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**RUSSIA'S SECURITY RELATIONS WITH FINLAND,
NORWAY, AND SWEDEN**

by

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September 2017

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the role that NATO and the United States play in the security policies of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and Russia's views on the activities of the Alliance and the United States along its northern flank. An analysis of the foreign and security policies of Finland, Norway, and Sweden indicates that these three countries view Russian activities in the region as a security threat. The thesis finds that NATO and the United States play a large role in the security calculations of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, while Russia considers the Alliance and the United States as threats to its national security. The thesis encompasses economic and political consideration; the historical context between Russia and Finland, Norway, and Sweden; and the current security policies of all four countries. It also analyzes NATO considerations, bilateral relations, and potential regional security implications. This thesis recommends that Norway continue to seek an increase in NATO activity in the region, while Finland and Sweden should seek NATO membership unless they are willing to combat potential Russian aggression alone.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	Anti-Access/Area Denial
BSR	Baltic Sea region
CEPA	Center for European Policy Analysis
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DOD	Department of Defense
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EPAA	European Phased Adaptive Approach
EU	European Union
FOI	Swedish Defense Research Agency
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIDS	Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies
NSR	Northern Sea Route
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
PaRP	Planning and Review Process
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RFI	Request for Information
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communications
UN	United Nations
USMC	United States Marine Corps

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis investigates the security relations between Russia and the Nordic countries of Finland, Norway, and Sweden since Russia's illegal annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine in March 2014. These three Nordic countries are actively involved in security cooperation with each other and other countries around the world through various organizations and agreements. Norway is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Finland and Sweden are officially neutral countries that actively cooperate with NATO in the Alliance's Partnership for Peace and participate in NATO-led military exercises and other activities. The biggest questions concerning military and security cooperation in the Nordic region involve Russia and the activities of NATO with the Scandinavian countries. What role does NATO play in the security considerations of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and how does Russia view the activities of NATO along its northwestern border?

In response to recent Russian acts of aggression and increased Russian military capabilities, Norway would like to see a greater NATO presence in the North Atlantic Ocean. What effect would an increased NATO presence in the North Atlantic Ocean or the Arctic Ocean have on Russian military and security strategy? Is there a potential for conflict in the North Atlantic Ocean or the Arctic Ocean? Due to their concerns about recent Russian aggressions, Finland and Sweden have increased their cooperation with NATO. Do Finland and Sweden have plans to join NATO? How would Russia view the expansion of NATO by including Finland and Sweden? Would there be strategic changes in Russia's military posture to counter an expansion of NATO that could lead to a potential conflict? Alternatively, would the NATO membership of these two countries reinforce deterrence and have a stabilizing effect?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

This thesis analyzes the actions taken by Finland, Norway, and Sweden regarding Russia since Moscow's illegal annexation of the Crimean region of Ukraine in 2014.

Moreover, it evaluates the effects of those actions in each country's security relations with Russia. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has undergone significant transformations, especially in the military sector. According to Kristian Åtland, Russia began modernizing its Armed Forces in 2008 and will continue to do so.¹ Moreover, Russia might use its Armed Forces as a threat against smaller states along its periphery.² Åtland also noted that Russian military activity in the Arctic region is "higher today than it was in the 1990s," and that Russia has "for the first time since 1992 resumed flights with strategic bombers in the international airspace over the Barents Sea."³ Russia's military modernization has created a military capability gap between Russia and Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Realizing that Russia has a distinct advantage in military capabilities, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have each undertaken military modernization efforts to close that gap. Russia may, however, view or portray the increased capabilities of Finland, Norway, and Sweden as a potential security threat to its homeland.

Russia has also demonstrated an ability to use its military to exert its national will. The ongoing Ukraine crisis has left the Scandinavian countries, as well as many other countries in Europe, uncertain over Russia's intentions in international politics. Kate Tringham wrote that Russia "will remain the defining factor of Norwegian planning" and that Russian actions in Ukraine have "increased uncertainty regarding Russia's intentions."⁴ Finnish and Swedish government documents show that Finland and Sweden

¹ Kristian Åtland "Northern European Security after the Ukraine Conflict," *Defense & Security Analysis* 32, no. 2 (April 2016): 173, doi:10.1080/14751798.2016.1160484. Kristian Åtland is an expert with the Analysis Division of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment.

² Ibid.

³ Kristian Åtland, "Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?" *Comparative Strategy* 33, no. 2 (April 2014): 153, doi:10.1080/01495933.2014.897121.

⁴ Kate Tringham, "Norway Country Briefing: Northern Recomposure," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, October 16, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1754595>. Kate Tringham is the features editor with IHS *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

view the actions of Russia in the Ukraine crisis as destabilizing to Europe.⁵ Finland, Norway, and Sweden are uncertain about Russia's intentions; they will therefore take precautions to protect themselves. Russia may, however, see or portray those precautions by these three Nordic countries as a potential threat. The Russians may consider it politically advantageous to depict the self-defense measures of these three Nordic nations as menacing to Russia.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature reviewed for this thesis comprises mainly primary and secondary sources from 2014 onward. The primary sources consist largely of government documents and communications from government officials. The secondary sources include press reports, scholarly journal articles, and books. These secondary sources reference expert opinions on matters of concern for Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden. This literature review highlights some key observations in representative works related to the central themes of the thesis.

Given the geographical location of Russia and these three Nordic countries, much of the relevant literature focuses on the Arctic region, the Baltic Sea area, and the North Atlantic Ocean. Paul Josephson described Russia's ambitions in the Arctic in his book *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*. Josephson noted that in an effort to bring Russia back to a superpower status, "Putin supports increased expenditures on...nuclear power and the military."⁶ The Arctic Circle has garnered attention from the Kremlin due to its resources and strategic significance.⁷

⁵ "Sweden's Defense Policy 2016 to 2020," Government Offices of Sweden, June 01, 2015, <http://www.government.se/information-material/2015/06/swedens-defence-policy-2016-to-2020/>; Margot Wallström, "Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs," Government Offices of Sweden, Government of Sweden, February 24, 2016, <http://www.government.se/speeches/2016/02/statement-of-government-policy-in-the-parliamentary-debate-on-foreign-affairs-2016/>; "Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy," Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, September 2016, <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=348060>.

⁶ Paul R. Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014): 333. Paul Josephson is a Russian and Soviet History professor at Colby College.

⁷ Ibid.

Josephson also noted that the economic importance of the Arctic has become competitive recently, and that the Kremlin has sought to secure the region with its military.⁸ Russia views the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as having significant importance in its return to the capabilities and status of a global superpower.⁹ Given the importance of the Arctic, Russia tried to claim an additional 150 miles beyond the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).¹⁰ Interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea will determine if Russia's attempt to add 150 miles to its EEZ is valid.¹¹

Josephson pointed out that in September 2012 Putin set out to “rejuvenate Russian military industry.”¹² Part of this rejuvenation involved support for special Arctic troops; Russia presented this as a reaction to Finland and Norway creating special Arctic units.¹³ Moscow professes to believe that other countries began “the international arms race in the region of the North Pole.”¹⁴

Russia's ambitions and actions in the Arctic have not come without provoking concern from its neighbors in Northern Europe. In their book *Eurasian Disunion: Russia's Vulnerable Flanks*, Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova suggested that Moscow has objectives in “flexing its military muscles.”¹⁵ First, Moscow wants to “demonstrate that Russia is again a great power and can create an environment of uncertainty in the...Nordic region.”¹⁶ Second, Moscow is testing NATO's response to

⁸ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*, 341.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 342.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 346.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova, *Eurasian Disunion: Russia's Vulnerable Flanks* (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 99. Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, DC. Margarita Assenova is the director of programs for the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia at the Jamestown Foundation.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Russian aggression.¹⁷ Finland, Norway, and Sweden “are growing increasingly concerned” by the actions of Russia along its western border.¹⁸

The extent of the role that NATO will play in the Arctic has yet to be determined. NATO enlargement has been a concern for Russia since the end of the Cold War. According to David Yost, NATO Allies “have often shown caution in discussing the collective defense implications of NATO enlargement in an attempt to avoid antagonizing Russia,” and have tried to increase cooperation with Russia to ease any concerns Russia might have over NATO expansion.¹⁹ Russia, however, has “consistently expressed concern” over NATO expansion into Eastern Europe.²⁰ Looking at the expansion from Russia’s point of view, “the NATO and EU [European Union] enlargement processes since the end of the Cold War form part of a larger pattern of Western expansion into a formerly Soviet- and Russian-dominated sphere of influence.”²¹ On the other hand, NATO Allies believe that the Alliance’s expansion into Eastern Europe actually benefits Russia.²² The arguments of NATO “have not to date persuaded the Russians.”²³ Russia still views NATO expansion into Eastern Europe as a threat to its national security.²⁴

With Russian aggression along its western border, notably in Georgia and Ukraine, speculative discussions about Finland and Sweden possibly joining NATO have gained attention. According to Yost, the cooperation of Finland and Sweden with NATO has become so great that “some Allied observers regard them as ‘virtual Allies.’”²⁵

¹⁷ Bugajski and Assenova, *Eurasian Disunion*, 99.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ David S. Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014), 288. David Yost is a professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

²⁰ Ibid., 289.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 290.

²³ Ibid., 291.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 297.

Russia has not taken this cooperation lightly.²⁶ Russia has warned Finland and Sweden not to join NATO, and has encouraged “deeper military relations with Russia.”²⁷ Russia has also threatened Finland and Sweden with various forms of retaliation if they join NATO.²⁸

In his article “North European Security after the Ukraine Conflict,” Åtland identified five lessons learned about Russia from the illegal annexation of the Crimea region in Ukraine.²⁹ First, “Russia is willing to use military force...in situations where this may serve the country’s national interests.”³⁰ Second, Russia has improved its military capabilities since 2008.³¹ Third, Russia has deviated from its traditional form of warfare and is more willing to use unconventional tactics.³² Fourth, Russia will defend ethnic Russians in other countries.³³ Fifth, Putin has benefited politically from the invasion of Crimea and may use this same tactic elsewhere on the periphery of Russia.³⁴

Åtland noted that three lessons learned about Russia in the Ukraine crisis have raised concerns for the Nordic countries.³⁵ First, due to the limited presence of NATO troops “on the periphery of Europe,” Russia maintains local military superiority in the region.³⁶ Second, countries need to be able to protect themselves against the unconventional tactics currently used by Russia, as well as the potential employment of

²⁶ Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 297.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 297–298.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 298.

²⁹ Åtland, “Northern European Security after the Ukraine Conflict,” 165.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 166.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, 166–167.

³³ *Ibid.*, 167.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Åtland, “Northern European Security after the Ukraine Conflict,” 172.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

conventional tactics.³⁷ Third, countries need to find mutual interests with Russia to enhance cooperation in addition to sustaining deterrence.³⁸

The foreign and defense policies of these three Nordic countries are similar in some respects, despite the fact that only Norway is a member of NATO and not a member of the EU. The “Government Report of Finnish Foreign and Security Policy” identifies Russia as a threat to security in Europe as well.³⁹ Finland is concerned about the increase in Russian military activity along its border.⁴⁰ Finland seeks to “intensify its cooperation with the United States” as well as its cooperation with NATO.⁴¹ “Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020” confirms Sweden’s commitment to cooperation with NATO as well as to increasing bilateral cooperation with the United States and the modernization of its military capabilities.⁴² In its 2016 “Statement of Government Policy,” Sweden views Russia as the biggest threat to security in Europe since the end of the Cold War.⁴³ In the “Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy” published by the Norwegian Minister of Defense, Russia is identified as the “defining factor of Norwegian defence planning in the foreseeable future.”⁴⁴ Norway intends to take “an active role in building a strong NATO.”⁴⁵ According to this Norwegian policy statement, Russia’s actions in Ukraine “challenged the ‘deep peace’ in Europe.”⁴⁶

³⁷ Åtland, “Northern European Security after the Ukraine Conflict,” 172–173.

³⁸ Ibid., 173.

³⁹ “Government Report On Finnish Foreign and Security Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, October 7, 2016, <http://www.defmin.fi/SOI>.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² “Sweden’s Defense Policy 2016 to 2020,” Government Offices of Sweden.

⁴³ “Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs”; “Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy.”

⁴⁴ “Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy: United Effort,” Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2015, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/defence/ltp/ny-langtidsplan-for-forsvarssektoren/the-expert-commission-on-norwegian-security-and-defence-policy/id2480914/>.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Norway is undertaking a modernization of its military as well. Norway attaches great importance to its relationship with the United States.⁴⁷

While Finnish and Swedish military cooperation with NATO is growing, so is other support for NATO. In “Between Military Non-Alignment and Integration,” Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz noted in 2015 that certain members of the Finnish government support joining NATO, but that the “Finnish people are still clearly opposed to membership.”⁴⁸ They also noted that public support in Sweden is growing, with some polls showing almost half the population wanting to join NATO.⁴⁹

Norway is looking for an increased NATO presence in the North Atlantic Ocean. In “NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalizing Collective Defense and the Maritime Domain,” Ine Eriksen Soreide, the Norwegian Minister of Defense, expressed concern about Russian strategic capabilities.⁵⁰ She stated that Russia’s ability to conduct “Anti-Access/Area Denial [A2/AD] operations in the North Atlantic” Ocean and other places around Europe could pose a “challenge to NATO.”⁵¹ The Alliance should not underscore the importance of “safeguarding NATO’s freedom of movement and operation.”⁵² Like Finland and Sweden, Norway is also modernizing its military capabilities.⁵³

Outside of NATO, other factors affect the security relationship between Russia and these three Nordic countries. In “The Swedish Kings of Cyberwar,” Hugh Eakin asserted that Sweden has been deeply involved in cyberwar operations against Russia,

⁴⁷ “Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy: United Effort,” Norwegian Ministry of Defence.

⁴⁸ Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz, “Between Military Non-Alignment and Integration: Finland and Sweden in Search of a New Security Strategy,” *SWP Comments* 25 (April 2015): 2, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ss0ar-431317>. Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz are experts at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ine Eriksen Soreide, “NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalizing Collective Defense and the Maritime Domain,” *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 6, no. 2 (July 2016): 51, <http://cco.ndu.edu/Publications/PRISM/PRISM-Volume-6-no-2/Article/835074/nato-and-the-north-atlantic-revitalizing-collective-defense-and-the-maritime-do/>.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 54.

and to a smaller extent, Norway as well.⁵⁴ According to Eakin, some analysts believe that the Baltic Sea will become “a main theater in a new cyberwarfare arms race.”⁵⁵

In an article titled “Keep Calm and Carry On: Sweden’s Navy Seeks Sustainable Strategic Presence,” Lee Willett examined in detail an incident in which Sweden identified “foreign underwater activity” in its territorial waters.⁵⁶ “Yet while the incursion prompted a shift in public security focus back toward domestic issues, at a policy level the Swedish military and wider government had been paying closer attention to growing risks at home, including at and from the sea, for a number of years.”⁵⁷

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis will investigate three hypotheses about the security relations between Russia and Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

First, it is most likely that Russia will assume that anything Finland, Norway, and Sweden do to modernize their military capabilities and enhance their national security is a potential threat. One could expect Russia to apply pressure by any means possible to try to prevent Finland, Norway, and Sweden from improving their military and security situation.

Second, it is also possible that Norway will be able to modernize and secure its borders with fewer threats from Russia, while Finland and Sweden will experience resistance from Russia. Norway, as part of NATO, will be sheltered from potential hostile actions from Russia because of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Finland and Sweden, which are potential candidates for NATO membership, will receive Russia’s full effort to try to prevent them from joining the Alliance.

⁵⁴ Hugh Eakin, “The Swedish Kings of Cyberwar,” *New York Review of Books*, January 19, 2017, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/01/19/the-swedish-kings-of-cyberwar/>.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Lee Willett, “Keep Calm and Carry On: Sweden’s Navy Seeks Sustainable Strategic Presence,” *Jane’s Navy International*, October 27, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1755238>. Lee Willett is the editor of IHS Jane’s Navy International and head of IHS Jane’s Naval Desk.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

The third, and least likely, hypothesis is that Finland, Norway, and Sweden will all be able to modernize their military forces and increase their security without interference from Russia. This hypothesis implies that Russia believes that Finland, Norway, and Sweden pose no threat to its national security; therefore, anything they do to improve their military and security situation would have no bearing on Russia.

Finland, Norway, and Sweden are concerned about Russia's intentions given its military modernization followed up by its recent aggression in Ukraine. All three countries have identified areas of concern regarding their militaries and national security in light of Russian military capabilities and Moscow's recent actions. Finland, Norway, and Sweden are taking actions to be better able to counter Russia's military capabilities and defend their sovereign territories.

Norway, in the process of modernizing its military, will gain improved capabilities to defend itself and even project power into Russia. For example, Norway is one of the countries involved in the development and acquisition of the F-35, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Upgrades like this would give Norway a better capability to strike targets in Russia, and, Norwegians hope, deter Russian aggression. Russians may, however, see improved Norwegian capabilities as a potential threat.

The North Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic Ocean are a concern for Norway. These areas have great economic importance. Given the increase of Russian naval activity, Norway is seeking a greater NATO influence in the area. An increase in the NATO presence in these maritime areas could, however, result in a further increase in Russian activities.

The bilateral relationship with the United States is important for Finland, Norway, and Sweden. All three countries view the United States as an important ally. Given the statements from Russia viewing the United States and the enlargement of NATO as direct threats, increasing ties with the United States will be a cause for concern in security relations with Russia.

Sweden is officially a neutral country, but it has deep ties with NATO. The debate about whether to join NATO has garnered interest in recent years. While Russia is aware

of the deep ties that Sweden has with NATO and considers Sweden a de facto member of the Alliance, Russia will take exception if Sweden joins the Alliance.⁵⁸

The Baltic Sea is another area of concern for Sweden. Increased military activity in the Baltic Sea resulted in an unidentified military submarine violating sovereign Swedish territorial waters.⁵⁹ This incident resulted in Sweden monitoring Russian activities more closely. Increasing military activity in the Baltic Sea raises the chances of a potential conflict.

Finland, like Sweden, is also officially a neutral country that has extensive ties with NATO. One of the key differences from Sweden is that Finland has an extensive border with Russia. Another important difference resides in the wars between Finland and the USSR, 1939–1940 and 1941–1944. Finland has since 1948 been concerned with maintaining cordial relations with Moscow. Finland, however, views its ties with NATO as crucial to defending its territory.⁶⁰ If Finland opted to join NATO, it would have to deal with a likely degradation of its relationship with Russia.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design of this thesis is primarily analytical. Qualitative analyses of events will provide background on the relations between Russia and Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Foreigners have invaded Russia multiple times throughout history. Russia has a history of invading other countries as well, however. By establishing the historical relationships between Russia and these three Nordic countries, this thesis will identify historical factors that could potentially influence future relations.

An analysis of the security and foreign policies of Finland, Norway, and Sweden will give indications of how the three countries view their current military and security situation. Based on what the three governments assess as their vulnerabilities, one can examine how they have responded to their perceived weaknesses. By examining the

⁵⁸ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 297–298.

⁵⁹ Willett, “Keep Calm and Carry On.”

⁶⁰ “Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland.

responses of Finland, Norway, and Sweden to their vulnerabilities, one can formulate informed judgements as to how Russia may react to the future security policies of these neighbors to the west.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The organization of the remainder of this thesis is as follows. Chapter II gives a brief synopsis of some of the important aspects of the economic and political ties between Russia and Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

Chapter III examines briefly the historical context of all four countries. This chapter will begin by examining the security relations of Finland, Norway, and Sweden with Russia. Each country has taken a different path, and that path helps explain how each country views its current security relations with Russia. The chapter will end with an examination of Russia's history. Outsiders have invaded Russia numerous times; this may help to explain Russia's negative approach to NATO enlargement. This chapter reviews Russia's acts of aggression in the 21st century as well as what lessons NATO nations and Finland and Sweden have taken from Russia's aggression in Ukraine.

Chapter IV examines how Finland, Norway, and Sweden plan to modernize their military capabilities. This chapter will cover the role that NATO and bilateral relations play in the security policies of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, as well as the individual security concerns of each country.

Chapter V considers the Russian perspective on the military and security activities of Finland, Norway, and Sweden and Russia's strategic goals and outlook concerning the Arctic. This chapter also includes a section on Russia's military modernization. Putin has used the military and threats of violence many times; understanding how Putin is modernizing Russia's military will help one understand the concerns of Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

Chapter VI is the conclusion. This chapter begins with a summary and includes an analysis of NATO considerations, bilateral considerations, and potential regional security implications. It then offers recommendations on how to improve the security situations of

Finland, Norway, and Sweden and concludes with reflections on the current security situation in northeastern Europe.

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II. BACKGROUND

Russia and the Nordic countries of Finland, Norway, and Sweden have more than just security issues between them. In order to understand the full scope of the security relations between Russia and these three Nordic countries, one must be aware of other factors that influence security relations. This chapter presents a brief overview of two important non-military factors that affect the security relations between Russia and these three Nordic countries. First, it examines some significant economic issues that could have future security implications. Second, it considers various political organizations in which the four countries try to resolve issues among themselves.

A. ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Several economic issues have the potential to affect the security relations between Russia and Finland, Norway, and Sweden. One of the most important future considerations will be natural resources. Both Russia and Norway have coastline on the Arctic Ocean and claims to the natural resources under it. After almost 40 years, Norway and Russia recently finalized the debate over which parts of the Arctic Ocean and the Barents Sea Russia controls and which parts Norway controls by agreeing to a treaty that specified “the maritime delimitation line...in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean.”⁶¹ The treaty also discussed fisheries matters and transboundary hydrocarbon deposits.⁶² Given the fact that the treaty covered these resources in detail, they will be important to both countries in the future, and a potential security concern could arise if one country does not abide by the bilateral treaty.⁶³

This treaty has established trust and cooperation between Russia and Norway. Yearn Hong Choi noted that due to cooperation between Russia and Norway, the fishing

⁶¹ “Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean,” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 15, 2010, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/international-law/innsikt_delelinje/treaty/id614006/.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

industry in the Barents Sea is doing well, while globally many “fish stocks are in poor condition.”⁶⁴ By working together, Russia and Norway have been able to preserve the important fishing industry while improving their relationship with one another. Choi cited the Norwegian prime minister at that time, Jens Stoltenberg, as saying, “the treaty will strengthen our neighborly relations with Russia and will enhance predictability and stability in the area.”⁶⁵ As long as both sides sustainably manage the shared fishing industry, positive relations should continue to exist; however, what may be a stable relationship now could change in the future if either country acts irresponsibly over the fishing industry.

The economies of Russia and Norway depend heavily on oil and gas. Graça Ermida noted that in Norway, petroleum represents “25% of its revenues and 50% of the country’s exports” and in Russia, oil and gas comprised almost one-third of its GDP and two-thirds of its exports.⁶⁶ Both countries’ Arctic strategies have prioritized energy resources.⁶⁷ Cooperation between the two countries in the fishing industry is vital because it is a renewable resource. However, in the oil and gas industry, exploiting a non-renewable resource might face future complications as one or both countries could try to maximize claims of the limited amount of resources under the Arctic Ocean.

Another economic issue of the future could be the emergence of the NSR. Constantin Georgescu noted that the NSR could shorten the trip between Europe and Asia by 11,000 km (instead of going through the Panama Canal) or by 19,000 km

⁶⁴ Yearn Hong Choi, “The Barents Sea: Equal Division of the Disputed Sea between Russia and Norway,” *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 28, no. 2 (October 2014): 68, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1678561564?accountid=12702>. Yearn Choi is a research fellow at the Society of Ieodo Research.

⁶⁵ Jens Stoltenberg, quoted in Yearn Hong Choi, “The Barents Sea: Equal Division of the Disputed Sea between Russia and Norway,” *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 28, no. 2 (October 2014): 68–69, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1678561564?accountid=12702>.

⁶⁶ Graça Ermida, “Energy Outlook for the Arctic: 2020 and Beyond,” *Polar Record* 52, no. 2 (February 2015): 174, doi: 10.1017/S0032247415000625. Graça Ermida was a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa in Lisbon.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

(instead of going around Cape Horn).⁶⁸ This shortened trip has the potential to save shipping companies time and money; with the right sailing conditions on the Arctic, one can expect the NSR to see an increase in shipping traffic. The Northern Sea Route Information Office reported an increase of traffic on the NSR in 2016 by 35 percent over 2015 with over 7 million tons shipped.⁶⁹ Mikhail Grigoryev believes that shipping could get as high as 75 million tons within the next 10 years.⁷⁰ If the NSR sees greater shipping in the future, these increases could bring political issues.

One potential issue is what governing bodies regulate traffic on the NSR. According to Arild Moe, the “underlying assumption” in most countries is that the NSR lies in international waters and therefore nations should abide by “international agreements.”⁷¹ Russia, on the other hand, believes the “waterways...are a part of the national transport infrastructure holding the country together.”⁷² Pavel K. Baev noted that in 2001, Russia became the first country to submit a claim to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to expand its EEZ in the Arctic.⁷³ Russia is concerned about the potential of being unable to control shipping in the Arctic.⁷⁴ Russia views the NSR as an important aspect of its Arctic strategy, and as such, there could be a potential security concern for the countries that view the NSR as an international trade route.

⁶⁸ Constantin Georgescu, “Northern Sea Route,” *Knowledge Horizons—Economics* 6, no. 4 (October 2014): 157. Constantin Georgescu is a professor in the Department of Economics and International Affairs at “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University.

⁶⁹ “Traffic Volume on the NSR Increased in 2016,” Northern Sea Route Information Office, February 2, 2017, <http://www.arctic-lio.com/node/264>.

⁷⁰ Mikhail Grigoryev, quoted in “Traffic on the NSR Can Reach 75 mln Tons to 2025,” Northern Sea Route Information Office, February 20, 2017, <http://www.arctic-lio.com/node/265>. Mikhail Grigoryev is a member of the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

⁷¹ Arild Moe, “The Northern Sea Route: Smooth Sailing Ahead?” *Strategic Analysis* 38, no. 6 (November 2014): 785–786, doi:10.1080/09700161.2014.952940. Arild Moe is the Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 786.

⁷³ Pavel K Baev, “Russia’s Arctic Ambitions and Anxieties,” *Current History* 112, no. 756 (October 2013): 267, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1443781458?accountid=12702>. Pavel Baev is a research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 267–269.

The NSR has significance for Norway as well. Leiv Lund reported that Norway is one of the top shipping nations in the world.⁷⁵ The decreased ice cover has presented new opportunities in the Arctic, and Norway has become a leading explorer of the NSR.⁷⁶ With shipping valuable to Norway as well as Russia, and with different views over the NSR, there is an increased potential for conflict between the two countries.

Can a country consider an increase in commercial shipping traffic a security concern? Katarzyna Zysk and David Titley cited a Russian naval admiral's statement in 2014 that the Arctic region could be a source of new threats to Russia, thus justifying military modernization in the area.⁷⁷ They hold that Russia might declare "its entire Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic to be a security zone and require permission for any vessel to sail in or through."⁷⁸ The Arctic region has not seen any security conflicts in recent history, but if the NSR continues to see increases in the volume of traffic, the chances of Russia adopting a policy like the one just described will mount as shipping traffic increases.

Yet another economic issue between Russia and the three Nordic countries in focus in this study are trade relations. Trade between Russia and these three Nordic countries since 2014 has been sporadic. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, only Finland has exports to and imports from Russia in its top five national trading partners and none of these three Nordic countries is in Russia's top five countries of imports or exports.⁷⁹ Three of the four countries do not stand to lose a lot of trade if

⁷⁵ Leiv Lunde, "The Nordic Embrace: Why the Nordic Countries Welcome Asia to the Arctic Table," *Asia Policy* 18, no. 1 (July 2014): 40–41. Leiv Lunde is the director of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Norway.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁷⁷ Katarzyna Zysk and David Titley, "Signals, Noise, and Swans in Today's Arctic," *SAIS Review* 35, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2015): 177, doi:10.1353/sais.2015.0015. Katarzyna Zysk is an associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and the Norwegian Defence University College in Oslo. David Titley is the founding director of Penn State's Center for Solutions to Weather and Climate Risk.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ "Sweden," The Observer of Economic Complexity, accessed Feb 27, 2017, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/swe/>; "Finland," The Observer of Economic Complexity, accessed Feb 27, 2017, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/fin/>; "Norway," The Observer of Economic Complexity, accessed Feb 27, 2017, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/nor/>; "Russia," The Observer of Economic Complexity, accessed Feb 27, 2017, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/rus/>.

relations sour; therefore, stable trade relations may not constitute a strong incentive to help the countries resolve differences.

Sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine crisis did affect trade between Russia and the three Nordic countries in focus in this thesis. Thomas Nilsen reported that Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish exports to Russia were down from 30 to 70 percent during 2015.⁸⁰ Russian exports to Sweden and Finland were also down by approximately 30 percent, but Russian exports to Norway were up 15 percent.⁸¹ Trade following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in November 2013 between Russia and the three Nordic countries under examination experienced an overall decrease.

How long can a decrease in trade last? Recently, there have been talks about increasing trade between Russia and the Nordic countries. Nilsen, among others, noted in February 2017 that talks between Norway and Russia have resumed on economic cooperation.⁸² An increase in trade relations between Finland and Russia appears promising as well. Sputnik International, a Russian government-controlled agency, reported in June 2016 that a meeting between the foreign ministers of Finland and Russia resulted in talks to improve trade relations between the two countries.⁸³ After an initial decline following the start of the Ukraine crisis, an increase in trade relations between Russia and the three Nordic countries in focus appear to be gaining momentum. The volume of trade does not seem to be a factor that would help prevent security concerns from escalating.

⁸⁰ Thomas Nilsen, "Trade with Russia; Down, Down, Down: 2015 Was a Bad Year for Norway, Finland and Sweden's Trading with Russia," *The Independent Barents Observer*, January 4, 2016, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry/2016/01/trade-russia-down-down-down>. Thomas Nilsen is the editor of *The Independent Barents Observer*.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Thomas Nilsen, "Brende Travels to Arkhangelsk to Assure Arctic Relations with Russia: First Visit to Russia by the Norwegian Foreign Minister in Three Years," *Independent Barents Observer*, February 17, 2017, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2017/02/brende-travels-arkhangelsk-assure-arctic-relations>; "Norway Resumes High-Level Trade Talks with Russia after Two-Year Break," *Reuters*, November 28, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/norway-russia-trade-idUSO9N1CA009>.

⁸³ "Finland, Russia Working Together to Restore Trade Turnover Amid Sanctions," *Sputnik International*, June 6, 2016, <https://sputniknews.com/business/201606061040857710-finland-russia-trade/>.

Sanctions constitute another economic issue between Russia and the three Nordic countries under examination. The EU “imposed restrictive measures against the Russian Federation” in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine by Russia in March 2014.⁸⁴ Many of the restrictive measures fall under the category of “economic sanctions” that have affected trade relations between Russia and all countries that support the EU sanctions.⁸⁵ According to Maja Kocijancic and Adam Kaznowski, “the European Union council linked the duration of those economic restrictions to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements.”⁸⁶

In addition to EU members Finland and Sweden, Norway, as a non-member of the EU, supports the EU sanctions against Russia. In February 2014, Norwegian Foreign Minister Borge Brende announced that Norway would “align itself with the sanctions agreed upon by a united EU.”⁸⁷ The sanctions against Russia would garner a response from Moscow. Viljar Veebel and Raul Markus reported on Russian counter-sanctions in response to EU sanctions.⁸⁸ Each time the EU implemented a round of sanctions against Russia there would be a round of counter-sanctions implemented against the countries that support EU sanctions.⁸⁹ While sanctions and counter-sanctions match each other, the intent behind each varies. Veebel and Markus noted that sanctions against Russia do not constitute a “punishment,” but a clear signal that Russian aggression in Ukraine is intolerable.⁹⁰ The goal of the Russian counter-sanctions, on the other hand, was to

⁸⁴ Maja Kocijancic and Adam Kaznowski, “EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine Crisis,” European Union Newsroom, European Union, last modified February 27, 2017, https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions_en. Maja Kocijancic and Adam Kaznowski are experts at the European External Action Service.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ “Norway Aligns Itself with EU Sanctions against Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Norway, February 20, 2014, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-aligns-itself-with-eu-sanctions-a/id751575/>.

⁸⁸ Viljar Veebel and Raul Markus, “Lessons from the EU-Russia Sanctions 2014–2015,” *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics* 8, no. 1 (August 2015): 175–176, doi: 10.1515/bjlp-2015-0015. Viljar Veebel is an associate professor at the Estonian National Defence College. Raul Markus is a doctoral student at Tallinn University of Technology.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 178.

“punish” countries that supported sanctions against Russia.⁹¹ Sanctions and counter-sanctions are supposed to be in the “economic” category, but the bigger issue is whether the tit-for-tat sanctions and counter-sanctions could keep escalating and potentially lead to a conflict between Russia and those countries that support them.

In sum, many different economic areas have fostered positive relationships between Russia and Finland, Norway, and Sweden. For the most part, these relationships are mutually beneficial and most likely will continue in the near future; but the potential exists for one country to try to exploit another for economic gain. For example, Russia could try to exploit a non-renewable resource in its relations with Norway. Exploitation could lead to deterioration in future relationships and potentially a conflict between the opposing countries. Sanctions and counter-sanctions stemming from the Ukraine crisis put Russia at odds with all the countries that support the continuation of the sanctions, including Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Sanctions and counter-sanctions are not limited to the economic arena; they have implications in other parts of country’s national strategy. Economic issues between Russia and the three Nordic countries under examination could cause future security concerns.

B. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden are involved in different political organizations with various goals. This section details some of the organizations common to Russia and one or more of the Nordic countries, and how the organization can influence each country’s security relations.

The first organization is Partnership for Peace (PfP). As noted in the NATO website, PfP “is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. The purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner

⁹¹ Veebel and Markus, “Lessons from the EU-Russia Sanctions 2014–2015,” 178.

countries.”⁹² Finland, Russia, and Sweden have been members of the PfP since 1995.⁹³ This organization should be a platform in which Finland and Sweden (and Norway as a NATO member) could work out security issues with Russia.

PfP, however, does not guarantee peace. Georgia and Ukraine have also been members of PfP since 1994,⁹⁴ but that did not stop Russian aggression in either of those countries. While PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council may have good intentions, they do not have the guarantees of collective defense that the NATO alliance has; they cannot do much to prevent a conflict from breaking out if the countries involved are not members of NATO.

Second, the Arctic Council is an organization with commonality. Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden, along with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and the United States, are all member nations.⁹⁵ The Arctic Council has described itself as “the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states...on common Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”⁹⁶ The Arctic Council fosters cooperation and good relationships between the member nations, but its focus is on economic and environmental issues. Security issues are not the central focus of the Arctic Council, and this organization would most likely not be the place to resolve security concerns.

Third, the United Nations (UN) is possibly the international organization in which the four countries can cooperate most successfully on security issues. All four countries

⁹² “Partnership for Peace Programme,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 7, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm.

⁹³ “Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 10, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ “Member States,” Arctic Council, July 6, 2015, <https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states>.

⁹⁶ “The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder,” Arctic Council, May 20, 2015, <https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us>.

(as well as Ukraine) have been members of the UN for over half a century.⁹⁷ Founded in 1945, its main mission is “the maintenance of international peace and security.”⁹⁸ Given the main mission of the UN, this organization should be the perfect place to settle any disputes peacefully. The Ukraine crisis, unfortunately, demonstrates that this is not the case. According to Lawrence Freedman, during the Ukraine crisis “Moscow could exercise a veto as a permanent member of the Security Council,” and the UN Security Council was therefore not going “to be of much use” in resolving the crisis.⁹⁹ The veto powers of the five permanent members of the Security Council could make it useless in conflict resolution, as is the case in the ongoing Ukraine crisis, and could be the case in a potential future act of Russian aggression.

Last, bilateral agreements play an important role in Russian foreign relations, but the intent behind these bilateral agreements is debatable. Anke Schmidt-Felzmann noted that “states of particular importance to Russia receive a more favourable treatment,” and that Russia has been “criticized for pursuing a *divide-and-rule* policy toward the EU.”¹⁰⁰ Some believe that Russia’s bilateral negotiations with EU members have weakened the organization as a whole.¹⁰¹ Russia is concerned about the enlargement of NATO, and speculation that Finland and Sweden could potentially join is clearly important to Russia. Finland and Sweden should be cautious about any future bilateral agreements with Russia. The potential exists for Russia to try to drive a wedge between Finland and Sweden and potential NATO allies such as the United States.

⁹⁷ “Member States,” United Nations, accessed February 28, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html>.

⁹⁸ “Maintain International Peace and Security,” United Nations, accessed February 28, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/maintain-international-peace-and-security/index.html>.

⁹⁹ Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management,” *Survival* 56, no. 3 (June–July 2014): 25, doi: 10.1080/00396338.2014.920143. Lawrence Freedman is a professor of War Studies at King’s College London.

¹⁰⁰ Anke Schmidt-Felzmann, “Is the EU’s Failed Relationship with Russia the Member States’ Fault?” *L’Europe en Formation* 4 (Winter 2014): 40,42, doi: 10.3917/eufor.374.0040. Anke Schmidt-Felzmann is a researcher in the Special Research Programme for International Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 40.

Russia has a history of upholding bilateral agreements only for as long as it is convenient to do so. Freedman noted that the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation” was supposed to have resolved the issue of Crimea in 1997.¹⁰² However, during the Crimea crisis in 2014, this agreement had no effect on Russian actions when brought up by Kiev.¹⁰³ As history demonstrates, Russia is willing to renege on past agreements; therefore, Finland, Norway, and Sweden should be cautious. Russia may be trying to buy time with any current or future bilateral agreements.

In sum, Russia is politically involved in organizations and bilateral agreements that should be able to resolve potential conflicts peacefully. That has not happened, however. PfP and the UN are two organizations devoted to peace with Russia as a member, but the past decade has seen conflicts between Russia and other members of these organizations, notably in Georgia and Ukraine. The Arctic Council provides a venue for all Arctic nations to come together and cooperate; thus far, the Arctic has been peaceful, but the design of the Arctic Council is not to resolve security issues. Recent history has demonstrated that bilateral agreements with Russia are not necessarily mutually beneficial, and Russia has shown its willingness to ignore agreements when it suits its national purpose. Political organizations can be foundations for peace and stability, but this is not necessarily the case with Russia.

¹⁰² Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management,” 24.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 24–25.

III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The histories of Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden are intertwined owing in part to their close geographic proximity. This chapter begins by reviewing the historical relations of the three Nordic countries with Russia. It ends with the Russian perspective on historical relations with European countries that have invaded Russia. The historical context will clarify how these Nordic countries view Russia's current behavior as well as how Russians may view current actions by these three Nordic countries as grounds for concern about a potential "Western" invasion.

A. FINLAND

The long border between the two countries has substantially affected Finland's history with Russia. The border spans 1,309 km, and it is Finland's largest shared land border.¹⁰⁴ According to Mikko Juva, the history of relations between Finland and Russia dates back to the early fourteenth century.¹⁰⁵ Conflict between the two countries has occurred at various times throughout the past half millennium.¹⁰⁶ Anatole Mazour noted that for over a century (1809–1917) the Russian empire included Finland.¹⁰⁷ Sweden ruled parts or all of Finland for centuries until the conclusion of the war in 1809 between Sweden and Russia.¹⁰⁸ As a result of the peace treaty concluding this war, "all rights to Finland...were...surrendered to Russia."¹⁰⁹ Finland declared its independence from Russia in December 1917 following the Bolshevik revolution;¹¹⁰ it has been a sovereign nation since 1917.

¹⁰⁴ "The World Factbook: Finland," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed March 7, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/fi.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Mikko Juva, "A Thousand Years of Finland," in *Finland: Creation and Construction*, ed. Hillar Kallas and Sylvie Nickels (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), 23. Mikko Juva is a Finnish historian and professor of history at Helsinki University.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 23–27.

¹⁰⁷ Anatole G. Mazour, *Finland: Between East and West* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), 11–14, 45–46. Anatole Mazour is a professor of history at Stanford University.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 5–8.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 45–46.

Russia has constantly tried to exert its influence on Finland. According to C. Jay Smith, Jr., “upon the outbreak of World War I in August, 1914, the Russian Imperial Government rightly suspected that...Finland posed a great danger on its northern flank.”¹¹¹ This was not a surprise, given that Russia had spent the past 15 years trying to “destroy the effective autonomy” of Finland.¹¹² Leading up to the Finnish Civil War, Soviet Russia aided the Finnish Red Guard, which “came to blows with the nationalist Protective Corps.”¹¹³ Civil war immediately followed.¹¹⁴ This was the beginning of a new pattern of Russian attempts to influence Finland.

The Winter War continued the trend of Soviet aggression toward Finland. Vaino Tanner noted that due to the threat of Germany in the spring of 1938, Soviet Russia sought to improve security relations with Finland through secret negotiations.¹¹⁵ Albin T. Anderson observed that over time, the Soviet diplomats became increasingly more demanding.¹¹⁶ When Finland would not give into those demands, Moscow viewed Finland’s actions as hostile.¹¹⁷ Eventually, the Soviet Union took action against Finland. In Tanner’s words, “unexpectedly and without a declaration of war, the Soviet Union attacked [Finland] on the morning of November 30,” 1939, beginning the Winter War.¹¹⁸

In addition to this unexpected attack on Finland, the Soviet Union’s demands for peace were equally egregious. Tanner observed that the Soviet Union demanded more

¹¹¹ C. Jay Smith, Jr., “Russia and the Origins of the Finnish Civil War of 1918,” *The American Slavic and East European Review* 14, no. 4 (December 1955): 481, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3001208>. C. Jay Smith is the author of *Finland and the Russian Revolution, 1917–1922*.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid., 485.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Vaino Tanner, *The Winter War: Finland Against Russia 1939–1940*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957): 3–5. Vaino Tanner was a prime minister of England.

¹¹⁶ Albin T. Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy,” *World Politics* 6, no. 2 (January 1954): 171–187, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008988>. Albin Anderson was an expert in modern European and Soviet history at the University of Nebraska – Lincoln.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 187.

¹¹⁸ Tanner, *The Winter War: Finland Against Russia 1939–1940*, 89.

territory than it was able to conquer.¹¹⁹ The Winter War continued the pattern of aggression by Russia, and then the Soviet Union, toward Finland during the 20th century.

World War II would bring further Soviet influence upon Finland. Timothy Snyder noted that the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 contained a secret protocol that divided Eastern Europe into “areas of influence for Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.”¹²⁰ The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact assigned Finland to the Soviet sphere of influence.¹²¹

Russian and Soviet aggression toward Finland during the first half of the 20th century influenced Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union after World War II. Andrew Cottey emphasized that the shared border and “vulnerability to the Soviet Union” concerned Finland.¹²² Efraim Karsh concluded that Finnish leaders believed they needed a formal agreement in order to assure Moscow that Finland would not attack the USSR or allow an attack through its territory against the Soviet Union.¹²³ As a result, Finland and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 1948.¹²⁴

This treaty would prevent Finland from becoming a founding member of NATO, because Finland had already committed itself to the Soviet Union, and thus could not join the Alliance. As Cottey observed, the Soviet Union could view any future “political or military ties with NATO” by Finland as a threat.¹²⁵

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 251.

¹²⁰ Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 116. Timothy Snyder is a professor of history at Yale University.

¹²¹ Ibid., 172.

¹²² Andrew Cottey, “The European Neutrals and NATO: Ambiguous Partnership,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 34, no. 3 (December 2013): 454, doi: 10.1080/13523260.2013.842295. Andrew Cottey is a senior lecturer and Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Integration in the Department of Governance at the University College Cork.

¹²³ Efraim Karsch, *Neutrality and Small States* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 91. Efraim Karsch was a visiting scholar at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Cottey, “The European Neutrals and NATO,” 454.

The relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union as a result of the Treaty of Friendship led to the term “Finlandization.” According to Walter Laqueur, the term Finlandization means the “process or state of affairs in which, under the cloak of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the sovereignty of a country becomes reduced.”¹²⁶ Russia did not insist that Finland become part of the Soviet Union, but Finland had to accept many Soviet demands concerning its independence.¹²⁷ First, Finland could not oppose most aspects of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy.¹²⁸ Second, the Soviet Union determined the strength of Finland’s army.¹²⁹ Third, “only those political parties approved by the Soviet Union” could be active in politics.¹³⁰ Fourth, Moscow expected Finland to actively trade with the Soviet Republics.¹³¹ Last, Finland was to deny that there was anything “ominous or even out of the ordinary” in its relations with the Soviet Union.¹³² Finland would maintain this status throughout the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War brought about a change in security relations for Finland. Anna Wieslander observed that, starting in 1994, Finland “developed interoperability [with NATO] through the Planning and Review Process (PaRP),” participated with NATO nations “in military and civilian exercises,” and contributed “troops to all NATO-led missions.”¹³³ Because of the more than twenty years of cooperation, Finland has achieved “the status of gold partners.”¹³⁴ In addition, Justyna Gotkowska and Piotr Szymański noted in 2015 that Finland is important to NATO in the event of a crisis in the

¹²⁶ Walter Laqueur, “Europe: The Specter of Finlandization,” *Commentary* 64, no. 6 (December 1977): 37, <https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/europe-the-specter-of-finlandization/>. Walter Laqueur was the chairman of the Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ Anna Wieslander, “‘Extended Cooperative Security’ in the Baltic Sea Region,” *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2016): 136, <https://www.cceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=417360>. Anna Wieslander is the secretary general of the Swedish Defense Association.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

Baltic Sea area and that Finland has continued its recent participation in “regular military exercises” with NATO and other Nordic countries.¹³⁵ In her view, this close interaction with NATO countries indicates Finland’s willingness to “co-operate with NATO militarily” in the event of a regional crisis.¹³⁶ After the breakup of the Soviet Union and Russia’s decline after the Cold War, Finland was able to look elsewhere to protect its security interests. Russia probably views Finland’s increasing ties with NATO as a potential threat to its national security.

To summarize, conflict and uneasy relations between Finland and Russia have been prevalent throughout the shared history of the two countries. Finland experienced Russian and Soviet aggression and land grabbing during the first half of the 20th century. Russia supported the Communists in the Finnish Civil War of 1918, the Soviet Union unexpectedly attacked Finland to begin the Winter War (November, 30 1939–March 13, 1940) and then fought the Continuation War against Finland (June 25, 1941–September 19, 1944). After World War II ended, as noted above, in order to protect itself against further Soviet aggression, Finland decided in 1948 to sign a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union, and therefore did not have a chance to join NATO when the founding members established the Alliance one year later. Finland existed under intense scrutiny from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War in 1989–1991 enabled Finland to escape Moscow’s influence and increase ties and cooperation with NATO. Today, much to the dismay of Russia, NATO views Finland as an important partner to the Alliance.

B. NORWAY

Norway gained its independence in 1905. During World War I, Norway maintained a policy of neutrality. According to Jan Normann Knutsen, upon gaining its

¹³⁵ Justyna Gotkowska and Piotr Szymański, “NATO’s Presence in the Baltic State—Reassurance for Its Allies or Deterrence for Russia?” OSW COMMENTARY no. 169, (April 2015). [Policy Paper], <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-04-29/natos-presence-baltic-states-reassurance-allies-or-deterrence>. Justyna Gotkowska is the project coordinator of the Security and Defense in Northern Europe Program. Piotr Szymański is a research fellow of security and defense in Northern Europe Program.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

independence, Norway adopted a policy of neutrality to keep itself from entering conflicts.¹³⁷ If events forced Norway to choose a side, based on previous experiences, Oslo was prepared to align itself with Britain.¹³⁸ Norway traded with both the Allies and the Central Powers, but this caused problems for Norway's "policy of neutrality."¹³⁹ Norway balanced its exports between Britain and Germany while trying to maintain its neutral status.¹⁴⁰ In the end, Norway was able to avoid military conflict during World War I.¹⁴¹ However, Oslo was beginning to understand that "there was no longer any room for the traditional non-partisan neutrality as a practical-political principle."¹⁴² Neutrality served Norway well during World War I, but it saw vastly different results during World War II.

At the onset of World War II, Norway was a neutral country that had strategic significance for both Germany and Britain. Karsh noted that Norway was a neutral state between two belligerents where a balance of power existed.¹⁴³ At the beginning of the war, Norway's neutrality benefited Germany, and this was something Britain recognized.¹⁴⁴ At first, Germany did not intend to invade Norway, but German military leaders convinced Adolf Hitler to do so.¹⁴⁵ Germany invaded Norway on April 9, 1940.¹⁴⁶ Norway's declared neutrality was not able to keep the country out of World War II. As a result, Norway changed its view on neutrality and alliances.

The experience of World War II forever changed Norway's outlook. Olav Riste reported that Germany's five-year occupation of Norway was the longest occupation of

¹³⁷ Jan Normann Knutsen, "Norway in the First World War," *Folia Scandinavica*, Vol. 5 (1999): 43, <http://hdl.handle.net/10593/3883>. Jan Knutsen was a professor at the University Kristiansand.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 46.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 51.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 51–52.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 55.

¹⁴² Ibid., 56.

¹⁴³ Karsch, *Neutrality and Small States*, 101–102.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 102.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 103–105.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 106.

any European country in World War II.¹⁴⁷ Norway's military was unprepared for the German assault, and the military support from its allies was inadequate.¹⁴⁸ This feeling was "encapsulated in the watchword 'Aldri mer 9. April! (9 April, never again!).'"¹⁴⁹ A majority of Norwegians took that phrase to mean that in the future Norway would have a prepared military and allies that would assist Norway if required.¹⁵⁰ Events would soon take place that would test Norway's new approach.

After World War II, the Soviet Union expanded its influence into countries of Eastern Europe. Riste pointed out that in May 1947 communism spread to Hungary and in February 1948 to Czechoslovakia.¹⁵¹ In addition, two days after the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union offered Finland a non-aggression treaty.¹⁵² The Soviet Union was expanding its sphere of political influence and Norway could see a potential Soviet threat to Western European countries looming.

To counter the looming threat, Norway sought a regional alliance. According to Magnus Petersson and Håkon Lunde Saxi, Norway sought a "Scandinavian defence union during 1948–49," but Sweden would not commit to such a union; and Norway abandoned its plans for the union.¹⁵³ The end of hopes for the Scandinavian defense union did not put an end to Oslo's quest for an alliance; Norway looked elsewhere. Petersson and Saxi noted that Norway became one of the original signing members of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.¹⁵⁴ With the North Atlantic Treaty, Norway had an alliance to assist with protection and military preparedness.

¹⁴⁷ Olav Riste, "With an Eye to History: The Origins and Development of 'Stay-Behind' in Norway," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 6 (December 2007): 997, doi:10.1080/01402390701676527. Olav Riste was the research director for the Norwegian Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS).

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 997–998.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 998–999.

¹⁵² Ibid., 999.

¹⁵³ Magnus Petersson and Håkon Lunde Saxi, "Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 6 (December 2013): 761, doi:10.1080/014023390.2011.608934. Magnus Petersson is an associate professor and Håkon Lunde Saxi is a research fellow with the NIDS.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

Even though it was a member of NATO, the Norwegian government still held a pragmatic view toward the Soviet Union. Petersson and Saxi wrote that while Norway believed that preparations must occur to prevent an attack on its homeland, Moscow must also be convinced that Norway would not allow the development of a threat from its territory against the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁵ To do this, Norway declared that other countries could not establish military bases on its territory as long as there was not a war or a threat of attack against Norway.¹⁵⁶ Even though Norway finally had an alliance to guarantee its security, it still perceived potential dangers from the Soviet Union if it was too bold in its defense policies.

During the Cold War, Norway focused on defense of its homeland. According to John Karlsrud and Kari M. Osland, NATO's focus was on the defense of NATO territory "against the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact."¹⁵⁷ Norway understood that it would not be able to defend its territory against the Soviet Union alone. Olav Bogen and Magnus Håkenstad wrote that Norway's strategy for the defense of its territory was to delay and hold the key terrain until allied forces arrived.¹⁵⁸ This strategy would last for the duration of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War brought about military change in Norway. Karlsrud and Osland noted that at the end of the Cold War "NATO had to refocus and reinvent itself," and this led to a change in Norway's "strategic culture," from "national defence to international operations."¹⁵⁹ Bogen and Håkenstad asserted that the change in strategic

¹⁵⁵ Petersson and Saxi, "Shifted Roles," 764.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ John Karlsrud and Kari M. Osland, "Between Self-Interest and Solidarity: Norway's Return to UN Peacekeeping?" *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 5 (September 2016): 789, doi: 10.1080/13533312.2016.1235096. John Karlsrud is a senior research fellow and manager of the Training for Peace program at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and Kari Osland is the head of the Peace and Conflict Research Group at the NUPI.

¹⁵⁸ Olav Bogen and Magnus Håkenstad, "Reluctant Reformers: The Economic Roots of Military Change in Norway, 1990–2015," *Defence Studies* 17, no. 1 (January 2017): 25, doi: 10.1080/14702436.2016.1256210. Olav Bogen is a fellow and Magnus Håkenstad is a research fellow at the NIDS.

¹⁵⁹ Karlsrud and Osland, "Between Self-Interest and Solidarity," 789.

culture resulted in Norway's military becoming "much smaller, highly modernized, more flexible and capable of participating in expeditionary operations abroad."¹⁶⁰

In sum, upon gaining its independence in 1905, Norway assumed a position of neutrality. This neutral stance kept Norway out of World War I and the strategy continued into World War II. The policy of neutrality failed in 1940, as Germany invaded and occupied Norway for five years. Norway was unable to provide an effective resistance to Germany. Following World War II, Norway vowed never to find itself in the situation that caused its occupation during World War II. As a result, Norway became one of the original members of NATO. Throughout the Cold War, realizing that Norway alone could not defeat the Soviet army, Oslo focused its defense plans on preparations to delay the Soviets until Allied help could arrive. The Norwegian military posed virtually no threat to the Soviet military. The end of the Cold War brought about a new military strategy. Now the Norwegian military is capable of conducting expeditionary operations abroad, such as those under NATO auspices in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya.

C. SWEDEN

Sweden's early history with Russia saw Sweden as both an ally and enemy of Russia. According to H. Arnold Barton, Sweden "had been a great European military and imperial power" until the Great Northern War (1700–1721) when the Russian army defeated the Swedish Army at Poltava.¹⁶¹ Over the course of the next century, Sweden twice declared war on Russia "in vain attempts to reestablish its great-power status."¹⁶² Eventually Russia "compelled" Sweden to give up its territory of Finland.¹⁶³

The antagonistic relationship between Sweden and Russia took a turn for the better. Barton noted that Sweden "renounced any future claims to Finland" shortly after

¹⁶⁰ Bogen and Håkenstad, "Reluctant Reformers," 25.

¹⁶¹ H. Arnold Barton, "From Warfare to Welfare State: Sweden's Search for a New Identity," *Scandinavian Studies* 77, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 316–317, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40920600>. H. Arnold Barton is an American historian and national authority on Swedish-American history at Southern Illinois University.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 318.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

Stockholm gave it up in 1809, and in return, Russia pledged to help “Sweden acquire Norway from Denmark.”¹⁶⁴ For a short time, therefore, Sweden and Russia were allies, but they eventually reverted to being adversaries.

The twentieth century saw more conflict between Russia and Sweden. Barton asserted that during World War I part of the Swedish population wanted to ally with Germany.¹⁶⁵ During the Russian civil war in 1918, Sweden supported the White (anti-communist) forces.¹⁶⁶ During the Soviet-Finnish Winter War in 1939–1940, Swedish volunteers fought against the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁷ Leading up to World War II, Sweden’s relationship with Russia had moments of friendship, but for the most part, they were adversaries.

Sweden’s role during World War II was one of declared neutrality. According to Pia Molander, Sweden maintained a neutral status during World War II.¹⁶⁸ Even though Sweden was a neutral country, it played a part in the conduct of the war. Molander noted that Sweden “came under repeated pressure from both belligerents”—that is, the Allies and the Axis.¹⁶⁹ As a neutral country, Sweden gave “significant assistance” to the Axis powers through 1944 that contributed to Germany’s war efforts.¹⁷⁰ Stockholm’s aid to Germany was consistent with Sweden’s history of opposing Russia during the twentieth century.

During the Cold War, Sweden avoided entering any alliances. Wilhelm Agrell noted that Sweden “remained non-aligned in the Cold War.”¹⁷¹ The reason for Sweden’s

¹⁶⁴ Barton, “From Welfare to Welfare State,” 316.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 322.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ Pia Molander, “Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Swedish Dilemma: The Special Operations Executive in Neutral Sweden, 1939–45,” *Intelligence and National Security* 22, no. 5 (October 2007): 723, doi: 10.1080/02684520701718146. Pia Molander is an expert at the Department of Military Studies at the Swedish Defence University.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Wilhelm Agrell, “Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 4 (August 2006): 633, doi: 10.1080/01402390600766056. Wilhelm Agrell is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Lund University.

Cold War non-alignment relates to its neutrality during World War II. As Cottey observed, Sweden's policy of neutrality during World War II allowed it to escape both occupation and attack.¹⁷² Sweden chose to pursue this successful strategy into the Cold War.¹⁷³ The policy of neutrality had worked during World War II and there was no reason to believe that it would not work afterward.

The neutrality of Sweden, however, was non-binding. Thomas Fischer, Juhana Aunesluoma, and Aryo Makko emphasized that Sweden's neutrality was not the consequence of a legally binding agreement, but was a result of "foreign policy traditions and unilateral commitment."¹⁷⁴ While Sweden can legally revoke its policy of non-alignment at any time, during the Cold War Sweden emphasized it would not become involved in a war unless it was attacked.¹⁷⁵ Maintaining a status of neutrality during the Cold War was important to Sweden.

Even though Sweden was officially non-aligned during the Cold War, it had much more in common with Western Europe than it did with the Soviet Union. Fischer pointed out that Sweden was "culturally oriented to the West, with states deeply rooted in liberal traditions, democratic systems of government, and the principles of private property and a market economy."¹⁷⁶ Everything in Swedish culture was the opposite of the Soviet Union. If Sweden showed an orientation toward Western Europe, the Soviet Union might interpret those actions as threatening to Soviet interests. This, however, did not stop Sweden from cooperating with Western European countries that were members of NATO.

¹⁷² Cottey, "The European Neutrals and NATO," 454.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Thomas Fischer, Juhana Aunesluoma, and Aryo Makko, "Neutrality and Nonalignment in World Politics during the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (Fall 2016): 7, doi: 10.1162/JCWS_a_00677. Thomas Fischer is a research fellow and visiting lecturer in history and political science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Juhana Aunesluoma is the Government of Finland and David and Nancy Speer Professor in Finnish studies at the University of Minnesota, and Aryo Makko is a postdoctoral researcher at Stockholm University and a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian studies.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 8.

Sweden established ties with NATO and specific NATO member states during the Cold War. According to Cottey, Sweden realized that it would need assistance in a conflict with the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁷ Sweden did numerous things during the Cold War to increase ties with NATO and its member states.¹⁷⁸ It formed numerous “significant bilateral defence ties with NATO member states,” entered into secret military alliances, and expanded runways to enable “them to host NATO aircraft.”¹⁷⁹ Sweden kept the cooperation with NATO from the public and all but a few senior government officials.¹⁸⁰ The cooperation “was only revealed by an official commission” in 1994.¹⁸¹ The Soviet Union may have been aware of the ties between Sweden and NATO, however.¹⁸² During the days of the intense competition between NATO and the Soviet Union, Sweden was aligning itself with NATO.¹⁸³

Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden, like Finland, has increased its level of cooperation with NATO. Wieslander pointed out that beginning in 1994, Sweden “developed interoperability [with NATO] through the Planning and Review Process (PaRP),” participated “in military and civilian exercises,” and contributed “troops to all NATO-led missions.”¹⁸⁴ Because of the past twenty years of cooperation, Sweden has achieved “the status of gold partners.”¹⁸⁵ In addition, Gotkowska and Szymanski noted, Sweden is important to NATO in the event of a crisis in the Baltic Sea area, and Sweden has continued its recent participation in “regular military exercises” with NATO and other Nordic countries.¹⁸⁶ This close interaction with NATO countries indicates Sweden’s willingness to “co-operate with NATO militarily” in the event of a regional

¹⁷⁷ Cottey, “The European Neutrals and NATO,” 455.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 455–456.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 456.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Wieslander, “‘Extended Cooperative Security’ in the Baltic Sea Region,” 136.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Gotkowska and Szymański, “NATO’s Presence in the Baltic State.”

crisis.¹⁸⁷ Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has closely aligned itself with NATO. While Sweden is still a non-member, Swedish interactions with NATO likely send a signal to Russia as to where its loyalties lie.

To summarize, the historical relations between Sweden and Russia have been mostly as adversaries; but there was a short period in the early nineteenth century when the two countries aligned with each other. The Great Northern War ended Sweden's time as a great European military power. Sweden's attempt to regain that great military status by twice declaring war against Russia (in 1743 and 1788) both ended in failure. In the early twentieth century, Sweden supported Russia's opponents in various conflicts. From World War II forward, Sweden has maintained a status of neutrality, but its recent actions have brought it closer to Western European nations and the NATO alliance.

D. RUSSIA

History demonstrates that Russia is vulnerable to invasions by European powers. While the reasons for invasions may differ, the consequences to Moscow were the same – a major European power declared war on Russia. The nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century were especially brutal for Russia, as European powers invaded Russia for various reasons.

France, led by Napoleon in 1812, was an early European invader of Russia, and this was due to Russia's unwillingness to bend to Napoleon's imperial desires. According to Harold T. Parker, Tsar Alexander I promised Napoleon that Russia would "declare war on England and enforce the Continental System."¹⁸⁸ Napoleon's stance was that if Russia opened its "ports to neutral ships carrying colonial and English merchandise, and in effect made peace with England...war would come."¹⁸⁹ Russia opened its ports to neutral ships, and Napoleon responded by invading Russia.¹⁹⁰ Alexander I did what he thought was

¹⁸⁷ Gotkowska and Szymański, "NATO's Presence in the Baltic State."

¹⁸⁸ Harold T. Parker, "Why did Napoleon Invade Russia? A Study in Motivation and the Interrelations of Personality and Social Structure," *The Journal of Military History* 54, no. 2 (April 1990): 144, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1986039>. Harold Parker was a history professor at Duke University.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

best for his country, but in the process did not bend to the will of Napoleon. Consequently, France invaded Russia to further its policy objectives.

Another declaration of war by European powers against Russia was the Crimean War. Some historians believe that Russia was ultimately responsible for the war. R.L.V. French Blake contended that the Russian goal of “territorial expansion” was the main cause of the war.¹⁹¹ However, Winfried Baumgart argued that the “intervention of the European great powers” into the Ottoman Empire was the main cause.¹⁹² Great Britain, France, and Russia all had interests in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹³ While Russia was not void of blame, there was resistance against Russia’s intervention in the area. John Shelton Curtiss noted that there were acts of aggression against Russia in the area as well.¹⁹⁴ In the end, as noted by Baumgart, it was Great Britain and France that declared war on Russia on March 27 and 28, 1854.¹⁹⁵ A military confrontation may not have been avoidable, but it was Great Britain and France who chose to declare war on Russia, not the other way around.

Yet another example of European nations declaring war on Russia occurred during the Great War (World War I). Holger H. Herwig noted that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand set off “a chain reaction of mobilization orders and declarations of war.”¹⁹⁶ However, as argued by Frank C. Zagare, Russia, a supporter of Serbia, tried to defuse the crisis by encouraging Serbia to accept as many of Austria’s demands as possible.¹⁹⁷ In order to prepare itself for a potential conflict, Russia decided

¹⁹¹ R.L.V. French Blake, *The Crimean War* (London: Sphere Books Limited, 1973), 1. R.L.V. French Blake was a historian and military officer who helped set up the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

¹⁹² Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War 1853–1856* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5. Winfried Baumgart was a professor of history at the University of Mainz.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 5–8.

¹⁹⁴ John Shelton Curtiss, *Russia’s Crimean War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), 12–14. John Curtiss was a professor of history at Duke University.

¹⁹⁵ Baumgart, *The Crimean War 1853–1856*, 14.

¹⁹⁶ Holger H. Herwig, *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918* (London: Arnold, 1997), 33. Holger Herwig was a Professor of History at the University of Calgary.

¹⁹⁷ Frank C. Zagare, “Explaining the 1914 War in Europe,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 21, no. 1 (January 2009): 65, doi: 10.1177/0951629808097284. Frank Zagare is a distinguished professor of political science at the University of Buffalo, SUNY.

to partially mobilize its military and “take other military measures” as required.¹⁹⁸ Russia was doing what it needed to do in order to protect itself against potential aggression.

War was not a forgone conclusion at this point. Zagare asserted that “a partial mobilization did not necessarily imply a war between Russia and Germany.”¹⁹⁹ However, after learning that Russia had begun a partial mobilization, Germany decided to mobilize against Russia.²⁰⁰ Soon afterward Russia followed suit and mobilized against Germany and Austria.²⁰¹ On August 1, 1914, Germany and Russia declared war against each other.²⁰² As Russia and its allies went to war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, one could argue that German and Austrian actions forced Russia to act, that Russia made an effort to avoid war, and that the consequences of the Serbian-Austrian conflict forced Russia into a war.

Germany’s aggression helped to bring the Soviet Union into World War II. According to Gerhard L. Weinberg, the Nazis and Soviets signed a nonaggression pact on August 22, 1939, that stated that “Germany and the Soviet Union would not attack the other or assist any third power at war with the other.”²⁰³ This pact also contained a secret provision that divided Eastern Europe between the Nazis and the Soviets.²⁰⁴ A trade agreement signed a few days before the nonaggression pact resulted in the Soviet Union providing Germany supplies to help fund its war campaign.²⁰⁵ The agreements between Hitler and Stalin provided Germany the opportunity to fight a one front war in Europe, with the Soviet Union dividing Poland with Germany and undertaking annexations of

¹⁹⁸ Zagare, “Explaining the 1914 War in Europe,” 65.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 69

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² “First World War Erupts in Europe,” History, accessed March 16, 2017, <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/first-world-war-erupts-in-europe>.

²⁰³ Gerhard L. Weinberg, “The Nazi-Soviet Pacts: A Half-Century Later,” *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 4 (Fall 1989): 175, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044116>. Gerhard Weinberg was a professor of history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 176.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 176–177.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and parts of Finland and Romania—all with the approval of Nazi Germany.

Stalin's underestimation of Hitler's ambitions was one of the factors that led to a German surprise attack that cost Russia dearly. Weinberg noted that Soviet intelligence agents, the British, and the Americans warned Stalin about the potential for an attack from Germany.²⁰⁶ On June 22, 1941, approximately two years after signing a nonaggression pact with Moscow, Hitler made the decision to attack the Soviet Union.²⁰⁷ Through the agreements of the nonaggression pact, Stalin had isolated the Soviet Union against Germany on the Eastern Front, which resulted in "millions and millions of Soviet citizens" killed.²⁰⁸ The nonaggression pact enabled Germany to put itself into a position that made attacking the Soviet Union easier because Stalin did not have any allies on the Eastern Front. (Stalin had annexed or occupied some potential allies under the terms of the non-aggression pact with Hitler.) Yet again, from Moscow's perspective, a European country had attacked Russia, continuing a trend that had existed since the attacks by the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth century, the Swedish attacks in the eighteenth century, and Napoleon's invasion of Russia in the nineteenth century.

The question of Russian perceptions of the country's political-military history remains complex. As William Odom noted, in 1898 "the Imperial General Staff proudly reported to the tsar that between 1700 and 1870 the army had fought thirty-eight wars, all but two of them offensive."²⁰⁹ The "special importance" of this report, as N.N. Sukhotin noted, is that it shows that "Russian military elites themselves certainly did not believe that Russia was the victim of frequent foreign invasions...Notwithstanding the actual record of Russia's habit of frequently invading its neighbors, the popular image remains

²⁰⁶ Weinberg, "The Nazi-Soviet Pacts: A Half-Century Later," 188.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 187.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 188.

²⁰⁹ William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 1–2. William Odom was a director of the NSA and a professor of political science at Yale University.

strong in Russia that it has always and frequently been the victim, not the perpetrator of wars.”²¹⁰

Following the conclusion of World War II, 10 western European countries and the United States and Canada formed NATO in 1949 during the beginning of the Cold War. The Soviet Union viewed NATO as a threat to its security and responded in 1955 with its own security organization—the Warsaw Pact. According to the Warsaw Pact, signed May 14, 1955,

the situation created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris agreements, which envisage the formation of a new military alignment in the shape of “Western European Union,” with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and the integration of the latter in the North-Atlantic bloc, which increased the danger of another war and constitutes a threat to the national security of the peaceable states; being persuaded that in these circumstances the peaceable European states must take the necessary measures to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe.²¹¹

At the time of the creation of the Warsaw Pact, France, West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States were members of NATO.²¹² While France, Great Britain, and the United States were the Soviet Union’s allies during World War II, three of those countries—France, Germany, and Great Britain—had previously attacked Russia or the Soviet Union in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the United States had intervened in the Russian Civil War in 1918–1920. The Soviet Union and the countries that signed the Warsaw Pact regarded the NATO Alliance as a security threat, and banded together to protect themselves against the supposed threat of potential NATO aggression. The Warsaw Pact countries allied with the Soviet Union provided a buffer zone from the NATO alliance.

²¹⁰ N.N. Sukhotin, *Voina v istorii russkogo mira* (St. Petersburg, 1898), 113–114., cited in William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 421.

²¹¹ “The Warsaw Security Pact: May 14, 1955,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, accessed March 22, 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warsaw.asp.

²¹² “What Is NATO?” Member Countries, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed February 6, 2017, <http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>.

The fall of the Soviet Union brought about a change in security relations in Europe. An important security concern for Russia was how NATO would move forward. According to Mary Elise Sarotte, the consensus among leaders and scholars from Britain, Germany, and the United States was that NATO did not intend to expand east.²¹³ NATO was not oblivious to Russian concerns either. Luca Ratti pointed out that in December 1991, NATO formed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council “to discuss issues of common concern between NATO and former Soviet bloc states,” and that Moscow became a member of the PfP program in June 1994 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in May 1997.²¹⁴ Even though NATO was trying to foster cooperation with Russia, the Kremlin still viewed NATO as “a conventional military alliance directed against Moscow.”²¹⁵ Although NATO tried to stress that it was not a threat to Russia, Moscow never backed off its skeptical view of NATO, and multiple rounds of post-Cold War NATO enlargement increased Moscow’s skepticism about NATO’s intentions.

At the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991, the Allies had no plans for NATO enlargement to the east. Former Warsaw Pact countries sought membership in NATO, however. To respond to their aspirations, the NATO Allies in December 1994 commissioned the *Study on NATO Enlargement*. The process defined in this study has so far led to the following accessions to the Alliance: in 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland; in 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia; and in 2009, Albania and Croatia.²¹⁶

Moscow viewed those expansions in a negative light. Anna Franekova pointed out that Russia resisted NATO enlargement in 1999, but that resistance seemed to wane to

²¹³ Mary Elise Sarotte, “Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to “Bribe the Soviets Out” and Move NATO In,” *International Security* 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 116–117, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40784649>. Mary Sarotte is a professor of international relations at the University of Southern California.

²¹⁴ Luca Ratti, “Back to the Future? International Relations Theory and NATO-Russia Relations since the End of the Cold War,” *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 400–401, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40204516?seq=1#fndtn-references_tab_contents. Luca Ratti is a lecturer of the history of international relations at Rome 3 University.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 401.

²¹⁶ “What is NATO?” Member Countries, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed February 6, 2017, <http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>.

acceptance during the enlargement in 2004.²¹⁷ Even if Russia may not have expressed as much resistance to the second round of post-Cold War NATO enlargement in 2004, Moscow continues to object to NATO enlargement. Marzia Scopelliti and Elena Conde Pérez asserted in 2016 that the Kremlin views “the US and NATO’s enlargement as the primary threat to Russian security.”²¹⁸ Russia may therefore resist potential future NATO enlargement. If Moscow believes it is in a stronger position today than it was in the 1990s and 2000s, one should expect Russia to object to any potential future Alliance expansion. Russian reactions to Montenegro’s candidacy support this judgement.

Russia has conducted two major international aggressions in the past 10 years. The first occurred when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. According to Svante E. Cornell, Georgia underwent the “Rose Revolution” in 2003.²¹⁹ The following year Georgian actions indicated that the country wished to join the EU and NATO.²²⁰ Russian President Putin believed the “color revolutions” had put Georgia (and Ukraine) on a path to join NATO.²²¹ Georgia’s aspirations were “regional threats to the emerging ‘Putin doctrine’” and Russia would seek to exert its influence over the former Soviet Republic.²²² Charles King noted that following the Cold War, Georgia “distanced itself from Moscow and reclaimed its independence in 1991.”²²³ South Ossetia and Abkhazia were autonomous under the Soviet Union and pursued their own independence from Georgia.²²⁴ Russia

²¹⁷ Anna Franekova, “Uneasy Expansion: NATO and Russia,” *Harvard International Review* 24, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 10, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/230862142?accountid=12702>. Anna Franekova is an author at the *Harvard International Review*.

²¹⁸ Marzia Scopelliti and Elena Conde Pérez, “Defining Security in a Changing Arctic: Helping to Prevent an Arctic Security Dilemma,” *Polar Record* 52, no. 6 (November 2016): 675, doi: 10.1017/S0032247416000528. Marzia Scopelliti is a PhD candidate of international law and Elena Conde Pérez is a professor of international law at University Complutense of Madrid

²¹⁹ Svante E. Cornell, “War in Georgia, Jitters All Around,” *Current History* 107, no. 711 (October 2008): 307–308, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/200744322?accountid=12702>. Svante Cornell is a research director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 308–309.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 309.

²²² *Ibid.*

²²³ Charles King, “The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow after the Georgia Crisis,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2008): 4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699368>. Charles King is a professor at Georgetown University.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 4–5.

supported these independence movements by South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia.²²⁵ Moreover, Russia sought to maintain as much influence as it could in the Caucasus.²²⁶ Russia was not going to allow Georgia to exert its influence over areas that were autonomous elements in Georgia under Soviet rule.²²⁷

Prior to the actual conflict, Russia conducted military exercises in the Caucasus. Cornell noted that in the weeks prior to the invasion, “Russia conducted a major military exercise dubbed ‘Kavkaz-2008.’”²²⁸ After the completion of the exercise on August 2, 2008, Russia kept its troops in the area and put them on alert instead of sending them home.²²⁹ Five days later, the conflict began with an attack by Georgia in response to shelling by Ossetian separatists.²³⁰ Russia responded the following day by invading Georgia.²³¹

The aggression against Georgia served larger purposes for Russia. According to Cornell, the attack was meant as a warning for Ukraine, a potential candidate for NATO membership, and “sent a strong message to the West” to stay out of the former Soviet Union.²³² The invasion of Georgia was the beginning of a larger trend of Moscow aggression.

The second major Russian international aggression occurred against Ukraine in 2014, and the circumstances had similarities to Russia’s invasion of Georgia. Andrei Tsygankov reported that in November 2004 Ukraine underwent the “Orange revolution.”²³³ The newly elected president, Viktor Yushchenko, sought to gain

²²⁵ King, “The Five-Day War,” 5.

²²⁶ Ibid., 6

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Cornell, “War in Georgia,” 311.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid., 313.

²³³ Andrei Tsygankov, “Vladimir Putin’s Last Stand: The Sources of Russia’s Ukraine Policy,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 31, no. 4 (July 2015): 281, doi: 10.1080/1060586X.2015.1005903. Andrei Tsygankov is a faculty member for the department of international relations and political science at San Francisco State University.

“membership in the Western security alliance” (NATO).²³⁴ Russia, responding as it did when Georgia sought membership in the EU and NATO, viewed Ukraine’s actions as a threat to its national security and began to apply pressure on Ukraine.²³⁵ The relationship between Kiev and Moscow became so tense that in 2009 the Russian President, then Dmitry Medvedev, “denounced Yushchenko for conducting ‘anti-Russian policies.’”²³⁶

The elections of 2010 resulted in Viktor Yanukovich winning the presidency. Tsygankov pointed out that under Yanukovich relations between Kiev and Moscow warmed, but “the Russia-Ukraine partnership remained limited.”²³⁷ Yanukovich decided against joining NATO and postponed “an Association Agreement with the EU.”²³⁸ The decision against a closer relationship with the EU in November 2013 resulted in protests by the Ukrainian people, during which Russia annexed Crimea and “amassed around 30,000 troops on Ukraine’s border.”²³⁹ Moscow also backed the pro-Russian rebels in the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the Russian military participated in active conflict against Ukraine as well.²⁴⁰ Other countries condemned Russia’s actions, especially in Europe.

The Russian conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine provided lessons about Russia. Åtland emphasized five lessons about Russia from the two conflicts.²⁴¹ First, Moscow will use “military force and other means of influence” when it suits its purpose.²⁴² Second, the Russian military has improved greatly since the modernization efforts began in 2008.²⁴³ Third, Russia is willing to use unconventional means of conducting

²³⁴ Tsygankov, “Vladimir Putin’s Last Stand,” 282.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid., 283.

²³⁷ Ibid., 284.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid., 285.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 286.

²⁴¹ Åtland, “North European Security after the Ukraine conflict,” 165.

²⁴² Ibid., 166.

²⁴³ Ibid.

warfare.²⁴⁴ Fourth, “Russia is willing to go to great lengths to ‘defend’ ethnic Russians and Russian speakers” outside of Russia.²⁴⁵ Last, the conflicts gave Putin political capital, and he may be willing to “apply similar measures in other regions” if it suits his purpose.²⁴⁶ These lessons are worrisome because Russia has had past success with aggressions against neighboring countries, and Russia now has a military with improved capabilities; it would be reasonable to assume that Russia could use similar tactics in the future against other countries on its border.

In sum, Russian history includes occasions when European powers declared war against Russia—e.g., France in 1812, France and Great Britain in the Crimea War, and finally, Germany in World War I and World War II. Following World War II, the Soviet Union viewed the formation of NATO as a threat to peace and security in Eastern Europe. In 1955, Moscow formed the Warsaw Pact to counteract NATO. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, three rounds of NATO expansion (in 1999, 2004, and 2009) have resulted in several former Soviet republics or satellite countries joining NATO. Today, Russia views further NATO enlargement as the primary threat to its national security. Russia’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine have demonstrated that Moscow is willing to use force against countries that it regards as threatening to Russia’s national security. The potential remains high that in the near future Russia may use force against other countries on its borders.

²⁴⁴ Åtland, “North European Security after the Ukraine conflict,” 166–167.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 167.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

IV. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Historical Russian aggression and the lessons learned about Russia from the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine have left Finland, Norway, and Sweden concerned about their future security relations with Russia. Christopher S. Chivvis et al. asserted that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO countries believed that Russia did not intend to harm the Alliance.²⁴⁷ However, recent “aggression in Ukraine, combined with Russian snap exercises on NATO’s borders, [and] multiple aerial incursions into NATO and partner territory...have forced a deep reassessment of U.S. strategy, plans, and posture in Europe and other regions in which Russia is active.”²⁴⁸ The security situation in Northern Europe has changed since the early 1990s, and Finland, Norway, and Sweden need to change with it to ensure their future security from potential Russian aggression.

This chapter examines how these three Nordic countries are preparing for a future with an improved Russian military and a greater potential for future Russian aggression in Northern Europe, including the Arctic. It discusses cooperation in international military organizations, military modernization, and specific security concerns of each country. Finland is the first country discussed, followed by Norway, and ending with Sweden.

A. FINLAND

The threat of Russian military actions is a concern for Finland. As published in its *Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*, Helsinki believes that “Russia, through its actions and interpretations, has challenged the essence of the security regime to an extent, and has destabilised it.”²⁴⁹ Because of Russia’s actions, there is

²⁴⁷ Christopher S. Chivvis, et al., “NATO’s Northeastern Flank—Emerging Opportunities for Engagement,” (Santa Ana, CA: RAND, 2016). http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1467z1.html. Christopher Chivvis is an associate director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ “Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 11.

“increased tension and military activity in the Baltic Sea region” and Russia has “increased its military footprint and activity in the Arctic.”²⁵⁰ The Finnish government’s report stated that “the use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be excluded.”²⁵¹ Dmitri Trenin noted that in the Arctic, Russia has “reactivated some of the military bases” and is “building six new military installations in the region.”²⁵² With Russia’s military modernization and increased buildup of military capabilities in the Arctic, Finland may find itself in a vulnerable position if it and other states do not counter Russia’s actions.

Finland seeks to increase its national security through various means, including international military cooperation. Currently Finland is not part of a military alliance.²⁵³ However, Finland is involved in “international networking” as it “maintains the option to seek membership in a military alliance.”²⁵⁴ Given Finland’s history with Russia, international security relations will be an integral part in maintaining its national security.

The most important international security organization for Finland is NATO. According to the *Government’s Defence Report*, “Finland promotes the deepening of cooperation under the auspices of NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Programme (EOP) and the ‘28 (NATO) +2 (Finland & Sweden)’ meetings.”²⁵⁵ Moreover, according to the same report, “Finland maintains the option to seek NATO membership. As Finland keeps developing its defence capability, it continues to take into account the prospects for defence cooperation and interoperability, and ensures the elimination of any practical

²⁵⁰ “Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 11.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Dmitri Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded,” *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 3 (May/June 2016): 28, <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fora95&div=53&id=&page=>. Dmitri Trenin is the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

²⁵³ “Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy,” 17; “Government’s Defense Report,” Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, February 2017, https://www.defmin.fi/en/publications/the_governments_defence_report_2017.

²⁵⁴ “Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 17.

²⁵⁵ “Government’s Defence Report,” Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, 17.

impediments to a possible membership in a military alliance.”²⁵⁶ NATO provides security, and Finland will likely continue to keep its options open to the possibility of membership in the Alliance.

NATO also benefits from the relationship with Finland. According to NATO, “Finland is one of NATO’s most active partners and a valued contributor to NATO-led operations and missions,” and “Finland’s role in training the forces of NATO partner countries is greatly valued.”²⁵⁷ The activity of Finland with NATO has other benefits as well.²⁵⁸ “An important priority for cooperation is to develop capabilities and maintain the ability of the Finnish armed forces to work with those of NATO and other partner countries.”²⁵⁹ NATO benefits from its close relationship with Finland; the Alliance would most likely welcome any request by Helsinki to join.

Even though Finland’s relationship with NATO is strong and Finland keeps its options open to potential membership in NATO, there is still uncertainty as to whether or when Finland would actively seek to become a member of the Alliance. Chivvis et al. believe that the possibility of Finland joining NATO “in the near future” is unlikely.²⁶⁰ However, since 2014 the idea of joining NATO has been gaining momentum in Finland. In 2015, Etzold and Opitz noted that some Finnish government officials (including the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister) were in favor of joining NATO, but other government officials (including the Foreign Minister) were against the idea.²⁶¹ Moreover, only 25 percent of the population supported joining NATO.²⁶² Chivvis et al. believe that “NATO membership in the medium term is possible, and that possibility should be made

²⁵⁶ “Government’s Defence Report,” Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, 17.

²⁵⁷ “Relations with Finland,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified March 30, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Chivvis, et al., “NATO’s Northeastern Flank,” 3. There is no stated timeline for the terms “near future” or “medium term.”

²⁶¹ Etzold and Opitz, “Between Military Non-Alignment and Integration,” 2.

²⁶² Ibid.

clear to Russia and leveraged as an additional deterrent against Russian aggression.”²⁶³ Finland has been posturing itself for potential NATO membership, but the likeliness of that happening “in the near future” appears low. Future Russian aggression may play a role in a potential Finnish decision to join NATO.

Russia is not oblivious to Finland’s cooperation with NATO. Lincoln Flake noted that in 2013 Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated that “any expansion of NATO to include...Finland would upset the balance of power and force Russia to respond.”²⁶⁴ Mike Winnerstig noted that in 2012, high-level members of the Russian military would view a “Finnish NATO membership...as a threat to Russia’s security.”²⁶⁵ Given the past rhetoric from Moscow, there is a high probability that Russia would view Finnish membership in NATO in a negative light. Based on historical aggressions from Russia, Moscow’s rhetoric is likely a concern for Finland.

Finland has been cultivating bilateral relationships to protect its national security. The United States is an important partner and vital to the security and defense of Finland.²⁶⁶ Recently, the two countries signed an agreement to reaffirm their commitment to each other. The Statement of Intent (signed on October 7, 2016) between the two countries seeks to “increase the practical cooperation and collaboration between the U.S. DOD [Department of Defense] and the Finnish MOD by building on current cooperative activities, and implementing new initiatives to work together effectively and efficiently.”²⁶⁷ It also intends “to enhance our defense partnership further and to improve

²⁶³ Chivvis, et al., “NATO’s Northeastern Flank,” 3.

²⁶⁴ Dmitry Medvedev quoted in Lincoln Edson Flake, “Russia’s Security Intentions in a Melting Arctic,” *Military and Strategic Affairs* 6, no. 1 (March 2014): 111. [http://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/MASA6-1Eng%20\(4\)_Flake.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/MASA6-1Eng%20(4)_Flake.pdf). Lincoln Flake is a research fellow with the U.S. National Intelligence University.

²⁶⁵ Mike Winnerstig, “Security Policy at Road’s End? The Roles of Sweden and Finland in the Nordic-Baltic Defence Cooperation Process,” *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2013–2014* 12, no. 1 (December 2014): 165, doi: 10.2478/lasr-2014-0007. Mike Winnerstig is a deputy director of research at the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI).

²⁶⁶ “Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 22.

²⁶⁷ “Statement of Intent between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland,” Ministry of Defense of Finland, October 7, 2016, <http://www.defmin.fi/SOI>.

our defense cooperation through a wide range of activity areas.”²⁶⁸ While the statement of intent does not specify any adversaries, Russia is the country that concerns Finland the most, and it is most likely the country that prompted this agreement. Close Finnish ties with the United States will probably not go over well with Russia either. Scopelliti and Pérez pointed out that the Kremlin views the United States (and NATO enlargement) as the primary threats to Russia’s security.²⁶⁹ The more Finland increases its ties to the United States, the greater the threat Moscow is going to perceive.

Finland also seeks to improve its national security through military modernization. Tobias Etzold and Pawel Tokarski noted that “in its defense policy, Finland is seeking to close ranks with its Nordic neighbours, the European Union and NATO.”²⁷⁰ According to the “Government’s Defence Report,” as Finland keeps developing its defense capability, “it continues to take into account the prospects for defense cooperation and interoperability, and ensures the elimination of any practical impediments to a possible membership in a military alliance.”²⁷¹ The ability to rapidly strike targets over long ranges will be critical to “military deterrence in the 2020s.”²⁷² Future military technology will focus on developing “long-range weapons systems” and improving targeting capabilities.²⁷³ Given Finland’s increased cooperation with NATO and the importance Finland puts on NATO in its national defense, one would expect a Finnish military modernization to be in line with similar efforts by NATO countries, which would strengthen Helsinki’s ties to the Alliance, but at the same time, probably elicit a negative response from Russia.

²⁶⁸ “Statement of Intent between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland,” Ministry of Defense of Finland.

²⁶⁹ Scopelliti and Pérez, “Defining security in a changing Arctic,” 675.

²⁷⁰ Tobias Etzold and Pawel Tokarski, “New Centre-Right Government in Finland: Economic and European Challenges and Perspectives,” *SWP Comments* 35 (June 2015): 2, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-437664>. Pawel Tokarski is an associate in SWP’s EU/Europe Division.

²⁷¹ “Government’s Defence Report,” Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, 17.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

Finland is currently looking at major upgrades to its Air Force and Navy. Finland is currently upgrading two of its major platforms—“the Navy’s vessel project and the Air Force’s fighter programme;” both are highly important to Finland’s defense.²⁷⁴

The first major upgrade is to Finland’s Air Force. Finland’s Ministry of Defense noted that “the aim of the HX Fighter Program is to replace the operations capability of the Air Force F/A-18 aircraft.”²⁷⁵ The Air Force plays an “integral part of air defence and the joint fire capability of the Defence Forces to engage land- and sea-based targets.”²⁷⁶ Finland estimates the costs for the HX Fighter Program could be from 7 to 10 billion euros.²⁷⁷ *Defense News* reported that Finland “sent a Request for Information (RFI) for the acquisition of a Hornet replacement to the UK, France, Sweden and US defense administrations.”²⁷⁸ Finland is planning to spend a lot of money upgrading its aging Hornet fleet, and the four countries to which Finland sent RFIs are in NATO or closely aligned with NATO. The replacement for the Hornet will therefore further integrate Finland’s military with NATO. Given the shared border between Finland and Russia, Moscow likely views the HX Fighter Program as a threat to Russia’s national security, especially if that upgrade turns out to be the JSF.

The second major upgrade is to Finland’s Navy. The Government’s Defence Report noted that the “Squadron 2020 project entails replacing and modernizing the capabilities of the seven vessels which will have been or are scheduled to be decommissioned against contemporary threats.”²⁷⁹ According to John Pagni, Finland will spend 1.2 billion euros to replace seven aging vessels with four new offshore patrol

²⁷⁴ “Government’s Defence Report,” Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, 26.

²⁷⁵ “HX Fighter Program,” Puolustusministeriö Försvarsministeriet Ministry of Defense, accessed April 6, 2017, http://www.defmin.fi/en/administrative_branch/strategic_capability_projects/hx_fighter_program.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ “Government’s Defence Report,” Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, 27.

²⁷⁸ “Finland Issues RFI for Hornet Replacement,” *Defense News*, accessed April 6, 2017, <http://defensenews-alert.blogspot.com/2016/04/finland-issues-rfi-for-hornet.html>.

²⁷⁹ “Government’s Defence Report,” Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, 26.

vehicles.²⁸⁰ Finland's Ministry of Defense stated that these "new vessels are expected to be capable of territorial integrity surveillance, securing vital sea lines of communication and deterring attacks from the sea."²⁸¹ Replacing old vessels with new vessels that are more capable than their predecessors is nothing new, but the likelihood of Moscow viewing Finland's naval upgrades as a threat to Russia's navy and national security interests in the Baltic Sea region is high.

In addition to direct Russian aggression against its homeland, Finland has concerns about potential Russian aggression in other parts of the Baltic region. Chivvis et al. emphasized that the Finns are "concerned about how a conflict elsewhere in the Baltic region might affect them."²⁸² Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are vulnerable to Russian aggression, and a conflict involving one or more of the Baltic States could potentially spill over to other areas of the Baltic region.²⁸³

A conflict in the Baltic region would probably spill over into Finnish territory. Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis pointed out that "most military operations in the Baltic region require access to what is today Swedish and Finnish air, sea, and land."²⁸⁴ The most important "geostrategic islands" in the Baltic Sea include the Åland Islands.²⁸⁵ Justyna Gotkowska and Piotr Szymański emphasized that the Åland Islands have no military presence during times of peace, and in the event of a conflict, Finland is

²⁸⁰ John Pagni, "Finland Authorizes Work to Begin on 'Squadron 2020' OPVs," *Jane's IHS Navy International*, October 4, 2016, <http://www.janes.com/article/64313/finland-authorises-work-to-begin-on-squadron-2020-opvs>. John Pagni is an expert with *IHS Jane's Navy International*.

²⁸¹ "Squadron 2020," Puolustusministeriö Försvarsministeriet Ministry of Defence, accessed April 6, 2017, http://www.defmin.fi/en/administrative_branch/strategic_capability_projects/squadron_2020.

²⁸² Chivvis, "NATO's Northeastern Flank," 4.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, "The Baltic States: The United States Must Be Prepared to Fulfill Its NATO Treaty Obligations," *The Heritage Foundation* no. 3039 (September 2015), <http://report.heritage.org/bg3039>. Luke Coffey is a Margaret Thatcher Fellow and Daniel Kochis is a research associate in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

responsible for their defense.²⁸⁶ If Russia attempted to take control of the Åland Islands, Finland's responsibility could draw Helsinki into a conflict with Russia.

Russia understands the value of the Åland Islands, and Finland knows that Russia could take them over. Gotkowska and Szymański noted that there “are fears that the [Åland Islands] archipelago's demilitarized status may be an incentive for Russia to occupy the Islands.”²⁸⁷ According to the Finnish Defense Minister Jussi Niinisto, “the ministry of defense began to think what kind of assistance the Defense Forces would provide to the Åland Islands in case of the arrival of the [Russian] ‘green men.’”²⁸⁸ Russian military exercises over the past few years have given validity to these concerns.

An increase in unannounced Russian military exercises beginning in 2014 has been a source of concern. According to Martin Hurt, “Russia has repeatedly surprised European nations by launching unannounced ‘snap exercises.’”²⁸⁹ Moscow claims these exercise are for readiness purposes, but many scholars believe the Kremlin intends to show the strength of the Russian military.²⁹⁰ One of these exercises simulated the capture of territory in the Baltic Sea. Edward Lucas observed a scenario in which Russian troops captured Northern Norway, the Åland Islands, and Gotland Island, essentially isolating the Baltic States from NATO Allies.²⁹¹ This snap exercise confirmed that Russia has developed plans for a potential invasion of Finnish territory.

²⁸⁶ Justyna Gotkowska and Piotr Szymański, “Gotland and Åland on the Baltic Chessboard—Swedish and Finnish Concerns,” *Osrodek Studiów Wschodnich* (October 2016), <https://www.osw.waw.pl/print/24813>.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ “Finland Preparing for Russia's Occupation of Åland Islands,” Unian Information Agency, July 30, 2015, <https://www.unian.info/world/1106483-finland-preparing-for-russias-occupation-of-aland-islands.html>.

²⁸⁹ Martin Hurt, “Preempting Further Russian Aggression Against Europe,” *The Heritage Foundation* (2016), 38, <http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/preempting-further-russian-aggression/>. Martin Hurt is the deputy director and member of the executive board at the International Centre for Defense and Security in Estonia.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Edward Lucas, “The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report,” *Center for European Policy Analysis* (June 2015), 9, [http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20\(2\).compressed.pdf](http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20(2).compressed.pdf). Edward Lucas is a senior vice president at the CEPA.

In sum, Helsinki believes there is a threat of Russian aggression against Finland. Finland has accordingly sought different ways to improve its national security. Finland has become more active in its cooperation with NATO. Bilateral agreements, especially with the United States, have multiplied. Military modernization will give Finland improved capabilities to defend its homeland and strike targets abroad. In addition to direct action against Finland, Helsinki is also worried about potential conflict in the Baltic Region, as it is responsible for the Åland Island, which has strategic military significance in the Baltic Sea region. Potential Russian aggression has motivated Finland to improve its security situation, but every step that Helsinki takes will probably draw negative responses from Moscow and portrayed as a threat to Russian national security. Helsinki will likely view any effort by Russia to bolster its border security as a threat to Finland, and the cycle may repeat itself.

B. NORWAY

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Norway and Russia maintained bilateral relations in many different fields. Åtland reported that the two countries' militaries conducted exercises in the 1990s and 2000s.²⁹² These exercises helped to establish a level of military stability between the two countries. Åtland also noted that the relationship between Russia and the West has had its "ups and down."²⁹³ The military relationship between Russia and Norway has not always been stable. As a result, Russia has been a concern for Norway. Åtland asserted that Russia historically has been a priority in Norway's "security policy and defense planning," and most likely will continue to be.²⁹⁴

The relationship between Norway and Russia currently is in a time of uncertainty. Scopelliti and Pérez noted that Russian military exercises and naval activities in the Arctic have "triggered a sense of insecurity among other Arctic states," and these states

²⁹² Åtland, "Northern European Security after the Ukraine Conflict," 170.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Åtland, "Northern European Security after the Ukraine conflict," 164.

are responding accordingly.²⁹⁵ Today, Norway's security concerns about Russia are similar to those of Finland and Sweden. Norway believes that recent Russian actions have "challenged the 'deep peace' in Europe."²⁹⁶ Russia therefore remains a high priority in Norwegian security and foreign policy.²⁹⁷ One concern for Norway is the size of the Russian military. Russian military and nuclear capabilities create a "significant regional imbalance" compared to Norwegian capabilities.²⁹⁸ This imbalance creates a need for Norway to seek cooperation with other countries to address its security concerns.

One of the ways Norway has historically dealt with its security concerns is through NATO membership. Norway was one of the founding members of NATO in 1949.²⁹⁹ Norway, as a member of NATO, receives Alliance benefits, in contrast with non-member states such as Finland and Sweden. Norway enjoys the security of Article 5, more commonly known as the collective defense commitment. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that

the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of the individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.³⁰⁰

The collective defense provision has given Norway an international security guarantee to help prevent an attack from an outside country.

²⁹⁵ Scopelliti and Pérez, "Defining security in a changing Arctic," 675.

²⁹⁶ "Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy," Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 13.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.; "The Future Course of Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense of Norway, April 21, 2017, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/future_course/id2550127/.

²⁹⁸ "Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy," Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 15.

²⁹⁹ "Member Countries," NATO.

³⁰⁰ "Collective Defense—Article 5," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified March 22, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.

NATO remains an important part of Norway's defense policy. According to Ine Eriksen Soreide, the Norwegian Minister of Defense, the NATO security guarantee, along with close ties to the United States and other countries, comprises the "cornerstone of Norway's security strategy."³⁰¹ Borge Brende, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently stated that "NATO and the US security guarantee will remain the cornerstone of Norway's security policy."³⁰² NATO has given Norway a high level of security, but, as the statements above indicate, bilateral relations with specific countries also play a part in Norway's security policy.

The country that Norway values its bilateral relations with most is the United States. The two countries have maintained a "healthy relationship...for decades."³⁰³ In January 2014, Norwegian Minister of Defense Soreide described the United States as Norway's "most important ally," and declared that Norway wished to seek further cooperation.³⁰⁴ That close cooperation continues today. In February 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Norwegian Minister of Defense Soreide reaffirmed the countries' "close defense relationship" and "extensive military-to-military cooperation."³⁰⁵

The cooperation between the two countries is extensive. Øystein Bo, the Norwegian State Secretary, reiterated in a speech in April 2017 at the Norwegian-American Defense conference that the United States "is no doubt our most important

³⁰¹ Soreide, "NATO and the North Atlantic," 53.

³⁰² "The Future Course of Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense of Norway.

³⁰³ "Readout of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work's Office Call with Norway's State Secretary for Defense," U.S. Department of Defense, May 26, 2015, Release No: NR-199-15, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/605530/readout-of-deputy-secretary-of-defense-robert-works-office-call-with-norways-st/>.

³⁰⁴ "The U.S. Is Our Most Important Ally," Norwegian Ministry of Defense, January 20, 2014, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/the-us-is-our-most-important-ally/id748895/>.

³⁰⁵ "Defense Relationship Highlights Mattis Meeting with Norway's Defense Minister," U.S. Department of Defense, February 17, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1087739/defense-relationship-highlights-mattis-meeting-with-norways-defense-minister/>.

ally.”³⁰⁶ He noted that relations between the two countries were “broad and deep,” and emphasized three areas of bilateral cooperation.³⁰⁷ The first is the work the two countries do in monitoring “the High North and the North Atlantic.”³⁰⁸ The second is the level of joint training and improving of defense capabilities.³⁰⁹ The last area he emphasized was the role the United States plays in Norway’s acquisition of defense equipment, with “about half” of Norway’s defense imports coming from the United States.³¹⁰ Extensive cooperation between the two countries allows for a United States presence in the area and helps Norway protect its national security interests and improve its military capabilities.

One of the ways in which Norway improves its military and defense capabilities is through joint training. In December 2016, Norway announced that, beginning in January 2017, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) would soon establish a “limited rotational force presence” in Norway.³¹¹ Norwegian Minister of Defense Soreide stated that the “US participation in military exercises and training in Norway is one element in this long-standing and close security policy relationship.”³¹²

As expected, Moscow did not welcome this news. When asked about the potential deployment of U.S. Marines to Norway, Frants Klintsevitsj, a deputy chairman of Russia’s defense and security committee, stated that “this is very dangerous for Norway and Norwegians” and that “we have never before had Norway on the list of targets for our strategic weapons. But if this develops, Norway’s population will suffer.”³¹³ Any

³⁰⁶ “Opening Remarks at NADIC by Øystein Bo,” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, April 11, 2017, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/opening-remarks-at-nadic-by-oystein-bo/id2549269/>.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ “Norway Welcomes USMC Rotational Training and Exercises,” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, October 24, 2016, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/amerikanske-styrker-kommer-til-a-trene-og-ove-mer-i-norge/id2517088/>.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Frants Klintsevitsj, quoted in “‘Norway Will Suffer’: Russia Makes Nuclear Threat of U.S. Marines,” *The Local*, October 31, 2016, <https://www.thelocal.no/20161031/norway-will-suffer-russia-makes-nuclear-threat-over-us-marines>.

addition of NATO troops, especially American troops, on Norwegian territory will result in criticism from Moscow.

Military modernization is also an important part of Norway's defense strategy. In addition to having a much smaller military than Russia, Norway was falling behind in technology as well. Tringham reported that in 2015, Oslo realized that the "country is poorly equipped to defend itself against certain threats."³¹⁴ As a result, Norway undertook an effort to modernize its military.

One of Norway's modernization projects involves an increase in maritime patrol capabilities in the North Atlantic. In March 2017, Norway agreed to purchase five P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft; they are scheduled for delivery from Boeing in 2022 and 2023.³¹⁵ Norwegian State Secretary Bo called this a "major milestone" and said it was an "important capability" for "decades to come."³¹⁶ The P-8A is "designed to be combat-capable" and has the ability to "conduct anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions."³¹⁷ Oslo considers the acquisition "an important element in the Norwegian Long Term Plan."³¹⁸

Another important modernization project also involves Norway's Air Force. Over 10 years beginning in 2015, Norway plans to add over 50 F-35As to its fleet to replace its aging F-16 fighters.³¹⁹ Oslo views the F-35A as a "game changer," with new capabilities to strike "well defended targets at extended distances with very high precision;" and it is another "key component" in Norway's Long Term Plan.³²⁰

³¹⁴ Tringham, "Norway Country Briefing."

³¹⁵ "Norway Has Ordered Five Boeing P-8A Poseidon," Norwegian Ministry of Defense, April 4, 2017, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norge-har-inngatt-kontrakt-om-kjop-av-fem-nye-p-8a-poseidon-maritime-patruljefly/id2546045/>.

³¹⁶ "Opening Remarks at NADIC by Øystein Bo," Norwegian Ministry of Defense.

³¹⁷ "Aircraft and Weapons: P-8A Poseidon," Naval Air Systems Command, last modified February 2017, <http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=cfd01141-cd4e-4db8-a6b2-7e8fbfb31b86>.

³¹⁸ "Norway Has Ordered Five Boeing P-8A Poseidon," Norwegian Ministry of Defense.

³¹⁹ "Norway's First F-35 Rolled Out," Norwegian Ministry of Defense, September 22, 2015, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norges-forste-f-35-er-klar/id2440898/>.

³²⁰ "Opening Remarks at NADIC by Øystein Bo," Norwegian Ministry of Defense; "Norway's first F-35 rolled out."

Norway is improving its military capabilities. According to Svein Efstad, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense Policy Director, “Norway will have advanced and modern forces in all services, optimized for deterrence and high-intensity warfare in the northern region.”³²¹ Åtland contends that Norway’s military modernization “remains a source of concern for Russia, in the same way that Russia’s military modernization remains a source of concern for Norway.”³²² Given that Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States are all in NATO,³²³ and that Finland and Sweden are close partners of NATO, Moscow will almost certainly view Norway’s military modernization as directed toward Russia. As Norway and Russia continue to modernize their armed forces, the chances that they will see each other as bigger threats will continue to grow.

The territorial waters surrounding Norway have recently grown in strategic importance to Norway. According to Norwegian Defense Minister Soreide, there are “important economic drivers for prioritizing” the North Atlantic Ocean as well as the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean.³²⁴ The problem facing Norway in this region is that it is a huge area requiring coverage by a relatively small population.³²⁵ This area is also important to Russia for many of the same reasons.³²⁶ There has been a recent increase in Russian military activity in the North Atlantic, and Russia could take control over the North Atlantic during a time of conflict if no one protected it from Russia.³²⁷ As a result, Norway is pushing for greater NATO involvement in the North Atlantic.³²⁸

The North Atlantic has strategic implications for NATO as well. According to John Hamre and Heather Conley, Russia values freedom of movement for its military

³²¹ Svein Efstad, “Norway and the North Atlantic: Defence of the Northern Flank,” *Whitehall Papers* 87, no. 1 (May 2016): 73, doi: 10.1080/02681307.2016.1291021.

³²² Åtland, “Interstate Relations in the Arctic,” 157.

³²³ “Member Countries,” NATO.

³²⁴ Soreide, “NATO and the North Atlantic,” 49.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 50–51.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 51.

vessels in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions.³²⁹ In the event the North Atlantic region becomes a contested area, NATO must ensure that it is able to maintain open sea lines of communication (SLOC).³³⁰ If Russia were able to control the SLOC in the North Atlantic, the NATO Allies would have to adjust how they support each other.

Some experts think NATO does not have a strong enough presence in the North Atlantic. Hamre and Conley noted that many United States and NATO military personnel think that NATO must “increase its physical presence in the North Atlantic.”³³¹ Countries in addition to Norway would like to see more NATO involvement in the North Atlantic.

Oslo is doing its part to bring more NATO involvement to the country and surrounding area. In 2016, Norway hosted its biannual winter exercise, Cold Response, which involved 14 countries and around 15,000 troops.³³² In 2018, Norway will host one of NATO’s largest exercises, Trident Juncture.³³³ The Norwegian Armed Forces expect Trident Juncture 2018 to involve around 36,000 personnel from over 30 nations.³³⁴

Are these training exercises enough? John Olsen contends that, while exercises are important, there needs to be a “sustained presence” in the region to “demonstrate commitment.”³³⁵ The answer is not as simple as just stationing more troops in the area. Oslo’s agreement to host 300 U.S. Marines on a rotational basis on Norwegian territory drew strongly worded criticism and threats from Moscow. The challenge facing Norway

³²⁹ John J. Hamre and Heather A. Conley, “The Centrality of the North Atlantic to NATO and U.S. Strategic Interests,” *Whitehall Papers* 87, no. 1 (May 2016): 46, doi: 10.1080/02681307.2016.1291020. John Hamre is the president and CEO of CSIS. Heather Conley is a senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and the director of the Europe program at CSIS.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 48.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 54.

³³² “Cold Response 2016,” Norwegian Armed Forces, accessed April 27, 2017, <https://forsvaret.no/en/coldresponse>.

³³³ “Trident Juncture 2018,” Norwegian Armed Forces, last modified January 18, 2017, <https://forsvaret.no/en/exercise-and-operations/exercises/nato-exercise-2018>.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

³³⁵ John Andreas Olsen, “Conclusions and Recommendations,” *Whitehall Papers* 87, no. 1 (May 2016): 104, doi: 10.1080/02681307.2016.1291024. John Olsen is a director in the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, a colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force, and a visiting professor at the Swedish Defense University.

and its allies is how to increase NATO presence in the area while minimizing Russian complaints.

An area in the North Atlantic that is important to Norway is Svalbard. The Svalbard Treaty (also known as the Spitsbergen Treaty) gave Norway “absolute sovereignty...over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen.”³³⁶ Article 9 of the treaty prevents the development of naval bases or fortifications; it also stipulates that the islands “may never be used for warlike purposes.”³³⁷ Under Article 10 Russian nationals and companies are treated in the same way as the citizens and enterprises of the other signatories of the Treaty.³³⁸ Norway has ruled the island chain ever since the conclusion of the treaty in 1920.

The history of relations between Norway and Russia concerning Svalbard is rife with controversy. Many scholars argue that this controversy stems from differing interpretations of the Svalbard Treaty and its sometimes-vague language.³³⁹ Timo Koivurova and Filip Holiencin pointed out that in 1944 the Soviet Union tried to change the Svalbard Treaty by seeking an agreement with Norway to establish a military presence on the island.³⁴⁰ The matter ended when Norway joined NATO and put Svalbard under NATO protection, even though Moscow objected that this violated Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty.³⁴¹ Åtland and Torbjorn noted that, after the end of the Cold War, Russia objected to Norway’s use of “radars and satellite stations” on the

³³⁶ “Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British Overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen,” Likumi, February 9, 1920, <https://m.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=282061>.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Timo Koivurova and Filip Holiencin, “Demilitarisation and Neutralization of Svalbard: How has the Svalbard Regime been Able to Meet the Changing Security Realities during almost 100 Years of Existence?” *Polar Record* 53, no. 2 (January 2017): 132, doi:10.1017/S0032247416000838; Kristian Åtland and Torbjorn Pedersen, “The Svalbard Archipelago in Russian Security Policy: Overcoming the Legacy of Fear – or Reproducing It?” *European Security* 17, no. 2–3 (June–September 2008): 229, doi: 10.1080/09662830802642470. Timo Koivurova and Filip Holiencin are experts at the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland. Torbjorn Pedersen was a senior research fellow in the department of political science at the University of Tromsø.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 135.

³⁴¹ Ibid., 135–136.

island, claiming that Norway could use them for war purposes, such as integrating them into “a U.S. missile defence scheme,” thus violating Article 9.³⁴²

Svalbard is a key piece of terrain in the North Atlantic region and the Arctic region. Koivurova and Holiencin argued that because of its distance from Russian installations and its potential for basing air assets, it “has a very important geo-strategic location.”³⁴³ They noted that Norway deemed this area its “most important strategic priority” of the future.³⁴⁴ Magnus Nordenman pointed out an aspect of Svalbard’s strategic significance—it is “an ideal place for receiving data from orbiting satellites.”³⁴⁵ In 2011, there was a suspected Chinese cyber-attack on NASA facilities there.³⁴⁶ While relations in this area continue to be relatively peaceful, Svalbard remains a high value piece of terrain that could become the center of a conflict in the North Atlantic or Arctic region.

In sum, Norway and Russia have maintained bilateral relations since the end of the Cold War, but recently those relations have been in a phase of uncertainty. Oslo is concerned about recent Russian aggression. With Russia having a clear advantage in military capabilities, Norway depends on international treaties and bilateral relations as important elements of its national security. As one of the founding members of NATO, Norway relies on the Alliance for its security needs. Bilateral relations with the United States also play a large part in Norway’s security. Oslo has undertaken military modernization in key areas that will give Norway’s military enhanced defensive capabilities. With the attention of some NATO Allies focused elsewhere in the world, Norway is concerned that the Allied presence in the North Atlantic region and the Arctic region is inadequate, and Oslo is seeking an increase in NATO forces in the area. To

³⁴² Åtland and Pedersen, “The Svalbard Archipelago in Russian Security Policy,” 228–229.

³⁴³ Koivurova and Holiencin, “Demilitarisation and Neutralization of Svalbard,” 132

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Magnus Nordenman, “Back to the Gap: The Re-emerging Maritime Contest in the North Atlantic,” *RUSI Journal* 162, no. 1 (February/March 2017): 28, doi:10.1080/03071847.2017.1301539. Magnus Nordenman is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative with the Brent Scowcroft Center on international security at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

promote an increased NATO presence, Norway has been active in hosting international exercises. An area of concern for Norway in the North Atlantic is the Svalbard Island chain. The island chain has strategic significance in the North Atlantic and the Arctic, and Russia could seek military control over it in a future conflict.

C. SWEDEN

Sweden has voiced concerns about Russian aggression that are similar to those put forth in Finland. In the past few years, Swedish government officials on numerous occasions have expressed the view that Russian aggression may lead to instability in the European security situation.³⁴⁷ The increase in Russian aggression has led some Swedes to fear that Russia might attack Sweden. According to Peter Hultqvist, Sweden's Minister of Defence, although the likelihood of an attack by Russia is small, Sweden "cannot rule out armed attacks in the future."³⁴⁸ Sweden has therefore taken measures to increase its national security.

Sweden, like Finland, has opened up to international military cooperation. Etzold and Opitz emphasized in 2015 that "military non-alignment is firmly embedded in Sweden's...security culture."³⁴⁹ That stance, however, has begun to loosen in recent years. Winnerstig observed a change in Sweden's defense policy in 2009.³⁵⁰ In a significant shift in policy, the government declared that Sweden would assist "another EU member state or Nordic country" if it came under attack and that Stockholm would

³⁴⁷ Wallström, "Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs"; "Speech by Peter Hultqvist at the Munich Security Conference 2016," Government Offices of Sweden, February 13, 2016, <http://www.government.se/speeches/2016/02/speech-by-peter-hultqvist-at-the-munich-security-conference-2016/>; "Speech by Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist at Leangkollen Security Conference," Government Offices of Sweden, "February 13, 2017, <http://www.government.se/speeches/2017/02/speech-by-minister-for-defence-peter-hultqvist-at-leangkollen-security-conference/>"; "Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2017," Government Offices of Sweden, February 15, 2017, <http://www.government.se/statements/2017/03/statement-of-government-policy-in-the-parliamentary-debate-on-foreign-affairs-2017>.

³⁴⁸ "Speech by Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist at Leangkollen Security Conference," Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁴⁹ Etzold and Opitz, "Between Military Non-Alignment and Integration," 1.

³⁵⁰ "Winnerstig, "Security Policy at Road's End?" 156.

expect those other countries to do the same if Sweden was attacked.³⁵¹ Sweden has stood by this policy since 2009, and it remains in force today.³⁵²

As with Finland, cooperation with NATO is becoming more frequent and extensive for Sweden. F. Stephen Larrabee et al. noted that the Ukraine crisis “intensified Sweden’s...interest in closer cooperation with NATO,” and that Sweden has recently increased its defense cooperation with NATO.³⁵³ As stated in *Sweden’s Defense Policy 2016 to 2020*, “cooperation with NATO allows the Swedish Armed Forces to develop military capabilities and, by contributing to qualified international crisis management operations, Sweden contributes to building security together with partners.”³⁵⁴ Sweden also benefits from the NATO presence in the Baltic Sea region. Hultqvist asserted that NATO plays a “key role to ensure stability and to deter threats in the Baltic Sea” and that Sweden, from a “non-military alignment” platform, will continue to increase ties with NATO.³⁵⁵ The Alliance gives many benefits to Sweden that it would not have if it did not redefine its policy of non-alignment.

Sweden also supports NATO in various ways. According to NATO, Sweden signed a “memorandum of understanding on Host Nation Support” that gives Allied forces support when they are in or transiting through Sweden.³⁵⁶ Moreover, Sweden is active in training Afghan forces and contributes money to the Afghan Nation Army Trust Fund.³⁵⁷ “Sweden participates in the NATO Response Force.”³⁵⁸ Sweden actively assists

³⁵¹ “Winnerstig, “Security Policy at Road’s End?” 156.

³⁵² “Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2017,” Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁵³ F. Stephen Larrabee et al., *Russia and the West after the Ukrainian Crisis: European Vulnerabilities to Russian Pressures*, (Santa Ana, CA: RAND, 2017): 11, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1305.html. F. Stephen Larrabee is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation.

³⁵⁴ “Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020,” Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁵⁵ “Speech by Peter Hultqvist at the Munich Security Conference 2016,” Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁵⁶ “Relations with Sweden,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified March 30, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52535.htm.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

in the training of personnel from NATO partner nations and “continues to support a number of Trust Fund projects.”³⁵⁹ Sweden’s active support of many NATO and partnership programs ensures that the benefits of the relationship between NATO and Sweden are mutual.

Despite all the mutual support between NATO and Sweden, there is still debate on whether Sweden should join NATO. Etzold and Opitz noted that Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström stated that “the Swedish people are genuinely fearful of Russia once more.”³⁶⁰ Surveys conducted at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 revealed that one-third to one-half of Swedes favor joining NATO.³⁶¹ The government, however, is still not supportive of NATO membership.³⁶² As noted previously, Chivvis et al. believe that NATO membership for Sweden (as for Finland) is unlikely in the “near future,” but possible in the “medium term,” and that Sweden could use its potential NATO membership as leverage—that is, “as an additional deterrent against Russian aggression.”³⁶³ Continued Russian aggression may result in an increase of support for NATO membership in Sweden. The reverse may also be true. That is, if Russia stops its aggression, support for NATO membership in Sweden may wane.

Russia has taken note of Sweden’s cooperation with NATO. Lora Chakarova, Alex Kokcharov, and Dijedon Imeri asserted that, while Russia considers Sweden a “de facto” member of NATO, that assessment has not stopped Russia from criticizing Sweden’s actions and threatening Sweden militarily.³⁶⁴ Flake noted that Russian Prime Minister Medvedev included Sweden, along with Finland, as countries whose NATO

³⁵⁹ “Relations with Sweden,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

³⁶⁰ Etzold and Opitz, “Between Military Non-Alignment and Integration,” 2.

³⁶¹ Ibid., 2–3.

³⁶² Ibid., 2.

³⁶³ Chivvis et al., “NATO’s Northeastern Flank,” 3. There is no stated timeline for “near future” or “medium term.”

³⁶⁴ Lora Chakarova, Alex Kokcharov, and Dijedon Imeri, “Finnish and Swedish NATO Membership Unlikely before 2020 Despite Growing Support, Russia to Retaliate Economically,” *Jane’s Intelligence Weekly* (October 2015), <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1754980>. Lora Chakarova, Alex Kokcharov, and Dijedon Imeri are experts with Jane’s Intelligence Weekly.

membership would “upset the balance of power and force Russia to respond.”³⁶⁵ Winnerstig cited a Russian military expert as saying that Sweden could become a potential target of Russian military capabilities if it joined NATO.³⁶⁶ Russia does not want to see Sweden or Finland join the Alliance. Moscow will do what it can to try to prevent a Swedish NATO membership.

In addition to increased cooperation with NATO, Sweden is also increasing bilateral cooperation with the United States. *Sweden’s Defense Policy 2016 to 2020* stated that “it is in Swedish interests to maintain and further deepen the bilateral relationship with the United States.”³⁶⁷ Foreign Minister Wallström stated that “relations with the new US administration remain important for...our security.”³⁶⁸ The value of relations with the United States is important in various areas of the Swedish government.

There has been recent increased bilateral cooperation between Sweden and the United States. According to a U.S. DOD release, in June 2016 the United States and Sweden “signed a statement of intent, which cements the close relationship between the United States and Sweden and sets out a path for greater defense cooperation in the future.”³⁶⁹ This letter of intent “sends a strong signal of deterrence to those who might seek to intimidate our [United States] partners and allies in Europe.”³⁷⁰ The signed statement of intent does not name specific countries,³⁷¹ but the DOD readout reported on a meeting between Peter Hultqvist and Bob Work that discussed “enhancing defense

³⁶⁵ Flake, “Russia’s Security Intentions in a Melting Arctic,” 111.

³⁶⁶ Winnerstig, “Security Policy at Road’s End?” 166.

³⁶⁷ “Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020,” Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁶⁸ Wallström, “Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs.”

³⁶⁹ “Readout of Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work’s Meetings With Swedish Minister of Defense Peter Hultqvist,” U.S. Department of Defense, Release No: NR-207-16, June 8, 2016, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/794733/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-ash-carter-and-deputy-secretary-of-defense-bob>.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ “Statement of Intent between the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America and the Minister of Defense of Sweden,” Government Offices of Sweden, June 8, 2016, <http://www.government.se/articles/2016/06/minister-of-defence-peter-hultqvist-signed/>.

cooperation, to include increasing deterrence of provocative Russian behavior.”³⁷² Although the statement of intent does not specifically name countries, all indications point toward Russia being the immediate threat in the area.

Russian actions have contributed toward the increased bilateral cooperation between Sweden and the United States. Brian Jenkins noted that “fears of Russian aggression have prompted both Sweden and Finland...to sign bilateral agreements intending to ensure closer collaboration with the United States on defense matters.”³⁷³ In addition, some statements by President Trump have cast doubt on the effectiveness of NATO and may increase Russian activity along its borders. Henrik Breitenbauch stated that “the threat of the U.S. no longer wanting to honor its security guarantees is the most important development in the history of the alliance [NATO].”³⁷⁴ Political statements that question the effectiveness of NATO, whether true or not, are likely to encourage more aggressive Russian actions. Russia may test how NATO responds to certain actions. If Russia continues its aggressive actions, Sweden will almost certainly pursue closer relations with the United States.

Another factor affecting Sweden’s national security is the state of its military. Certain aspects of Sweden’s military have vulnerabilities to foreign military activity. An incident in 2014 provides a good example. In October 2014, multiple news agencies reported “foreign underwater activity” with potential Russian involvement off the shores of Stockholm.³⁷⁵ Stefan Lundqvist and J.J. Widen argued that this incident exposed

³⁷² “Readout of Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work’s Meetings with Swedish Minister of Defense Peter Hultqvist,” U.S. Department of Defense.

³⁷³ Brian Michael Jenkins, “A Revanchist Russia versus an Uncertain West: An Appreciation of the Situation since the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis,” Center for the Study of Democracy (December 2016). Brian Jenkins is a Senior Advisor to the president of the RAND Corporation.

³⁷⁴ Henrik Breitenbauch, quoted in Martin Selsoe Sorensen, “Sweden Reinstates Conscription, With an Eye on Russia,” *New York Times*, March 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/world/europe/sweden-draft-conscription.html?_r=0. Henrik Breitenbauch is the director of the Center for Military Studies in Copenhagen.

³⁷⁵ Niklas Pollard, “Sweden Steps Up Hunt for ‘Foreign Underwater Activity,’” *Reuters*, October 19, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-deployment-idUSKCN0I70L420141019>; Peter Walker, “Sweden Searches for Suspected Russian Submarine off Stockholm,” *The Guardian*, October 19, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/19/sweden-search-russian-submarine-stockholm>.

“Sweden’s apparent lack of ASW [anti-submarine warfare] helicopter capability.”³⁷⁶ The next year, Sweden acquired the first of a small fleet of ASW helicopters.³⁷⁷ This incident shed light on the state of the Swedish military.

Sweden became more proactive in improving its military. Stockholm announced that “an increased defense budget is fundamental, particularly in light of the deteriorating security situation, but also to address the need to increase warfighting capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces.”³⁷⁸ Therefore, in 2015 Stockholm gave its defense budget “a substantial increase” from 2016 to 2020, something it had not done in over twenty years.³⁷⁹ Lundqvist and Widen asserted that this increase of over 10 billion Swedish krona (SEK) to the defense budget resulted from the Ukraine crisis.³⁸⁰ Two years later, Stockholm added another half-billion SEK to its defense spending.³⁸¹ Sweden took the first step to improve its military capabilities and national security situation.

Sweden’s Defense Policy 2016 to 2020 mentions three special priorities.³⁸² The first is basic requirements.³⁸³ Sweden is investing in basic equipment and training for its troops as well as exercises “in order to provide advanced joint exercises.”³⁸⁴ One of the shortcomings of Sweden’s military was the number of trained personnel. In order to maintain military readiness, Sweden reactivated its conscription for the first time in almost a decade; it will start with 4,000 recruits in 2018 and steadily progress to 8,000

³⁷⁶ Stefan Lundqvist and J.J. Widen, “Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea: Motives, Prospects and Challenges,” *Defence Studies* 16, no. 4 (October 2016): 360, doi: 10.1080/14702436.2016.1220805. Stefan Lundqvist and J.J. Widen are experts at the Military Studies Department at the Swedish Defense University.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ “Sweden’s Defense Policy 2016 to 2020,” Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Lundqvist and Widen, “Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea,” 366.

³⁸¹ “Sweden Adding 500 million SEK to 2017 Defence Budget,” Government Offices of Sweden, last modified March 17, 2017, <http://www.government.se/articles/2017/03/sweden-adding-500-million-sek-to-2017-defence-budget/>.

³⁸² “Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020,” Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

recruits in 2022.³⁸⁵ In addition to increasing the number of troops, Sweden regularly conducts training exercises, which range from exercises designed to teach new recruits to comprehensive “real-life scenarios” that bring multiple agencies together.³⁸⁶ One such exercise is Aurora 17, which will in September 2017 bring together all of the Swedish armed forces and military units from other countries to simulate resisting an attack on Sweden.³⁸⁷ Sweden is investing resources to increase the capability and interoperability of its military, which Russia most likely will portray as a threat to its security.

A second priority articulated in *Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020* is anti-submarine capabilities.³⁸⁸ Stockholm holds that “anti-submarine capabilities are important to...maintain Swedish territorial integrity.”³⁸⁹ Peter Hultqvist stated that Sweden was committed to increasing its anti-submarine capability by adding two “next-generation” submarines and undertaking “additional investments.”³⁹⁰ Richard Scott reported that the two “next generation” submarines will be “Type A26 submarines” and that construction began in September 2015.³⁹¹ The A26 submarines will have multiple roles, including ASW.³⁹² The additional investments include helicopters. Gareth Jennings noted that Sweden received the first of nine ASW helicopters in December 2015.³⁹³

³⁸⁵ “Sweden Re-Activates Conscription,” Government Offices of Sweden, last modified March 2, 2017, <http://www.government.se/articles/2017/03/re-activation-of-enrolment-and-the-conscription/>.

³⁸⁶ “Exercises,” Swedish Armed Forces, accessed April 14, 2017, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/exercises/>.

³⁸⁷ “Aurora 17 – Building a Stronger Defence Together,” Swedish Armed Forces, accessed April 14, 2017, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/exercises/aurora-17/>.

³⁸⁸ “Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020,” Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ “Speech at the U.S.–Sweden Defence Industry Conference,” Government Offices of Sweden, June 3, 2015, <http://www.government.se/speeches/2015/06/speech-at-the-u.s.-sweden-defence-industry-conference/>.

³⁹¹ Richard Scott, “Sovereign Wealth: National Priorities Condition Sweden’s A26 Programme,” *Jane’s Navy International*, September 16, 2016, <http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1783467>. Richard Scott is an expert with *Jane’s Navy International*.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Gareth Jennings, “Sweden Receives First Anti-Submarine NH90 Helo,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, December 17, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1758743>. Gareth Jennings is an expert with *Jane’s Defence Weekly*.

Sweden is also converting four additional search and rescue (SAR) helicopters currently in its fleet to ASW helicopters.³⁹⁴

The third priority of the *Swedish Defence Policy 2016 to 2020* is the defense of Gotland Island.³⁹⁵ Gotkowska and Szymański asserted in 2016 that Sweden's military presence on Gotland Island has been "insignificant" for the past 10 years.³⁹⁶ Jannicke Fiskvik pointed out that the defenses of Gotland Island have been "all but eliminated" due to decreases in the defense budget over the past years, but that Russia's annexation of Crimea renewed talks about the military and its defense of Gotland Island.³⁹⁷ Peter Hultqvist stated that the Swedish Ministry of Defense is "looking at a renewed regional focus" and will put troops back on Gotland Island.³⁹⁸ The *Swedish Defence Policy 2016 to 2020* calls for the stationing of a new "Battlegroup Gotland" on the island beginning in 2018 and for the conduct of regular exercises in defense of the island.³⁹⁹

Gotland Island is similar to the Åland Islands in its importance. According to Coffey and Kochis, Gotland Island has strategic significance in the Baltic Sea, and Russia clearly understands this.⁴⁰⁰ Many scholars have noted Swedish concerns that a Russian conflict with NATO could result in Russian troops stationed in Kaliningrad occupying Gotland Island to set up defenses.⁴⁰¹

Swedish concerns over Gotland Island are grounded in Russian behavior and capabilities. Russian snap exercises and other Russian military exercises have focused toward Gotland Island (the same as with the Åland Islands). Lucas asserted that the same

³⁹⁴ Jennings, "Sweden Receives First Anti-Submarine NH90 Helo.."

³⁹⁵ "Swedish Defence Policy 2016 to 2020," Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁹⁶ Gotkowska and Szymański, "Gotland and Åland on the Baltic chessboard."

³⁹⁷ Jannicke Fiskvik, "Nordic Security: Moving Towards NATO?" CSS Analyses in Security Policy (April 2016), 2, <http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:49412/eth-49412-01.pdf>. Jannicke Fiskvik is a Ph.D. candidate at the department of historical studies at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim. She was a visiting fellow at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich from August to December 2015.

³⁹⁸ "Speech at the U.S.–Sweden Defence Industry Conference," Government Offices of Sweden.

³⁹⁹ "Swedish Defence Policy 2016 to 2020," Government Offices of Sweden.

⁴⁰⁰ Coffey and Kochis, "The Baltic States," 14–15.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.; Gotkowska and Szymański, "Gotland and Åland on the Baltic Chessboard."

snap exercises Russia conducted to occupy Finland's Åland Islands also focused on occupying Gotland Island.⁴⁰² Other military activities have also raised concerns. Lucas noted that recent Russian submarine activity has "created alarm" in Sweden and Finland.⁴⁰³ Winnerstig recalled an incident of a Russian intelligence ship operating near Gotland Island during a "major international military exercise" taking place in Sweden, as well as incursions of Russian aircraft into Swedish airspace.⁴⁰⁴ As with Finland, snap exercises demonstrate that Russia has developed plans for a potential occupation of Swedish territory (Gotland Island), and Russian military activities could be testing Sweden's response to a potential Russian invasion.

Sweden has also been active in cyber security. According to Hugh Eakin, during the 1940s and 1950s, Sweden participated in Cold War spying for the United States and NATO.⁴⁰⁵ In the 1970s, "the Försvarets radioanstalt (FRA) used the Swedish embassy in Helsinki to intercept Soviet military and diplomatic communications."⁴⁰⁶ Currently over 80 percent of Russia's "foreign cable-based communications flows through Sweden."⁴⁰⁷ Many experts see the Baltic Sea as the "main theater in a new cyberwarfare arms race."⁴⁰⁸ To counter Sweden's cyber security operations, Russia could increase its own cyber operations in the Baltic Sea. Eakin noted that Russia has increased its submarine activity around the undersea cables and could conduct a cyber-attack against Sweden in the event of a conflict.⁴⁰⁹ Cyber security and cyber operations will likely continue to be a source of contention between Russia and Sweden in the foreseeable future.

In sum, Russian actions on its western periphery have raised concerns in Sweden about its national security. As a result, Sweden has sought different means of ensuring its

⁴⁰² Lucas, "The Coming Storm," 9.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., 10.

⁴⁰⁴ Winnerstig, "Security Policy at Road's End?" 170.

⁴⁰⁵ Eakin, "The Swedish Kings of Cyberwar."

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

national security. Sweden's defense policy has changed from the historic non-alignment to military cooperation and mutual assistance. Sweden has increased cooperation with NATO and forged stronger bilateral relations with the United States. *Sweden's Defence Policy 2016 to 2020* is increasing the number of active duty military personnel through 2022 while ensuring that these personnel have proper equipment and training. Sweden is also improving its ASW capabilities. The significance of Gotland Island has not escaped Stockholm or Moscow. Stockholm has put more emphasis on protecting the island. Sweden has increased its capabilities to protect its national security interests, but with these capabilities have come the potential for concerns from Russia. Russia could increase its forces in Kaliningrad to counter Sweden's increased capabilities. As with Finland, Russia and Sweden could engage in a cycle of political-military competition.

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V. RUSSIA'S SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ON ITS NORTHERN FLANK

Russia experienced about a decade of relative insignificance on the global stage following the end of the Cold War. In 2000, the Russian citizens elected Vladimir Putin as their president. During his first eight years in office, as noted by Paul Josephson, President Putin worked tirelessly to bring Russia back to the world arena.⁴¹⁰ Part of Putin's effort involved modernizing Russia's military capabilities.⁴¹¹ Today, concerned European nations have taken a revived Russia into account and have taken security precautions against potential Russian aggression. Moscow has also taken precautions to ensure the security of Russia. This chapter details Russian security considerations as they relate to Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

A. NATO

Moscow views NATO with great concern for its national strategy and military. The *Russian Federation's National Security Strategy* specifically states that NATO and its activities "are creating a threat to national security."⁴¹² The *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* also lists NATO and its activities as a "main external military danger."⁴¹³ Given that the Kremlin specifically names NATO as a threat in multiple government documents, one could reasonably imagine that the relations between NATO and Russia since the end of the Cold War have been adversarial, but that has not always been the case.

Moscow has a history of cooperation with NATO. According to Yost, Russia joined NATO's PfP (albeit as "an exceptionally passive participant") in 1994, signed the

⁴¹⁰ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*, 332.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 333.

⁴¹² Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 683, *Russian Federation's National Security Strategy*, December 31, 2015, point 15, <http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf>.

⁴¹³ President of the Russian Federation, *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, December 25, 2014, point 12, <https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Russia-s-2014-Military-Doctrine.pdf>.

NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, and agreed to cooperate with NATO to fight terrorists after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.⁴¹⁴ The cooperation between NATO and Russia, however, has not been enough to alleviate Moscow's concerns over NATO's enlargement since the end of the Cold War.

NATO has undertaken multiple rounds of enlargement in countries that were either part of the Soviet Union or in its sphere of influence. Trenin emphasized that from Moscow's perspective, NATO promised Russia that it would not expand "if a reunited Germany were able to stay in NATO."⁴¹⁵ The allied countries in NATO, however, never agreed to this condition. In the end, Trenin wrote, in Russian eyes NATO enlargement constitutes "a major breach of faith on behalf of the West."⁴¹⁶ Yost emphasized that NATO has "shown caution" and has tried to "avoid antagonizing Russia" in its enlargement through cooperation with Moscow.⁴¹⁷ These efforts have not had the intended effect, as "Russian officials and experts have consistently expressed concern" about NATO expansion and believe that NATO is trying to move into the "formerly Soviet- and Russian-dominated sphere of influence."⁴¹⁸

Ulrich Kühn pointed out that Russia has objected to every NATO enlargement that has occurred over the past two decades.⁴¹⁹ This trend holds true today as Moscow is trying to eliminate the possibility of Finland and Sweden becoming members of the Alliance. According to Trenin, Moscow is trying to "undo the budding cooperation between Sweden, Finland, and NATO" through various means.⁴²⁰ The result Moscow would like is for Finland and Sweden to avoid any confrontations with Russia.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁴ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 219–221.

⁴¹⁵ Dmitri Trenin, "The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry," *Carnegie Moscow Center* 9, no. 7 (July 2014): 11.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁷ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 288.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 289.

⁴¹⁹ Ulrich Kühn, "U.S.-Russian Relations and the Future Security of Europe," *Arms Control Today* 47, no. 1 (January 2017): 18. Ulrich Kühn is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

⁴²⁰ Trenin, "The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great Power Rivalry," 12

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*

Moscow would also like to keep NATO out of those two countries.⁴²² Kühn noted that “any enlargement of Western institutions, be it NATO or the European Union, runs counter to Russian interests.”⁴²³

B. UNITED STATES

Moscow also views the United States as a threat to Russian national security. The *Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy* notes that Russia is regaining its stature as a global power “against a backdrop of new threats to national security” and that “the United States and its allies” are opposing Russia’s foreign and domestic policy.⁴²⁴ The document also states that the United States and the European Union are portraying Russia as the enemy of Ukraine.⁴²⁵ As Russia continues to gain strength, Moscow will most likely continue to perceive the United States as a threat to its national security.

U.S. involvement in the states on Russia’s periphery is a cause of concern for Moscow. Bugajski and Assenova noted that Moscow believes “that among the most serious regional hazards are conspiracies to ‘overturn legitimate government’ in neighboring states and establish regimes that threaten Russia’s interests.”⁴²⁶ Moscow also believes these conspiracies are “American ploys.”⁴²⁷ Moscow will most likely view any involvement by the United States in neighboring countries, such as Finland or Sweden, with suspicion and assume that Washington is developing a plot against Russia.

The Kremlin also tries to convince its citizens that the United States is an adversary of Russia. Michael McFaul noted that Russian government media outlets “portray the United States as Russia’s number one enemy intent on weakening if not even

⁴²² Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great Power Rivalry,” 12.

⁴²³ Kühn, “U.S.-Russian Relations and the Future Security of Europe,” 18.

⁴²⁴ *Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy*, point 12.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, point 17.

⁴²⁶ Bugajski and Assenova, *Eurasian Disunion*, 13.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*

dismembering Russia.”⁴²⁸ The same media blames the United States for tragedies in the world, such as civil wars and extremist attacks.⁴²⁹ Moscow can use the media to garner public support in its actions to counter the United States.

The governmental expressions of distrust are not one sided, however. McFaul emphasized that in 2014, the U.S. president, then Barack H. Obama, declared that Russia, in addition to ISIS and Ebola, were “the three greatest threats to the world.”⁴³⁰ Because of governmental antagonisms, the people of each country tend to view the other as an enemy.⁴³¹ While the Russian government controls media that portray the United States as an enemy, the U.S. government’s actions have led some U.S. citizens to believe that Russia is an enemy.

C. RUSSIA’S 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY CHANGES

The Russian military entering the 21st century was in dire need of reform. Dale R. Herspring observed in 2005 that there were a significant number of “severe and long-term problems” in the Russian military.⁴³² Lack of training, old weapon systems, desertion, lack of education, and crime were all detrimental to Russia’s military.⁴³³ In addition, the Russian military was significantly smaller entering the new millennium than the military establishment of the Soviet Union. Herspring noted that the number of military personnel during the Soviet era was approximately 2.7 million.⁴³⁴ The number of Russian military personnel was approximately 1.365 million at the beginning of 2001.⁴³⁵

⁴²⁸ Michael McFaul, “US-Russia Conflict: Diagnosis and Prescription,” *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* (July 2016): 49, <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-40133205.html>. Michael McFaul is the Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and a professor of political science at Stanford University.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Dale R. Herspring, “Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia,” *European Security* 14, no. 1 (March 2005): 139, doi: 10.1080/09662830500041991. Dale Herspring is a faculty member in the department of political science at Kansas State University.

⁴³³ Ibid., 139–140.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., 141.

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

If the world was to see Russia as a dominant global power, changes in the Russian military would need to occur.

Reform of the Russian military attracted Putin's interest at the beginning of his presidency. According to Herspring, Putin formed commissions starting in late 2000 to fix the problems of the Russian military.⁴³⁶ Russian leaders emphasized developing a professional military and increasing its mobility.⁴³⁷ The Russian government nonetheless did not realize how inadequate its military was on a global scale. Herspring pointed out how ineffective Russian military advice to Iraq was "on how to resist the American attack."⁴³⁸ Putin took this as a need for "major reform."⁴³⁹

A few years later, Jacob Kipp reported that while Russia had defeated the Georgian army in 2008, the conflict exposed serious flaws "in the [Russian] conduct of modern, information-intense operations."⁴⁴⁰ Herspring's assessment of the lesson of the war in Georgia was the same: "the 2008 war in Georgia demonstrated to everyone, but especially to Moscow's conservative military, that Russia's armed forces were inept and that it was time for some major changes."⁴⁴¹ Military reform continues today.

Like its Nordic neighbors, Russia has also undertaken the process of military modernization. According to the *Russian Federation's National Security Strategy*, national defense is one of Russia's "long-term national strategic interests" and "strategic national priorities" with an end state to "ensure its military security."⁴⁴² The Kremlin plans to enhance Russia's security through a variety of means ranging from current and potential threat mitigation to modernization of weapons and equipment to upgrading the

⁴³⁶ Herspring, "Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia," 141.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., 143–148

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 149.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Jacob W. Kipp, "'Smart' Defense from New Threats: Future War from a Russian Perspective: Back to the Future after the War on Terror," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 27, no. 1 (2014): 47–48, doi: 10.1080/13518046.2014.875744. Jacob Kipp is an adjunct professor at the University of Kansas and a columnist on Eurasian security for the Jamestown Foundation.

⁴⁴¹ Dale Herspring, "Military Reform," in *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain* 6th ed., ed. Stephen K. Wegren (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 329.

⁴⁴² Russian Federation's National Security Strategy, points 30, 31, and 33.

defense industry complex.⁴⁴³ The Kremlin intends for military modernization to help Russia ensure its national defense and military security.

Understanding what Moscow perceives as threats may help to clarify why Russia is actively pursuing military modernization in the Arctic. According to Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin, security considerations are just as important as economic considerations in the Arctic.⁴⁴⁴ The ease of access to the Arctic Ocean and Atlantic Ocean along with the position of Russia's Northern Fleet "makes this region well suited for strategic naval operations."⁴⁴⁵ Moscow is also concerned about a potential attack from over the North Pole.⁴⁴⁶ The Kremlin believes that NATO and the United States are trying to "undermine Russia's position," and Moscow is concerned about the increased United States presence in the region.⁴⁴⁷ These reasons explain why having a modern military of sufficient size is important to the Kremlin.⁴⁴⁸

Moscow indicated it was serious about prioritizing its military modernization by increasing defense spending. According to Jonathan Holslag, increases in military spending have allowed Russia to "start modernizing its armed forces."⁴⁴⁹ Herspring noted that in 2012, the Russian prime minister, then Vladimir Putin, allocated 23 trillion rubles toward defense spending.⁴⁵⁰ This would result in Russia devoting just fewer than 3 percent of its GDP to military spending from 2012 to 2020.⁴⁵¹ This money marked the beginning of the first major military modernization in Russia since the end of the Cold War.

⁴⁴³ *Russian Federation's National Security Strategy*, point 37.

⁴⁴⁴ Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin, "Is Russia a Revisionist Military Power in the Arctic?" *Defense & Security Analysis* 30, no. 4 (October 2014): 324. Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev are professors in the department of international relations and history at St. Petersburg State University.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 324–325.

⁴⁴⁹ Jonathan Holslag, "Hedging the Hard Way: Russia's Response to World Disorder," *Global Affairs* 2, no. 2 (2016): 167, doi:10.1080/23340460.2016.1166329.

⁴⁵⁰ Herspring, "Military Reform," 328.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Strategic forces are an important priority to Russia's military. According to Sergunin and Konyshev, "nuclear deterrence and MAD [mutually assured destruction] doctrines still remain a key element of Russian military strategies."⁴⁵² Therefore, maintaining its nuclear forces is important to Moscow.⁴⁵³ As a result, Russia's strategic submarine fleet is undergoing upgrades. Konyshev and Sergunin pointed out that Russia continues to modernize its Delta IV strategic submarines and will equip them with the new *Sineva* ballistic missile that Russia developed in 2007.⁴⁵⁴ Sergunin and Konyshev also noted that Russia is outfitting its *Typhoon* class submarines with long-range cruise missiles.⁴⁵⁵ Even with upgrades to its current fleet, the Kremlin is planning for its next generation strategic submarine. Sergunin and Konyshev reported that Russia's Defense Ministry is planning to build eight "new *Borey*-class fourth-generation nuclear-powered strategic submarines," half of which will be stationed with the Northern Fleet in the Arctic.⁴⁵⁶

Russian nuclear capabilities are becoming more prevalent in the Arctic as well. According to Heather Conley and Caroline Rohloff, in 2015, Russia based 81 percent of its 576 sea-based nuclear warheads with the Northern Fleet, an increase from 67 percent only four years earlier.⁴⁵⁷ The number of deployed launchers and submarine launched ballistic missiles has increased since 2013 as well.⁴⁵⁸ The Russian military has conducted regular missile tests in the Arctic Ocean and surrounding seas since 2004 and "twice in 2014, simulated massive retaliatory nuclear attacks in the Barents Sea."⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵² Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev, "Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic: Change or Continuity?" *European Security* (2017): 11, doi:10.1080/09662839.2017.1318849.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Konyshev and Sergunin, "Is Russia a Revisionist Military Power in the Arctic?" 330.

⁴⁵⁵ Sergunin and Konyshev, "Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic," 11.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., 11–12.

⁴⁵⁷ Heather A. Conley and Caroline Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain: Russia's Strategic Reach to the Arctic* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 78. Heather Conley is senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic and director of the Europe program at CSIS. Caroline Rohloff is a research associate with the CSIS Europe program.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., 78–79.

Russian conventional forces are also undergoing modernization. Moscow has plans to modernize its navy. The Northern Fleet, Russia's largest naval fleet,⁴⁶⁰ is located close to the border of Norway on Russia's Kola Peninsula.⁴⁶¹ According to Kristian Kristensen and Casper Sakstrup, the Russian 2020 material investment plan allotted 4.7 trillion rubles toward its Navy.⁴⁶² With this money, Russia plans to build 51 new surface ships⁴⁶³ with possibly 15 of them going to the Northern Fleet by 2020.⁴⁶⁴ Russia is modernizing more than just surface and subsurface vessels for its navy. Holslag noted that Russia is upgrading bases and personnel accommodations along the Barents Sea for the Northern Fleet as well as other installations of the Navy.⁴⁶⁵

Russia's air force and air defense forces have undergone changes in the Arctic region as well. According to Conley and Rohloff, in 2013 there were "18 Su-33 fighter aircraft and 2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) regiments based on the Kola Peninsula."⁴⁶⁶ Russia is stationing more air assets in the Arctic region as well. Conley and Rohloff noted that Moscow is deploying "a group of interceptor MiG-31s" to the Rogachevo airfield, which is located on an island "between the Barents and Kara Seas."⁴⁶⁷ They note that "the number of troops on the Novaya Zemlya" has the potential to increase two-fold by 2020.⁴⁶⁸

An increase in air assets requires an expansion of facilities. Multiple scholars have pointed out that Russia announced plans to open about a dozen new airfields in the

⁴⁶⁰ Kristian Soby Kristensen and Casper Sakstrup, "Russian Policy in the Arctic after the Ukraine Crisis," Center for Military Studies: University of Copenhagen (September 2016), 19. Kristian Kristensen is a senior researcher at the Centre for Military Studies. Casper Sakstrup is a PhD Student in the department of political science at Aarhus University. See also Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 75.

⁴⁶¹ Kristensen and Sakstrup, "Russian Policy in the Arctic after the Ukraine Crisis," 19.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

⁴⁶³ Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 75; Sergunin and Konyshchev, "Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic," 12.

⁴⁶⁴ Sergunin and Konyshchev, "Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic," 12.

⁴⁶⁵ Holslag, "Hedging the Hard Way," 168.

⁴⁶⁶ Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 79.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., 80.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

Arctic.⁴⁶⁹ In addition to building new facilities, Moscow plans to refurbish a network of outdated facilities in northern Russia. Conley and Rohloff noted that “Colonel General Viktor Bondarev, commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force, announced that approximately 50 military airfields will be repaired and modernized by 2020” in the Arctic region.⁴⁷⁰

Those airfields will house capabilities in addition to aircraft; air defense assets are also undergoing changes in the Arctic. Sergunin and Konyshev asserted that some of the air defense units stationed in northern Russia have “re-established many of the old Soviet airfields and military bases in the Arctic.”⁴⁷¹ In addition, Moscow plans to replace the current air-defense missile system, the S-300, with the upgraded S-400, and “restore continuous radar coverage” along the Arctic.⁴⁷²

The Russians have been strengthening the ground forces in the Arctic region as well. They plan to establish two Arctic brigades, one in the Murmansk region and the other in the Arkhangelsk region.⁴⁷³ Moscow has accelerated the creation of ground units in the Arctic region. Sergunin and Konyshev argued that the actions by “unfriendly” countries in the Arctic forced Russia to respond to protect its territory in the north.⁴⁷⁴ Moscow also accelerated its plans to open up a “new strategic command ‘North’” due to NATO actions in the area.⁴⁷⁵ The new strategic command for the north “was established in December 2014 (three years ahead of schedule).”⁴⁷⁶

Moscow does not consider its buildup of troops in the Arctic to be aggressive. According to Sergunin and Konyshev, Moscow regards its military actions in the Arctic

⁴⁶⁹ Holslag, “Hedging the Hard Way,” 168; Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 73.

⁴⁷⁰ Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 74.

⁴⁷¹ Sergunin and Konyshev, “Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic,” 12.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, 12–13.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*, 13; Holslag, “Hedging the Hard Way,” 168; Kristensen and Sakstrup, “Russian Policy in the Arctic after the Ukraine Crisis, 18–19.

⁴⁷⁴ Sergunin and Konyshev, “Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic,” 13.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

region as “defensive in nature” and few in number.⁴⁷⁷ Moscow also views these actions as necessary to protect its interests as the Arctic ice melts and makes the area more accessible.⁴⁷⁸ Looking at the troop buildup from Moscow’s point of view, one could reasonably understand why the Russians judge that they need an increased troop presence in the area.

D. RUSSIAN INTENTIONS

Do Moscow’s military activities on Russia’s western border convey the impression that the troops are defensive in nature? Bugajski and Assenova argue that Russia uses its military in a threatening manner.⁴⁷⁹ First, Moscow uses “military threats” to counter “policies pursued by neighbors” that it does not agree with, and states in its military doctrine that it “reserves the right to conduct a preemptive military strike” against a threat to the nation.⁴⁸⁰ Second, the Kremlin uses “close military encounters” to raise tensions in an area and test the responses of countries that it deems potential threats.⁴⁸¹ Third, Russia has recently conducted many “intimidating exercises.”⁴⁸² Fourth, “conjuring confrontation” by assuming “an especially threatening posture” is a tactic that Russia has used recently.⁴⁸³ Last, Moscow uses “nuclear blackmail” as it has made inflammatory nuclear threats to go along with its “military doctrine [that] provides for the first use of nuclear weapons” in certain circumstances.⁴⁸⁴

Since the beginning of 2014, small-scale incidents involving the Russian military have been increasing in number and gravity. Mark Kramer asserted that the pattern of Russian aggression “changed dramatically...as tensions mounted over Crimea and

⁴⁷⁷ Sergunin and Konyshchev, “Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic,” 14.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁹ Bugajski and Assenova, *Eurasian Disunion*, 45.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., 45–46.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., 46.

⁴⁸² Ibid., 47.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., 48.

eastern Ukraine.”⁴⁸⁵ Shane Tayloe reported that in 2014, NATO aircraft “conducted over 100 intercepts of Russian aircraft,” a three-fold increase from the previous year.⁴⁸⁶ Many scholars consider some of the events requiring a “NATO security response” as being “unusually provocative” or “bringing a higher level risk of escalation.”⁴⁸⁷ Three events had a “high probability of causing casualties or a direct military confrontation.”⁴⁸⁸

Finland, Norway, and Sweden have not escaped Russian provocations on the small-scale level. Larrabee et al. noted that in 2016, Finland experienced five incursions of Russian aircraft into its airspace, up from an average of one or two per year in the previous decade.⁴⁸⁹ Conley and Rohloff reported that in 2014 “Norway intercepted 74 Russian fighter jets along its coast,” up almost a third from 2013.⁴⁹⁰ According to Kramer, in February 2015 Russian bombers penetrated Swedish airspace to test Sweden’s reactions and in March 2015 Russian submarines operated in Swedish waters, “nearly provoking an armed confrontation at sea.”⁴⁹¹ These examples comprise a small part of the increased evidence of recent tensions between the Russian military and Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and other countries, including Japan and the United States.

Russia has conducted large-scale military exercises in the past few years that have raised concerns for European countries and their allies. Leo Michel reported that Russia has recently changed the way it uses “exercises and deployments” of its strategic and

⁴⁸⁵ Mark Kramer, “The New Russian Chill in the Baltic,” *Current History* 114, no. 770 (March 2015): 111, <http://www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=1228>. Mark Kramer is the director of the Cold War Studies program and a senior fellow of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian studies at Harvard University.

⁴⁸⁶ Shane C. Tayloe, “Projecting Power in the Arctic: The Russian Scramble for Energy, Power, and Prestige in the High North,” *Pepperdine Policy Review* 8 (June 2015): 1, <http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr/vol8/iss1/4>. Shane Tayloe was a graduate research assistant at Pepperdine University School of Public Policy.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ Larrabee et al., “Russia and the West after the Ukrainian Crisis,” 3.

⁴⁹⁰ Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 82.

⁴⁹¹ Kramer, “The New Russian Chill in the Baltic,” 112.

conventional forces.⁴⁹² He noted that they have increased in “frequency and complexity.”⁴⁹³ Kristensen and Sakstrup also noted that these exercises are of “remarkably large-scale” and occurred in different areas of the country.⁴⁹⁴

Many of those large-scale exercises occurred in the Arctic in close proximity to Finland, Norway, and Sweden. In 2013 and then again in 2014, Russia’s Northern Fleet conducted missile exercises in the Barents Sea just miles from Norway’s coast.⁴⁹⁵ In 2015, Russia’s strategic naval forces conducted exercises in the Arctic Ocean in what appeared to be a response to NATO announcing its intention to “reinforce its border in Eastern Europe.”⁴⁹⁶

Some of these were joint exercises, involving two or three branches of the Russian military services. In March 2015, Russia responded to the Joint Viking exercise, an exercise led by Norway that involved approximately 5,000 troops, by conducting a snap exercise that involved around 40,000 troops, over 3,300 vehicles, about 55 naval vessels, and over 100 aircraft.⁴⁹⁷ Two months later, following the completion of the May–June 2015 Arctic Challenge exercise, which involved participants from Finland, Sweden, and NATO partners providing approximately 3,600 troops and over 100 aircraft, Russia conducted a second snap exercise with about 12,000 troops and 250 aircraft.⁴⁹⁸ Conley and Rohloff noticed a trend that began in 2013: Moscow’s counters to NATO involved exercises are usually about “10 times as large.”⁴⁹⁹ Every country has a right to

⁴⁹² Leo Michel, “NATO as a ‘Nuclear Alliance,’” *FIIA Working Paper* (February 2017): 20, http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/661/nato_as_a_nuclear_alliance/. Leo Michel is a visiting senior research fellow for the Global Security Research Program at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Kristensen and Sakstrup, “Russian Policy in the Arctic after the Ukraine Crisis,” 22.

⁴⁹⁵ Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 87; Kristensen and Sakstrup, “Russian Policy in the Arctic after the Ukraine Crisis,” 23.

⁴⁹⁶ Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 87; Kristensen and Sakstrup, “Russian Policy in the Arctic after the Ukraine Crisis,” 23.

⁴⁹⁷ Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 87; Kristensen and Sakstrup, “Russian Policy in the Arctic after the Ukraine Crisis,” 22.

⁴⁹⁸ Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 88; Kristensen and Sakstrup, “Russian Policy in the Arctic after the Ukraine Crisis,” 22.

⁴⁹⁹ Conley and Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain*, 88.

defend itself, and there would most likely be little concern over Russian counter exercises if they were announced and similar in size to the NATO exercises. However, given the recent Russian history in Georgia and Ukraine, the tendency to respond with disproportionate counter exercises leads to the question of what exactly are Moscow's intentions.

E. THE ARCTIC REGION

Russia puts so much effort into developing its military in the Arctic because it is important to the country's future. The *Russian Federation's Policy for the Arctic to 2020* specifies two areas of national interest in the Arctic that have the potential for future security implications that could involve conflict with other nations.⁵⁰⁰ The first is the "use of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation providing the solution of problems of social and economic development of the country."⁵⁰¹ The second is the "use of the Northern Sea Route as a national single transport communication of the Russian Federation in the Arctic."⁵⁰² These two areas are likely to spark international debate because what Russia believes it is entitled to in the Arctic may differ from the views of other powers.

The Arctic region has vast potential for economic resource extraction. Duncan Depledge noted that there is over \$22 trillion worth of natural resources in the Russian Arctic.⁵⁰³ Josephson pointed out that in 2001 Russia passed a bill establishing its Maritime Policy that stated its position of sovereignty over its EEZ and continental shelf.⁵⁰⁴ Later that year, Russia sought to expand its EEZ by "150 miles...beyond its 200-mile zone" into the waters of the Arctic Ocean and surrounding waters that Moscow

⁵⁰⁰ President of the Russian Federation, *Russian Federation's Policy for the Arctic to 2020*, ARCTIS, September 18, 2008, <http://www.arctis-search.com/Russian+Federation+Policy+for+the+Arctic+to+2020>

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Duncan Depledge, "How Russia Could Annex the Arctic," *Defense One*, March 23, 2015, <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/03/how-russia-could-annex-arctic/108229/>. Duncan Depledge is an associate fellow of RUSI, where he previously worked on the climate change and security program.

⁵⁰⁴ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*, 340–341.

considers “as its possessions.”⁵⁰⁵ The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) rejected this claim because Moscow based the claim on insufficient evidence that the land under the Arctic Ocean was actually an extension of Russia’s continental shelf.⁵⁰⁶

In 2015, Russia submitted a second claim to extend its EEZ; the CLCS has not ruled on this claim.⁵⁰⁷ Depledge argues that this submission is going to cause problems no matter what the outcome.⁵⁰⁸ On one hand, if the CLCS rejects the claim, Moscow will use the rejection in propaganda that it is “being kept down...by Western rivals.”⁵⁰⁹ On the other hand, if the CLCS approves the claim, no one knows what actions Moscow might take to “exert its authority...in the Arctic.”⁵¹⁰

The natural resources in the Arctic Region have tremendous economic potential for the country that has rights to them. Russia understands how these vast resources could help boost its economy and other areas of national interest, and has twice petitioned to extend its EEZ by 150 miles. So far, Moscow has employed peaceful means to seek international recognition of what it claims rightfully belongs to Russia concerning an extension of the EEZ. If the CLCS denies Russia’s second petition, Moscow may go against international cooperation and declare the area off its north coast part of Russia’s EEZ. With the buildup and modernization of the Russian military in the Arctic region, coupled with a potential increased NATO presence, there is a greater potential for conflict in the region.

The NSR is a second area of great importance in the Arctic for Russia. According to Märta Carlsson and Niklas Granholm, the *Transport Strategy of the Russian*

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., 342

⁵⁰⁶ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*, 342.

⁵⁰⁷ “Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,” Oceans & Law of the Sea: United Nations, last modified July 5, 2017, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.

⁵⁰⁸ Depledge, “How Russia Could Annex the Arctic.”

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

Federation up to 2030 details the importance of developing the NSR and making it an “international transport route.”⁵¹¹ There is a lot that Russia needs to accomplish to make the NSR viable for commercial use. Carlsson and Granholm noted that Russia plans to spend over 20 billion rubles on infrastructure and 134 billion rubles “to build a functioning border control and rescue service” along the NSR.⁵¹² If Russia is to succeed in making the NSR an international transport route, it is going to invest a substantial amount of money in doing so.

If the NSR becomes a viable shipping option, and with Russia’s view of the Arctic off its northern border as sovereign territory, Moscow will likely seek to take economic advantage of its developments. Baev reported on Russia’s economic intentions concerning the NSR.⁵¹³ Having invested money in upgrading port facilities, Russia will charge shipping companies to use its ports.⁵¹⁴ In addition to charging for the use of ports, Russia will seek to commercialize its icebreakers.⁵¹⁵ Russia has spent a tremendous amount of money developing its Arctic infrastructure. Earning revenue from other countries will help offset development costs. As shipping increases along the NSR the likelihood of countries and companies paying to use Russia’s services will mount.

Another way Russia will try to use the NSR to its economic advantage is by charging tariffs. Russia views the NSR as part of its EEZ; it will charge shipping vessels to travel through its EEZ. Mead Treadwell noted that Russian tariffs could reach \$500,000 for some ships using the NSR.⁵¹⁶ Commercial ships that sail through Russia’s

⁵¹¹ Märta Carlsson and Niklas Granholm, *Russia and the Arctic: Analysis and Discussion of Russian Strategies* (Stockholm: FOI—Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2013), 22. Märta Carlsson is an expert in security policy and strategic studies for the Swedish Defense Research Agency. Niklas Granholm is the deputy director of studies of FOI, the Swedish Defense Research Agency, and Division for Defense Analysis.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, 22–24.

⁵¹³ Baev, “Russia’s Arctic Ambitions and Anxieties,” 268.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁶ Mead Treadwell, “Arctic Ambitions: Will U.S. let Russia Control Shipping in the Far North?” *Alaska Dispatch News*, June 28, 2015, <http://www.adn.com/article/20150628/arctic-ambitions-will-us-let-russia-control-shipping-far-north>. Mead Treadwell is the former chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission.

EEZ should be prepared for Moscow to demand payment for use of what it deems Russian waters.

What happens when there is an international dispute on national rights in the Arctic region? For example, the United States and Russia view the Arctic region differently. According to a statement by an anonymous senior Obama administration official published in *The New York Times* in 2015, the United States views the Arctic as a “global common,” while Russia does not.⁵¹⁷ Instead, Moscow views the vast area off its northern coast as sovereign territory. If a country views the Arctic as a common area, it must be prepared to meet resistance from Russia and its claim of sovereign territory. These different views present potential grounds for conflicts.

F. THE BALTIC SEA REGION

The Baltic Sea region (BSR) is another area that has potential security concerns for Russia. Andrey Makarychev and Alexander Sergunin examine three different areas of Moscow’s security strategy that could lead to rising tensions in the BSR.⁵¹⁸ First, any increased NATO and United States presence in the BSR has Moscow concerned about its security.⁵¹⁹ Second, Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia are a concern of Moscow.⁵²⁰ Third, Russia does not view international organizations as worthy instruments to promote peace in the region.⁵²¹

U.S. missile defense systems in Eastern Europe have been a concern for Moscow in recent years. James Robbins noted that the Obama administration formulated a new missile defense plan, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), to deploy missile

⁵¹⁷ Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Is Seen as Laggard as Russia Asserts Itself in Warming Arctic,” *New York Times*, August 29, 2015, <http://nyti.ms/1Kkt6nA>.

⁵¹⁸ Andrey Makarychev and Alexander Sergunin, “Russia’s Role in Regional Cooperation and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region,” *Journal of Baltic Studies* (2017): 11, doi: 10.1080/01629778.2017.1305186. Andrey Makarychev is an expert at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Science at the University of Tartu.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

defense systems “in Central Europe by 2015” and “to Poland by 2018.”⁵²² He asserted that, to the countries of Eastern Europe, the presence of a U.S. missile defense system in Europe would “secure a long-term American presence and strategic commitment.”⁵²³ Makarychev and Sergunin reported that the Kremlin has plans to remilitarize Kaliningrad in response to a U.S. missile defense system in Europe.⁵²⁴ To give further credibility to those plans, Robbins noted that in 2013, the Kremlin “deployed...tactical ballistic missiles to Kaliningrad.”⁵²⁵ Even though the Obama administration canceled phase 4 of the EPAA, Moscow still opposes any missile defense system in Europe.⁵²⁶

There has been an increased NATO presence in the BSR since the Ukraine Crisis began in 2013–2014. According to Şafak Oğuz, NATO created the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to counter Russian hybrid warfare.⁵²⁷ Part of the RAP included increasing NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe, “specifically in the Baltic countries and Poland.”⁵²⁸ That presence, however, is not permanent. Martin Zapfe and Michael Haas emphasized that to keep within the terms of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO rotates forces in the Baltics to have a “persistent presence” instead of a “permanent presence.”⁵²⁹ Oğuz noted that these rotational forces comprise a “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and activities.”⁵³⁰ NATO has increased its air presence over the Baltics, naval presence in

⁵²² James S. Robbins, ““East European Missile Defense is Needed Now more than Ever,”” *Defense Dossier* (November 2015): 11. James Robbins is a senior fellow in National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.

⁵²³ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵²⁴ Makarychev and Sergunin, “Russia’s Role in Regional Cooperation and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region,” 11.

⁵²⁵ Robbins, “East European Missile Defense Is Needed Now More than Ever,” 12.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, 12–13.

⁵²⁷ Şafak Oğuz, “The New NATO: Prepared for Russian Hybrid Warfare,” *Insight Turkey* 18, no. 4 (Fall 2016): 172, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1868135271?accountid=12702>.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁵²⁹ Martin Zapfe and Michael Carl Haas, “Access for Allies? NATO, Russia, and the Baltics,” *The RUSI Journal* 161, no. 3 (2016): 37, doi: 10.1080/03071847.2016.1193355. Martine Zapfe leads the Global Security Team at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. Michael Carl Haas is a researcher in the Global Security Team at ETH Zurich.

⁵³⁰ Oğuz, “The New NATO,” 173.

the Baltic Sea, and ground presence in “the eastern members,” and there were approximately “three hundred NATO and national exercises in 2015 alone.”⁵³¹

An increased NATO presence, however, does not correlate to military dominance in the BSR. David Shlapak and Michael Johnson pointed out that the rotating forces rarely exceed a battalion-sized element; they would be unable to resist a Russian attack of any magnitude.⁵³² Zapfe and Haas emphasized that while the Russian military, as a whole, is unable to contend with the military capabilities of NATO, the Kremlin is building up troops in its Western District, which would allow Russia “to outmatch NATO forces where and when it counts.”⁵³³

The population of ethnic Russian minorities living in Estonia and Latvia could develop into a security concern. As stated in Chapter III, Åtland noted that “Russia is willing to go to great lengths to ‘defend’ ethnic Russians and Russian speakers” outside of Russia.⁵³⁴ Shlapak and Johnson emphasized that “Estonia and Latvia are home to sizeable ethnic Russian populations that have been at best unevenly integrated.”⁵³⁵

A large ethnic Russian population in specific Baltic States does not necessarily mean that Russia will “go to great lengths to defend” that population. For example, according to Tom Rostoks and Nora Vanaga, the ethnic Russian population in Latvia was wide spread and approximately 27 percent in 2011, down 7 percent from the end of the Cold War.⁵³⁶ Over one-third of the people in Latvia speak Russian.⁵³⁷ Latvian politicians were concerned that the size of the ethnic Russian population could lead to a scenario

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank,” (Santa Ana, CA: RAND, 2016): 3, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt19w71fs>. David Shlapak is a senior international research analyst and codirect of the RAND Center for Gaming. Michael Johnson is a senior international research analyst at the RAND Corporation.

⁵³³ Zapfe and Haas, “Access for Allies,” 35–36.

⁵³⁴ Åtland, “North European Security after the Ukraine Conflict,” 165–167.

⁵³⁵ Shlapak and Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank,” 3.

⁵³⁶ Tom Rostoks and Nora Vanaga, “Latvia’s Security and Defence Post-2014,” *Journal on Baltic Security* 2, no. 2 (2016): 90. Tom Rostoks and Nora Vanaga are experts at the Latvian National Defense Academy.

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

similar to that in Ukraine.⁵³⁸ However, surveys indicated that the ethnic Russian population was unlikely to support separatist policies.⁵³⁹ While the probability of Russian aggression in the BSR based on ethnic Russian minorities is low, opinions could change in the future, or Moscow could use the ethnic Russian population as a pretext for intervention.

The scarcity of international organizations in the BSR that include Russia suggests dim prospects for a collective peace agreement. According to Makarychev and Sergunin, Moscow holds that the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed in 1990 “is the only international arms control agreement that could be applicable to the BSR.”⁵⁴⁰ However, the Baltic States are not parties to this treaty because they were part of the Soviet Union when the participating countries signed the treaty in 1990 and not independent nations.⁵⁴¹ Finland’s and Sweden’s histories of neutrality and non-alignment prevented those two countries from signing the treaty.⁵⁴² Because Russia has never complied with Article IV of the CFE Treaty, none of the “Western signatories” ratified the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty.⁵⁴³ Russia “suspended” its compliance with the treaty in 2007 and “abrogated” it in 2015.⁵⁴⁴ With no international treaty focused on the BSR, peace depends on bilateral agreements with Russia and multilateral accords such as the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. As Finnish history demonstrates, bilateral agreements with Russia can be one-sided and seem to be unlikely to resolve all the potential conflicts that could arise in the BSR.

G. CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT

Moscow has many security concerns of its own on its northern flank. Russia considers NATO its greatest threat. Multiple rounds of NATO enlargement have

⁵³⁸ Rostoks and Vanaga, “Latvia’s Security and Defence Post-2014,” 88.

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*, 88–89.

⁵⁴⁰ Makarychev and Sergunin, “Russia’s Role in Regional Cooperation,” 11.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

⁵⁴³ Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 323.

⁵⁴⁴ Makarychev and Sergunin, “Russia’s Role in Regional Cooperation,” 11.

dampened previous cooperation between NATO and Russia. Moscow considers that enlargement to be a breach of faith from promises given by leading NATO nations upon the reunification of Germany after the end of the Cold War.⁵⁴⁵ One of Moscow's main goals is to prevent further enlargement of the Alliance, specifically with Finland and Sweden.

Moscow also considers the United States to be a threat to its national security. Moscow deems U.S. actions in nations along Russia's periphery to be an attempt to weaken Russia's position in the global order. To exacerbate the situation, media propaganda in both countries has portrayed each country as the other's enemy. Moscow will probably continue to question U.S. intentions in maintaining a military presence in Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and regard it as a potential threat to Russia's national security.

When Putin took over as President of Russia at the end of 1999, the military was a shell of its former self during the Soviet era. Putin has been trying to address the many problems burdening the Russian military. Russia is undertaking military modernization as well. Based on Moscow's perceived threat coming from the Arctic, many modernization efforts are underway in Russia's Northern Fleet. The Kremlin has prioritized upgrading and replacing its strategic nuclear submarines while increasing its other nuclear capabilities in the Arctic. Moscow has funded upgrades to its naval, aviation, air defense, and ground troops in the Arctic. The Kremlin is currently upgrading or reopening old Soviet Arctic facilities and planning to construct new facilities as well.

Moscow claims that it uses its Northern Fleet solely for defensive purposes, but its actions send a different signal to its potential adversaries. Incidents involving Russian aircraft testing NATO responses to intrusions have been on the rise since the Ukraine crisis began in 2013–2014. Russia has conducted large military exercises in response to NATO exercises; most of the Russian exercises are “snap exercises” and disproportionately larger than the corresponding NATO exercises.

⁵⁴⁵ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 290–293.

Regarding NATO, Moscow has areas of concern in both the Arctic and Baltic regions. In the Arctic, Russia is trying to extend its EEZ by 150 nautical miles through the CLCS to claim rights to the natural resources in the area. The Russians claim that this area is rightfully theirs, and the potential for Russian aggression exists either way the CLCS rules on Russia's claim. The NSR is another potential issue as some countries (including the United States) regard the Arctic as a global common for shipping, while Russia maintains that the waters in its EEZ are its "possessions."⁵⁴⁶ If the Arctic ice continues to melt and the NSR becomes a viable shipping option, there may be discord over access to specific areas.

In the Baltic region, an increased presence of NATO forces, including those of the United States, causes concern in Russian eyes. Plans for U.S. missile defense systems in Europe have met resistance from Moscow. Russia has met an increased NATO presence in the Baltic region with an increased Russian military presence in its Western military district, and the disproportionate Russian build-up has provoked concern in NATO nations and in partners such as Finland and Sweden. The ethnic Russian minority population in Estonia and Latvia could pose future problems for those two countries, depending on Russian behavior. The lack of an international organization for the Baltic Sea Region that incorporates Russia could hamper peace efforts in the area.

⁵⁴⁶ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*, 342.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Finland, Norway, and Sweden all have similar concerns regarding potential Russian aggression in the Arctic. While their concerns are similar, the individual circumstances of each country are different. These differences make each country's situation unique and provide for potentially different paths moving forward. This chapter consists of three sections. The first section summarizes Chapters II through V. The next section analyzes NATO considerations, bilateral agreements, and the regional security concerns of Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The last section provides recommendations for each country to address its security concerns.

A. SUMMARY

1. Chapter II

Many economic activities have fostered positive relations between Russia and Finland, Norway, and Sweden. For the most part, these relations have been mutually beneficial and most likely will continue in the foreseeable future; but the potential exists for one country to try to exploit another for economic gain. Sanctions and counter-sanctions stemming from the Ukraine crisis put Russia at odds with all the countries that support the continuation of the sanctions. Economic issues between Russia and Finland, Norway, and Sweden could cause future security concerns.

Russia is politically involved in organizations and bilateral agreements that should be able to resolve potential conflicts peacefully. NATO's PfP and the UN are two organizations devoted to peace with Russia as a member, but the past decade has seen conflicts between Russia and other members of these organizations. The Arctic Council provides a venue for all Arctic nations to come together and cooperate; but the designation of the Arctic Council is not to resolve security issues. Recent history has demonstrated that bilateral agreements with Russia are not necessarily mutually beneficial. International organizations can be foundations for peace and stability, but this is not necessarily the case with Russia.

2. Chapter III

Conflict and uneasy relations between Finland and Russia have been prevalent throughout the shared history of the two countries. Finland experienced Russian and Soviet aggression and land grabbing during the first half of the 20th century. After World War II ended, in order to protect itself against further Soviet aggression, Finland signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Under this treaty, Finland existed under intense scrutiny from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War in 1989–1991 enabled Finland to escape Moscow's influence and increase ties and cooperation with NATO and the European Union. Today, much to the dismay of Russia, NATO views Finland as an important partner to the Alliance.

Upon gaining its independence in 1905, Norway assumed a position of neutrality. The policy of neutrality failed in 1940, however. Norway vowed never to find itself again in the situation of lacking allies that facilitated its occupation during World War II. As a result, Norway in 1949 became one of the original members of NATO. Throughout the Cold War, Oslo focused its defense plans on preparations to delay the Soviets until Allied help could arrive. The end of the Cold War brought about a new military strategy. Now the Norwegian military is capable of conducting expeditionary operations abroad, notably in support of NATO and EU crisis management.

The historical relations between Sweden and Russia have been mostly as adversaries. The Great Northern War (1700–1721) ended Sweden's time as a great European military power. Sweden's attempts to regain that great political-military status by twice declaring war against Russia ended in failure. In the early twentieth century, Sweden supported Russia's opponents in various conflicts. Since World War II, Sweden has maintained a status of neutrality, but its recent actions have brought it closer to Western European nations and the NATO alliance.

Russian history includes occasions when European powers declared war against Russia. Following World War II, the Soviet Union viewed the formation of NATO in 1949 as a threat to peace and security in Eastern Europe. In 1955, Moscow formed the Warsaw Pact to counteract NATO. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, there have

been several rounds of NATO enlargement. Today, Russia views further NATO enlargement as a primary threat to its national security.

3. Chapter IV

Helsinki believes there is a threat of Russian aggression against Finland, which has accordingly sought different ways to improve its national security. Finland has become more active in its cooperation with NATO. Bilateral agreements have multiplied. Military modernization will give Finland improved capabilities to defend its homeland and strike targets abroad. Helsinki is also worried about potential conflict in the Baltic region. Potential Russian aggression has motivated Finland to improve its security situation, but Moscow will probably portray every step that Helsinki takes as a threat to Russian national security.

Norway is concerned about recent Russian aggression. With Russia having a clear advantage in military capabilities, Oslo depends on international treaties and bilateral relations as important elements of its national security. Norway relies on the Alliance for its security needs. Bilateral relations with the United States also play a large part in Norway's security. Oslo has undertaken military modernization in key areas that will give Norway's military enhanced defensive capabilities. With the attention of some NATO Allies focused elsewhere in the world, Norway is concerned that the Allied presence in the North Atlantic region and the Arctic region is inadequate. To promote an increased NATO presence, Norway has been active in hosting international exercises. An area of concern for Norway in the North Atlantic is the Svalbard Island chain.

Moscow's actions on Russia's western periphery have raised concerns in Sweden about its national security. As a result, Sweden has sought different means of ensuring its national security. Sweden has increased cooperation with NATO and forged stronger bilateral relations with the United States. The significance of Gotland Island has not escaped Stockholm or Moscow. Sweden has increased its capabilities to protect its national security interests, but these improved capabilities have become potential Russian concerns.

4. Chapter V

Moscow has many security concerns of its own on its northern flank. Russia considers NATO its greatest threat. Moscow regards NATO enlargement as a breach of faith from promises supposedly given by leading NATO nations upon the reunification of Germany at the end of the Cold War.⁵⁴⁷ Moscow also considers the United States to be a threat to its national security. Moscow portrays U.S. actions in nations along Russia's periphery as attempts to weaken Russia's position in the global order. Moscow will probably continue to question the intent behind the U.S. presence in Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and regard it as a potential threat to Russia's national security.

Military operations in the 1990s and the 2000s exposed flaws in Russia's military and demonstrated the dire need for reform. Based on Moscow's perception of threats coming from the Arctic, many modernization efforts are underway in Russia's Northern Fleet. Moscow claims that it uses its Northern Fleet solely for defensive purposes, but its actions send a different signal to its potential adversaries. Incidents involving Russian aircraft testing NATO (and non-NATO) responses to intrusions have been on the rise, and Russian "snap exercises" have been disproportionately larger than the corresponding NATO exercises.

Moscow has areas of concern in both the Arctic and Baltic regions. In the Arctic, Russia is trying to extend its EEZ by 150 nautical miles through the CLCS to claim rights to the natural resources in the area. The NSR is another potential issue as some countries regard the Arctic as a global common for shipping, while Russia maintains that the waters in its EEZ are its "possessions."⁵⁴⁸ Moreover, in the Baltic region, an increased presence of NATO forces causes concern in Russian eyes.

⁵⁴⁷ David S. Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014), 290–293. David Yost is a professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

⁵⁴⁸ Paul R. Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014): 342. Paul Josephson is a Russian and Soviet History professor at Colby College.

B. ANALYSIS

1. NATO Considerations

For Finland and Sweden, the question remains whether each country will apply for membership in the Alliance. Ongoing cooperation has strengthened the ties between NATO and Finland and Sweden. Indeed, according to the NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations Michel Soula, “Sweden and Finland are most valued partners to NATO who contribute more to NATO than many member states.”⁵⁴⁹ Currently, the idea of joining NATO is gaining momentum in both countries. However, as long as each country maintains the option to seek membership in NATO, Moscow will likely attempt to prevent it from happening. In the end, the option for Finland and Sweden regarding NATO membership is simple: they apply to join the Alliance or they do not.

Historic relations with Russia have not been positive for Finland. After World War II, in order to gain a security guarantee from Moscow, Finland agreed to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. This treaty was so one-sided that it led to the term “Finlandization.” After the end of the Cold War, Helsinki was able to escape from the confines of the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Finland elected to increase its cooperation with the Alliance; and today, NATO considers Finland a valuable partner. Will Finland continue to strengthen its ties with the Alliance and apply for membership, or will it maintain its non-membership status?

If Finland elects to seek membership in NATO, Moscow will likely publically condemn that action and claim that it constitutes a threat to Russian security. Finland would probably face potential repercussions from Russia, but the EU and NATO have the potential to offset those repercussions, if necessary. Moscow could attempt to use economic ties as a means to punish Finland for joining NATO. According to the Observer of Economic Complexity, Finland is the only one of the three countries

⁵⁴⁹Michel Soula, quoted in Stefan Lundqvist and J.J. Widen, “Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea: Motives Prospects and Challenges,” *Defense Studies* 16, no. 4 (2016): 366.

examined in this thesis whose imports from and exports to Russia are in its top five trade relationships.⁵⁵⁰

Moscow could use economic coercion to try to prevent Finland from joining the Alliance. Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova point out that Moscow often uses trade relations as a means of “enticement” or “punishment,” and seeks to establish and deepen the energy dependence of neighboring states on gas and oil imports from Russia.⁵⁵¹ Russia could cease its exports of gas and oil to Finland. According to a report published in 2012 by the International Energy Agency (IEA), Finland imported approximately 90 percent of its oil and all of its natural gas from Russia in 2011.⁵⁵² The sanctions levied upon Russia in light of the Ukraine crisis have not resulted in a big change in Finland’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. A 2017 report by the International Energy Agency noted that in 2015 Finland was 100 percent dependent on imports of gas and oil, with 83 percent of oil and 100 percent of gas imported from Russia.⁵⁵³ Given the magnitude of Finland’s dependence on Russia, importing large amounts of oil and gas from other countries on short notice would be difficult. Helsinki could find itself in a dire situation if Moscow decided to cut off its exports of oil and gas to Finland. Finland’s reliance on Russian gas and oil could have future national security implications.

If Helsinki regarded this situation as a significant risk, Finland would have to be prepared to find new supplies of oil and gas, potentially from countries such as Norway

⁵⁵⁰“Sweden,” The Observer of Economic Complexity, accessed Feb 27, 2017, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/swe/>; “Finland,” The Observer of Economic Complexity, accessed Feb 27, 2017, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/fin/>; “Norway,” The Observer of Economic Complexity, accessed Feb 27, 2017, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/nor/>; “Russia,” The Observer of Economic Complexity, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/rus/>.

⁵⁵¹ Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova, *Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks* (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 35–36. Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the CEPA in Washington, DC. Margarita Assenova is the director of programs for the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia at the Jamestown Foundation.

⁵⁵²“Oil and Gas Security: Emergency Response of IEA Countries—Finland,” International Energy Agency (2012), <https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CountryChapterFinland.pdf>.

⁵⁵³“Finland—Energy System Overview,” International Energy Agency (2017), <https://www.iea.org/countries/membercountries/finland/>. The other 17 percent of oil is supplied by Norway and other non-Russian sources.

and the United States. Finland's allies would also need to be prepared to support Finland's demand, either by having oil and gas-producing countries increase their output or by the consuming countries preparing for a greater demand on the existing supply, resulting in higher energy prices or reduced consumption.

Moscow would also likely respond with increased military pressure, potentially in the form of rhetoric or more frequent and bigger military exercises. According to Mike Winnerstig, Russian military officials have stated that Finnish membership in the Alliance would constitute a threat to Russian security.⁵⁵⁴ Given that Finland and Russia share a long border, it is understandable that Finnish membership in NATO would be of concern to Moscow. However, being a member of NATO would give Finland Article 5 security guarantees. If Russia were to conduct aggression on sovereign Finnish territory, as it has done in the past, Helsinki could invoke the collective defense commitment and have the support of the Alliance to defend against any Russian attack.

The relations between Russia and Sweden have been different from those of Finland and Russia. There was conflict between the two in the early eighteenth century, but Stockholm's policy of neutrality over the past two centuries has kept Sweden out of major conflicts with Russia. Recently, Stockholm has lightened its stance of neutrality. As with Finland, cooperation between NATO and Sweden has increased since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance considers Sweden a valuable partner. Discussions about potential membership in NATO are gaining momentum in Sweden. Also as with Finland, Russia will attempt to prevent Swedish membership in the Alliance.

Sweden does not have the economic ties to Russia that Finland has, and therefore the potential effects of economic coercion by Russia are not as great. Russia is not in Sweden's top five countries of exports or imports. In addition, Sweden is not as dependent as Finland on Russia for oil and gas. According to a 2012 report issued by the IEA, in 2011 oil and gas from Russia accounted for less than a third of Sweden's total energy consumption. Sweden imported approximately half its oil from Russia while

⁵⁵⁴ Mike Winnerstig, "Security Policy at Road's End? The Roles of Sweden and Finland in the Nordic-Baltic Defence Cooperation Process," *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2013–2014* 12, no. 1 (December 2014): 165, doi: 10.2478/lasr-2014-0007. Mike Winnerstig is a deputy director of research at the FOI.

Denmark supplied all of its imports of gas.⁵⁵⁵ As with Finland, these numbers have not significantly changed since the inception of sanctions on Russia in 2014 due to the Ukraine crisis. A 2017 report by the IEA noted that Sweden is 100 percent dependent on imported oil and gas, with just over 40 percent of its oil imports coming from Russia while Denmark still supplies 100 percent of Sweden's gas imports.⁵⁵⁶ Sweden would have to make some adjustments if Russia cut off its supply, but would not be in as dire a situation as that which Finland could find itself in if Russia stopped exporting oil and gas.

As the debate over potential Swedish membership in the Alliance continues, one can expect Russia to persist in applying military methods of coercion to prevent NATO enlargement. Andrew Michta asserted that Russian military intrusions into Swedish and Finnish airspace constitute an attempt to intimidate “both the elites and the publics of Sweden, Finland, and others in the Baltic region.”⁵⁵⁷ He also noted that Moscow wants to discredit the potential for a “collective defense system” in the Nordic and Baltic regions, and ultimately undo the “special relationship” that has developed between the Alliance and Sweden and Finland.⁵⁵⁸ Membership in NATO would give Sweden Article 5 security protection against potential Russian aggression, alleviating some of the concern over Russian intrusions in the area.

Based on Moscow's goals for the region, if Sweden and Finland applied for membership and NATO accepted them, which it likely would do without hesitation, the Russian military intrusions might not stop. In fact, Moscow might further increase pressure in the region in an attempt to discredit the Alliance. An increase in pressure would raise the potential for an incident to occur. However, an incident would not necessarily lead to a military conflict with Russia.

⁵⁵⁵ “Oil and Gas Security: Emergency Response of IEA Countries—Sweden,” International Energy Agency (2012), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Sweden2012_OSS.pdf.

⁵⁵⁶ “Sweden—Energy System Overview,” International Energy Agency (2017), <https://www.iea.org/countries/membercountries/sweden/>. The other 60 percent of oil imports derives from Norway and other non-Russian sources.

⁵⁵⁷ Andrew Michta, “Putin Targets the Scandinavians,” *The American Interest* (2014), <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/11/17/putin-targets-the-scandinavians/>. Andrew Michta is the M.W. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College and an adjunct fellow at the CSIS.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid.

Some scholars have recently expressed the belief that Russia is trying to avoid confrontation with NATO. In October 2016, Pavel Baev emphasized that Moscow is looking for quick, decisive victories and that Russia is unlikely to initiate a conflict with NATO over Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania.⁵⁵⁹ Given Russian economic interests, Moscow would probably not start a conflict in the Arctic given the potential for a “complete shutdown of international cooperation” in the region.⁵⁶⁰ In December 2016, Brian Jenkins asserted that Russia desired “to avoid the risks of higher order conflict” and that NATO policies could make Moscow “change risk calculations.”⁵⁶¹

One such incident that supports the theory of avoiding conflict with NATO occurred in 2015 when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet over sovereign Turkish territory. As reported by the BBC, there was much debate over the circumstances of the incident, as Turkey held that the Russian fighter was over Turkey while Russia asserted that its fighter was over Syria.⁵⁶² Tensions escalated between Turkey and Russia, but they did not lead to a war between the opposing sides.⁵⁶³ This incident could have provided Russia with an opportunity to start a conflict with Turkey, but the risk of Turkey potentially activating Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty may have helped to resolve the situation.

In a worst-case scenario, Russia might declare that it was compelled to invade Finland or Sweden before either or both exercised the option to join NATO. Many scholars have noted NATO officials making statements to the effect that NATO has no

⁵⁵⁹ Pavel Baev, “What Drives Moscow’s Military Adventurism?” *Current History* 115, no. 783 (2016): 256. Pavel Baev is a research director and professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 257.

⁵⁶¹ Brian Michael Jenkins, “A Revanchist Russia versus an Uncertain West: An Appreciation of the Situation since the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis,” Center for the Study of Democracy (December 2016): 15–16. Brian Jenkins is a senior advisor to the president of the RAND Corporation.

⁵⁶² “Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane—What We Know,” BBC News, December 1, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581>.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*

obligation to defend non-members.⁵⁶⁴ In this scenario, Article 5 would not bind NATO by treaty to protect either country because they would still be non-members of the Alliance. If NATO chose not to act, Finland and Sweden would be on their own or have to rely on bilateral agreements for support—unless all or some of the NATO Allies chose to act under Article 51 of the UN Charter. If Helsinki and Stockholm believed that Russian aggression is a threat to their national security, maintaining their current standing as non-members to the Alliance could lead to a potential conflict with Russia without NATO support. If Finland and Sweden choose to remain outside the Alliance, Helsinki and Stockholm must plan for future conflicts without NATO support, no matter how strong current political relations may be.

Norway, as a member of NATO, has enjoyed the security of collective defense since 1949. Potential Russian aggression, while still of concern to Oslo, is not as likely to spill over into Norway because of the Article 5 security guarantee. However, due to its security interests in the region, Norway is pushing for a greater NATO presence in the North Atlantic and Arctic.

Like Russia, Norway considers the North Atlantic and Arctic as an area with strategic significance. Edward Lucas noted that Norway “fears that the other [NATO] countries do not understand the threats and opportunities it faces.”⁵⁶⁵ The location of the Northern Fleet in the Kola Peninsula presents a potential threat to Norway and therefore the Alliance. The issue, however, is that an increased Alliance presence in the area to offset the threat of the Northern Fleet will almost certainly garner a negative response from Moscow. While Norway sees the Russian presence in the Arctic as a threat, Russia would see an increased Alliance presence in the region as a threat. Moscow would likely

⁵⁶⁴ Mike Winnerstig, “Security Policy at Road’s End? The Roles of Sweden and Finland in the Nordic-Baltic Defence Cooperation Process,” *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2013–2014* 12, no. 1 (December 2014): 169, doi: 10.2478/lasr-2014-0007; Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “The Baltic States: The United States Must Be Prepared to Fulfill Its NATO Treaty Obligations,” *The Heritage Foundation* no. 3039 (September 2015): 16, <http://report.heritage.org/bg3039>; Edward Lucas, “The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report,” *Center for European Policy Analysis* (June 2015), 4, [http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20\(2\).compressed.pdf](http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20(2).compressed.pdf).

⁵⁶⁵ Lucas, “The Coming Storm,” 4–5. Edward Lucas is a senior vice president at the CEPA.

respond with military reactions such as the threat of attack, more exercises, or an increased military presence in the area.

Negative responses from Moscow to NATO activities in the area are not new. Scholars and government officials have noted Russian responses to NATO actions in the region. Kristian Åtland noted that Russia “has a tendency to respond negatively to almost any aspect of an increased Alliance presence in the region.”⁵⁶⁶ Norwegian Minister of Defense Ine Erikson Soreide, in remarks about Russian criticism of the rotational U.S. Marine force in Norway, stated that “there is no objective reason for the Russians to react to this. But the Russians are reacting at the moment in the same way toward almost everything the NATO countries are doing.”⁵⁶⁷ How great is the danger if NATO countries treat these Russian threats as mere saber rattling? They know the Russian threats are there, but do not take them at face value.

In sum, NATO is a factor in the security deliberations of all three of these Nordic countries. Finland and Sweden, while non-members, have increased their relations with NATO since the end of the Cold War. Russia is trying to prevent Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO. In the event that Helsinki and Stockholm elect to join NATO, Russia will most likely continue to apply pressure to both Finland and Sweden, as well as the region as a whole. Moscow could use coercion tactics or increased military aggression to try to fragment the Alliance. An actual military conflict between an enlarged NATO and Russia, however, is unlikely due to the Kremlin’s apparent reluctance to go to war with member nations of NATO.

Norway, with its interests, is seeking an increased NATO presence in the Arctic. Given the strategic significance of the area, increased Alliance activities in its proximity make sense. However, as in the past, Moscow will probably meet any Allied activity in the area with a negative response from Moscow. An increased NATO presence in the

⁵⁶⁶ Kristian Åtland, “Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?” *Comparative Strategy* 33, no. 2 (April 2014): 157, doi:10.1080/01495933.2014.897121. Kristian Åtland is an expert with the Analysis Division of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment.

⁵⁶⁷ Ine Eriksen Soreide, quoted in “‘Norway will Suffer’: Russia makes Nuclear Threat Over U.S. Marines,” *The Local*, October 31, 2016, <https://www.thelocal.no/20161031/norway-will-suffer-russia-makes-nuclear-threat-over-us-marines>.

North Atlantic or Arctic will most likely increase already high tensions between the Alliance and the Kremlin.

2. Bilateral Considerations

Bilateral relations are not as great a concern for Norway's security considerations as they are for Finland and Sweden because Norway is a member of NATO. However, as long as Finland and Sweden maintain their NATO non-member status, bilateral relationships will be important to their security considerations. Helsinki and Stockholm have recently signed defense cooperation agreements with Washington, DC, and have openly stated that the United States is their most important ally. These agreements provide a foundation for Finland and Sweden to integrate their defense capabilities with those of the United States. Joint exercises and technology sharing bring the countries closer together. Bilateral defense cooperation agreements with the United States strengthen the defense capabilities of Finland and Sweden.

When it comes to their bilateral agreements with the United States, Finland and Sweden must account for two considerations. First, the United States is not bound to assist either Finland or Sweden in the event of a potential conflict with Russia. The agreements are for defense cooperation; they are not mutual defense treaties. If Finland and Sweden seek security guarantees, they can apply for NATO membership. Given recent Russian acts of aggression, coupled with Finland's and Sweden's standing as valued partners of NATO, a scenario in which the United States, or any other NATO member nation, would agree to a bilateral defense treaty with Helsinki or Stockholm is hard to imagine when membership in the Alliance is open to both countries.

A second consideration that Finland and Sweden must take into account in their bilateral defense cooperation is the United States relationship with Russia. Current Russian military and security doctrines specifically refer to the United States as the leading adversary. Moscow believes that the United States is trying to undermine Russia's interests along its periphery. There is a high probability that the Kremlin believes—or finds it in its interests to assert—that the United States relations with Finland and Sweden are elements in a plot against Russia.

With Russia being the exception, NATO and EU member nations surround Finland and Sweden; currently the biggest threat to Helsinki and Stockholm in the region comes from Moscow. Given the adversarial relations between Russia and the United States, Finland (especially with its shared border) and Sweden must be cognizant of how the Kremlin will perceive their defense cooperation with the Pentagon. As Finland looks to replace its aging fleet of Hornets, its replacement will most likely draw criticism from Moscow. One possibility for its replacement could be the F-35, among other aircraft.⁵⁶⁸ Given that Moscow has already expressed concern about Norway's acquisition of the F-35, if Finland were to acquire it Moscow would probably issue stronger criticisms for a couple of reasons. First, Finland is closer to Russia than Norway, and aircraft launched from Finland could penetrate further into Russia, potentially to Moscow. Second, Moscow might view Finland's or Sweden's acquisition of the F-35 as one step closer to NATO membership.

Finnish and Swedish bilateral relations with the United States will likely draw Russian criticism no matter what. Helsinki and Stockholm will most likely continue to pursue this avenue of bilateral cooperation, but there is an alternative option. A hypothetical situation could arise in which Finland and Sweden cease cooperation with NATO and the United States and seek a treaty with Russia, as Finland did in the past with the Soviet Union.

Ending cooperation with NATO and the United States in order to sign a treaty with Russia is an extremely unlikely scenario that would have few benefits and potentially great costs for Helsinki and Stockholm. A potential benefit of a treaty with Russia would be that Moscow would probably cease its military rhetoric and threats of aggression toward Finland and Sweden. Another potential benefit could be access to Russian oil and gas in return for Helsinki's and Stockholm's "loyalty" to Moscow. Russia has the ability to offer carrots to those countries that choose to align themselves with Moscow.

⁵⁶⁸Beth Stevenson, "Finland Receives Five Responses for HX Fighter Procurement," *Flight Global*, November 25, 2016, <https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/finland-receives-five-responses-for-hx-fighter-procu-431832/>.

The few benefits that Russia could offer, as history has indicated, would not be worth what Finland and Sweden would hypothetically give up. According to Bugajski and Assenova, Russia has a history of using bilateral agreements in a coercive manner.⁵⁶⁹ First, one would be hard-pressed to imagine a scenario in which Moscow would not demand that Helsinki and Stockholm end their cooperation with NATO and the United States. By signing a treaty with the Kremlin, Finland and Norway would commit themselves to Russia and lose the benefits they had enjoyed with NATO cooperation.

Second, Moscow would likely make demands on Finland and Sweden similar to those imposed on Helsinki in the Treaty of Friendship of 1948. Helsinki and Stockholm could potentially hand over some of their sovereignty to Moscow. The term “Finlandization,” derived from what Finland gave up to the Soviet Union when it signed the Treaty of Friendship, is not how a country would like to see its relations with Russia described.

Third, a treaty with Russia is not a guarantee that a country is safe from Russian aggression. History provides examples of this. The Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Poland in 1932 and Mutual Assistance Treaties with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1939, all of which Moscow ignored when Stalin and Hitler divided up Eastern Europe in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Prior to the Winter War, Finland was negotiating a treaty with the Soviet Union when Moscow decided to attack Finland. Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 even though the two countries had a treaty. Given lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis and past Russian and Soviet history, if attacking another country furthers a political agenda for Moscow, a treaty will not stop it from doing so.

The risks would far outweigh the benefits of a bilateral treaty with Russia. If Finland and Sweden determined there was no practical course of action other than signing a bilateral treaty with Russia, they would be at the mercy of Moscow, and this is something that Helsinki and Stockholm would probably never voluntarily accept.

⁵⁶⁹Bugajski and Assenova, “Eurasian Disunion,” 35–36.

In sum, as long as Finland and Sweden remain outside the NATO political-military alliance, bilateral relations remain their best choice to increase their national security; however, they do not necessarily provide defense guarantees. Currently, the United States is the most important ally to Finland and Sweden. Many benefits come with bilateral relations with the United States, but Moscow's relations with Washington could make the bilateral relations of other countries with the United States complicated, especially along Russia's periphery. An alternate, but improbable, scenario would be for Finland and Sweden to enter into bilateral security pacts with Russia. This situation would likely involve ending cooperation with NATO and accepting Moscow's demands for a security guarantee. This is something that Helsinki and Stockholm would do only if they felt that there was no other option.

3. Potential Regional Security Implications

All three of the Nordic countries examined in this study have regional security concerns regarding a potential Russian conflict. Russia has three points of vulnerability when it comes to SLOCs—the Baltic Sea, the North Atlantic and Arctic, and the North Pacific and Arctic. For Norway, the Svalbard Islands are a security concern in the North Atlantic. For Finland and Sweden, the Åland Islands and Gotland Island are security concerns in the Baltic Sea. All three have geostrategic importance in controlling SLOCs.

In a conflict against NATO, Russia would likely attempt to take control of all the islands mentioned above. Controlling the North Atlantic would be crucial to the defense of Russia's Northern Fleet and seaports on the Arctic Ocean. Russia would therefore likely attempt to control the Svalbard Islands and disrupt NATO naval access. Controlling the Baltic Sea would be crucial to the defense of Kaliningrad and the area surrounding St. Petersburg, as well as the conduct of cybersecurity operations. In a conflict with NATO, Russia would most likely attempt to take over the Åland Islands and Gotland Island to protect its interests in the Baltic Sea region. Given the close cooperation of Finland and Sweden, Moscow would likely assume that Helsinki and Stockholm would either remain neutral or support the Alliance in a conflict between Russia and NATO. Therefore, if Moscow decided to take over the aforementioned islands

in the Baltic Sea, the Kremlin would have to accept the risk that its actions would likely drive Finland and Sweden into the conflict on the side of the Alliance and compel the two countries to apply for NATO membership.

In the event that Moscow decided to attack Finland or Sweden, both the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic and Arctic regions would come into play. Although officials have stated that NATO has no obligations to support non-members, given the recent cooperation of Finland and Sweden with NATO, Moscow would make a strategic error if it assumed NATO would not support Finland or Sweden. Nick Witney believes that “NATO countries and EU countries are so dependent on one another, their interests run into each other so much...[that] no one is going to attack Stockholm and think that...NATO forces will stand aside and watch.”⁵⁷⁰ Therefore, taking over the Åland Islands, Gotland Island, and the Svalbard Islands would put Russia in a better defensive position in the event NATO entered the conflict. One concern that Russia might have is that taking control of the Svalbard Islands would almost certainly draw the Alliance into a conflict, but if Moscow felt that NATO involvement was a foregone conclusion, Russian policy-makers might reason that strategically an advantageous move would be for Russia to take over the islands from the beginning before NATO had a proper chance to defend them.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Finland

Given its history and long border with Russia, Finland is in a precarious position regarding potential Russian aggression. Recent Russian acts of aggression and snap exercises have raised concerns in Helsinki about potential threats to Finland’s national security. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia was not in a position to stop NATO enlargement, but since 2008, Russia has entered into two distinct conflicts (Georgia and Ukraine) to prevent the potential NATO membership of countries along its periphery. If

⁵⁷⁰ Nick Witney, quoted in Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 299. Nick Witney is a former chief executive of the European Union’s European Defense Agency.

Moscow decided that it needed a buffer against NATO on its northern flank, Finland would likely be the focus of Russia's effort.

Finland needs to decide how best to secure its national interests against potential Russian aggression. Past treaties between Finland and Russia have been one-sided, with Moscow being on the better end. A future treaty between Helsinki and Moscow involving a Russian security guarantee is almost certainly out of the question. Bilateral agreements with EU or NATO member nations are unlikely to result in security guarantees against potential Russian aggression. History demonstrates that Helsinki realizes that it would need allies to win in a conflict with Russia. According to Fred Iklé, the Finns "barely saved their national existence" at the conclusion of the Winter War by agreeing to the territorial demands of the Soviet Union.⁵⁷¹ Helsinki then choose to align itself with Germany during World War II in an attempt to regain lost territory, but the day after Germany was defeated at Stalingrad, Finnish officials agreed that peace with the Soviet Union was needed.⁵⁷² Finnish President Mannerheim believed that "if this nation [Finland]...be defeated militarily, there can be no doubt that it will be driven into exile or exterminated."⁵⁷³ Therefore, Finland should apply for NATO membership and gain the collective defense guarantees that the Alliance provides—and add to the Alliance's strength and capacity for effective deterrence and defense. Cooperation between Finland and NATO is already high, and a Finnish membership in the Alliance would benefit both sides.

2. Sweden

Historic neutrality has allowed Sweden to avoid conflicts with Russia. Geography puts Sweden in a more favorable position than Finland. Sweden does not share a border with Russia and has Finland as a buffer between the two countries. However, like Finland, Sweden has been concerned about recent Russian acts of aggression. Recently

⁵⁷¹ Fred Iklé, *Every War Must End*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 25.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, 25–26.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, 66.

the attitude in Stockholm has changed from a historic stance of neutrality to one that allows for international cooperation, but Sweden remains a non-member of NATO.

Sweden, like Finland, needs to determine the best way to protect itself against potential Russian aggression. Cooperation between NATO and Sweden is high; therefore, a security treaty with Russia would not make sense. If Stockholm were to sign a security treaty with Moscow, Sweden could isolate itself in the Baltic Sea region as cooperation with NATO would likely cease, especially if Finland decided that its best course of action would be to join the Alliance. Bilateral agreements with EU and NATO member nations would be just as likely for Sweden as they would be for Finland to lack security guarantees against potential Russian aggression. Choosing to revert to its previous stance of neutrality is an option for Stockholm, but that would put Sweden in a position without any help from neighboring countries to counter any potential further Russian aggression. Therefore, Sweden's best option is to apply for NATO membership. As with Finland, membership in the Alliance would afford Sweden protection under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Cooperation between Sweden and NATO is high and valued by both sides as well, and Swedish membership in the Alliance would be mutually beneficial.

3. Norway

After the German occupation of Norway during World War II, Oslo quickly determined that membership in a security alliance was its best course. After a potential Nordic security alliance never came to fruition, Norway became a founding member of NATO. As a member of the Alliance, Norway has the benefit of being able to invoke Article 5 if Russia were to attack it. Norway's concern therefore revolves around perceived vulnerabilities of the alliance.

Russia's decline following the end of the Cold War, coupled with recent military operations in other parts of the world, notably in the Middle East, and the fight against terrorism, has drawn NATO's attention away from the Arctic region. Norway believes that the Alliance is vulnerable to Russian A2/AD capabilities in the North Atlantic and Arctic and has pushed for an increased NATO presence in the region. However, Moscow would likely view an increased NATO presence as a threat to Russian interests and could

counter the Alliance with a further increase of the Russian military presence in the region. Nevertheless, if NATO did nothing, the likelihood of Russia exploiting the Alliance's perceived vulnerability to A2/AD capabilities would increase. Therefore, Norway's best course of action is to continue hosting NATO exercises, especially those with a focus on naval operations in the North Atlantic and Arctic.

D. FINAL REFLECTIONS

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been an important factor, albeit for different reasons, in the security considerations of Finland, Norway, and Sweden. As a member nation, Norway has benefited from the security guarantees of the Alliance. Oslo has the option to invoke Article 5 in the event of external aggression against Norway. Norway believes there is a potential NATO vulnerability to Russian military forces in the North Atlantic and Arctic region, and has pushed for a greater NATO presence in the area. Finland and Sweden have increased their military and security cooperation with NATO in the past quarter century. While cooperation with NATO has resulted in improved military capabilities for both Finland and Sweden, neither country has NATO security guarantees because they are not members of the Alliance. All three countries continue to be wary of how the Kremlin will perceive NATO involvement in the region.

Moscow views NATO and potential NATO enlargement as among the main threats to Russian security. In the past decade Russia has been involved in conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine to prevent potential NATO enlargement. Recently, in response to an increased NATO presence in the North Atlantic and Arctic region, Moscow has increased the belligerence of its political rhetoric and its capacity for military coercion toward Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Norway must be cognizant of how Russia could react to an increased NATO presence in the North Atlantic and Arctic region. Moscow would probably view an increased Alliance presence as a threat to Russian security and likely counter more extensive NATO activities with more of its own military activities. Close cooperation by Finland and Sweden with NATO will continue to attract Moscow's attention. Helsinki and Stockholm must consider the possibility that Russia could start a conflict with one or both countries, as it did with Georgia and Ukraine, to prevent NATO

enlargement. Finland and Sweden must be prepared for a conflict with Russia without NATO assistance if they continue to not seek membership in the Alliance.

Bilateral relations with the United States are important for Finland, Norway, and Sweden as well. All three countries consider the United States their most important security partner. Norway has allowed a rotational US Marine Corps force on its territory. Finland and Sweden have signed security cooperation agreements with the United States. While cooperation with the United States helps each country with its own security, it also elicits a negative response from Russia.

Moscow views the United States involvement in the area in the same light as NATO involvement: as a threat to Russian security. Strongly worded threats have come from the Kremlin in regard to the rotational U.S. Marine Corps presence in Norway. Finnish and Swedish security cooperation with the United States has drawn criticism from Moscow as well.

The question that Helsinki, Oslo, and Stockholm need to ask is the following: would Moscow be willing to risk a conflict with them? Given the importance of the Arctic to Russia and Moscow's seeming unwillingness to go to war with NATO, a conflict with Norway, an Ally backed by the Alliance, is unlikely. Given Moscow's recent actions in Georgia and Ukraine, however, Finland and Sweden can expect continued acts of aggression by Russia in an attempt to prevent NATO membership for the two countries. The possibility of Russia engaging in a conflict with Finland and Sweden is higher when the two countries are not members of the Alliance. If Finland and Sweden joined NATO, the security guarantees of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would greatly decrease the possibility of a conflict with Russia.

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