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CIVIL AFFAIRS FRAMEWORK FOR EXECUTING GOVERNANCE

by

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December 2017

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CIVIL AFFAIRS FRAMEWORK FOR EXECUTING GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT

Although the U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) Regiment is charged with assessing and implementing governance tasks in conflict and immediate post-conflict areas, it lacks adequate education and tools to do the job properly. This lack of proficiency has led to an inability to consistently and effectively execute governance operations prior to handing off this task to host-nation (HN) government officials. Our thesis corrects CA's governance training deficit by providing a four-step process that guides the user through the execution of a governance mission. Included in the process is an instructional guide that CA teams can use as they train and deploy that will aid them in advising, assisting and assessing regional and local governance in conflict and post-conflict environments. The thesis compiles the best governance practices and assessment techniques of international and U.S. institutions, but tailors these ideas to the specific contexts of CA units working at the local level. Our approach will allow CA units to properly assess and promote good governance while enabling for a seamless handoff to HN officials and international and U.S. aid organizations to foster long-term good governance. Additionally, this thesis includes a recommendation for a governance period of instruction (POI) within CA.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CA	Civil Affairs
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CAQC	Civil Affairs Qualification Course
CME	Civil Military Engagement
CMSE	Civil Military Support Element
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DRG	Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
ETM	Essential Task Matrix
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FOB	Forward Operating Bases
HN	Host Nation
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JP	Joint Publication
MPICE	Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MOP	Measures of Performance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PKSOI	U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

S/CRS	Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SF	Special Forces
SWCS	Special Warfare Center and School
TCP	Theater Campaign Plan
TSOC	Theatre Special Operation Command
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department and Agriculture
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
WB	World Bank

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I. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

A. WHY WE CREATED THIS THESIS

This thesis was created to guide Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers on how to successfully execute governance tasks when supporting missions requiring CA support in the advising, assisting, and stabilization of post-conflict environments.

Across the Army, the CA soldiers are recognized as the governance experts. CA soldiers consistently deploy worldwide to advise civil authorities on how to execute stable and sustainable governance at all levels. Governance proficiency is emphasized throughout CA doctrine and CA mission statements as a foundation of the CA branch. Department of the Army (2014b), *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Pamphlet 600-3) and Department of the Army (2014a), *Civil Military Operations* (FM 3-57), both state the mission of CA is “to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities through the planning and conducting of Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)” (Department of the Army [DA], 2014b, p. 188; Department of the Army [DA], 2014a, p. 1-1). However, despite the emphasis on governance proficiency, CA soldiers receive very little formal training on advising local authorities on governance. It is not covered in the Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC), and there are no other opportunities for further professional development. In their NPS capstone project, *Friends with Benefits: Optimizing Civil Affairs for Future Engagements*, MAJ Clay Daniels and LTC David Foster (2014) argue that the lack of governance training in the CA branch is a significant shortfall that prevents CA soldiers from successfully executing assigned missions such as stability and irregular warfare (p. 42). In addition, when deployed, CA soldiers are expected to take lessons learned from previous teams, conduct on-the-job training and receive rudimentary mentorship from leadership. Based off mission statements of Army and CA doctrine, and what is done in preparation to execute those missions, it is clear there is a gap between what CA is expected to do and what CA is trained to do. CA soldiers must receive additional education and participate in training

exercises that validate their governance expertise. This thesis will assist soldiers assigned to governance missions, especially those who have not received formal training.

B. WHO IS THE TARGETED AUDIENCE FOR THIS THESIS?

This thesis is intended specifically for use at the local governance level by CA teams; however, it can also be used by CA companies or battalions when tasked to work at the district or provincial level of government. It is important to note that not all portions of the thesis will apply to all operational environments. It is the responsibility of the user to conduct a country study and complete adequate problem diagnosis (introduced in Chapter III as Step One of the four-step governance execution process) prior to deployment and then determine, based off training received in the CAQC, what portions of the thesis best apply to the mission set. For example, all essential services will not apply when working in portions of Afghanistan because some of the people there may never have had electricity. However, other portions of the thesis may be highly useful.

C. SETUP OF THE THESIS

This thesis is designed to assist CA soldiers in the execution of governance missions and bridge the gap between the expectations that the defense community has of CA soldiers in governance and their actual level of training. Chapter I serves as an introduction to the research, discussing both why it was conducted and the target audience, and as well as outlining the information to be found in subsequent chapters. Chapter II, Section A, begins with a discussion of why it is critical for CA to conduct governance and, more specifically, the niche that CA is designed to fill, which makes the military's mission different than those of other USG organizations in building government and governance. To better articulate this mission, Chapter II, Section B, stresses the difference between governance and government, highlighting that CA units focus on building good governance. Chapter II Section C, discusses the building blocks of good governance by introducing theories and concepts that should be evaluated and considered prior to beginning the assessment process. These building blocks include social norms, social capital, civil society organizations (CSOs), social contract theory, ideology, influence, and the theory of competitive control. Chapter II, part D introduces

five principles of good governance that this thesis will use for evaluation: 1) participation (inclusion, consensus, and voice), 2) fairness, 3) accountability, 4) transparency, 5) performance (responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency), and 6) predictability. Chapter II, part E discusses the four pillars of government that will be evaluated using the five principles stated earlier. These four pillars include security (human and physical), rule of law, social well-being, and economy and infrastructure. Chapter III introduces a four-step governance execution process that will guide the user in problem diagnosis, governance assessment, implementation, and evaluation. Chapter IV offers the conclusion, which is followed by three appendices. Appendix A consists of the governance assessment framework, described in Chapter III that can be detached and used in the field for governance assessments. Appendix B provides a summary of the main U.S. government (USG) and civilian government, stability and reconstruction frameworks that were used to derive this research. The reader can also use these references for additional information and guidance when conducting governance missions. Appendix C includes a recommend training syllabus that was used to conduct a graduate level course for CA and Special Forces (SF) officers at NPS that focused on governance. It can be used to better educate and prepare for missions involving advising and assisting host nation (HN) governments on how to improve governance.

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II. UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE

A. WHY CIVIL AFFAIRS?

American experience in war has shown that, despite superior combat power and capabilities, often the U.S. cannot win wars through force alone. Despite U.S. success in completing all phases of warfare through stabilization in World War II, the U.S. currently continues to struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan due to a lack of planning and preparation for post-conflict nation-building. In 2005, the military formally recognized the importance of stabilization when it published DOD Directive 3000.05 (2009), *Stability Operations*, which states that stability is a “core U.S. military mission” and that the U.S. military must be prepared to “conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments” (p. 2). Furthermore, DOD Directive 2000.13 (2014b), *Civil Affairs*, specifically states that CA forces will support this by providing “support to governance” (p. 1). Given these directives and the variety of environments in which the USG operates, Army forces, and specifically CA forces, are best suited to execute support to governance operations in a variety of scenarios that exceed the capabilities of other agencies. Therefore, it is critical that CA soldiers receive more education and training on how to execute this critical task.

However, despite the above directives, the military, arguably, still struggles when successfully planning post combat operations. According to Guttieri et al. (2014), this struggle can be attributed both to the Army’s resistance in fully embracing the mission and the traditional “American way of war,” which relies on kinetic and logistical aspects of warfare. Their article states that “Civilian-centric and non-kinetic considerations of war have no comparable status in the institutional U.S. military” (p. 8). Scales (2017) posits that military leaders would rather focus on combat operations than post-conflict stabilization, possibly because stabilizing a nation and rebuilding its government are more difficult than defeating the enemy on the battlefield. He highlights that conventional units do not receive adequate training to execute these tasks (p. Introduction section).

There is also pushback from personnel in the interagency regarding the military's role in stabilization. Muller (2017) articulates the common argument that because other organizations such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of State (DoS), and the United Nations (UN) focus on building partner-nation capacity, there is no need for the military to put energy into these efforts (p. 7). Also, interagency partners are often concerned that U.S. military support to governance will result in the militarization of foreign civilian institutions.

Nadia Schadlow's book, *War and The Art of Governance* (2017), identifies the misunderstandings of both military personnel and civilians regarding who is best suited to execute governance as the "denial syndrome," which consists of four themes: "discomfort in a democracy with the idea of the military taking the lead in political activities, American concerns about colonialism, the view that civilians could take the lead in governance operations, and traditional views about what constituted war and the military profession" (p. 22). According to Scales (2017), this "denial syndrome" was evident when the U.S. conquered Baghdad. The Army allocated too few personnel to restore order within the city, leaving it susceptible to insurgent influence (p. Conclusion section). Since then, the controversy continues over who is responsible for building partner nation governance capability.

Despite reluctance by both the military and the interagency for military participation in stabilization operations, lessons learned in past conflicts, such as Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan suggest a gap exists that only the military can fill when conducting governance operations. According to Schadlow (2017), the U.S. Army plays a critical role in establishing political order during and post combat operations (p. X). She highlights that prior to engaging in war, military plans must be made for the transition from combat to achieving desired political end states (p. XI), and this analysis should encourage decision makers to critically analyze what the post war objective is, and if it justifies the U.S. going to war in the first place (p. 12). Shadlow argues that the Army is the only organization capable of "decisively acquiring, holding and stabilizing territory and operating in sufficient scale for ample duration to provide a foundation for a transition to the reestablishment of political order" (p. 14). This applies to areas of

conflict where lack of security inhibits civilian ability to operate. Within the Army, the DOD Directive, 200.13 (2014a) highlights the CA branch as specifically designated to execute these tasks that include

support stability operations, including activities that establish civil security; provide support to governance; provide essential services; support economic development and infrastructure; and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-US military authority (p. 1).

There are some operating environments in which interagency partners are not capable of executing governance and others where CA forces enhance the ability of our partners to build partner nation capacity.

For example, civilian interagency organizations may not be equipped to execute governance in areas of poor security. Because of this, the Army and specifically CA forces are critical in building partner nation governance capacity during conflict and directly post conflict. During these times, civilian agencies do not possess the elements required, such as weapons, vehicles, and security personnel to operate in highly contested areas where enemy forces are a constant threat. Recent examples of this are demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both theaters, USAID and DoS were restricted to main bases such as the Green Zone and fortified Forward Operating Bases (FOB) because they did not have the internal apparatus to travel out and meet with key individuals, yet such meetings are critical when building partner nation capacity. Army troops, however, were spread across the operating environment, some embedded in local communities, giving them the ability to engage with local populations at the lowest level. The nature of conflict in both wars directed that U.S. forces work alongside local actors to assist them in improving their indigenous security. Because of this possibility, governance building must begin during times of conflict and continue during the transition to reconstruction, stabilization, and eventual civilian authority. When security is sufficient for civilian agencies to engage the population, then the Army can transition out of a governance advising role. Until that point, though, it is critical that CA forces are present and capable of advising and assisting local government entities.

CA forces also fill a critical gap in areas outside of war zones. In these areas, the U.S. Embassy and U.S. country team take the lead in operations; however, there is still a critical role for CA forces and opportunities exist to amplify the objectives of the USG, including supporting the Theatre Campaign Plan (TCP) for the DOD and both the Integrated Country Strategies (ICS) of USAID and DoS. In many of these countries, security in the outskirts is still poor. In these locations, the military can operate in areas of decreased security at the periphery, and partner with local leadership in attempts to expand the U.S. Ambassador's and USG influence beyond where civilian agencies are able to operate. Additionally, the U.S. country team's presence in some countries is limited, not having the personnel to build nation capacity outside major population centers. In such instances, CA forces are trained and capable of filling this gap, further amplifying the strategic objectives of the U.S. Ambassador.

Additionally, aside from mission requirements and capability, CA forces may be beneficial in governance building based upon logistical concerns. According to Mueller (2017), civilian organizations are not self-sustaining and cannot provide their own security. He highlights that they also cannot be forcibly deployed at a rapid rate (p. 7). Muller explains how the U.S. military expects all personnel to deploy within short notice; thus, both the military's flexibility and ability to react to situations exceed that of its interagency partners (p. 7). Additionally, Shadlow (2017) notes the cost of sending civilian government employees to Iraq or Afghanistan for one year is approximately \$410,000–\$570,000 per year, which is significantly more expensive than sending military troops (p. 17). In addition to this extreme cost, there are not enough DoS personnel to fill the need. As Schadlow notes, in 2011 there were approximately 1,000 civilian government employees in Afghanistan, and currently there are many less. She addresses that because the USG could not deploy enough civilians to fill the gap, Army reservists were relied on to fill this requirement and bridge the gap (p. 18).

There are many organizations such as DoS, USAID and the UN that professionally execute governance as one of their core tasks. These organizations and others such as United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Stability and Operations Institute (PKSOI) have done extensive research on how to better

execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. To come up with a governance thesis that is both intended for CA use and that integrates with interagency goals and objectives, the research for this thesis examined many of these agencies' frameworks, governance education and training models. Appendix B presents a summary of the interagency frameworks and models that are applicable to CA operations and cited in this thesis.

B. HOW WE DEFINE GOVERNANCE

Before proposing a framework, it is important to distinguish the difference between governance and government. CA personnel are expected to execute governance, which is different from bolstering government functions in a country. Arguably, USG interagency partners are better prepared and equipped to support and bolster government activities. However, the access and placement of CA units, and special operations training those units receive, specifically in post conflict scenarios, makes CA particularly equipped to focus on governance. This research introduces principles of governance that will be used to evaluate government pillars (or functions) within a country or society. The governance principles are intangible (participation, fairness, accountability, transparency, performance, and predictability), while the government pillars are more tangible (security, rule of law, social well-being, economy and infrastructure). Both the principles of governance and pillars of government will be introduced in detail in Chapter II, parts D and E.

In this manner, CA units will not be executing, advising, or assisting foreign partners on how to execute or conduct pillars of government. CA units will be partnering with foreign partners to advise and assist them in applying principles of good governance when conducting government jobs and functions. For this research, governance and government are distinguished in the following text, and these discernments are derived from the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2009) monograph, *What is Good Governance?* and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (n.d.). monograph, *A User's Guide to Measuring Local Governance*

Governance: “The process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)” (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2009, p. 1).

Governance is the result of interactions, relationships and networks between the different sectors (government, public sector, private sector and civil society) and involves decisions, negotiation, and different power relations between stakeholders to determine who gets what, when and how. The relationships between government and different sectors of society determine how things are done, and how services are provided. Governance is, therefore, much more than government or “good government” and shapes the way a service or any set of services are planned, managed and regulated within a set of political social and economic systems. (United Nations Development Programme, n.d., p. 5)

In contrast, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, defines government as follows:

Government is one of the actors in governance. Other actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of government that is under discussion. In rural areas, for example, other actors may include influential land lords, associations of peasant farmers, cooperatives, NGOs [Non-governmental organizations], research institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions, political parties, the military etc. (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2009, p. 1)

C. BUILDING GOVERNANCE

Prior to beginning any assessment, CA teams should do a thorough analysis of the operational environment. A four-step governance execution process is outlined in Chapter III. During Step One of this process, it is helpful for CA teams to identify and analyze the key foundational elements and social concepts that exist in a society. It is important to understand an environment, the population, and government / social dynamics prior to initiating any assessments. It is only possible to improve governance when the current and previous systems of governing are understood, as well as the cultural and social backgrounds of a society. These existing systems provide the foundation from which a CA team will begin working, and are, therefore, critical to understand prior to mission execution. Some of these concepts can be evaluated through

social theories and others are assessments of consensus throughout a society, including perceptions such as nationalism and ideology.

1. Social Norms

Prior to executing a governance mission, it is important to understand a society's social norms. Bicchieri and Muldoon (2014) define social norms as “the customary rules that govern behavior in groups and societies” (p. 1). The authors describe how social norms in societies can be applied through a variety of prisms: for example, anthropology—specifically how social norms function across cultures; economy—specifically how social norms impact market behavior; legally—specifically how social norms have the ability to serve as alternatives to laws and rules; and socially—specifically how social norms influence people to act (p. 1). Bicchieri and Muldoon state that social norms are “central to the production of social order or social coordination,” making them critical for CA teams to understand to the best of their ability prior to embarking on governance missions (p. 1). Therefore, as described by the authors, societal beliefs, knowledge (common and group), and social expectations have a direct impact on social norms and how people perceive them (p. 1).

Social norms are difficult for an outsider to identify. For example, if someone asked an American what their social norms were, it would be difficult to answer because social norms are not always obvious or planned beliefs. Some examples for Americans might include being able to drive five miles over the speed limit without getting pulled over, shaking hands when introduced to someone, giving up your seat on a bus for the elderly, and saying “please” and “thank you.” It is important to attempt to identify social norms prior to governance assessment and implementation. For example, if a country relies on tribal or elderly conflict resolution, instating a formal legal system with an appointed judge would not be respected as legitimate by the population.

McLeod (2008) notes that social norms provide order in a society, directing people's behavior in a way that encourages predictability (p. Social norms section). This allows the population to better understand the actions of others. Adherence to social norms is conformity. For example, under most circumstances, the majority of people do

not steal because they want to be socially accepted by the greater population. In this way, the social norm of not stealing creates the expectation that most people will adhere to that norm.

When advising and assisting local HN government officials, it is important to emphasize the value of trust and reciprocity when attempting to reinforce social norms. For example, Petrie (2002) indicates that if a government expects its population to value truth, social consideration and loyalty, it is important that the government demonstrate those qualities to the population in a transparent and accountable manner (p. 5).

When assigned a governance mission, CA teams must acknowledge that understanding the local social norms is critical in successful governance assessment and implementation. Granted, it is much easier to assess a problem using American social norms than taking the time and effort to decipher local norms; however, such an approach can be highly problematic and detrimental to overall mission success.

2. Social Capital

Social capital is an important social aspect to analyze when conducting a governance assessment. In *The Great Disruption*, author Francis Fukuyama (1999), defines social capital as “a set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among them” (p. 16). Fukuyama also notes that social capital is based on the trust people have between one another in a given society. He states that the more reliable and honest people in a population perceive one another to be, the greater the trust levels that exist (p. 16). When people trust each other, to include their government or informal leadership, they are more likely to invest in their social contract because they are confident the governing entity will deliver expected goods and services.

Fukuyama (1999) posits that while generally shared values and norms are usually considered a positive feature within a society, they do not necessarily translate to social capital. He explains that there are many groups that have shared values and norms, such as the mafia in Sicily; however, their society is grounded in distrust, resulting in low social capital. Fukuyama shows that to be a positive attribute, social capital must be grounded in values such as telling the truth, reliability and reciprocity (pp. 16-17). While

almost all societies exhibit characteristics of social capital, Fukuyama explains that what differentiates them is the “radius of trust,” which refers to the extent to which social capital is shared with different groups of people (p. 17). For example, many societies exhibit social capital within their immediate family unit; however, that capital may not expand to exclude groups outside the family.

According to Fukuyama (1999), some societies attempt to create social capital through laws, regulations, hierarchies and contracts, yet these come with high costs, including monitoring, adjudicating and policing. He explains that informal forms of social capital are those that are inherent in the population and do not require high costs to maintain. Fukuyama continues to address how informal social capital renders greater genuine trust between members of the population. He posits that social capital allows groups to unite together and defend their interests against their governing entity (p. 18).

When assigned a governance mission, it is helpful to evaluate the level of social capital that exists in a society before conducting assessments or making attempts at implementation. Fukuyama (1999) inspired some evaluation questions that include (pp. 22-23)

- Does the population trust the governing entity?
- What is the “radius of trust?”
- Does trust exist outside family units? Between different societal groups?
- What are the values of the population? Do different groups have different values?
- Do differences in values polarize the population?
- Is social capital formal (government relies on laws to maintain) or informal?

3. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

The United Nations Economic and Social Council (2006) indicates that civil society is a critical component of governance that holds leadership and powerful government officials accountable for their actions and decisions (p. 9). Similarly, U.S. Army PKSOI (2016) defines CSOs as “both informal and formal non-state, not-for-profit

organizations and groups that represent the interests of citizens in public discussions” (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute [PKSOI], 2016a, p. II-35). CSOs channel voluntary public participation and the interests and concerns of the population to influence public policy, provide checks and balances to governmental power, gain access to public resources, and prevent social abuse. Both Elahi (2009) and U.S. Army PKSOI give examples of CSOs which include faith; tribal and ethnic organizations; media outlets; women’s and minority advocacy groups; social, sports and recreation organizations; charities; youth groups; labor unions; noncommercial business associations; social movements; and organizations that express opinions on government policy (Elahi, 2009, p. 1171; U.S. Army PKSOI, 2016a, p. II-35).

While not state affiliated, CSOs hold a significant role in helping establish policies that serve both the interests of the state and of the citizens. U.S. Army PKSOI (2016a) notes that CSOs challenge unfair policies and resource allocation, ensuring state accountability and responsiveness. Additionally, CSOs are advocates for citizen rights, public services and policies that support the interests of the population. U.S. Army PKSOI asserts that CSOs also work to fight corruption, support fair taxation, and represent the citizens on policy and decision-making (U.S. Army PKSOI, 2016a, p. II-36).

Posner (2004) indicates that successful and sustainable CSOs have high levels of trust and reciprocity, also previously described as social capital (p. 242). For example, people are more likely to participate in CSOs if they trust that other members are dependable participants and willing to make the similar contributions. Posner contends that increased trust is often a byproduct of participation in a CSO that has dependable members. He adds that because trust, reciprocity and dependability are intangible qualities, they are very difficult for outsiders to foster or create. He states that another way to foster commitment to a CSO is through “selective incentives” which are personal benefits generated through participation in a CSO such as increased respect, prestige, social standing, and increased approval among peers (p. 243).

U.S. Army PKSOI (2016a) emphasizes that it is important to remember that civilian USG agencies, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and other international

organizations are usually responsible for restoration to and supporting civil society (p. II-35). In post conflict environments, these organizations may not be present, leaving that temporary responsibility to CA teams, optimally with the guidance of the U.S. interagency and IGOs. Even if interagency partners are present and active in the same area of operations as a CA team, it is still important for the CA team to be aware of CSOs that exist and their impact on the governing environment. Some military tasks to consider according to the U.S. Army PKSOI's (2016a) *Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media* regarding CSOs include the following (p. II-36):

1. Work alongside USG organizations, IGOs, and NGOs to identify civil society initiatives and support them as much as possible if assessed as a productive addition to the post conflict environment;
2. Encourage HN leadership to seek the opinions of CSOs prior to establishing government laws and policies;
3. Encourage HN leadership to promote the formation of CSOs and their participation in government;
4. Supporting civil society's attempts to conduct positive information campaigns (such as tolerance of minority groups), deliver public services, and support the interests of the civil population.

According to U.S. Army PKSOI's (2016a) *Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media*, additional civil society planning considerations include (p. II-37):

1. **Developing civil society requires advisors that have an in-depth cultural and historical understanding of the HN.** In post conflict regions, the government during the pre-conflict environment may have been a dictatorship, not allowing CSOs. This results in a population that lacks experience and is not educated in how to set up, participate in and run a CSO that actively contributes to society. Because of this, post conflict CSOs will often require extended mentorship and support;
2. **Expediting policy change and government building at the cost of public discussion and participation incurs significant risks.** The military often operates on a quick timeline, pushing progress at a rate that is not sustainable. While expedited post conflict reconstruction can be encouraged, it is often not beneficial or sustainable to do so in a way that eliminates the participation of civil society. Expedited legal, social and government formation and decision making that excludes civil society will likely result in a system that lacks legitimacy;

3. **Avoiding over empowering one main leader.** While it can be easier and faster for CA teams to work with one leader, rather than empowering other subordinate members of government or the civil society, such selection risks creating a government system that is dominated by one person. It is important to emphasize that subordinate local leaders and civil society should be included in decision making processes;
4. Encouraging CSO formation and the coordination between CSOs at the local level and then working to tie them into the next tier of government. This can leverage local issues at higher levels of government, and also publicize local initiatives, further motivating people from other regions to form CSOs as well;
5. Increasing the visibility of local CSOs by encouraging their participation and support of public service projects, public policy discussions and outreach efforts. Increased visibility can help encourage more participation, and demonstrates that CSOs are dedicated to supporting legitimate government initiatives;
6. **Encouraging the inclusion of civil society in the government legal framework.** It is important that civil society is supportive of the government's legitimate rule of law and ensures the legal system is fair and impartial to all demographic groups.

4. Social Contract Theory

According to Laskar (2013), social contract theory helps explain the relationship between the local population and both the government and the government's reliability (p. 3). He asserts that, within John Locke's interpretation of social contract theory, people in a society cede some of their rights to a governmental power in exchange for protection and assurance that conflicts will be dealt with fairly. He adds that without a social contract, Locke considered personal property insecure because there was an absence of law, no legitimate judicial structure or conflict arbitrator, and an absence of "natural power to execute natural laws" (p. 4). Because of this, Laskar contends Locke believed it beneficial for people to enter into a "social contract" that ensures government protection and fair arbitration of conflicts. Under the conditions of this contract, citizens are not required to cede all individual rights, but are required to cede the "right to preserve / maintain order and enforce the law of nature" (p. 4). In doing this, Laskar asserts individuals gain a legal system, legitimate judges, and government power to make and enforce laws (p. 4). He notes that in Locke's social contract interpretation, the government is responsible for upholding the "natural rights of men," and when the

government ceases to uphold these rights and fulfill its responsibilities, the population has no reason to support the government (p. 4). At this point, Laskar, in interpreting Locke, suggests it is the duty of the population to withdraw from the social contract and even rebel against the government (p. 6). When diagnosing sources of conflict in foreign countries during Step One of the governance cycle (see Chapter III), it is important to analyze the social contract between the government and the population. Some questions to consider are:

- What does the population provide to the government? (do they pay taxes, follow established laws, participate in required or voluntary government service?)
- What does the government provide the population in return?
- Is the population satisfied with what the government provides them?
- Does the population perceive the contract as fair?
- Does the population perceive the government as adequately protecting people and property?
- Is the population satisfied with the enforcement mechanisms the government uses when laws are broken?

Disparities between the expectations of the population and the government can lead to grievances within the population, which can lead to drivers of conflict. If the population does not feel the government adequately protects them, they may be more likely to seek protection from non-state actors, weakening the effectiveness of the legitimate government. On the other hand, if the government expects the citizens to pay taxes, they must deliver something tangible, showing that tax money is being utilized in a way that contributes to the well-being of the population. Some examples are a functioning police force or trash collection.

Coercion can be a key player in the social contract between a government and society. Violent coercion on behalf of the government or a non-state actor can force the population into abiding by a social contract. According to Killcullen (2013), coercion alone generally will achieve only temporary and brittle dominance, yet when combined with persuasion (security, order, predictability) and administrative support (essential

services, conflict mitigation, social, and economic institutions), a government may be much more resilient and effective (p. 134). When embarking on any mission involving governance, be sure to examine the social contract between the government and the population, and determine what the government utilizes to gain its credibility (persuasion, administration, coercion, or a combination).

5. Ideology

The ideology of a population is important to examine prior to executing governance on any mission set. Ideology can be articulated in many ways; however, for this research, it will be defined by Andrew Heywood (2017) as a “set of ideas that provides the basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power” (p. 10).

Heywood (2017) explains that all ideologies have the following characteristics:

1. offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a ‘world-view,’
2. advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the ‘good society,’ and
3. explain how political change can and should be brought about - how to get from (a) to (b). (Heywood, 2017, p. 10)

The influence that an ideology can wield according to Heywood (2017) is as follows: The ideology a group or society holds attempts to bridge the gap between the current state of affairs and the desired state, and also bridges thoughts to actions (pp. 11-12). This bridge provides people with an overview of the world and helps people understand their position in their current environment. Heywood asserts that this understanding is based on a set of normative beliefs that allows people to decipher the adequacy of their present arrangement in society. It can be a powerful set of shared or divergent beliefs—capable of both evoking emotion, anger, and satisfaction, and expressing beliefs and understanding of the world—within a population. These evoked emotions, Heywood observes, often become values of a population (p. 11). When making the connection between ideology and science, ideology is treated as a paradigm, which, Heywood states, is defined as “a set of related principles, doctrines and theories that help to structure the process of intellectual enquiry” (p. 11). Heywood emphasizes, it is

important to recognize that all people view the world through their own ideology, which is their set of theories, beliefs, and assumption that, in turn, shapes how they view their environment and their position in it (p. 12). When embarking on governance missions, it is important to have an understanding of the ideologies that the population possess. Some possible questions to consider are:

- Does everyone in the environment hold a common ideology?
- Are there certain groups who have a different ideology? Why?
- Is the ideology of the population congruent with the ideology of the government?
- Are differing ideologies a source of conflict? Does it mobilize the population to act or participate in violence? Is it creating a struggle for power?

6. Influence

Effective governments have the ability to influence their society. In post conflict environments, or any environment where CA teams operate, the legitimate government is usually actively striving to rebuild and gain the trust and confidence of the population. There will likely be other nefarious actors who are competing with the legitimate government for the support of the population. The competition between the government's efforts to re-establish itself and the corrosive efforts of the nefarious actors make it critical that the government have the ability to influence the population.

When beginning a mission involving governance, it is important to assess how influential and persuasive the government is. In *The Science of Social Influence*, Anthony Pratkanis (2007) states four categories that encompass tenants for effectively influencing a population:

1. Establish a favorable climate for the influence attempt [landscaping or pre-persuasion tactics]
2. Create a relationship with the audience
3. Present the message in a convincing fashion
4. Use the emotions to persuade (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 19)

A CA team can evaluate a government (or non-state actor's) ability to influence a population by examining each of these tenants. It is important to shape the population in preparation for influence activities. Pratkanis (2007) specifies that it is important to pre-condition or use "pre-propaganda" in attempt to prepare the population for influential messages: this effort can include the use of images, stereotypes, and stories to create an environment that encourages people to join the cause prior to persuasion attempts (p. 20).

Secondly, Pratkanis (2007) indicates that it is important to establish a positive relationship that creates "source credibility" with the population. He asserts that it is much easier to persuade a group when the messenger is perceived as upholding good character, sense, strong morals and kind intent. He also emphasizes that the establishment of a social relationship is also helpful, which can increase trust and familiarity between the messenger and the population (p. 30).

To be persuasive, Pratkanis (2007) contends that the message must be convincing, delivered using effective tactics, and should focus the audience's attention on the targeted objective. Pratkanis explains that some ways to do this are by encouraging the audience to think of reasons to support the message, make the reasons for the action appear just and good, direct the audience to the most powerful arguments, and deliver the message in ways that are most receptive to the audience (pp. 40-41).

Finally, Pratkanis (2007) highlights that effective messages often invoke strong emotion from the audience, using the "recipient's subjective feelings, affect, arousal, emotions, and tension-states as the basis for securing influence" (p. 50). He also notes that the injection of fear, anger, pity, happiness and sorrow can assist in encouraging the audience to sympathize and support a cause (p. 50).

When evaluating a government's ability to influence the population, some questions to consider are:

- How effective is the government in its attempts to influence the population?
- Does the government use effective influence tactics?

- Does the government have a positive relationship with the population that encourages the reception of the messaging?
- If not, is the government making attempts to improve its relationship with the population?
- Are there other non-state actors competing to influence the population?
- Are they more or less effective than the government?
- Does the government invoke emotions in its messaging?

7. Theory of Competitive Control

David Kilcullen (2013) describes his theory of competitive control in his book *Out of the Mountains*, as “In irregular conflicts, (that is, in conflicts where at least one combatant is non-state armed group), the local actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that population and its residential area” (p. 126). Kilcullen’s theory illustrates why people in a society actively respond to a governing system that is consistent, predictable, creates order, and dictates what they must do and how they must act to ensure safety and security (p. 126). While his theory specifically applies to irregular conflicts in which one actor is a non-state entity, this theory can be applied to a legitimate governing entity as well. It is also important for a CA team to understand this possibility because, often times, CA units work in areas where both a legitimate governing entity and a non-state entity are competing for the support of the population. According to the theory of competitive control, the population will support the governing entity that ensures predictable and orderly conditions, while providing safety and security. To achieve good and effective governance, legitimate state governments must exceed a non-state actor’s ability to provide these same conditions.

Kilcullen’s (2013) theory of competitive control implies that while important, influence alone, or the attempt to “win hearts and minds” is not enough for a government to gain the support of a population. Instead, he indicates that it may be necessary to examine the incentives that a governing entity provides, and to focus on the resulting behavior of the population (pp. 126-127). When executing governance missions, CA teams will often be advising and assisting a legitimate government that is battling

influence and control of non-state or insurgent actors. It is helpful to understand how insurgents gain influence throughout a population. Kilcullen asserts that one-way insurgents do this is by “sucking the population in,” or by creating enough disorder, causing insecurity, fear, and creating disputes so that the insurgents can be deemed the saviors when they diffuse the disorder they created. In this way, he states, they gain credibility by protecting the population from the instability they created (p. 127). Another technique that insurgents use is creating normative systems, which Kilcullen defines as “a set of rules that is correlated with a set of consequences” (p. 132). These normative systems, he suggests, set boundaries for behavior in a society, making all actions within those boundaries permissible and therefore a “safe zone,” while all actions outside those boundaries are “deeply unsafe” (p. 132). He theorizes the owner of the normative system is therefore the dominant figure in society and the actor, whether state or non-state, that is most effective in creating a normative system that appeals to and protects the population will have control over the contested space, thereby governing the population (p. 132). Kilcullen further articulates that predictability in the normative system is more important than popularity or content of the laws, and that predictability creates more safety and, therefore, generates more support. In that regard, he contends people do not need to whole heartedly support an ideology of a government, providing they are confident in the predictability of the normative system and security and safety that it creates (p. 132).

While the theory of competitive control is intended to enhance an understanding of insurgent activity and how non-state groups counter governments, the tenants can be applied when advising and assisting HN governments. It is helpful to understand what makes non-state or shadow governments successful, and then work to counter their activity or support the population in the same fashion, using legitimate means.

Reference Figure 1, Understanding Good Governance. In that figure, the yellow arrow points out the elements previously described above that are critical in building governance.




Figure 1. Building Governance: Social Norms, Social Capital, CSOs, Social Contracts, Ideology, Influence, and Control

D. PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

As stated in Part B, this research will introduce principles of governance that will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of a region's functions or pillars of government. After a thorough analysis of USG, IGO, and federal institution government frameworks (see Appendix B), this thesis identifies five key principles of governance that were derived from these sources: UNDP (2009) *What is Good Governance?* (pp. 2-3); UNDP (2011) *8 Governance Principles, Institutional Capacity and Quality* (pp. 271-271; 279-280); UNDP (n.d.) *A User's Guide to Measuring Local Governance* (p. 10 Box. 3); USAID (2014) *Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Strategic Assessment Framework* (p. iv); Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (2016), *Stability Operations* (Joint Publication [JP] 3-07) (p. III-52); Institute of Governance (2003) *Principles for Good Governance in the 21st Century* (p. 3); and The World's Bank (2017a) *Worldwide Governance Indicators* (p. Introduction section):

- Participation (Inclusion, Consensus, and Voice)

- Fairness
- Accountability
- Transparency
- Performance (Responsive, Effective, and Efficient)
- Predictability

1. Participation (Inclusion, Consensus, and Voice)

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2009) recognizes that participation of members in society is a critical aspect of good governance, and that participation can be achieved through the direct participation of citizens themselves, or through representatives chosen by the populace in shared consensus (p. 2). Additionally, the UNDP (2011) article “Governance principles, institutional capacity and quality” stresses that a society which allows for and encourages participation from its citizens creates an environment in which civil society has the capability to thrive, independent media exists, and citizens are empowered to have a voice in decision-making processes. Additionally, the UNDP stresses that increased participation leads to a greater shared ownership of societal outcomes, and solutions that are better suited for all facets of the society. In turn, the UNDP contends that this shared ownership and development of equitable solutions leads to increased stability, predictability, and transparency, resulting in greater information flow (p. 279). To reflect good governance, USAID (2014) asserts that participation must be inclusive of all demographics within the population and failure to allow certain groups to participate further marginalizes them, leading to increased conflict and potential violence (p. 12).

Participation goes beyond citizen involvement in government. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) contends that people should be free and encouraged to participate in CSOs that are empowered, held accountable, and protected, which includes media forums that are free from government influence (United States Institute of Peace [USIP] and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute [PKSOI], 2009, p. 8-120). U.S. Army PKSOI adds that together, CSOs, media and political parties (if applicable) create a platform that serves as a means to peacefully mitigate conflict between the population

and governing entities (p. 8-120). U.S. Army PKSOI asserts that this level of participation provides a system of checks and balances for the government, allows people to informally participate in government, and also influence policies and that a failure to allow public participation in CSOs can lead to violence as people strive to find a means to ensure their voice is heard (p. 8-120).

When conducting governance assessments, CA soldiers should strive to identify the extent of public participation in the current governing system. This is not always in the form of individual participation such as voting, but can be through opportunities for participation in CSOs that have the ability to voice their opinions regarding government decision making. It is also important to identify whether all demographic groups have the same opportunities to participate and if there is a shared consensus on major decisions and means of governing. Finally, the CA team must assess how the local population regards their ability to participate. For example, a government may feel like they allow popular participation, but if the population does not feel the same way, the government is not achieving its goal.

2. Fairness

In all environments, whether it be post conflict or stable state, people must be treated fairly and equally for them to view their governing entity as legitimate. UNDP (1997) indicates that fairness in this sense specifically refers to all citizens in a society having the opportunity to “improve or maintain their well-being” (p. 15). This means all demographics in a population should be able to participate in the same manner and receive the same benefits from the governing entity, including resource allocation and opportunities. UN-Habitat (n.d.) explains that fair societies provide everyone (rich, poor, religious, ethnic, handicapped, elderly, etc.) with the same access to “nutrition, education, employment and livelihood, health care, shelter, safe drinking water, sanitation and other basic services” (p. 2).

At the conclusion of violent conflict, there are usually two disparaged parties who must learn to adjust and work together to rebuild society. This makes fairness a significant obstacle because one party will likely hold more power than the other and,

therefore, be tempted to repress the other. CA soldiers must strive to identify and address the factors that will lead to inequality as well as the level of fairness that exists. Unfairness and inequality are significant drivers of conflict that can lead to future violence if allowed to persist.

3. Accountability

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2009) explains that good governance constitutes governing entities that are held accountable for their actions, which applies to both formal and informal facets of governing to include the government, private sector and CSOs (p. 3). It is critical that all organizations with governing ability be held accountable to the public and their stakeholders. However, those to whom an organization is accountable can vary from society to society, and that accountability also depends on whether the actions taken are internal or external to the organization. Generally, the UN asserts that an organization or institution should be accountable to those whom the decision or policy affects (p. 3). For example, if the government is collecting taxes from the population, the population should be entitled to know what the money is being used for and to hold the government accountable for spending that tax money in legitimate ways.

When conducting assessments, CA soldiers must attempt to determine the extent to which the legitimate government is held accountable to the laws it establishes and the social contract it strives to uphold.

4. Transparency

To be adequately enforced, accountability cannot be upheld without transparency. The UNDP (1997) explains that transparency articulates the openness and accessibility of information to all members of a society, which includes information about the government, its processes and institutions (p. 15). The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2009) emphasizes that transparency ensures that decisions and policies are made in accordance with agreed upon rules and regulations, and that the populace is kept informed of all actions (p. 3). Accountability,

transparency and rule of law go hand in hand, and cannot be adequately enforced separately from each other.

When conducting assessments, the CA team must determine if the government is transparent in its actions and avoids corruption. Additionally, it is equally as important that the public perceives the government as transparent.

5. Performance (Responsiveness, Effectiveness, and Efficiency)

To garner support from the population, a governing entity must be able to demonstrate qualities of good performance, which encompass responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency. USAID (2014) explains that a high performing government is responsive to the needs of its citizens by delivering goods and services in a fair and impartial manner (p. 23). USAID explains that this can be measured by the government's ability to provide public safety, security, justice, social services, basic infrastructure, education, and many others benefits that vary by location (p. 23). It is also measured by the amount of corruption and transparency that exists in the processes which the government uses to deliver goods and services, and the predictability by which the government will fulfill its obligations.

An effective government, as identified by USAID (2014) can manage its administrative infrastructure in a way that is responsive and adaptable when faced with changing needs and conditions (p. 23). More specifically, USAID describes effective governments as efficient in their policy making, transparent in their financial management, moral in their collection and generation of revenue, and capable of upholding standards and predictability in their delivery of services. However, USAID cautions, when effectiveness of a government is low, all institutions suffer to include education, healthcare, social services, security and the economy (p. 23). The organization indicates that an effective government will not only provide schools, hospitals and other institutions, but it will ensure government employees are paid on time and all institutions are open consistently for service (p. 24). Additionally, effective governments will not only generate revenue in the form of taxes, but financially account for all expenditures. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2009)

explains that efficient governments will make the best use of their resources, both natural and monetary and will deliver goods and services to the population within timely expectations (p. 3). A high performing government possesses qualities indicative of all principles of government articulated in this research. It is viewed as legitimate by the population based upon its ability to deliver results and meet expectations along a reasonable timeline.

A CA team will be required to evaluate the level performance at which a government operates to include its responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency. It is important that the government not only uphold a level of performance that provides for the needs and social well-being of the population, but that the public perceives the government as legitimately doing the best it can to improve its' level of performance.

6. Predictability

In his book, *Out of the Mountains*, David Kilcullen (2013) states, “Predictability is the basis for secure dispute resolution and thus for social stability” (p. 123). He further states that predictability creates a sense of order and security in society, making people feel safe and predictable governments are especially impressionable and desirable directly following periods of instability and conflict. For example, while many Afghans do not like the Taliban’s harsh methods, when asked, an Afghan from Kandahar told Kilcullen, “at least you know what you’re getting: they’re consistent and fair” (p. 123). Kilcullen further suggests that the Taliban are known for their predictable and consistent harsh punishments, which are attractive to people who are seeking just and enforceable conflict resolution, as well as a system that protects the population from criminals (p. 122). He posits predictable governments not only adjudicate crimes in a consistent manner, but they also publish a set of rules and laws, ensure everyone is informed of the expectations, and then punish accordingly when those rules and laws are broken (p. 123). When assessing the level of predictability, CA teams should be focused on the perception of predictability that the population holds regarding the government.

Again, reference the Understanding Good Governance Chart in Figure 2. The yellow arrow now highlights the principles of governance, as described above.




Figure 2. Principles of Governance: Participation, Fair, Accountable, Transparent, Performance, and Predictable

E. PILLARS OF GOVERNMENT

To conduct an assessment of governance that is useful when advising and assisting HN government officials, it is necessary to apply the principles of governance depicted above (part D) to functions of government. This thesis breaks down basic government functions into four pillars of government, which include security, rule of law, social well-being, and economy and infrastructure. These pillars were extracted from the USIP (2009) *Guiding Principles of Reconstruction and Stabilization* (p. 2-8); Agoglia, Dziedzic, and Sotirin, (2010) *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments* (MPICE) (p. xv); and JCS (2016) *Stability Operations* (JP 3-07) (p. III-1).

1. Security (Human and Physical)

UN-Habitat (2002) emphasizes that security is a fundamental right and need of everyone and a necessary condition for stability and enduring peace. People must feel physically safe in their environment, and confident that their human rights and property are protected. (p. 24). USIP (2009) describes security as an “all-encompassing condition” that “takes freedom, safety, governance, human rights, public health, and access to

resources into account” (p. 3:20). UN-Habitat adds that a lack of security keeps the population in constant fear, and creates a larger divide between marginalized populations and elites (p. 24). Therefore, for governing actors to gain legitimacy, they must provide a secure environment for the population. In post conflict states, the military will often play a large role in maintaining security, many times supplemented with coalition or NATO security forces. JCS, *Stability Operations* (JP 3-07) (2016) contends it is critical that the responsibility for effective security be turned over to HN forces as soon as they are capable of providing for it, then further turned over to HN civilian law enforcement authorities when they also are capable (pp. 1-2). The goal is for a nation to have sustainable, capable, and legitimate security forces (both military and civilian) to enforce and maintain security.

USIP (2009) emphasizes that protection of human rights is a second critical aspect of security, which includes, among others, the right to a fair trial, adequate food and shelter, protection under the law, access to adequate healthcare, freedom from state interference with home and family affairs, freedom of expression, and freedom from torture, cruelty, unjust arrest or detention, inhumane punishments, and slavery (p. 3-21). USIP adds that to provide good governance, the state must actively strive to reduce violence, achieve public order, maintain a monopoly over violence, and ensure physical and human security (p. 6-39).

CA soldiers are not experts in training security forces; however, when partnered with foreign leadership, CA can utilize the above principles of governance to conduct assessments of the current security posture, and make recommendations on ways to improve the security environment.

2. Rule of Law

Two essential elements to governance are a means to mitigate conflict and a rule of law system. USAID (2014) asserts that rule of law is a function of governance in which all personnel in a society (including the state) obey declared laws and are held accountable to the law and this system should be enforced equitably and fairly across all demographics (p. 18). In addition to rule of law, USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009)

contend it is essential that governing entities have a means to mitigate conflicts between citizens, specifically domestic disputes that include land ownership and property rights. Both organizations emphasize that the desired end state is to have a transparent legal system that is applied fairly and equally to all citizens, and perceived as legitimate while avoiding discrimination (p. 7-64).

Rule of law is executed differently throughout societies. Some societies mitigate conflicts through systems that have formal legal frameworks in place that are overseen by a judiciary, while other societies mitigate conflicts in traditional manners, such as a tribal system or through community elders. Prior to evaluating the effectiveness of a rule of law system, it is necessary to determine how that legal system is valued by the population.

Societies emerging from conflict often have rule of law challenges that contributed to instability, and those must be addressed. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) articulate that law systems that were historically repressive, discriminatory or corrupt may be a means by which ruling elites or non-state actors furthered their advantage when perpetuating conflicts. Both organizations assert that without rule of law, corrupt state and non-state actors will continue to fuel conflict through crime, human rights abuse, and discrimination, which will further polarize the population (p. 7-64).

To execute good governance, USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009), highlight the necessary qualities a rule of law system must exhibit (p. 7-65):

- A just legal system that is aligned with the social norms of society fosters public order and accountability. It should be transparent, equitable and responsive to everyone, including elites. It should also protect human rights, to include human freedom and property, and strive to minimize criminal and politically motivated violence;
- Accountability to the law is maintained, and all sects of the population, including public officials, perpetrators of past conflict, and criminals are held accountable for infractions. The adjudicating system (formal or informal) is independent and free from outside influence, and there is no abuse of power;
- Access to justice is equal across the population. Everyone can seek a legitimate (formal or informal) solution to address grievances through a judicial system that is fair, transparent, and equally applied;

- A culture of lawfulness exists in which everyone in the population is motivated to follow the law, and seeks out the justice system to address disputes.

When assigned governance missions, CA soldiers will work with local actors to identify and help address basic rule of law issues. CA personnel are not law experts, so, therefore, they will strive to first identify issues and offer guidance to foreign partners on ways that the current system can be improved. It is also recommended that CA teams reach back to appropriate interagency personnel to seek out better guidance when addressing rule of law and the mitigation of conflict.

3. Social Well-Being

To ensure stability in a region, a government must provide for the social well-being of its population. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) indicate that peace is not possible without social well-being because without it, instability will continue as people search for ways and means to provide for their basic needs (p. 10-162). When people become more desperate, they are more likely to turn to non-state and potentially nefarious actors for support. This research divides social well-being into different categories that include the following: basic needs (food, water, sanitation, shelter), social services (health and education), humanitarian aid, internally displaced people, civil society, media, leadership and institutions, and drivers of conflict within the society.

USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) explain that fulfillment of basic needs occurs when the population has adequate and reliable access to food, water and sanitation, and shelter, and this must be equally provided in a sustainable manner to all demographics within a population (p. 10-162). They add that delivery of social services consists of the government's ability to provide equal, sustainable and reliable healthcare and education to the population in a society, which results in both the educational advancement of citizens and the provision for their medical needs. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI contend that an active civil society includes an environment where people are permitted to participate in social groups, clubs, and organizations (both formal and informal) that provide a platform for people to voice thoughts and opinions, and also serve as a system of checks and balances to government authority (p. 10-163). For example, civil society

should be able to organize and participate in demonstrations against government decisions they deem unfair in a non-violent manner without receiving repercussions from the government. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI also explain that a healthy civil society is representative of all demographic groups, allowing everyone in society to stand up for their beliefs, and actively counter discrimination. The organizations further emphasize that the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their homelands (if possible) is a critical government function that supports civil society because it demonstrates the government's dedication to supporting and caring for those who were forced to move during times of violent conflict (p. 10-163). The final critical aspect of social well-being is the identification of drivers of conflict and how grievances related to social well-being can drive instability.

Government assurance of social well-being is a critical aspect of good governance. If the basic needs of society are not addressed, people will do anything to provide for their families, even if it requires supporting a nefarious actor that provides basic needs better than the government. Secondly, there must be a check on government power, and one way to achieve this is through CSOs. A population that is adequately supported and empowered is more willing to actively support their government and not turn to nefarious actors for support.

When assessing and implementing measures to improve social well-being in a region, USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) emphasize that it is critical to work with the end state of HN ownership and sustainability (p. 10-163). In post conflict environments, it is easier (and often less effective or even detrimental) for the USG to enter the arena and provide humanitarian assistance, replace leadership, and fund projects. It is much more difficult to build upon local systems already in place, making them self-sufficient, functional and capable of sustaining after the USG departs. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI stress that U.S. assistance is beneficial when it supplements local systems that are already in place, acting as a method to ignite forward progress; U.S. actors must work alongside the local leadership to help build their capability and legitimacy (p. 10-163).

There are many other USG organizations (such as those in appendix B) that specialize in pillars of government, especially social well-being. In post conflict

environments, often other USG organizations are not as prevalent due to the security posture. However, often organizations are situated at either an embassy or state / provincial headquarters, and can be helpful to the CA team when coming up with means to help address social well-being in a region.

4. Economy and Infrastructure

To build a stable and prosperous state, the population must have legitimate opportunities to earn revenue and create a livelihood. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) explain that economy is most prosperous when a society has an economic system that is regulated by laws, making it predictable and consistent. The organizations define economic governance as “the collection of policies, laws, regulations, institutions, practices, and individuals that shape the context in which a country’s economic activity takes place” (p. 9-132). Long term conflict and instability can devastate the economy of a region. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI stress that violence can destroy infrastructure, disrupt the economic market, destroy access to credit, decrease human capital, and encourage illicit actors to take advantage of weakened infrastructure and economies, as well as increased criminal activity. The organizations also articulate that displaced persons also weaken the economy by creating mass populations with no work opportunities, and creating space for nefarious actors to conduct illegal activities and recruit jobless personnel (p. 9-132). Because of this, post conflict governments must focus on improving the economy in ways that abide by good governance principles.

When assessing the economy and infrastructure in a post conflict environment, it is important to monitor the involvement and activity of illicit actors. Illicit activity in the economy can perpetuate conflict and hinder all attempts at good governance. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) assert that one way to monitor such activity is through the control of resources. The organizations contend that illicit control, trafficking, hijacking, smuggling and extortion of state and non-state resources can be leveraged as a source of power; essentially, whoever has control over the resources and their distribution has power within a region and can use violence, terror, threats and intimidation to limit the population’s access to them (p. 9-143). This can lead to perpetuated drivers of conflict. It

is important to understand how the economy is run and whether legitimate government actors are involved in illicit economic activity.

USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) explain that a sustainable market economy is an important aspect of economic stability and refers to infrastructure, private sector and human capital development. The organizations suggest that to remain sustainable, the market must be equitable in its delivery of goods and services, efficient, and transparent to the population (p. 9-149). Infrastructure norms are different based on location, and can be assessed based off pre-conflict conditions. For example, if a population had electricity prior to a conflict, they will expect the government to provide it post conflict. However, if a population never had electricity, it is unnecessary to impose new infrastructure immediately post conflict. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI describe that other types of infrastructure to consider include transportation, communication, water supply, fuel and government facilities (p. 9-150). The most critical thing regarding infrastructure is that its outputs be delivered in a fair, equitable, and predictable manner that is transparent to the population and in line with cultural norms and expectations.

A final focus regarding a sustainable economy involves job opportunities and employment generation. USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) highlight that people must have a legitimate means to generate revenue and support their families (p. 9-156). Governments should focus on ensuring there are jobs available for people, and also strive to create jobs for returning displaced populations. To prevent people from turning to illicit means of revenue generation, governments should ensure their means of advertising and distributing jobs are fair and transparent.

CA teams do not have a specialized skill set to address technical economic and infrastructural issues. However, especially in post conflict situations, CA teams have the access required to conduct assessments of current conditions, and then request support from organizations (such as those in appendix B) to assist in helping the HN improve their current economic situation.

Finally, in the Understanding Good Governance Chart in Figure 3, the arrow directs us to the pillars of governments described above.




Figure 3. Pillars of Government: Security, Rule of Law, Social Well-Being, Economy, and Infrastructure

III. THE GOVERNANCE PROCESS

Chapter II of this thesis introduces a four-step process to assist the user in executing governance operations across all operational environments, reference Figure 4. This research recommends that the user follow the four-step process sequentially to ensure the user has the appropriate amount of background information prior to beginning assessments. While it is understandably difficult to conduct a completely accurate assessment on the first attempt, the better the first assessment is, the more successful the implementation will be, which results in fewer reiterations of the process. This research derived Step One of the governance execution process (problem diagnosis and four sub-steps) from the DoS (2008) *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework* (ICAF) and the USAID (2014) *DRG framework*. The subsequent steps (steps two through four), were generated by the authors.

1. Step One: Problem Diagnosis
 - (a) Evaluate the Context of the Conflict;
 - (b) Understand Core Grievances and Social/Institutional Resilience;
 - (c) Identify Drivers of Conflict;
 - (d) Describe Opportunities for Increasing or Decreasing Conflict (Department of State, 2008, pp. 6-13)
2. Step Two: Governance Assessments (Appendix A)
3. Step Three: Implementation
4. Step Four: Evaluation




Figure 4. Governance Execution Process

In Step One, the user will diagnose the key issues in the operational environment by conducting an in-depth analysis of drivers of conflict and core grievances. Step Two is the governance assessment portion of this thesis, which analyzes each pillar of governance (rule of law, security, economy and infrastructure, and social well-being) using the principles of good governance and building blocks of governance (Appendix A). Within the governance assessment framework, the user will be presented with a series of desired end states, measures of assessment, governance principles, governance building blocks, potential drivers of conflict and the desired outcome (evaluation metric) that will better allow the user to focus his or her resources efforts. In Step Three, the user will make a plan for and execute implementation, and Step Four will require the user to evaluate the results of the implementation plan and adapt in an attempt to further diagnose the problem and continue the process.

While the process should be completed sequentially, within Step Two, the individual pillars of government do not need to be completed in the order presented in Appendix A. Based on the user's country study and initial analysis in Step One, pillars of

government can be analyzed based on the prioritization of core grievances and drivers of conflict.

A. STEP ONE: PROBLEM DIAGNOSIS

The first step in facilitating improved governance must start with diagnosing the existing sources of conflict and identifying core grievances, which is described by the DoS (2008) ICAF (p. 6). Prior to implementation, a CA team must know where to focus its efforts. USAID (2014) articulates that the output of this first step is an accurate identification of the challenges that are inhibiting good governance in a region (p. 7). This thesis used the ICAF and USAID DRG framework as guides when crafting Step One of this governance execution process. Both frameworks are relevant tools when determining the sources of instability that lead to conflict and then helping to mitigate those factors while informing U.S. policy and decision makers. Additionally, analysis of the building blocks of governance (CH. II, part E) is also helpful in fully understanding society. The result of Step One is a foundation of knowledge that can be used to inform and prepare the user as he/she proceeds to Step Two (assessment). The DoS emphasizes that thorough problem diagnosis also helps to clearly articulate mission goals, develop a plan, allocate resources and determine a best approach for facilitating improved stability and governance (p. 3).

1. Step One, Part A: “Evaluate the Context of the Conflict”

To optimally execute a mission conducting governance, a CA team must have a thorough understanding of the “contextual issues of the conflict environment,” including the history of the conflict and factors that have made the unstable environment resistant to change in the past, which the ICAF (2008) articulates (p. 7). The document describes that violent conflict exists in many unstable regions because the state and population have determined that the best method of conflict resolution is through violence (p. 7). To rebuild and stabilize a government, the CA team must understand why conflict is historically prevalent in the first place. In addition to a history of conflict, USAID’s (2014) DRG states contextual issues will vary from state to state and may include environmental characteristics, natural resources, demographic factors, the economy,

social factors, poverty, leadership legacies, country type and political trend (p. 7). While there are many causes of civil unrest, USAID's DRG framework highlights many underlying issues that affect a government's ability to adequately support the population. The framework acknowledges that a lack of natural resources can lead to civil unrest because natural resources directly impact supply and demand and fulfillment of basic needs. The framework adds that a suffering economy can lead to unemployment and vulnerability of a population to resort to counter-state employment to earn money and provide for their families. Additionally, the framework emphasizes that authoritarian or corrupt leadership can prevent participation and inclusion of the civilian populace in government procedures, reducing transparency and trust in leadership, resulting in perceptions of illegitimacy (p. 7). CA teams will likely address many of these contextual issues during pre-mission training (PMT) or in a country study; however, additional analysis and verification should be completed when the CA team arrives in theatre. Once the context of the conflict is understood and analyzed, a CA team should use that information to identify core grievances of the population.

2. Step One, Part B: "Understand Core Grievances and Social/Institutional Resilience"

The ICAF (2008) defines a core grievance as "the perception, by various groups in a society, that their needs for physical security, livelihood, interests or values are threatened by one or more other groups and/or social institutions" (p. 8). The ICAF explains that core grievances shed light on where the local government is falling short in providing for various groups' needs. The document further explains that institutional performance evaluates the extent to which state sponsored entities are adequately fulfilling their functions of providing for the populace (p. 8). When evaluating the core grievances of groups, it is critical that upon arrival in theatre, the CA team identify the different societal groups in the operating area, especially those who feel threatened by another group. The ICAF articulates that in areas of conflict, there are usually multiple groups, and often one that is directly threatened by another, based upon differences in race, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or other factors: this threatening environment can lead to perceptions of decreased safety and security, jeopardizing a minority group's

basic needs and fundamental interests (p. 8). In turn, the ICAF explains that this environment then leads to a set of core or shared grievances by the minority group that are often universal and attributed to the government's lack of support. These core grievances can be a result of societal patterns that reinforce a minority status, driving a wedge further between groups. The ICAF gives examples of these patterns to include: "elitism, exclusion, corruption, state capacity deficits (e.g., systemic economic stagnation, scarcity of necessary resources, ungoverned space), and unmet expectations" (p. 9).

The ICAF (2008) contends that institutional resilience is another potential source of grievance that can motivate conflict (p. 9). Formal and informal institutions make up key aspects of how states function. The ICAF gives examples of formal institutions which include judiciary and legal systems, branches of government, security forces, economic institutions, public schools and religious institutions. The ICAF further explains that these formal institutions provide citizens with services that are essential in fulfilling basic needs, societal organization and maintaining traditional functions for life for that community (p. 9). The absence of these formal functions escalates core grievances. Informal institutions in a society are also critical in many populations for the execution of daily governmental functions and also for government participation and organization. The ICAF gives examples of informal institutions which include tribal groups, traditional rule of law methods such as tribal court systems, local armed groups, and social organizations such as Boy Scouts (p. 9). USAID (2014) *DRG framework* highlights that in some societies, informal institutions execute the same responsibilities as formal institutions and in those societies, informal institutions are equally as critical to social well-being, participation and inclusion in government activities. The USAID DRG framework further highlights that outputs of institutions are important in gauging the effectiveness of governance, and recommends considering the following (p. iv):

- Is the output from institutions fulfilling the needs of the population? Do the institutions support all members of society equally?
- Is there a method for citizens to provide feedback on performance of institutions?

- Are institutions held accountable for their lack of support or corruption, if applicable?

Institutional performance assessment is critical in diagnosing the existing sources of conflict.

As indicated by the ICAF (2008), at the conclusion of sub-task two, CA teams should list the core grievances and identify weaknesses in institutional performance (p. 9). Both grievances and institutional weakness should be prioritized in their potential for counter-state actor mobilization.

3. Step One, Part C: “Identify Drivers of Conflict”

The ICAF (2008) defines drivers of conflict as “the dynamic situation resulting from key actors’ mobilization of social groups around core grievances” (p. 10). ICAF differentiates between drivers of conflict and core grievances by depicting that drivers of conflict are “active energy” while core grievances are “potential energy” (p. 10). Key actors in society have the potential to motivate the population in both positive and detrimental ways. The ICAF emphasizes that it is important to identify all key actors in a society and then determine which ones have potential to facilitate stabilization and which ones attempt to motivate the population to act on core grievances and mobilize to counter the legitimate government (p. 10). As depicted in the ICAF, a CA team should identify key actors as soon as possible, specifically those people who have influence over the population and “are able to shape perceptions and actions and mobilize people around core grievances,” while also being “able to provide means (money, weapons, information) to support other key actors who are mobilizing people around core grievances” (p. 11).

The ICAF (2008) indicates that these key actors can be drawn from the membership of various formal and informal institutions and may include current government officials, judiciary personnel, religious leaders, private business owners, police personnel, media members, and academicians. The document recommends that when key actors are identified, it is important to determine their motivations and means, to include why they are compelled to be involved and what resources they have that

would assist in exerting their influence. It explains that these means can include money, weapons, charisma, networks, leadership potential and access to media (p. 11). It is critical to identify both key actors that CA teams can align with, such as legitimate government actors or influential personnel who can assist in improving governance, and also those actors who have the potential to actively encourage the population to mobilize against the government. The ICAF highlights that counter-state key actors have the ability to mobilize the population to act on behalf of their core grievances, and thus become drivers of conflict (p. 12).

As indicated in the ICAF (2008), at the conclusion of sub-task three, CA teams should list drivers of conflict, rank ordering them by strength, and identify all key actors in the operational area, both those that support the legitimate government and those that oppose it (p. 12). Key actors should be linked to core grievances and rank ordered based on their potential for influence and engagement.

4. Step One, Part D: “Describe Opportunities for Increasing or Decreasing Conflict”

The ICAF (2008) explains that the final sub-step of problem diagnosis involves identifying both near-term and long-term events that have the potential to either positively or negatively impact the legitimate government’s ability to govern (p. 13). ICAF defines windows of vulnerability as “moments when events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally change the balance of political or economic power” and explains that key actors can utilize windows of vulnerability such as elections, legislative or judicial changes, and changes in power to exacerbate drivers of conflict (p. 13). Similarly, ICAF defines windows of opportunity as “moments when over-arching identities become more important than sub-group identities” (p. 13). The document gives examples of windows of opportunity that include natural disasters, at which time the local government leaders have the ability to actively support the population, increasing the leaders’ legitimacy and demonstrating to the populace the government’s commitment to their well-being” (p. 13).

During this step, CA teams should identify potential scenarios that would allow counter-state actors to mobilize the population in a window of vulnerability, such as

natural disasters, economic crises, ideological and cultural divides, and ungoverned spaces. The ICAF (2008) suggests that identifying these windows can help prepare the legitimate government for potential conflict and help counter factors that would lead to conflict (p. 14). During this step, CA teams should also identify situations that could lead to the opening of windows of opportunity. The ICAF indicates that these situations can be ones that counter core grievances, unite the population under government support, or give the government legitimacy and credibility (p. 14). Additional resources, indicated in the Department of the Army (2014a), *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), that CA teams can request to assist in problem diagnosis are the Annex K (CAO) to the OPLANS and CONPLANS. This can be obtained by submitting a request through the Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC) and/or battalion S3. Annex K is usually generated by the G9/S9 or CAO staff at the Theatre Special Operation Command (TSOC) (p. 1-2). These documents can serve as informative tools for the CA team by providing an articulation of the CA mission goals and objectives across the country. This knowledge can better help a CA team nest its operations within the overarching country strategy. Additionally, when co-located with an embassy, CA teams can request an ICS, which is a multi-year, overarching country strategy that articulates the goals and objectives for the USG in a given country. USAID (2012) explains that the ICS is intended to synchronize the efforts of DOS, USAID, and other USG agencies (p. 3). The ICS can be a useful tool for CA teams to help ensure that DOD priorities are well nested with those of other USG organization. At the completion of Step One, the user should have a sufficient understanding of the operational environment and be prepared to transition to assessment.

B. STEP TWO: GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT

Once a foundation of knowledge is established in Step One, the user is prepared to conduct governance assessments of the local area. The governance assessment framework is located in Appendix A. The appendix can be detached from this thesis, and taken to the field to guide the governance assessment process. Appendix A is divided into four pillars of government that are used for assessing governance. These pillars include security (human and physical), rule of law, social well-being, and economy and infrastructure. Each pillar of government may be assessed in two ways. First, each pillar

of government will be assessed by evaluating the government's ability to provide for the population. The principles of governance articulated in the second chapter of this thesis (participation [inclusion, consensus, and voice], fairness, accountability, transparency, performance [responsive, effective, and efficient], and predictability) will be used for this assessment. Secondly, each pillar of government will be assessed by evaluating the public's perception that the government is fulfilling its responsibilities within that pillar of government. The concepts for building governance articulated in the second chapter of this thesis (social norms, social capital, CSOs, social contract theory, ideology, influence, and theory of competitive control) will be used for this assessment. Following each assessment portion will be a section that identifies potential drivers of conflict for each pillar of government. These drivers of conflict are not for assessment purposes, but are to indicate to the user specific conditions that could lead to increased conflict and instability.

The intent is for the user to evaluate each pillar of government using the specified governance principle or method for building governance. It is critical to understand that CA teams do not have expertise in building governments; therefore, they should not be focused on each function of government. This assessment is designed to give CA teams insight into if and how governance principles are applied, evaluate if attempts are being made to build governance, and identify potential drivers of conflict that can result if these key aspects of governance are not adhered to by the HN government.

When conducting the governance assessment, CA teams should not be focused on answering each assessment question with a short answer, or as a "check the block." The intent is not to answer each portion of the assessment and send the results back to higher headquarters, but to evaluate the extent to which each governance principle applies to each pillar of government. For example, when probed if the population actively participates in government decision making, a yes or no answer will not be helpful to a CA team or their headquarters. However, it is helpful to analyze the extent to which all demographic groups have opportunities to participate, whether all groups are permitted to participate in CSOs, if the government allows social organization, if there are restrictions on involvement in organizations and if organizations are permitted to voice their opinions

freely. Once these areas are analyzed, a CA team can better identify the drivers of conflict and determine ways to help improve stabilization and governance. When probed if the population supports formal and/or informal legal procedures, again, a yes or no answer will not be helpful in mission accomplishment. The intent of this assessment is to evaluate the social contract and amount of social capital that exists between the population and the government. For example, if the population does not support the established legal procedures, they may not trust the government to be impartial and predictable, or may not believe that the government is adequately fulfilling their responsibilities in mitigating conflict. This would indicate low levels of social capital and an ineffective social contract.

It is also important to acknowledge that all portions of the assessment will not apply to all operational environments. Based off problem diagnosis and identification of core grievances and drivers of conflict, the CA team can determine what pillar of government is the key contributor to instability in their region and start with that portion of the assessment.

The governance assessment presented in Appendix A is not a tool that should be used one time, answered and then discarded. It is intended to be utilized as a working document that can continuously help assess the current level of governance, and also be used as a guide for further improvement. In this way, it can continuously shape the mission planning process, and serve as a resource to help CA teams focus on areas within a government system that are drivers of conflict. It is also critical that CA teams include their HN partners when executing their assessments. The U.S. Army PKSOI (2016) *Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections and Media* emphasizes that HN partnership is critical when identifying sources of instability and lack of governance, and helps guide the HN in developing plans for implementation and future monitoring. The inclusion of HN members also helps build a stronger relationship between the CA team and their HN partnerships (p. VII-1).

C. STEP THREE: IMPLEMENTATION

Following completion of a thorough governance assessment (Appendix A), CA teams should be able to identify and prioritize key sources of instability that hinder governance. Once this is complete, the team should use the outputs of their assessment to formulate an implementation plan. Because each implementation plan is based off the outputs of the previous two steps within a specific context, it is impossible to articulate one overarching plan that can be applied to all scenarios and areas of operation, making it beyond the scope of this research. However, this portion of the thesis will serve as a guideline for how to begin the implementation process and sources that can be used for reference.

Each area of operations offers different resources that CA teams can utilize during implementation. More specifically, the resources available while executing tactical missions may be different than those available on Civil Military Engagement (CME) missions. For example, on the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence website, Han and Youtz (2012) depict in their article “Grains of Truth” that tactical missions are those where CA units are integrated and working in a tactical environment alongside other special operations and conventional military units during contingency operations (p. Introduction section). In these missions, the DOD is usually the commanding element. In contrast, DOD (2014) *Special Operations* (JP 3-05) explains that CME missions are coordinated through the Theatre Special Operations Command (TSOC) and synchronized within the DoS country team (p. ii-8). Han and Youtz further explain that CME missions are integrated at the strategic level, under the approval and endorsement of the U.S. ambassador (p. Purpose and mission section). When embarking on either type of mission, a CA team should first start by revisiting what was taught in the CAQC, especially if they are recent graduates.

Tactical CA missions offer different implementation resources than CME missions. While not usually stationed in vicinity of a U.S. Embassy, sometimes there are other USG elements located in the area of operations, often at the district, provincial or state level. It is beneficial for CA teams assigned to any mission to seek out other agencies and utilize them as a resource for implementation.

Both tactical and CMSE missions often have access to USAID, which has field offices that are focused on areas such as education, health, democracy, and governance. These offices often have a wealth of knowledge of the region, and are normally conducting initiatives through implementing partners in the area. DOD and USAID do not always have the same goals and end states, but it is possible and often likely that there will be an overlap in interests. This creates opportunities for collaboration and coordination between CA teams and USAID. At the very least, it is important that CA teams are aware of USAID projects and initiatives to avoid duplication of effort, as well as ensure cooperation and synchronization in the area of operations. Tactical CA teams should strive to identify all other USG elements in the area, which also may include the DoS, NGOs (such as Spirit of America), IGOs (such as the UN and World Bank) and humanitarian organizations (such as International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)).

There are resources such as primary staff officers within a CA battalion that both tactical and CMSE teams can utilize to assist with implementation. The S2 (Intelligence) section often has a wealth of knowledge and intelligence on each operational area in their respective battalion. They have the ability to answer information requests and support specific mission information based requirements. When deployed, there are often contracted intelligence personnel who can also provide assistance. In addition to the S2, each CA battalion has a targeting section that can assist in non-lethal targeting.

If expertise or assistance is needed regarding rule of law issues, the unit judge advocate can be a useful resource. If healthcare or sanitation are sources of instability, the unit physician assistant or doctor can provide education, recommendations and medical expertise. Unit veterinarians can also be useful resources for husbandry education.

In many areas of operations, there are often other DOD elements that have expertise in specific areas. In the past, the U.S. Army Reserve deployed units that were focused on agriculture and development. Army medical units sometimes deploy teams that are focused on midwifery and child birth. It is critical for the CA team to inquire through their Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) or higher headquarters to get information on other specialty DOD units operating in the area. Often times, these units

can be requested to do site visits and offer assistance that contributes to a CA team's implementation plan.

CA missions are often heavily reliant on HN partnership. It is important to utilize HN expertise during implementation. For example, many district / provincial ministries have officials that specialize in agriculture, law, and medicine, etc. If there are issues at the local level in any of these areas, HN officials should be involved in implementation. To gain and sustain legitimacy, it is critical that every initiative and project have HN participation and ownership.

CMSE missions often have access to the same resources that tactical missions do, and more. They have the ability to frequently interact with the U.S. Embassy country team, as well as USAID mission personnel and foreign service officers from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). It is important for the CA team to understand that the employees of DoS, USAID, and other agencies often work in an embassy for extended periods of time, giving them an extensive knowledge base that is beneficial for CA teams to leverage. It is important to build and foster relationships with personnel in the interagency to maximize mission accomplishment, and synchronize efforts between both entities. Good rapport and trust between members of the country team and the CA team can lead to opportunities for future collaboration.

Finally, there are many resources that all CA teams can use to guide them in their implementation efforts. This thesis was built after the review and analysis of many interagency, IGO, and federal institution government and governance frameworks. Many of these frameworks offer guides and ideas for implementation, in addition to their proposed assessments. Some specific recommendations are the USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI (2009) *Guiding Principles of Reconstruction and Stabilization* and the DoS *Essential Task Matrix* (2005) (ETM). While these frameworks are often intended for use at higher levels of government, they have useful information regarding implementation in governance missions. A summary and links to the sources used in this research can be found in Appendix B.

D. STEP FOUR: EVALUATION

Following implementation, a CA team must assess the effectiveness of the team and HN's efforts. USAID (2016) defines evaluation as "the systemic collection and analysis of information about the characteristics and outcomes of strategies, projects, and activities as a basis for judgments to improve effectiveness, and timed to inform decisions about current and future programming" (p. 3). USAID emphasizes that the evaluation step is essential because it helps ensure accountability of the implementation program and also creates a platform for the CA team to learn from their implementation efforts and improve their plan to meet their desire mission end state (p. 4). This is a critical step because if the implementation plan was not effective, the team must proceed to Step One (problem diagnosis) and further diagnose and reassess the problem prior to altering their implementation. The four-step governance assessment process is intended to be fluid and continuous, moving once more to Step One following the completion of evaluation in Step Four. This allows for corrections to be made throughout the process. Additionally, since evaluation is based off of the outputs of the initial assessment, Cohen (2006) emphasizes in his USIP article, "Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction," it is critical that the initial assessment be conducted in a thorough manner (p. 1).

U.S. Army PKSOI's *Unified Action Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform* (2016) breaks down evaluation into Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance (MOP) (pp. VII:5-6). It explains that MOPs are a more quantitative means to evaluate a problem set and often consist of a tangible way to measure progress, often including a set of countable values, and can be viewed more as outputs than effective outcomes, measuring task completion. The document further explains that MOEs are a more qualitative means to evaluate a problem set and strive to measure desired outcomes, effects, and conditions (p. VII-6). U.S. Army PKSOI's document emphasizes that when measuring MOEs, it is important to remember that effectiveness must be measured according to what the customer acknowledges as effective. In governance missions, the HN leadership and population are usually the customer (p. VII-5). For example, if education is assessed to be an area of weakness, a

CA team can sponsor a project to build a school. However, if there are no trained teachers and/or the security is not sufficient that parents will send their children to school, the project cannot be measured as effective. Such efforts may result in a positive MOP rating (the number of schools in the area increased), but a negative MOE (children are not being educated). Therefore, U.S. Army PKSOI stresses that when conducting an evaluation, MOPs should be paired with a corresponding MOE (p. VII-6).

USAID (2016) specifies in their article “Evaluation: Learning from Experience,” five different types of evaluation that are helpful when initiating Step Four of the governance execution process. The intent of each evaluation is not to give a tangible answer, but to serve as a means to think about each type of evaluation, and determine what is going to be the desired outcome, and what areas are not responsive to implementation efforts.

- Impact evaluations are used to measure the effectiveness of a “defined intervention,” such as a quick impact development project. A quick impact project can be CA sponsored construction projects, or initiatives that are executed to produce an observable change. They can often be considered having a “cause and effect” type relationship, and are intended to produce quick results (p. 3). An example is an evaluation conducted after the purchase of generators to power government buildings. If power encourages government officials to attend work on a regular basis, then the project may be deemed effective. However, if after the purchase, officials still do not attend their office regularly, the generator purchase was not effective.
- Performance evaluations include a broad array of evaluation methods, usually identifying general trends and incorporating “before-after comparisons, but generally lack a “rigorously defined counterfactual” (p. 3). These evaluations address descriptive and/or cause and effect questions such as how the project is perceived and valued by the population, if the project is achieving the desired outcome, if the project is experiencing expected results, and general trends that are useful for the implementation team and decision makers (p. 3). An example of performance evaluation can be completed after a school is opened up in a town. Some evaluation measures are the number of children attending school, the quality of the teachers and information they are teaching, the public’s perception or value of the new education opportunity, and state support for the facility (ability to provide supplies, maintenance, security and other factors). If children are not attending school, why not? What other forms of implementation can be executed to facilitate student attendance?

- Performance monitoring is the ongoing evaluation of MOEs and MOPs to determine if implementation is continuing and outcomes are being achieved. It is an ongoing process that begins during the first implementation phase and continues throughout the mission (p. 3). Using the previous example of opening a school, performance monitoring would include constant evaluation of student attendance from week to week. Is it increasing or decreasing? Is the government consistently providing for the basic needs to keep the school running? Do they pay teachers on time, provide school supplies, and perform basic maintenance measures in a predictable manner? Is the curriculum at the school endorsed by the legitimate government?
- Performance indicators evaluate the specific output and outcomes of implementation measures. USAID articulates that “outputs are directly attributable to the program activities, while project outcomes represent results to which a given program contributes but for which it is not solely responsible” (p. 3). Using the same example from above, a performance indicator for the construction of a new school would be increased numbers of state educated children (output). A positive project outcome would be if 80 percent of the youth in that state were educated on an annual basis, which is a 40 percent increase from the previous year. While construction of the school set a platform for education, predictable state contributions (providing state funded teachers, school supplies, and building upkeep) made education in the region sustainable, which made the project effective over time.
- Performance management is the process by which a CA team will continuously plan, monitor, track and analyze evaluation data to observe progress, alter implementation plans, impact decision making, and improve results. It is the overall process of both quantitative and qualitative evaluation (p. 3). An example of performance management is the evaluation of the above school construction project beginning with receiving notification from HN officials that a school is needed, concluding the same in the governance assessment, submitting the project for funding, ensuring it is being completed according to schedule, monitoring the attendance, curriculum, and perceiving the value and impact on the population.

It is important to note that in all the above examples, a construction project is used as a clear means to describe different types of evaluation. In governance missions, a project is not synonymous with tangible construction. It can refer to mentoring of HN officials, training initiatives, legitimacy building, and all other implementation means when fostering good governance.

The CA team can use the governance assessment in Appendix A to aid in their evaluation of progress. The column farthest right on the assessment entitled “Evaluation Metric” indicates metrics that can be used to measure change (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. VII-5). This evaluation measurement is borrowed from USIP’s (2010) *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments* (MPICE) (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. xvii).

For example, if the team is assessing the performance of a legal system’s ability to solve issues in a timely manner, there is a “+” in the “Evaluation Metric” column. This indicates that the performance of the legal system should be improving. Conversely, in the column aligned with each “Potential Drivers of Conflict,” there is a “-” to indicate that the potential for conflict should be decreasing. If during evaluation, the CA team determines that the increasing or decreasing trend indicated in the assessment framework is not progressing in the direction indicated, the CA team must reevaluate the issue and adjust the implementation plan. U.S. Army PKSOI’s (2016) *Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform* reaffirms that it is important to note that some metrics are purely quantitative and count things (MOP), while others are more qualitative, measuring what is important, rather than what is simply “countable” or “tangible” (p. VII-5). U.S. Army PKSOI stresses that It is critical to ensure all MOPs are paired with MOEs to ensure overall effectiveness (p. VII-6).

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IV. CONCLUSION

Throughout the Army, CA soldiers are recognized as governance experts. CA personnel are constantly deployed worldwide conducting operations that involve advising and assisting HN government personnel on how to improve their execution of governance. Both the 95th CA BDE (A) and the 83rd CA BN (active army CA units) identify governance as a capability when articulating their mission. Additionally, the DOD Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs* (2014) states that a component of the CA mission is to “Support stability operations, including activities that establish civil security; provide support to governance; provide essential services; support economic development and infrastructure; and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authority” (p. 1). Despite this emphasis on the importance of the CA role in governance, very little training is given to CA soldiers on how to execute this task.

This thesis articulates why it is critical that CA execute governance, the essential elements that should be evaluated when building governance, the principles that should be used when assessing governance, and the key pillars of government. The main output of the thesis is an instructional manual that CA soldiers can use as they train and deploy when assigned governance missions; this thesis provides a means to assess, implement and evaluate governance. This instructional thesis is intended for use by CA personnel when assigned governance missions, and especially those who have limited governance training.

This thesis makes the following conclusions and recommendations. First, additional governance education and training is needed for all CA personnel. Based off the articulated importance of governance in CA unit statements, CA doctrine and DOD directives, more emphasis should be placed on the importance of training soldiers on how to effectively accomplish missions to which they are assigned. It is not sufficient to expect soldiers to learn how to execute a key capability of their CA branch expertise in an “on the job” fashion. The method in which to implement this training is beyond the scope of this research; however, this thesis makes a recommendation for a governance training

syllabus in Appendix C that was used as an initial governance curriculum in a NPS directed study for CA and SF officers.

Secondly, it is critical for CA soldiers to understand the difference between government and governance. Due to a lack of education on governance, this concept is often confused. This research articulates the difference between principles of governance and pillars of government and specifies that principles of governance should be utilized when assessing the effectiveness of a functioning government. When conducting governance missions, CA soldiers should be focused on assessing a government using the principles articulated in this research, and not on building a functioning government, which is largely the responsibility of interagency partners.

Thirdly, when embarking on a governance mission, CA soldiers must first focus on the completion of a detailed country study and thorough problem diagnosis. This includes (but is not limited to) the analysis of social norms, social capital, CSOs, social contract theory, ideology, influence and the theory of competitive control. Understanding these aspects of how a society functions is important when conducting an assessment and implementation planning during governance missions. Failure to conduct a detailed country study and develop an understanding of the population, values and ways of life of those affected can result in ineffective, sometimes highly inappropriate and even offensive recommendations for improvement.

Finally, when using this thesis and instructional thesis in the field, it is imperative that the user understand this is not a checklist. The assessment should not be answered in a “yes” or “no” fashion and sent back to the unit headquarters. The value in this thesis is to shed light on the essential elements of governance, and to enable the user to make a determination on the extent to which specific elements contribute to instability and become drivers of conflict. Once the assessment is complete, users can utilize the outputs to develop an implementation plan based off the resources available in their duty location and based off their determination of which portion of the assessment is the leading source of instability. The instructional thesis is intended to be used as a working document that can continuously help assess the current level of governance, and then be used as a guide for further improvement.

A. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

Because governance is such a critical capability in the CA branch, and due to the expanding desire to encompass unconventional warfare into CA mission core capabilities, there are many opportunities for future research regarding CA and governance. First, counter-governance has been identified as a CA capability in an unconventional warfare environment. Arguably, many of the same components evaluated in this governance thesis would also apply to a mission building or executing counter governance. The difference is that in counter governance missions, the CA team is focused on building the capabilities of a counter or shadow government instead of the legitimate government. Beneficial future research would include taking this thesis and adapting it to be specifically applicable to counter-governance missions.

A second recommendation for future research is to explore a method to better train and educate CA soldiers on how to execute governance. A means for doing this is to examine the governance education curriculum in Appendix C, improve it, and make recommendations on execution. This can include incorporating governance into the CAQC, TDY training opportunities with DoS, the UN or NGOs, a Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) governance course, or governance training conducted at the brigade, battalion or company level.

A final recommendation for future research is to expand on this governance instructional thesis by creating a regionally aligned thesis that focuses on governance problem diagnosis, assessment, implementation, and evaluation. This would create a thesis that is specific to the intricacies of each combatant command.

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APPENDIX A. GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS

A. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

This governance framework is not a checklist. Assessment statements should not be answered in a “yes” or “no” fashion. The intent of the assessment is to get the user to evaluate critical aspects of governance, determine what areas are deficient, and which of those are most likely to become drivers of conflict. The user should then use that information to develop an implementation plan that is HN driven, prioritizes areas that pose the greatest threat to instability, and incorporates the interagency and other assets in the operating environment such as NGOs and military specialties. This is a tool to aid CA units in the assessment of current governance conditions, formulate a plan for implementation, and continuously evaluate progress. It should be treated as a living document. Once Step Four (evaluation) is complete, the user should return to Step One (problem diagnosis) and continue the process in the order presented.

Four pillars of government will be assessed: rule of law, security, economy and infrastructure, and social well-being. Each pillar will be assessed in two ways. The first assessment uses the principles of government from Chapter II to evaluate the government’s ability to provide for the population: participation, fairness, accountability, transparency, performance, and predictability. The second assessment will evaluate the population’s perception of the government’s ability to fulfill their responsibilities using the concepts described in Chapter II for building governance: social norms, social capital, CSOs, social contract theory, ideology, influence, and theory of competitive control. Finally, potential drivers of conflict resulting from poor governance—and which carry the potential to lead to further instability—are articulated for each pillar of government.

Not all portions of this framework will pertain to your operating environment. It is the responsibility of the user based off pre-mission training, country studies, and problem diagnosis to identify which portions of the framework can be useful and which do not apply. While some portions may not apply, an intent of the framework is to motivate the

user to think about aspects of governance that may not be obvious, or were overlooked before. Some of these areas may contribute to drivers of conflict.

The outcome of the assessment after implementation and evaluation will be an increasing trend or a decreasing trend (not a “yes” or “no”). The column farthest to the right, “Evaluation Metric,” has either a “+” or “-” indicating the desired trend for the assessment statement. For example, for the assessment statement, “CSOs are protected and supported by the local government,” there is a “+” as the evaluation metric, indicating that CSOs should be increasingly supported by the local government following implementation measures. If trends are progressing in the desired manner, this indicates that the implementation measures have been successful. If they are not progressing as desired, or stagnant, the issue should be reassessed, and the implementation plan should be adjusted. It is the responsibility of the CA unit and their HN partners to determine the effectiveness of a project and then take measures to reassess and adjust if the desired result is not being achieved.

This is not a “quick fix” solution. Building governance takes time, effort, and partnership. There is no single plan for success. It is the responsibility of the CA unit to conduct a thorough problem diagnosis, assessment, and then use the resources outlined in this thesis, along with prior knowledge, personal experience, HN partners and resources in theatre to develop a plan for implementation.

B. GOVERNMENT PILLAR: SECURITY (HUMAN AND PHYSICAL)

Table 1. Security (Human and Physical)

Government Pillar: Security (Human and Physical)				
Desired End State: The Government Provides a Safe and Secure Environment				
Component 1: The Government Maintains a Secure Environment				
Governance Assessment		Governance Principle Applied		Evaluation Metric
(Legitimate Monopoly over Violence) ³	The government ensures security is a top priority. ¹	Performance	Accountable	+
	Government “security forces operate lawfully under legitimate authority.” ²	Transparent	Accountable	+
	The government is actively involved in Disarmament and Demobilization (DD) of violent groups. ³	Performance		+
	There is a process to reintegrate “former soldiers, paramilitaries, militia and guerrilla fighters.” ⁴	Performance		
	Host Nation (HN) police and military are properly vetted. ³	Transparent	Performance	+
	Military and intelligence services respect the population and the population’s rights. ⁵	Fair	Accountable	+
(Security Sector Reform)	Security “reforms reflect the security needs of the HN population.” ⁶	Performance		+
	There is a transition plan in place to reinstate HN security forces. ⁷	Performance		+
	Local control is successfully transitioning from military to legitimate civilian authority. ⁶	Performance		+
	Civilian oversight in civil society is strengthening. ⁶	Performance		+
	“A division of labor exists between the police and military services, with the former performing public safety roles and the latter involved in national security missions.” ⁸	Performance		+
(Physical Security)	A basic level of security exists that will allow for stabilization activities. ⁹	Predictable	Performance	+
	The physical security of people, infrastructure, and other elements of society is improving. ¹⁰	Performance	Predictable	+

	Security forces are adequately providing for the safety of the population in an indiscriminate manner. ¹⁰	Fair		+
	Extent to which HN security forces can perform operations on their own. ⁷	Performance		+
Population Feels Secure				
Governance Assessment		Building Governance		Evaluation Metric
(Legitimate Monopoly over Violence)	Perception that the government protects the population. ¹¹	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+
	Civil society supports and is involved in the DD program. ¹²	Influence	Civil Society Organizations	+
	Perception that ex-combatants can reintegrate and become valued members of society. ⁴	Social Capital	Influence	+
(Security Sector Reform)	Society perceives the security forces as an effective means of protection. ⁶	Social Contract	Social Capital	+
	There is a positive relationship between the community and police. ¹³	Influence	Social Capital	+
(Physical Security)	The population believes that a basic level of security exists that will allow for stabilization activities. ⁹	Social Contract		+
	The population supports the post-conflict peace terms and conditions. ¹⁰	Influence	Social Contract	+
	Civilians are free from constant fear or threats to their physical safety. ¹⁴	Social Contract		+
	Security forces treat the population (all demographics) equally and with respect. ⁷	Social Capital	Social Norms	+
Potential Drivers of Conflict				
(Legitimate Monopoly over Violence)	The population believes the military and intelligence services do not value their human rights. ⁵			-
	Citizens believe the military and security forces are biased. ¹⁵			-
	Citizens lack trust and confidence in the legitimate security forces. ¹⁵			-
(Security Sector Reform)	Military forces continue to monopolize control over civil security responsibilities. ⁷			-

(Physical Security)	Portions of the population support non-state authority and are against peace terms. ⁷			-
	Perception that the state security forces are corrupt. ¹⁰			-
	Perception that foreign forces will be “viewed as occupiers or as propping up an illegitimate government.” ¹⁰			-
	Factions of the population oppose the peace agreement. ¹⁰			-
(Political Violence)	“Opposition groups engage in violence to advance political agenda or to oppose the peace process by attacking: government forces, officials, NGOs, civilian population, military, and infrastructure.” ¹⁶			-
	Continued “recruitment by armed groups.” ¹⁶			-
	Nefarious actors control territory and portions of the population. ¹⁶			-
	Opposing parties continue to fight each other. ¹⁷			-
(Popular support for violent factions diminished) ¹⁸	The population supports armed opposition groups. ⁷			-
	Military-aged males support or express a desire to join the violent faction. (by identity group). ¹⁸			-
	“Intensity of popular support (passive sympathy, devotion, or active support) given to violent factions (by identity group).” ⁷			-
	Extent of “collaboration (passive sympathy, devotion, or active support) between various political-social institutions (e.g., tribal associations, groups, social welfare networks, educational centers, local media associations, or financial institutions) and violent factions.” ⁷			-
	Coercion is used to gain support from the population (government or nefarious). ⁷			-
	“Population feels intimidated by threats or actions of violent factions (by identity group).” ⁷			-
	“Incidents of public dissent (e.g., demonstrations, funeral processions, or symbolic marches) in response to the use of force by state security forces and/or the international mission against violent factions.” ⁷			-

^{a1} (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 8:103); ² (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 6:46); ³ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 6:47); ⁴ (United Nations Development Programme, 2012, p. 65); ⁵ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 13); ⁶ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 6:51); ⁷ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 5); ⁸ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 11); ⁹ (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016, p. III:8); ¹⁰ (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016, p. III:9); ¹¹ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 8:103); ¹² (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 6:48); ¹³ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 6:52); ¹⁴ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 6:53); ¹⁵ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 15); ¹⁶ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 2); ¹⁷ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 6:40);

^b Legend: a “+” indicates the governance assessment should increase; a “-” indicates the governance assessment should decrease (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010).

C. GOVERNMENT PILLAR: RULE OF LAW

Table 2. Rule of Law

Government Pillar: Rule of Law				
Desired End State: Effective and Efficient Systems in Place for Mitigating Conflict				
Component 1: The Effectiveness of the Formal and/or Informal Legal System				
Governance Assessment		Governance Principle Applied		Evaluation Metric
(Administration of Justice)	The government upholds the “rule of law as a primary responsibility of the HN government.” ¹	Accountable	Performance	+
	The quality of the legal system is adequate to solve issues in a timely manner. ²	Predictable	Performance	+
	The legal framework “vindicates the rights of persons and punishes wrongs committed.” ³	Transparent	Fair	+
	The population has access to and willing to utilize formal and/or informal legal systems to resolve disputes. ⁴	Participation		+
	Justice systems (formal, informal) together promote peaceful resolution of conflicts. ⁵	Performance	Fair	+
	The cultural norms of legality (formal and/or informal) are understood and accepted. ⁴	Participation	Transparent	+

	“Public institutions and public officials are committed to the rule of law.” ⁶	Accountable	Predictable	+
	The legal system holds everyone (elites, law enforcement, security forces, and civil population) responsible for their crimes with appropriate and equal punishments. ⁷	Accountable	Fair	+
	Law enforcement and security forces are legitimate and not corrupt. ⁸	Transparent	Accountable	+
	Law enforcement and/or security forces can execute responsibilities and maintain public order. ⁹	Performance		+
	Unbiased implementation of public policies and laws. ¹⁰	Fair	Transparent	+
Popular Support of the Formal and/or Informal Legal System				
Governance Assessment		Building Governance		Evaluation Metric
(Society Supports Rule of Law)	The population supports formal and/or informal legal procedures. ¹¹	Social Contract	Social Capital	+
	People from all identity groups have access to a means to mitigate conflict. ¹²	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+
	The population is confident that conflicts are dealt with in a timely manner through formal/informal systems. ¹¹	Social Contract	Social Norms	+
	All demographics within the population are treated equally within the legal system. ¹³	Social Capital	Competitive Control	+
	Citizens believe their basic rights, regardless of demographics, are protected. ¹⁴	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+
	The population believes the conflict adjudicators are consistent, competent, responsible and impartial. ¹⁵	Social Capital	Competitive Control	+
	The population has trust and confidence in the law enforcement and/or security forces. ⁴	Social Capital		+
	Citizens have confidence that the legal framework addresses and resolves: “property rights, revenue generation, commercial activity, family law and domestic relations, anti-corruption, customary law, military justice, civil service, elections, criminal activity, civil dispute resolution.” ¹⁶	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+

Potential Drivers of Conflict			
(Administration of Justice)	The legal system uses demographics as a way to discriminate amongst the population (class, race, etc.). ¹⁷		-
	Willingness of the population to turn to non-state or nefarious actors for conflict resolution. ⁴		-
	Nefarious or non-state actors mitigate conflicts in lieu of a formal or informal legal system. ²⁰		-
	Competition and/or inconsistencies between informal and formal justice systems. ¹⁸		-
	Formal and informal law enforcement and/or security forces discriminate or repress portions of the population. ¹⁷		-
	Formal or informal legitimate government and/or elites are corrupt. ⁶		-
	Formal and/or informal government actors support nefarious non-state entities. ¹⁹		-
	Increased trust in the illegitimate law enforcement and/or security forces. ¹⁸		-
	The population turns to non-state or nefarious actors to resolve civil disputes. ¹⁸		-

^{a1} (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 8:103); ² (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 7:86); ³ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 7:68); ⁴ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 40); ⁵ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 43); ⁶ (United States Agency for International Development, 2014, p. 22); ⁷ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 7:81); ⁸ (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2016b, p. F:2); ⁹ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 7:75); ¹⁰ (United States Agency for International Development, 2014, p. 24); ¹¹ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 47); ¹² (United Nations Development Programme, 2012, p. 56); ¹³ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 7:92); ¹⁴ (United States Agency for International Development, 2014, p. 11); ¹⁵ (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2016b, p. F:19); ¹⁶ (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2016b, p. F:1); ¹⁷ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 35); ¹⁸ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 43); ¹⁹ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 36);

^b Legend: + indicates the governance assessment should increase; - indicates the governance assessment should decrease (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010).

D. GOVERNMENT PILLAR: SOCIAL WELL-BEING

Table 3. Social Well-Being

Government Pillar: Social Well-Being				
Desired End State: The Government Ensures the Populations Social Needs are Met				
Component 1: Government Provides Basic Needs				
Governance Assessment		Governance Principle Applied		Evaluation Metric
(Food)	The government ensures most of the population has access to food (by identify groups). ¹	Performance	Fair	+
	Capacity of the government to meet “emergency food needs.” ¹	Performance		+
(Water and Sanitation)	The government ensures the population has access to potable water and functioning sanitation (by identify group). ¹	Performance	Fair	+
(Shelter)	The government has the means to provide adequate shelter to those in need (by identify group). ¹	Performance	Fair	+
(Heath)	The government is capable of meeting critical healthcare needs met. ²	Performance		+
(Education)	There is a functioning state sponsored education system in place and educational opportunities are available to all identity groups. ³	Performance	Fair	+
	“Perception that teachers are neutral (by identity group).” ³	Transparent		+
	The school adheres to the state sponsored, unbiased curriculum. ⁴	Transparent	Accountable	+
(Humanitarian Aid (HA))	Non-indigenous organizations (NGOs, DOS, ICRC, etc.) HA contributions facilitate to the stabilization of the government and the society. ⁵	Performance		other
	The HN military and/or security forces work effectively with other organizations in the operational environment. ⁶	Performance		+
	The legitimate government is the main provider for delivering basic needs (goods and services) vs non-state actors. ⁶	Performance	Accountable	+

(Internally Displaced Persons)	The government is providing for basic needs of IDPs (food, water, shelter, healthcare, education). ³⁶	Performance		+
	The government is executing reconstruction efforts to facilitate the return of IDP's to their home. ⁷	Performance		+
	The government provides adequate information to IDP's about their home location. ⁷	Transparent	Accountable	+
	Security conditions are suitable for return or resettlement for IDPs. ⁸	Performance		+
Population's Basic Needs are Met				
Governance Assessment		Building Governance		Evaluation Metric
(Basic Needs)	The population has confidence in the legitimate government as the entity providing for their basic needs. ⁶	Social Capital		+
	The population believes that delivery of basic needs is unbiased. ³⁶	Social Contract	Social Capital	+
(Food)	The population has confidence in the legitimate government as the entity providing for the minimum standard of food. ⁶	Social Capital		+
	The population believes that emergency food needs can be met from community networks and civil society organizations, or the government. ¹	Social Contract	Civil Society Organizations	+
(Water and Sanitation)	The population has confidence in the legitimate government as the entity providing water and sanitation needs. ⁶	Social Capital	Social Contract	+
	The government ensures the population has reliable access to potable drinking water and functioning sanitation (by identity group) per minimum standards. ¹	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+
(Shelter)	The population has confidence in the legitimate government as the entity providing emergency shelters. ⁶	Social Capital		+
	The population has access to adequate standards for shelter. ¹	Social Contract		+
(Health)	The population has confidence in the legitimate government as the entity providing adequate health care needs (critical and emergency). ⁶	Social Capital		+
	Majority of the population has access adequate healthcare. ³	Social Contract		+

(Education)	The population is satisfied with the quality of education provided by the government. ⁶	Social Capital	Social Contract	+
	Population believes the curriculum and teachers are unbiased. ³⁶	Social Capital		+
	All identity groups have access to government sponsored education. ³⁶	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+
(Humanitarian Aid)	Perception that all groups are supported equally by the government and other organizations. ³⁶	Social Capital	Civil Society Organizations	+
(Internally Displaced Persons)	IDPs are confident that their basic needs will be met by the government. ⁸	Social Contract		+
	IDP are confident in the government's ability to provide and security and safe passage as they return home. ⁷	Social Contract		+
Potential Drivers of Conflict				
(Basic Needs)	Non-state/illicit actors are the main providers for delivering basic needs to the population. ⁶			-
	The government does not meet the basic needs requirements for the population. ³⁶			-
	Basic needs are delivered in a discriminate manner. ³⁶			-
(Education)	Teachers and curriculum in the state schools are corrupted by non-state actors. ³⁶			-
(Humanitarian Aid)	Aid is inhibiting the legitimate government from developing institutions. ³⁶			-
Component 2: Civil Society Strengthened and Supports the Government				
Governance Assessment		Governance Principle Applied		Evaluation Metric
(Civil Society Organizations)	The government allows non-government Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to exist. ³⁶	Participation		other
	"CSOs have the capacity and vision to play their central role in political, social and economic life." ⁹	Participation		+
	"Public institutions respond to public needs and provide socially acceptable and accessible services." ¹⁰	Performance		+
	"Organizations are devoted to the promotion of civic participation." ¹¹	Participation		+

	Perception that all identity groups are represented in CSOs. ⁹	Fair	Participation	+
	All social “classes, groups, organizations and economic structures and interests” equally impact policy making. ¹²	Fair	Participation	+
	Local actors are involved in local government decision making. ¹³	Participation		+
	Non-state actors work in concert with the local government and positively impact stability. ¹⁴	Transparent		+
	CSO’s and citizens serve as a check on government abuse. ¹⁵	Participation		+
	There are “mechanisms (public meetings, hearings, consultative bodies, e-governance, government databases, or Internet-based social platforms) are in place for all citizens to provide their input to public decisions.” ¹⁶	Participation		+
	CSOs are protected and supported by the local government. ³⁶	Accountable		+
(Media)	The media supports a culture that follows rules of law and regulations. ¹⁷	Transparent		+
	Media reporting is accurate and reliable. ¹⁸	Transparent	Accountable	+
	The media is “free to provide information, analysis, and a forum for the completion of ideas.” ¹⁹	Participation		+
	The government fosters “independent media and access to information.” ²⁰	Performance		+
	The “media outlets are representative of and accessible to the population.” ²¹	Fair		+

Public Perception of the Government				
Governance Assessment		Building Governance		Evaluation Metric
(Public Perception of Government)	There is a positive relationship between the local government and the population. ¹¹	Social Capital	Social Contract	+
	The citizens support the government, its polices, and its officials. ⁵	Social Contract	Influence	+
	Perception that formal/informal institutions are fulfilling their responsibilities and providing for the populace. ¹¹	Social Capital	Civil Society Organizations	+
	Population is satisfied with their level of involvement in government decisions and policy making. ¹¹	Social Contract	Civil Society Organizations	+
	The population believes that the government keeps them informed on all government related activities. ¹¹	Influence	Social Capital	+
	There is civic participation in government sponsored programs and project. ¹¹	Civil Society Organizations		+
	The population believes that CSOs have the ability to impact change. ²²	Civil Society Organizations		+
	The population supports the established social contract with the government and elites. ¹²	Social Contract	Social Capital	+
	The population believes their opinions matter. ²³	Social Capital		+
(Confidence in Government)	The population supports the government election and/or leadership selection process. ²⁴	Social Contract	Social Capital	+
	Perception that the population has national pride and supports their leaders. ²⁵	Ideology	Social Capital	+
	The desire of the population to contribute to and participate in society. ²⁶	Social Contract		+
(Media)	The population believes the media is unbiased and not regulated by the government. ³⁶	Influence		+

Potential Drivers of Conflict				
(Civil Society Organizations)	The government does not allow or strictly regulates CSOs. ³⁶			-
	Perception that some classes, groups, organizations, etc., have more ability to impact policy than others. ¹²			-
	Perception that certain groups benefit more from the government than others. ¹²			-
	CSOs serve as a means to further polarize the population. ³⁶			-
	CSOs are a platform for inner-group conflict. ³⁶			-
	CSOs counter the legitimate government's narrative and policies in a way that is detrimental to stabilization. ³⁶			-
	Perception of exclusion of certain groups "(formally or informally) from meaningful political, social, or economic participation." ¹⁶			
(Social Decline)	Perception that certain societal groups are treated worse than others, based on race, gender, and religion. ²⁷			-
	Perception that discrimination of certain societal groups inspires violent acts. ²⁷			-
	Competing ideologies exists that result in the population resorting to violence. ²⁸			-
(Public Perception of Government)	Perception of government/institutional corruption. ³⁶			-
(Divisions in Society)	There is segregation among identity groups, and this segregation perpetuates violence. ²⁷			-
	Perception that race, ethnic identity, religion, class, caste, and tribal affiliation, segregates society. ²⁷			-
	"Readiness to use violence to achieve sociopolitical ends, including killing of noncombatants/innocent civilians." ²⁷			-
	"Perceptions of discrimination in government policies (by identity group)." ²⁷			-
	Social elites restrict marginalized groups from voicing their opinions or participating in government. ²⁷			-

	“Isolation/distance of excluded groups from centers of power/influence.” ²⁷			-
	“Prevalence of laws and policies that either enforce or prohibit expressions of group identity.” ²⁷			-
	“Prevalence of intolerance of competing worldviews.” ²⁸			-
	“Individuals perceive themselves as disconnected from society (distrust, discontent, pessimism, alienation, estrangement).” ²⁸			-
(Social Decline)	Ministration of “Informal and/or traditional social support structures (households, extended family, clan, and tribes)(by identity group).” ²⁸			-
	Number of street children and homeless families. ²⁸			-
	“Extent to which illicit power structures have replaced informal social support networks as a source of basic needs and social services.” ²⁸			-
(Demographics)	“Percentage of employment-aged youth who are unemployed or underemployed.” ⁸			-
	“A ‘youth bulge’ exists (percentage of population between (15 and 29).” ⁸			-
Component 3: Legitimate and Effective Institutions and Leadership				
Governance Assessment		Governance Principle Applied		Evaluation Metric
(Leaders and Institutions)	Leadership can be counted on to develop policies that foster growth, development, security and stabilization. ²⁹	Predictable	Accountable	+
	Leaders/institutions coordinate effectively to solve problems and facilitate growth. ^{29, 30}	Performance		+
	Leaders and Institutions coordinate to improve stabilization and minimize conflict. ³⁰	Performance		+
	Leadership’s holds a legitimate role in policy making and implementation. ³¹	Transparent		+
	The local government communicates with the next tier of government (request support, assistance, input, etc.). ²⁰	Performance		+

	Leadership/institutions provide incentives to the population to encourage their support. ²⁶	Participation		+
	Legitimate leadership actively supports and speaks on behalf of the population (all identity groups). ³²	Accountable	Transparent	+
Public Confidence in Institutions and Leadership				
Governance Assessment		Building Governance		Evaluation Metric
(Leaders and Institutions)	The population believes their leaderships represents their preferences and beliefs. ²⁶	Social Capital	Social Contract	+
	The population believes the elected decision maker(s) are members of the legitimate government and not a shadow actor. ³³	Competitive Control		+
	The population is confident that the next highest tier of government supports them. ²⁰	Social Capital		+
Potential Drivers of Conflict				
(Leaders and Institutions)	Leadership manipulates/coerces the population to politically support them. ³⁴			-
	Leadership bribes the population for their support. ³⁴			-
	Leadership excludes certain groups/demographics from participation in government. ³⁵			-
	The power vacuum will be filled by nefarious actors. ³⁶			-
	Leadership creates policies that serve their narrow interests and not the interests of the population. ³¹			-
	The HN is reliant on international organizations for support. ³⁶			-

^{a1} (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 73); ² (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 10:171); ³ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 74); ⁴ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 10:177); ⁵ (United States Agency for International Development, 2016a, p. 5); ⁶ (United Nations Development Programme, 2012, p. 51); ⁷ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 10:180); ⁸ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 71); ⁹ (United States Agency for International Development, 2014, p. 40); ¹⁰ (United States Agency for International Development, 2014, p. 24); ¹¹ (United Nations Development Programme, 2012, p. 79); ¹² (United States Agency for International Development, 2016a, p. 2); ¹³ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 8:107); ¹⁴ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 8:102); ¹⁵ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 28); ¹⁶ (United States Agency for International Development, 2014, p. 14); ¹⁷ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 7:94); ¹⁸ (U.S.

Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2016b, p. F:6);¹⁹ (United States Agency for International Development, 2014, p. 18);²⁰ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 8:108);²¹ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 8:124);²² (United States Agency for International Development, 2016a, p. 23);²³ (United States Agency for International Development, 2014, p. 12);²⁴ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 24);²⁵ (United States Agency for International Development, 2014, p. 11);²⁶ (The World Bank, 2017b, p. 13);²⁷ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 27);²⁸ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 70);²⁹ (The World Bank, 2017b, p. 5);³⁰ (The World Bank, 2017b, p. 6);³¹ (The World Bank, 2017b, p. 8);³² (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016, p. III:9);³³ (United States Agency for International Development, 2016a, p. 8);³⁴ (The World Bank, 2017b, p. 10);³⁵ (The World Bank, 2017b, pp. 12-13);

^b Legend: + indicates the governance assessment should increase; - indicates the governance assessment should decrease (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010).

E. GOVERNMENT PILLAR: ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Table 4. Economy and Infrastructure

Government Pillar: Economy and Infrastructure				
Desired End State: Sustainable Economy and Infrastructure				
Component 1: The Government Provides Services				
Governance Assessment		Governance Principle Applied		Evaluation Metric
(Essential Services)	The government delivers “essential services to meet basic human needs and restore the basis for government legitimacy.” ¹	Performance	Predictable	+
	Availability of “essential services (e.g., water, electricity, sewage, telephone, trash removal, public transportation) functioning compared with pre-conflict levels (by identity group and region).” ²	Performance		+
	Public goods delivery is returning to pre-conflict levels. ³	Performance		+
	All demographic groups have access to public goods and essential services. ⁴	Fair	Transparent	+
(Major Resources)	The government/leadership manages natural resources and wealth (mineral, oil, land, water) in ways that support the population and economic growth. ⁵	Accountable	Performance	+
	Government resources are protected and safe from corruption. ⁶	Transparent	Accountable	+

(Economic Infrastructure)	Critical infrastructure such as water, telecommunications, and transportation buildings related to industry, etc., has returned to pre-conflict levels. ⁷	Performance		+
	Critical infrastructure (transportation, communication, and electricity) is adequate to facilitate economic advancement. ⁸	Performance		+
	Critical infrastructure has been repaired so people can return to work. ²⁷	Performance	Accountable	+
(Employment)	There are licit job opportunities available for people of all ethnic and identity groups “(i.e., ex-combatants, military-aged youth, and disenfranchised groups).” ⁹	Fair	Participation	+
(Human Capital)	The government is providing legitimate and licit development opportunities. ¹⁰	Performance		+
	The labor market is increasing. ¹⁰	Performance		+
	Training and vocational programs increase human capital (life skills, on the job training). ¹¹	Performance		+
	Agriculture opportunities are returning to pre-conflict levels. ¹²	Performance		+
Popular Support for the Government Provided Services				
Governance Assessment		Building Governance		Evaluation Metric
(Essential Services)	The public is satisfied with the government’s ability to restore and deliver essential services (all demographics). ²	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+
(Human Capital)	The population (all demographics) is satisfied with their “state of livelihoods, including skills, capacity, motives, and access to resources.” ¹³	Social Capital	Ideology	+
(Employment)	Population is satisfied with the government’s ability to provide employment opportunities. ²⁷	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+
	Ex-combatants can find licit employment. ²⁷	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+

Potential Drivers of Conflict				
(Essential Services)	Insufficient essential services and access to public goods inhibits economic activity. ²			-
	Government/leadership exploits natural resources. ¹⁴			-
	Government uses demographics as a means of discrimination when delivering essential services and public goods. ²⁷			-
	Delivery of essential services are/ continues to “be performed by international actors.” ¹⁵			-
(Employment)	High “unemployment rates among ex-combatants and military-aged youth (by identity group).” ⁹			-
	“Unemployment rates of politically disadvantaged identity groups relative to the national average.” ¹⁶			-
Component 2: Sustainable Economy				
Governance Assessment		Governance Principle Applied		Evaluation Metric
(Revenue)	Revenue collected (taxes, aid donations, self-help) is used to provide services to the public. ¹⁷	Transparent	Accountable	+
	Post conflict commerce is improving/ adequate to sustain the economy. ¹³	Performance		+
	Economic growth is increasing. ¹⁰	Performance		+
(Economic Organizations)	The use of public/private institutions such as banks, schools, and markets are returning to pre-conflict levels. ¹⁸	Performance		
(Rules for the Economy)	There are legitimate rules that govern economic “assets and processes (e.g., property ownership, hiring, and delivery of services)?” ¹⁹	Transparent	Accountable	+
	Government allows and encourages economic competition in society. ¹⁹	Participation	Transparent	+
	The transitory economy is slowly returning to the formal economy. ³	Performance		+
	The local government prevents illicit actors from hindering good economic governance. ¹³	Performance	Accountable	+
	The government has rules and enforcement mechanisms to control the illicit economy. ²⁰	Accountable	Transparent	+

Popular Support for the Economy				
Governance Assessment		Building Governance		Evaluation Metric
(Revenue)	Society is willing to pay fees to the local government in return of services. ²⁷	Social Contract		+
	Perception that government uses the revenue to contribute to society's well-being. ¹⁷	Social Contract		+
(Rules for the Economy)	The population wants to return to the formal economy versus staying in the informal economy. ³	Social Contract	Competitive Control	+
	Citizens support the government's sponsored legal economy. ²¹	Social Contract		+
Potential Drivers of Conflict				
(Revenue)	Perception that the government and/or leadership keeps the revenue for itself. ¹⁷			-
(Economic Organizations)	There are economic organizations/ influential personnel that contribute to illicit groups. ¹⁷			-
(Rules for the Economy)	Monopolies exists that hinder economic activity. ¹⁹			-
	The black market and its illicit actors threaten the legitimate formal economy. ³			-
	Other organizations (HN, international, NGO, etc.) are conducting programs that are negatively impacting economic trends. ²²			-
	Illicit economic channels continue to affect the economy, or have been created post-conflict. ²³			-
(Illicit Wealth) (MPICE 53)	Large part of the economy takes place in illicit markets. ²⁴			-
(Public Offices)	"Public perception of corruption in public offices." ²⁵			-
	Citizens report that a "gift or informal payment is required to obtain a government service/job." ²⁴			-
	Citizens report that a "gift or informal payment is required to avoid arrest or a fine by police or to pass through a police checkpoint." ²⁵			-

(Illicit Actors)	“Armed opposition groups maintain spheres of influence where they exercise de facto authority to collect “taxes” or exploit criminalized economic activity.” ²⁵			-
	Economic growth programs allow illicit actors to earn money, power, or influence. ¹³			-
(Illicit Economic Incentives)	Government officials, the population, and illicit actors economically profit from continued conflict. ¹⁶			-
	“Relief supplies are expropriated by armed opposition groups.” ¹⁶			-
	Illicit actors drive conflict through economic means. ²⁰			-
	Resources gained from illicit markets and means are used to gain formal and informal power. ²⁰			-
(Inequality Between Groups)	Interests of economic stakeholders are contributing to the conflict. ²⁷			-
	There is group-based inequality (by identity group). ¹⁶			-
	“Perception of economic deprivation relative to other identity groups (by identity group).” ¹⁶			-
	Population that shares “group identity with ruling elites derive a disproportionate benefit from the resources that are extracted from society.” ²⁶			-
	Unequal “distribution of government subsidized food/basic needs/benefits (by identity group).” ²⁶			-
	“Extent of any disparity in the cost (e.g., fees, taxes, charges) of public goods and services (by identity group).” ²⁶			-

^{a1} (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 8:103); ² (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 58); ³ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:145); ⁴ (United States Agency for International Development, 2016a, p. 20); ⁵ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:135); ⁶ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 8:112); ⁷ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:150); ⁸ (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016, p. III:37); ⁹ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 61); ¹⁰ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:149); ¹¹ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:154); ¹² (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:157); ¹³ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:134); ¹⁴ (United States Agency for International Development, 2016a, p. 2); ¹⁵ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 24); ¹⁶ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 55); ¹⁷ (United States Agency for International Development, 2016a, p. 7); ¹⁸

(Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 10); ¹⁹ (United States Agency for International Development, 2016a, p. 8); ²⁰ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:143); ²¹ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:144); ²² (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016, pp. III-32); ²³ (United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute, 2009, p. 9:144); ²⁴ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 53); ²⁵ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 54); ²⁶ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 56);

^b Legend: + indicates the governance assessment should increase; - indicates the governance assessment should decrease (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010).

APPENDIX B. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS

A. INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (ICAF)

The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is a tool intended for a team comprised of multiple U.S. Government (USG) interagency personnel to collaboratively assess and prepare for conflict “prevention, mitigation and stabilization” (Department of State [DoS], 2008, p. 1). It introduces a two-task process, each task being comprised of sub-steps that strive to identify drivers of conflict in unstable regions. This process identifies indicators that may lead to instability or conflict, and forecasts why those conditions exist (DoS, 2008, p. 2). ICAF analysis is intended to be a first step in stabilization interagency planning, establishing USG goals, developing an initial plan, implementation of programs and allocation of resources (DoS, 2008, p. 3). It is designed to be used by any USG agency at all planning levels if necessary. It begins with conflict diagnosis, which is the portion most valuable to Civil Affairs, and then segues into planning, which applies more to higher level interagency coordination.




Figure 5. Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

B. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS (PEA)

The Political Economy Analysis (PEA) is a research methodology used by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to explain why certain events occur in aid-recipient countries (United States Agency for International

Development [USAID], 2016a, p. 2). It is intended to identify effective means of intervention throughout an aid program cycle. The PEA can also be used to identify sources of instability, conflict, or development and governance problems to include basic needs, healthcare, education, justice, climate change, etc. (USAID, 2016a, p. 2). The PEA was created with the ideology that success is more prevalent if USAID begins with local solutions, rather than implementing foreign solutions (USAID, 2016a, p. 3). The methodology is designed to identify critical infrastructure requirements, introduce key facts to consider, and then present a series of questions that indicate recommendations for topics to explore and data to be collected (USAID, 2016a, p. Annex: 2). Some of the topics include development considerations and governance “such as politics, rules and norms, social and cultural practices, beliefs and values, and historical and geographical determinants” (USAID, 2016a, p. 3).




Figure 6. USAID, Political Economy Analysis (PEA)

C. USAID, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE (DRG)

The USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) framework analyzes the political arena in a country and develops a strategy to improve each tenant of the DRG (democracy, human rights and governance) (United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2014, p. iii). This framework can be considered a PEA analysis for the DRG section of USAID (USAID, 2014, p. iii). The outputs of DRG assessments are critical in identifying areas of interest within countries that would both benefit from USAID programs, and have the potential to endure sustainable and long-term effects (USAID, 2014, p. 2 & 5). This framework helps identify the nature of the

political environment and situation within a country, and then adapts USAID programs to improve the environment (USAID, 2014, p. iii). While designed for USAID use, the DRG specifies that other entities within USG can benefit from utilizing DRG analysis methods (USAID, 2014, p. iii).

The DRG framework is divided into four steps of analysis or “DRG challenges” that include (USAID, 2014, p. iii):

1. Defining the DRG Challenge - democracy, human rights and governance;
2. Analyzing key actors and institutions (political economy analysis) in which they operate
3. Considering USAID’s operation and pragmatic environment
4. Outlining the proposed DRG strategy

Each step of analysis includes a series of assessment questions that help identify drivers of instability that lead to conflict. It is important to note that the steps do not need to be executed in sequential order. Steps two and three are interchangeable, and can be addressed in an alternating fashion (USAID, 2014, p. iii). In this assessment, USAID focuses on how the tenants of the DRG impact men and women. While priorities are weighted differently in the military and in USAID, this framework is a helpful reference when considering governance key tenants for the Civil Affairs (CA) branch.




Figure 7. USAID DRG Framework

**D. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)—
GOVERNANCE FOR PEACE**

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Governance for Peace document has three goals: consistently contribute to current theories and processes for promoting good governance in fragile environments, shed light on sound practices for good governance in environments in crisis and propose a framework for executing governance in conflict ridden and fragile environments (United Nations Development Programme, 2012 [UNDP], p. 11). The United Nations (UN) strives to work alongside and assist HN actors in regaining control over stabilization (UNDP, 2012, p. 12). They also emphasize the need to focus on marginalized groups, such as women and minorities. The UNDP (2012) framework has four key objectives:

- (a) Building responsive and accountable institutions
- (b) Promoting inclusive political processes
- (c) Fostering resilient state-society relations
- (d) Promoting partnerships (UNDP, 2012, p. 12)

The focus of the framework emphasizes the importance of restoring the social contract between the government and the people, which resonates throughout all key objectives (UNDP, 2012, p. 37). The framework also annotates “partnerships as a means of operationalizing” the first three key objectives, which includes partnerships with the UN, government and non-government entities, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and other organizations (UNDP, 2012, p. 38). The four objectives mutually reinforce each other and must work in concert to be effective, dictating a “comprehensive approach to renewing the social contract” in fragile environments (UNDP, 2012, p. 40).




Figure 8. UNDP Governance for Peace Framework. Source: United Nations Development Programme (2012, p. 38).




Figure 9. UNDP Governance for Peace

E. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (USIP) AND THE U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INSTITUTE’S (PKSOI) GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) joined together to create the Guiding Principles of Stabilization and Reconstruction. This document depicts principles necessary to build sustainable peace in a country following a period of conflict and instability (United States

Institute of Peace [USIP] and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute [U.S. Army PKSOI], 2009, pp. 1-3). The document strives to present a set of comprehensive principles that can be used to guide and set priorities for personnel conducting peacekeeping and stability operations, to include government and non-government decision makers and practitioners, as well as international actors (USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI, 2009, pp. 1-3). This document was developed following a comprehensive analysis of all peacekeeping and stability literature from a wide variety of actors to include state ministries, NGOs and defense officials.

The initial focus is on short-term objectives intended to assist a country in functioning on its own and then to ensure that a sustainable recovery path is nested within long term country objectives (USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI, 2009, pp. 1-5). This framework also takes into consideration the balance between stabilization and peacekeeping and long-term development, ensuring that the stabilization portion takes sustainable development into consideration, while development objectives proceed with a conflict-sensitive approach (USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI, 2009, pp. 1-5).

Based on comprehensive analysis, USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI identified five purpose-based end states to develop their strategic framework, as well as cross-cutting principles that affect each end state, all of which are depicted in figure six (USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI, 2009, pp. 2-8). In their document, USIP effectively lays out a framework that depicts desired end states, cross-cutting principles, high-level trade-offs, and high-level gaps and challenges. This compound structure effectively covers a wide range of considerations that can be useful for CA soldiers when advising and assisting a local government.



Figure 10. USIP's Five End States and Cross-cutting Principles. Source: United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute (2009, p. 2-8).




Figure 11. Guiding Principles of Stabilization and Reconstruction

F. MEASURING PROGRESS IN CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS (MPICE)

Together USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI developed Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), which is a document that consists of outcome based goals, indicators, and measures to be used in concert with implementation of operational plans in the transformation of war torn countries to stable, functioning governments (Agoglia,

Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. x) MPICE serves as a guide by providing assessment questions for current operational conditions, and identifying existing sources of prolonged conflict. In addition, it helps track progress initiating at intervention and continuing through the stabilization process. MPICE helps identify any remaining sources of instability and gauges a local indigenous government's ability to resume responsibility in post-conflict environments. This document guides the creation of realistic expectations for policymakers and planners, while advising them to provide adequate resources and personnel to maximize efforts in attaining sustainable peace and stability (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. 10).

MPICE identifies three conflict environments; State 0 (Imposed Stability), State I (Assisted Stability), and State II (Self-Sustaining Peace); however, it is ideally intended for State 0 and State I environments (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010, p. xiv). The document was created to coincide with USIP's "Framework for Societies Emerging from Conflict," annotated in the previous section. Because of this, MPICE and USIP's framework are valuable when used together in the planning and execution of stabilization operations.




Figure 12. MPICE Sectors. Source: Agoglia, Dziedzic, and Sotirin (2010, p. xv).




Figure 13. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments

G. ESSENTIAL TASK MATRIX (ETM)

The Essential Task Matrix (ETM) is an interagency product developed in 2005 by the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to guide users when facilitating the transition from post conflict to stabilization in warring states. It is no longer in circulation for use; however, it remains a helpful tool for those embarking on governance missions. It originated out of S/CRS working group

discussions and was intended to be a “living” document (Department of State [DoS], 2005, p. 1). The framework is divided into five technical sections security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization, and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation (DoS, 2005, p. 2). For each section, the matrix is further divided into three types of tasks; initial response tasks (short term), transformation tasks (mid-term), and fostering sustainability tasks (long term) (DoS, 2005, p. 2). The intent is to create a comprehensive planning tool that provides a spectrum of implementation recommendations that can be applied to a conflict at various stages. Finally, the ETM emphasizes that all situations are different and that the implementation approach will depend on the local environment (Department of State, 2005, p. 2).




Figure 14. Essential Task Matrix

H. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07, STABILITY

Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 was developed with the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to guide the Armed forces combatant commanders and joint forces commanders (JFCs) when executing activities involving governmental and non-governmental entities, multinational forces and other partners. The document identifies the fundamentals of stabilization as “conflict transformation, Host Nation (HN) ownership, unity of effort and building HN capacity” (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2016, p. xi). Using these fundamentals as a guideline, JP 3-07 presents a stabilization framework that is derived from the State Department’s ETM. It first identifies both the stage of the operation and necessary performance tasks, and then provides tools to

measure the extent to which the desired end state is being achieved (JCS, 2016, p. xi). To enhance assessment at all stages of conflict, JP 3-07 breaks up these performance tasks into initial response, transformation and fostering sustainability. The thesis also introduces joint stability functions, which it derived from the ETM. These functions include security, foreign humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. JP 3-07 provides military doctrine for commanders and military planners for stabilization operations (JCS, 2016, p. xviii).




Figure 15. JP 3-07, Stability Operations

I. UNIFIED ACTION HANDBOOK SERIES

The Unified Action Handbooks is a set of four handbooks developed by the U.S. Army PKSOI to guide the JFC in developing a whole of government approach when executing stability operations during steady-state and post-conflict operations (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute [U.S. Army PKSOI], 2016c, p. 1 & 3). The four handbooks are listed below:

- Book One: *Military Support to Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure*
- Book Two: *Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media*
- Book Three: *Military Support to Economic Stabilization*
- Book Four: *Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform*

The intent of the books is to complement military planning and assist the commander in preparing for a successful transition from military to local civilian authority in situations where the military is expected to act as the governing authority in

post-conflict environments (U.S. Army PKSOI, 2016c, p. 3). U.S. Army PKSOI emphasizes that HN authorities are the supported element, and the U.S. military should be prepared to augment HN security throughout the transition process (U.S. Army PKSOI, 2016c, p. 3). These handbooks were developed to supplement already published stability operations doctrine, assisting staffs in the planning and execution of stability operations across all operational areas (U.S. Army PKSOI, 2016c, p. 4).




Figure 16. Unified Action Series

J. WHAT IS GOOD GOVERNANCE?

The UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific developed the article entitled “What is Good Governance?” (2009) which aims to explain to the reader what governance is and what “good governance” means (p. 1). In three pages, this article distinguishes the difference between government and governance, clearly defining both. This article is highly recommended for those who are beginning their study of governance, because it clearly explains what governance is, and what comprises it, in a short and concise manner that is easy to understand. This article outlines good governance using eight characteristics that include participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, accountability, consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, and effectiveness and efficiency (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2009, pp. 2-3). The article concludes by articulating that good governance is difficult to achieve; however, it is necessary to consider when attempting to develop sustainable development in countries of interest (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2009, p. 3).




Figure 17. “What Is Good Governance?”

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APPENDIX C. GOVERNANCE COURSE

A. GOVERNANCE COURSE

This appendix is intended to provide the outline of a governance syllabus that Civil Affairs (CA) units can use to train their personnel on governance. As stated previously in this research, currently very little training or education exists for CA soldiers on how to execute governance. While this thesis provides an overview of important concepts, theories, and a means to execute governance, it is mainly intended for use by those who have not received any formal training, or as a tool to consolidate concepts and use during training exercises and deployments. Because governance is a core capability for the CA regiment, it would be beneficial to have a training course specifically focused on governance. This governance syllabus can be adapted for use at the brigade, battalion or company level or as a recommended self-study curriculum.

This course was compiled and led by Professor Heather S. Gregg, a Defense Analysis professor and Political Scientist at NPS. CA and Special Forces (SF) students led each of the topic discussions, which drew on both academic research on the topic and integrated lessons learned from personal deployments.

Purpose of Instruction

This course “aims to investigate how to understand and assess governance and counter-governance. Broadly, this class aims to help inform one of the core capabilities of Civil Affairs, which is “governance.” This course should also be directly relevant to Special Forces and their efforts to work with indigenous forces to either support a government in FID or COIN efforts, or challenge a government in UW operations” (Gregg, Heather S., Directed study syllabus, July 5, 2017).

B. TOPIC #1: THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY

a. Readings

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. (2009, July 10). What is good governance? Retrieved from UN website:
<http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>

Thomas Barfield, "Ibn Khaldun and Afghanistan," *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 56-65.

Google Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft for working definitions

Max Weber, "Three Types of Legitimate Rule," *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 2009), pp. 324-432. Read only pp. 324-333, 341-345, 358-366

Laskar, M. E. (2013). *Summary of Social Contract Theory by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau*. LL.M Symbiosis Law School, Pune.

b. Topics

- Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (google for basic definitions)
- Social contract (Laskar)
- Sources of legitimacy (Weber)

c. Study Questions

1. What is your definition of governance? What do you think it includes?
2. Do you think there are universal aspects of governance? (reasons for governments to form or "things" that governments should do in every case?)
3. Here are five variables of what "causes" government. How do you think each of these things caused governments to form?
 - Force
 - Family
 - Divinity
 - Economics
 - Social contract

4. Can you think of other causes of government besides these five?

5. What is Ibn Khaldun's theory of governance? What is "causing" the different forms of governance in the desert and the city?
6. What is *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*? How are they different? How do they work together? Can humans live in a perfectly *gesellschaft* world?
7. Weber begins with a discussion on the basis of legitimacy, which is really interesting. What does he think it involves?
8. Why does authority require more than just pure materialistic interests?
9. How is authority different from contract? How is it different from coercion or seduction?
10. What is his definition of legitimate authority?
11. What are his three "pure" forms of authority?
12. What are the strengths and limits of each?
13. Why are the pure forms of each impractical?

C. TOPIC #2: TRADITIONAL GOVERNANCE, MODERN GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

a. Readings

Ted C. Lewellen, *Political Anthropology: An Introduction*, Westport: Praeger, 2003.
<https://mahabubjnu.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/59811078-lewellen-political-anthropology>

Chapter 1: "The Development of Political Anthropology," pp. 1-14.

Chapter 2: "Types of Preindustrial Political Systems," pp. 15-42.

Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 6th ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Chapter 1: "Political Ideologies and Why They Matter," pp. 1-23.

Chapter 2: "Liberalism," pp. 24-61.

(Suggested, not required) Chapter 11: "Islamism," pp. 299-323.

Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Chapter 2: "Competing Ideologies of Order," pp. 26-41.

b. Topics

- The challenges of categorizing pre-Industrial (pre-modern) forms of governance
- Why Ideology Matters
- Liberalism
- Competing Ideologies and Islamism

c. Study Questions

Types of Pre-industrial Governance:

Political anthropology, which focuses on forms of governance in traditional and modern societies, has its roots in colonialism of the 19th century, and colonial powers' desire to catalogue different political systems they encountered in the areas they occupied. Early studies of political anthropology assumed that native forms of governance bordered on anarchy, and gave these systems problematic titles, such as "savage" (hunter-gatherers) and "barbaric" (simple agrarian), and assumed that all societies were on a trajectory towards governance that would reach the characteristics of western civilization. However, with time, and particularly after World War II, these studies evolved into more nuanced categorizations that focused on kinship structures, succession of leadership, political rivalries, and the role of economics in shaping pre-modern governance.

1. Why is it so difficult to categorize or make pre-industrial "types of governance?"
2. What are some of the difference between bands, tribes and chiefdoms?
3. Why do bands and some tribes disprove the hypothesis on social contracts?

Why Ideology Matters:

All people form assumptions and have their perceptions shaped by an underlying ideology. This section will examine Heywood's explanation of ideology to form a foundation for looking at potential conflict between a given political ideology and types or elements of government.

1. What is ideology?

2. Does the term ideology have negative connotations?
3. Why does ideology matter?
4. Is it helpful to distinguish between core concepts and peripheral concepts?

Liberalism:

It is important to recognize that many of our ideas of how government should operate are based on liberalism. Often, we assume many aspects of liberal democracy are universally accepted as 'right' without realizing the theoretical justification behind them. Even if we conclude that liberalism is the best political ideology, it is important to understand where it may come into conflict with other political ideologies.

1. What is liberalism?
2. How do the core values of liberalism translate across cultures? Are these values universal?
3. Why are the concepts of *social contract* and *constitutionalism* necessary from a liberal perspective?
4. What are the core and peripheral concepts of a liberal democracy?
5. Can a liberal democracy exist without a civil society?

Competing Ideologies of Order and Islamism:

Juergensmeyer speaks of the competition between religion and secular nationalism as competing ideologies of order. Both can perform similar functions of creating order ("the glue that holds together broad communities") and are therefore potential rivals.

1. What is Islamism? What is the Islamist view of the West?
2. What challenges would be faced in establishing effective governance in a society where the Islamist narrative resonates?
3. Do the core values of liberalism (individualism, freedom, reason, justice, and toleration) create conflict with religious values?

D. TOPIC #3: COMPONENTS OF GOVERNANCE / ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

a. Readings

James Gavrillis, (Nov/Dec 2005), The Mayor of Ar Rutbah, Foreign Policy, pp. 28-35
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/20/the-mayor-of-ar-rutbah/>

Hughes, C. C. (1966). FROM CONTEST TO COUNCIL: SOCIAL CONTROL AMONG THE ST. LAWRENCE ISLAND ESKIMOS'. Political anthropology, pp.255-263.

Rana Khalaf (2014) Beyond Arms and Beards: Local Governance of ISIS in Syria, pp. 57-67 <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/01/07/beyond-arms-and-beards-local-governance->

USAID (2012) Conflict assessment framework 2.0, pp. 15-32. Retrieved From USAID:
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf

US Army TRADOC - My Cousin's Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun "Tribes" in Afghanistan. Read the Mangal-Sabari Conflict section on pages pp. 8-21.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cousinsenemy.pdf>

b. Topics

- Fundamental elements of governance present across different governing entities
- Assessing Governance

c. Study Questions

The previous class focused on forms of governance as seen in both traditional and modern societies. This class looks at different social structures/governing bodies and seeks to identify governance components consistent across the spectrum. Understanding the fundamental components of governance helps to identify and mitigate governance-related vulnerabilities.

Initial Brainstorm - What are some "components of governance" that we expect in the U.S.?

The military frequently relies on a checklist to tell us if something is working or not. With something as complex as governance is this even possible? This class provides a basic familiarization of USAID's Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)

as a technique to identify the potential for conflict. If conflict exists, it is likely that some of the population's grievances are connected to governance issues.

1. Good governance vs. effective governance. Which should we focus on and why?
2. What are the opinions on the current U.S. approach to building governance capacity around the world? What are we doing right and what should we be doing differently.
3. What global competitors are working to build governance capacity? Are they successful? Why is this important?
4. How do we currently assess governance? What other means are available to assess governance?

E. TOPIC #4: CIVIL SOCIETY

a. Readings

Doraiswamy, P.K. "The Role of Civil Society in Good Governance" pp. 1-3.
<http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-openpage/the-role-of-civil-society-in-good-governance/article2276002.ece>

Scholte, J. A. (2002). Civil society and democracy in global governance. *Global Governance*, 8(3), 281-304. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800346>

Soni, J. K. (2006). GLOBALIZATION: BRIDGING DIVIDE BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 279-284. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856214>

b. Topics

- Defining civil society
- Mapping out the intellectual terrain of 'civil society' and exploring a range of conceptual understandings of how it is conceived, researched, and actioned
- Perspectives on the definition, diversity, impacts and legitimacy of civil society
- The World Bank (2010) has adopted the following definition of civil society:

The wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious

or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations.

The World Bank (August, 2010). Defining civil society. Retrieved from: <http://go.worldbank.org/4CE7W046K0>

c. Study Questions

1. How is civil society understood by the different stakeholders and what role does it play in promoting good governance?
2. What are the key challenges and obstacles for civil society in promoting good governance?
3. What strategies are used by the different stakeholders to ensure an active role for civil society in keeping the government accountable, transparent, and responsive to the needs of its population?
4. How does governance get influenced by civil society? What types of coalitions and alliances promote effective interventions on issues of governance?

F. TOPIC #5: ASSESSING AND MEASURING GOVERNANCE

a. Readings

USAID. (2016a). Draft working document: USAID applied political economy analysis (PEA) field guide. Retrieved from USAID: <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/Applied%20PEA%20Field%20Guide%20and%20Framework%20Working%20Document%20041516.pdf>

Agoglia, J., Dziedzic, M., & Sotirin, B. (2010). Measuring progress in conflict environments (MPICE): a metrics framework. Retrieved from USIP: [https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/MPICE_final_complete%20book%20\(2\).pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/MPICE_final_complete%20book%20(2).pdf)

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. (2016c). Unified action handbook series overview. Retrieved from Joint Electronic Library: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc_pam.htm

United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Institute. (2009). Guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press. Retrieved from USIP: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guiding_principles_full.pdf

b. Topics

- Interagency Governance Frameworks Overview
- Group exercise: Divide class up into groups and use the different frameworks to analyze a previous deployment
- By group, discuss pros and cons of each framework

There are many organizations, both interagency and other, that conduct governance in the same regions where Special Operations Forces (SOF) operates. Prior to deployment, it is important to understand what other organizations are operating in the area, and what frameworks they utilize to synchronize efforts. There are also lessons learned from these organizations that can be applied to military missions. In this class, we will do a brief overview of the frameworks that other organizations utilize, analyze their strengths and weaknesses, and then apply them to our past operational experiences to make recommendations on how to optimize SOF efforts.

c. Study Questions

1. Why is it important to understand interagency governance frameworks prior to deployment?
2. What are the strengths and deficiencies for each interagency framework? What would you add or subtract?
3. How can interagency frameworks be applied to SOF governance mission execution?
4. Do the assessment questions presented apply to your operational experience? What would you add or subtract?

G. TOPIC #6: COUNTER-STATE GOVERNANCE

a. Readings

Summer Newton and Robert Leonhard, "Shadow Government" in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. pp. 133-158
<http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/UndergroundsS.pdf>

- Kilcullen, D. (2015). "The Theory of Competitive Control," *Out of the mountains: The coming age of the urban guerrilla*. Oxford University Press. pp. 116-135. Use as case study: Tivoli Gardens and the "Shower Posse," pp. 89-102
- Mampilly, Z. C. (2011). *Rebel rulers: Insurgent governance and civilian life during war*. Cornell University Press. pp. 7-22
- Grynkewich, A. G. (2008). Welfare as warfare: How violent non-state groups use social services to attack the state. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31(4), 350-370.
- Flanigan, S. T., & Abdel-Samad, M. (2009). Hezbollah's Social Jihad: nonprofits as resistance organizations. *Middle East Policy*, 16(2), 122. Use as case study. https://www.academia.edu/3325098/Hezbollahs_Social_Jihad_Nonprofits_as_Resistance_Organizations._Middle_East_Policy_16_2_pp._122-137
- Kurtz, L. (2010). *Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000)*. Nonviolent conflict. Use as case study. <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/otpor-and-the-struggle-for-democracy-in-serbia-1998-2000/>

b. Topics

- Functions, objectives, and distinctive characteristics of counter-state governance
- The theory of competitive control as a theory of governance
- Group exercise: Identify the objectives and functions of governance for a specific counter-state case in assigned readings
- Present findings to the group and compare with other cases
- External support for, or against, counter-state governance

c. Study Questions

1. What are the functions of a shadow government?
2. What are the objectives of shadow government? Can differences in governance objectives be used to categorize counter-state groups?
3. Building legitimacy: what are the dimensions of sovereignty and how are these appropriated or threatened by counter-state groups?
4. What factors help to explain variation among counter-state governance strategies?

5. Is there a difference between counter-state governance and counter-governance (the latter being simply an effort to undermine the incumbent regime)? Is the distinction useful?
6. How can civil society groups actually work against the government? How can counter-state groups leverage civil society to further their objectives?
7. How could the theory of competitive control be understood as a theory of governance? What normative systems of control have you encountered that prevented you from accomplishing your mission in a particular area?

H. TOPIC #7: SHADOW GOVERNANCE

a. Readings

Kinzer, S. (2009). A thousand hills: Rwanda's rebirth and the man who dreamed it. John Wiley & Sons. (Chapters 3,4,11)

Nijssen, S. (2011). The Taliban's shadow government in Afghanistan. Civil-Military Fusion Centre. http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6400~v~The_Taliban_s_Shadow_Government_in_Afghanistan.pdf

Logan, S., & Grayson, G. W. (2015). The executioner's men: Los Zetas, rogue soldiers, criminal entrepreneurs, and the shadow state they created. Transaction Publishers. Ch 4 (pgs 67-81)

b. Topics

- Functions of a Counter-State Governance
 - o Coercive Power →
 - o Conflict Resolution →
 - o Control Resources → Forming Legitimacy
 - o Revenue Generation →
 - o Essential Services →
- In order understand a shadow government's role, we must first attempt to define what a shadow government is (class discussion).

c. Study Questions

1. What functions does a shadow government conduct? How does a shadow government differ or relate to counter-state governance?
2. What is the intent and the difference between counter-state and shadow government?

3. Discussion: Draw a spectrum of intent on the board that ranges from organized crime to overthrow.
4. Analyze each case study that is highlighted in assigned readings section. Attempt to identify elements of counter-state governance and determine the intent of each organization.
5. What counter-state governance actions did each case study exhibit?
6. What was the intent behind each organization? Was it the same throughout the campaign?
7. What elements of these shadow governments are transferable to other regions of the world; What elements are completely unique to the circumstance in each case study?
8. Discuss differences between internally grown and externally supported counter-state organizations.
9. How can an external state actor successfully build and utilize a shadow government to overthrow a state's government? What elements are present in all three cases?

I. TOPIC #8: INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE

a. Readings

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- Kinzer, S. (2009). *A thousand hills: Rwanda's rebirth and the man who dreamed it*. John Wiley & Sons. (Chapters 3,4,11)
- Nijssen, S. (2011). The Taliban's shadow government in Afghanistan. Civil-Military Fusion Centre. http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6400~v~The_Taliban_s_Shadow_Government_in_Afghanistan.pdf

Logan, S., & Grayson, G. W. (2015). *The executioner's men: Los Zetas, rogue soldiers, criminal entrepreneurs, and the shadow state they created*. Transaction Publishers. Ch 4 (pgs 67-81)

b. Topics

- Define international actors (i.e. NGO, sovereign nations, criminal enterprises, all foreign entities, etc.)
- Discuss roles and scope of international actors
- Consider levels of engagement (i.e., persistent vs. episodic)
- Licit vs illicit international actors for governing institution and/or civil society
- Effects of international actors

c. Study Questions

1. What is the spectrum of international actors? Can we create groups or types of international actors?
2. Which international actors are operating in collaboration or competition with a HN's government or civil society? Can NGOs aimed at developing or helping society be a source of destabilization for governments? How and why?
3. How long should "legitimate" international actors (i.e., those invited by the government) engage HNs? How do they know when it is time to go home?

J. TOPIC #9: TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE

a. Readings

Lyons, T. "Transforming the Institutions of War: Postconflict Elections and the Reconstruction of Failed States." in Robert I. Rothberg, ed. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton University Press, 2010. pp. 269-294

Adesina, O. A., Adeyeye, M., "Security in Post-Civil War Democratic Transitions in Africa." In Akanmu G. Adebayo, ed. *Managing Conflicts in Africa's Democratic Transitions*. Lexington Books, 2012. Pp.21-34

DeGrasse, B. C., & Caan, C. (2006). *Transitional Governance: From Bullets to Ballots*. *United States Institute for Peace* (2006). (read 1-20 and skim 21-24)
<https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/06/transitional-governance-bullets-ballots>

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Translation and Consolidation*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Skim Table 4.2. Table 3.1 is just to help understand the categories in Table 4.2

b. Topic:

- Creating sustainable peace after conflict / government collapse
- Balancing the importance of conflict termination and democratization
- Transforming the security sector in post-civil war societies to support and sustain the peace
- The role of international actors in government transitions

c. Study Questions

1. How does the peace agreement after a civil war affect the prospects for a continuing peace?
2. What is more important, war termination or democratization? How does the prioritization of one over the other affect international support?
3. What is the importance of a transitional government, and what aspects of it are critical to ensuring the continuation of peace and stability?
4. How can the instruments of war be demilitarized and turned into instruments of peace?
5. What were the specific security-related problems faced by the new Liberian government after the second civil war, and how applicable are they in a broader context of post-war peace and stability?

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