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Political Culture and Risk Analysis

An Outline of Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya

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Abstract: Since the 1980s, the political culture concept experienced important theoretical advances that stressed durable patterns of behavior over time. Since these theories can be applied to conflict settings and unstable states, the potential value of culture within risk analysis has emerged. Risk analysis has tended to treat political culture more as an afterthought, but the integration of several theoretical contributions allows it to be considered a starting point. Examining the contemporary cases of Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya in the frame of this alternative approach establishes the groundwork for assessing future cases while providing an added dimension to risk analysis.

Keywords: political culture, political assessment, political tension, cultural integration, risk analysis, risk assessment, national maturity, independence movements, extremists, national violence, Africa, Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, Tunisia, Libya

The political culture concept has been circulating for decades, and although it initially seemed to have limited scope, several contributors have made important advances since the 1980s. Particularly, the work of political sociologist Larry J. Diamond, political scientists Harry H. Eckstein and Lucien W. Pye, as well as others broadened political culture's applicability to a wider number of cases and stressed the importance of observable patterns

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of behavior over long periods of time. Because of this work, political culture's potential as an effective tool in risk analysis has emerged; it can be applied to conflict settings and unstable states, including current situations in contemporary Africa. Despite the underlying potential, political culture has remained dormant. This latency does not mean that risk analysis has not considered political culture, but that as a separately delineated concept, it is rarely prioritized in cases of actual or potential conflict. Instead, political culture has been treated less as a starting point and more as an afterthought.

At least some of the rising number of crises across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in recent years can be understood as resulting from either the assessment limitations of risk analysis or a failure to convince decision makers of political culture's influence and suggests the need for an additional or alternative approach. In almost all cases of conflict, or even political unrest, outside stakeholders will always have concerns regarding any signs of institutional, economic, political, and social instability. From business investors to humanitarian aid workers, both government-based and nongovernment-based outsiders have had to consider the risks involved in taking any course of action; however, there is no unified approach among analysts. Not only do the factors analysts select to study vary, but the temporal window can even range from the immediacy of a crisis to a relatively remote period on the horizon. Moreover, different risk analyses produce different results and prioritize different factors, though most overlook patterns of political behavior over long periods. Recently harkening to the important role of the past, however, President Barack H. Obama recently admitted to the failure in Libya and the need for "a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn't have any civic traditions."¹ What form those efforts might take is not specified, but the president calling attention to the significance of *civic traditions* is notable. A serious look at the civic traditions that are key to political culture was also neglected by those who supported the regime change in Syria.² In such cases, a focused political culture approach should be able to differentiate between a people's capacity to engage in organized demonstrations and the extent to which they are able to form and maintain new governments, thus reducing the amount of risk in efforts to assist in these transitions.

A focused political culture approach can suggest an assessment of people's capacity or aptitude for several political actions and activities, offering a more useful, focused assessment than a general *political assessment*. In fact, people's capacity to embrace political actions vis-à-vis their nation's political milieu is often conflated. Political assessments often include analysis and description of government and political institutions with a largely top-down emphasis that can be microscopic. A political culture approach is more bottom-up, offering a broader view that includes the population at large and the potential political

actions they will experience and indeed cocreate. The political culture approach also affords a people with agency, compared to overall political assessment, which is more focused on structure. Often, agency requires skills or aptitudes that citizens have developed over time and under conditions specific to their locales, and the talents that are identified as positive or desirable, such as a capacity for community building or decision making by consensus, sometimes need to be further developed or at least supported and maintained.

The Horn of Africa and North Africa provide some interesting cases for understanding how political culture can better inform parties interested in assessing risks in those regions. Taking Diamond's, Eckstein's, and Pye's conceptual developments and "trying them on" selected contemporary cases, such as Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya, might lay some groundwork for applying—or not applying—them to other cases in the future. The 1991 breakup of Somalia and its fragmentation into three quite distinct polities is one such case, considering the shared religion, ethnicity, clan system, and social culture as well as the unexpected, disparate, and lasting outcome. The two northern polities of Somaliland and Puntland have had an almost reflexive avoidance of prolonged armed conflict, while the south seems to have had an almost reflexive appetite for it. This contrast suggests that the inclination to reach consensus in the north, instead of reaching for weapons, is a combination of skills learned and habits formed. Tunisia and Libya as neighboring states are also two interesting cases with quite different outcomes. Here, an overview of the apparent role of political culture might more fully inform those trying to understand these disparities. This article aims to promote an extended understanding of political culture and to suggest how the approach might be informative in situations that are politically unstable, openly conflictual, or in a postconflict phase. After a brief discussion of the concept, its role is considered in the cases mentioned above, and the article concludes with a discussion on the strengths and limitations of a political culture approach to risk analysis.

Overview of Political Culture

The notion of political culture hails from the earliest times in Western political thought, from its close association with the early Greek concept of *paideia* to contemporary political analyses based on surveyed attitudes.³ By the nineteenth century, the French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville understood *paideia* as actions and attitudes that had direct and indirect political implications and pointed to the crucial role it played in determining a people's political direction.⁴ He supported the idea that political culture was in fact historically rooted, as he documented in his now famous observations of the early United States.⁵

In the mid-twentieth century, however, when the political culture concept was taken up by several scholars, it was usually treated as static and ahistorical

when applied to modern developed states. Difficult to define, political culture had limited research options since it relied heavily on attitude surveys.⁶ By the 1970s, this trend began to change due to important contributions by the scholars mentioned previously, as well as Ron Inglehart and Robert Putnam, who further developed the idea to include historical process and thus examine how political culture could and did develop over time.⁷ The focus was on observable patterns of behavior that often endured, sometimes in different forms of expression despite changes in context and time. Even though the importance of patterns of cooperation, agreement by consensus, and accommodation had been raised in previous works, scholars of the time had not elaborated sufficiently on the concepts. Pye revitalized the assertions in a 1985 essay, which stressed “mutually reinforcing” patterns of behavior over long periods.⁸

Political culture as a tool for understanding people’s response to political movements, then, was infused with new ideas, adding breadth and depth up to a point. While Pye had introduced a sense of durability, other authors picked up on this as well. In 1994, Diamond expressed political culture by applying a geological analogy that compared it to sedimentary deposits set down over time.⁹ Political material from earlier layers was not simply covered by succeeding layers, but often integrated into the next layer and combined with, or otherwise coexisted alongside, more recent sedimentary deposits.¹⁰ Even Diamond’s proposed working definition implied political culture as process, describing “a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system.”¹¹ The word *predominant* suggested not only the idea of temporality, but also to consider the possibility of competing, lesser or peripheral political cultures (i.e., political subcultures). Even so, the definition still seemed to limit political culture by suggesting it could only be observed through surveys covering a people’s beliefs, attitudes, and sentiments to list a few. The weakness of this assumption was observed by the political culture scholar Stephen Welch, who remarked that “Political culture is not supposed to be the same as public opinion. . . . Yet, it is measured by the same method as highly volatile public opinion.”¹²

Understanding the nuances of political culture calls for a more integrated consideration of the works of political culture scholars where the underpinnings for applying political culture to risk analysis can be found. Welch, for example, identifies the problem with determining political culture through surveyed attitudes, but authors Diamond, Eckstein, and Pye provide some conceptual direction to an alternative approach. Eckstein took up the idea of *orientation* in 1988, describing it as “reliant on and informed by culturally determined, cognitive, affective and evaluative elements.”¹³ He saw that a people’s orientations promoted predictability, stability, continuity, and security,

serving as a filter for all subsequent (collective) learning. Conversely, a lack of orientations left a people insecure, ungrounded, and not equipped for autonomy. Eckstein also explained that a people's orientations could be expressed through their actions as well as attitudes.¹⁴ Eckstein's discussion of actions and attitudes dovetailed neatly with an earlier work of Pye's, where four paired themes were identified as recurring within his study. Two of the paired themes, equality/hierarchy and liberty/coercion, were observable as actions. Trust/distrust were attitude-based, and particular/general were identity-based.¹⁵

Linking equality and liberty as two tangible *action* orientations opens the door for observing political culture in contexts—as in active conflicts or insurgencies over long periods, such as Vietnam or South Africa—where *attitude* surveys are not practical. Equality might be captured in several ways and would neither have to be absolute nor limited to the obvious example of its presence or absence in legislation. Equality would also be observable by the inclusiveness of the population in collaboration and alliances found within economic, political, educational, and social sectors. One example would be no ethnic, religious, or gender barriers to those seeking political office; another would be integrated schooling where it was historically segregated. A more specific equality dynamic that likely institutionalizes rivalry and conflict can be seen in Northern Ireland where 97 percent of schools are segregated between Catholics and Protestants, and integration is considered to be competition between various sports teams.

Liberty would be discernible through a people's relative autonomy—the extent to which their lives are self-directed or governed (lightly versus heavily). To use an extreme comparison, the regimented personal lives of civilians living within Nazi Germany would have contrasted sharply with the relative resourcefulness and determination of the contemporary French Resistance. Thus, with political culture understood as a process taking place over time and indicated by equality and liberty, how consistently either of them prevail over time speaks to how deeply entrenched a political culture might be. Put another way, the political culture of a people who have been inclusive and autonomous throughout several generations is likely to be different than that of a hierarchically ordered people who have been living in a long-term context of coercion. Moreover, assessing these action-based orientations can streamline political culture research in temporal and conflictual contexts as the demands differ from those of surveys, and evaluations can be as heavy or light as resources, time, and available information permit, provided the identified themes are pursued and consistency is maintained.

Early on, Pye made another important distinction between elite political culture and mass political culture, which introduced the idea of political subcultures within the larger, overarching political culture.¹⁶ Within elite and mass

political cultures in larger and more complex societies, there is a likelihood of significant, and sometimes competing, subcultures that are usually divided along social, ethnic, religious, ideological, or geographical lines. Clarification is still needed between actual subcultures versus inevitable variations within the predominant political culture. If the subcultures are competing, the distinction is clear; however, if their interests and principles are largely compatible, exactly where variations on a predominant political culture end and political subculture begins is uncertain.

In seeking enduring patterns of behavior over time, just how far back in time one should venture depends on the intended extent of the study and the consistency and reliability of available resources. The period covered needs to be sufficiently long enough for possible patterns to emerge, of course, which would mean at least five or six generations. For this brief overview, the early nineteenth century is a realistic starting point, as it was a time when European travel and thus reporting—though at times biased—had dramatically increased. This period also offers comparative views with colonial and postcolonial eras, allowing sufficient perspective for noting patterns of liberty/coercion and equality/hierarchy in the cases used for this discussion—Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya.

Observing Political Culture

This preliminary look at patterns of political culture over time involves polities with relatively small populations. Somaliland, Puntland, and southern Somalia have a combined population of approximately 11 million, divided as 3.5 million, 4 million, and 3.5 million, respectively.¹⁷ Tunisia has a total population of about 11 million as well, and Libya's population is slightly more than 6 million, so there is some degree of comparability between them. Granted Libya's and Tunisia's populations are significantly less homogenous than the Somali polities are assumed to be, yet Somali clan identity has more priority than any overarching sense of homogeneity and thus makes for reasonable comparison to the other two countries.¹⁸ Admittedly, each of these cases has a much richer and more complex history than can be presented here, but this exercise only illustrates broad patterns that might lead to more in-depth study.

The Somali Experience

In 1991, upon the overthrowing of Mohamed Siad Barre, the country's dictator of 22 years, the Somali Democratic Republic fragmented into three main entities, ultimately becoming Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland in the northeast, and southern Somalia, which remained conflictual and is so at present.¹⁹ Each entity acted autonomously at the time. Although the past 25 years has not been a smooth road for any of them, the two northern polities have been predominantly quiet while the south has been persistently dominated by

armed conflict.²⁰ The south's conflict has changed in terms of actors, but not in any appreciable reduction of violence. In the north, any episodes of conflict were negligible in scale and duration, never approaching that of the south. The continuous violence in the south, in fact, is unprecedented in Somali history.²¹ Despite any apparent parity between the three entities in terms of ethnicity, clan system, culture, and religion, the regional variations between them do not sufficiently account for such divergent political outcomes.²²

This political disparity between the two northern regions and the south invites a historical political culture perspective. The three contemporary Somali polities share some similarities with their respective historical counterparts during the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, not only in terms of regional space but also in terms of liberty/coercion and equality/hierarchy. The ways in which people organized themselves, their treatment by and reactions to those claiming authority over them, and how they cooperated internally all have implications, which are reflected in circumstances today. Briefly reviewing the polities individually highlights these significant overarching differences.

Somaliland

Created through a series of interclan meetings that began in 1991 and occurred for approximately two and a half years, Somaliland came into being as a fledgling liberal government. During this crucial time, and despite the numerical predominance of one clan, efforts to include other clans were immediately palpable and woven into the future government.²³ Although various problems have surfaced since, the hard fact remains that for 25 years there has been no descent into prolonged violence, and relatively speaking, Somaliland has certainly evolved for the better.²⁴

In this northwest area, governance until 1885 was a patchwork of rather relaxed, suzerain-type arrangements with limited incidents of violence. From early in the century, Somali coastal export trade through bustling seasonal markets was paramount. During this period, none of the overseeing government arrangements were in place long enough to take over the trade or the Somalis themselves.²⁵ The activities in the primary coastal markets varied over time and from one coastal market center to the next, with perhaps Berbera representing the apex of significant commercial skills and organization. Several thousand camels arrived with inland caravans, more than 70 ships from ports near and far were anchored offshore, and 5,000 temporary traders' huts were built annually. Trade would have been impossible to have taken place at all, expand, or persist without a variety of well-developed administrative and organizational skills. The need for these skills was not limited to the ports along the coast, but inland people also used them for such activities as bartering along caravan

routes and intricately herding large numbers of livestock to the ports to ensure they arrive in good health.²⁶

Trade increased exponentially after a British garrison was established in 1839 at Aden in modern-day Yemen, only a day's sailing from the Somali coast. When rephrased as cooperative and collaborative decision making and organizational proficiency, these skills created a market context of pragmatic egalitarian relations. There was no place for divisive behavior interfering with the business of trade; even fighting that arose from disagreements was regulated and permitted only at a prescribed distance from the market itself.²⁷ In this instance, Diamond's list of skills required for democracy—moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, *and* participation—was also crucial to the successful longevity of the markets.²⁸

These market skills were expressed through increasing political engagement and organization from 1885 to 1940, when the British formally established a large part of the northern coastline and its hinterland as a protectorate, but not for the purposes of colonization.²⁹ On a limited budget, the result was tentative and unambitious administrative rule that allowed the Somalis to continue their lively export trade similar to past decades.³⁰ No matter if they were forming charitable or political organizations, refusing to comply with direct orders as civil servants or military recruits, serving as British administration-employed arbiters, or demonstrating against unwanted administration interferences, the autonomy required to do so and the skills for organizing themselves was unmistakable.

Persisting into the underfunded postcolonial period from 1940 to 1960, limited British aid and Somali self-sufficiency saw the people through even famine and drought.³¹ Preparations for independence that the British were obligated to provide by United Nations (UN) agreement moved at a plodding rate. After attaining independence in 1960, the people proved to be sufficiently self-contained and voted overwhelmingly against the proposed constitution for the new Somali state.³² Through voting ambiguities this decision was disregarded, but the historical capacity for, and indeed habit of, self-reliance was undiminished. Marginalized during the new Somali Republic's brief attempt at democracy (1960–69), dormant political skills soon resurfaced after Barre assumed power and slowly tightened his grip on the north. Pockets of resistance emerged over time, and Barre's 1988 bombing of the northern city of Hargeisa was the beginning of his end; only two and a half years later, his departure signaled the birth of Somaliland. The history of the polity's foundation demonstrates a clear sense of several forms of autonomy crossing over several generations and a rather pragmatic equality born first from the necessities of commerce and then of political expediency.

Puntland

The path that led to the birth of Puntland was one of fits and starts. After the united, independent Somalia disintegration in 1991, and following various efforts at autonomous rule, Puntland came into being in 1998. Several short-lived administrations attempted to promote at least some semblance of inclusive autonomy previous to this, yet none involved protracted violence nor any lasting attempts at coercive rule. In the midst of political infighting, charges of corruption, surreptitious links to pirates, and more, the people's overall determination to avoid armed conflict and yet organize politically, seemed to suggest an intrinsic pattern towards liberal values. Today, Puntland is a struggling autonomous state with its own government and constitution, multiparty politics, legal system, lively economy, active media, access to education, and other attributes expected of a modern state. At the time of this writing, Puntland's military forces successfully and impressively countered an attempted infiltration by al-Shabaab, killing 100 of its fighters and injuring more than 50.³³

The nineteenth century, however, began with people living in a harsh and demanding physical environment, one to which they had capably adapted survival strategies during the past several centuries. Even with infrequent trade and coastal dependence on a rather unique and localized *shipwreck economy*, life was a bleak, daily survival challenge that relied on mutual cooperation and alliances rather than overt competition for resources.³⁴ Historian Wayne K. Durrill observed that "when the rains failed, no one died of starvation, and no general warfare ensued."³⁵ The enduring and carefully balanced relationship between the people and their environment changed rapidly upon the 1839 establishment of the British garrison at Aden. Provoking a leap in export trade all along the northern coastline within five short years, the region went from no livestock exports in 1839 to 15,000 head in 1844 and from more than 700 tons of gum in 1843 to an estimated 1,000–1,500 tons by 1856.³⁶ Within 20 years, a string of internal conflicts arose about depleted resources within an already resource-strained environment during periods of drought and famine.³⁷ The profound departure from the countless generations of cooperation and alliance building to maintain subsistence conditions was not a long-lasting effort; within 20 years after internal conflicts began, the clans of the northeast salvaged the remains of their former capacity for cooperation and alliance building, and transformed them to face a different challenge: Italian colonialism.

Starting in 1885, Italian efforts toward colonization dominated the lives of the northeastern Somali clans. In 1888 and 1889, the leadership from the two major sultanates, Obbia and Majeerteen, signed agreements to become Italian protectorates in return for autonomy and other concessions from the Italians, including, rather remarkably, weapons.³⁸ Overall, it was a period of sporadic internal conflicts and rivalries, increasing demands from the Italians, and con-

tentious encounters with the nationalist religious leader Mohammed Abdullah Hassan (a.k.a. Sayyid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan). Along the northern coastline, active trade still took place, but as a sign of the times, small and large forts were built in key locations. The Somali leadership complied with the Italians when they could, but since there was little experience with or appetite for direct rule, they militarily opposed any moves that appeared too demanding. With old rivals at times agreeing to cooperate against Italy, significant organized resistance to Italian rule continued into the 1920s and lasted until the Italians left in 1941. This resistance was characterized by consistency and unity of purpose throughout the colonial period.

With little incident, the clans of the northeast moved through the post-colonial period. In 1949, the UN decided that Italy would be tasked with preparing its former colony, now a UN trust territory, for independence targeted for 1960. Although the south and the northeast were thereby technically under the remit of Italy, the northeast's great distance from the south, approximately 500 miles, afforded the two regions an unintended autonomy. This sovereignty continued after independence when the new government limited their attention toward and interfered even less in the region. Perhaps the relative isolation, limited resources, and small population were blessings in disguise since they facilitated this neglect. It is no small wonder that the first open resistance to Barre's 1969 coup that took place in the 1970s was based in this region.³⁹ Puntland reflects the heritage of a largely uninterrupted experience with autonomous life, the persistent capacity for self-sufficiency, and the capacity to cooperate in, adapt to, thrive despite of, and defy throughout changing contexts, similar to the experiences of the residents in Somaliland but in a different environment.

Southern Somalia

Southern Somalia has differed from the two northern areas in several ways, most notably by 200 years of a largely uninterrupted chain of external and internal coercion and conflicts as well as natural disasters and other challenges. The region's state of constant flux can be observed when working back in time—beginning when Barre fled the country in 1991 and southern Somalia fell into well-armed, clan-based divisions that competed for power, territory, and goods at a wanton level for several years. The most common figures estimate 500,000 fatalities from 1991 to about 2008.⁴⁰ Clan faction violence was replaced eventually by the violence of al-Shabaab, then a fledgling religious extremist group. As of this writing, al-Shabaab's activity fluctuates, and its members have claimed responsibility for several acts of terrorism.⁴¹ Although the context and actors have changed, the trend toward violent coercion that characterizes southern Somalia's past 25 years dominated by armed conflict and its accompanying instability has remained.

The 30 years preceding 1991 was another period marked with instability, conflict, and sluggish political progress. A weak democratic government began in 1960, ruled 9 years, and was followed by 20 years of Barre's increasingly stormy dictatorship, but this relative instability can be traced back further. Decades of internal political, violent outbreaks preceded independence, and indeed, UN observers commented then that the Somalis in the south were not sufficiently prepared for independence.⁴² The colonial era saw southern Somalis initially living under Italian rule and Italian Fascist rule by 1923. Afterward, racially oppressive, apartheid-like laws were passed and the people were living the very lives their forebears had long feared; inhumane punishments were often meted out to those who openly opposed the Italians, and the Somali population at large was unable to effectively resist.⁴³

One of the ostensible main issues during the colonial era revolved around abolishing slavery—necessary according to international agreement, yet replaced with an indentured system that was “indistinguishable from slavery.”⁴⁴ Slavery was a uniquely southern Somali holdover from the nineteenth century, when the lush inter-riverine region west of Mogadishu was used to grow an array of crops for export and thousands of slaves were depended on to work the land. Once Italy legislated that Somalis were no longer allowed to own land, both the Somalis and their slaves either found ways to fend for themselves on less choice land or adopted other means of livelihood. In a curious twist of fate, former Somali slave owners found themselves working the land.

The immediate precolonial period was similarly restrictive, unsettling, and very different from the relative autonomy and collaborative habits of the Somalis in the north. The entire Benadir region had long been under the rule of Omani Arabs based in Zanzibar, about 750 miles south of Mogadishu.⁴⁵ The south had no vast markets as did the north; instead, Indian and Arab traders dominated the Benadir ports, and Somalis, in general, were simply not welcome. Although Somalis did indeed engage in inland trade, they stopped well short of the coast, and middlemen would complete the journey of their wares and produce for export. Moreover, this system was in no way comparable to the north; for example, caravans were observed to be only twenty camels long.⁴⁶

From natural disasters to intrusions from Zanzibar, internal conflicts, and the significant Baardheere jihad, there was never more than five years before some catastrophe or violent interference took place, and sometimes several disruptive events took place concurrently.⁴⁷ For the southern Somalis, the pattern of life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was so immersed in conflict and division that whatever small gains were made throughout this time never found sufficient traction. In the nearly 200 years leading up to 1991, the people of the southern Somali clans had little experience with stable, inclusive, or autonomous living.

Tunisia and Libya

The brief review of Tunisia and Libya is only undertaken to grasp a broad, overall understanding of the political culture approach. A deeper study would involve the multiple layers of actors in ever-shifting roles, regional differences, and changes in context, circumstances, objectives, and stakeholders. By taking a few steps back and viewing the wider landscape in terms of selected themes, however, these two cases emerge as interesting but contrasting examples in spite of being contiguous and having been part of the Ottoman Empire.

Tunisia has proven to be the one positive result of the Arab Spring, a peptunia in the MENA onion patch. As the country that initiated the round of defiance toward authoritarian regimes in December 2010, it is now a place where “pro-democracy reverberations produce jitters in nondemocratic regimes.”⁴⁸ Indeed, 67.27 percent of eligible registered voters participated in the national election in November 2014, although the sector comprised of disenchanted and disenfranchised younger voters did not participate as much as was hoped.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, the country’s 2014 constitution, which includes liberal rights for women, is understood to have been the result of a type of *bargain politics* that allowed for power sharing and very consciously avoided Islamist extremism.⁵⁰

Even more interesting is the decision on the part of those opposing the 24 years of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s autocratic rule as president (1987–2011) to adhere to an unwavering commitment to nonviolence. Because of this commitment, the opposition in Tunisia is unquestionably credited with “achieving the most amount of political change for the lowest cost in terms of bloodshed.”⁵¹ The opposition’s aversion to armed reaction is significant, particularly when its members appear to have been baited to resort to it. Such resistance deserves a closer look, especially in view of nonviolence being considered more as “an ingrained tradition” than a practical realization of an opponent’s military superiority.⁵² The opposition’s success required an appreciable number of the skills involved with autonomous strategizing, logistics, negotiation, compromise, and long-term thinking in an atmosphere that is, and must be, inclusive: nonviolent action requires broad participation.

Previously, Tunisia had been part of the Ottoman Empire that was treated as an autonomous province for more than 200 years, from the sixteenth century until 1881, when the French established it as a protectorate. During most of the Husaynid Dynasty, which remained in place as sovereign rulers from 1705 until the French arrived, Tunisia was significantly stable, even in the midst of unsuccessful provocations that included attempted attack from Algeria in 1807 and the revolt of a military class called the janissaries in 1811.⁵³ For almost 20 years, Ahmad ibn Mustafa ruled as Bey (governor) of Tunisia (1837–55). Open to increasing European influence and ties, Ahmad initiated several legal reforms. Among the most significant reforms were the abolition of the slave

trade in 1841 and then the abolishment of slavery itself in 1846. During this time, Tunis was an important center of commerce and on the path toward becoming a modern city in the coming decades.

After generations of autonomous rule, the ambitions for independence from France arose in the early twentieth century are of little surprise. Slowly evolving into a force to be reckoned with, the people ultimately achieved success by 1956. With the exception of some small-scale civil disturbances and the wounding and killing of hundreds of demonstrators in 1938, the pattern of life for most Tunisians had been relatively without incident and increasingly progressive for several generations. A somewhat liberalized autocracy led by President Habib Bourguiba (1957–87), the polity was strongly intolerant of critical journalists, but eager to establish a secular state; modern, liberal civil rights (especially for women); and other advances for 31 years. By 1987, Bourguiba was removed from office rather quietly due to health reasons and replaced by Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.

The new presidency began in 1987 with democratic intentions and political reforms, but slowly shifted into 24 years of various abuses, an overall level of corruption described by political scientist and Middle East specialist Lisa Anderson as “personalist . . . predatory . . . breathtaking.”⁵⁴ Resistance to this shift was quietly accumulating, and by 2011, Ben Ali was compelled to flee the country amid pending arrest. Tunisia was ripe for significant change, and those behind the changes were not from any single sector of society. As the noted scholar Michael J. Willis observes “the heterogeneity of the different sections of Tunisian society . . . [i]tinerant vegetable sellers, lawyers, agricultural workers, trades unionists, computer technicians, football supporters, academics, and the urban unemployed came together to oust Ben Ali and his system.”⁵⁵ Thus, Ben Ali not only agitated people across several sectors of society, but did this so thoroughly that all sectors were sufficiently effected to collectively, but non-violently, act against him.

The fact that nonviolent change emerged after 55 years of liberal autocracy suggests it had been quietly growing all along, just below the surface and perhaps with seeds that had been sown in generations past. Sitting on a foundation of historical autonomous rule, some progressive leanings, and decades of striving for independence, the terms of Bourguiba and Ben Ali were sufficiently tolerant, or careless, to have not completely crushed popular political will. The people’s participation and support across society also accounts for Tunisia’s success. Recent improvements in media freedom have also been a positive sign.⁵⁶ Tunisia, however, is still a work in progress, and is not without problems. Concerns about contemporary power rivalries and the marginalization of youth and the grassroots groups behind nonviolent changes take place

in an atmosphere where those in power have witnessed the tenacious resolve and political capacity of these groups.⁵⁷

Contemporary Libya has had very different historical circumstances. Since the death of Muammar “King of Kings” Qaddafi in October 2011, the country has not found its way toward a unified liberal state or unified state of any kind.⁵⁸ Rather, Libya has been afflicted with various problems such as regional fragmentation and fragmented authority, several hundred armed militia groups meting out their own ideas of justice, all kinds of smuggling, and the growing presence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).⁵⁹ Although nonviolent demonstrations, diverse political parties, and local nongovernment organizations have been present, the overriding and inescapable predominance of violent conflict renders nonviolent efforts inadequate to meet the challenges that the, almost infectious, ongoing violence presents.⁶⁰

The continued predominance of social division and violence is not only a contemporary problem, but part of a tightly linked chain spanning several generations. Unlike Tunisians, Libyans have a difficult time identifying more than a few consecutive years of peace and stability. Yet, similar to Tunisia, the Tripoli region, Tripolitania, acted autonomously from the ruling Ottoman Empire from the early 1700s to the mid-1800s. Without the Ottoman government providing direction, however, coups occurred so frequently that emerging leaders rarely stayed in place for more than a year. With the region’s economy partly reliant on income from corsairs who forced passing ships to pay tribute, the occurrences of the First and Second Barbary Wars in the early nineteenth century were hardly surprising. All of this turmoil served as a troubling foundation for the political future.

Ending piracy by the 1820s allowed a few years of respite before civil war between three sons of the previous ruler erupted in the early 1830s. The Ottoman sultan intervened to end the conflict, but order was never truly restored and tribal resistance from different groups with different aims continued until about 1858, when the last revolt leader died.⁶¹ His death led to the end of local rule and the beginning of direct Ottoman control, about 50 years of which brought significant modernization in Tripoli and a period of stability and relative peace. In sum, 150 years of turbulent coercion under a dysfunctional and despotic autonomy was more or less rescued by about 50 years of progressive but absolute rule from Constantinople as the seat of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Small pockets of resistance rose and fell as Tunisia rolled into the early twentieth century.

After the end of the Italo-Turkish War (1911–12), Italy turned its colonizing ambitions to Libya, gained control, and renamed the territory Italian North Africa. Efforts to colonize were accompanied by eventually setting up 5

major and 10 minor concentration camps for those who resisted or were simply Bedouins living in tents.⁶² As Italy continued building its empire, particularly coercive, divisive, and oppressive methods were employed with large numbers of deportations and punitive killings occurred, and high mortality rates were seen at the concentration camps.⁶³ Italy went through its own political struggles because of the First World War, and re-emerged as a Fascist state with a more strident inclination to dominate territories and people than ever. Consequently, Libyan attempts at organized resistance were effectively defeated in 1931, yet the man who was to become Libya's first king, Idris I (1951–69), continued to lead resistance from exile in Egypt between the two world wars.

Upon its defeat in WWII, Italy relinquished claims to Libya, which became an independent state in 1951 with UN membership in 1955. The new Libyan government appeared to be off to a solid start with a constitution that formally championed a range of rights in regard to equality, civil and political rights, and more, with Article 11's well-known phrase "without distinction of religion, belief, race, language, wealth, kinship or political or social opinions." Despite such promising beginnings, King Idris proved to be somewhat autocratic, and was losing support among the population by the late 1960s. The recently discovered oil wealth had led to more centralized government and almost inevitable corruption within Idris's well-established patronage network. Ruling from 1951 to 1969, and often frustrated by various events around him, the king attempted to abdicate and establish a republic more than once. In 1969, Idris stepped aside under the ruse of needing medical treatment in Turkey, creating space for Qaddafi to take over.

Qaddafi's reign and fall is complex, well-documented, and not delved into here.⁶⁴ What can be said is that, partly, due to Qaddafi's nationalization of the oil industry, he was able on the one hand to dramatically raise the living standards of the Libyan people to the highest in Africa and indeed higher than in many parts of the world.⁶⁵ On the other hand, Qaddafi's erratic leadership, radical social reforms, human rights abuses, armed militant group support, and intensely anti-Western stance cast a dark shadow on his more than 40 years in power.⁶⁶ In the twenty-first century, Qaddafi was more receptive to the West, but there was widespread discontent among the broader population. Galvanized by the Arab Spring in Tunisia, an armed resistance arose, and by August 2011, Qaddafi had been killed in an ambush. Since then, Libya has been fragmented, leaving an alarming power vacuum. Looking back, persistent nascent resistance attempts have failed to gain ground, yet resistance has also failed to be completely defeated, and instead doggedly resurfaces time and again. This resilience suggests an enduring political subculture that has managed to survive over time and has not yet had the opportunity to fully mature.

Applying Political Culture

At first glance, the preceding overviews appear to be not much more than general historical summaries. Compiled with a political culture lens, they offer some perspectives that otherwise might be easily overlooked or lost among competing information. At the very least, even a rudimentary political culture approach informs us and the tangible grasp of prevailing patterns, whether patterns of liberty/coercion or equality/hierarchy, becomes more than a mere history lesson; it reveals the nature and extent of those patterns through several generations and their possible meaning in the present. The history tells us about the overriding forces that a people have collectively lived through, what engendered their experiences. Significantly, coercion observed at one level has limited bearing because it is experienced by both perpetrator and victim. Of course, at another level, the political subcultures of perpetrators and victims can be further examined, but no matter if it is violence or cooperation, inclusive or exclusive practices, an informing first step is a macroscopic one that recognizes and characterizes the overarching, collective experience. Undoubtedly, both macroscopic and microscopic political culture each have their own stories to tell; there is no logic in faulting one for not performing the tasks of the other.

With the Somali cases, even a cursory look highlights their differing paths. The Somalis in contemporary Somaliland live pangenerationally with self-reliance, minimal violent coercion, and limited exclusion or hierarchy, all contributing to an environment, which in the long run, has been surprisingly stable. southern Somalis experience quite the opposite: pangenerational living with constant hardships, violent intrusions, and exclusionary treatment practiced both by and toward them, contributing to an environment that has been almost monotonously traumatic. Somalis in the northeast experience something in between, but more akin to their northwest neighbors. These trends—positive or negative—will not necessarily continue indefinitely, but do signal that it will take some considerable undoing to change them, which can in turn guide more than just expectations.

Tunisia and Libya have some similarities with the Somali cases. While Tunisian resistance had a conscious commitment to nonviolence, armed violence in Somaliland, past and present, has been limited and historically avoided overall. And although both Tunisia and Libya were autonomous parts of the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia's experiences in the nineteenth century were generally uneventful in terms of armed violence, and dotted with such highlights as Tunis's commercial importance, modern reforms, and ending of slavery that continued through their experience as a French protectorate. Amid advancements in the infrastructure, a liberation struggle against the French was organically develop-

ing. The struggle was not without conflict, but it never escalated to large-scale, ongoing, violent conflict. In this way, Somaliland's experiences during the nineteenth century can be similarly characterized with the British administration era, although the Tunisian liberation movement was more prevalent early on. After independence in 1956 and until 2011, Tunisians lived under somewhat liberalized autocracies under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, interestingly enough, with both men ousted without armed violence. During their terms in office, popular aspirations toward a more liberal political life never disappeared, and were present through various walks of life as evidenced by the varying groups involved in the 2011 revolution. Although Tunisia is yet on the cusp of a unified government, it nevertheless has made great gains in a short amount of time as Somaliland did by 1995.⁶⁷

Contemporary Libya is not unlike southern Somalia's past and present in terms of political fragmentation, armed militias with their own agendas, little sense of a shared or unified national identity, and the increasing presence of armed and violent Islamic extremists. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as part of the Ottoman Empire, it had few years of peace or stability, coups took place almost annually, civil war erupted, and it economically depended on piracy at different points. After deciding that direct Ottoman rule was needed, Libyans found the resultant 50 years of relatively uneventful rule was not sufficient enough of a foundation to deflect, or weather the coming storm of, the harsh rule from imperialist, and later Fascist, Italy. Despite both southern Somalia and Libya experiencing Italian Fascist rule differently, the effect of living in such coercive environments was similar in both cases: people in those countries were not prepared for self-rule and unable to affect positive change. In Libya's case, King Idris was elected by a national congress in 1951, but similar to southern Somalia, in less than 10 years his government was losing credibility. Idris was overthrown by 1969; his 18 years of unsatisfactory leadership was followed by 40 years of the troubled dictatorship of Qaddafi, which left the Libyan populace with the political fragmentation and culture of violence seen today. At what point in time might the Libyans, or the southern Somalis, have had the opportunity to develop and nurture a widespread and consistent political culture of autonomy and inclusiveness?

Conclusion

More work needs to be done on the concept of political culture, of course, such as identifying whether a certain critical population mass is required before one can claim the prevailing political culture and determining the relative weight of political subcultures and competing political cultures. Also, the role of national versus tribal identities, or that of any other group identity including gender, needs to be examined.⁶⁸ A comparative look at the role of women in

Tunisia versus Libya might reveal if women were decisive to the Tunisian success.⁶⁹ Moreover, consideration needs to be given to bias in historical reporting as well as accusations of historical determinism.

Because political culture analysis focuses on any politically relevant patterns that have developed over time, identifying and understanding them opens the door for how best to foster or marginalize their development in the present. In this way, a people's future is not locked into their past, and instead, openings for well-grounded change can be recognized and acted upon. Guided by a political culture approach, policy decisions can be made based on the knowledge of the nature of the political culture current circumstances were born out of and how severe and deeply entrenched the cultures are. A political culture approach is not meant to replace or compete with other types of analysis, but work cooperatively with them to articulate a more informed future.

Notes

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1. Dominic Tierney, "The Legacy of Obama's 'Worst Mistake,'" *The Atlantic*, 15 April 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/>.
2. Jefferey Frank, "Hillary Clinton's Baffling Foreign-Policy Problem," *New Yorker*, 30 December 2015, <http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/hillary-clintons-baffling-foreign-policy-problem>.
3. Werner Jaeger quotes Plato in referring to paideia as a form of education, " 'which makes men passionately desire to become perfect citizens, knowing both how to rule and how to be ruled on a basis of justice.' " *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. I, *Archaic Greece: The Mind of Athens*, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 113.
4. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Anchor Books, 1968), 287, 305, n. 8. See also James Ceaser, "Alexis de Tocqueville on Political Science, Political Culture, and the Role of the Intellectual," *American Political Science Review* 79, no. 3 (1985): 656–72, doi:10.2307/1956836.
5. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 31.
6. Most notable among these would be Gabriel A. Almond's article "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics* 18, no. 3 (August 1956), 391–409.
7. See, for example, Ron Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (1988): 1203–30, doi:10.2307/1961756; and Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
8. Lucien W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 7.
9. Larry Diamond, "Causes and Effects" in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 230.
10. Ibid.
11. Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy," in *Political Culture and Democracy*, 7.
12. Stephen Welch, "Political Culture: Approaches and Prospects," in *Intelligence Elsewhere*:

- Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*, ed. Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 15.
13. Harry H. Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," in *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (1988): 791. Almond also referred to orientations in his early work; see Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," 396.
 14. Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change."
 15. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," 21–23.
 16. *Ibid.*, 16–17.
 17. Sources are inconsistent, but total population for all three areas ranges from more than 10 million to more than 12 million.
 18. I. M. Lewis, "Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 74, no. 4 (2004): 511.
 19. There have been numerous attempts at localized autonomy, but it is Somaliland, Puntland, and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) that have persisted, admittedly with the FGS the most recent in a series of attempted governments. "Southern Somalia" here is meant to indicate the territory south of Puntland, which is presently governed by the FGS. Because its borders closer to Kenya are and have been in flux rather persistently due to al-Shabaab and attempts at autonomous government, it is difficult to specify precise boundaries.
 20. In methodological terms, the three cases offer almost ideal cross-case comparison as well as variation in outcome; such conditions are uncommon.
 21. Abdi Ismail Samatar commented in his 1992 article, "at no time in the recorded history of Somalia has nearly one-third to one-half of the population died or been in danger of perishing due to famine caused by civil war. This calamity surpasses all previous ones and has most appropriately been called 'Dad Cunkii', the era of cannibalism." Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 4 (1992): 625.
 22. The frequently changing intricacies of interclan and intraclan politics as well as debates about clan influences on contemporary politics constitute a separate work in and of itself and so cannot be covered here.
 23. The details of this period are exhaustively covered in Michael Walls, *A Somali Nation-State: History, Culture, and Somaliland's Political Transition* (Pisa, Italy: Ponte Invisible, 2014), 161–204. See also by Walls, "The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland," *African Affairs* 108, no. 432 (2009): 371–89, doi:10.1093/afraf/adp019. An alternative view of the process is found in Dominik Balthasar, "Somaliland's Best Kept Secret: Shrewd Politics and War Projects as Means of State-Making," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 2 (2013), 218–38, doi:10.1080/17531055.2013.777217.
 24. For a very recent and detailed analysis of contemporary Somaliland politics, see Sarah G. Phillips, "When Less Was More: External Assistance and the Political Settlement in Somaliland," *International Affairs* 92, no. 3 (2016): 629–45, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12601. For a less optimistic view, see the report by International Crisis Group, *Somaliland: The Strains of Success* (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015), [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/b113-somaliland-the-strains-of-success.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/b113-somaliland-the-strains-of-success.pdf).
 25. M. J. Fox, *The Roots of Somali Political Culture* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2015), 47.
 26. Pankhurst cites several nineteenth-century observers on the number of camels in the caravans, one reporting 4,000–5,000 camels at one point; see "The Trade of the Gulf of Aden Ports of Africa in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 3, no. 1 (1965): 45, 50. Another observer, Frederick Forbes, reported similarly in 1833, see Roy Bridges, "The Visit of Frederick Forbes to the Somali Coast in 1833," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 19, no. 4 (1986): 690, doi:10.2307/219140. Regarding the movement of livestock see Charles L. Gesheker, "Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern Horn of Africa before 1950," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 18, no. 1 (1985): 22, doi:10.2307/217972.
 27. Pankhurst, "Trade of the Gulf," 49.

28. Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy," 1.
29. This took place formally during the Berlin West Africa Conference (1884–85), when spheres of influence in Africa were agreed to by Great Britain, several other European states, the United States, and the Ottoman Empire.
30. This is discussed throughout Brock Millman, *British Somaliland: An Administrative History, 1920–1960* (London: Routledge, 2014).
31. *Ibid.*, 28–108, 161, 249–51.
32. Only about 15 percent of the northern population voted at all, and half of them opposed the constitution. Southern votes in favor of the constitution exceeded the total overall population for the area: 1,711,013 from a reported population of 1,300,000. See Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 87–88; and Gilbert Ware, "Somalia: From Trust Territory to Nation, 1950–1960," *Phylon* 26, no. 2 (1965): 173–85.
33. Fred Mukinda, "Three Kenyans Captured, 100 Al-Shabaab Killed in Puntland, Somalia," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 7 April 2016, <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Three-Kenyans-captured-fighting-for-Al-Shabaab/-/1056/3150434/-/rkdikcz/-/index.html>.
34. Wayne K. Durrill, "Atrocious Misery: The African Origins of Famine in Northern Somalia, 1839–1884," *American Historical Review* 91, no. 2 (1986): 287, doi:10.1086/ahr/91.2.287.
35. *Ibid.*, 289–90.
36. *Ibid.*, 299.
37. *Ibid.*, 301–6.
38. Obbia is also known as *Hoboyo*.
39. Lewis, "Visible and Invisible Differences," 503.
40. See "Secondary Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century," Necrometrics, February 2012, <http://necrometrics.com/20c300k.htm#Somalia>. For comparisons, see Bethany Lacina, *The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946–2008*, Version 4.0, ed. Bethany Lacina and Gabriel Uriarte (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2009), https://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/PRIObd3.0_documentation.pdf.
41. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for a large number of terrorist attacks, most notably the 2015 Garissa University attacks in northern Kenya, killing 147 students, and the 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi, where 72 people were killed. See Thomas Gaist, "Nairobi Westgate Mall Attack Death Toll Continues to Rise as FBI Deploys Agents to Kenya," Global Research Center for Research on Globalization, 27 September 2013, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/westgate-mall-attack-death-toll-continues-to-rise-as-fbi-deploys-agents-to-nairobi/5351724>.
42. Robert L. Hess, *Italian Colonialism in Somalia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 194.
43. Fox, *Roots of Somali*, 145–53.
44. Italy's ongoing obligations to suppress slavery were found within the Berlin Conference, the Brussels Conference Act of 1890, and various agreements with the Sultan of Zanzibar. Francis J. R. Rodd, *British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa: During the Years of 1941–47* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), 162.
45. Historically, the Benadir region along the southern Somali coast extended about 125 miles, paralleled the Shabelle River, and included Mogadishu and Barawe. Trade and commerce were active in the region.
46. Lee V. Cassanelli, *The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600–1900* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1982), 160.
47. Founded in 1819, the Baardeere jihad was an ambitious reformist religious movement that interfered with trade and was eventually defeated by the Sultan of Geledi in 1843.
48. Larbi Sadiki, "The Tunisian Elections: Toward an Arab Democratic Transition," Middle East Institute, 24 October 2014, <http://www.mei.edu/content/article/tunisian-elections-toward-arab-democratic-transition>.

49. See figures published by the electoral observer, *Legislative and Presidential Elections in Tunisia: Final Report, October, November and December 2014* (Atlanta, GA: Carter Center, 2014) 162, 62.
50. Sadiki, "Tunisian Elections," and for comparison, note 24 herein.
51. Michael J. Willis, "Revolt for Dignity: Tunisia's Revolution and Civil Resistance," in *Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters*, ed. Adam Roberts et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 30.
52. *Ibid.*, 31.
53. The janissaries were an elite military unit in the Ottoman Empire known for their discipline and internal solidarity. Due to corruption and other issues, the unit was abolished in 1826.
54. Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 2–7.
55. Willis, "Revolt for Dignity," 49.
56. Diana Moukalled, "On Arab Press Freedom, Tunisia Shows the Way," *Al Arabiya* (Dubai), 27 April 2016, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2016/04/27/On-Arab-press-freedom-Tunisia-shows-the-way.html>.
57. Chris Stephen, "The Tunisia Quartet: How an Impossible Alliance Saved the Country from Collapse," *Guardian* (Manchester), 8 December 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/08/tunisia-quartet-arab-spring-islamist-nobel-peace-prize>; Associated Press, "The Latest: Tunisia's Islamist Party Denounces Bus Attack, Urges Unity," *U.S. News & World Report*, 24 November 2015, <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/11/24/the-latest-blast-strikes-tunisia-presidential-guard-bus>; and Farah Samti, "Tunisia's Ruling Party Is Falling Apart," *Foreign Policy*, 3 December 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/03/tunisi-as-ruling-party-is-falling-apart/>.
58. About 200 African tribal leaders and kings assigned the title "King of Kings" to Muammar Qaddafi just before he was elected chairman of the African Union in February 2009; see "Gaddafi: Africa's 'King of Kings'," BBC News, 29 August 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7588033.stm>.
59. For examples of smuggling, see Patrick Kingsley, "Libya's People Smugglers: Inside the Trade that Sells Refugees Hopes of a Better Life," *Guardian* (Manchester), 24 April 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/24/libyas-people-smugglers-how-will-they-catch-us-theyll-soon-move-on>; *Libya: A Growing Hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara* (Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2015), <http://globalinitiative.net/libya-criminal-economies-and-terrorist-financing-in-the-trans-sahara/>; Associated Press, "Up to 3,000 Daesh Fighters in Libya, UN Experts Say," *Gulf News Libya* (Dubai), 2 December 2015, <http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/libya/up-to-3-000-daesh-fighters-in-libya-un-experts-say-1.1630612>; and Carol Morello, "Conference Tries to Avert Mayhem in Libya, 'the Next Emergency' after Syria," *Washington Post*, 13 December 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/conference-tries-to-avert-mayhem-in-libya-the-next-emergency-after-syria/2015/12/13/b402d248-9e9e-11e5-9ad2-568d814bbf3b_story.html.
60. Details and background on efforts at nonviolent resistance, both presently and during Qaddafi's reign, are fully explored in George Joffé, "Civil Resistance in Libya during the Arab Spring," in *Civil Resistance*, 116–40.
61. Anna Baldinetti, *The Origins of the Libyan Nation: Colonial Legacy, Exile and the Emergence of a New Nation-State* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2014), 28–29.
62. *Ibid.*, 48.
63. Precise figures are difficult to find, and what figures do exist are complex over time; see *ibid.*, 36–40.
64. See for example, Lindsey Hilsum, *Sandstorm: Libya in the Time of Revolution* (London: Faber & Faber, 2012).
65. Due to oil wealth, Qaddafi is credited with being able to dramatically raise living stan-

- dards as well as provide free public health care, adult literacy programs, education through the university level, electricity, and more.
66. Lisa Anderson cogently sums up an explanation for the longevity of Qaddafi's reign in *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 267–69.
 67. “Ennahdha Welcomes President Caïd Essebsi's Initiative to Form National Unity Gov't,” Agency Tunis Afrique Press, 6 April 2016, <http://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Politics/7657356-ennahdha-welcomes-president-caid?>
 68. See Amal Obeidi's interesting concluding discussion on identity from the 1990s in *Political Culture in Libya* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), 199–214.
 69. Mehrezia Labidi, “Tunisia's Women Are at the Heart of Its Revolution,” *Guardian* (Manchester), 23 March 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/23/tunisia-women-revolution>; and Nadia Marzouki, “From People to Citizens in Tunisia,” *Middle East Report* 259, no. 41 (Summer 2011): 16–19.