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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-06-2018	2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 25-07-2017 to 15-06-2018
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sitting with the Enemy: How to Integrate a Former Violent Group into Government	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Bernabe F. Whitfield, US Air Force	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School 7800 Hampton Blvd Norfolk, VA 23511-1702	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
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9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Not for Commercial Use without the express written permission of the author.

14. ABSTRACT
It has been 17 years since the deployment of the United States armed forces to Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, and American military forces continue to operate in Afghanistan in a conflict with no foreseeable end. One way for the U.S. to withdraw is to cooperate with former belligerents in an attempt to stabilize the government of Afghanistan. This is problematic but other states have integrated former violent groups into government as a means to end the violence. Therefore, this thesis analyzes how to integrate a former violent group into government, and how those processes can apply to integrate the Taliban back into the government of Afghanistan, and end the conflict. The thesis analyzes four cases, namely the FARC and IRA as a success, and the MILF and Hezbollah as a mixed success to integrate into government. Both the governments and violent groups had to agree to negotiate peacefully, and each violent group had to cease violent and coercive acts. Both parties made concessions on issues such as violent groups giving up ruling by Shari'a law, and governments allowing the possession of arms, while other groups conceded to disarming. All four groups integrated into government in varying degrees, and this thesis provides recommendations to integrate the Taliban back into the Afghanistan government.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Integrating Violent Groups into Government

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unlimited	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 58	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Bernabe F. Whitfield, Lt Col, USAF
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (757) 443-6307

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



Sitting with the Enemy: How to Integrate a Former Violent Group into Government

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Sitting with the Enemy: How to Integrate a Former Violent Group into Government


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense. This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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Abstract

It has been 17 years since the deployment of the United States armed forces to Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, and American military forces continue to operate in Afghanistan in a conflict with no foreseeable end. One way for the U.S. to withdraw is to cooperate with former belligerents in an attempt to stabilize the government of Afghanistan. This is problematic but other states have integrated former violent groups into government as a means to end the violence. Therefore, this thesis analyzes how to integrate a former violent group into government, and how those processes can apply to integrate the Taliban back into the government of Afghanistan, and end the conflict. The thesis analyzes four cases, namely the FARC and IRA as a success, and the MILF and Hezbollah as a mixed success to integrate into government. Both the governments and violent groups had to agree to negotiate peacefully, and each violent group had to cease violent and coercive acts. Both parties made concessions on issues such as violent groups giving up ruling by Shari'a law, and governments allowing the possession of arms, while other groups conceded to disarming. All four groups integrated into government in varying degrees, and this thesis provides recommendations to integrate the Taliban back into the Afghanistan government.

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Chapter One – Introduction

“The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, liberty, and peace. But in the face of American aggression they have risen up, united as one man.”

-- **Ho Chi Minh**¹

Since the attack by al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001, United States (U.S.) military forces have been in a protracted conflict to combat terrorism in Afghanistan. Since the U.S.’ initial engagement on 7 October 2001, Afghanistan has encountered the strengthening of the Taliban and continuous activity by al-Qaeda. The U.S. conducted operations in Afghanistan for over sixteen years, and killed numerous members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, to include Osama bin Laden. The U.S. is now fighting the sons, and perhaps grandsons, of those members the U.S. previously killed. Why is the U.S. still in Afghanistan, and why are the Afghan people not governing their own country without a U.S. presence or influence to establish a democracy? This scenario sounds all too familiar as one looks back in history, as there are strong resemblances when the U.S. attempted to democratize the government in South Vietnam.

According to Matthew Lee and Alex Brandon, the former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited with the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, among other senior members, in Afghanistan and stated, “there is a place for moderate elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan's government as long as they renounce violence and terrorism and commit to stability.” As well as, there are Taliban members who no longer wish to continue fighting, nor do they want their children to continue fighting. Additionally, Secretary

¹ James H. Willbanks, ed, *Vietnam War: The Essential Reference Guide*, ABC-CLIO, 2013. “Gale Virtual Reference Library,” <http://link.galegroup.com/apps/pub/6CHE/GVRL?u=wash60683&sid=GVRL> (accessed January 17, 2018).

Tillerson stated there are certain requirements the Taliban should comply with regarding participation within the Afghan government. One, the Taliban should prepare to negotiate with the Afghan government. Two, the Taliban must renounce terrorism. Three, the Taliban must renounce violence. Four, the Taliban must commit to the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan.²

Using Tillerson's requirements as a starting point, this thesis analyzes how to integrate a former violent group into government, and how the processes used can apply to integrating the Taliban back into the government of Afghanistan and end the armed conflict. It analyzes why the U.S. and international community should enable the Afghan leadership to integrate the Taliban into their government. By analyzing four cases, the goal is to identify how these states integrated terrorist groups into their government. After doing so, this research evaluates whether any of those processes are feasible for integrating the Taliban back into the Afghan government. After the four states integrated terrorist groups into their government, the major conflicts ceased.

Although their organizations are not perfect, the important aspect of all four states was the ability to stabilize the state and end the conflict after terror group integration into their government. This thesis assumes if the government of Afghanistan integrates the Taliban as a political party, and develops a hybrid government with the Taliban taking appropriate seats of government, the conflict will cease, and the country of Afghanistan will stabilize enough for the U.S. to withdraw forces.

The rest of this thesis organization is as follows. Chapter two discusses the

² Matthew Lee and Alex Brandon, Associated Press, Microsoft Network News, msn.com, 23 October 2017, <https://www.apnews.com/60dc8a96d22a42dfba5a05b387dd418a/Tillerson-says-room-for-Taliban-in-Afghan-government> (accessed October 23, 2017).

background of the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Taliban. This chapter also details why the U.S. and Afghan leadership should work with and integrate the Afghan Taliban into the Afghan government. This chapter also provides details of the research methods to analyze the cases. Chapter three details two cases regarding the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and the Irish Republican Army, as a successful integration into their government as a political party. Chapter four details two cases regarding Hezbollah and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, as a mixed success of integration into their government as a political party. Chapter five provides an analysis of the four case studies. Chapter six provides details on integrating the Afghan Taliban into the Afghan government. Lastly, chapter seven provides conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter Two – Background and Methods

There are two different Taliban groups, with two different objectives: The Afghani Taliban group, which developed after the Soviet departure from Afghanistan, and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or the Pakistani Taliban group, which established itself in 2007.¹ After withdrawal of the Soviet military in 1989, Afghanistan became a state of impending collapse and entered into civil war with competing tribal Warlords dueling for power. Of the warring parties during the civil war, several warlords controlled various regions of Afghanistan.²

Among all these warlords, according to Ahmed Rashid, the social, political, and economic environment were in a state of disorder and violence. The warlords removed occupants and seized homes, farms, and businesses.³ The acts of disorder and violence included robbery, fighting, kidnappings of boys and girls for sexual pleasure, selling of goods and equipment from merchants for money, and many other acts of violence. The Taliban originated from amid the lowland Pashtuns from the region of Kandahar,⁴ and consisted of a group of young Pashtun men, former Mujahedeen, and those who deserted from the Afghan government.⁵ The Taliban were educated young men, and to stabilize a country of disorder and violence they established specific objectives: “restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Shari’a law, and defend the integrity of Islamic character

¹ Sarah Jones, “Did you know that there are two different Taliban groups?” Digital Journal, digital journal.com, (1 April 2013), <http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/347009> (accessed 21 October 2017).

² Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, 21.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, *Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012*. 2013, <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=4704142> (accessed October 14, 2017), 24.

⁵ Richard J. Krickus, *The Afghanistan Question and the Reset in U.S.-Russian Relations*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011, 43.

in Afghanistan.”⁶

Once the Taliban leaders established roots in seventy five percent of Afghanistan, after capturing Kabul, they founded the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and ruled the country starting in 1996.⁷ By 1998, the Taliban took over ninety percent of Afghanistan,⁸ and established the IEA under Taliban rule of which they instituted an administration with the Inner Shura council and the Central Shura council,⁹ ruling Afghanistan until 2001. The Taliban harbored al-Qaeda training camps and supported Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda. Therefore, the U.S. and United Nations (UN) applied diplomatic pressure on the Taliban and later imposed sanctions on Afghanistan.¹⁰

Three years later, on September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. and killed approximately 3,000 American citizens. Afghanistan is the location where the September 11, 2001 planning took place, and the hijackers resided at the “Beit al Shuhada [the Martyr’s House]” in Kandahar.¹¹ Of note, days after the 9/11 attacks the Afghan Taliban leaders divisively discussed whether to surrender Osama bin Laden, to the point of a possible revolt among the leadership.¹² On 7 October 2001, the U.S. attacked Afghanistan and within three months overthrew the Taliban government.¹³

According to Sarah Jones, the TTP originated from different militant groups from the northwest region of Pakistan, and the initial reason for their cause was to state their

⁶ Rashid, *Taliban*, 22.

⁷ Stanford University, “The Taliban: Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford.edu, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/367#cite14> (accessed 14 October 2017).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Neamatollah Nojumi, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, New York, NY: PALGRAVE, 2002, 137.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Seth G. Jones, *In The Graveyard of Empires, America’s War in Afghanistan*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009, xxii.

¹² Rashid, *Taliban*, 219.

¹³ Jones, *In The Grave of Empires*, xxii.

opposition of the Pakistan military fighting in concert with U.S. and NATO forces to combat al-Qaeda. Jones further states the TTP executes acts of terror and holds a strong relationship with the al-Qaeda leadership.¹⁴ Additionally, Ahmed Rashid states the TTP's prime objective was to obtain control of Pakistan and rule the country according to Shari'a law. The TTP conducts training and provides fighters for the insurgency in Afghanistan, and protects the sanctuaries of which terrorists from al-Qaeda and other international groups reside. Rashid also states the TTP created havoc across Pakistan, against the Pakistan army, police, and government, throughout various areas of Pakistan to include Hangu, Kohar, and Swat Valley, using militant actions and suicide bombings.¹⁵ Of the two Taliban groups, the U.S. and Afghan government must eradicate the TTP from Afghanistan, and to do so, the U.S., Afghan government, and international community must work with and recognize the Afghan Taliban.

This thesis assumes there are two reasons for the U.S. and Afghan leadership to work with and integrate the Afghan Taliban into the Afghan government, as well as with business leaders and civilians from the U.S. and other countries. Essentially, the reasons why the U.S. and other countries need to treat Afghanistan as a partner on the world stage. The first reason, according to Anna Blue, is China and Russia have a stake in the sovereignty of Afghanistan. Both China and Russia initiated steps to engage in communications with the Afghan government in Kabul. Yet, the Russia Kremlin secretly conducted multiple meetings with the Taliban, at which the Taliban revealed that the union with Russia resulted from the U.S. being a common adversary. Blue

¹⁴ Sarah Jones, "Did you know that there are two different Taliban groups?" Digital Journal. digital journal.com, (1 April 2013), <http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/347009> (accessed 21 October 2017).

¹⁵ Rashid, *Taliban*, 239-241.

further states the problem with this scenario is that Russia's interaction with the Taliban undermines the U.S. actions in Afghanistan, and that the purpose for the meetings was to establish an "anti-US alliance in Afghanistan."¹⁶ In reference to China's actions, Beijing maintains economic and military interests.

Blue additionally states China has commenced military patrols on the border of China and Afghanistan, but disavows doing so. Blue states Beijing's reason to maintain forces on the border is due to preventing terrorist activities in the Xinjiang province.¹⁷ The Chinese do have a legitimate concern about the Xinjiang province, as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan seeks to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan with the goal of inevitably controlling the Chinese provinces in the west and Central Asia.¹⁸ Blue also states the U.S. cannot allow the Chinese to take control of leading any sort of operations in Afghanistan, especially military operations. China's bottom line is, it is Afghanistan's top investor and engages in communications with the Afghan Taliban and Afghan government. Most importantly, China established a deal to build a railway from Afghanistan to China that will enable four million dollars' worth of product through the northern most area of Afghanistan.¹⁹

The actions and engagement between the Chinese, Russians, Afghan government, and the Afghan Taliban ought to be a strong signal that the U.S. must consider the Afghan Taliban as part of the Afghan leadership. It is important that the U.S. do so because Afghanistan has substantial resources that can aid other countries while putting

¹⁶ Anna Blue, "The Real Threat to US Interests in Afghanistan," Fair Observer, Make Sense of the World, fairobserver.com, (12 April 2017), https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/us-foreign-policy-afghanistan-russia-china-taliban-world-news-analysis-44304/ (accessed 21 October 2010).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Rashid, *Taliban*, 243.

¹⁹ Blue, "The Real Threat."

Afghanistan on the world stage as a competitor rather than a warring nation.

Secondly, according to Mariam Amini, Afghanistan is rich in natural resources and contains fossil fuels, uranium, gold, copper, and minerals, which are crucial in manufacturing with an estimated value of three trillion dollars. In addition to those resources, the northern section of Afghanistan contains natural gas reserves, which the Soviets tried to control during their invasion in 1979 and are still an interest to Russia. In the Helmand province, Amini further states there are lithium deposits that are of key interest to Germany. As the world migrates toward electric vehicles and other electronic products, lithium will be a vital resource that Afghanistan can use to bring itself into the global market. China is also working on extracting one hundred billion dollars' worth of copper from the Afghanistan copper mines, and gained approval from the Taliban. However, after the Chinese and Afghan workers discovered an ancient Buddhist city of Afghan heritage, the Afghan Taliban halted the project in Mes Aynak, Afghanistan.²⁰ Interestingly, this is a different mindset compared to the Taliban destroying Buddhad artifacts in 2001.²¹

Another natural resource in Afghanistan is emeralds. The country has 171 emerald mines owned and operated by tribal leaders in the Panjshir Valley.²² The common theme with the natural resources is the Afghan Taliban controls them and

²⁰ Mariam Amini, "Precious Metals and Mining, At stake in US military efforts to stabilize Afghanistan: At least \$3 trillion in natural resources, CNBC, cnbc.com, (19 August 2017), <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/18/trumps-afghanistan-strategy-may-unlock-3-trillion-in-natural-resources.html> (accessed 21 October 2017).

²¹ Rashid, Ahmed. "After 1,700 Years, Buddhas Fall to Taliban Dynamite." The Telegraph. telegraph.co.uk. 12 March 2001. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1326063/After-1700-years-Buddhas-fall-to-Taliban-dynamite.html> (accessed February 19, 2018).

²² Parija Kavilanz, "This startup is protecting Afghanistan's prized rare emeralds," CNN Money. money.cnn.com, (29 August 2016), <http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/29/smallbusiness/afghanistan-emeralds-panjshir-aria/index.html> (accessed 22 October 2017).

interfaces with China, Russia, and the Afghan government. Since the U.S. never officially identified the Afghan Taliban as a terrorist group, according to Amini, it is essential that the U.S. recognize the importance of the Afghan Taliban. However, until the U.S. forces depart the country, the Taliban will not come to the table to discuss anything with the U.S., as stated in a letter the Taliban recently wrote to President Trump requesting the U.S. remove its military forces.²³

As of February 2018, President Ashraf Ghani offered the Taliban peace talks, to open and review the constitution, and enable the Taliban to establish political office. To include assisting in removing of sanctions against it, especially to those who recognize the Afghan government as it is, respects the Afghan rule of law, and renounces violence.²⁴ Although, on 12 March 2018, President Ghani offered unconditional talks with a cease-fire, the recognition of the Taliban as a political party, and the release of Taliban prisoners, yet the Taliban has not responded.²⁵ However, it has recently stated concerns. The Taliban stated it has genuine concerns with the Afghan government regarding corruption, justice, and predatory governance stemming from years ago, and the government must remedy those issues.²⁶ Furthermore, the Taliban stated that the situation in Afghanistan cannot be solved militarily.²⁷

²³ Amini, "Precious Metals."

²⁴ Ehsan Popalzai and Joshua Berlinger, "Afghanistan offers to recognize Taliban as legitimate 'political party'." 28 February 2018. CNN. CNN.Com. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/28/asia/afghanistan-taliban-talks-intl/index.html> (accessed 11 March 2018).

²⁵ Kathy Gannon, "A bold Afghan peace offer, but are the Taliban interested?" Washington Post, washingtonpost.com, 12 March 2018, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2018/03/12/bold-afghan-peace-offer-but-are-taliban-interested.html> (accessed 13 Mar 2018).

²⁶ Asad Hashim, US lauds afghan offer to open talks with Taliban, Al Jazeera News,. aljazeera.com, 7 March 2018. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/lauds-afghan-offer-open-talks-taliban-180307065610670.html> (accessed 13 March 2018).

²⁷ Colin Dwyer, Afghan President Urges Taliban To Talk Peace, Offering Political Recognition, NPR. npr.org, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/28/589426780/afghan-president-urges-taliban-to-talk-peace-offering-political-recognition> (accessed 13 March 2018).

Methods

The method of analysis consists of document research and review of four cases of integrating terrorist groups into government to end conflict, to include how the integration took place. The first case is the integration of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) into the Colombian government. The second case is the integration of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) into the government of the United Kingdom, in Northern Ireland. The third case is Lebanon's integration of Hezbollah into their government. The fourth and final case is the integration of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) into the Philippine government.

Although there are other cases of groups that transitioned from terrorism to politics, such as the African National Congress and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, known as ETA,²⁸ there are four reasons for the selection of these four particular cases. They are in different regions of the world, namely Europe, Asia, South America, and the Middle East, and show diverse groups. Secondly, they illustrate how a mixed group of people with different religions or classes can integrate as a government. Third, although violence continued during the peace process, they were able to end conflict after their integration into the political process. Lastly, these cases show similar factors from the beginning of the peace negotiation to their integration into government.

The FARC case illustrates a struggle between classes of peasants against a class of elites. This relates to Afghanistan, as it is a country of varying classes, which are hierarchical and comprised of many groups. To name a few, in the order of hierarchy, there are Pashtuns (Durrani and Ghilzais), Tajiks (Sunni), Uzbeks (Sunni), and Hazaras

²⁸ Anisseh van Engeland and Rachael M. Rudolph, *From Terrorism to Politics: Ethics and Global Politics*, Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008, 13, 67.

(Shia), with the Pashtuns at the top of the hierarchy, in which the government and Taliban are primarily Pashtun.²⁹ The Taliban will need to consider all classes and not just the Pashtuns if integrated into the government. Aside from being under British rule, the IRA case illustrates a struggle between Catholic and Protestants, and the Protestants considered the Catholics a lesser class. Although the Afghans are primarily Muslim, and practice the religion of Islam, as stated above, the country consists of varying groups and ethnicities, and will have to consider these differences as factors.

Hezbollah conversely showed the willingness to accept multiple religions, especially since the Lebanese government consists of multiple ethnicities, and Hezbollah conceded not to use Shari'a law. This is important to note, because the Taliban used strict Shari'a law during its previous reign, and is a factor it may need to concede. As a lesson learned, the Taliban and the Afghan government can stand to integrate other ethnic groups into their government. The MILF case also illustrates that Roman Catholic and Muslims can share governmental powers, and work together, which is another takeaway for the Afghan government integrating the Taliban. However, what makes these cases a success or mixed success? This thesis makes the assessment that what made these four cases a success, or mixed success, are the results of actions taken by the violent groups and the governments to end violence and integrate the violent groups into government.

The four critical factors for defining complete success are, to end coercive acts of violence (namely terrorism); disarm, and disband the violent group's armed force (such as the militant groups); and the violent groups solving internal disputes through non-violent means with the government. Lastly, the violent group integrating into the

²⁹ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, 5-8.

government, as a political party, that results in stability between the former violent group and government, thereby ending conflict.

By stopping coercive acts of violence (terrorism), this indicates the violent group is taking a step towards peace, and coming to a resolution of meeting its needs (especially after or during negotiations). By disarming and disbanding its armed force, illustrates the need is no longer required to continue an armed struggle, and shows commitment to end violence. By solving internal disputes through non-violent means illustrates the violent group is willing to work in a civil manner with the government. The violent group integrating into government is the final act of good will between the government and the violent group, and that they resolved their conflict and are committed to peace and stability of their country and people, and are willing to work through a political process to solve their differences.

The four critical factors for defining a mixed success are, to end coercive acts of violence (namely terrorism); the violent groups maintaining arms and an armed force (such as the militant groups); as well as the violent group solving internal disputes through non-violent means. Lastly, the violent group integrating into the government, as a political party, that results in stability between the former violent group and government, thereby ending conflict. The violent group maintaining their arms and an armed force is the defining factor for a mixed success. Meaning, the violent group still has a means to commit coercive acts of violence. However, the government allows and accepts the violent group to maintain arms to protect either their region or country.

In reference to defining a failure, if the violent group continues with coercive acts of violence (namely terrorism) against the government, along with the non-integration of

a violent group into government, then this constitutes a failure of integrating a violent group into government, resulting in instability between both.

Although this thesis defines the meaning of success above with four critical factors, Tillerson articulated four requirements the Taliban must comply with to participate in the government of Afghanistan, and they are as follows: Prepare to negotiate, renounce terrorism, renounce violence, and commit to stability and prosperity. This thesis will test the value of Tillerson's four requirements using the four cases. Specifically, this thesis will compare these four requirements to the applicable factors discovered during this research, which includes the four critical factors, and other indicators in the cases to determine their correlation.

Chapter Three – Case Studies of Clear Success

The following two cases were a success because after years of violence, both the FARC and the government of Colombia, as well as the IRA and the government of the United Kingdom, came to the negotiating table, ended violence, and disarmed and disbanded the violent group's armed force. The former violent groups are now solving internal disputes through non-violent means, and integrated into government as a political party that resulted in stability between both parties.

FARC

FARC's roots began as a guerilla group emerging from the remnants of negative social, political, and economic effects from varying issues in Colombia. The major cities in Colombia, namely Medellin, Bogota, Cali, and Baranquilla, are geographically separated by vast mountains and jungle. Due to this isolation, the Colombian people in rural areas had difficulty trusting their government within the cities.¹

As Gary Leech states, the Colombian government never efficiently controlled its national territory. Since 1810, after Colombia's independence from Spanish colonial rule, the new Colombian elites, whom were decedents from Spain, served their own political and economic interests. By the mid-twentieth century, these new elites established the Liberal and Conservative political parties, with differing viewpoints regarding separation of church and state, governmental systems, and economic policies. Because of their political differences, there were frequent outbreaks of low intensity violence throughout the twentieth century, to include violent conflict from 1899 to 1902

¹ Garry Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, n.p.: Halifax, N.S.: Fernwood Pub., 2011, <https://ebookcentral.Proquest.com/lib/nationaldefensebooks/detail.action?docID=721166> (accessed December 9, 2017), 4, 5.

resulting in about 100,000 deaths.²

In 1946, the newly elected Conservative party government in Bogota engaged in violence to reverse actions instituted by the Liberal political party, and assassinated the Liberal party's leader. By 1948, the low intensity violence escalated marking the start of the armed peasant uprising, and a new leader, Manuel Marulanda Velez, eventually became the supreme commander of the FARC. By 1958, the Liberal and Conservative parties instituted an agreement to share power called the National Front, of which both parties divided government positions equally between them and alternated the presidency every four years. Peasant uprising and violence resulted because the Conservative and Liberal party elites obtained control of prime agricultural lands, disallowed peasants from gaining legal titles for their land, prohibited peasants from gaining access to credit, established unequal distribution of confiscated and redistributed arable land, invoked severe social abuse, forced peasants from their lands, and instilled state repression.³

As violence continued, 27 May 1964 marks the date of the beginning of Operation Marquetalia, in which U.S. backed Colombian military forces engaged to eradicate the peasant uprising and the beginning of the group named FARC. The FARC set its plan in motion to organize in mass, educate its people, and to produce publicity and funds to establish a guerrilla movement of a protracted struggle against the elites and Liberal government. By 1982, the group renamed itself as FARC-EP,⁴ (Fuerza Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejercito del Pueblo),⁵ which translates to Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – Army of the People or People's Army.

² Leech, *The FARC*, 6.

³ *Ibid.*, 8-11, 18-19.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 14-16, 25.

⁵ Leech, *The FARC*, 25.

After 53 years of violence, FARC and the Colombian government finalized a peace agreement ending conflict. In 2011, the FARC stated its position as being ready to negotiate with the Colombian government. The FARC agreed to end its tactics of kidnapping civilians for extortion. Yet, during the peace process, the FARC continued its attacks on Colombian soldiers in mid-year 2012, and then announced it planned to stop some of its tactics, including abductions. The FARC and Colombian Congress discussed various requirements such as the need to establish political participation, resolve the trafficking of narcotics, developing agriculture, caretaking of the victims from conflict, and included discussions to end the violent conflict.⁶ The FARC agreeing to negotiate correlates with one of Tillerson's four requirements, namely prepare to negotiate.

As the peace negotiation proceeded into January 2013, the peace talks slowed down, while the FARC requested more land rights for the poor and laborers. By May 2013, the Colombian government solidified a land agreement, which included social and economic development regarding rural regions, instituting of a bank to deal with reallocating land, and the distribution of land among poor farmers. In June 2013, the focus was on incorporating FARC rebels in Colombian politics.⁷

In early July 2013, the FARC political party, the Patriotic Union, renewed and obtained legal status with the plan of entering the elections in 2014, but the Patriotic Union and the Colombian government were unable to reach an agreement regarding FARC's involvement in politics. The Patriotic Union lost its political status in 2002 due to the party failing to provide candidates during an election. The peace process entered

⁶ In The News, "Political Intelligence Briefing 8-11," International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 2016, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=119095275&site=eds-live&scope=site> (accessed December 1, 2017), 1, 2.

⁷ Ibid.

into 2014, and the FARC paused the negotiations allowing it to analyze the proposal from the Colombian government.⁸

As peace negotiations continued, violence was still prevalent between FARC and the Colombian government. By the end of 2014, the FARC announced a ceasefire and an end to the conflict. By mid-2015, the Colombian government and FARC reached an agreement on FARC political involvement, land reform, and a cessation of drug trafficking. This agreement was due to the Colombian government recognizing FARC's commitment to the cessation of violence and conflict, and in return, the Colombian government stopped the aerial bombing of FARC encampments.⁹ The FARC announcing a cease-fire to stop violence and end conflict correlates with two of Tillerson's four requirements, which are renouncing terrorism and violence.

The most predominant issue causing a delay during the peace negotiations were human rights abuses committed by both the FARC and the Colombian government. By September 2015, a leap forward in the process occurred when the FARC and Colombian government established peace tribunals and special courts with jurists from other countries to ensure members from both sides received justice and held accountable for human rights abuses. The only stipulation added were provisions to assure amnesty for actions both groups conducted during combat. By October 2015, the FARC ended combat training for its members, and by August 2016, with UN supervision, the FARC initiated the disarming of nearly nine thousand FARC rebels, at 26 disarming locations, within a six-month period.¹⁰

⁸ In The News, "Political Intelligence Briefing 8-11," 2-3.

⁹ Ibid., 3.

¹⁰ Ibid., 4.

In September 2016, the government of Colombia finally approved the peace agreement, with actions moving towards including FARC into the political system. However, as the Colombian government put forth the agreement for a public vote on 2 October 2016, the Colombian people voted against the peace agreement by a very small margin, with the majority of the people in rural areas voting for peace, and those in Bogota voting against the peace agreement. Despite the vote, FARC committed itself to ending conflict. By November 2016, the peace deal was final after adding additional stipulations, which included confining FARC rebels who confessed to crimes to remain in areas outside the cities for a period of up to eight years.¹¹

Telesur news from Colombia reported 2017 updates on the FARC. The FARC initiated its assembly to become a political party on 27 August 2017 to conduct its actions by political means, with the aim of converting the FARC to a political organization. On 10 October 2017, the FARC registered as an official party with the National Electoral Council becoming a legal party, enabling its participation in elections. The FARC nominated five senators along with five members for the House of Representatives. On 14 October 2017, after completing its registration and becoming a political party, the FARC-EP handed over its arms and munitions, with UN oversight in Colombia, disarming the FARC and ending 53 years of conflict.¹² Currently, the FARC is setting its sights on forming a political coalition for the upcoming 2018 elections in Bogota, and will hold 10 seats in Congress until 2026, according to the terms stated in the peace

¹¹ In The News, "Political Intelligence Briefing 8-11," 5.

¹² Telesur, "UN to Hand Over FARC Arms to Colombian Government," News, Latin America, Telesurtv.net Online, (14 October 2017), <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/UN-to-Hand-Over-FARC-Arms-to-Colombian-Government-20171014-0002.html> (accessed December 9, 2017).

accord,¹³ with its new party name as The Common Alternative Revolutionary Force.¹⁴ The FARC committing to peace, integrating into the government as a political party, turning in all its arms, correlates with one of Tillerson's four requirements, which is to commit to the stability and prosperity of Colombia.

The takeaways from this case for the FARC to integrate into the Colombian government are both parties had to make several concessions and agree to them throughout the peace process (see Figure 1 on page 40), to include the Colombian government accepting the FARC to become part of their government. Most prominently within this case, is the FARC disarming and turning in its arms after 53 years of struggle, and transitioning from a fighting force to a political party. Some of these same measures can apply to integrating the Taliban into the Afghan government.

Irish Republican Army

The roots of the Irish Republican Army began with the Irish seeking nationalism and independence from Great Britain, as well as to create a united Ireland.¹⁵ From 1800 to 1919, the Nationalist Catholic Irish conflicted with the Unionist Protestant Irish, due to the Protestants supporting unification with the U.K. The IRA began in 1919 as the official Army of the state under the Sinn Fein political wing's leadership, and set out to attack the Irish Unionists, as well as the British army and police forces, with terrorist

¹³ Julia S. Cobb and Nelson Bocanegra, "Colombia's FARC Political Party Looks to Coalition for 2018 Elections," Reuters World News, reuters.com, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-politics/colombias-farc-political-party-looks-to-coalition-for-2018-elections-idUSKCN1BC62J> (accessed February 18, 2018).

¹⁴ Aljezeera, "Colombia's FARC Transforms into a political party," Aljezeera Bogota, aljazeera.com, 2 September 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/colombia-farc-transforms-political-party-170902005950448.html> (accessed March 20, 2018).

¹⁵ Tommy McKearney, "The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament," London: Pluto Press, 24 June 2011, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nationaldefense-ebooks/reader.action?docID=3386369> (accessed December 27, 2017), 14.

tactics using assassinations and bombings as a means of conflict for Irish independence.¹⁶

As the conflict continued from 1919 to 1969, Irish Catholics experienced slum living conditions, gerrymandering, and continuous physical and cultural violence by the British and Unionists. As Irish Catholics engaged in mass protest against the current situation, they demanded basic needs such as voting, fair employment access, and fair housing, while the armed local government forces pushed the Irish Catholics from their homes using gasoline bombs, and shot them in the streets in 1969. During this period, the British government and state of Northern Ireland would not grant the Irish Catholics their demands for civil rights.¹⁷

The Provisional IRA (PIRA) separated from the IRA in Belfast in 1969. One reason was the deep-rooted marginalization of Irish Catholics in society, and the second was the ideology of using non-violent means versus violent means to address the British. According to Tommy McKearney, the state of Northern Ireland used deadly force to suppress the Irish Catholic's non-violent requests for democratic reforms. This caused differences between the IRA and PIRA's ideas on how to engage with the Unionists and British, turning non-violent protest of the IRA to terrorist aggression by the PIRA, facilitating a direct threat to Britain.¹⁸ More precisely, McKearney states, "While the IRA was indeed present, it was trapped both by tradition and suspicion of mass social participation. Indeed, it was precisely due to their relative marginalization within the local community in the initial period of response to the state and its auxiliaries that the

¹⁶ Amy Zalman, "Guide to the Irish Republican Army: Understanding the IRA," ThoughtCo., thoughtco.com, 28 April 2017, <https://www.thoughtco.com/guide-to-the-irish-republican-army-3209135> (accessed December 27, 2017).

¹⁷ Tommy McKearney, "The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament," ix, 1-6.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, ix, 1-6.

Republican movement split.”¹⁹

According to Anisseh van Engeland and Rachael Rudolph, the IRA did not agree with using armed force against the British forces, and later announced a cease-fire in 1972. However, hard-liners from the IRA opposed those views and formed the PIRA, and commenced to using violent means against the British military in Northern Ireland, with the goal of protecting the Catholics from the repression by British forces.²⁰

By 15 May 1975, the Northern Ireland Act of 1973 recognized the Sinn Fein political party as a legal organization, and by February 1994, under President Clinton, the U.S. allowed entry of the Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams into the U.S. to aid in the peace process. The U.S. was hopeful to maintain a role in pushing the peace process along. As the conflict continued into 1997, a cease-fire finally occurred and the Sinn Fein political wing entered into formal negotiations with Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister.²¹ The peace process with the IRA lasted for several years, and involved the U.S., the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland.

According to the UN Peacemaker database, from 1985 to 2006, there were seven peace agreements recognized at the UN to establish peace with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland government, and the Republic of Ireland government. While the peace process was underway, the IRA still committed acts of violence and engaged in conflict throughout this period. Two agreements of note are the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 and the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement in 1998. The Anglo-Irish

¹⁹ Tommy McKearney, “The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament,” 14.

²⁰ Anisseh van Engeland and Rachael M. Rudolph, *From Terrorism to Politics: Ethics and Global Politics*, Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008, 54-55.

²¹ Public Broadcasting System, “The IRA & Sinn Fein,” PBS Frontline. PBS.org, Chronology, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/etc/cron.html> (accessed December 27, 2017).

Agreement 1985, signed between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom government, established articles covering political concerns, security concerns, legal concerns to include administration of justice, and the promotion of cross-border cooperation between Northern Ireland, the U.K., and the Republic of Ireland.²²

As reported by The Guardian, 1998 marked the first year in which significant steps occurred in the peace process, which entailed the first discussions of decommissioning the paramilitary groups in the IRA and turning over weapons. The U.S. also aided in the peace process by establishing deadlines, and the parties involved introduced another peace agreement.²³

The 1998 Northern Ireland Peace Agreement was between the United Kingdom of Great Britain government and Northern Ireland, in agreement with the Republic of Ireland government. This agreement established several items and superseded the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. It covered contents such as Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Ministerial Councils, British-Irish Councils, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, decommissioning of the paramilitary groups, security, policing and justice, as well as the rights, safeguards, and equality of opportunity.²⁴

More importantly is how the peace negotiation process occurred with all parties, and the nine lessons learned that are relevant to other cases of integration. First, the Irish and British prime ministers, as well as the U.S. President Bill Clinton, were involved

²² United Nations, "Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985," Ireland. United Nations Peacemaker, (15 November 1985), https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=Ireland (accessed October 9, 2017).

²³ The Guardian, "A Brief History of Northern Ireland 1919-1999," 27 January 1999. The Guardian, theguardian.com. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/jan/28/northernireland1> (accessed December 27, 2017).

²⁴ United Nations, "The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement," Ireland. United Nations Peacemaker, (15 November 1985), https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=Ireland (accessed October 9, 2017).

during the 1998 peace process negotiations. Second, all political parties involved reached an agreement on how to govern the people with differing views on political, constitutional, and cultural perspectives. Third, all parties agreed on the disarmament and demobilization of paramilitary groups.²⁵ The 1998 peace negotiations and the disarming and demobilization of paramilitary groups correlate with three of Tillerson's four requirements, which are prepare to negotiate, and renouncing terrorism and violence. By giving up weapons and breaking up the paramilitary groups illustrates the violent group is renouncing the use of violence and terrorism altogether.

Fourth, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were involved and assisted politicians to conduct discussions between the parties that were involved in the conflicts. Fifth, the NGOs also engaged with the local communities, against the wishes of politicians. This was effective and enabled discussion with the parties, who may not have otherwise spoken to each other. Additionally, NGOs established a cross-talk program called "Initiative 92." After a year using the program, they obtained over 500 recommendations from the community in Northern Ireland, and enclosed the recommendations in an "ideas book" for Northern Ireland, which became the Opsahl Report. Many of the recommendations from the Opsahl Report aided in developing the peace agreement.²⁶

Sixth, the local churches engaged in various venues within the communities, and performed a vital role on enhancing trust within those communities affected by the peace

²⁵ Mari Fitzduff, "Breaking down the Walls – Lessons from Northern Ireland: The Irish Case and the Effectiveness of Community Involvement in Peace-Making," *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture*, 2017, Vol. 22, No. 1: 76-85, http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=a8149b03-7090-4afa-8a5f-f6e17e17_e95d%40sessionmgr4006 (accessed September 15, 2017), 76-78.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 78-80.

process. Seventh, the business community engaged with the trade unions and enabled all major trade unions to combine and speak out for the need of a successful political solution, and that it was important for business profits.²⁷

Eighth, representatives from the Sinn Fein party became involved in town governance, but all representatives had to sign an agreement to not use violence, or support violence, while serving in the governance. Upon accession to seats in their councils, violence in each of their areas diminished. Numerous members once active in the IRA integrated into the political process with the Sinn Fein party, such as one of the lead members becoming the education minister. As for the ninth item, NGOs involved themselves again and engaged with the members that committed previous acts of violence, and established a program to educate the members on the political processes such as on elections, voting, candidacy, and strategies for political parties.²⁸

The representatives signing an agreement to not use violence, or support violence, while serving in the governance, along with the integration of IRA members into governance, all reduced the violence and terrorism. This correlates with three of Tillerson's four requirements, which are renouncing terrorism and violence, and committing to the stability and prosperity of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.

There were additional measures in the peace process, but these nine items illustrate how the IRA integrated into the political process and governance within Northern Ireland, reducing the violence and terrorism. The Sinn Fein political party currently holds seven seats in the United Kingdom House of Commons, under the Legislative Branch in Northern Ireland. The current political leader of the Sinn Fein

²⁷ Fitzduff, "Breaking down the Walls," 78-80.

²⁸ Ibid., 78 - 81.

party in Northern Ireland is Mary Lou McDonald.²⁹

The takeaways with this case for the IRA to integrate into the United Kingdom of Great Britain government, is both parties had to make several concessions and agree to them throughout the peace process (see Figure 1 on page 40), to include the UK government accepting the IRA, a violent terrorist group, to become part of their government. Of note, this particular case had the involvement of NGOs, church members, the local population, the U.S., and members from both parties engaged in determining a peace agreement and integrating into the government of the UK, to include integrating into the local governance within towns.

The unique takeaway was the established program to educate violent members on the political processes such as on elections, voting, candidacy, and strategies for political parties. This can be a useful method to educate Taliban members on the political process as opposed to using violence, and then integrate some of those members into local governance within villages. Additionally, some of the other measures can also apply to integrating the Taliban into the Afghan government. Such as the NGOs asking questions regarding the needs of the people, which turned into the Opsahl Report that aided in developing the peace agreement.

In summary, aside from the other factors (see Figure 1 page 40), both the FARC and the IRA cases illustrated the four critical factors for defining complete success. The violent groups ended coercive acts of violence (namely terrorism); disarmed and disbanded the violent groups' armed force (such as the militant groups); and the violent groups solved internal disputes through non-violent means with the government. In

²⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Europe: Ireland," The World Fact Book, CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/print_ei.html (accessed March 20, 2018).

addition, the violent group integrated into the government, as a political party, that resulted in the stability between the former violent group and government, and ended the conflict. Both the FARC and the IRA cases illustrated a correlation with all four of Tillerson's requirements, in which the violent groups negotiated, renounced violence and terrorism, and committed to the stability and prosperity of their countries.

Chapter Four – Case Studies of Mixed Success

The following two cases were a mixed success because after years of violence, both Hezbollah and the government of Lebanon, as well as the MILF and the government of the Philippines, came to the negotiating table, to end violence, however these two violent groups maintained arms and an armed force (such as militant groups). The two former violent groups are now solving internal disputes through non-violent means, and integrated into government as a political party that resulted in stability between the former violent groups and government, thereby also ending conflict.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah began on 2 June of 1982, as an armed militia fighting against Israeli occupation throughout various areas of Lebanon, with the aid of Iran and inspiration of Islamic clerics. Hezbollah's primary objectives were to improve political representation, economic capability, and the use of social services to integrate principles of Islam into the political system of Lebanon, and the removal of influence within the electoral system to establish Lebanon as an Islamic State. Additional objectives of Hezbollah were to remove the American, French, and Israeli militaries from Lebanon.¹ As a terrorist group, Hezbollah primarily committed attacks within Lebanon on the Israeli Army, foreign troops, journalists, and workers from the UN. Hezbollah used methods such as taking hostages, suicide attacks, abductions, and martyrdom. The martyrdom strategy had an effect on the enemy, meaning it was difficult to fight against Hezbollah if members are willing to die for their beliefs and sacrifice their young fighters.² Despite these acts,

¹ Krista E. Wiegand, "Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party," *Journal, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 8 (April 2008), 670, 671, 672.

² Anisseh van Engeland and Rachael M. Rudolph, *From Terrorism to Politics: Ethics and Global Politics*, Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008, 31, 34-35, 46.

Hezbollah integrated into the Lebanese government.

Hezbollah's current position in the Lebanese government resulted from two factors. One factor was the political advantage over the government. The other is that leaders of Hezbollah toned-down their objectives to attain domestic political goals. Hezbollah's civil role began in 1983, by providing social and health services, community utilities and waste services, as well as educational and cultural services. It then converted to working within the Lebanese political system using political means as opposed to using violence. By 1990, at the end of the Lebanese civil war, Hezbollah faced a couple choices. The leaders of Hezbollah either had to disband their militia group, because other militia groups disbanded after the war, or become a political party and join the new Lebanese government. Hezbollah chose neither one, and decided to stop political violence, yet preserve its militia group to fight against Israeli occupation,³ and be actively involved in the Lebanese government. Among the concessions won during mediated negotiations by Qatar, Hezbollah decided not to disarm its members, but did agree not to use any armed force to resolve political disputes within the Lebanese government.⁴

The actions and agreements by Hezbollah, such as conducting negotiations in Qatar and stopping political violence, correlate with two of Tillerson's four requirements. Namely, prepare to negotiate and renounce violence, even though Hezbollah maintained its weapons.

Is disarming Hezbollah a possibility? In 2004, the UN passed Resolution 1559, which called for the disarmament of Hezbollah, coupled with the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon. After the Syrian troops departed, Hezbollah's political power

³ Wiegand, "Reformation of a Terrorist Group," 670, 673.

⁴ Ibid., 669.

increased, yet it retained its arms. By 2006, due to UN Resolution 1701, Hezbollah pulled all of its militant members from Southern Lebanon [after a month long war with Israeli forces and the support of 15,000 Peace Keepers].⁵ At the time, Hezbollah ministers resigned and there was little activity or playing of a political role by Hezbollah in the government, and it still did not disarm. For Hezbollah to continue its political movement and be a part of the Lebanese government, it may have to consider disarming its militant force. However, if members do not wish to disarm, the alternative could be to join the Lebanese forces.⁶ To this day, they have not disarmed.

Hezbollah's integration into the Lebanese government and acceptance as a legitimate party within the Lebanese government was contingent on the group accepting certain conditions. First, Hezbollah had to accept the current political institution as being legitimate, and accept the existing condition of the governmental institution. Secondly, it had to work with the government using non-violent means, and accept a multi-religious Lebanese state. Third, it had to surrender ambitions of making Lebanon an Islamic state with Shari'a law. Fourth, it had to negotiate with the Syrian-backed Lebanese government, and finally, the government had to recognize Hezbollah as a legitimate actor. Hezbollah agreed and negotiated peacefully with the government leaders. The Lebanese government, in return, agreed to provide protection for Hezbollah and pledged to treat Hezbollah as a legitimate party, and endorsed Hezbollah's resistance of the Israeli occupation. The Lebanese government allowed Hezbollah to participate in the elections,

⁵ United Nations, "Security Council Calls For End To Hostilities Between Hezbollah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701 (2006)," Meeting Coverage and Press Releases (11 August 2006), <https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm> (accessed February 17, 2018).

⁶ Anisseh van Engeland and Rachael M. Rudolph, *From Terrorism to Politics: Ethics and Global Politics*, Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008, 43-48.

of which Hezbollah gained eight of 128 seats in the 1992 elections, and later gained 57 seats in the 2009 elections.⁷

As stated, there are 128 seats in Lebanon's parliament, which the government split evenly among Christians and Muslims. When broken down further, there are Sunni Muslims, Greek Orthodox and Maronite Christians, and the Druze [another Islamic religion of Lebanon],⁸ to include others equating to 18 different religions with each represented in parliament. Within the offices of parliament, the Speaker is Shia, the Prime Minister is Sunni, and the President is Maronite Christian. Of the different parties in Parliament, there are five total as follows: the Future Movement led by a Sunni, the Free Patriotic Movement led by a Christian, the Amal Movement led by a Shia, the Progressive Socialist Party led by Druze, and Hezbollah led by a Shia, Hassan Nasrallah.⁹ This is important to note because Lebanon is able to work with all religions within government. Especially when looking at the history of the IRA regarding the difference and struggle only between two groups, the Irish Catholics and the Irish Protestants.

For over 16 years, the Lebanese people recognized Hezbollah as a legitimate party, despite the continuous label as a terrorist organization by other countries.¹⁰ Hezbollah's place as a political party, and the end of its drive for revolt, illustrates its acceptance into the Lebanese government.¹¹ Lastly, according to the UN Peacemaker database, the 2006 agreement, "The Mutual Entente document between Hezbollah and

⁷ Wiegand, "Reformation of a Terrorist Group," 673 - 676.

⁸ Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, merriam-webster.com, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/> (accessed February 18, 2018).

⁹ Alia Chughatai, "Lebanon's Power Players," Al Jazeera News, aljazeera.com, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/11/lebanon-power-players-17110419-1728060.html> (accessed February 18, 2018).

¹⁰ Wiegand, "Reformation of a Terrorist Group," 678.

¹¹ Florence Gaub, "The Role of Hezbollah In Post-Conflict Lebanon," *Directorate General For External Polices, Policy Department, European Parliament*, (July 2013): [www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/.../EXPO-FET_NT\(2013\)433719_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/.../EXPO-FET_NT(2013)433719_EN.pdf), 10.

the Free Patriotic Movement,”¹² covered eight categories essential to the agreement. These include: a consensus democracy, the electoral law, the building of the state, cessation of war and cooperation, returning Lebanese members in Israel back to Lebanon, the withdrawing of Israeli troops from Lebanon, cessation and condemning of political assassinations, and reforming security services for the protection and stability of the state. The final sections of the agreement provided peace terms to instill a peaceful relationship among the Lebanese, Syrians, and Palestinians. The last section of the Mutual Entente set terms for the protections of Lebanon and the consolidation of its independence and sovereignty, and provided details and reasons for Hezbollah to maintain weapons.¹³

The agreements by Hezbollah, such as cessation and condemning of political assassinations, and reforming security services for the protection and stability of the state, correlate with two of four Tillerson requirements. Specifically, renounce terrorism and committing to the stability and prosperity of Lebanon.

After many years of violent conflict, the actions of Hezbollah and the Lebanese government show that it is possible for a government to legitimize and integrate a terrorist group into a government to cease conflict. The integration is not perfect and there are internal tensions among the parties.¹⁴ As of October 2017, the Lebanon Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, plans to join the coalition government with Hezbollah, which will continue to build its political strength. Hariri further stated that a large population of Shia in Lebanon still relies on Hezbollah’s financial, medical, and social services, and

¹² United Nations, “The Mutual Entente Document Between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement,” Lebanon. United Nations Peacemaker, (6 February 2006), <http://peacemaker.un.org/lebanon-entente-mutuelle2006> (accessed October 8, 2017).

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Wiegand, “Reformation of a Terrorist Group,” 678.

Hezbollah maintaining its weapons defends Lebanon.¹⁵ This is a clear indication that although Hezbollah remains part of the government, it will not disarm. Hezbollah continues as a political party and a main contributor of schools, hospitals, and agricultural services to the Lebanese people.¹⁶

The takeaways from this case for Hezbollah to integrate into the Lebanese government are both parties had to make several concessions and agree to them throughout the peace process (see Figure 1 on page 40). The Lebanese government accepted Hezbollah becoming part of the government, Hezbollah conceded ambitions of making Lebanon an Islamic state with Shari'a law, and the government allowed Hezbollah to maintain possession of their weapons.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) when the MNLF accepted a peace agreement brokered by Libya, promising autonomy for the group.¹⁷ After signing the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, which promised autonomy for the MNLF, by 1977 the vice-chairman of the MNLF disagreed with the strategy and ideology of the MNLF leader. The MNLF leader's motivation was nationalistic with a more secular political effort. The vice-chairman sought a more religious movement,¹⁸ and so formed the MILF in 1977, with the purpose of establishing an independent Islamic state in the Mindanao region of the Philippines,

¹⁵ Anna Ahronheim, "Lebanese Prime Minister Joins Coalition Government With Hezbollah," The Jerusalem Post, jpost.com, (17 October 2017), <http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Lebanese-Prime-Minister-joins-coalition-government-with-Hezbollah-507691> (accessed February 17, 2018).

¹⁶ Downtown Beirut, Hezbollah Official Website, downtownbeirut.com, <http://www.downtownbeirut.com/lebanon-directory/government-sites/hezbollah-official-website/> (accessed December 27, 2017).

¹⁷ Peng Er Lam, *Japan's Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role*. London: Routledge, 2010.

¹⁸ Bacani, Benedicto R., and United States Institute of Peace, 2005, *The Mindanao Peace Talks: Another Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines*, United States Institute of Peace, 4-5.

immersing the region in the Moro culture, and focusing on Islam. The MILF's primary effort was building its organization, creating the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Force, and negotiating with the Philippine government for independence.¹⁹ The reason for wanting independence is historically, the island of Mindanao was the Moro's homeland long before the Spaniards, and Americans colonized the region, in which the foreigners merged the islands politically by force into the Philippine territory, as it stands today.²⁰

After settling peace with the MNLF, the Philippine President then pursued a peace agreement with the MILF. During the process, the MILF leader made several requests on behalf of the Bangsamoro people. The requests included a range of cultural, social, political, and economic issues, such as the recognition of ancestral domain; violation of human rights; discrimination against Muslims; reparations to victims with destructed property from war; corrupt policies affecting the Moro people; economic imbalances; exploitation of natural resources from Moro lands; and the requirement for agricultural reform.²¹ However, during the years of peace deliberation, there were still acts of violence.

The MILF's first act of violence occurred in 1986, in which it bombed a Catholic wedding. In 1987, the MILF continued with attacks by bombing and destroying property to display its strength and to coerce the Philippine government to take it seriously and to negotiate. From the 1980s through the 1990s, the MILF garnered support from populations in the southern regions, and created a coexisting government in Mindanao.

¹⁹ Stanford University, "Mapping Militant Organizations, Moro Islamic Liberation Front," Stanford.edu, 24 August 2015, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/309> (accessed December 17, 2017).

²⁰ Patricio N. Abinales, "The End of War in the Southern Philippines," *Asian Ethnicity* Vol 15, No. 3, 394-398. (July 2014) <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=681369d4-ee8b-4494-ace7-123b2261dc43%40sessionmgr4008> (accessed December 16, 2017), 394.

²¹ Bacani, Benedicto R., *The Mindanao Peace Talks*, 5.

By 1996, the Philippine government established a peace agreement with the MNLF to expand the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). After the agreement, some MNLF members integrated into the Philippine social and political system. This 1996 agreement discouraged and angered the MILF, resulting in some MNLF members defecting to the MILF, growing it into a larger force. In retaliation, the MILF escalated attacks against government targets.²²

The MILF began negotiations with the Philippine government in 1997.²³ Due to the escalation of violence after the 1996 agreement, the Philippine government offered a ceasefire to the MILF, which both parties signed in 1997. The MILF stressed a governmental role in its negotiation strategy, while continuing to strengthen and build its military force. Some MILF members continued attacks, and by 1999 it developed a Special Operations Group, which committed bombings and other terror attacks. President Joseph Estrada then changed policy, stopped the peace negotiations, and declared war on the MILF. As a result, by 2000, the MILF declared a holy war, and members violently attacked the Philippine government, causing misery and the dislocation of some Philippine citizens. In 2001, the MILF became the largest and strongest militant group while fighting the Philippine government, and after Gloria Arroyo became the President, she changed policy again and ended the conflict with her new policy of “all-out peace.”²⁴ The actions by the MILF, such as negotiating with the Philippine government and establishing the ceasefire, correlates with two of Tillerson’s four requirements, namely prepare to negotiate and renounce violence.

²² Stanford University, “Mapping Militant Organizations, Moro Islamic Liberation Front.”

²³ Anisseh van Engeland and Rachael M. Rudolph, *From Terrorism to Politics: Ethics and Global Politics*, Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008, 159.

²⁴ Stanford University, “Mapping Militant Organizations, Moro Islamic Liberation Front.”

During her presidency, President Arroyo continued with peace talks and persuaded the U.S. President George W. Bush not to designate the MILF as a terrorist group to inspire peace talks. Yet, certain rogue operatives in the MILF continued with intermittent attacks and kidnappings during the peace talks. By 2003, the MILF reiterated its 1997 agreement and rejected acts of terrorism. The peace talks progressed and continued through 2008, when the Philippine government and the MILF signed a memorandum of agreement to allow a greater share of power and independence for the Moro regions, but the Supreme Court opposed the agreement, which became invalid. In 2010, the MILF retracted its request for complete independence and sought regional autonomy as an alternative.²⁵ The MILF 1997 agreement to reject acts of terrorism correlates with one of Tillerson's four requirements, which is to renounce terrorism.

By 2014, the MILF and the Philippine government signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), with both parties agreeing on sharing power and wealth. These agreements enabled the establishment of Muslim Shari'a courts, as well as non-Muslim courts. The agreements also delineated jurisdiction for revenue sources and maritime areas and established provisions to transition MILF combatants to civilian status, which included the decommissioning of some armed members and relinquishing of weapons.²⁶ During 2015, the MILF continued further integration into the Philippine government, and the Philippine Commission on Elections held venues for registration and voting for MILF members. In May 2015, the MILF officially registered as the United Bangsamoro Justice

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Further details on all the various agreements between the Bangsamoro and the Philippine government, which both parties signed during the peace process throughout the years, are located online at the UN Peacemaker database web site.

Party. In June 2015, the MILF continued to disarm and relinquished additional weapons. On 27 July 2015, the Philippine government initiated negotiations on a law to transition MILF members to a Bangsamoro government.²⁷

Though the peace process is ongoing, and is by no means perfect, as of 28 November 2017 the MILF began working towards becoming a non-governmental organization (NGO) with a focus on social services after the Bangsamoro government is fully established. The establishment of the government is predicated on the enactment and passing of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). President Roberto Duterte of the Philippines vowed to pass the BBL while he maintains the office of presidency. When this occurs, the BBL will fully implement the FAB and CAB agreements that the MILF and Philippine government signed in 2014, and the Bangsamoro government will maintain a parallel government to the Philippine government within its region.²⁸

With the MILF establishing provisions to transition combatants to civilian status, the decommissioning of some armed members and relinquishing of weapons, the continued integration into the Philippine government, and becoming an NGO with a focus on social services, correlates with two of Tillerson's four requirements. Which are to renounce violence and commit to stability and prosperity of the Philippines.

As of 19 December 2017, according to Mick Basa, the Philippine House of Representatives and President Duterte realized the 1987 Philippine constitution conflicts with the proposed BBL, and they are working to resolve the issue. The House of Representatives still plans to pass the BBL by March 2018. In addition, President

²⁷ Stanford University, "Mapping Militant Organizations, Moro Islamic Liberation Front."

²⁸ Mick Basa, "MILF to be transformed in NGO once Bangsamoro Basic Law passed," Rappler News. rappler.com, 28 November 2017, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/189728-milf-transform-ngo-passage-bangsamoro-basic-law> (accessed December 24, 2017).

Duterte stated that if the BBL does not pass rather quickly there could be trouble to come,²⁹ meaning that if the law does not pass, the MILF may react negatively.

The takeaways from this case for the MILF to integrate into the Philippine government are both parties had to make several concessions and agree to them throughout the peace process (see Figure 1 on page 40), to include the Philippine government accepting the MILF as part of the government. As stated earlier, prior to Gloria Arroyo's presidency, during the presidency of Joseph Estrada the policy of negotiation stopped in the year 2000, in which the Philippine government declared war on the MILF.³⁰

In summary, aside from the other factors (see Figure 1 page 40), both the Hezbollah and MILF cases illustrated the four critical factors for defining a mixed success. The violent groups ended coercive acts of violence (namely terrorism); the violent groups maintained arms and an armed force (such as the militant groups), even though the MILF is now in the process of disarming; as well as the violent group solving internal disputes through non-violent means. Lastly, the violent group integrated into the government, as a political party, that resulted in stability between the former violent group and government, and ended conflict. Both Hezbollah and the MILF cases illustrated a correlation with all four of Tillerson's requirements, in which the violent groups negotiated, renounced violence and terrorism, and committed to the stability and prosperity of their countries.

²⁹ Pia Ranada, "Duterte not confident BBL allowable by Constitution," Rappler News, rappler.com, 19 December 2017, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/191760-duterte-not-confident-bangsamoro-basic-law-constitution> (accessed December 24, 2017).

³⁰ Anisseh van Engeland and Rachael M. Rudolph, *From Terrorism to Politics: Ethics and Global Politics*, Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008, 159.

Chapter Five -- Analysis

In the introduction, this research noted that after the 9/11 attacks the Afghan Taliban leaders divisively discussed whether to surrender Osama bin Laden or not, to the point of a possible revolt among the leadership. Because of this, though the discussion of surrendering Osama bin Laden happened several years ago, this thesis assumes moderate members of the Afghan Taliban will to work with the U.S., but not the U.S. military.

It is important to make a distinction between the two Taliban groups because each has a different motivation as presented in the background chapter. Additionally, the Afghan Taliban group is indigenous to Afghanistan, and the TTP is indigenous to Pakistan. The U.S. and Afghan government must eradicate the TTP from Afghanistan, and the U.S., Afghan government, and international community must work with and recognize the Afghan Taliban, since this group has a vital interest within its country and working with other countries as noted in chapter one. Since the Afghan Taliban will not come to the negotiating table until the U.S. removes its forces, this thesis also assumes the Afghan Taliban will work with countries and U.S. civilians to stop the conflict.

As stated, this thesis analyzes how to integrate a former violent group into government, and how the processes used can apply to integrating the Taliban back into the government of Afghanistan and end the armed conflict. After many years of violent conflict, all four cases illustrated it is possible for a violent group to integrate into a government, and the similarities throughout the case studies included many like factors.

Initially both the government and violent group had to agree to negotiate peacefully. Each violent group had to cease violence and coercive acts, such as kidnaping, abductions, and suicide bombings. Both the violent groups and the

government made concessions on issues such as violent groups giving up ruling by Shari'a law, request for independence, or autonomy; and in turn, governments gave up land, a region, or allowing the possession of arms, and allowing the group to become a political party. The violent groups agreed to recognize and accept the existing government, and in turn, the government agreed to recognize the violent group as a legitimate political party. Each of the violent groups in the case studies agreed to establish a peace agreement, became a political party, and inevitably, were accepted and integrated by their government.

The four case studies also illustrated the need to discuss disarming as a part of peace negotiations and to end conflict. Two of the four decommissioned their Armies and turned in weapons, which were the FARC and the IRA. Yet, the MILF and Hezbollah maintained their arms to aid in protection of their country such as Lebanon, or their region as in Mindanao. Yet, the MILF began to disarm and turn in some weapons in 2015. This thesis assumes that the Afghan Taliban will maintain its weapons, as did Hezbollah, and aid in defense of Afghanistan. This premise is due to the warring nature of the Afghan Taliban, and because the country experienced multiple foreign invasions and conflict over the decades.

As negotiations took place to further the peace process by disarming, each case study illustrated the groups established peace agreements in which both sides in all four cases made compromises. This thesis assumes that the Taliban will come to terms with the Afghan government to be a part of the government and end the conflict. Therefore, a peace agreement will be necessary and the Afghan Taliban must agree to settle internal disputes by non-violent means, as is illustrated in all four case studies.

The final similarities each case study illustrated was each group established a political party, entered into the election process, and established either a parallel government, such as in the MILF, or obtained seats in the government after establishing a political party. The Afghan government will have to compromise and accept the Afghan Taliban as a political party, and allow it to participate in elections and garner seats in the government if elected to do so. Before any negotiation can take place, and to stop the terrorist attacks, one of the steps necessary for the Afghan Taliban to come to the negotiating table is the U.S. military forces must depart Afghanistan. Once U.S. forces depart Afghanistan, and uses U.S. and international civilian experts, and NGOs, the leaders of Afghanistan can then initiate the process to integrate the Afghan Taliban back into the Afghan government.

This thesis identified 15 factors that were similar in all four case studies (see Figure 1), and were pertinent to integrating the violent groups into government.

Factors		IRA	FARC	MILF	Hezbollah
1	Agreed to negotiate peace terms	Y	Y	Y	Y
2	Agreed to end coercive acts of violence ** / ***	Y	Y	Y	Y
3	Group conceded to goal/demands of government ***	Y	Y	Y	Y
4	Government conceded to demands of group ***	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	Agreed to non-violent disputes **	Y	Y	Y	Y
6	Agreed to disarm/disbanded militant group ** / ***	Y	Y	N/Y	N
7	Maintained armed force	N	N	Y	Y
8	Peace Agreement signed	Y	Y	Y	Y
9	Established a political party	Y	Y	Y	Y
10	Group recognized and accepted existing government	Y	Y	Y	Y
11	Government recognized group as legitimate political party	Y	Y	Y	Y
12	Group allowed to participate in elections	Y	Y	Y	Y
13	Members of group integrated in government	Y	Y	Y	Y
14	Members hold seats in government	Y	Y	Y	Y
15	Group integrated into government as political party **	Y	Y	Y	Y
Critical Factors for Integration into Government **					
Requires Further Explanation ***					

Figure 1: Fifteen Factors to Integrate into Government

Based on the four case studies, these factors can apply to integrate the Taliban back into the government of Afghanistan. Of the fifteen factors identified, Factors 1, 2, and 5,

correlate with three of Tillerson's four requirements, prepare to negotiate, renounce terrorism, and renounce violence. In regards to Secretary Tillerson's fourth requirement, commit to stability and prosperity, this indirectly falls in line with other indicators found during the research, and somewhat falls in line with Factors 6, 8, and 12 through 15, because these factors are associated with the commitment to stability and prosperity.

Regarding the triple asterisk items in Figure 1 (page 40), they indicate a further explanation required. In reference to Factor 2, each group had different type of coercive acts they agreed to stop, such as kidnappings, abductions, acts of terrorism, or assassinations. In reference to Factor 3, each violent group conceded different goals or demands from the government, such as Shari'a Law, autonomy, or retracted its' request for independence and sought regional autonomy as an alternative, such as the MILF; or stopped the trafficking of narcotics, such as the FARC. Factor 4 refers to the government conceding to demands of a violent group. Such as giving up or providing land; allowing the possession of arms, such as the MILF and Hezbollah; the allowance of the violent groups' political party to exist; and allowing autonomy and the share of power in the political system, such as the MILF. Factor 6 with a N/Y regarding the MILF, indicates that the MILF began to disarm, but many of its members still maintain weapons and are a formidable force; yet according to the most recent news it is going through the disarmament process.

Chapter Six – Lessons Learned and Application to Afghanistan

To integrate the Taliban into the government of Afghanistan, the U.S. must not view the Afghan Taliban as an enemy force, especially moderate members of the group, and enable negotiations to take place. Secondly, as a lesson learned from Hezbollah, the Taliban must agree to retract its ambitions of maintaining and practicing strict Shari'a law. Additionally, as in Hezbollah's case, the toleration of other religions and ethnic groups is essential in Afghanistan, and if other countries and groups are able to integrate into government from different religions, there should be no reason inhibiting the Taliban from integrating into the Afghan government, after making concessions to tolerate others. Third, as with Hezbollah, the Afghan Taliban must recognize and accept the current political institution of Afghanistan as a legitimate government. Although the Taliban stated in March 2018, that it has concerns with the Afghan governments corrupt past, it is unclear at this time whether the Afghan Taliban is willing to recognize the current Afghan government, but could be a role for the international community and NGOs.

Fourth, just as NGOs participated in the peace process with the IRA, they can establish a program to educate the Taliban members on the political processes, such as on elections, voting, candidacy, and strategies for political parties. In addition, NGOs could interface with various villages in Afghanistan to determine the needs of the Afghans, and present it as a report to provide a framework to develop a peace agreement with the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Fifth, the Afghan government must initially agree to the Taliban retaining its weapons, and plan a future date for disarmament, just as the IRA, FARC, and MILF disarmed years after their peace agreement. Although the Pakistani Taliban stated in

2012 it would not disarm,¹ it is unclear whether the Afghan Taliban is willing to do so. This is another potential area for NGOs or the international community to engage in. This research assumes that a peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban will enable the Taliban to maintain some weapons due to the foreign invasion history of Afghanistan. Just as Hezbollah maintains a military force, the Afghan government could integrate members of the Afghan Taliban as part of the Afghan military. However, further discussion on this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Additionally, just as in all four cases, the Taliban must agree to use non-violent means when solving issues, and to use a peaceful process. The international community must agree to a peace agreement and recognize the Afghan Taliban as an official party of the Afghan government, with a peace agreement signed and archived at the UN. Since the Afghan Taliban currently controls 34 of 400 districts, contesting 167 other districts, and competing for 52 more districts,² unless conflict continues to eradicate the Afghan Taliban, it is imperative to involve the Afghan Taliban in a peace agreement and integrate them into the Afghan government. Just as in the IRA, the Afghan government can place Taliban members in villages to participate in governance. Moreover, as stated in chapter one, the Afghan Taliban has engaged in commerce with China and Russia, which can further enhance the economy of Afghanistan. This complex problem requires a solution that may not fit the U.S. democratic model of government or that of the international community.

¹ Saud Mehsud, "Pakistan Taliban chief says group will negotiate, but not disarm," Reuters World News, United Kingdom Top News, 28 December 2012, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/pakistan-taliban-video/pakistan-taliban-chief-says-group-will-negotiate-but-not-disarm-idINDEE8BR07620121228> (accessed January 2, 2018).

² James P. Farwell, "4 Ways America Can Fix Afghanistan," The National Interests, nationalinterest.org, 4 July 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/4-ways-america-can-fix-afghanistan-21390> (accessed October 31, 2017).

The current Afghan government can establish a hybrid government with governance in the rural areas, creating formal and informal powers at the central level and local rural levels. The Afghan government can establish Taliban leaders and networks throughout areas of Afghanistan by co-opting and restructuring organizations at various levels, as Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla stated, this is a process the Taliban is good at doing. The Taliban is able to move swiftly throughout the country, as it did after the Soviet withdrawal, and establish rule of law and aid those in need. Selecting local leaders and solving grievances is a typical method the Taliban practices, and this can be of great benefit to solving issues throughout Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Taliban can influence the economic, social, and the political climate.³

Lastly, this thesis assumes that the Taliban will be a case of mixed success, according to the four critical factors. It must end coercive acts of violence (namely terrorism), which correlates to Tillerson's requirement of renouncing terrorism. It will most likely maintain its arms and an armed force (such as the militant groups). It must commit to solving internal disputes through non-violent means, which correlates to Tillerson's requirement of renouncing violence. The Taliban must integrate into the government, as a political party, commit to stability between the former violent group and government, and end conflict. Which correlates with Tillerson's requirement to commit to stability and prosperity. Lastly, to start the process, the Taliban must negotiate with the Afghan government, which correlates to Tillerson's requirement of prepare to negotiate.

³ Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, eds., *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2012, 53, 200, 201.

Chapter Seven – Conclusions and Recommendations

This thesis analyzed how to integrate a former violent group into government, and how the processes can integrate the Taliban back into the government of Afghanistan and end the armed conflict. Although integrating a violent group and ending conflict are two different goals, this thesis makes the assumption based on the case studies that violence will continue during the negotiations, and perhaps escalate, until the peace process is over. The Afghan government must take measures to prepare for this, and engage with the UN to use peacekeepers, as opposed to U.S. forces. This thesis also assumes that after the Taliban integrates into the Afghan government and signs a peace agreement, the conflict will end.

The four cases illustrated that it is possible to integrate a violent group into a government, and provided details in each case that there must be compromises with all parties involved to ensure integration is possible. The main concern is the Afghan Taliban is only willing to come to the table to negotiate with the Afghan government without a U.S. military force present. If this is the case, the U.S. must determine if a force remaining in place is the right approach, or defer to U.S. civilian experts and NGOs, and enable Afghanistan to engage with the UN.

In addition to Tillerson's four requirements, other factors that were critical to success are: To end coercive acts of violence (namely terrorism); disarm and disband the violent group's armed force (such as the militant groups); the violent groups solving internal disputes through non-violent means, and the violent group integrating into the government, as a political party. Tillerson's requirements of renounce terrorism and renounce violence directly correlate with two of the critical factors. However, to increase

the likelihood of success, all fifteen factors must occur to integrate a violent group into government. To begin the integration process, the Afghan government must establish protective measures to enable the retrograde movement of U.S. forces back to the U.S.

The first step towards integration is, the Afghan government must encourage the Afghan Taliban to begin peace negotiations (Factor 1). The Taliban must agree to end acts of violence (Factor 2). Both the government and Taliban must make concessions, such as allowing the Taliban to become part of the political process and disallow Shari'a law (Factor 3 and 4). The Taliban must agree to non-violent disputes during negotiations (Factor 5).

Presumably, the most divisive factor is having a discussion on either to disarm the Taliban, some of the Taliban, or integrate them into the Afghan forces (Factor 6). If unwilling, both parties must discuss whether the Taliban should maintain an armed force like Hezbollah (Factor 7), and become part of Afghanistan's defense measure. The Afghan Taliban must establish a peace agreement (and abide by it) with the Afghan government, and the U.S., with the establishment of a cease-fire to end the conflict (Factor 8). Also, before the groups write the peace agreement, use the NGO process, as the IRA peace negotiations conducted, and infuse NGOs among the population to get a sense of what the people's needs are, then archive the document at the UN.

The Afghan government must establish the Afghan Taliban as a political party, with a name of their choice, and enable elections (Factor 9 and 12). The Taliban must concede to accepting a non-Shari'a based government as it is (Factor 10). The Afghan government must concede and recognize the Taliban as a legitimate political party without any equivocation (Factor 11). To complete the process, the government must

concede to integrate some Taliban members into local governance within villages and the Afghan government, to include holding seats, thereby integrating the group into the government (Factors 13, 14, and 15).

Lastly, the larger implications of this thesis is that states must adopt a more flexible means of dealing with violent groups, as opposed to a more simplistic view of using a standard approach of engaging in conflict and not negotiating with terrorists. Especially those violent groups with reasonable requests as illustrated in the four case studies. These four case studies illustrated that inevitably the long violent conflicts, despite their duration, resulted in negotiations in the end. Therefore, although peace talks will involve concessions by both parties, starting with negotiations first, coming to agreeable terms, and avoiding the long conflict may prove to be a better solution.

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Vita

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