

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB NO. 0704-0188		
<p>The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA, 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</p>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 21-02-2018		2. REPORT TYPE Final Report		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 1-Sep-2014 - 30-Nov-2017	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Final Report: State Repression and its Effects on Civil Conflict, Socio-Economic Outcomes, and Leadership Tenure			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER W911NF-14-1-0485		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 611102		
6. AUTHORS			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES AND ADDRESSES George Washington University 2121 I Street NW Rice Hall Suite 601 Washington, DC 20052 -0086			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS (ES) U.S. Army Research Office P.O. Box 12211 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2211			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) ARO		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 66102-LS.18		
12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views, opinions and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other documentation.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	15. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Susan Aaronson
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER 202-994-7974

RPPR Final Report

as of 06-Mar-2018

Agency Code:

Proposal Number: 66102LS

Agreement Number: W911NF-14-1-0485

INVESTIGATOR(S):

Name: Susan Aaronson
Email: saaronso@gwu.edu
Phone Number: 2029947974
Principal: Y

Organization: **George Washington University**

Address: 2121 I Street NW, Washington, DC 200520086

Country: USA

DUNS Number: 043990498

EIN: 530196584

Report Date: 28-Feb-2018

Date Received: 21-Feb-2018

Final Report for Period Beginning 01-Sep-2014 and Ending 30-Nov-2017

Title: State Repression and its Effects on Civil Conflict, Socio-Economic Outcomes, and Leadership Tenure

Begin Performance Period: 01-Sep-2014

End Performance Period: 30-Nov-2017

Report Term: 0-Other

Submitted By: Susan Aaronson

Email: saaronso@gwu.edu

Phone: (202) 994-7974

Distribution Statement: 1-Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

STEM Degrees:

STEM Participants:

Major Goals: Major Goals:

We seek to better understand the dynamic relationships among repression, civil conflict, and leadership tenure. We see this relationship as a feedback loop: how citizens respond peacefully or violently influences the type of repression rulers employ. How rulers use repression influences how and whether citizens protest. Moreover, how rulers respond to their citizens may influence leadership duration.

Obviously, the relationship among repression, civil conflict and leadership tenure is complicated; we believe it can be best understood holistically. However, researchers have only examined some parts of this relationship. Moreover, few scholars have focused on how their findings might be applied to policymakers in the real world. We believe US (and allied) officials may want policy options to influence rulers who are becoming increasingly repressive (as in Turkey and Egypt) or leaders who preside over countries where instability appears to be on the rise (as in Honduras and Kazakhstan).

Goals:

We aim to produce scholarly research that is easily replicable and policy useful. We will use our findings to provide policymakers with recommendations on how to deal with countries with political and/or violent repression.

Accomplishments: 1. Major activities

Completed three case studies: Honduras, Kazakhstan, and Turkey.

Completed a final paper on the relationship between repression and leadership tenure.

Revised our year 2 paper.

Maintained our website <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/political-science/research/projects/conflict-repression>

Blogged and tweeted our findings.

2. Specific objectives:

We will:

-use these 2 types of scholarly research to develop predicted values and policy recommendations.

-revise the 3 papers for scholarly publication at major journals.

3. Significant Results: Summary of Findings

Year 1 Findings: Changes in Political Repression and Non-Violent Protest

Our findings indicate a striking general pattern that, when leaders change the level of political repression in any direction from the status quo, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.

RPPR Final Report as of 06-Mar-2018

- a. When leaders deviate from the status quo and employ less politically repressive tactics, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.
- b. When leaders deviate from the status quo and employ more politically repressive tactics, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.

Changes in Political Repression and Violent Protest

We found a similar pattern linking change in leaders' use of political repression and violent protest. Nearly all levels of change in political repression elicit violent protest.

- c. When leaders employ relatively less politically repressive tactics, citizens respond with more rebellion against the state in the following year.
- d. When leaders increase the intensity of political repression, citizens respond with more rebellion against the state in the following year.
- e. One contrast to the pattern above is that, when leaders employ relatively less political repression, the likelihood of a new civil war slightly decreases.
- f. When leaders employ relatively more political repression, the likelihood of a new civil war modestly increases up to a certain point. In addition, at relatively high levels of political repression, citizens are slightly less likely to begin a new civil war in the following year.

Changes in Violent Repression and Non-Violent Protest

- g. When leaders reduce their use of violent repression, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.
- h. When leaders increase their use of violent repression, citizens also respond with more non-violent protest.

Changes in Violent Repression and Violent Protest

- i. In contrast to the earlier patterns, when leaders diverge from the status quo and use less violent repression, citizens are less likely to protest violently.
- j. However, we also found that, when leaders intensify the types of violent repression, citizens are more likely to participate in violent protest.

Simultaneous Use of Political and Violent Repression and Non-Violent Protest

- k. Where leaders use less political and violent repression, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.

Simultaneous Use of Both Political and Violent Repression and Violent Protest

- l. When leaders use less political and violent repression, citizens respond with more violent protest.
- m. When leaders use more political and violent repression, citizens respond with more violent protest.

Summary of Year 2 Findings

Our findings indicate that leaders are flexible. Leaders often respond with violence when met with both violent and peaceful protests. However, at times, leaders also respond to peaceful protests by modestly improving political rights—in this case, they may be trying to divide their opposition or to reward less violent forms of citizen protest.

Summary of Year 3 Findings

Leaders have choices about how they can use repression to maintain power. First, leaders who use violence against their own people are likely to lose power over time because they have alienated so many of their constituents. Second, leaders who invest in their people by providing public goods have shorter leadership tenures than those leaders who do not invest in their citizens. Finally, leaders who curtail some of the civil and political rights of their citizens generally remain in power longer than those who don't curtail these rights.

4. Outcomes and Accomplishments:

We presented our research at the National War College, Stockholm University, the International Studies Association, Binghamton University, George Washington University, and University College London.

We are starting to send out scholarly papers after receiving scholarly feedback.

We wrote a set of predicted values.

We wrote a set of policy recommendations based on the findings from our three papers and case studies. We used our website, blogs and tweets for outreach.

Training Opportunities: Nothing to Report

RPPR Final Report

as of 06-Mar-2018

Results Dissemination: We used blogs and tweets to inform scholars and others of our findings.

M. Rob Abouharb published:

March 5, 2017, "Rights and repression: how leaders respond to violent and peaceful protests." Campaign for Social Science. <https://campaignforsocialscience.org.uk/rights-repression-leaders-respond-violentpeaceful-protests/>

March 29, 2017 "Taming the Tiger: peaceful and violent protest and the repressive responses of government. The Policy Space." <http://www.thepolicyspace.com.au/2017/29/175-taming-the-tiger-peacefuland-violent-protest-and-the-repressive-responses-of-government>

We used our web site for dissemination:<http://www.cnmd.ac.uk/spp/research/conflict-repression>

We also gave several scholarly talks based on our research.

Talks by Susan Aaronson

What is the Relationship between Repression and Civil Conflict, National War College, Washington DC, February 27, 2017

How does Repression affect Civil Conflict? Stockholm University Higher Research Seminar, March 17, 2017

Talks by Rodwan Abouharb

"Citizens Always Respond To Repression: Repression Types and Their Consequences For Non-Violent And Violent Civil Conflict." Binghamton University, State University of New York. September 7th, 2016.

Honors and Awards: Susan Ariel Aaronson

GWU Cross Disciplinary Fellow, 2015-present

Cavalho Fellow, Government Accountability Project, 2015

Protocol Activity Status:

Technology Transfer: Nothing to Report

PARTICIPANTS:

Participant Type: PD/PI

Participant: Susan Aaronson

Person Months Worked: 3.00

Project Contribution:

International Collaboration:

International Travel:

National Academy Member: N

Other Collaborators:

Funding Support:

Participant Type: Co-Investigator

Participant: Mohammed Abouharb

Person Months Worked: 3.00

Project Contribution:

International Collaboration:

International Travel:

National Academy Member: N

Other Collaborators:

Funding Support:

Participant Type: Co-Investigator

Participant: Natalie Susan Gaines

Person Months Worked: 2.00

Project Contribution:

International Collaboration:

International Travel:

Funding Support:

RPPR Final Report
as of 06-Mar-2018

National Academy Member: N
Other Collaborators:

CONFERENCE PAPERS:

Publication Type: Conference Paper or Presentation **Publication Status:** 0-Other
Conference Name: International Studies Conference
Date Received: 13-Feb-2018 Conference Date: 18-Mar-2016 Date Published: 31-Aug-2016
Conference Location: Atlanta, Georgia
Paper Title: CITIZENS ALWAYS RESPOND TO REPRESSION: REPRESSION TYPES AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES FOR NON-VIOLENT AND VIOLENT CIVIL CONFLICT
Authors: Abouharb, Rod; Aaronson, Susan; Gaines, N. Susan
Acknowledged Federal Support: **Y**

Publication Type: Conference Paper or Presentation **Publication Status:** 0-Other
Conference Name: International Studies Conference
Date Received: 13-Feb-2018 Conference Date: 20-Mar-2016 Date Published: 06-Mar-2016
Conference Location: Atlanta
Paper Title: Taming the Tiger
Authors: Abouharb Rodwan, Aaronson Susan, and Gaines N. Susan
Acknowledged Federal Support: **Y**

Publication Type: Conference Paper or Presentation **Publication Status:** 0-Other
Conference Name: MidWest Political Science Association
Date Received: 14-Feb-2018 Conference Date: 15-Apr-2015 Date Published: 15-Apr-2015
Conference Location: Chicago, IL
Paper Title: Is it Better to be Feared than Loved?: A Machiavellian Theory of Leadership Tenure
Authors: M. Rodwan Abouharb, N. Susan Gaines
Acknowledged Federal Support: **Y**

WEBSITES:

URL: <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/research/conflict-repression>
Date Received:
Title: Conflict and repression Researching the relationship between repression and civil conflict
Description: Web site housing project description and products, hosted at UCL

Repression, Civil Conflict, and Leadership Tenure

Summary of Findings and Policy Implications

Summary of Year 1 Findings

Changes in Political Repression & Non-Violent Protest

Our findings indicate a striking general pattern that showed when leaders change the level of political repression in any direction from the status quo, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.

- a. When leaders deviate from the status quo and employ *less* politically repressive tactics, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.
- b. When leaders deviate from the status quo and employ *more* politically repressive tactics, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.

Changes in Political Repression & Violent Protest

We found a similar pattern linking leaders' change in political repression and violent protest; almost any change elicits violent protest.

- c. When leaders employ relatively less politically repressive tactics, citizens respond with more rebellion against the state in the following year.
- d. We also find when leaders increase the intensity of political repression, citizens respond with more rebellion against the state in the following year.
- e. One contrast to the pattern above is that when leaders stray from the status quo and employ relatively less political repression, the likelihood of a *new civil war* gently decreases.
- f. When leaders change from the status quo and employ relatively more political repression, the likelihood of a new civil war modestly increases up to a point, and at relatively high levels of political repression, citizens respond by becoming slightly less likely to begin a new civil war in the following year.

Changes in Violent Repression & Non-Violent Protest

When leaders change their use of violent repression it elicits non-violent protest.

- g. When leaders reduce their use of violent repression, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.
- h. When leaders increase their use of violent repression, citizens also respond with more non-violent protest.

Changes in Violent Repression & Violent Protest

- i. In contrast to the patterns highlighted before, when leaders depart from the status quo and utilize less violent repression, citizens are less likely to protest violently.
- j. However we also find that when leaders use more intense forms of violent repression, citizens respond by becoming more likely to participate in violent protest.

Simultaneous use of both Political and Violent Repression and Non-Violent Protest

- k. Where leaders depart from the status quo and use less political and violent repression, citizens respond with more non-violent protest.

Simultaneous use of both Political and Violent Repression and Violent Protest

- l. When leaders use less political and violent repression, citizens respond with more violent protest.
- m. When leaders use more political and violent repression, citizens respond with more violent protest.

Summary of Year 2 Findings

Our findings indicate that leaders are flexible; they respond to the signals from protestors with different strategies. Like scholars such as Davenport (2007), we find that leaders often respond with violence when met with violent protests, and they also respond with violence when met by peaceful protest. However, at times, leaders also respond to peaceful protest by modestly improving political rights—they may be trying to divide their opposition or to reward less violent forms of citizen protest.

Summary of Year 3 Findings

Leaders have choices about how they can use repression to maintain power. Those who use violence against their own people are likely to lose power over time. We also find that leaders, which invest in their people by providing public goods such as healthcare, have shorter leadership tenure than those leaders who do not invest in their citizens. Finally, leaders who curtail some of the civil and political rights of their citizens generally stay in power longer.

Implications of our Research for Policymakers

Our qualitative and quantitative findings have important implications for US policymakers who seek to reduce repression and instability.

- a. Levels of repression are fluid. Among our case studies, Thailand, Turkey, the DRC and Bahrain became increasingly repressive. Turkey and Bahrain shifted from a focus on political repression towards more frequent use of violent repression. Mali, Argentina and Sri Lanka became less repressive.
- b. Large changes in the level of repression create instability. While it is desirable that a leader who relied on violent repression moves to ease conditions, sizeable policy changes that reduce repression can create instability. Consequently, while US policymakers want to improve human rights conditions, they should avoid creating further instability. Instead, these officials should promote slow and steady improvements in human rights practices.
- c. US policymakers must find ways to balance two complicated tasks: first to prod repressive leaders to slowly reduce the level and type of repression, and secondly to encourage those officials to slowly rebuild trust with their constituents without increasing political tensions.
- d. Many repressive leaders consider their options to repress or ameliorate the demands of their citizens with a view to maintaining their hold on power. They use a variety of repressive responses and often a mixture of repressive and conciliatory policies towards their citizens' demands. However, leaders do not always make the right choices if they are concerned about retaining power. Leaders who use violence tend to have shorter tenures than those that rely on political repression. We also found that leaders that invest in their citizens' health (an important development objective) also tend to have shorter tenures than those that rely on variants of political repression. The challenge for US policymakers is to convince these leaders that it is in their interest to gradually improve development and human rights outcomes for their people.
- e. Many of the governments we studied Many of the governments we studied denied equal provision of state largesse (education, health benefits as example) to various groups of citizens (ethnic, minority or opposition groups).
- f. We found that even in democratic countries such as Argentina, corruption, impunity and political repression were closely linked. In fact, everyone of our case studies had significant problems of corruption and impunity. However, in Thailand, Kazakhstan and Honduras, corruption was a systemic problem where leaders used repression to maintain their control of government, allowing them to continue to capture revenue streams. Repression was a tool to enable corruption. Hence we believe policymakers could benefit from further study of the repression/corruption relationship.




Pages

All Users
100.00% Page Views

3 Mar 2015 - 20 Feb 2018

Explorer

Page Views



This data was filtered with the following filter expression: **conflict-repression**

Page	Page Views	Unique Page Views	Avg. Time on Page	Entrances	Bounce Rate	% Exit	Page Value
	772 % of Total: 0.07% (1,132,275)	599 % of Total: 0.07% (859,695)	00:01:52 Avg for View: 00:01:30 (24.87%)	324 % of Total: 0.07% (437,939)	69.44% Avg for View: 63.93% (8.63%)	46.50% Avg for View: 38.68% (20.23%)	US\$0.00 % of Total: 0.00% (US\$0.00)
1. /spp/research/conflict-repression	312 (40.41%)	236 (39.40%)	00:01:40	134 (41.36%)	64.18%	41.35%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
2. /spp/research/conflict-repression/team	104 (13.47%)	89 (14.86%)	00:01:48	54 (16.67%)	72.22%	60.58%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
3. /spp/research/conflict-repression/case-studies/thai-case-study-2006-2014	89 (11.53%)	74 (12.35%)	00:03:16	70 (21.60%)	80.00%	73.03%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
4. /spp/research/conflict-repression/case-studies	82 (10.62%)	52 (8.68%)	00:01:15	15 (4.63%)	60.00%	35.37%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
5. /spp/research/conflict-repression/questions	60 (7.77%)	51 (8.51%)	00:02:06	23 (7.10%)	82.61%	45.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
6. /spp/research/conflict-repression/findings	55 (7.12%)	38 (6.34%)	00:02:19	9 (2.78%)	55.56%	38.18%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
7. /spp/research/conflict-repression/strategies	32 (4.15%)	25 (4.17%)	00:02:28	2 (0.62%)	100.00%	15.62%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
8. /spp/research/conflict-repression/sponsors	19 (2.46%)	18 (3.01%)	00:02:41	6 (1.85%)	83.33%	52.63%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
9. /spp/research/conflict-repression/downloads	5 (0.65%)	4 (0.67%)	00:00:11	2 (0.62%)	0.00%	40.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
10. /spp/research/conflict-repression/	3 (0.39%)	3 (0.50%)	00:06:50	2 (0.62%)	50.00%	66.67%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
11. /silva/spp/research/conflict-repression/case-studies/thai-case-study-2006-2014	2 (0.26%)	2 (0.33%)	00:00:00	2 (0.62%)	100.00%	100.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
12. /spp/research/conflict-repression/case-studies/	2 (0.26%)	1 (0.17%)	00:00:12	1 (0.31%)	0.00%	0.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
13. /spp/research/conflict-repression/case-studies/index	2 (0.26%)	1 (0.17%)	00:00:17	1 (0.31%)	0.00%	50.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
14. /silva/spp/research/conflict-repression	1 (0.13%)	1 (0.17%)	00:00:19	1 (0.31%)	0.00%	0.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
15. /silva/spp/research/conflict-repression/findings	1 (0.13%)	1 (0.17%)	00:00:00	0 (0.00%)	0.00%	100.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
16. /silva/spp/research/conflict-repression/sponsors	1 (0.13%)	1 (0.17%)	00:00:00	0 (0.00%)	0.00%	100.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
17. /silva/spp/research/conflict-repression/team	1 (0.13%)	1 (0.17%)	00:00:27	1 (0.31%)	0.00%	0.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
18. /spp/research/conflict-repression/strategies/	1 (0.13%)	1 (0.17%)	00:00:00	1 (0.31%)	100.00%	100.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)




Pages

All Users
100.00% Page Views

3 Mar 2015 - 20 Feb 2018

Explorer

Page Views



This data was filtered with the following filter expression: conflict-repression

Table with 8 columns: Page, Page Views, Unique Page Views, Avg. Time on Page, Entrances, Bounce Rate, % Exit, Page Value. It lists 19 different page URLs and their corresponding metrics.

		(0.19%)	(0.24%)		(0.00%)		(0.00%)	
20.	/political-science/research/projects/conflict-repression/downloads	1 (0.19%)	1 (0.24%)	00:00:06	1 (0.47%)	0.00%	0.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
21.	/political-science/research/projects/conflict-repression/questions/strategies/findings/case-studies/team	1 (0.19%)	1 (0.24%)	00:00:25	0 (0.00%)	0.00%	0.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
22.	/political-science/research/projects/conflict-repression/questions/strategies/findings/case-studies/team/sponsors	1 (0.19%)	1 (0.24%)	00:00:09	0 (0.00%)	0.00%	0.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
23.	/political-science/research/projects/conflict-repression/team/sponsors	1 (0.19%)	1 (0.24%)	00:00:11	0 (0.00%)	0.00%	0.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
24.	/silva/political-science/research/projects/conflict-repression	1 (0.19%)	1 (0.24%)	00:00:07	0 (0.00%)	0.00%	0.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)
25.	/silva/political-science/research/projects/conflict-repression/questions	1 (0.19%)	1 (0.24%)	00:01:04	0 (0.00%)	0.00%	0.00%	US\$0.00 (0.00%)

Rows 1 - 25 of 25