post-conflict countries are back at war within a decade.⁴ Studies show that countries with a stagnant growth rate over a decade after a civil war have a high risk of conflict reoccurrence. This is because economic growth improves a government's legitimacy and stimulates job creation, making conflict less attractive.⁵ A country is thus faced with two challenges during the post-conflict period: avoiding the civil conflict trap and improving its socioeconomic conditions.⁶ This thesis investigates why countries may pursue different growth strategies following civil conflict, thus enhancing our knowledge of recovery in conflict-affected states.

More specifically, this research is important to policymakers and academics because it contributes to the knowledge of how political elites, and the dynamics between the state and society, play a significant role in the development process. An analysis of Rwanda and Burundi, two countries who are considered twins in almost every aspect, provides a deeper analysis on the conditions that shape elite predatory or developmental behavior in a post-conflict setting.

B. ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

Rwanda and Burundi's economies show how these two neighbors, once on equal footing, are now worlds apart. Comparative data gathered from the CIA Factbook shows that Rwanda and Burundi have roughly the same population size, 11.18 million and 11.61

² Paul Collier, "On the Economic Consequences of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 51, no. 1 (January 1999): 168–169.

³ Paul Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy," Department of Economics, Oxford University, April 2006, 16.

⁴ Christopher Adam, Paul Collier and Victor Davies, "Post-Conflict Monetary Reconstruction," *World Bank Economic Review* 22, no. 1 (January 2008): 108.

⁵ John F.E. Ohiorhenuan and Frances Stewart, *Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity*, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report 2008, United Nations Development Program, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (New York: United Nations Publications, 2008), 41.

⁶ Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, World Bank Publications, 2003, accessed August 9, 2016, ProQuest Ebook Central, 141.

million (2014), and are two of the most densely populated African countries. Both countries derive their foreign exchange earnings from minerals, coffee, and tea. Almost 90 percent of the populations in both countries rely on subsistence agriculture. They are both dependent on foreign aid, which is 30–40 percent of their national incomes.⁷ At a glance, Rwanda and Burundi appear to be two sides of the same coin but there are deeper differences.

Rwanda and Burundi shared an economy until independence in 1960. The 1960s and 1970s were characterized by political infighting and little effort was spent on economic growth-enhancing policies. The first half of the 1980s realized economic growth but land fragmentation, soil erosion, food insecurity, and a rapidly growing population exacerbated an already fragile situation.⁸ The 1993 ethnic conflict in Burundi and 1994 genocide in Rwanda left both countries in a state of economic decline and socio-political deterioration. It negatively affected all sectors of their economies, especially those that relied on highly skilled labor and export markets. After the end of the wars, both countries employed diametrically opposed economic strategies for post-conflict growth and recovery. The Rwandan government took its inspiration from Singapore and followed an urban-based growth-first strategy that prioritized higher education, the service sector and information technology development. Two decades later, the capital, Kigali, has transformed into a dynamic high-tech financial hub. This urban-centered strategy has led to an increase in income inequality between the rural and urban dwellers, which in effect means between the Hutu in the countryside and the Tutsis in the city.

On the other hand, Burundi's post-conflict recovery stalled due to a 1996 economic embargo imposed by neighboring countries as a reaction to a military coup

⁷ "The World Factbook: Burundi," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed September 5, 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html>; "The World Factbook: Rwanda," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed September 5, 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html>.

⁸ Janvier Nkurunziza, and Floribert Ngaruko "Why Has Burundi Grown So Slowly? The Political Economy of Redistribution," in B.J. Ndulum, S. O'Connell, J.P. Azam, R.H. Bates, A.K. Fosu, J.W. Gunning, and D. Njinkeu, eds. *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960-2000: Country Case Studies 2*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (2008), 54-56.

instigated by Major Pierre Buyoya. International cooperation and assistance was also stalled during this period; inflation, poverty, unemployment, and corruption reached new heights. International cooperation with Burundi was limited. Widespread smuggling revived clientelist networks among elite executives and civil servants. Sanctions were suspended in 1999 once the Burundi government committed to negotiations. The Burundi government has since been on a slow economic recovery trajectory with a development strategy focused on the rural areas, which so far, appears to have made little impact.⁹

Rwanda has managed to outpace its neighbor, Burundi, in both economic growth and social welfare. Over the past decade, Rwanda has boasted a GDP growth rate of approximately 7–8 percent, and has been well above Burundi’s 4–5 percent annual growth rate, every year since the cessation of conflict in 1994. Although Rwanda’s GDP per capita (see Figure 1) in 2015, \$697, is low by international standards but is more than twice that of Burundi’s (\$276).¹⁰

⁹ Peter Uvin, “Structural Causes, Development Co-Operation and Conflict Prevention in Burundi and Rwanda.” *Conflict, Security & Development* 10, no. 1 (2010): 172-173.

¹⁰ “World Development Indicators (2015): GDP Per Capita, Current US\$,” World Bank, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=RWA#>.




Figure 1. GDP per Capital (Current U.S. Dollars)¹¹

To reduce unemployment, Rwanda grew its services sector by expanding tourism, transport, telecommunications, finance and insurance industries, which accounts for the largest share of GDP at 47 percent (2015).¹² A report compiled by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) shows that due to service sector growth, unemployment in Rwanda (0.6 percent) is now significantly lower than in Burundi (6.9 percent).¹³ The same report shows, however, that poverty remains high in both countries but Rwanda's sustained growth has succeeded in reducing its poverty rate from 57 percent in 2006 to 39 percent in 2014.¹⁴ The report also shows that Burundi's poverty rate, however, only went down 2 percent points from 67 percent in 2006 to 65 percent in 2014.¹⁵ The following socioeconomic indicators show how both countries have fared in

¹¹ Adapted from "World Development Indicators (2015): GDP Per Capita, Current US\$," World Bank, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=RWA#>.

¹² Bryan Kimenyi, "Rwanda GDP Grew by 6.9 Percent in 2015," *All Africa*, March 17, 2016, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201603171474.html>.

¹³ "About Rwanda," UNDP, accessed December 14, 2016, <http://www.rw.undp.org/content/rwanda/en/home/countryinfo.html>; "About Burundi," UNDP, accessed December 14, 2016, <http://www.bi.undp.org/content/burundi/fr/home/countryinfo.html>.

¹⁴ "About Rwanda," UNDP; "About Burundi, UNDP."

¹⁵ Ibid.

world rankings. In 2016, Rwanda ranked 59th out of 190 economies on the World Bank's Doing Business rankings (second highest ranking in Africa after Mauritius), compared to Burundi's 155th ranking.¹⁶ Rwanda's score in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (where 100 = no corruption) jumped from 31 in 2005 to 54 in 2015, while Burundi regressed from 23 points in 2005 to an all-time low of 18 in 2009 and a slight improvement to 21 points in 2015.¹⁷ Despite its achievements, Rwanda is ranked 163rd out of 188 on the 2014 Human Development Index, slightly ahead of Burundi's 184th ranking.¹⁸ Rwanda has undoubtedly outperformed Burundi in terms of economic development and poverty alleviation, but is there a path dependence that led to this variance in post-conflict economic trajectories?

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Several explanations and theories have been put forward to account for the divergent post-conflict economic trajectories of Rwanda and Burundi, most of which center on reforms in macroeconomic policies and institutional arrangements. Rather than focusing on these obvious policy considerations of post-conflict economic growth and development, I analyze the post-conflict political contexts in relation to growth-enhancing or growth-impeding economic institutions. The analysis will focus on the idea that these economic institutions are largely influenced by politics, as they are reflections of decisions made by powerful groups in society. This literature review centers on two distinctive political determinants of economic growth: elite dynamics and center-periphery dynamics. I discuss four theoretical aspects of elite dynamics: political settlement, dominant party governance, technocratic elite, and political leadership to understand what shapes development policy as a determinant of economic growth. In addition, I also review literature on how state-society interactions—center-periphery

¹⁶ "Economy Rankings 2016," Doing Business, World Bank, accessed January 10, 2017, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.

¹⁷ "Corruption Perceptions Index 2015," Transparency International, accessed April 10, 2017, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015>.

¹⁸ United Nations Development Programme, and Khalid Malik, *Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress-Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience*, UN, 2014, <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf>.

relations—influence the choices that are made regarding economic growth policies. I expect these two bodies of literature to effectively capture the variation in Rwanda and Burundi.

1. Elite Dynamics

a. Political Settlements

Political settlement analysis is a broad field of research that has been used to examine how and why some states can transition from conflict to peace and stability, and subsequently rapid economic growth.¹⁹ Scholars have long subscribed to various definitions of political settlement: an elite balance of power that leads to peaceful political contestation; the power dynamics that exist between political elites; a state-institution relationship that restrains violence; or in other words, institutional principles and practices that provide for ethnic or identity representation in decision-making on common issues.²⁰ Tim Kelsall categorizes political settlements as either developmental, predatory, or hybrid. Developmental settlements are inclusive, with coordinated elites, and impersonal bureaucratic norms. Predatory settlements are exclusive, spoils-driven, and pervasive patron-client relations. Hybrid settlements fall somewhere between developmental states and predatory settlements.²¹

Kunal Sen contends that political settlements are the main determinant of institutional performance, and subsequently, economic growth.²² It is widely accepted in the literature that victories with clear winners and losers lead to more stable post-conflict environments than those attained through negotiated settlements. If the political

¹⁹ Tim Kelsall and Seiha Heng, “The Political Settlement and Economic Growth in Cambodia,” *ESID Working Paper* No.37, 2014, www.effective-states.org, 3.

²⁰ Joseph Wales, Arran Magee, and Susan Nicolai, “How Does Political Context Shape Education Reforms and Their Success?” Overseas Development Institute, *Dimension Paper* 06, August 2016. <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10808.pdf>, 10; Peter Uvin, and Leanne Bayer, “The Political Economy of Statebuilding in Burundi,” In *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace*, edited by M. Berdal and D. Zaum, London: Routledge, 2013: 263.

²¹ Wales, Magee, and Nicolai, “How Does Political Context Shape Education Reforms and Their Success?” 13.

²² Kunal Sen, “The Political Dynamics of Economic Growth,” *World Development* 47 (2013): 25, 29.

settlement is widely accepted, it is less likely to fluctuate over time, providing greater stability for economic development. Moreover, a political settlement with a winner-takes-all scenario and a weak opposition is conducive for long-term development. In such instances, leadership can take long-term views of development and allocate resources effectively.²³ Contrarily, conflict mediators view winner-takes-all politics as the root of Africa's election violence and consider inclusive politics as the solution for peace.²⁴ This sub-section examines how the nature of political settlements could lend insight into why Rwanda, although more devastated than Burundi after its civil war, managed to record dramatic economic growth while Burundi lagged.

Scholars and policymakers continue to debate the potential determinants of Rwanda's post-conflict success against Burundi's spiraling poverty. The nature of the political settlements in Rwanda and Burundi differed. Burundi's political settlement was long and drawn out in order to accommodate all the groups involved. For Rwanda, the civil war ended when the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) fought its way to the capital and took over the government without having to make any concessions to the opposition. Scholars like Will Jones attribute Rwanda's development success to the outright victory of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).²⁵ An outright victory made it possible for the Rwandan regime to institutionalize central power in the executive branch and form its own brand of 'consensual democracy' that gave the illusion of power sharing, leaving decision-making with the RPF. Kelsall characterizes Rwanda as having an inclusive, coordinated, impersonal-type settlement; which is not a particularly common trait of developing states.²⁶ Based on Kelsall's classification, Rwanda should have a high degree of embryonic development capacity that grants them the ability to make unilateral decisions.

²³ Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (2004): 287.

²⁴ Ian S. Spears, "Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (2000): 105.

²⁵ Will Jones, "Between Pyongyang and Singapore: The Rwandan State, its Rulers, and the Military," In *Rwanda Fast Forward*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 243.

²⁶ Tim Kelsall, "Thinking and Working with Political Settlements," London: Overseas Development Institute (2016), <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10185.pdf>, 4.

In contrast, Burundi's protracted negotiated settlement, politics of accommodation, and divided power sharing political landscape led to competition among Burundi's major political elites, each preoccupied with defending their positions of power.²⁷ Using Kelsall's model, one can characterize Burundi's political settlement as exclusive, spoils-driven, and personalized. These types of settlements are usually under constant threat of conflict and are incapable of supplying public goods effectively.²⁸ Burundi's predatory political settlements have historically resulted in general neopatrimonial tendencies that transcend changes in government and continue to drive the behavior of the ruling elite. Parties tend to splinter, and there is little or no difference in ideologies between the various vying political parties.²⁹ Given the differing nature of political settlements in the two countries, this approach is potentially useful for my research question.

b. *Regime Cohesiveness*

Studies of developmental states have shown a linkage between the cohesion of executive actors and government effectiveness. Unity of executive action is essential in coordinating and implementing developmental policies. Cohesion brings about consistent policy goals as well as the commitment of key actors to the pursuit of these goals. Cohesion can also exist within a regime in the form of corporate culture. This is particularly evident in regimes with dominant parties where appointment decisions favor party patronage; however, studies show that appointment decisions based on other factors like keeping power away from other groups may not have a positive effect on cohesion.³⁰ As I discuss in this sub-section, a focus on these aspects of cohesion is potentially useful for understanding the divergent economic trajectories in Rwanda and Burundi.

²⁷ Philippe Rieder, "Comparative Reconciliation Politics in Rwanda and Burundi," PhD diss., Concordia University, 2015, 296.

²⁸ Kelsall, "Thinking and Working with Political Settlements," 4-5.

²⁹ Devon Curtis, "Development Assistance and the Lasting Legacies of Rebellion in Burundi and Rwanda," *Third World Quarterly* 36 no. 7 (2015): 1375.

³⁰ Rachel Sigman, "Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Financing, Patronage and State Capacity in African Democracies," (2015), PhD diss., Syracuse University (2015), 102-104.

Bernhard et al. found that a strong dominant party state fosters greater investments and stronger growth performance as it is more likely to have less coordination problems than a multi-party state.³¹ A study of successful Sub-Saharan states found that a dominant party state succeeds in development only when combined with long-term centralized-rent management (developmental patrimonialism), a strong visionary leader committed to political inclusion, top-down patron-client relations, a growth strategy, sound policy framework, and a disciplined technocratic elite capable of using rents productively.³² Similar studies of other African cases show that multi-party competition encourages leaders to take short-term views of rent allocation resulting in endemic corruption.³³ An analysis of cohesion based on the framework of dominant versus multi-party states lends itself well to my case study.

Using Bernhard et al.'s framework, Rwanda could be characterized as a strong dominant party.³⁴ In 2003, Rwanda opted for a model of majoritarian democracy, whilst in 2005, Burundi opted for yet another model of power sharing along ethnic lines.³⁵ Burundi's National Council for the Defense of Democracy and the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (identified by its French acronym, CNDD-FDD) government is characterized by inter-party violence, banditry, widespread corruption, and quarreling political elites who are largely isolated from the communities they serve.³⁶ The lack of cohesion within CNDD-FDD led to intra-party fractures and consequently weakened the

³¹ Michael Bernhard, Fernando Bizzarro, Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, and Svend-Erik Skaaning, "Party Strength and Economic Growth," (2015), 29–30.

³² David Booth, *Development as a Collective Action Problem*, London: Africa Power and Politics Programme, Overseas Development Institute, 2012, 25–26.

³³ Tim Kelsall, "Authoritarianism, Democracy and Development." *DLP State of the Art Paper* No.3. Birmingham: Development Leadership Programme, 2014, 13.

³⁴ Michael Bernhard, Fernando Bizzarro, Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, and Svend-Erik Skaaning, "Party Strength and Economic Growth," (2015), 12.

³⁵ Carla Schraml, "Ethicized Politics: Patterns of Interpretation of Rwandans and Burundians." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 4, no. 2 (2010): 262–263.

³⁶ Rieder, "Comparative Reconciliation Politics in Rwanda and Burundi," 26.

party's leadership.³⁷ The RPF dissimilarly is cohesive, confrontational, and dominative.³⁸ The RPF elite direct and manage donor-funded activities in the Rwanda in a way that improves the regime's legitimacy with its citizenry, whereas, the CNDD-FDD in Burundi has failed to cultivate meaningful donor relationships.³⁹ In 2015, the World Bank assessed Rwanda's government effectiveness at 54% and Burundi's at 12%, where the higher value in Rwanda indicates better governance ratings.⁴⁰ The dichotomous nature of Rwanda and Burundi's regimes suggest that cohesion among the ruling elite makes the regime more effective at delivering public goods and services by centralizing the development of policies and delivery of public goods.

c. Political Leadership

Another set of theories discusses whether economic growth is attributable to individual leadership. Scholarly and policy literature on this approach underscore the primacy of individuals in reshaping the world around them. This approach focuses on how individuals—commonly referred to as 'Great-Men' or 'Big-Men' or 'Strong-Men—are influenced by different institutional arrangements and incentives. An individual's ability to exercise agency varies largely due to the balance of economic, social and political power relations at play.⁴¹ A study conducted by Jones and Olken shows that growth rates change drastically through transitions in leadership, which suggests that leaders can have a positive or negative effect on a country's economic trajectory.⁴² However, as Easterly postulates, 'Strong-Man' theories require many assumptions about

³⁷ Noel Twagiramungu, "Two Rebel Roads to Power: Explaining Variation in the Transition from Genocidal Violence to Rebel Governance in Contemporary Rwanda and Burundi," PhD. Dissertation, Tufts University, April 2014, 88.

³⁸ Twagiramungu, "Two Rebel Roads to Power," 106.

³⁹ Curtis, "Development Assistance and the Lasting Legacies of Rebellion in Burundi and Rwanda," 1377.

⁴⁰ "World Governance Index," World Bank, accessed January 12, 2017, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>.

⁴¹ David Hudson, and Adrian Leftwich, "From Political Economy to Political Analysis," *DLP Research Paper*, No. 25, DLP, University of Birmingham, UK, www.dlprog.org/publications/from-political-economy-to-political-analysis.php, 106.

⁴² Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken, "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120 (2005): 861.

the individual's abilities to raise growth. After a study of 150 countries, in the years 1960–2008, Easterly concludes that the impact of Strongmen on economic growth is negligible once all other variables are controlled for.⁴³ This sub-section examines how the nature of political leadership could lend insight into why Rwanda, although more devastated than Burundi after its civil war, managed to record dramatic economic growth while Burundi lagged.

Two dissimilar leaders emerged out of the violence of the 1990s. President Paul Kagame, of Rwanda, an enigmatic internationally renowned leader with strict discipline and an iron grip on power overshadows his Burundian counterpart, President Pierre Nkurunziza who is much less illustrious.⁴⁴ Nkurunziza's popularity at the center seems to be waning but he still appears to maintain his popularity in the rural areas.⁴⁵ Nkurunziza's decision, in April 2015, to seek a third presidential term in office led in riots and protests throughout the capital, Bujumbura, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and reports of human rights violations. As for Kagame, various prominent media outlets have profiled him, praising his visionary but paradoxical leadership style. He is popular among Rwandans such that over ninety-eight percent of Rwandans voted in favor of a constitutional change that will allow Kagame to continue governing Rwanda for another seven years.⁴⁶ Some authors have drawn parallels between Kagame and post-colonial reformist leaders like Kwame N'Krumah and Julius Nyerere, who have all strived to reform rural population, improve access to services, align village structures, and encourage non-agricultural ways of generating income. Kagame has also managed to garner various appellatives: to donor agencies he is "a man with a plan," and to others "a Benevolent Dictator," or "a modern-day Machiavellian Prince."⁴⁷ The distinct character

⁴³ William Easterly, "Benevolent Autocrats." Work. Pap., Dev. Res. Inst., New York Univ., New York 2011, 14, 23.

⁴⁴ Twagiramungu, "Two Rebel Roads to Power," 7.

⁴⁵ Alexis Arieff, "Burundi's Electoral Crisis: In Brief," Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44018.pdf>, 5.

⁴⁶ Jack Shaka, "African Presidents: The Obsession with Clinging to Power," (2015), <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2849422>.

⁴⁷ Simon Turner, "Mirror Images: Paths to Building Peace and Building States in Rwanda and Burundi," DIIS Report 2013: 22, 29; Reese Renford, "Paul Kagame: Machiavelli's Prince," *Journal of Diplomacy and International Affairs*, Issue 1, 2014, 1.

differences between Kagame and Nkurunziza suggest that the nature of political leaders could have a direct effect on post-conflict economic recovery.

d. Technocratic Elite

A number of authors have looked at the effects of technocratic elite on economic development. Studies show that technical competency at the ministerial level is essential in the success of development programs.⁴⁸ Adrian Leftwich describes these technocratic elite as a small cohort of politicians with a mindset and culture oriented towards development.⁴⁹ The first argument suggests that elites support economic productive sectors because they perceive that this helps them maintain power. The second argument suggests that strong technocratic elites, focused on long-term economic growth and development, are a source of stability as they provide institutional memory and continuity of policy. The ability of a regime to deliver on long-term economic goals, hinges on its vertical coordination and technocratic integrity. A third argument, focuses more on incentives than on technocracy, as it suggests that elite control over the modes of production enables them to choose to redistribute assets in ways that can increase employment, economic efficiency and reduce inequality. Alternatively, they can choose to act as rent-seekers and direct resources towards benefiting the small cadre of elite. The decision to act altruistically or predatory depends on how elites determine the need for development in society; whether the development threatens or advances their position of power. The challenge thus lies in pinpointing the incentive that aligns elite incentives with society's goals.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Sigman, "Which Jobs for Which Boys?" 99.

⁴⁹ Adrian Leftwich, "Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State, *The Journal of Development Studies*, 31, no. 3 (1995): 405.

⁵⁰ Michael Spence, *The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development*. Commission on Growth and Development Final Report, World Bank Publications: Washington, DC 2008, 3; David Booth, and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda," *African Affairs* 111, no. 444 (2012):16; Alice Amsden, Alisa DiCaprio, and James Robinson, "Planning for Development: Aligning Elites with Development," The Robinson Rojas Archive, accessed June 9, 2017, <http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/dev0031b.htm>.

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda left the civil administration in shambles. It was necessary to reconstruct it from scratch; therefore, ministries drew staff from returnees from the diaspora. These returnees were young, college educated, and ambitious.⁵¹ Rwanda's technocratic elite have managed to sustain economic recovery, therefore weakening the public's distaste for the regime's authoritarian tendencies. The civil administration in Burundi after the war was not as devastated as Rwanda's. However, the devastation after the war still required a skilled civil service to rebuild the country. Burundi's political elites refused to incorporate the returning diaspora, most of whom are well educated. The CNDD-FDD's conception of its legitimacy was based on member contribution during the civil war and thus returnees were considered to be lacking in this regard.⁵² Rwanda has also managed to attract more foreign aid and investment than Burundi. Rent-seeking technocratic elites have exacerbated the foreign aid system in Burundi; and subsequently, donors mistrust Burundi's institutions and seek to work outside these national structures.⁵³ These theories suggest that Rwandan elite chose to be developmental to increase their legitimacy within the regime, whereas Burundi garnered its legitimacy through participation in the war and consequently engaged in more rent-seeking behavior because development has little to no impact on maintaining their political positions.

2. Center-Periphery Dynamics

Strong states require society's participation in policy decision making in order to identify the requisite rules for well-functioning markets.⁵⁴ This section examines theories on center-periphery linkages—centralized or decentralized management—and their effect on post-conflict economic policy decision-making.

⁵¹ Booth, and Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental patrimonialism?" 16–17.

⁵² Benjamin Chemouni, "The Politics of State Effectiveness in Burundi And Rwanda: Ruling Elite Legitimacy and The Imperative of State Performance," PhD diss., The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2016, 148.

⁵³ Curtis, "Development Assistance and the Lasting Legacies of Rebellion in Burundi and Rwanda," 1376.

⁵⁴ Niels Hermes, Wiemer Salverda, Herman W. Hoen, and Joachim Ahrens, *State, Society, and Development: Lessons for Africa?* Centre for Development Studies, University of Groningen, 1999, 9.

Center-periphery relations in developing states present a challenge for state elites as they compete with traditional authorities at the local level whose governance structure parallel that of the state.⁵⁵ There are very few administrative linkages between the core and the periphery as governance emanates from the center with minimal presence in the localities. The main idea behind institutional decentralization is to promote local political participation and grassroots democracy. Regimes adopt or eschew this strategy to their own advantage.⁵⁶ Endogenous growth is a process of empowerment the periphery to be self-reliant with the aim of achieving growth and sustainability. This process stimulates local democratic decision-making and community building.⁵⁷

Decentralization was a key strategy in the 2000 Arusha Peace agreement aimed to strengthen the linkages between state and the marginalized rural communities. However, resources to finance decentralization plans, like the Communal Development Plan, are insufficient.⁵⁸ Homegrown participatory initiatives in Rwanda like *Girinka Munyarwanda* (one cow per family), *Umuganda* (community services), *Gacaca* (traditional courts), *Imihigo* (performance contracts), and *Imidugudu* (villagization) are intended to bring about economic and social development. The ability of Rwanda's central government to mobilize the periphery can be a factor attributable to their economic success. In contrast, Burundi government's internal divisions have undermined the government's ability to control the peripheries.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The major question addressed by this thesis is why economic development is sustained in some post-conflict developing (or African) countries and not in others. Drawing on the literature discussed above, the thesis addresses two main hypotheses

⁵⁵ John M. Luiz, "The Politics of State, Society and Economy," *International Journal of Social Economics* 27, no. 3 (2000): 230.

⁵⁶ Catherine Boone, "Decentralization as Policy in West Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 4 (2003): 359.

⁵⁷ Asasira Simon Rwabyoma, "Terrains of Glocalisation Struggles: Home-Grown Initiatives and Endogenous Development in Rwanda," *Humanities and Social Sciences Review* 5, no. 2 (2016): 320.

⁵⁸ "Fiscal Decentralization and Local Governance in Burundi," The World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/12/05/fiscal-decentralization-and-local-governance-in-burundi>, accessed December 5, 2014.

regarding the importance of elite dynamics and center-periphery dynamics as they relate to post-conflict economic trajectories. These two hypotheses represent a departure point, with the possibility of adding additional hypotheses derived from the theoretical perspectives outlined above. The hypotheses laid out herein are intended to examine key aspects of the political context mentioned in the literature review. The first hypothesis is that Rwanda's history of failed political settlements led the RPF elite to seek a drastic change of the political landscape. The RPF, through its party-led enterprises, institutionalized and centralized rent-seeking behavior in a way that benefited the country and the party, while in Burundi, various iterations of power sharing arrangements have historically reinforced corrupt rent-seeking behavior. This hypothesis challenges perspectives emerging from the political settlements literature suggesting that inclusive power sharing agreements are better for post-conflict economic growth and development. The second hypothesis is that centralized management of the periphery in post-conflict countries yields higher economic growth than decentralized management. This hypothesis analyzes the degree of delegation of policy decision-making and its effects on post-conflict economic recovery.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This research is developed through a structured focused comparison of two similar cases. This analytical framework is based on qualitative research and supported by theories of economic development, political economy, and post-conflict recovery. The first hypothesis requires an in-depth analysis of political elite behavior in Rwanda and Burundi that emerged from their respective political settlements. An examination center-periphery dynamics in Rwanda and Burundi facilitates the study of the second hypothesis. The research draws data from secondary sources, including books, scholarly articles, credible journalistic reports, and documents from private and public organizations.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is structured into four chapters. Following the introduction chapter, the second chapter analyzes Rwanda transition from conflict to peace, highlighting key aspects of the political elite dynamics and center-periphery dynamics that led to the country's remarkable post-conflict economic trajectory. The third chapter reviews Burundi's long path from conflict to peace, homing-in on the political elite dynamics of the power sharing agreement as well as the center-periphery dynamics that led to the country's dismal post-conflict economic performance. Finally, this thesis concludes by analyzing the findings from the analysis of the aforementioned hypotheses. This conclusion also seeks to infer the underlying implications of politics on post-conflict economic development.

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II. RWANDA

This chapter aims to improve our understanding of the puzzling nature of Rwanda's post-conflict economic recovery. To do so, it first provides an overview of Rwanda's unique transition from conflict to peace in order to highlight some of the distinctive features of Rwanda's post-conflict political landscape. The following section demonstrates how the center, dominated by a cohesive and technocratic elite, spearheaded post-conflict economic recovery through party-led enterprises, thus effectively centralizing the control of rents and creating a developmental form of neopatrimonialism. The chapter further demonstrates how a minority Tutsi-led elite, primarily composed of former refugees, has managed to gain legitimacy with its citizenry through economic development while curbing elite capture at the lower level through decentralization and performance contracts. The overall goal of this chapter is to show how the circumstances surrounding the RPF's elite dynamics and center-periphery relations that emerged out of RPF's winner-takes-all victory have enabled the government to radically transform and reprioritize post-conflict economic growth in a way that serves party, state, and society interests.

A. BACKGROUND: PATH FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE

RPF's winner-takes-all victory, which terminated Rwanda's civil war (1990–1994), challenged the conventional wisdom that a power sharing peace agreement is best for post-conflict recovery. However, studies surrounding the impact of a power sharing peace agreement on peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery have been limited. Most of the literature on post-conflict recovery has overwhelmingly focused on the Weberian ideal of political settlements, promoted by Western outsiders, which also endorses state, political, and economic liberalization as the only path to long-term peace. Rwanda's transition from genocide to peace challenges the internationally imposed prescription of peace settlement as a form of conflict resolution. In fact, the peace settlement that was agreed upon during the 1993 Arusha Peace Accords resulted in more deaths—genocide—than the civil conflict that preceded it. Peace was only achieved after a military victory by

the RPF in 1994, resulting in a strong dominant regime, led by the RPF, which created the conditions for a long-term developmental approach to post-conflict economic recovery.⁵⁹

In the aftermath of the civil war (1990–1994), the RPF inherited a country that was traumatized and destroyed: hundreds of thousands were killed, and millions displaced; state infrastructure and the economy were also destroyed. However, despite these dire circumstances, the RPF quickly moved to re-establish a functioning state. How, therefore, has Rwanda managed to achieve remarkable post-conflict economic growth? This chapter argues that RPF’s dominant starting position enabled them to cultivate elite and center-periphery dynamics to facilitate radical transformation and orient existing policies and institutions towards prioritizing post-conflict economic growth and development. These factors enabled the Rwandan government to successfully achieve rapid economic development through party-led enterprise and maximize agricultural productivity and service delivery to its citizenry. The following sections explore the political dynamics of post-conflict economic growth by analyzing elite and center-periphery power dynamics in order to understand how a victor’s peace, rather than a peace settlement, managed to shape Rwanda’s development trajectory.

B. POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: ELITE DYNAMICS

The 1994, RPF military victory allowed for a monopoly of power by the RPF, which narrowed the political space and allowed for an unchallenged vision of Rwanda’s post-conflict economic recovery. In the aftermath of the genocide, the situation in the country was precarious, which allowed the RPF to take a heavy-handed approach in decision-making. In the spirit of the 1993 Arusha Accords, the RPF created a coalition Government of National Unity (GNU), composed of the RPF and seven other political parties. Though power sharing was eventually instituted into the 2003 constitution, the RPF managed to maneuver around that arrangement by gradually eliminating opposition parties through infiltration and intimidation, thus closing the political landscape.

⁵⁹ Prithvi Behuria and Tom Goodfellow, ‘The Political Settlement and “Deals Environment” in Rwanda: Unpacking Two Decades of Economic Growth,’ *Effective States and Inclusive Development Working Paper*, no. 57 (April 10, 2016): 8.

Moreover, opposition parties were either co-opted or suppressed resulting in a de facto single party rule by the RPF.⁶⁰ In addition, a social re-engineering process of de-ethnicization instituted by the central government further served to hide and consolidate Tutsi dominance in government. Although they form approximately ten percent of the population, Tutsis have managed to occupy two-thirds of the public sector.⁶¹ These core elite, primarily composed of Tutsi ex-refugees, had to quickly establish legitimacy with the rest of the country. Unlike in Burundi, the RPF-led regime took a strong anti-corruption stance; spearheaded economic growth by taking control of the country's commanding heights of the economy; and geared patronage towards long-term development.

The RPF's innermost circle is composed of competent and cohesive technocratic elites with a shared history: many grew up together in the Ugandan refugee camps, were educated at Ntare secondary school and Makerere University in Uganda, shared family links, and participated in armed struggles within Uganda's National Resistance Army (NRA) in the 1980s.⁶² During their time with the Ugandan NRA, the RPF forged cohesion and built camaraderie by fighting together. Military ideology is therefore predominant within the political elite and is reflected in the regimes' post-conflict development strategies and the wider civil society by prioritizing monitoring, control, and service provision. Consequently, institutions and policies take on a more coercive and authoritarian nature that are typical characteristics of military structures.⁶³ In the 1970s and 1980s, similar forms of elite cohesion led to rapid economic transformation in South

⁶⁰ Esther Marijnen, and Jaïr Van der Lijn, "Rwanda 2025: Scenarios for the Future Political Stability of Rwanda," *Rwanda Fast Forward: Social, Economic, Military and Reconciliation Prospects*, Basingstoke, UK (2012): 17.

⁶¹ Filip Reyntjens, *Rwanda: Twenty Years after the Genocide*, No. 6, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB), 2014, 1.

⁶² Will Jones, "Between Pyongyang and Singapore: The Rwandan State, its Rulers, and the Military." In *Rwanda Fast Forward*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 237–239.

⁶³ Marco Jowell, "Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 2 (2014): 280, 290.

East Asian countries like Singapore and South Korea, which the RPF-led has modeled itself after.⁶⁴

President Kagame's zero tolerance approach on corruption has been one of the regime's major legitimating tools. In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, most of the elites within the previous regime fled the country. The post-1994 leadership, therefore, had to build a new state administration from scratch, which made it easier for the regime to make huge transformations. One strategy of transformation was doing away with corruption. The regime carried out a vigorous anti-corruption crusade that resulted in the resignation, dismissal, or persecution of various ministers and civil servants. For instance, right before the 2003 presidential elections, President Kagame received a report from the Auditor General that accused 36 mayors of misappropriating public funds. President Kagame immediately ordered the arrest of these district officials even though they were a critical link between RPF and constituencies who would have an effect on the electoral outcome. In addition to enabling Kagame to reconstitute the government in his interest, President Kagame's primary motivation for taking this harsh stance on corruption was its desire to win the support of the Hutu masses by providing essential public goods and services through effective public institutions. However, some reports point out that it also serves to remove high-ranking elites who are out of line politically.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, Kagame's crusade has resulted in several defectors and enemies who felt deprived of what they considered their rightful share of the spoils of the state.⁶⁶

Anti-corruption initiatives have quickly proved to be successful: According to the 2015 Transparency International Index, Rwanda ranks 44 out of 176 countries and territories. It is perceived as the fourth least corrupt country in Sub-Saharan Africa (after

⁶⁴ Atul Kohli, *State-directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 388; Jeff Chu, "Rwanda Rising: A New Model of Economic Development," *Fast Company* 1 (2009), 1.

⁶⁵ *Transformation Index BTI 2016: Political Management in International Comparison*, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 15.

⁶⁶ Zsuzsanna Biedermann, "Rwanda: Developmental Success Story in a Unique Setting," Budapest, Hungary: Center for Economic and Regional Studies HAS Institute of World Economics, 2015, 8–9; Andrew M. Mwenda, "Why Kagame Succeeds Where Others Fail," *The Independent Uganda*, June 16, 2009, <https://www.independent.co.ug/kagame-succeeds-others-fail/>.

Botswana, Cape Verde, and the Seychelles).⁶⁷ These improved trends reflect the regime's political will to fight corruption. Moreover, improvements in governance have increased the willingness of donors to provide aid, which in-turn has contributed to Rwanda's post-conflict economic growth. In Burundi, one sees that this is not the case as corruption is rampant at all levels of government.⁶⁸

The RPF-led regime, unlike the pre-1994 regimes in Rwanda that were characteristically neo-patrimonial, exemplifies a more pro-developmental form of neopatrimonialism. Patronage in Rwanda is centered on the distribution of political positions—cabinet, legislature, and the Senate. Eight out of twenty-six senators are appointed by the president. Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected by party leaders in Kigali instead of by public votes. Moreover, the 2003 constitution institutionalized power sharing across political parties, allowing for redistributive patronage. Opposition parties have little popular support and are in place to provide the appearance that the regime is broad-based. It is also argued that Kagame has successfully co-opted opposition members with positions in the cabinet and senate.⁶⁹ Although government positions are still leveraged for private gain, the pervasiveness of the more destructive aspects of corruption like embezzlement or theft are comparatively low as compared to the typical African modal pattern of short-term kleptocracy, clientelism, and corruption.⁷⁰

Rwanda's economic growth and development has been spearheaded by the RPF in what can be best referred to as party-led enterprises (hereafter party-statal) thus enabling RPF to solidify participation of its technocratic elite and expand its coalition without risking loss of production. Research conducted by Nilgün Gökgür on Rwanda's

⁶⁷ "Corruption Perceptions Index 2015," Transparency International, accessed April 10, 2017, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015>.

⁶⁸ "Kenya: Burundi Most Corrupt Country in East Africa as its Revenue Authority Tops List of Corrupt Institutions," Transparency International Kenya, July 22, 2010, https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20100722_kenya_burundi_most_corrupt_country_in_east_africa_as_its_revenue_a, 22 July 2010.

⁶⁹ Elliott Green, "Patronage as Institutional Choice: Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda," *Comparative Politics* 43, no. 4 (2011): 429–430.

⁷⁰ Tim Kelsall, "Rethinking the Relationship between Neo-patrimonialism and Economic Development in Africa." IDS bulletin 42, no. 2 (2011): 76; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, "Developmental Patrimonialism?" 380.

party-statals found that the RPF, through its fully or partially owned party-statals has dominated the commanding heights of the country's economy—construction, real-estate development, security, energy, furniture manufacturing and import, packaging material manufacturing, agro-processing of tea and coffee, pyrethrum, telecommunications, broadcasting and media. These party-statals stemmed from an effort to kick start the country's economy and have since grown to over two dozen enterprises under the investment group holdings of Crystal Ventures (formerly Tri-Star), Horizon Group, and Rwanda Investment Group (RIG), which are fully or partially owned by the RPF in joint ventures with the state, military, and party-linked business elites.⁷¹ RPF's involvement in the ownership of for-profit companies has boosted the amount of economic rents at the disposal of the regime.

RPF's party-statals also serve to finance its campaigns as politics, which frees leadership from the pressure of generating funds by methods such as fraud, kickbacks, or other forms of corruption. Due to its party-statals, RPF has grown to be one of the best funded political parties relative to the country's size. Crystal ventures (CVL), with 7,000 staff, is one of Rwanda's largest business ventures. CVL provides the most number of jobs second only to the state.⁷² In the last twenty years after the genocide, centrally planned and managed rents through party-statals have positively affected economic development in Rwanda: as of 2011, mobile telephony and data coverage has reached 96 percent of the population and a high-speed fiber optic network that extends throughout the country.⁷³ More remarkably, between 2006 and 2014, over one million Rwandese have escaped the poverty trap.⁷⁴

Elite dynamics in Rwanda have given rise to a more economically productive post-conflict environment. Rwanda's ruling elites' military history and technocracy gave the Rwandan elite the capacity to pursue development effectively and their minority-

⁷¹ Nilgün Gökgür, *Rwanda's Ruling Party-Owned Enterprises: Do They Enhance or Impede Development?* no. 2012.03, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB), 2012, 8.

⁷² Biedermann, "Rwanda: Developmental Success Story in a Unique Setting," 12.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 12–13.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

Tutsi status and ex-refugee status contributed to their cohesiveness and motivation to gain legitimacy. The unique post-conflict setting also allowed the new regime to make drastic and unchallenged changes to policies. The technocratic elite, which formed the core of the ruling regime, were developmentally focused. In addition, elite patronage, in the Rwandan setting was not detrimental to the states' ability to conduct effective post-conflict economic growth and development. In examining elite dynamics in Burundi, one finds that elite patronage lacks the developmental dimension that is characteristic of the Rwanda's elite.

C. POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: CENTER-PERIPHERY DYNAMICS

Most of the political elites in Rwanda are ex-refugees from Uganda, and have limited ties to the rural areas and consequently, are unable to capitalize on mass popular support and must garner legitimacy through economic development. Most of these elite are Tutsis who have lived outside Rwanda as refugees for decades or generations, while most of the Rwandan peasants are Hutus born and raised in the countryside.⁷⁵ This new group of elite differs remarkably from previous regimes: the first President of Rwanda, Gregoire Kayibanda favored the central region; the second president Major General Juvenal Habyarimana who was from the North favored his home region; while the elites in the current regime, under President Kagame, have no allegiances to any specific region as they lost their ties to their rural origins after living outside the country for decades.⁷⁶

Because the RPF did not have entrenched patron-client networks, it needed to uncover a different scheme for generating popular legitimacy. It sought to create this legitimacy through its developmental and modernizing focus. The elite's top-down development agenda has focused on the modernization and professionalization of the agricultural sector in an effort to achieve broad-based agricultural growth. However, this lack of support for small-scale farmers has a negative implication on the regime's

⁷⁵An Ansoms, *A Green Revolution for Rwanda? The Political Economy of Poverty and Agrarian Change*, IOB, University of Antwerp, 2008, 12.

⁷⁶An Ansoms, "Re-engineering Rural Society: The Visions and Ambitions of the Rwandan Elite," *African Affairs* 108, no. 431 (2009): 293–294.

legitimacy within the rural peasantry. Consequently, the central government has exerted a heavy hand in its effort to pursue legitimacy within the periphery and counter-act the negative effects of its agricultural policies that have no role for the small-scale farmers.⁷⁷ It has done so firstly through massive social spending with the aim to improve living standards and reduce unrest. Mann and Berry postulate that the Rwandan government makes invest heavily in social spending with the goal of garnering mass support for the regime's developmental vision. This social spending bears two forms: cash disbursements to populations most affected by the genocide such as widows and genocide survivors; and services like health care, water and education to the populous.⁷⁸

The RPF instituted a paradoxical decentralization program that served to reduce the threat of local elites in the periphery. The decentralization program, instituted in 2003, advanced service delivery and citizen participation and reconciliation, all the while increasing central government control though limiting local government positions and instituting a top-down pattern of governance.⁷⁹ Green suggests that the Rwandan decentralization process redesigned the structure of local governance into one that allowed for top-down planning and monitoring by the center while concurrently reducing patronage in the periphery. The decentralization program cut down the number of districts from 154 to 106.⁸⁰ Green's analysis also shows that second wave of the decentralization initiative, instituted in 2006, made more drastic cuts across all levels of local government to make further cuts on patronage networks. The number of provinces went down from 12 to 5, districts from 106 to 30, sectors from 1,536 to 416, and cells from 9,135 to 2,148. Vice mayors per district also went down from three to two.⁸¹ The goal for Rwanda's decentralization initiative was to reduce the amount of patronage to

⁷⁷ An Ansoms, "Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor? A Critical Review of Rwanda's Rural Sector Policies," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 01 (2008): 18, 27; Ansoms, "Re-engineering Rural Society," 300.

⁷⁸ Laura Mann and Marie Berry, "Understanding the Political Motivations That Shape Rwanda's Emergent Developmental State," *New Political Economy* 21, no. 1 (2016): 133–134.

⁷⁹ Benjamin Chemouni, "Explaining the Design of the Rwandan Decentralization: Elite Vulnerability and the Territorial Repartition of Power," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 2 (2014): 246–247.

⁸⁰ Green, "Patronage as Institutional Choice," 429–430.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 430.

the periphery, limit local elite capture in the countryside where RPF's legitimacy is lowest, and create a local framework that was more conducive for the regime to better implement their development agenda.⁸²

The Rwandan government also radically transformed the rural areas to maximize agricultural productivity through spatial reorganization in the form of Villagization, land-tenure reform and agricultural modernization to further gain legitimacy by achieving economic growth. Villagization also provides a secondary benefit of increasing service delivery to the periphery, which served as another avenue for regime legitimation. Instead of providing water, electricity, sanitation, etc., to scattered rural dwellers, the Rwandan government only has to deliver these services to a more centralized and compact set of villages. In addition to performance legitimacy, Villagization also helped RPF elites—former exiles without connections to the hinterland—to gain traction on the rural areas in order to further extend the central government's influence at the local level.⁸³

The RPF regime has made tremendous efforts to depoliticize the periphery to prevent local elites from mobilizing the predominantly Hutu peasantry in the periphery along ethnic or regional lines. Like Burundi and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, decentralization in Rwanda has served to maintain centralization. However, Rwanda is unique in that has used decentralization to depoliticize the periphery and install a technocratic elite that is loyal to the regime. This is primarily because the RPF lacks power bases in the countryside thus must limit the availability of resources at the local level that could potentially be used for the formation of rebel movements. The installation of RPF loyal Mayors in the periphery, who are often young and grateful for their overnight success, serves further tighten central control at the local level.⁸⁴

The decentralization program also re-engineered the physical and institutional environment to wield economic and political control of the periphery.⁸⁵ Since the RPF

⁸² Chemouni, "Explaining the Design of the Rwandan Decentralization," 256, 259.

⁸³ Filip Reyntjens, " (Re-) Imagining a Reluctant Post-Genocide Society: The Rwandan Patriotic Front's Ideology and Practice." *Journal of Genocide Research* 18, no. 1 (2016): 72.

⁸⁴ Chemouni, "Explaining the Design of the Rwandan Decentralization," 253–256.

⁸⁵ Mann and Berry, "Understanding the Political Motivations That Shape Rwanda's Emergent Developmental State," 133; Chemouni, "Explaining the Design of the Rwandan Decentralization," 246.

took over in 1994, it has launched a grand scheme to reorganize rural space and increase agricultural production as an avenue towards post-conflict economic growth. This reconfiguration of the periphery has also bolstered the regime's authority in the hinterland, which was predominantly Hutu. Reorganization has been enforced through top-down developmental reforms that are implemented by local administrators, who are tightly connected to the regime.⁸⁶ Unity and reconciliation policies have bolstered political control by the center, while facilitating policy implementation. Decentralization reform also restructured the local administration system into one that was responsible for implementing national development goals at the local level.⁸⁷

Imihigo was introduced as a means of improving and monitoring local development and service delivery to the periphery as well as a basis for the dismissal or promotion of local government officials. This practice dates back centuries to the commitment of military leaders to their King to achieve certain objectives, such as the conquest of an enemy or a region. Military leaders were rewarded for their achievements and received acclaim from their tribe for their accomplishments. By the same token, failure by military leaders to achieve their goals was met with shame. *Imihigo* has since been modernized and institutionalized as part of the decentralization reform accountability.⁸⁸ Today, it is a written contract between the President of the Republic and a district Mayor that sets development targets backed by specific performance indicators. The *Imihigo* signing process is ceremonial, widely covered, and acts as a great advertising medium for the Rwandan government. Often, ministries sent out evaluators to districts to oversee the implementation of national policies that are under their purview. Consequently, planning power remains at the center whilst implementation has devolved to the districts. This new structure thus allows the central government to permeate all levels of local administration.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ An Ansoms and Giuseppe D. Cioffo, "The Exemplary Citizen on the Exemplary Hill: The Production of Political Subjects in Contemporary Rural Rwanda," *Development and Change* 47, no. 6 (2016): 1247–1248.

⁸⁷ Biedermann, "Rwanda: Developmental Success Story in a Unique Setting," 14.

⁸⁸ Jesse McConnell, *Institution (Un)Building: Decentralizing Government and the Case of Rwanda*, (EUI Working Paper No. 39), Florence: European University Institute (2010), 3.

⁸⁹ Chemouni, "Explaining the Design of the Rwandan Decentralization," 248–250, 257.

As part of its post-conflict economic recovery strategy, the Rwandan government instituted several ambitious projects to include agricultural reforms and land-tenure reform. The Villagization policy or *Imidugudu*, introduced in 1996, was initially geared towards resettling refugees after the war but quickly evolved into the coercive relocation of scattered rural dwellers into centralized accessible villages. The Villagization initiative freed up production space and facilitated the Rwandan government's redesign of farming practices for agricultural intensification.⁹⁰ Although most Rwandans rely on subsistence farming, the RPF's agriculture and land reform policies were focused on modernization and land consolidation. Land reform created a private land market through the registration of land tenure and consolidated small subsistence farms to accommodate large-scale farming. Agricultural reforms mandated that farmers grow cash crops, compulsory mono-cropping, and employment of new farming techniques. The government-mandated transformation of agricultural production also included the roll out of commercial seeds, import fertilizers and pesticides. The reform also did away with low-value crops and concentrated on the production of six commercial crops—maize, wheat, cassava, beans, Irish potatoes, and rice.⁹¹

The top-down nature of the decentralization policy requires the local government to manage what the farmers cultivate by reporting production upwards through *Imihigo*. Agricultural reform, since implementation in 2008, has yielded significant growth in productivity; between 2007 and 2010, there was a threefold increase in the production of maize, wheat, and cassava, bean production grew twofold, and Irish potato production increased by a third.⁹² A negative consequence of the success of this program is the employment of coercive methods such as fines or destruction of property by local

⁹⁰ Ansoms and Cioffo, "The Exemplary Citizen on the Exemplary Hill," 1254.

⁹¹ Giuseppe D. Cioffo, An Ansoms, and Jude Murison, "Modernising Agriculture through a 'New 'Green Revolution: The Limits of the Crop Intensification Programme in Rwanda," *Review of African Political Economy* 43, no. 148 (2016): 281-282.

⁹² Ansoms and Cioffo, "Exemplary Citizen on the Exemplary Hill," 1255–1256; Cioffo, Ansoms, and Murison, "Modernising Agriculture through a 'New 'Green Revolution," 281, 285.

administrators in order to meet centrally imposed targets; failure to achieve targets would negatively affect their careers.⁹³

The minority Tutsi-led RPF is weakest in the periphery, which is predominantly Hutu. The regime has to work against the threat of local elite capture and rural mobilization along ethnic lines in order to gain legitimacy. In order to garner legitimacy at the periphery, RPF sought to increase service delivery at the local level power by moving scattered settlements into more organized and centralized villages. The RPF also improved upward and downward accountability at the local level through *Imihigo*. Additionally, the RPF, through its agricultural and land reform, increased agricultural productivity and improved service delivery to the periphery.

D. CONCLUSION

Rwanda, even without conflict, has significant economic challenges. It is landlocked, highly dependent on agriculture, overpopulated, and has limited options for diversification outside its primary commodities. These factors limit its potential for economic growth and poverty alleviation. However, given these challenges, Rwanda has still made a remarkable transformation since the end of the 1990s-civil war and 1994 genocide. The endogenous dynamics of the conflict to peace transition were absent of internationally imposed negotiations and liberal peacebuilding agendas. This allowed the RPF to consolidate power, close the political space, and maintain clarity of vision in orchestrating the country's economic recovery. This economic success is sustained by RPF's party-statal, which are spearheaded by highly technocratic and development-oriented elites. The regime's main initiatives—to increase investment in the non-agricultural sector, transform the economy to become knowledge-based through technology and technical education, grow the private sector, and increase investments—appear to neglect the periphery. However, the long-term view of the regime is that these modernist goals would lead to a trickle-down effect of poverty alleviation in the periphery.

⁹³ Chris Huggins, "Agricultural Policies and Local Grievances in Rural Rwanda." *Peace Review* 21, no. 3 (2009): 299.

By contrast, as I show in the next chapter, protracted negotiated peace settlements in Burundi have led to a division of the political landscape amongst the elite. Consequently, neopatrimonialism has persisted throughout changes in government and continue to drive the behavior of the ruling elite. Parties tend to splinter, resulting in multiple parties that tend to have similar ideologies. Moreover, the government is perceived to be inherently extractive as corruption is rampant at all levels. Accordingly, economic inequalities in the periphery follow ethno-regional patterns of patronage. Additionally, local governments are insufficiently funded and lack the technocratic capacity to conduct any meaningful development. Burundi, is therefore unable to achieve a similar rate of post-conflict economic growth.

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III. BURUNDI

This chapter aims to explore how elite dynamics and center-periphery relations have led to Burundi's weak post-conflict economic recovery. This chapter examines how internationally brokered power sharing arrangement influenced the political economy of the Burundi in the aftermath of the 1993–2005 civil war. Although Burundi's institutional arrangement of power sharing has been successful in dealing with ethnic division, it has been ineffective nurturing strong institutions and controlling political corruption.

The first section of the chapter examines Burundi's transition from conflict to peace that sets the stage for the post-conflict elite power dynamics at the center as well as the motivations that shape the regimes relationship with its citizenry. The second section addresses how the new regime that emerged out of the power-sharing peace settlement, perpetuated the rent-seeking exclusionary policies and practices of the previous regime and carried on with politics as usual; characterized by clientelism, weak coordination and lack of cooperation among the political elites. Although patronage and politicization of civil service positions in Burundi have always been the *modus operandi*, this practice reached new heights under the CNDD-FDD regime. The next section of this chapter delves into how the CNDD-FDD regime relates to the rural peasantry. The analysis focuses on how the political elites in Burundi have managed to gain legitimacy within the periphery despite their lack of political will or development capacity to deliver services to their rural majority. The overall goal of this chapter is to show how the circumstances surrounding CNDD-FDD elite dynamics and center-periphery relations failed to generate economic growth in the aftermath of the civil war.

A. BACKGROUND: PATH FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE

Burundi's history of regime succession, prior to the first multi-party elections in 1993, was a result of successive military coups. The 1990s wave of international donor push for multi-party democracy resulted in a new Burundi constitution, in 1992, that allowed for multi-party politics and provisions for power sharing arrangements aimed to promote diversity in government and national unity. The Hutu political party, *Front pour*

la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), won the first multi-party elections in 1993, electing Melchoir Ndadaye to the presidency. The Tutsi political elites who had benefitted from the long-standing patronage network under President Pierre Buyoya's regime, feared losing access to spoils of the state. Tutsis also feared land dispossession due to the mass return of Hutu refugees, who would challenge claims to land. These two factors led to the assassination of President Ndadaye and other senior members of FRODEBU in October 1993, within three months of taking office, and ignited ethnic-based conflict around the country that lasted from 1993 to 2005.⁹⁴

The United Nations (UN) led series of internationally brokered peace agreements from 1994 to 2005 aimed to stabilize the country and avoid a tragedy like the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Like its northern neighbor Rwanda, Burundi's post-independence conflicts have been a consequence of ethnic strife between Hutus and Tutsis. Although the Arusha process failed in Rwanda in 1993, the UN and other international organizations still envisioned elite power sharing as the only path to peace and reconciliation in Burundi. The various iterations of negotiations focused on reaching an ethnically based elite power sharing political arrangement in the interim that would be followed by multi-party elections. The UN brokered a power sharing government that divided power equally between UPRONA (Tutsi) and FRODEBU (Hutu).

The hard-liners within FRODEBU did not like the idea of resolution through peace negotiations. Consequently, FRODEBU split into two factions: one committed to peace negotiations (maintaining the FRODEBU party name) and the other committed to winning power back through violent means, *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD). The Hutu rebel movement, Palipehutu-FNL, joined CNDD-FDD in launching attacks. The situation in the country deteriorated over the next two years, and the power sharing government was unable to stabilize the country. Major Buyoya, former president of Burundi (1987–93), used the inability of the government to stabilize the country to justify a military coup in 1996 that returned the country to military rule. Later, in 1998, peace talks resumed and

⁹⁴ Curtis, Devon, "The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power Sharing and Post-Conflict Governance in Burundi," *African Affairs* 112, no. 446 (2013): 79–80.

were followed by a peace agreement in 2000 and several other subsequent agreements that culminated in the 2005 constitution. The CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL came to the negotiating table much later, after signing a Global Ceasefire agreement in November 2003.⁹⁵

The lack of legitimacy of the Arusha Agreement was one of the primary reasons why the CNDD-FDD party, which was not part of the negotiations, won the 2005 and 2010 general elections. However, the series of peaceful multi-party democratic elections in 2005 and 2010, suggests that the process was successful in achieving the goals set out by the international community—conflict termination as well as its relative success to that of Sudan/South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Authoritarian tendencies by Nkurunziza’s regime as well as low-intensity conflict in Burundi were therefore overlooked by international actors.⁹⁶

Devon Curtis observes that power sharing, as outlined in the Burundi constitution pertains to all spheres of governance and security. The constitution allows for a President and two Vice Presidents, who must come from different ethnic groups and political parties. It also provides for ethnic apportionment of the government, National Assembly, armed forces, national police, and intelligence services, all composed of 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi members.⁹⁷ Curtis examination of the constitution also finds that each province must provide two senators from different ethnicities and any party that gains at a minimum 5 percent of the popular vote, is eligible for ministerial positions. The constitution also makes a 30 percent provision for women in government and the National Assembly.⁹⁸ Curtis analysis also highlights the provisions for minority Tutsi representation as it ensures that they too have a voice when it comes to passing legislation in the National Assembly.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Curtis, “The International Peacebuilding Paradox,” 80–85; Jessica Piombo, “Peacemaking in Burundi: Conflict Resolution versus Conflict Management Strategies,” *African Security* 3, no. 4 (2010): 250.

⁹⁶ Curtis, “The International Peacebuilding Paradox,” 86–87.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 86–87.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 87.

Today, political conflict in Burundi primarily lies along party affiliations and not ethnic cleavages.¹⁰⁰ While the process has succeeded in de-ethnicizing politics, it has failed to make significant strides in post-conflict economic recovery. This chapter argues that despite the regime change, from Tutsi-domination to Hutu-domination of the political spheres in Burundi, the political dynamics remain the same. Lack of political will, corruption, clientelism, and other predatory behavior geared towards elite self-interest have stifled economic growth. The following sections will examine how the power sharing arrangement that emerged, in contrast to the unilateral seizure of power in Rwanda, led to a divergent political transition characterized by elite and center-periphery dynamics that cemented the relationships that were already present and limited institutional changes necessary for successful post-conflict economic recovery.

B. POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: ELITE DYNAMICS

The power sharing peace agreement that ended the conflict in Burundi did not change the politics of the past as old elites were replaced with a new group of elites who continued with the similar pattern of predation. Since independence in 1962, conflict in Burundi has been primarily a manifestation of the struggle for control of the state as a tool of wealth and power. Burundi is a primary agricultural economy, with coffee, tea, and cotton accounting for over 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings. Burundi also has an overly bloated public sector, where public servants make up the richest six percent of the population compared to the average of 13% in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁰¹ Consequently, the political system has become exclusionary and caters to a select minority. Cycles of conflict and power sharing have resulted in a web of rival political parties that have split into numerous factions vying for a stake in government. The indiscriminate nature of the peace negotiations process led to a proliferation of parties: from four in 1996 to seventeen in 2000. It is in this political environment that CNDD-FDD came to power, after winning the 2005 and 2010 presidential and legislative elections. During this period, Nkurunziza's regime was characterized by compromised governance within a fragmented structure.

¹⁰⁰ Stef Vandeginste, "Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and Error," *Africa Spectrum* (2009): 81.

¹⁰¹ Nkurunziza, and Ngaruko, "Why has Burundi Grown So Slowly?" 80.

This lack of elite cooperation immobilized the government, thus limiting development efforts geared towards post-conflict economic recovery.¹⁰²

The CNDD-FDD, in contrast to the RPF, was neither elite driven nor firmly hierarchical. The CNDD-FDD is still plagued with the same issues it had during the war when it was a rebel movement. It is composed of a political (CNDD) and military (FDD) wing, each with its own centers of command and no clear hierarchical structure. The dual centers of command have led to a lack of cohesion as competing influences push the organization in different directions. The organization is disorganized, has poor communication linkages, has issues of discipline, lacks vision, and consequently has been unable to consolidate a coherent strategy under one hierarchy. Over its lifetime, CNDD-FDD has experienced various crises in leadership, where transitions in positions of power were often gained through violence. In addition, the strength of the party has been diminished over time due to internal splits that cause supporters to leave with their respective leaders, weakening the party's base of support.¹⁰³

Although the power sharing agreement was successful at bringing about peace as well as an ethnic, regional and gender balance of government, it was not accompanied by a change in political elite behavior. The new political elites in Burundi were of a different social class and ethnic background as compared to the previous regime. The CNDD-FDD sprung out of the four decades of frustrations over oppression and discrimination of the Hutu peasantry. Consequently, CNDD-FDD was an amalgamation of young poorly educated people from rural areas, unlike the Rwandan elite who were highly educated. When CNDD-FDD assumed power, most of its elite were poor and very few of them had any business experience, a stark contrast to RPF's elite, who were prosperous in the diaspora and later when they returned to Rwanda. Most of the political elite, approximately 98 percent, had failed to complete their lower secondary school education. Participation in the conflict as a member of CNDD-FDD afforded one preferential treatment for government positions. Local and central administration positions were

¹⁰² Cara Eugenia Jones, *Giving up the Gun: Rebel to Ruler Transitions in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, University of Florida, 2013, 196-197.

¹⁰³ Jones, *Giving up the Gun*, 98-99, 180, 182, 213-214, 220-221.

therefore occupied with poorly educated elite. In addition, ideological differences within the party are evident in the regime's incoherent approach to post-conflict economic recovery.¹⁰⁴

In contrast to the unity of the RPF once it was in power, in Burundi, political parties have been riven with internal rivalries. Parties suffered internal fights, division, and resignations throughout the decade of peace negotiations. Elites within the various fragmented parties used violence as a means of getting a seat at the peace negotiations table and to take advantage of the changing political landscape. Instead of settling the underlying grievances of Tutsi ethnocracy and Tutsi-Hutu inequality that led to the conflict, power sharing arrangements served as an avenue for elite to gain political seats and improve their financial positions.¹⁰⁵ For instance, between 2007 and 2008, very few laws were passed by the Burundian parliament due to inter- and intra-party fighting.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, youth factions of major political parties are often used to intimidate and manipulate the opposition into compliance, especially in the run-up to elections.¹⁰⁷ Constant party schisms have therefore affected the functioning of the legislature and executive, and consequently, the ability of these institutions to implement coherent post-conflict economic policies.

Like Rwanda, the state and its resources are the main source of political patronage; however, the contrast with Burundi is stark. The political landscape in Burundi since independence has been historically intertwined with the economy, as rent-seeking bureaucracies have manipulated market policies and state-led development for personal and political gain. Although power sharing in Burundi has enabled the country

¹⁰⁴ "Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis," Africa Report No. 185, March 21, 2012, International Crisis Group, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/185-burundi-a-deepening-corruption-crisis.pdf>; Chemouni, "The Politics of State Effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda," 144, 162, 236; Arieff, "Burundi's Electoral Crisis," 5.

¹⁰⁵ Curtis, "The International Peacebuilding Paradox," 85; Jessica Piombo, "Peacemaking in Burundi: Conflict Resolution versus Conflict Management Strategies," *African Security* 3, no. 4 (2010): 246.

¹⁰⁶ Leontine Specker, Ivan Briscoe, and Jean Marie Gasana, *Early Economic Recovery in Fragile States, Case Study Burundi: Operational Challenges*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, 2010, 17–18.

¹⁰⁷ Specker, Briscoe, and Gasana, *Early Economic Recovery in Fragile States*, 16.

to overcome ethnic tensions, it has also incentivized elites to adopt short-sighted politics. Political priorities of the Burundian elite are usually centered on forthcoming elections instead of long-term development, which is characteristic of the Rwandan elite. Elites often focus on securing election support or maintaining authority within a political party. The high-turnover of elites within government and their short-term perspective has hindered long-term strategic planning of post-conflict economic development.¹⁰⁸ Even though there have been some significant post-conflict reforms, like free maternal healthcare and primary education, Burundi has yet to achieve the sort of economic success that Rwanda enjoys.¹⁰⁹

The political outcome of the transition to peace was a shift in power from one dominated by Tutsi interests to one dominated by Hutu interests; however, the pre-war neopatrimonial vertical power structure endured.¹¹⁰ The CNDD-FDD, once in power, replaced non-members in key positions with party activists, regardless of their level of competence. Unlike in Rwanda where the small number of elites at the center have political space to implement uncontested pro-economic growth reform, the preponderance of political parties in Burundi has led to political deadlock, which has paralyzed parliament and key institutions. For instance, the 2007 to 2008 parliamentary deadlock was due to CNDD-FDD infighting as well as inter-party fighting. During this period of political stalemate, very few laws were passed by parliament, and major political parties used youth wings to terrorize opponents to coerce them into compliance.¹¹¹

Another aspect of Burundi's low quality public administration capacity is corruption. Burundi is rated by Transparency International as the most corrupt country in

¹⁰⁸ Specker, Briscoe, and Gasana, *Early Economic Recovery in Fragile States*, 20.

¹⁰⁹ Patricia Daley, "Political Violence in Post-Conflict Societies in Africa: The Limits of Peace-Building and Stabilization in Burundi," *Jindal Journal of International Affairs* 3, no. 1, (2013): 118.

¹¹⁰ Mats Berdal, and Dominik Zaum, eds. *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace*. Routledge, 2013, 270, 273.

¹¹¹ Specker, Briscoe, and Gasana, *Early Economic Recovery in Fragile States*, 16, 18.

East Africa, with corruption permeating all levels of government.¹¹² On the occasion that independent monitoring groups find evidence of corruption by senior officials, they often receive threats of death, imprisonment, and intimidation. Endemic corruption within government hinders cooperation with donors, which limits access to funding for development. Consequently, the government of Burundi, under pressure from donors, established an Anti-Corruption Brigade and Anti-Corruption Court in 2006 but so far, both have been ineffective as the regime has purposefully underfunded them and only supported their efforts in pursuing senior officials who have fallen out of favor with the party.¹¹³ Pervasive corruption has therefore undermined the credibility of post-conflict institutions and affected economic development due to reductions in donor funding.

As a whole, political elites in Burundi do not have strong incentives to pursue policies and programs that would promote post-conflict economic growth. This lack of political will is driven by the institutionalization of power sharing that has resulted in competing patron-client networks for access to state resources. This neopatrimonial structure is a continuation of Burundi's pre-war order, which was characterized by corruption, political infighting, and low administrative capacity. The post-conflict era was therefore merely a reshuffling of the political power dynamics. While it is evident that Burundi's dismal post-conflict economic growth trajectory is endogenous to elite political dynamics, one cannot discount the contributing role of center-periphery interactions.

C. POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: CENTER-PERIPHERY DYNAMICS

Unlike the RPF in Rwanda which initially came to power with very little political legitimacy, the CNDD-FDD, with its pre-existing forms of legitimacy in the countryside, did not see the need to develop alternative sources of legitimacy. CNDD-FDD, a former Hutu rebel group, maintained an extensive network of patronage and support in the countryside prior to assuming power in 2003. The party benefitted from a network of

¹¹² "Kenya: Burundi Most Corrupt Country in East Africa as its Revenue Authority Tops List of Corrupt Institutions," Transparency International Kenya, July 22, 2010.

¹¹³ Daley, "Political Violence in Post-Conflict Societies in Africa," 118.

regional ‘motivators’ who put pressure on informal institutions, such as kinship and regional networks. Moreover, the CNDD-FDD had several party headquarters at the local level, and therefore could permeate nearly all the provinces in Burundi. Although it was mostly a Hutu organization, it promoted a multiethnic composition, which distinguished itself from its competitors and garnered the support of some of the marginalized Tutsis. Once the party was in power, the political elite integrated their existing patron-client network into state institutions.¹¹⁴ Consequently, the political elite in Burundi lacked the incentive to devote time and resources to post conflict economic recovery.

Like Rwanda, the design of the decentralization program in Burundi ran counter to the participatory principles of decentralization. It improved control of the center, devolved financial responsibility, and deconcentrated development implementation to the local level; however, it differed in that it lacked an accountability feedback mechanism. Local administrators were also centrally appointed and thus had to rely on the center and not the periphery to shore-up their positions. Moreover, the government of Burundi instituted the minimum requirement for members of the Communal Council members to have high school diplomas. Due to the low literacy and education rates in the rural areas, Council positions were usually filled with urban educated elites who had little to no ties with the rural citizenry they governed. Furthermore, one third of Council members were not required to live in the communes and thus were disconnected from local issues and politics.¹¹⁵ This dynamic of disconnected local elites is also present in Rwanda; however, unlike in Burundi where there was no accountability mechanism, local Rwandan elite were beholden to deliver services to their constituents through performance contracts. Since local governments were no longer financed by the central government, they had to rely on local and donor financing. Consequently, local governments had very low self-financing capacities due to low tax bases in the periphery, poor land registration, and outdated manual filing system procedures. Over 80 percent of local revenue was spent on operating costs, leaving very little for development programs. Moreover, limited donor

¹¹⁴ Cara Eugenia Jones, *Giving up the Gun: Rebel to Ruler Transitions in Africa’s Great Lakes Region*, University of Florida, 2013, 182, 220, 283.

¹¹⁵ Peter Uvin, “Local Governance after War: Some Reflections on Donor Behavior in Burundi,” *Praxis* 23 (2008): 112.

funding reached the local government due to the distributive practices described above. This hindered the ability of local governments to facilitate their own development programs.¹¹⁶

Poverty reduction initiatives aimed at economic growth, marginalized the majority within the rural communities. Burundi's 2012 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II (PRSP-II), prepared through broad consultations with the World Bank and the IMF, proposed modernizing and diversifying agriculture. It also focused on developing family oriented commercial agriculture by targeting farmers with land over one hectare and the technical qualifications to achieve PRSP-II's goals. Those with less than one hectare of land, who were the majority in the rural areas, were excluded from this process due to their lack of qualifications.¹¹⁷

Issues surrounding land have placed the peasantry in direct conflict with the elite and returnees. The National Commission for Land, established in 2006 as part of the peace agreement, failed to make significant progress resolving land disputes. Complex state land legislation, layers of bureaucracy within the CNDD-FDD government, illiteracy, poverty, inheritance laws that dispossess widows or lack of succession rights of women, have further complicated land claims. Returnees, mostly Hutus who were displaced during the conflict, find their land either re-allotted, squatted or stolen. Land grabbing by the elite is also a product of a general lack of land policy enforcement within the periphery.¹¹⁸

D. CONCLUSION

The power sharing arrangement in Burundi was considered a success by the international community and was a welcome promise of hope to the country's citizenry that was desperate to end twelve years of war. A closer examination of elite power dynamics and state society relations has shown that the power-sharing peace process, while transformative in several ways, has not brought about any significant changes to

¹¹⁶ Specker, Briscoe, and Gasana, *Early Economic Recovery in Fragile States*, 26.

¹¹⁷ Daley, "Political Violence in Post-Conflict Societies in Africa," 119.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 120–121.

the country's political economy. A decade into the post-war period, very little has changed within Burundi's political landscape: the poor remain poor; the institutionalized system of corruption and clientelism continues to plague the government at all levels; there is a total lack of accountability; and the political elite use the state and its resources to advance their own interests. The incentive structure, in the case of Burundi, is one that is predatory and geared towards preserving short-term political power rather than fostering economic development. This brings into question the efficacy of power sharing as a roadmap to post-conflict recovery.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Re-creating a viable economy after prolonged conflict is one of the most serious challenges of post-conflict recovery. Some countries have emerged from conflict and have been successful at resuming or surpassing their normal economic development trajectory, while a greater number of countries have had difficulties jumpstarting their economies. This thesis examined the political determinants of post-conflict economic growth in Rwanda and Burundi by examining each country's transition from conflict to peace, elite dynamics and center-periphery dynamics to determine why these 'twins' took divergent economic trajectories in the aftermath of their most recent civil wars. The main finding of this research is that victories with clear winners and losers is more conducive for economic development than those attained through negotiated settlements.

This final chapter is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the findings borne out of the study of the elite and center-periphery dynamics that emerged in Burundi and Rwanda after their respective transitions from conflict to peace. The second section analyses the two hypotheses proposed in Chapter I and their implications for the study of post-conflict economic recovery. The final section suggests areas that may require further research.

A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The decisive victory of the RPF in Rwanda made it possible for the regime to narrow the political space thus facilitating uncontested decision-making by the regime. This was not the case in Burundi, however, as the protracted negotiated settlement that led to the end of the conflict resulted in a fragmented political landscape that left the elite ineffective in supplying public goods and meaningful development. The RPF and CNDD-FDD, both former rebel organizations, came to power at the end of their respective civil wars; however, they had very different organizing principles. The RPF in Rwanda, were heavily influenced by the NRA while in exile in Uganda. The RPF was highly trained, disciplined, well-structured, and experienced. In contrast, the CNDD-FDD has and continues to suffer from internal struggles and desertions. CNDD-FDD has not been able

to transform itself from a war movement into an organization capable of running the government. The Tutsi-led RPF lacked legitimacy with the majority Hutu citizenry and thus oriented their strategy and vision towards good governance, accountability, and development. The political will of the RPF elite, coupled with the lack of strong opposition, has enabled the regime to employ transformative economic policies that have orchestrated Rwanda's miraculous economic recovery.

Moreover, the RPF elite, a group of highly technocratic and developmentally-oriented elites, manage the commanding heights of the economy as high-ranking officials within party-led enterprises. The CNDD-FDD, on the other hand, was an internal movement with representation from a broad cross section of the country, and had linkages in several provinces during the conflict in Burundi. These linkages were sustained through CNDD-FDD's transition to power, thus legitimating the party. The protracted negotiated peace settlements led to a division of the political landscape amongst the elite. Consequently, neopatrimonialism has persisted throughout changes in government and continue to drive the behavior of the ruling elite. Parties tend to splinter, resulting in multiple parties that tend to have similar ideologies. Furthermore, the government of Burundi is perceived to be inherently extractive as corruption is rampant at all levels.

The RPF elite, consisting mostly of former Tutsi refugees, came to power without a reserve of legitimacy among the Rwandan citizenry. It was therefore imperative for the new Rwandan ruling elite to gain legitimacy and did so through aggressive economic reforms that led to the country's rapid post-conflict economic growth. By contrast, in Burundi, the CNDD-FDD came into power with a tremendous reserve of legitimacy among the rural peasantry due to the party's predominantly Hutu compositions, which resonated with the largely Hutu citizenry. Although it appears that the Rwandan regime neglected the periphery by employing modernist economic growth policies, it did so with the goal that these policies would lead to a trickle-down effect of poverty alleviation in the periphery. While in Burundi, economic inequalities in the periphery follow ethno-regional patterns of patronage. Additionally, local governments are insufficiently funded

and lack the technocratic capacity to conduct any meaningful development. The next section synthesizes this case study in relation to the hypotheses studied.

B. HYPOTHESES EVALUATED

This thesis examined two hypotheses that potentially explain the divergent post-conflict economic trajectories of Rwanda and Burundi. The first hypothesis challenges perspectives emerging from the political settlements literature suggesting that inclusive power sharing agreements are better for post-conflict economic growth. It suggested that the military victory of the RPF in Rwanda allowed the political elite to close the political space. The Tutsi-led RPF sought to gain performance legitimacy through development as it lacked legitimacy with the majority-Hutu citizenry. In contrast, in Burundi the peace settlement was a politically allocated power-sharing agreement that reinforced existing predatory elite behavior. The second hypothesis submitted that centralized management of the periphery in post-conflict countries yields higher economic growth than decentralized management. This hypothesis analyzes the degree of delegation of policy decision-making to the local level and its effects on post-conflict economic recovery.

Regarding the first hypothesis, this research challenges conflict resolution practitioners who advocate inclusive political settlements. Most advocates of inclusive political power settlements focus on the peace aspect of the process rather than on how it affects post-conflict economic development. This prescription assumes that peace is a prerequisite for development. My analysis finds that the winner-takes-all victory in Rwanda fostered a closed institutional arrangement, however, with a more inclusive distributional outcome. Rwanda's exclusive group of elites oversaw a post-conflict economic transformation that realized significant economic growth with some degree of poverty alleviation. The inclusive power-sharing agreement in Burundi, on the other hand, has been unable to stimulate a trajectory of sustained economic growth. More pointedly, it points to the motivations that drive political elites to either promote economic growth or eschew opportunities for economic growth in favor of short-term predatory practices.

The second hypothesis challenged the internationally advocated policy of decentralization for development. In examining these two countries, this thesis endeavored to determine whether centralized management of the periphery yields higher post-conflict economic growth. Both countries instituted *de jure* decentralization policies that reinforced regime centralized control of the periphery. The difference between the two, centered on the functions each chose to decentralize. Rwanda opted for a decentralization policy that allowed for control and monitoring by the center as well service delivery through local government. Burundi, in contrast, employed a decentralization policy that disavowed the central government's responsibility of financial support to local governments while still maintaining political control of the periphery through existing networks of influence. Local governments do not receive funding from the central government and thus rely on limited funding through local taxation and support from donor organizations. This devolution of fiscal responsibility has limited the post-conflict economic recovery, especially in Burundi's rural areas.

C. FUTURE RESEARCH

This analysis of the political determinants of post-conflict economic growth still leaves open questions in our understanding of post-conflict recovery. One key underlying question is why some political elite opt out of using patronage to gain legitimacy. The examination of Rwanda in this thesis uncovered that the political elites were motivated to be developmentally oriented because of their lack of embeddedness with the Hutu; however, this study does not explain why the RPF political elites chose not to develop patronage networks to gain legitimacy in the periphery. Further exploration into Rwanda's center-periphery dynamics, through field research, would aid in this study. Another key question that arises from this research is whether RPF's winner-takes-all victory in Rwanda also contributed to peace. A study of existing literature on this aspect of transition from war to peace would further challenge the viability internationally advocated power-sharing process as prescription for post-conflict peace and stability. This thesis has shown that post-conflict economic choices are highly conditioned by political context. However, a serious gap remains in the existing research on the determinants of post-conflict economic growth. Differences such as luck, leadership,

history, geography, culture, natural resources, diseases, climate, aid and external actors, influence how and why post-conflict economic recovery varies across countries. Future empirical research that analyzes the economic impact of these other factors would be especially welcome, as they are likely to contribute to a better understanding of the economic recovery challenges facing post-conflict countries.

D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

Each post-conflict situation is unique; however, there are certain political dynamics, applicable to several situations, that might assist scholars and practitioners in understanding underlying political factors of post-conflict economic recovery. The nature of post-conflict political settlements influence and incentivize political elites to deliver economic growth and development to the societies they serve. Elite and center-periphery relations are mutually supportive: elite dynamics determine the distribution of power at the center. This group of elites then must find a way to command and inspire support from their citizenry through either development, in the case of Rwanda, or clientelism, in the case of Burundi. Consequently, political elites cannot ignore the periphery as it has the capacity to maintain or unseat the existing regime in power.

What appears to be central to the disparate trajectories of these two countries is the nature of their respective dominant political parties, the source of government legitimacy within their societies, and the parameters of the political settlement during the transition from conflict to peace. Incorporating these three aspects can help international organizations to understand the political drivers in post-conflict states that constrain or facilitate economic growth and development.

Furthermore, the distribution of aid is influenced by the political interests of those in power. Understanding of the political settlement framework, as well as the elite and state-society dynamics that it creates, helps development donors and organizations determine the impediments to getting aid to where it is needed most. More importantly, a better understanding elite and state-society relations that result from political settlements will influence what form of settlement international actors will seek to influence. While inclusive peace settlements support political reconciliation, the implication of this study

is that they may work against economic development, at least in the short-term. Therefore, understanding the provenance, ideology, and motivations of political elites will help guide peace settlement negotiators in determining the best-case scenario for each country. By failing to have a deep knowledge of these dynamics surrounding political settlements, elites, and society, the international community may be contributing to slowing down the process of post-conflict economic recovery.

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