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THESIS

**SWISS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE
DEFENSE SECTOR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
SWISS SECURITY POLICY**

by

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December 2017

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IMPLICATIONS FOR SWISS SECURITY POLICY**

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ABSTRACT

Swiss governmental communication agencies operate in an environment widely different from other Western democracies. In 2014, contrary to Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport's (DDPS) hopes, the Swiss electorate voted against the procurement of a new fighter jet. In the aftermath of that vote, criticism about DDPS communication emerged. Hence, this thesis asks: How effective are the DDPS and armed forces governmental communication agencies within the realm of domestic politics? This thesis compares the governmental communication practitioners' work in two political campaigns that ended in public votes: in the 2013 vote, DDPS and its communication agencies achieved the desired outcome, but DDPS lost the 2014 public vote. The results of this analysis show that the communication practitioners meticulously planned, and, within their allowed leeway, executed their plans aptly. The idiosyncratic Swiss strategic culture, however, which is shaped by far-reaching public democratic rights and laws that reflect politics' tight grip on the military, significantly limit the communication practitioners' scope of action. With these restrictions, the Swiss, in their preference for democratic legitimacy over administrative efficiency, restrict the government's ability to act. Hence, the Swiss willingly create outcomes that leave them with security gaps.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CHAF	Chief of Armed Forces (head of Armed Forces)
CSS	Center for Security Studies
DDPS	Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport
DETEC	Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications
DHDC-DDPS	Deputy Head of Departmental Communication DDPS
DOD	Department of Defense
EAER	Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research
EMD	Eidgenössisches Militärdepartement (Federal Military Department (former name of DDPS))
ETH	Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zürich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich)
FDF	Federal Department of Finance
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
FDHA	Federal Department of Home Affairs
FDJP	Federal Department of Justice and Police
FoIF	Freedom of Information Act
FTE	Full-time Equivalent
GCSP	Geneva Center for Security Policy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GICHD	Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining
GSoA	Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee (Group for a Switzerland without Armed Forces)
ISN	International Relations and Security Network
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NZZ	Neue Zürcher Zeitung
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PfP	Partnership for Peace

SRG	Schweizer Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft (Swiss broadcasting company)
TF CIS	Task Force of the Conference of Information Services
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII	World War Two

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I. INTRODUCTION

On 18 May 2014, a 53.4 percent majority of the Swiss electorate decided against the acquisition of a new fighter jet, the Swedish-built Gripen.¹ The government had decided to acquire 22 Gripen fighter jets to replace 54 antiquated U.S.-made F-5 Tigers,² scheduled to go out of service by 2016. By November 2018, they should have been partially replaced with the Gripen. The replacement would have cost 3,126 billion Swiss Francs over a span of 11 years, money that would have come from the regular defense budget but that financial planners would have pooled through the creation of a fund.³ Parts of the electorate, however, decided to call a referendum against the funding and, consequently, against the procurement of the jet itself.

Except for this single instance in 2014, since 1989, Swiss citizens in all other eight votes have decided in favor of the further development of the armed forces. The referendum on the Federal Law to Create a Fund for the Procurement of the Gripen Fighter Jet (Gripen fund law)⁴ was a turning point: it marked the first defeat by the public of a vote that concerned the security sector.⁵ This outcome marks the starting point for this thesis and has motivated this study's focus on the civil-military relations of strategic communications in the Swiss defense sector.

The result of the vote is particularly surprising, as, in 2014, the Swiss population's overall approval of the armed forces was significantly higher than in 2013.⁶ Also in 2013,

¹ Federal Chancellery, "Volksabstimmung vom 18.05.2014," (National Vote of 18 May 2014) accessed 2 June 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20140518/>. All information in this thesis that was not published in English is translated by the author.

² Federal Chancellery, "Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates," (National Vote of 18 May 2014: Explanations from the Federal Council) accessed 10 May 2017, <https://www.bk.admin.ch/themen/pore/va/20140518/index.html?lang=de>, 37–39, 42–43.

³ Ibid., 38.

⁴ In German, the title of the referendum was "Bundesgesetz über den Fonds zur Beschaffung des Kampfflugzeugs Gripen (Gripen-Fonds-Gesetz)."

⁵ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, "Armeerelevante Abstimmungen," (Votes Relevant for the Armed Forces) accessed 8 February 2017, <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/de/vbs/zahlen-fakten/abstimmungen.html>.

⁶ Tibor Szvircsev Tresch et al., *Sicherheit 2014* (Security 2014) (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich und Militärakademie an der ETH: Zürich, 2014), 10, 24.

Swiss citizens had voted with a clear 73.2 percent⁷ majority against the initiative For the Abolition of Conscription Service, a result that pleased the defense minister and the armed forces command. In 2014, the year of the Gripen vote, four out of five Swiss citizens judged the armed forces as essential to creating security and stability. Also, the armed forces in 2014 enjoyed support from all political affiliations.⁸ Hence, in 2013, a year with lower overall approval of the armed forces, the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport (DDPS) won a vote, but lost one in year of higher approval.

The contradiction between the lost vote and high levels of support brings up the question: was the vote on the referendum an expression of substantial mistrust of the electorate toward the armed forces or rather a deficit of coherent defense information provided to the electorate? Indeed, a representative post-vote analysis found that six percent of the “No” voters claimed the campaign and insufficient information directly as their reason for their negative vote.⁹ Another 13 percent declared that they were insecure about the chosen jet type and complained about an opaque procurement process, also related to insufficient public information.¹⁰ Given the close outcome of the vote—53.4 percent “No” to 46.4 percent “Yes”¹¹— it seems that a better campaign in favor of the Gripen could have made the difference.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis focuses on the communication department of the DDPS and of the Swiss Armed Forces. The primary research question is: How effective is the governmental communication of the DDPS and the Swiss Armed Forces within the realm of domestic politics?

⁷ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, “Armeerelevante Abstimmungen.”

⁸ Szvircsev Tresch et al., *Sicherheit 2014*, 24.

⁹ Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen, SRF, “Gegen den Gripen, aber für die Armee,” (Against the Gripen But for the Armed Forces) accessed 10 February, 2017, <http://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/gegen-den-gripen-aber-fuer-die-armee>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, “Armeerelevante Abstimmungen.”

To understand the conditions under which the practitioners of strategic communications operate, this author takes a look at secondary questions including the following: How does the Swiss political system influence the communication agencies? Which opportunities and limitations do practitioners confront in theory and practice in the face of changing domestic politics as well as a tumultuous European and world order in the 21st century?

B. IMPORTANCE

Switzerland is home to a specific civil-military tradition of direct participation in national defense. In line with this tradition, Swiss governmental communication agencies, consequently, are limited in their scope. An explanation of such limitation, as well as Switzerland's federal organization, makes the issue of governmental communications in Switzerland especially compelling for a U.S. readership.

European political studies rarely explore the particular civil-military character of Switzerland. The dearth of literature, and English language literature specifically, on the defense security and foreign policy of Switzerland is very noticeable within policy and a global scholarly community devoted to all aspects of European security and defense institutions. Explanations for the shortage of scholarly work on Switzerland range from Switzerland being too small to matter to Switzerland being too specific in its institutions to provide broad lessons. Still others discount Switzerland as the focus of such study for reasons of cause and effect.¹² By cause and effect, Clive Church means that, as there are only a few prior studies on the issue available, there is little encouragement for scholars to start new research. Additionally, while there is broad scholarly agreement on the political importance of strategic communications, there is a lack of research in the Swiss context.¹³ Existing studies concentrate on the communicational aspects of governmental

¹² Clive H. Church, *The Politics and Government of Switzerland* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1–3. While using other words, other authors claim similar findings. Ulrich Klöti et al., *Handbook of Swiss Politics*, 2nd ed. (Zürich: NZZ Publishing, 2004), 117; Gregory A. Fossedal, *Direct Democracy in Switzerland* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), x–7; Hugh Robert Wilson, *Switzerland: Neutrality as a Foreign Policy* (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, 1974), 14.

¹³ Sybille Hardmeier, “Public Relations der Öffentlichen Hand in der Schweiz,” (Governmental Agencies’ Public Relations in Switzerland) *Politische Kommunikation in der Schweiz*, 2005, 91–92.

strategic communications, mostly because political science researchers, who could have added a broadened analysis, have not shown any interest to do research so far.¹⁴ Also, Swiss researchers, to gain visibility in their field, rather concentrate on theoretical than practical studies, for which the field of interested readers is considerably smaller.¹⁵ This thesis is therefore targeted primarily at an English-language readership.

Also, in a time when communication channels have widened, and the public can largely choose which communication products it consumes, an academic examination of how, when, and why public communication leads to political action is of scholarly interest.¹⁶ Relating to Swiss security policy, however, English language literature rarely focuses on how the voters make decisions and even less on how the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies strive to influence the electorate's decision making.¹⁷ Moreover, Swiss governmental communication agencies in the security sector do not assess their effectiveness through written reports. This thesis aims to fill this gap.

¹⁴ Hardmeier, "Public Relations der Öffentlichen Hand in der Schweiz," 92–93; Spiro Kiouisis and Jesper Strömbäck, "The Strategic Context of Political Communication," in *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication*, eds. Derina Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfass (New York: Routledge, 2015), 383.

¹⁵ Fritz Sager, "Geschichte, Struktur und Inhalte der Politikwissenschaftlichen Verwaltungswissenschaft in der Schweiz," (History, Structure, and Contents of the Political Analysis of Public Administration in Switzerland) *Austrian Journal of Political Science*, no. 4 (2014): 389.

¹⁶ Günter Bentele and Howard Nothhaft, "The Public Sphere from a European Perspective," in *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication*, ed. Derina Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfass (New York: Routledge, 2015), 71; Jürgen Habermas, "Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research," *Communication Theory* 16, no. 4 (2006): 415–20, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2006.00280.x; Alex Fischer, "Lobbying: Strukturen. Akteure. Strategien; Politikberatung und Lobbying in Brüssel," (Lobbying: Structures. Actors. Strategies; Political Consultation and Lobbying in Brussels) *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 1 (2011): 94–95, doi:10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02006.x; *Direkte Demokratie in der Informationsgesellschaft: Herausforderungen für den Kanton Aargau* (Direct Democracy in the Age of Information: Challenges for the Canton of Aargau) prepared by Zentrum für Demokratie Aarau, eds. Glaser Andreas, Daniel Kübler and Béatrice Ziegler (Aarau, Switzerland, 2011), 11–17; Sybille Hardmeier, "Public Relations Der Öffentlichen Hand - Eine Replik Auf Den Propaganda- Vorwurf," (Public Relations of the Administration - A Reply to the Propaganda Reproach) In *Politik Im Fokus: Festschrift Für Ulrich Klöti* (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2003), 92–93; Edwin Czerwick, "Verwaltungskommunikation," (Communication of Administrations) in *Politische Kommunikation in der Demokratischen Gesellschaft: Ein Handbuch mit Lexikonteil*, ed. by Ottfried Jarren (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002), 489; Hardmeier, "Public Relations der Öffentlichen Hand in der Schweiz," 93.

¹⁷ Based on research of the literature and on feedback of a practitioner. Walter Frik, deputy chief of information Swiss Armed Forces, email message to author, 22 February 2017.

C. HYPOTHESES

The central hypothesis of this work is that the DDPS and the armed forces strategic communication practitioners do not employ their means as efficiently as possible. To test the main hypothesis, the author brings up a secondary hypothesis: The DDPS and/or Swiss Armed Forces communication agencies contributed to the defeat in the 2014 referendum on the topic of the Gripen fund law. As this defeat was the only lost vote in military matters since the end of the Cold War, it makes the most robust case for the author to assess the communication agencies' effectiveness.

There is ample evidence to believe that deficient communication on the part of DDPS and the armed forces led to a negative impact during the campaign, eventually leading to the “No”-vote on the referendum on the Gripen fund law.¹⁸ Pointedly, during the campaign, a critical air force evaluation report was leaked to the press.¹⁹ The report was based on an earlier model of the fighter jet and not the one that the armed forces intended to procure. As a consequence, parts of the media assumed that the air force was dissatisfied with the performance of the new fighter jet. The impression of disagreement among and within security pundits and military experts led to widespread discussions among the electorate about whether the “IKEA fighter jet” should be acquired.²⁰ Throughout the campaign, DDPS and armed forces communication agencies were unable to redirect the discussions from bickering about the best type of fighter jet to the actual issue: approving the funds to eventually buy the jet that air force specialists and their civilian counterparts had chosen. Whether the communication practitioners' hesitant efforts were the result of self-restriction or based on laws and rules will have to be answered in this thesis.

¹⁸ Lorenz Amiet, “Nach dem Gripen-Nein: Versuch eines Debriefings,” (After the No-Vote to Gripen: The Attempt of a Debriefing) *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift* 7 (2014): 8–9.

¹⁹ To the author's knowledge, Swiss authorities have not revealed who leaked the report.

²⁰ Due to the jet's perceived performance shortcomings, critical journalists had started to use the term throughout the campaign. See Renat Künzi, “Der Gripen fliegt erst in den Köpfen,” (For now, Gripen Flies in People's Heads Only) Swissinfo, last modified 1 December 2011, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/der-gripen-fliegt-erst-in-den-koepfen/31675822>; Gareth Jennings, “Gripen E Not Reliant on Swiss Referendum,” *Jane's Defence Weekly* 51 (2014), ProQuest 1507956163.

A related explanation for the defeat of the Gripen at the ballot box lies in the cautious political mobilization of the professional armed forces personnel at the workplace. In general, 15.5 percent of average Swiss voters claim to get their information at the workplace,²¹ generally because their employer has a specific interest in the case that the vote is about. From the author's personal impression, in the case of the Gripen vote, the DDPS and armed forces did not mobilize the Swiss career officers and non-commissioned ranks to such an extent. Instead, the armed forces command seems to leave political decision making strictly to the personal sphere. In addition to career personnel, active service members—around 137,000 conscript soldiers—usually fulfill their yearly service. If they were not well informed on the topic of the vote during their service period, their political mobilization was likely an unused or under-used potential.²²

Another possible explanation for the loss of the 2014 referendum lies in the structure of choice. As Elisabeth R. Gerber argues, “Campaign hurdles are lower for direct preserving than for direct modifying campaigns.”²³ The government's proposal, however, meant a change of existing law and would, therefore, face higher hurdles. As a result of the average citizen's risk aversion, campaigners who intensely mobilize against a decision submitted to a referendum have a good chance to prove successful.²⁴ The electorate felt insecure as to whether the air force had chosen the best possible jet and had reason to believe that there were high ranking officers that shared this insecurity. Therefore, some voters may have chosen to maintain the status quo.

²¹ Hanspeter Kriesi, *Direct Democratic Choice: The Swiss Experience* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2005), 40.

²² Whereas the current number of active service members as of 2014 was 137,710, the author does not know how many actually served in 2014 (meaning that did not postpone their service to the next year). Numbers retrieved from DDPS, “Die Armee in Zahlen,” (The Armed Forces in Numbers) Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, accessed 13 February 2017, <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/de/vbs/zahlen-fakten/armee.html>.

²³ Gerber is cited in Kriesi, *Direct Democratic Choice: The Swiss Experience*, 25.

²⁴ Kriesi, *Direct Democratic Choice: The Swiss Experience*, 25.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this literature review is to outline scholarship on the influence of direct democracy on Swiss political processes, and to analyze the existing schools of thought within the area of governmental communications.

1. Direct Democracy

As the ultimate goal of the thesis is to analyze the effectiveness of strategic communications of the DDPS and the Swiss Armed Forces, the reader needs to understand the political and institutional environment that practitioners face in Swiss democracy. As practitioners of strategic communication have communicated to this author,²⁵ the effects of direct democracy are among the main influencing factors in their daily work.

Scholars widely agree that the Swiss version of direct democracy differs from other Western democracies, which are more hierarchically structured and which modulate the voice of the voter through government institutions in the legislative and the executive branches.²⁶ It is characteristic for all democracies both past and present to possess institutional mechanisms for the people's control of elites. However, while in most Western democracies citizens elect representatives and hire experts to decide on policy and the use of power—methods that Switzerland also uses—Switzerland puts more faith directly in the people.²⁷ Voters, through the system of initiatives and referenda, make many particular decisions directly, including those about security policy and the armed forces.²⁸ The electorate constantly has the potential to directly contribute to the political process.²⁹ When the electorate has the final say on governmental decisions, government

²⁵ Walter Frik, deputy chief of information Swiss Armed Forces, email message to author, 22 February 2017.

²⁶ Ulrich Klöti et al., *Handbook of Swiss Politics*, 2nd ed. (Zürich: NZZ Publishing, 2004), 117; Gregory A. Fossedal, *Direct Democracy in Switzerland* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), x–7; Hugh Robert Wilson, *Switzerland: Neutrality as a Foreign Policy* (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, 1974), 14.

²⁷ Fossedal, *Direct Democracy in Switzerland*, x–7; Wilson, *Switzerland: Neutrality as a Foreign Policy*, 14.

²⁸ Fossedal, *Direct Democracy in Switzerland*, x–7.

²⁹ Klöti et al., *Handbook of Swiss Politics*, 108–109.

officials could have interest in manipulating such decisions. To counter such fear, practitioners of governmental strategic communications are expected to do their jobs with restraint to avoid accusations of employing government propaganda.

a. *History of Direct Democracy*

The concept of popular rights is well established in Switzerland. The cantons of Berne, Lucerne, Schaffhausen, Aargau, St. Gallen, Vaud, and Basel District established their citizens' popular rights even before the modern Swiss republic was founded in 1848.³⁰ The 1830 constitutions of these cantons all granted the citizens of their respective territories the right to vote on their constitution and any future changes. As early as 1831, the canton of St. Gallen established a veto right for its citizens, a precursor to the current referendum right. The 1848 Federal Constitution allowed for obligatory referenda and an initiative to demand a full revision of the Federal Constitution. With the democratic movement of the 1860s, the initiative and referendum, as they are known today, become apparent on both the cantonal and the federal level.

b. *Effects of Direct Democracy*

Direct democracy shapes the Swiss political processes: the popular rights constrain the executive and legislative branches in their decision making, limiting the government in its room for maneuver. The media and the political parties each play their roles in the people's decision-making process and contribute to an informed populace. Finally, the factors of direct democracy frame the armed forces' contributions to the process of security planning.

(1) Effects of Popular Rights on Political Processes

The rights of the people to call for a referendum and to launch a popular initiative affect the Swiss political system directly. The Swiss constitution defines the processes for both, referenda and initiatives in detail.

³⁰ Wolf Linder, "Direkte Demokratie," (Direct Democracy) in *Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, Manuel de la Politique Suisse*. 5th ed., eds. Peter Knoepfel et al. (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2014), 145–46.

Obligatory referenda, which require double majorities at the popular as well as the cantons levels, are held when the Swiss constitution is about to be amended, when urgent federal laws that are not based on the constitution are implemented for more than a year, or when Switzerland seeks to join supranational organizations or organizations that aim to produce collective security.³¹ Optional referenda, which only need a popular majority, can be brought to vote if 50,000 people who are entitled to vote, or eight cantons, demand it.³² Optional referenda can be held for a wide range of federal decisions such as federal laws, urgent federal laws if they are meant to endure for more than one year, federal resolutions (if the constitution or law allows it), and contracts under international law (if they are lasting for an indefinite period and not subject to termination, foresee the accession to an international organization, comprehend essential constitutive directions, or if their implementation needs new federal laws).³³

Whereas the optional referenda are a way for the citizens to express disapproval with the political elite's policy choices and thus a means of control, the initiative is a means to be proactive. Specifically, 100,000 citizens who are entitled to vote can demand a full or partial amendment of the constitution.³⁴ As Article 138 of the constitution demands, these initiatives have to be brought to a public vote, a requirement that creates institutional constraint as it forces political authorities and voters to discuss particular issues. Thus, initiatives allow promoters to bring new options to the political scene that would otherwise be neglected or ignored.³⁵

Initiatives and voluntary referenda are expressions of differences between the political elites' and the citizens' policy preferences. Consequently, the existence and practice of popular rights have had limiting effects on the elites' power.³⁶ Additionally,

³¹ Swiss Confederation, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (Bern: 1999): Article 140.

³² Ibid., Article 141.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., Article 138–139.

³⁵ Yannis Papadopoulos, "How Does Direct Democracy Matter? The Impact of Referendum Votes on Politics and Policy Making," *West European Politics* 24 (2001): 44.

³⁶ Pascal Sciarini and Alexandre H. Trechsel, "Démocratie Directe en Suisse: L'Élite Politique Victime des Droits Populaires," (Direct Democracy in Switzerland: The Elites as Victims of Popular Rights) *Swiss Political Science Review* 2 (June 1996): 4.

new actors are granted easy access to the political system.³⁷ Therefore, public rights shape the process of elites' decision making as they encourage the elites to make popular choices to avoid referenda and seeing their proposals rejected.³⁸

For the citizens to launch an optional referendum or an initiative, though, they must be mobilized.³⁹ Citizens have to realize that their interests match with the interests of other voters. When they achieve such collective awareness, some new identity arises from it that then needs resources to manifest in collective action. Because of these possibilities for collective action and direct political contributions, the Swiss citizen is often the focus of political action.⁴⁰ The elites realize that they need to build majority support before taking political action. Consequently, Swiss policies can be expected to have support from the majority of the citizens.

The negative side, as some scholars claim, is that the citizens' veto rights make the Swiss political system slow and resistant to adaptation, sometimes even stopping projects before they start.⁴¹ In some cases, the veto role of the optional referendum is postulated to create a pro-status-quo bias,⁴² an argument that could explain the outcome of the vote on the 2014 referendum on the Gripen fund law. In addition to the direct effects of popular rights, the referendum also exerts indirect effects. The electorate has the consistent potential to contribute to the political process directly. These potential exertions of influence are, therefore, a constant threat to government decisions and actions.⁴³ Also, as Thomas Christin, Simon Hug, and Pascal Sciarini write: "The literature suggests that poorly informed voters might reject innovations since existing

³⁷ Fossedal, *Direct Democracy in Switzerland*, xi.

³⁸ Theory based on Leonard Neidhart in Sciarini and Trechsel, "Démocratie Directe en Suisse," 6–7.

³⁹ Hanspeter Kriesi, "Politische Potentiale und Ihre Mobilisierung," (Political Potentials and Their Mobilization) in *Bewegung in der Schweizer Politik: Fallstudien zu Politischen Mobilisierungsprozessen in der Schweiz*, ed. Hanspeter Kriesi (Frankfurt: Campus, 1985), 29.

⁴⁰ Fossedal, *Direct Democracy in Switzerland*, xi.

⁴¹ Papadopoulos, "How Does Direct Democracy Matter?," 38–39; Church, *The Politics and Government of Switzerland*, 152–53.

⁴² Papadopoulos, "How Does Direct Democracy Matter?," 43.

⁴³ Klöti et al., *Handbook of Swiss Politics*, 108–9. Also Wolf Linder, "Direkte Demokratie," 156–57.

policies are better known.”⁴⁴ As a result, the government favors cautious action, and the voters are cautious because they lack information or even only feel poorly informed. This combination then results in a preference for preserving the status quo.

Some scholars point out another potential weakness of the Swiss system: they expect the general public to be unable to make competent decisions. John Stuart Mill, for example, proposes an “elitist alternative to universal democratic suffrage.”⁴⁵ By granting the right to vote only to those who prove capable, these representatives are expected to make better decisions than the whole citizenry. While this argument is not negligible, scholars regularly advocate that the Swiss often take responsible decisions.⁴⁶

(2) The Limited Role of the Government

Direct democracy also influences the government’s role: direct democracy constrains the government’s room for maneuver. The Swiss electorate expects the members of parliament to try to influence the citizens’ decision making through public speeches and political marketing, but people expect members of the government, including the minister of defense, to act with much more restraint during a campaign. The electorate wants to make its decision independently and remain undisturbed from governmental influence. Communications by members of the administration ahead of national votes are, therefore, subject to conflict between the duty to inform the public and the fear of propagandistic influence.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Thomas Christin, Simon Hug, and Pascal Sciarini, “Interests and Information in Referendum Voting: An Analysis of Swiss Voters,” *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 41 (2002): 760.

⁴⁵ Richard Arneson, “Democratic Rights at the National Level,” in *Philosophy and Democracy: An Anthology*, ed. Thomas Christiano (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 107–110; David Held, *Models of Democracy* (New York: Cambridge Polity Press, 1987), 94.

⁴⁶ See for example Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgässner, “Direct Democracy, Political Culture, and the Outcome of Economic Policy: A Report on the Swiss Experience,” *European Journal of Political Economy* 16 (2000): 295, 297; Feld and Kirchgässner, Feld and Matsusaka, Feld and Savioz, Kirchgässner et al., Freitag and Vatter, Pommerehne, Vatter, Vatter and Rüefli, and Wagschal as quoted in Linda Maduz, “Direct Democracy,” *Living Reviews in Democracy, E-Journal* 2 (2010), accessed 8 October 2017, <https://www.lrd.ethz.ch/index.php/lrd>.

⁴⁷ *Direkte Demokratie in der Informationsgesellschaft: Herausforderungen für den Kanton Aargau*, 10.

In 2008, the fear of government propaganda seemed to be acute: a committee accused the Federal Council of illegitimately influencing the national votes. Hence, this committee started and successfully brought to vote the initiative on *Volkssouveränität statt Behördenpropaganda* (Sovereignty of the People instead of Propaganda by the Administration).⁴⁸ The committee's goal was to forbid members of the Federal Council and all higher officials from campaigning—with the sole exception of a short information statement by the head of the respective department at the beginning of a campaign period.⁴⁹ The electorate rejected the initiative at the ballot box with a clear 75.2 percent.⁵⁰ Still, those 24.8 percent of yes-voters remain a significant part of the electorate who wanted to exclude officials from all campaigning activity and proves that parts of the public are sensitive to the issue of governmental communication practice.

By rejecting the initiative, the voters changed the subsequent policy of the Federal Court in 2008. Until 2008, the administration was only allowed to take part during the campaign period for “valid reasons,”⁵¹ such as, for example, to counter wrong information spread by the opposing committee. When the Swiss voters decided against the initiative, they gave the sign to the Federal Court that they would allow further campaign activities by the administration. Since then, the Federal Court focuses less on administrative interventions and primarily oversees the modalities of political communication. Since the government takes a far-reaching advisory role in promoting or defending a ruling or in opposing a citizens' proposal, the government and the

⁴⁸ Federal Chancellery, “Volkssouveränität statt Behördenpropaganda,” (Sovereignty of the People instead of Propaganda by the Administration) accessed 2 June 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis313.html>.

⁴⁹ Federal Chancellery, “Eidgenössische Volksinitiative ‘Volkssouveränität statt Behördenpropaganda:’ Änderung Verfassungstext,” (Federal Initiative ‘Sovereignty of the People instead of Propaganda by the Administration:’ Amendment of Constitution) accessed 31 May 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis313t.html>.

⁵⁰ Federal Chancellery, “Vorlage Nr. 533: Übersicht,” (Bill No. 533: Overview) accessed 31 May 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20080601/det533.html>.

⁵¹ Ruling of the Federal Court as cited in *Direkte Demokratie in der Informationsgesellschaft: Herausforderungen für den Kanton Aargau*, 10.

administration need to act with political restraint in their campaign activities.⁵² Such restraint holds as a rule that administrative communications have to be objective, transparent, and appropriate.⁵³ Appropriate here means that governmental information must allow for the voter to make an informed decision; consequently, governmental information must contain arguments of both campaigning camps. Although the government's communications have to be objective, that does not mean the government cannot inform on its viewpoint. As is often the case, the vote concerns a government decision, about which the government necessarily has an opinion.

In addition to the voters who demand independence, also the parliament needs the government to act with restraint. In many ways, parliamentarians depend on the administration. Since the Swiss Parliament is not a professional parliament but instead one of militia politicians, many politicians struggle with the flood of information. Hence, the federal administration has taken over a large part of the task of preparing information for the politicians as well as the legal bases. The federal documentation service facilitates the information collecting of politicians through dossiers. All collected information is open source.⁵⁴ Such an approach, of course, contains risks of manipulation. Hence, the parliament relies on the government's self-constraint and willingness not to tilt all discussion in its favor. To assure its independent decision making, and to uphold the separation of powers, the Federal Assembly operates its parliamentary services, an information gathering office directly subordinated to the Federal Assembly.⁵⁵ Hence, in addition to the government's constraint, there are checks and balances in place to ensure the government's limited role.

⁵² Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Role of the Federal Government in Direct Democratic Campaigns," in *Rediscovering Public Law and Public Administration in Comparative Policy Analysis: A Tribute to Peter Knoepfel*, eds. Peter Knoepfel et al. (Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes, 2009), 83.

⁵³ *Direkte Demokratie in der Informationsgesellschaft*, 10–11.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Federal Assembly, "Die Parlamentsdienste," (Parliamentary Services) accessed 15 October 2017, <https://www.parlament.ch/de/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/parlamentsdienste>.

(3) The Importance of the Media

In a system of direct democracy, the media play the important role of providing the voters with well-balanced information. Over the last 30 years, the media has become increasingly dependent on the free market for their success, rather than on the political parties.⁵⁶ Consequently, their role as a mediator between the public and the politicians has changed; political actors have had to adapt to the rules of communication imposed by the mass media with regard to topics, timing, and public appearances when these actors wished to be covered. Some scholars claim that such new communication channels as the Internet, the Sunday press, and free daily tabloids have provided new communications opportunities for political actors to exploit.⁵⁷ They deduced that, over time, political actors have become less dependent on the traditional mass media.⁵⁸ While this may well be the case, the traditional media remain a significant source of information for Swiss citizens.

Ahead of national votes, coalitions compete for the citizens' support and seek citizen mobilization in the public sphere. Within this sphere, various venues exist to inform the voters: "the press ..., television, radio, billboards on the street, printed materials distributed to ... households, direct mailings, information stands ..., (and) the workplace."⁵⁹ The Swiss press is, in general, considered to be a free press.⁶⁰ Officials can thus not engage Swiss media outlets for the spread of propaganda,⁶¹ but the elites, as they seek to win the vote, must engage in persuasion. Members of the parliament are expected

⁵⁶ *Direkte Demokratie in der Informationsgesellschaft: Herausforderungen für den Kanton Aargau*, 57.

⁵⁷ Patrick Rademacher as cited in *Direkte Demokratie in der Informationsgesellschaft: Herausforderungen für den Kanton Aargau*, 57.

⁵⁸ *Direkte Demokratie in der Informationsgesellschaft: Herausforderungen für den Kanton Aargau*, 57.

⁵⁹ Kriesi, *Direct Democratic Choice: the Swiss Experience*, 38.

⁶⁰ Wilson, *Switzerland: Neutrality as a Foreign Policy*, 22; To maintain and further their journalistic freedom, Swiss journalists have agreed on a self-regulation code. Schweizer Presserat, "The Declaration of the Duties and Rights of a Journalist," accessed 27 May 2017, http://www.presserat.ch/Documents/Declaration_2008.pdf.

⁶¹ Wilson, *Switzerland: Neutrality as a Foreign Policy*, 22. The author of this thesis decidedly does not want to imply that the Swiss government might have an interest in using propaganda.

to influence the citizens' decision making through public speeches and political marketing.⁶²

The elites are not only dependent on the media to spread their viewpoints, but the media also shape the elite's decision making. As the elites play their role as influencers, their channels for information gathering gain importance. Studies in Switzerland have shown that members of the executive and legislative branches concerned with security policy most often consult traditional media. Newspapers are their favorite source of information, followed by products of national TV and radio.⁶³ Products of interest groups, such as political parties, specialized journals, policy briefs, or academic reports are consulted on a far less frequent basis. Surprisingly, the new media, such as newsletters, blogs, Twitter, or social media are hardly ever considered.⁶⁴ Also, most security politicians rely on information that they receive passively, rather than searching for it.⁶⁵ One has, therefore, to expect the traditional media to play a significant role in the process leading to the outcome of a direct democratic vote.

(4) The Role of the Political Parties

Switzerland's democracy is not party-based. Swiss political parties have only limited influence on state and society.⁶⁶ Party institutions in Switzerland are only partially professional; they have limited financial resources and weak institutions on the federal level; and finally, they display only low internal homogeneity.⁶⁷ Notably, their

⁶² Sciarini and Trechsel, "Démocratie Directe En Suisse," 5.

⁶³ Jonas Hagmann and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, "Der Staat Weiss es am Besten? Die Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik Als Verwaltungszentriertes Politikfeld," (The State Knows Best? Swiss Security Policy as a Field of Politics Centered on the Administration) *Zeitschrift Für Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik* 6 (April 2013): 208–11.

⁶⁴ Ibid., The Security Study 2017, published on 26 May 2017, confirms this finding in the year 2017. Tibor Szvircsev Tresch and Andreas Wenger, *Sicherheit 2017: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung Im Trend*. (Security 2017: Trends in Decision-making on Foreign, Security, and Defense Policies) (Zürich: Center for Security Studies, 2017), 91–108.

⁶⁵ Hagmann and Szvircsev Tresch, "Der Staat Weiss es am Besten?" 208–11.

⁶⁶ Andreas Ladner, "Politische Parteien," (Political Parties) in *Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, Manuel de la Politique Suisse*, eds. Knoepfel et al., 361–63; Hardmeier, "Public Relations der Öffentlichen Hand in der Schweiz," 97.

⁶⁷ Ladner, "Politische Parteien," 361.

limited influence is reflected in the partisan press, which gave way to independent media outlets starting in the 1960s. Until 1999, in fact, the federal Constitution did not even mention political parties. In the process of political decision making, the parties face intense competition from interest groups,⁶⁸ who strive to shape policies to their liking.

Switzerland's social and cultural heterogeneity present political parties with integrational challenges.⁶⁹ The country is characterized by four national languages; two major religions; due to its geography, significant differences between densely and sparsely populated areas; and, accordingly, largely differing economic structures. Such breadth and width makes it challenging for any national party to find common grounds. In addition to the integrational challenge, the country's small population size limits the potential to recruit new political elites while, at the same time, promoting the militia system. Hence, for most politicians, political work is their hobby and not their way of earning a living. Also, federalism leaves its mark on the Swiss political system: Cantonal parties enjoy considerable autonomy and impose substantial coordination efforts on the federal party. While unc customary, cantonal parties can recommend voting differently from the federal party.⁷⁰ The political parties lack direct influence on the political process because of all these previously described reasons.

In recent years, however, parties often used the potent popular rights as a means to exert influence.⁷¹ Also, one should keep in mind that citizens often follow party-heuristics when they vote. This finding suggests that, given the complexity of some topics that are brought to vote, voters choose a shortcut to come to an opinion and have the tendency to vote how their party, or the party they most relate to, suggests.⁷² This should increase the parties' importance. However, Hanspeter Kriesi and his colleagues in their broad study on three national votes found evidence for both, cases in which the voters

⁶⁸ Ladner, "Politische Parteien," 361.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 362–63.

⁷¹ Ibid., 363.

⁷² *Direkte Demokratie in der Informationsgesellschaft: Herausforderungen für den Kanton Aargau*, 36.

followed party heuristics and cases in which voters followed their issue preferences.⁷³ Hence, Kriesi et al.'s findings back this author's claim that the parties' influence is limited. Also, the overall trust in political parties among citizens is low, and since the 1990s, the number of citizens who do not relate to a specific party has grown steadily.⁷⁴ The role of political parties is, thus, at the national level, severely confined.

(5) Contributions of the Armed Forces

The armed forces' leeway to influence a vote is especially limited. During a political campaign, the members of the parliament enjoy liberty in their efforts to influence the citizens' decision making through public speeches and political marketing; the members of the government and administrative bodies, such as the armed forces, on the other hand, do not have this leeway. With obeisance to the ideal of the citizen in uniform,⁷⁵ the Swiss Armed Forces have maintained the personal freedom of expression for its soldiers even during such periods of stress as WWII, seeing the soldiers above all as "free Swiss citizens."⁷⁶ Soldiers and the press at the time used a "sort of voluntary censorship of written opinion."⁷⁷ This self-censorship of members of the armed forces has mostly endured over time.

Official regulations issued by the Federal Council for service members with respect for the citizen in uniform remain vague on the competing interests of freedom of speech and an apolitical armed forces. Article 25, paragraph 3, which describes the duties of commanders, demands commanders to assure their subordinates of comprehensive

⁷³ Hanspeter Kriesi, *Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns: Enlightening or Manipulating?* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 235.

⁷⁴ Ladner, "Politische Parteien," 378.

⁷⁵ This ideal can be said to be a Swiss product of early modern history. The Swiss gained their military strength in the early 16th century from the participation of each individual in the political life. As Delbrück states, "the defiant self-confidence that animated every single soldier gave the irresistible force to the undertakings of the Confederation." Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 82–83.

⁷⁶ Still, among soldiers and within the press, the war years led to the voluntary restriction of freedom of public expression to act in the best interest of the nation. Wilson, *Switzerland: Neutrality as a Foreign Policy*, 22.

⁷⁷ Wilson, *Switzerland: Neutrality as a Foreign Policy*, 22–23.

information in general, but also regarding questions of security policies and defense.⁷⁸ Also, every service member retains the right to use his or her constitutional and lawful rights during military service. Article 93 includes the right to freedom of speech.⁷⁹ Article 96, however, limits these rights: members of the armed forces are not allowed to organize or take part in political meetings or demonstrations or to engage in propaganda while in uniform.⁸⁰ Thus, despite the uncontested need for civil-military cooperation in the development of security policy, which relies on political contribution, the political engagement of members of the armed forces is limited.⁸¹

The Swiss soldiers—conscripts and members of the professional force⁸²—as citizens in uniform are at any point of a campaign conflicted between their role as a part of a governmental body and their rights as private citizens. While the regulations of service explicitly forbid political influencing during military service, an active servicemember's private actions—off duty—are not restricted.⁸³ Career officers and career non-commissioned officers are not restricted in their political rights but have to announce their political engagements.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the duties of federal employees, thus also career officers and career non-commissioned officers, explicitly do not rule out to speak out critically about departmental plans.⁸⁵ When the career personnel kept quiet, it did so because of its choice.

⁷⁸ Federal Council, *Dienstreglement*, (Regulations for Service Members) (Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 1995), Article 25.

⁷⁹ Ibid., Article 93.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Article 96.

⁸¹ During times of conscript duty service, the Swiss Armed Forces personnel are only allowed to take off their uniforms during off-duty-weekends. Consequently, all political activities are limited to the weekend. Laurent F. Carell, et al., “Demokratische und Zivile Kontrolle von Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräften,” (Democratic and Civilian Control of Security Policy and Armed Forces) *Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung* 41 (1997): 29–31.

⁸² They are also called career personnel.

⁸³ The same regulations apply for conscripted and professional (career) members of the armed forces.

⁸⁴ Article 91 of the *Bundespersonalverordnung*. The same article limits any engagement that is in potential conflict with the employee's main occupation. Federal Council, “*Bundespersonalverordnung*,” (Executive Order on Employees of the Confederacy) accessed 20 September 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20011178/index.html>.

⁸⁵ Chapter 5, Duties, of the *Bundespersonalverordnung*. Federal Council, “*Bundespersonalverordnung*.”

During a campaign, the political side requires a strict mandate of non-interference from the military, and the military tends to respect this policy.⁸⁶ Many career military personnel show largely apolitical behavior. For the members of the professional staff, as opposed to the conscript personnel, the unwritten rules indeed are understood more sharply. They are expected to give up some of their personal rights as citizens to fulfill their role as officials.⁸⁷ From the author's knowledge and personal experience, these rules make part of the values of the professional corps and are transmitted in this way only. It is thus hard to define, *who* expects this behavior. All of the following, therefore, could be the source of the demand to give up personal rights: the armed forces as an institution, the senior leadership, fellow career personnel, or even the public. Whoever made the demand, it had the effect that military authorities act with even more restraint than other governmental bodies. Hence, one can observe a majority of career personnel to acquiesce to the political body strictly.⁸⁸

Whereas Swiss officers throughout history often have fought in heated internal debates, at least until recently, they have demonstrated unity in public as soon as a political issue might emerge that required the corporate identity of the armed forces in Swiss society.⁸⁹ Showing this behavior, they followed an unwritten rule. In contrast, the increasingly open discussions and discord during the Gripen campaign in 2014 marked a turning point in the professional corps. In combination with a cautious bureaucracy

⁸⁶ Dieter Baumann, "Berufsethik in Anderen Streitkräften am Beispiel der Schweizer Armee," (Work Ethics in Other Armed Forces on the Example of the Swiss Armed Forces) in *Handbuch Militärische Berufsethik*, ed. Thomas Bohrmann (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2014), 365–66.

⁸⁷ For example, Major General Paul Zollinger, Deputy Chief of Staff for Professional Military Personnel in 1997, stated loyalty as one of his expectations for his personnel. In this sense, one can see why it would be inopportune for military personnel to publicly argue against the political decisions in military matters. Paul Zollinger, "Das Anforderungsprofil Für Den Berufsoffizier Der Schweizer Armee," (Job Specifications for Career Officers of the Swiss Armed Forces) *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift* (1997), doi:10.5169/seals-64658, 5.

⁸⁸ As, for example, three-star general Baumgartner, the commander of the Swiss ground forces, claimed in a recent interview: "In the end, this is a political question, which is why I will abstain from further comment." Marc Tribelhorn and Heidi Gmür, "Interview mit Korpskommandant Baumgartner: Bei den Maturanden haben wir eine hohe Ausfallquote," (Interview with Three-star General Baumgartner: We Have High Loss Rates among Future University Students) *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, accessed 22 February 2017, www.nzz.ch/schweiz/schweizer-armee-militaerdienst-ueberfordert-viele-ld.146992.

⁸⁹ Markus Häfliger and Ruedi Lüthi, "Was ist los mit der Schweizer Armee?" (What Is Going on with the Swiss Armed Forces?) *Tagesanzeiger*, 23 May 2016, <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/pWas-ist-los-mit-der-Schweizer-Armeep/story/27361952>.

(DDPS and defense office) that is limited in resources, such elite disaccord may lead to unwanted outcomes of votes.

2. Strategic Communications

Not only the environment in which communication practitioners operate will influence whether their work can be seen as efficient, but also what one expects from such work. Therefore, it is crucial to achieve an agreement on a definition of strategic communication itself before trying to answer any question about the effectiveness of governmental communication.

a. The Understanding of “Strategic”

In a military environment, strategy refers to the higher aspects of war and conflict. In the U.S. context, military strategy is defined as “the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.”⁹⁰ Accordingly, most articles written in the U.S. environment of the Department of Defense (DOD) refer to the Joint Publication 1–02 DOD definition: “[Strategic communications are] focused ... government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”⁹¹ Thus, the focus lies on achieving goals. In a Clausewitzian sense, “The original means of strategy is victory—that is, tactical success.”⁹² Carl von Clausewitz was among the first to identify “‘the capture of public opinion’ as one of three general principles of strategy.”⁹³ It is safe to assume that every

⁹⁰ Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” U.S. Army War College, accessed 1 March 2017, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy/13lykke.pdf>.

⁹¹ Christopher Paul, *Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 18–19.

⁹² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 143.

⁹³ Howard Nothhaft and Hagen Schölzel, “(Re-) Reading Clausewitz: The Strategy Discourse and Its Implications for Strategic Communication,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication*, eds. Derina Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfass (New York: Routledge, 2015), 19.

organization, the Swiss Armed Forces included, strives to achieve its goals and thus applies strategy to achieve those goals.

As pertains to the demands of this subject in a continental European aspect, the German scholar and social critic Jürgen Habermas represents the group of scholars who object to the politicians' reliance on strategic communications.⁹⁴ He claims that politicians "are in a position to use professional techniques to transform social power into political muscle."⁹⁵ In this sense, to focus on communication's effectiveness, with the goal to change people's behavior, goes along with the critique of manipulation.⁹⁶ With this approach, critics state that public opinion has largely become the output of professional communicators who knew "how to push the right buttons."⁹⁷ Within the same line of argument, "strategic," in its most common meaning, refers to an organization's perceived will to manipulate its environment to its benefit, which can explain why strategic communication sometimes provokes negative associations.⁹⁸ In such a Habermasian reading, a government engaging in strategic communications then has to face accusations of manipulation and using propaganda.⁹⁹

From a less critical standpoint, however, strategic communications in practice can be a management function. "Strategic" is then associated with power and decision making. The strategy of organizations often describes how the organization competes with its environment.¹⁰⁰ According to this school of thought, organizations, to create

⁹⁴ Holtzhausen and Zeffass, "Strategic Communication: Opportunities and Challenges of the Research Area," 5.

⁹⁵ Jürgen Habermas as cited in Bentele and Nothhaft, "The Public Sphere from a European Perspective," 67.

⁹⁶ Simon Moberg Torp, "The Strategic Turn in Communication Science," in *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication*, 47–48; Charles C. Self, "Dewey and the Public Sphere," in *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication*, 77–78.

⁹⁷ Øyvind Ihlen and Piet Verhoven, "Social Theories for Strategic Communication," in *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication*, 128.

⁹⁸ Kirk Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," *International Journal of Strategic Communication* 1, no. 1 (2007) doi:10.1080/15531180701285244, 12.

⁹⁹ Merriam-Webster defines propaganda as: ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause. According to Merriam-Webster, the word propaganda is today most often used in reference to political statements. "Propaganda," Merriam-Webster Dictionary, accessed 10 February 2017, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/propaganda>.

¹⁰⁰ Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 12–13.

favorable conditions, often try to influence and shape the environment to their needs. Sometimes, however, the effects are inverted: The organization's awareness of its environment leads to organizational behavior that often is in line with the environment's value system. Because of this awareness, organizations become more inclusive in their decision making rather than manipulative of their environment.¹⁰¹

Also, one can analyze the term "strategic" with an emphasis on action.¹⁰² "Strategic" then refers to the practice and the tactics used to implement strategy. From this angle, strategic communication allows for a study of how communication practices transform organizations and societies with action and reaction.¹⁰³ In a political context, the two main goals of communication then are to achieve wanted outcomes in campaigning and governing.¹⁰⁴ While "strategic" emphasizes the role of communication as a management practice to "advance the organization's own purposes,"¹⁰⁵ it does not necessarily imply that the organization strives, or even can strive, to exert power and control over other stakeholders. Rather, successful communication practitioners manage to portray outcomes that are mutually beneficial to the organization and other stakeholders.¹⁰⁶ Such a renewed understanding of strategic communication¹⁰⁷ demonstrates more overlap with the Swiss understanding of strategy.

Overall, the Swiss understand strategy in a more limited way and are, due to their reliance on an informed electorate in a system of direct democracy, critical of any governmental manipulation. Swiss strategic culture is, therefore, not necessarily defined top-down but can be shaped by the public.¹⁰⁸ The result often is a security policy that

¹⁰¹ Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 14.

¹⁰² H. Mintzberg as cited in Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 14.

¹⁰³ Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 14–16.

¹⁰⁴ Kioussis and Strömbäck, "The Strategic Context of Political Communication," 384.

¹⁰⁵ Kirk Hallahan, "Organizational Goals and Communication Objectives in Strategic Communication," in *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication*, eds. Derina Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfass (New York: Routledge, 2015), 261.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Wilhelm Mirow, "The Idiosyncrasies of Contemporary Swiss Security Policy and Practice: A Strategic Culture-Based Explanation," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 2 (1 August 2012): 338–39.

contains, to use the words of Andreas Wenger et al., much politics, but little strategy.¹⁰⁹ In line with this aversion to strategy and state influence, to the author's knowledge, strategic communication is a term not used within Swiss bureaucracy. Also, scholarly work on Swiss government communications refers to public relations of the state or political communication rather than strategic communication.¹¹⁰

Arguably then, with a people averse to state institutions manipulating public opinion through strategic communication in the sense of state propaganda, governmental communication is not allowed to achieve influence as characterized by the DOD or Clausewitzian definitions. Thus, only when the meaning of "strategic" is broadened, and strategic communications are understood as the "coherent, unifying, and integrative pattern"¹¹¹ in communication practices, does the term makes sense in the Swiss context. In this thesis, a detailed analysis of the DDPS and Swiss Armed Forces communication plans reveals whether a strategic level of practice is achieved or even intentionally pursued.

In line with this author's claim for the need of a broadened understanding of "strategic" in Swiss context, the literature focusing on Swiss strategic communication is scarce. To the author's knowledge, there is no scholarly writing about the effectiveness of the communication agencies of either the DDPS or the armed forces; no library or database searches yielded any results.¹¹² Also, the DDPS communication agency confirmed that no internal studies are conducted. While the agency tracks and surveils

¹⁰⁹ Wenger et al. use these words in the title of their article. Andreas Wenger, Victor Mauer, and Daniel Möckli, "Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2010: Viel Politik, Wenig Strategie," (Security Report 2010: Much Politics, Little Strategy) *Bulletin Zur Schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik* (2010), accessed 2 March 2017, <https://www1.ethz.ch/fsk/publications/pdfs/Bulletin-2010-9-26.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Hardmeier, "Public Relations Der Öffentlichen Hand—Eine Replik Auf Den Propaganda-Vorwurf," 248–49; Hanspeter Kriesi, *Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century Series* (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2011), 1–4.

¹¹¹ Arnaldo C. Hax, "Redefining the Concept of Strategy and the Strategy Formation Process," *Planning Review* 18 (1990), doi:10.1108/eb054290, 37.

¹¹² The author searched extensively in international libraries and databases such as NPS's Dudley Knox Library, ProQuest, EBSCO, Web of Science and Swiss libraries and databases such as the Swissbib, Alexandria, Helveticat, and Bibliothek am Guisanplatz.

print, online, radio, TV, and social media the analysis of this surveillance and the decisions on consequences for the communication agency are only done orally.¹¹³

b. The Interpretation of “Communication”

Within the term “strategic communication,” the “communication” aspect is less vividly discussed than the “strategic” aspect. However, different schools of thought exist about what communication does and should contain. Scholars refer to two basic models of communication: the transmission model of communication and the interactive model of communication.¹¹⁴ In 1949, Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver postulated the transmission model of communications,¹¹⁵ using a channel to transmit one-way signals and allowing only for limited feedback. Scholars, however, criticized their model as focusing too much on the sender and largely ignoring the receivers.¹¹⁶ The second model is the interactive model of communication. It is rooted in the idea that the different actors in the communication process create meaning through exchange.¹¹⁷ Most scholars today agree on the interactive model and have adapted it rather than opposed it.¹¹⁸

With regard to the transmitted content, scholars differ in their emphases on different aspects of communication: some concentrate on the meaning that communication creates, whereas others focus on the influence communicators can exert.¹¹⁹ Those who focus on meaning are interested in social, cultural, and psychological

¹¹³ Andreas Abächerli, chief strategist communication office DDPS, email message to author, 7 August 2017.

¹¹⁴ While all scholars known to this author refer to these models, they also claim that middle ground between the two models exist.

¹¹⁵ Shannon and Weaver as cited in Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 20; Holtzhausen and Zerfass, “Strategic Communication: Opportunities and Challenges of the Research Area,” 4.

¹¹⁶ Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 20.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 20–21.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 22–26. Simon Moberg Torp refers to the same aspects when he distinguishes participation-oriented and effectiveness-oriented communication. Moberg Torp, “The Strategic Turn in Communication Science,” 47–48.

aspects of communication. These scholars research how messages are understood and remembered, how ambiguity develops, and how ambiguity can be mitigated.¹²⁰

More applicable to this work, scholars who focus their studies on influence are interested in communication's capacity to "caus[e] an effect in indirect or intangible ways."¹²¹ Glen M. Broom claims that organizations have four tools at their disposal to change people's behavior: "physical force, patronage, purchase, or persuasion."¹²² Within strategic communications of a governmental organization in a democratic state, such as the DDPS and Swiss Armed Forces communication with the Swiss electorate, however, only persuasion and, in some cases, patronage are acceptable. Also, in an interconnected society such as Switzerland, the degree of influence of organizational communication is limited. The production of mutual understanding for decisions, however, can still be the goal of communication and often is much needed for organizations.

c. Definition for this Thesis

The predominant current scholarly definition for strategic communication seems applicable to Switzerland: Most contemporary scholarly articles refer to the definition of Kirk Hallahan et al. In 2007, they defined strategic communications "as the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission."¹²³ Christopher Paul offers his working definition in his book *Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates*: "[Strategic communications are] coordinated actions, messages, images, and other forms of signaling or engagement intended to inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences in support of national objectives."¹²⁴

In a thesis concerned with Swiss governmental communication practices, this author chooses to use an adapted definition based on Hallahan et al.'s and Paul's

¹²⁰ Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 23.

¹²¹ Webster's, as cited in Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 24.

¹²² Broom, as cited in Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 23.

¹²³ Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 3.

¹²⁴ Paul, *Strategic Communication*, 3.

definitions: Strategic communications are coordinated informational, persuasive, and discursive actions, messages, images, and other forms of signaling or engagement intended to create an organization's purposeful interaction with its environment.^{125,126}

E. METHODOLOGY

This thesis seeks to assess the political and strategic efficiency of the communication programs of the DDPS and the Swiss Armed Forces. The research relies on some assumptions: a) the DDPS and Swiss Armed Forces operate with plans¹²⁷ for strategic communications or sub-tactics; b) the implementation of these plans shows different levels of efficiency and is, therefore, at times not as effective as it could or should be; and c) there is political and organizational room for maneuver to enhance these plans. By asking a prescriptive question to address a gap—to improve DDPS and armed forces strategic communications—the thesis must answer how the plans of strategic communications can work best in a direct democratic environment. From this ideal, the thesis then assesses how efficiently strategic communication agencies currently function.

For a judgment on the efficiency of Swiss strategic communications, the author compares intended outcomes with actual outcomes while analyzing the DDPS and Swiss Armed Forces communicative inputs during the process.

1. Choice of Case Studies

This author believes that one can best study the effects of governmental strategic communication in the framework of political campaigns. With this in mind, the author focuses her research on the years from 2000 through 2014. The earlier years of analysis serve to explain the framework of the analyzed votes. As the concept of strategic communications is relatively new, the author has no particular reason to think that an analysis going further back in time would change the results. The year 2014, with the

¹²⁵ Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 17.

¹²⁶ Paul, *Strategic Communication*, 3.

¹²⁷ In Switzerland, such plans are often called concepts.

vote on the referendum on the Gripen fund law, promises to provide an ample amount of information and political analysis.

To compare the effectiveness of strategic communications, the author contrasts two public votes:

1. The 2013 initiative *Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht*¹²⁸ (Yes to the Abolition of Conscription) and
2. The 2014 referendum on *Bundesgesetz über den Fonds zur Beschaffung des Kampfflugzeugs Gripen (Gripen-Fonds-Gesetz)* (Federal Law to Create a Fund for the Procurement of the Gripen Fighter Jet (Gripen fund law)).¹²⁹

With this sample, the author can compare the communications practitioners' effectiveness in both variants of political rights, initiative and referendum; this approach allows for the control of the effects of the specific right in use. While it might have been enlightening to contrast two referenda, one successful and one in which the DDPS was defeated, to add such an analysis exceeded this author's capacities.

2. Data Basis

The author analyzes official documents, as provided under the federal Freedom of Information Act (FoIF).¹³⁰ Official documents the author employed include: selected speeches of the Minister of Defense (head of DDPS) and the Chief of Armed Forces (CHAF); press releases of DDPS; articles on DDPS intranet and the intranet of the armed forces; other products of internal communication such as information material aimed at members of the armed forces (e.g., PowerPoint presentations); and, most importantly, articles or reports as covered by media outlets in Switzerland.

¹²⁸ Federal Chancellery, "Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht," (Yes to the Abolition of Conscription) accessed 11 June 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis391.html>.

¹²⁹ Federal Chancellery, "Bundesgesetz über den Fonds zur Beschaffung des Kampfflugzeugs Gripen (Gripen-Fonds-Gesetz)," (Federal Law to Create a Fund for the Procurement of the Gripen Fighter Jet (Gripen fund law)) accessed 10 May 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/rf/cr/2012/20121820.html>.

¹³⁰ Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, Federal Act on Freedom of Information in the Administration (Bern: 2004). While the English version of this text is non-binding, the German version is: Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, "Bundesgesetz über das Öffentlichkeitsprinzip der Verwaltung," (Federal Act on Freedom of Information in the Administration) accessed 11 June 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20022540/index.html>.

The following sources of relevant information the author has, however, not been able to access: written meeting protocols of the communication committee DDPS,¹³¹ reports on strategic controlling of DDPS communication, and reports on monitoring and analysis of communication policies and security discussions in the media, not produced either by DDPS or the armed forces communication offices.¹³² The author analyzes in Chapter II why these relevant documents are not produced.

3. Media Outlets

The Swiss population consumes information from a wide range of media outlets because of its four national languages. This author uses the same media outlets for the media content analyses on the 2013 and 2014 campaigns. While the two case studies cover the time span from 2013 to 2014, the author has ample reason to believe that the media environment has not changed in such a way that the choice of outlets would corrupt results. The selection reflects the Swiss population's main languages and the media outlets' importance. The author decided to concentrate on print media and the most relevant TV outlets for political communication. In 2015, when the last data are available,¹³³ the Swiss citizens spoke the following main languages: 63 percent German, 20.4 percent French, 6.5 percent Italian, 0.5 percent Romansh.¹³⁴ As was expected, the analysis of print media was more fruitful: In Switzerland, the print media dominate political communication, not TV outlets.¹³⁵

¹³¹ According to the DDPS chief strategist, the meetings are not on the record. Andreas Abächerli, chief strategist DDPS communication agency, email message to author, 7 August 2017.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Earlier available statistics refer to 2000 and are, given the larger distance in time to 2014, likely less accurate.

¹³⁴ The remaining percent claimed another language to be their main language. Federal Department of Home Affairs FDHA, Office for Statistics, "Sprachen," (Languages) accessed 20 May 2017, <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bevoelkerung/sprachen-religionen/sprachen.html>.

¹³⁵ Frank Marcinkowski, Felix Flemming, and Christopher Starke, "Mediensystem und Politische Kommunikation," (Media System and Political Communication) in *Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, Manuel de la Politique Suisse*. 5th ed., eds. by Peter Knoepfel et al. (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2014), 456.

The chosen newspapers, as shown in Table 1, roughly correspond to the language proportions within the Swiss citizenry;¹³⁶ at the same time, the choice reflects the respective outlet's importance according to circulation and quality. Ranks refer to circulation and number of readers.

Table 1. Analyzed Print Media Outlets¹³⁷

Name of the newspaper	Type	Language	Reason for Analysis
<i>20 Minuten</i>	Free newspaper Primarily read by commuters, focus on entertainment, low quality ¹³⁸	German	Most widely circulated and read free newspaper among German-speakers (rank 1)
<i>Blick</i>	Paid newspaper Tabloid style, neither right nor left ¹³⁹	German	Most widely circulated and read paid newspaper (rank 4)
<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	Paid newspaper Balanced quality journalism ¹⁴⁰	German	Among the most widely circulated and read paid newspapers (rank 5)

¹³⁶ The author has not analyzed a print media outlet in Romansh.

¹³⁷ *La Quotidiana* is the only Romansh daily newspaper. Due to its small circulation of around 4,000, the author chose to exclude it from this analysis. Data used in the table for rankings was extracted from Verband Schweizer Medien, "Die 15 Grössten Tageszeitungen 2014," (The 15 Biggest Daily Newspapers of 2014) accessed 21 May 2017, http://www.schweizermedien.ch/SCHM/media/SCHMMediaLibrary/Statistiken/Top15_Tageszeitungen_Aufl_Leser_04_2014.pdf. Data for the type of newspaper is referenced separately. Data used to judge the quality of the outlet: The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to their 2016 performance: Medienqualitätsranking, "MQR-16," (Quality Ranking of the Media 2016) accessed 21 May 2017, <http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/>. The author decided not to analyze *Blick am Abend*, a free newspaper of limited quality, which holds the second rank in the ranking for most widely circulated and read newspapers. *Blick am Abend*'s content is widely similar to *Blick* because it has the same publisher.

¹³⁸ The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to the 2016 performance: Medienqualitätsranking, "20 Minuten," accessed 21 May 2017, <http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/boulevard-und-pendlerzeitungen/id-20-minuten.html>.

¹³⁹ The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to the 2016: Medienqualitätsranking, "Blick," accessed 21 May 2017, [html http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/boulevard-und-pendlerzeitungen/blick.html](http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/boulevard-und-pendlerzeitungen/blick.html).

¹⁴⁰ The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to the 2016: Medienqualitätsranking, "Tages-Anzeiger," accessed 21 May 2017, <http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/tages-und-onlinezeitung/tages-anzeiger.html>.

Name of the newspaper	Type	Language	Reason for Analysis
<i>Die Nordwestschweiz</i> ¹⁴¹	Paid newspaper Balanced, mean quality	German	Among the most widely circulated and read paid newspapers (rank 6)
<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	Paid newspaper Balanced, slightly over mean quality ¹⁴²	German	Among the most widely circulated and read paid newspapers (rank 7), based in the region of the Swiss capital
<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i> ¹⁴³	Paid newspaper Liberal, highest quality of journalism ¹⁴⁴	German	Not among the 15 most widely circulated and read paid newspapers, however, ranked the one with highest quality of reporting (German) ¹⁴⁵
<i>20 minutes</i>	Free newspaper Primarily read by commuters, focus on	French	Most widely circulated and read free newspaper

¹⁴¹ *Nordwestschweiz* is a name used to unite several smaller newspapers, all produced by the same publisher and with only regionally differing content. As one example here, the author decided to use *Aargauerzeitung*. The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to the 2016: Medienqualitätsranking, “Aargauerzeitung,” accessed 21 May 2017, <http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/tages-und-onlinezeitung/aargauer-zeitung.html>.

¹⁴² The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to the 2016: Medienqualitätsranking, “Berner Zeitung,” accessed 21 May 2017, <http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/tages-und-onlinezeitung/berner-zeitung.html>.

¹⁴³ Although Rademacher, Gerth, and Siegert’s specific study analyzed the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*’s (NZZ) influence on other media outlets for a different election, one can assume that the NZZ’s leading role in the vote on the conscription and Gripen was similarly high. Patrick Rademacher, Matthias A. Gerth, and Gabriele Siegert, “Media Organizations in Direct-Democratic Campaigns,” in *Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century Series*, 100.

¹⁴⁴ The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to the 2016: Medienqualitätsranking, “Neue Zürcher Zeitung,” accessed 21 May 2017, <http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/tages-und-onlinezeitung/neue-zuercher-zeitung.html>.

¹⁴⁵ Regula Hänggli, “Key Factors in Frame Building,” in *Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns: Enlightening or Manipulating?* ed. Hanspeter Kriesi (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 133.

Name of the newspaper	Type	Language	Reason for Analysis
	entertainment, low quality ¹⁴⁶		among German and French-speakers (rank 3)
<i>24 heures</i>	Paid newspaper Balanced, mean quality ¹⁴⁷	French	Among the most widely circulated and read paid newspaper (rank 13)
<i>Le Temps</i>	Paid newspaper Balanced, highest quality of journalism ¹⁴⁸	French	Not among the 15 most widely circulated and read paid newspaper, however, ranked the one with highest quality of reporting (French)
<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	Paid newspaper, regional focus ¹⁴⁹	Italian	Not among the 15 most widely circulated and read paid newspaper nationally, however, most circulated among Italian-speakers

In addition to the print media outlets, the author analyzed the major broadcasting stations. The major Swiss broadcasting company, Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft (SRG), is organized as a media company organized under the civil

¹⁴⁶ The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to the 2016: Medienqualitätsranking, “20 Minutes,” accessed 21 May 2017, <http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/boulevard-und-pendlerzeitungen/id-20-minutes.html>.

¹⁴⁷ The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to the 2016: Medienqualitätsranking, “24 heures,” accessed 21 May 2017, <http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/tages-und-onlinezeitung/id-24-heures.html>.

¹⁴⁸ The judgments of quality and type of media outlet are taken from and refer to the 2016: Medienqualitätsranking, “Le Temps,” accessed 21 May 2017, <http://mqr-schweiz.ch/de/mqr-16/tages-und-onlinezeitung/le-temps.html>.

¹⁴⁹ Quality not judged by Medienqualitätsranking. Circulation retrieved from WEMF AG für Werbemedienforschung, “Auflagebulletin 2014,” (Statistics of Media Circulation 2014) accessed 21 May 2017, <https://wemf.ch/de/downloads/audit-statistics/auflegebeglaubigung/auflegebulletins/auflegebulletin-2015-4.pdf>, 10.

law. However, the Federal Constitution, the Ordinance on Radio and Television, and the concession granted by federal authorities define SRG's mission. Still, SRG is politically and economically independent.¹⁵⁰ SRG is organized as a non-profit company and primarily financed with fees.¹⁵¹ Every Swiss household pays fees that make up for 75 percent of SRG's income. SRG makes the rest of its income from commercials. As SRG is the recipient of the largest sum of fees,¹⁵² the Swiss Confederation tasks it with a "service public,"¹⁵³ the equivalent to the U.S. public broadcast service. "Service public" demands specific accomplishments of SRG: it has to provide journalism of high quality, choose relevant information, and convey it to the Swiss citizens to enable them to navigate the ever-growing flow of information.¹⁵⁴ Audience ratings are secondary to proper information that allows the citizens to enter democratic debates.¹⁵⁵ This setting puts SRG in the role of the market leader in all four language regions for radio and as the leading domestic station for television.¹⁵⁶ A detailed structural analysis of TV content derived from watching all important shows during the campaign periods could have been revealing, but such an attempt would have exceeded the author's possibilities. Hence, the author has pre-screened TV content through a media content analysis tool and only watched content that newspapers later referred to.¹⁵⁷ For practical reasons of resources available to the author, the author chose not to analyze radio programs. Therefore, this thesis concentrates on the stations referred to in Table 2.

¹⁵⁰ Schweizer Radio- und Fernsehen, "Zahlen Daten Fakten 2016/2017," (Figures, Data, Facts 2016/2017) 5.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁵² Billag, "Gebührenverteilung," (Distribution of Fees) accessed 21 May 2017, <https://www.billag.ch/privat/wer-erhaelt-gebuehren/>.

¹⁵³ Schweizer Radio- und Fernsehen, "Geschäftsbericht 2014," (Management Report 2014) accessed 21 May 2017, http://gb.srgssr.ch/fileadmin/gb2014/SRG_GB_2014_de.pdf, 16.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 3, 32, 36, 40, 42, 48.

¹⁵⁷ The author carried out a media content analysis through Argus Data Insights, Argus Avenue. The author accessed the data through a Swiss government issued account. <https://www.argusdatainsights.ch/de/homepage/>.

Table 2. Analyzed Television Stations.¹⁵⁸

Name of the station	Type	Language	Reason for Analysis
<i>SRF I</i>	Information, Entertainment, Cultural Programming reflecting Switzerland with its different cultural spheres ¹⁵⁹	German / Romansh	Most widely consumed domestic television station
<i>RTS Un</i>	All-round programming with home-produced programs during primetime ¹⁶⁰	French	Most widely consumed domestic television station
<i>RSI La 1</i>	All-round programming for broad viewership ¹⁶¹	Italian	Most widely consumed domestic television station

F. THESIS ORGANIZATION

To review, this introductory chapter (Chapter I) introduced the challenges of this thesis and the political environment of the analysis. Chapter II follows up on the general functioning of the Swiss security sector and the practice of strategic communication. It then concludes with an analysis of the current communications plans. In this chapter, the author finds evidence that the practitioners are restrained in their work in ways that are not necessarily obvious. Chapter III then examines the strategic communications in

¹⁵⁸ Table based on data retrieved from SRF (details as indicated in the footnotes).

¹⁵⁹ Schweizer Radio- und Fernsehen, “Fernsehen,” (Television) accessed 21 May 2017, <http://www.srgssr.ch/de/fernsehen/schweizer-radio-und-fernsehen/>. In detail, contents of the following TV shows have been analyzed: SRF 1 Rundschau, SRF 1 Arena, SRF 1 Tagesschau Spätausgabe, SRF 1 Tagesschau Hauptausgabe. These are shows where political content in German language is to be expected. Programs for the minority Romansh speakers are also broadcasted on SRF I. Thus, there is no fourth television station to analyze.

¹⁶⁰ Schweizer Radio- und Fernsehen, “Television,” (Television) accessed 21 May 2017, <http://www.srgssr.ch/de/fernsehen/radio-television-suisse/>. Specifically, contents of the following TV shows have been analyzed: RTS Un Le Journal. This is the show where political content in French language is to be expected.

¹⁶¹ Schweizer Radio- und Fernsehen, “Televisione,” (Television) accessed 21 May 2017, <http://www.srgssr.ch/de/fernsehen/radiotelevisione-svizzera/>. In detail, contents of the following TV shows have been analyzed: RSI LA 1 Telegiornale sera. This is the show where political content in Italian language is to be expected.

practice when comparing the communication strategy and the outcome of the votes on the 2013 initiative on conscription and the 2014 referendum on the procurement of the fighter jet.

II. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE DEFENSE SECTOR

Strategic communication practitioners in Switzerland operate in an environment that is shaped by an idiosyncratic political environment. Also, they engage with their stakeholders under legal limitations and from a position of comparable weakness. In combination, these factors can explain why strategic communication in Switzerland has such a decidedly different meaning than, for example, in U.S. context.

A. SWISS SECURITY SECTOR AND ARMED FORCES

The Swiss security structure proves a complex system. A large field of stakeholders contribute to Swiss security; they often widely disagree on which political goals to pursue. Any strategy, therefore, reflects the smallest commonality, rather than being a dynamic declaration of intention. In a system of well-functioning civil-military relations, the armed forces mirror these processes; the lack of a clear legislative intent translates into organizational difficulties.

1. The Security Structure

Swiss security interests are defined within a particular political environment, different from other democracies: security policy reflects the opinions of a long list of stakeholders: Swiss security policy today includes a large number of actors and many policy areas.¹⁶² Actors of various levels¹⁶³ and domains influence security policy.¹⁶⁴ It is the strategic leadership's task to coordinate this extensive network of actors: from the federal administration, to the parliament, to the public, and the economy, and non-governmental organizations (NGO).¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Andreas Wenger, "Security Policy," in *Handbook of Swiss Politics*, 2nd ed., eds. Ulrich Klöti et al. (Zürich: NZZ Publishing, 2004), 604.

¹⁶³ The levels range from international organizations to individuals.

¹⁶⁴ Wenger, "Security Policy," 604.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 604–9.

a. Strategic Leadership by Federal and Cantonal Governments

The federal and cantonal governments, together, are responsible for strategic leadership in Switzerland: they fulfill the task of policy coordination. The governments, according to their political estimates of the global and national situation, define the ends they want to pursue to safeguard their national or cantonal interests.¹⁶⁶ In line with Swiss federalism, the federal government, which is the Federal Council, shares this task with the 26 cantonal governments.¹⁶⁷

As Switzerland is a federalist state, the Confederation, the cantons, and the municipalities share power. The Swiss Constitution regulates the coordination between the Confederation and the cantons. In the Swiss political system, the cantons have substantial autonomies while the federal state is only responsible when the Federal Constitution specifically empowers it. Hence, each one of the 26 cantons is responsible for tasks that the Constitution does not designate as federal matters. Also, the cantons have extensive constitutional rights in Switzerland's international relations and security matters.¹⁶⁸

The collective of the seven Federal Councilors and the cantonal governments report their policy goals in the national security policy.¹⁶⁹ Although there is a president of the Swiss Confederation, he or she is one of the seven Federal Councilors—elected for one year and equal in authority to the six other members. The president's role is to lead cabinet meetings and to represent the government. Security policy, however, is decided by the collective of all seven Councilors. As in all other matters within Swiss political practice, Councilors must defend the position of the Federal Council, even if the collective decision is contrary to their personal view or that of their party. The Swiss call

¹⁶⁶ Based on the definition as given in Swiss Armed Forces, Chief of Armed Forces, *Begriffe Führungsreglemente der Armee: Strategische Führung* (Definitions in Leadership Regulations for the Armed Forces: Strategic Leadership); Wenger, "Security Policy," 604–5.

¹⁶⁷ Wenger, "Security Policy," 604.

¹⁶⁸ See Article 55–57 of the Swiss Constitution. Swiss Confederation, "Bundesverfassung," (Federal Constitution) accessed 10 March 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html#a8>.

¹⁶⁹ Based on the definition as given in Swiss Armed Forces, Chief of Armed Forces, *Begriffe Führungsreglemente der Armee: Strategische Führung* (Bern: 2004).

this the principle of collegiality.¹⁷⁰

Given the extensive need for coordination in this environment, in 1994, Switzerland established a *Sicherheitsausschuss* (security committee), to facilitate coordination and cooperation between the Federal Departments and Offices and the cantonal governments. Since 2011, the committee consists of the heads of the Departments of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport¹⁷¹ (DDPS), of Economic Affairs, Education and Research¹⁷² (EAER), and of Justice and Police¹⁷³ (FDJP).¹⁷⁴ The Committee's task is to analyze the current situation in security affairs and to coordinate between the federal departments.¹⁷⁵ For this purpose, the committee is supported by the *Kerngruppe Sicherheit* (Core Group of Security Affairs), which consists at present of the Secretary of State¹⁷⁶ of the Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA),^{177,178} the head of the Federal Intelligence Service as part of DDPS,¹⁷⁹ and the head of the Federal Police¹⁸⁰ as part of FDJP.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁰ Federal Chancellery, "The Swiss Confederation—A Brief Guide," accessed 3 March 2017, <https://www.bk.admin.ch/dokumentation/02070/index.html?lang=en>, 41.

¹⁷¹ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, "Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport," accessed 13 February 2017, <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/en/home.html>.

¹⁷² Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research, "Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research," accessed 13 February 2017, <https://www.wbf.admin.ch/wbf/en/home.html>.

¹⁷³ Federal Department of Justice and Police, "Federal Department of Justice and Police," accessed 13 February 2017, <https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/en/home.html>.

¹⁷⁴ Federal Council, "Der Bundesrat Regelt die Sicherheitspolitische Führung Effizienter," (The Federal Council Reorganizes the Leadership in Security Affairs to Increase Efficiency) accessed 14 June 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-40719.html>.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Not to be confused with the U.S. Secretary of State. In Switzerland, he or she is the deputy head of FDFA and directs the conceptual development, coordination, and planning of foreign policy and oversees the reports submitted to the political authorities.

¹⁷⁷ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, "Federal Department of Foreign Affairs," accessed 13 February 2017, <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home.html>.

¹⁷⁸ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, "State Secretariat," accessed 14 June 2017, <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/fdfa/organisation-fdfa/state-secretariat.html>.

¹⁷⁹ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, "Federal Intelligence Service," accessed 13 June 2017, <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/en/ddps/organisation/administrative-units/intelligence-service.html>.

¹⁸⁰ Federal Department of Justice and Police, "Federal Office of Police: Fedpol," accessed 15 March 2017, <https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/fedpol/en/home/ueberuns/amt.html>.

¹⁸¹ Federal Council, "Der Bundesrat Regelt die Sicherheitspolitische Führung Effizienter."

b. *The Role of the Federal Administration*

The Federal Administration plans for and engages the Swiss instruments of national power. Swiss security policy consists of eight tools that are at the disposal of different federal departments.¹⁸² The FDFA manages (1) *Swiss foreign policy*.¹⁸³ (2) *Customs administration* is part of the Federal Department of Finance (FDF).¹⁸⁴ (3/4) *Economic policy* and *civil service* are functions of the EAER.¹⁸⁵ The DDPS seeks to attain national security goals through (5) the *armed forces*, (6) *civil protection*, and (7) the *Federal Intelligence Service*.¹⁸⁶ Finally, the (8) *police forces* are managed by the FDJP¹⁸⁷ and by the cantons. The federal police, a section of FDJP, was founded in 2000. Some 870 people work for the federal police.¹⁸⁸ By far, the more substantial number of police officers are salaried by the cantons. Around 17,000 police-officers work for one of the 26 cantons.¹⁸⁹ Out of the total of seven departments, five must, therefore, contribute with their tools to a successful security policy, and the cantons have to contribute with their police forces.

¹⁸² Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, “Sicherheitspolitik,” (Security Policy) accessed 13 February 2017. <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/de/themen/sicherheitspolitik.html>; Wenger, “Security Policy,” 604.

¹⁸³ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.”

¹⁸⁴ Federal Department of Finance, “Federal Department of Finance,” accessed 13 February 2017, <https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/en/home.html>.

¹⁸⁵ Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research, “Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research.”

¹⁸⁶ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, “Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport.”

¹⁸⁷ Federal Department of Justice and Police, “Federal Department of Justice and Police,” accessed 13 February 2017, <https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/en/home.html>.

¹⁸⁸ Federal Department of Justice and Police, “Federal Office of Police: Fedpol.”

¹⁸⁹ Susanne Loacker and Gian Signorell, “Öffentliche Sicherheit,” (Public Security) *Der Beobachter*, 6 February 2015, http://www.beobachter.ch/justiz-behoerde/buerger-verwaltung/artikel/oeffentliche-sicherheit_notstand-bei-der-polizei/#.

The remaining two departments, the Federal Department of Home Affairs (FDHA)¹⁹⁰ and the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC)¹⁹¹ do not contribute with an instrument that is explicitly listed in the federal security policy. With the broad Swiss understanding of national security, however, these two do contribute with their safeguard and advancement of high standards in healthcare, education, and research (FDHA) and the assurance of sustainable primary services provision (DETEC). Thus, directly or indirectly, all seven departments and, accordingly the entirety of the federal administration, contribute to the national security policy.

DDPS, as the home department of the armed forces and its seat at the security committee, is one of the bodies most involved in security issues. Since the end of the Cold War, the Federal Council has reorganized DDPS several times. In 1995, the then *Eidgenössisches Militärdepartement* (EMD) (Federal Military Department) was remodeled as part of the armed forces Reform 95.¹⁹² Only three years later, the department was renamed and got its current name. In 2003, during the reform called *Armee XXI*, the post of the CHAF was created. This new post allowed for a “clear division between the political ... and the military leadership.”¹⁹³ Swiss security interests are, therefore, pursued in a not only multi-level and multi-departmental, but also increasingly dynamic environment.

c. Parliamentary Contributions

In a system of checks and balances, the Swiss parliament contributes to security policy as well. Switzerland’s legislature is organized in two chambers of a semi-professional parliament.¹⁹⁴ The parliament makes its main contributions to security

¹⁹⁰ Federal Department of Home Affairs, “Federal Department of Home Affairs,” accessed 13 February 2017, <https://www.edi.admin.ch/edi/en/home.html>.

¹⁹¹ Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, “Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications,” accessed 13 February 2017, <https://www.uvek.admin.ch/uvek/en/home.html>.

¹⁹² Wenger, “Security Policy,” 606.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Hagmann and Szvircsev Tresch, “Der Staat Weiss es am Besten?” 203.

policy through the security policy commissions of the two chambers: both the *Nationalrat* (National Council) and the *Ständerat* (Council of States)¹⁹⁵ maintain their security policy commissions. While the parliament can only acknowledge the government's security reports and has no right to amend them, the commissions are tasked with the creation of legislation relevant to security and defense and, therefore, have ample influence on its content.¹⁹⁶ Also, the parliament decides on the federal budget and, therefore, can impact security instruments considerably.¹⁹⁷ Thus, while the government is concerned with national strategy, the parliament contributes to security policy through its setting of legislative and fiscal measures.

The 2014 Gripen referendum vote illustrates the fiscal policy's influence on security policy. In the case of the Gripen procurement, the Federal Council chose to create a fund to procure the new fighter jets. This choice, agreed to by both chambers of the Federal Assembly, required the change of existing federal law, opening the funding to an optional referendum. This move decisively changed Swiss security policy.

d. The Citizens' Role

As mass politics has been transformed in the new millennium and the security environment in Europe has also been the subject of constant flux, the general public has increased its contributions to security policy since the beginning of the 2000s. The means of choice is, mostly, the referendum.¹⁹⁸ The government, however, also actively encourages the public to participate in policy creation as a means to strengthen consent on security policy. In 1996, for example, with the political goal of creating greater consent among the Swiss, the Federal Council tasked a commission to create the basis for a new security report. Accordingly, the team around Edouard Brunner, the head of the Swiss strategic group for whom the report was named, delivered the arguments for deeper

¹⁹⁵ The politicians in the Council of States represent their cantons.

¹⁹⁶ Wenger, "Security Policy," 606–7.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 607.

¹⁹⁸ Wenger, "Sicherheitspolitik," 660.

integration.¹⁹⁹ Presented in 1998, the Brunner commission's suggestions, not only represented experts, but rather a broad moiety of Swiss citizens.²⁰⁰

e. Cooperation with the Economy and NGOs

Swiss security interests are thus not only shaped by the entirety of all seven federal departments, the parliament, and even citizens, but also by a significant number of civilian organizations. In line with the general privatization of security issues since the last two decades, the Swiss government strives to coordinate private efforts in security matters with governmental endeavors.²⁰¹ For this purpose, the Swiss established new institutions: in 1995, Switzerland founded the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP). Moreover, the Swiss decided to promote the free flow of information and to support this process through the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).²⁰² In 1998, Switzerland, in cooperation with other countries, also established the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).²⁰³

In a similar vein, the Swiss government coordinated efforts for the protection of critical infrastructures and information security.²⁰⁴ Also, the Federal Administration created a specialized staff to cooperate and support the private sector in their efforts to secure their businesses.²⁰⁵ All these efforts illustrate the Swiss' inclusive approach in the creation of a national security strategy. Thus, as a consequence of Switzerland's direct

¹⁹⁹ Jürg Martin Gabriel, Bericht Brunner: Stärken und Schwächen, (The Brunner Report: Strengths and Weaknesses) *Center for International Studies (CIS): Beiträge* (Zürich: CIS / ETHZ, 1998), 8–9.

²⁰⁰ Wenger, "Sicherheitspolitik," 660.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 660–61.

²⁰² In 2016, ISN's services were integrated into the Center for Security Studies (CSS). CSS's site can be found under <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/center.html>. CSS is part of the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.

²⁰³ In 2016, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining received core contributions, project and program funding, and in-kind support from 30 governments and organizations. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Donors," accessed 4 September 2017, <https://www.gichd.org/who-we-are/donors/#.Wa2WP7pFwv0>. However, Switzerland, as host nation, provides substantial contributions. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA. "Mine Action Strategy of the Swiss Confederation 2012–2015," accessed 4 September 2017, <https://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-mined-areas/Switzerland-MA-Strategy-2012-15-en.pdf>, 12.

²⁰⁴ Wenger, "Sicherheitspolitik," 661.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

democracy, strategy is often not solely defined top-down but can also be shaped by the public.

2. Security Strategy

Since 2000 to the present, the period of analysis used in this thesis, three security reports—the Swiss equivalent of a defense white paper—influenced Swiss security policy: the 2000, 2010, and 2016 security reports.

a. Security Report 2000

The challenging and time-consuming creation of the 2000 security report best illustrates the integrative and comprehensive method of Swiss strategizing. While not directly describing the strategic framework of the 2013 and 2014 national votes, the 2000 report serves this author best to explain Swiss strategic thinking and sets the scene for the 2010 report. The conflict in the Balkans and the 1998–1999 war in Kosovo reinforced the Swiss realization that their own security and stability, as well that of Europe, could no longer be achieved unilaterally but only through cooperation with multilateral security institutions. Therefore, at the beginning of the new millennium, the idea for the need of deeper cooperation was predominant within the Swiss government.

With the political goal of creating greater consent among Swiss political elites, the Federal Council tasked a commission to create the basis for a new security report in line with this experience. Accordingly, Edouard Brunner's team delivered the arguments for deeper integration and even suggested the creation of a Swiss crisis reaction force capable of cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).²⁰⁶ Presented in 1998, the Brunner commission's suggestions, however, went too far for some conservative members of the Swiss parliament and fueled their disapproval. As most members of parliament had no experience of contemporary war and crisis, they had, and still have, imprecise ideas of the requirements that modern armed forces have to meet. In combination with what some saw as extravagant goals that Brunner and his colleagues

²⁰⁶ Gabriel, Bericht Brunner, 8–9.

advocated, noticeable resistance formed among members of parliament.²⁰⁷ The Brunner report, written in preparation of the 2000 security report, thus promoted cooperation, but without yet creating consent among political elites.

The final product, the 2000 security report, reflected the need for more cooperation, while it also excluded the possibility of deeper integration in areas where the Federal Council doubted political feasibility. Hence, the report excluded a return to strictly autonomous national defense. On the other hand, the report also limited how far the Swiss can open; the report refused NATO membership as it reconfirmed Switzerland's neutrality.²⁰⁸ Through this compromise, the Federal Council achieved agreement on the statement that the Swiss security policy goals were no longer achievable unilaterally.²⁰⁹ This agreement, however, did not lead to multilateral action. Hence, even though the report was a good Swiss compromise, it still did not manage to revive Swiss security policy.

b. Security Report 2010

The 2000 security report failed to create greater consent: In the years leading up to the 2010 security report, further polarization in opinions relating to questions of security policy had led to stagnation. In 2004, in a very rare case, the parliament even failed to agree on the defense budget.²¹⁰ In response, the Federal Council and the committee tasked with the creation of the new report hoped to overcome the domestic

²⁰⁷ Bruno Lezzi, "Behutsame Schritte in die Partnerschaft für den Frieden. Überlegungen eines Aussenstehenden Beobachters," (Cautious Steps toward the Partnership for Peace. Reflections of an Independent Observer) in Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, Directorate of Political Affairs PA, "Schweizer Partnerschaft mit der NATO: 20 Jahre Schweizer Teilnahme an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden," accessed 29 July 2017, https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/mehrsprachig/documents/publications/Politorbis/politorbis-61_dfe.pdf, 20–21.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 14.

²⁰⁹ Jon A. Fanzun and Andreas Wenger, "Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik im Umbruch: Der Bericht 2000 vor dem Hintergrund des Kosovo-Konflikts," (Ruptures in Swiss Security Policy: Security Report 2000 with Regard to the Kosovo Conflict) *Bulletin zur Schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik / Bulletin Sur La Politique De Sécurité Suisse* (Zürich: CSS / ETHZ, 2009), 13.

²¹⁰ Wenger, "Sicherheitspolitik," 607.

blockade in security policy through the inclusion of diverse stakeholders.²¹¹ The 2010 Swiss security report²¹² was based on extensive hearings the committee held in spring 2009. The committee questioned some 45 organizations—political parties, interest groups, representatives of police forces, as well as domestic and international experts.²¹³ The resulting draft report stimulated broad dialogue about Swiss security policy.²¹⁴ Accordingly, the 2010 security report was the lowest common denominator and, to use Wenger et al.’s words, much politics, but little strategy.²¹⁵ It seems clear that in such an environment as the Swiss governmental context provides, practitioners in the area of strategic communications are severely limited by the force of direct democracy.

According to the 2010 security report, strategy had to meet three basic needs to be internally acceptable and externally effective. *First*, the chosen strategy must be customized to reflect the current dangers and threats and has to be effective in countering these, while being flexible enough to counter threats and menaces that will become apparent in the future.²¹⁶ More precisely, Switzerland strives to maintain its ability to act, which includes its self-determination and the integrity of the Swiss territory, to protect the people, as well as their basic needs (such as its supply of electricity, food and medical care), and to contribute to stability and peace beyond national borders. Accordingly, the Swiss authorities strive to secure Switzerland against direct and indirect menaces and

²¹¹ Wenger, Mauer, and Möckli, “Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2010: Viel Politik, Wenig Strategie,” 9–11.

²¹² The Swiss equivalent of a white paper on security.

²¹³ “Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2010,” (Security Report 2010) Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport, accessed 2 March 2017, <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/de/themen/sicherheitspolitik/sicherheitspolitische-berichte/sicherheitspolitischer-bericht-2010.html>; Wenger, Mauer, and Möckli, “Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2010: Viel Politik, Wenig Strategie,” 9–11.

²¹⁴ “Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2010,” Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport; Wenger, Mauer, and Möckli, “Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2010: Viel Politik, Wenig Strategie,” 10, 26.

²¹⁵ Wenger and his colleagues referred to this shortcoming in the title of their article. Wenger, Mauer, and Möckli, “Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2010: Viel Politik, Wenig Strategie.”

²¹⁶ “Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2010,” 5158–59.

dangers. *Second*, the policy has to be viable with the resources that are at hand. *Third*, the policy should be based on broad political consensus.²¹⁷

As the security policy, furthermore, is created in a political culture of consensus and under the principle of collegiality, the strategy's inclusive bottom-up, rather than courageous top-down, appearance becomes somewhat more understandable. In part, it is this inclusiveness—grown out of and furthering consensus and collegiality—that contributes to Switzerland's consistent performance in pursuing a coherent security policy but also its strategic ponderousness. The author analyzes the first case study in chapter III A, the 2013 conscription initiative, in light of the 2010 security report.

c. Security Report 2016

In May 2013, the Federal Council tasked DDPS to deliver a new security report by the end of 2014.²¹⁸ DDPS fulfilled the task, but not without a delay. The Russian annexation of Crimea in February and March 2014,²¹⁹ and the Swiss public's intervention in security matters with the referendum on the Gripen fund law changed the security environment faced by those drafting the new document.

Consequently, the authors needed more time to draft it. In contrast to earlier security reports, the 2016 report lacked political vision for the future. The authors of the report claimed that at the level of the instruments of security policy—armed forces, Foreign Policy, and Civilian Protection, to name the most important—too many ongoing projects existed. The authors sought to avoid hindering these projects' progress with new strategic guidelines.²²⁰ The report that they finally presented in 2016 managed to deliver a modern threat analysis. The authors, however, missed the opportunity to indicate

²¹⁷ "Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht 2010," 5134.

²¹⁸ Andreas Wenger and Christian Nünlist, "SIPOL-B 16: Ein Bedrohungsbericht, keine Neue Strategiekonzeption," (Security Report 2016: A Report on Threats, Not a Strategic Vision) *Military Power Revue der Schweizer Armee* 1 (2017): 6.

²¹⁹ Gwendolyn Sasse, "Revisiting the 2014 Annexation of Crimea," Carnegie Europe, accessed 15 September 2017, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/03/15/revisiting-2014-annexation-of-crimea-pub-68423>.

²²⁰ Wenger and Nünlist, "SIPOL-B 16: Ein Bedrohungsbericht, keine Neue Strategiekonzeption," 7.

corresponding strategies and concepts.²²¹ It is such lack of strategic vision that the opponents of the Gripen fighter jet fielded for their cause. Opponents argued that one should refrain from procuring expensive weapon systems such as the Gripen, if the strategic intent for the armed forces was so unclear.

Because the writing process of the 2016 security report overlapped with the period when the Swiss voted on the Gripen fund law, the author conducts the analysis of the second case study, in chapter III B, in light of the 2016 security report.

3. Armed Forces

To understand the position from which DDPS and armed forces strategic communication practitioners operate, one needs to understand the situation in which the armed forces currently find themselves: in the Swiss case, as in many others, the end of the Cold War had left a need for reorientation. Strategic planners have not yet satisfactorily fulfilled this task: The armed forces, as the main tool of Swiss security policy, underwent turbulent times since the end of the Cold War. With no clear enemy on which to focus, politicians, as well as military strategists, faced the challenge of defining new areas of engagement and missions for the armed forces. The DDPS, as the home department of the armed forces, was and is primarily involved in security matters.²²² DDPS, specifically, is concerned with the maintenance of a military composed of conscript citizen-soldiers and bearing a profoundly democratic and republican character. In comparison with other Western liberal democracies, Swiss military spending is below average at around one percent of its gross domestic product (GDP).²²³ Although below

²²¹ Wenger and Nünlist, “SIPOL-B 16: Ein Bedrohungsbericht, keine Neue Strategiekonzeption,” 6–19.

²²² Wenger, “Security Policy,” 606.

²²³ Thomas Bernauer and Stefanie Walter, “Die Schweiz im Globalen Kontext,” (Switzerland in Global Context) in *Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, Manuel de la Politique Suisse*, eds. Knoepfel et al., 34–35.

average, Swiss spending is comparable to that of other neutral European states such as Austria.²²⁴

Where the Swiss are unique, however, is in that the citizens are allowed to vote on the existence of their armed forces. On 26 November 1989, the armed forces were the focus of a vote to abolish the military altogether.²²⁵ While the majority of Swiss voters refused to dissolve the armed forces, 36 percent voted for this total disarmament.²²⁶ During the height of the Cold War, to many Swiss such a decision would have been unthinkable since the danger was quite real and memories of WWII still lingered. The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 signaled the easing of international tensions, leading many Swiss to perceive fewer threats. Until this vote in 1989, the armed forces were an almost uncontested institution, a situation that, of course, changed with such a result.

The Swiss Armed Forces found themselves in a challenging situation after the 1989 vote: not only had more than one-third of the voters demanded its abolition, but the international system changed radically also with the growing perception of generalized, enduring peace in the so-called “end of history.”²²⁷ The head of DDPS at the time reacted quickly and ordered the preparation of a new security report.²²⁸ The 1990 report reflected the political ambiguities of the time. The increasing weakness of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the revolutions of the 1980s in some Soviet republics let

²²⁴ Bernauer and Walter, “Die Schweiz im Globalen Kontext,” 34–35; Between 2003 and 2016, the Austrian defense spending fluctuated between 0.7 to 0.9 percent of its GDP. Data retrieved from Herwig Jedlaucnik, “Monetäre Realität Europäischer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,” (Financial Realities in European Security and Defense Politics) Institut für Strategie und Sicherheitspolitik der Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien, accessed 14 October 2017, http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/iss_aktuell_2014_05_edit.pdf, 13; Statista, “Anteil der Militärausgaben am Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) in Österreich von 2003 bis 2016,” (GDP Percentages of Austrian Defense Spending from 2003 to 2016) accessed 14 October 2017, <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/300314/umfrage/anteil-der-militaerausgaben-am-bruttoinlandsprodukt-in-oesterreich/>.

²²⁵ Bernauer and Walter, “Die Schweiz im Globalen Kontext,” 34–35.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ The most prominent proponent being Francis Fukuyama. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest*, no. 16 (1989), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184>, 3.

²²⁸ Bruno Lezzi, “Schweizer Armee zwischen Tradition und Neuen Realitäten,” (The Swiss Armed Forces Caught between Tradition and New Realities) *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 27 June 2009, https://www.nzz.ch/die_armee_zwischen_traditionellen_bindungen_und_neuen_realitaeten-1.2828467.

the Swiss simultaneously hope for greater cooperation as well as fear rising confrontations. The Swiss policymakers' critical assessment of the situation was proven to be right later in the decade. The Swiss were particularly concerned with the developments after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Due to the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later Kosovo, Switzerland accepted about 83,000 refugees. This experience augmented the Swiss interest in finding joint solutions.²²⁹ While accurate in its assessment of further international development, the 1990 report lacked strategic foresight and imposed two parallel paths on Swiss security policy that were hard to combine: developments according to a worst-case scenario with "return to confrontation" and to a best-case scenario with "agreement and cooperation."²³⁰ In line with this situation, the Swiss disagreed on whether to strive for more cooperation with other countries or stronger autonomous defense efforts.

The armed forces, partially as a consequence of the new security report and partially due to existing plans, were reformed with a concept called *Armee 95* (armed forces 95. The number refers to the year of implementation: 1995). Hans-Ulrich Ernst, then the general secretary of the EMD,²³¹ was the father of the 1988 reform concept for the Military Department and the armed forces. He aimed at making both the Department and the armed forces, smaller and more efficient. With the sudden dissolution of the USSR, the concept did not reflect the political change that happened between the concept's creation and its realization. Consequently, the *Armee 95* reform did not go far enough in its attempt to reorganize the armed forces for its current tasks. The head of the DDPS at the time, Federal Councilor Villiger, struggled with the adaptation of his department to these new developments. For example, when in January 1994, NATO announced its intention to launch a practical program to create a partnership with selected

²²⁹ Statistics retrieved from Federal Department of Justice and Police, State Secretariat for Migration, "Humanitarian Tradition," accessed 13 August 2017, <https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/asyl/asyl/humanitaere-tradition.html>.

²³⁰ Gabriel, Bericht Brunner, 2.

²³¹ In 1998, the department was renamed to Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport (DDPS).

states²³² and invited Switzerland to join its Partnership for Peace (PfP), a chance for deeper integration in security matters and cooperation presented itself, well in line with the 1990 security report.²³³ Councilor Villiger and the government, however, did not decide on the invitation to PfP before it had consulted the report of a special commission, which investigated the partnership's compatibility with Swiss neutrality.²³⁴ Only Federal Councilor Villiger's successor, Federal Councilor Ogi, in 1996,²³⁵ convinced Swiss politicians to allow Switzerland to join the PfP with the argument for deeper integration in security matters and cooperation.²³⁶ It was also Federal Councilor Ogi who sought, although this time unsuccessfully, to close ranks with regard to security policy and who, consequently, initiated the bottom-up process leading to the 2000 security report.²³⁷

The federal politician's inability to create a clear strategy led to organizational issues within the armed forces. Some of these security policy issues prevail. Organization and doctrine of the Swiss Armed Forces were, and still are, discussed without taking the Transatlantic and European Security Organizations such as NATO and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) into serious account. Conservative understanding of defense still refers to the autarchic defense of WWII and the Cold War era and lacks understanding of security, including the armed forces, as a system as a whole, interlinked with an international system. As for the armed forces' development, the senior military leadership has to accept partial responsibility; the vision for the Armee

²³² David S. Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 201.

²³³ Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser, and Patrick Lehmann, "Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden—eine Chance für die Schweiz," (The Partnership for Peace—An Opportunity for Switzerland) Center for Security Studies, accessed 8 July 2017, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Bulletin-1997-98-Partnerschaft-fuer-Frieden.pdf>, 58.

²³⁴ Ibid., 70–72.

²³⁵ NATO, "NATO: Relations with Switzerland," last updated 8 December 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/de/natoq/topics_52129.htm.

²³⁶ Wenger, Breitenmoser, and Lehmann, "Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden—eine Chance für die Schweiz," 58.

²³⁷ Lezzi, "Schweizer Armee zwischen Tradition und Neuen Realitäten."

XXI, established in 2004,²³⁸ failed to analyze the international political environment in enough detail as to define the circumstances in which its armed forces should and could cooperate.²³⁹ Thus, rather than focusing on strategic reflections, the politician's discussions about the armed forces concentrated and still concentrate on structural considerations. Accordingly, the Federal Parliament often debated and still debates the armed forces' structure and equipment, rather than addressing the fundamental questions on neutrality, strategy, and doctrine.²⁴⁰ Whereas the need for civil-military cooperation in the development of security policy is uncontested, and political contributions thus needed, the exact procedures are not defined, and outcomes are often suboptimal.²⁴¹ Clear and consensual political directions on the fundamental questions and political restraint on structural questions would allow the armed forces to develop purposefully and promote trust internally and externally, a much-needed asset for armed forces based on conscription.

B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Among the first questions that have to be answered when one wants to take a look at DDPS and Swiss Armed Forces communications' efficiency are: What are the governmental communication agencies' areas of authority and restrictions in fulfilling their tasks? How is strategic communication organized within the Swiss bureaucracy? Also, what goals do the governmental communication agencies pursue? This chapter lays out the characteristics of governmental strategic communication and explains how the agencies of the different hierarchical levels interact. In addition to the limitations imposed on communication practitioners, this chapter strives to illustrate the communication practitioners' limited leeway for their work.

²³⁸ Swissinfo, "Armee 95 Macht den Schritt zur Armee XXI," (Armed Forces 95 Develops into Armed Forces XXI) last modified 16 December 2003, <https://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/armee-95-macht-den-schritt-zur-armee-xxi/3680186>.

²³⁹ Lezzi, "Schweizer Armee zwischen Tradition und Neuen Realitäten."

²⁴⁰ One example is the discussion on which new fighter jet to procure. The author discusses the Gripen procurement in Chapter III B.

²⁴¹ Carell, "Demokratische und Zivile Kontrolle von Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräften," 29–31.

1. Characteristics of Governmental Strategic Communications

Governmental communication agencies at all levels differ from strategic communications, which a civilian institution would and could employ. Governmental communication agencies derive their legitimacy from the national legal framework and are, in all their actions, held accountable in a culture of direct democracy.

a. Areas of Authorization

The areas of authorization for actions of governmental communication derive from the Federal Constitution, the *Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz* (Government and Administration Organization Act),²⁴² the *Bundesgesetz über die politischen Rechte* (Federal Act on Political Rights),²⁴³ and the *Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsverordnung* (Government and Administration Organization Regulation).²⁴⁴ In its Article 180, the Federal Constitution stipulates that part of the Federal Council's duties is to plan and coordinate governmental action and to inform the public early and extensively.²⁴⁵ The Government and Administration Organization Act then specifies these duties. In its Article on information policy, the act states that the Federal Council has to affirm the information of the Federal Assembly, the cantons, and the public.²⁴⁶ The method in which the government has to inform the public is specified in the Federal Act on Political Rights which demands completeness, objectivity,

²⁴² Federal Assembly, "Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz," (Government and Administration Organization Act) accessed 20 September 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19970118/index.html>.

²⁴³ Federal Assembly, "Bundesgesetz über die Politischen Rechte," (Federal Act on Political Rights) accessed 20 September 2017. <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19760323/index.html>.

²⁴⁴ Federal Council, "Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationverordnung," (Government and Administration Organization Regulation) accessed 20 September 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19983439/index.html>.

²⁴⁵ Federal Assembly, *Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, (Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation) Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 1999, Article 180.

²⁴⁶ Federal Assembly, "Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz," Article 10. Also stated in Federal Assembly, "Bundesgesetz über die Politischen Rechte," Article 10.

transparency, proportionality, and agreement with decisions of the Federal Assembly.²⁴⁷ The Government and Administration Organization Act further holds the Federal Council accountable for coordinated, timely, and continuous information on its assessments, plans, decisions, and measures.

The Federal Council is, by law, required to task a leading member of the Federal Chancellery to act as their spokesperson.²⁴⁸ Also, the Federal Council has to actively maintain relations with the public and stay informed on the opinion prevalent in the public discussions.²⁴⁹ Articles 34 and 40 of the act define the flow of information between the Federal Councilors and their respective departments as well as the public.²⁵⁰ This flow of information is further specified in the Government and Administration Organization Regulation, in which the Federal Chancellery is tasked with the planning of federal communication policy.²⁵¹ Finally, Article 54 defines the mission of the Information Conference.²⁵² Many of the Federal Chancellery's and the Information Conference's goals thus derive from legal requirements imposed on the Federal Communications offices. What seems like a long list of rights, is, in fact, in many cases a list of duties.

b. Restrictions

While the Government and Administration Organization Act provides the communication offices with the legal authority to act, and allows the Federal Council to communicate the full breadth of an issue in an objective, transparent, proportional manner, yet the law is as much a restriction as it is an authorization.²⁵³ For example, the

²⁴⁷ Federal Assembly, "Bundesgesetz über die Politischen Rechte," Article 10. Specialists on federal law see the demanded agreement with the Federal Assembly as a challenge when disputed bills are put to a vote. Ulrich Häfelin, Walter Haller, Helen Keller, and Daniela Thurnherr, *Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht*, (Swiss Federal Law) 9th ed. (Zürich: Schulthess, 2016), 420.

²⁴⁸ Federal Assembly, "Bundesgesetz über die Politischen Rechte," Article 10.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 11.

²⁵⁰ Federal Assembly, "Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz," Article 34, 40.

²⁵¹ Federal Council, "Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationverordnung," Article 23.

²⁵² Federal Assembly, "Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz," Article 54.

²⁵³ Federal Assembly, "Bundesgesetz über die Politischen Rechte," Article 10.

act denies the public access to the information discussed in the Federal Council's meetings, a ruling needed to uphold the concept of collegiality.²⁵⁴ The Federal Court's decisions further restrict the Federal Council and the Federal Administration's communication engagement: in more than one judicial ruling, the Court specified what it considered appropriate behavior on behalf of the government or governmental authorities.²⁵⁵ Specifically, the Federal Court prohibited any form of behavior, including communication, that any critic could perceive as a form of governmental propaganda.²⁵⁶ Of course, the line between legitimate information and propaganda is thin.

In addition to the legal restrictions, the federal communication agencies self-censor. In 2001, a Task Force of the Conference of Information Services (TF CIS), researched the Federal Council's and the Federal Administration's communication engagement ahead of national votes and proposed four principles that the Federal Council and Administration should follow to create a framework for future, transparent communication.²⁵⁷ While based on legal and scholarly consultant recommendations, the report strongly encouraged voluntary restrictions on the federal communication agencies' work: the TF claimed these restrictions were necessary to assure the principles of continuity, transparency, objectivity, and proportionality.²⁵⁸ Hence, due to the perceived sensitivity of state intervention in public decision making,²⁵⁹ the 2001 TF CIS provided guidelines for the Federal Council, federal authorities, and communication agencies for

²⁵⁴ Federal Assembly, "Bundesgesetz über die Politischen Rechte," Article 21.

²⁵⁵ Federal Court Rulings 114 Ia 432 E.4a, 113 Ia 295 E.3b, 112Ia 335 E.4b as quoted in Häfelin et al., *Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht*, 418–19.

²⁵⁶ Federal Court Rulings 132 I 104 E. 5.2 as quoted in Häfelin et al., *Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht*, 420.

²⁵⁷ Federal Chancellery, Task Force Conference of Information Services, *Das Engagement von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung im Vorfeld von Eidgenössischen Abstimmungen* (The Federal Council's and Federal Administration's Engagement Ahead of Federal Votes) (Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 2001), 3.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 25–27. Other scholars confirm these recommendations in their work. See, for example, Hardmeier, "Public Relations Der Öffentlichen Hand—Eine Replik Auf Den Propaganda-Vorwurf," 255–56.

²⁵⁹ Federal Chancellery, Task Force Conference of Information Services, *Das Engagement von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung im Vorfeld von Eidgenössischen Abstimmungen*, 24.

their work ahead of national votes,²⁶⁰ and, hence, agreed on rules and regulations that further restrict their daily work.

For example, the TF CIS agreed to limit itself on the use of tools with which other market researchers or opinion leaders usually engage. The TF CIS suggested not excluding opinion polling entirely, but to use surveys to assess the voters' level of education.²⁶¹ Notwithstanding, TF CIS chose to refrain from using surveys to influence the citizens' vote. As usual, the difficulty lies in the details: The line between ascertaining the level of education and influencing a person's vote is often blurred. Critics can argue that any additional information the governmental communication practitioners gain from opinion polls will aim to convince voters of the governmental stance.²⁶² To counter such accusation of propaganda, TF CIS decided to publicize any results of governmental polling activity. Also, in the four weeks before the day of the vote, to avoid being accused of manipulation, members of government and the federal administration must restrain from conducting opinion polls and publishing results altogether.²⁶³ However, this were the interesting period: many citizens decide only shortly before the vote.²⁶⁴ Consequently, the polling tool loses much of its actual utility. So, it is not surprising that 82 percent of all governmental communication practitioners stated in a representative survey that they had not once used polling in 2000.²⁶⁵ Also, out of 12 offices affected by national votes in 1999 and 2000, only four had used a public opinion survey to prepare their respective campaigns.²⁶⁶ Hence, while Swiss law imposes many constraints on the

²⁶⁰ Federal Chancellery, Task Force Conference of Information Services, *Das Engagement von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung im Vorfeld von Eidgenössischen Abstimmungen*, 3.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 32.

²⁶² Ibid., 34.

²⁶³ Ibid., 33.

²⁶⁴ A 2000 study showed that around 30 percent of voters have a clear opinion from when the issue at stake is presented, around 40 percent make their decision around three to one week(s) before the vote and around 17 percent of voters decide within days before the vote. Vox Study No. 72 as cited in Federal Chancellery, Task Force Conference of Information Services, *Das Engagement von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung im Vorfeld von Eidgenössischen Abstimmungen*, 28.

²⁶⁵ Hardmeier, "Public Relations Der Öffentlichen Hand—Eine Replik Auf Den Propaganda-Vorwurf," 252.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 253.

communication practitioners' liberties, the communication practitioners voluntarily limit themselves further.

c. Target Groups

Overall, to ensure successful governance, governmental communication targets all internal and external stakeholders during all political phases.²⁶⁷ Political communication agencies, therefore, have to address a wide range of target groups simultaneously.²⁶⁸ Internal communication comprises the three fields of leadership communication, the internal spread of information based on the evaluation of environment, and the cultivation of relations with staff members.²⁶⁹ While these three fields are crucial for the authorities to function efficiently, the internal forms of communication do not pertain to this study. Instead, the external communication practice is of interest. The agencies' external communications, as explained in the section on the agencies' restrictions, are largely constrained by the law. In the Swiss context, external governmental communication is mainly what Edwin Czerwick calls media relations.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ Based on Neuron and Zielmann's definition of state communication. Alessia C. Neuron and Sarah Zielmann, "Staatskommunikation: Definition und Forschungsfragen aus Publizistikwissenschaftlicher Perspektive," (State Communication: Research Questions and Definitions from a Media Studies Perspective) *Medienwissenschaft Schweiz*, No. 1 (2004): 4.

²⁶⁸ Sybille Hardmeier, "Public Relations der Öffentlichen Hand in der Schweiz," (Governmental Agencies' Public Relations in Switzerland) *Politische Kommunikation in der Schweiz* (2005), 91; Hardmeier, "Public Relations Der Öffentlichen Hand—Eine Replik Auf Den Propaganda-Vorwurf," 246.

²⁶⁹ Czerwick, "Verwaltungskommunikation," 490–91.

²⁷⁰ Czerwick in his work also refers to public relations and governmental information campaigns. The author specifies the applicability of public relations in the Swiss context later in the paragraph. The third form of external governmental communications is information campaigns. Governmental information campaigns, according to Czerwick, strive to pass on information. Such campaigns can include the replies to inquiries, clarifications, warnings, or advice. While not always sharply distinguishable, these means differ in their emphasis. The content of a reply to an inquiry might be the same as the basic information provided during a media relation campaign, but the difference here is that the information is released on request. Contents of information campaigns mainly fulfill the government's duty to inform its citizens of dangers (such as smoking, or excessive alcohol abuse), or of offers and the services of the welfare state. Czerwick, "Verwaltungskommunikation," (Communication of Administrations) 492.

Media relations are a central part of the governmental communication agencies' work.²⁷¹ Although the media has diversified in recent years and new forms of information distribution have found their way into the public sphere,²⁷² the impact that the authorities have through traditional media coverage remains significant.²⁷³ Media relations comprise the release of communiqués to the press, the organization of press conferences, conversation, and interviews, as well as facilitating contacts with specialists.²⁷⁴ Additionally, scholars consider governmental agencies' publications as part of media relations.²⁷⁵ With the intent of using the media to increase resonance and to multiply the spread of governmental information, the authorities consequently have to respect the media's need and communicate accordingly.²⁷⁶ As Sybille Hardmeier states, media relations are of particular significance for governmental communication agencies because they, in contrast to communication agencies of civilian, market-oriented institutions, need the media to facilitate their communication with the public.²⁷⁷ The governmental communication agencies thus reach their primary audience, the citizens, only indirectly.

Czerwick, in his contribution to the handbook on political communication, also referred to governmental public relations as one form of governmental strategic communications. He sees governmental public relations as a means of "acceptance management."²⁷⁸ In this function, the governmental agency advertises for its position on

²⁷¹ Czerwick, "Verwaltungskommunikation," 492. Sybille Hardmeier refers to the same aim, when she describes the information function of governmental communication. Hardmeier, "Public Relations Der Öffentlichen Hand—Eine Replik Auf Den Propaganda-Vorwurf," 249; Hardmeier, "Public Relations der Öffentlichen Hand in der Schweiz," 91.

²⁷² Federal Chancellery, *Information und Kommunikation von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung: Leitbild der Konferenz der Informationsdienste (KID)* (Information and Communication of the Federal Council and the Federal Administration: Principles of the Conference of Information Services (CIS)), (Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 2015), 3.

²⁷³ Federal Chancellery, Task Force Conference of Information Services, *Das Engagement von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung im Vorfeld von Eidgenössischen Abstimmungen*, 35.

²⁷⁴ Czerwick, "Verwaltungskommunikation," 492.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.; Federal Chancellery, *Information und Kommunikation von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung: Leitbild der Konferenz der Informationsdienste (KID)*, 23.

²⁷⁷ Hardmeier, "Public Relations der Öffentlichen Hand in der Schweiz," 94.

²⁷⁸ Czerwick, "Verwaltungskommunikation," 492.

the issue at stake and promotes the government's image to the public.²⁷⁹ Hardmeier agrees on these two functions of strategic communications, but she refers to them separately. In Hardmeier's words, acceptance management becomes "issue and decision management."²⁸⁰ In her view, communication also promotes the government's good image, a function that she simply calls "image management."²⁸¹ Although the different authors choose different ways of grouping, they agree on the functions that governmental communication serves. However, the combination of the Swiss legal framework, popular rights, and the reflective value system, widely denies Swiss practitioners of strategic communications the function of image management.²⁸² Consequently, the author expects to find only a limited range of public relations methods applied by Swiss governmental communication agencies in her analysis of the two national votes.

d. Implications

The areas of authorization and the restrictions imposed on Swiss governmental communication practitioners influence their daily work. The Federal Constitution and the legal framework, restrictions, and implementation orders on the federal government limit the tools available to the communication agencies. As if these restrictions were not enough, TF CIS further limits the tools available to governmental communication agencies. Naturally, governmental institutions have an information advantage, given the fact that policies were developed in their realm. Consequently, the media first turn to the governmental bodies in search for information on a topic that will be brought to a vote. The practitioners are aware of their information lead, which some scholars even call a "governmental bias,"²⁸³ on topics that are put to the vote. Communication practitioners, however, either for the sake of fairness or the fear of unfavorable public perception, restrain from taking profit from this lead. Hence, these self-imposed limitations are a

²⁷⁹ Czerwick, "Verwaltungskommunikation," 492.

²⁸⁰ Hardmeier, "Public Relations Der Öffentlichen Hand—Eine Replik Auf Den Propaganda-Vorwurf," 250.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 251.

²⁸² Compare with the author's explanations in Chapter II B, 1 B.

²⁸³ Marcinkowski, Flemming, and Starke, "Mediensystem und Politische Kommunikation," 453.

feature of a well-developed modern democracy in continental Europe (versus some other contemporary examples where self-control might be said to be deficient) and a strategic leadership that is well aware of the limited role the government is allowed to play in a direct democracy, such as in the Swiss case. Members of the government and the federal authorities are careful to respect the citizens and their right to make their decisions independently from any state intervention.

At the same time, governmental communication practitioners have to address a wide range of stakeholders, allowing them less specificity in their messaging.²⁸⁴ Given the widely accepted need for communicators to target messages to a specific audience,²⁸⁵ such broad audiences result in diluted messaging. One can thus not expect governmental communication agencies to communicate as efficiently as civilian agencies.

Finally, many scholars agree that “being persuaded is seldom, if ever, a one-message proposition.”²⁸⁶ Rather, to change a person’s behavior in the long term and assure the wanted voting behavior, communication practitioners, once a voter is persuaded, should engage in response-reinforcing messaging.²⁸⁷ Targeted messaging then is a process. Hence, when TF CIS, due to cultural reasons rooted in direct democracy, imposed a polling ban during the critical period of a political campaign and thus denied a targeted communication to specific voter groups,²⁸⁸ communication agencies cannot operate to full effect. Also, the reader should consider Kriesi’s finding: “Campaigns [have] ... massive effects on the voters’ choices, which confirms the increasingly popular

²⁸⁴ Hardmeier, “Public Relations der Öffentlichen Hand in der Schweiz,” 94–95.

²⁸⁵ James L. Garnett, *Communicating for Results in Government: A Strategic Approach for Public Managers* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 22–24; Christopher Carpenter, Franklin J. Boster and Kyle R. Andrews, “Functional Attitude Theory,” in *The SAGE Handbook of Persuasion Developments in Theory and Practice*, 2nd ed., eds. James Price Dillard and Lijiang Shen (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2013), 103–4.

²⁸⁶ Miller and Burgoon, and Saltiel and Woelfel as cited in Gerald R. Miller, “On Being Persuaded: Some Basic Distinctions,” in *The SAGE Handbook of Persuasion Developments in Theory and Practice*, 2nd ed., eds. James Price Dillard and Lijiang Shen (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2013), 76.

²⁸⁷ Miller, “On Being Persuaded: Some Basic Distinctions,” 76–77.

²⁸⁸ Targeted communication would include response-changing messages to opposing voters, response-reinforcing messages to supporting voters, and response-shaping messages to hesitant voters. For the theory behind this, see Miller, “On Being Persuaded: Some Basic Distinctions,” 73–80.

idea that ‘campaigns matter.’”²⁸⁹ The governmental communication agencies’ constraint and restraint in the process of campaigning, thus, matters.

2. Federal Communication Agency

While a large number of contributors to the Swiss security policy does not make the task of pursuing a coherent policy any more straightforward, there are institutions in place that strive to promote Swiss national security strategy. On the federal level, the Federal Chancellery provides communication coordination among the seven departments and interdepartmental services.

a. Organization

Within Swiss bureaucracy, the communication agencies are organized hierarchically. On the federal level, the Federal Chancellery serves as communication agency. The federal communication agency thus leads and coordinates all departmental sub-agencies. The means are communication sections that aim to achieve strategic communication “across organizational endeavors.”²⁹⁰ More specifically, the task of providing consistency in communications is fulfilled by the section for communication and strategy, a subordinate to the Federal Chancellery.²⁹¹ Communication and strategy consist of three sub-sections: communication, communication support, and strategic management support,²⁹² each contributing to its field.

First, the *communications* sub-section pursues and achieves an integrated communication procedure, ensuring that various communication channels are “coordinated regarding content, timing, and appearance.”²⁹³ With the goal of communication efficiency, the section works closely with the federal departments to determine how, where, and when to communicate decisions. This section provides

²⁸⁹ Kriesi, *Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns: Enlightening or Manipulating?* 234.

²⁹⁰ Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 7.

²⁹¹ Federal Chancellery, “Bereich Kommunikation und Strategie.”

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Federal Chancellery, “Sektion Kommunikation.”

products such as online communication by the authorities and government, the management of crisis communication, internal and external information about Federal Chancellery business, and the running of the media center.²⁹⁴

Communications support, the second sub-section, functions as the administration's communication agency. Their consultancy includes conceptual as well as strategic questions.²⁹⁵ Finally, the third sub-section, the *strategic management support* section, among other tasks, drafts the Federal Council's reports.²⁹⁶ Strategic management support also prepares the Federal Council's legislature plan and its annual objectives in coordination with the seven departments. In preparation, it produces a report for the Federal Council on possible long-term challenges. For this matter, the sub-section continually analyzes global trends to detect medium-term strategic crisis potential and to foresee its potential impact on political planning.²⁹⁷

b. Goals

On the federal level, the Federal Chancellery, with its concept of integrated communication, strives for coordination among the Federal Council and the seven departments as well as inter-departmentally. The communication specialists on the federal level follow the guidelines of active communication as agreed by the conference of information services of the federal bureaucracy. Their goal is to inform, to explain causal links, and to promote transparency to build trust for the Federal Council and the Federal Administration.²⁹⁸ The federal communication practitioners seek to support the public in its legitimate right to be made aware of governmental decision-making processes.

²⁹⁴ Federal Chancellery, "Sektion Kommunikation."

²⁹⁵ Federal Chancellery, "Sektion Kommunikationsunterstützung."

²⁹⁶ Federal Chancellery, "Sektion Strategische Führungsunterstützung."

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Federal Chancellery, *Information und Kommunikation von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung: Leitbild der Konferenz der Informationsdienste (KID)*, 5; Hardmeier, "Public Relations der Öffentlichen Hand in der Schweiz," 98–100.

The federal practitioners strive to communicate in three phases and according to ten guiding principles. These phases reflect the process of communication. In the *first* step of federal communications, the practitioners explain the issue itself, illustrate how the Federal Council and Administration assess a specific situation, what means they have at hand or intend to acquire, and in which period the Federal Council intends to impose measures to deal with the issue. In the *second* phase, communication practitioners lay out the options with their respective pros and cons and enable open and broad discussions among interested parties. In the *third* and last phase, communication practitioners explain the Federal Council's decision and why the chosen solution is preferable to other options.²⁹⁹

Throughout these phases, according to the Conference of Information Services, federal communication practitioners should follow ten principles to achieve their goal. *First*, practitioners strive to communicate actively.³⁰⁰ It is the duty of federal authorities to inform the public, rather than the citizens' duty to inquire about an issue. The Government and Administration Organization Act in its Article 10 holds the Federal Council responsible for consistent, prompt, and regular information on its assessments, plans, decisions, and provisions.³⁰¹ Active information causes fewer misinterpretations, prejudices, and leaked information. *Second*, governmental communications should happen early, but certainly or on time. Through ongoing and complete information cycles, the Federal Council, the Federal Administration, and their communication practitioners seek to avoid speculations and rumors.³⁰² *Third*, all information has to be objective and truthful. Members of federal authorities are expected to avoid spreading propagandistic, manipulative, deceiving, faulty, or misleading information.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ Federal Chancellery, *Information und Kommunikation von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung: Leitbild der Konferenz der Informationsdienste (KID)*, 5.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁰¹ Federal Assembly, "Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz," Article 10.

³⁰² Federal Chancellery, *Information und Kommunikation von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung: Leitbild der Konferenz der Informationsdienste (KID)*, 9.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 9–10.

Fourth, communication practitioners of the federal authorities must inform extensively. The public has the right to know all relevant facts and figures as long as no important public or private interests contradict their publication. Whether this information will further or hinder governmental plans is irrelevant. While it is appropriate to reduce complexity in the communication of federal issues, this reduction must never lead to an unbalanced perspective.³⁰⁴ *Fifth*, the principle of collegiality³⁰⁵ demands that the Federal Council speak with one voice to the public. Although members of the Federal Council, or their respective political parties, might disagree with a decision, collegiality demands that they defend the collegial decision. In this function, the principle of collegiality contradicts the principle of transparent information.³⁰⁶ *Sixth*, to speak with one voice, members of the government, governmental authorities and communication practitioners must coordinate all communication. The preferred method is the daily telephone conference of practitioners, the monthly conference of communications agencies and further meetings, called upon on demand.³⁰⁷

Seventh, governmental communication should start as early as possible and be ongoing. It is against the communication principles to withhold information for tactical reasons.³⁰⁸ *Eighth*, transparency is a principle of governmental information. Citizens must be able to identify the source of information so that a free democratic process can be ensured.³⁰⁹ *Ninth*, governmental information practices should encourage dialogue. Article 11 of the Government and Administration Organization Act holds the Federal Council responsible for dialogue and interaction with the Swiss population.³¹⁰

³⁰⁴ Federal Chancellery, *Information und Kommunikation von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung: Leitbild der Konferenz der Informationsdienste (KID)*, 10.

³⁰⁵ The author has explained the principle in chapter II A, 1 a.

³⁰⁶ Federal Chancellery, *Information und Kommunikation von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung: Leitbild der Konferenz der Informationsdienste (KID)*, 11.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., 13.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

Finally, governmental communication should focus on its respective target group and should be presented in a manner suitable to the media. Information must be understandable and accessible to all media channels at the same time.³¹¹ Given the broad range of stakeholders and the four official national languages, this principle is often hard to achieve. While some of these principles define the communication goal's level of achievement, others, such as the time of communication, are widely self-imposed. In any case, while offering guidance, these principles also restrict practitioners.

3. Departmental Communication Agencies

In addition to the federal endeavors, the departments maintain their own communication sections, which are subordinates to the federal communication agency. The departmental communication agencies operate in close cooperation with the Federal Chancellery, that is the Federal Council's communications agency and are responsible for their internal and external communication.³¹²

a. Organization

DDPS communication agency coordinates the political communication for all its offices. Therefore, the departmental communication agency of DDPS handles more and broader issues than the armed forces alone. The following Federal Offices are part of the department's responsibilities: armed forces, civil protection, sport, defense procurements, and the federal intelligence service. To handle all these areas, the DDPS communication agency at the time of this writing has 13 employees, organized into two main units (depicted in Figure 1).³¹³

³¹¹ Federal Chancellery, *Information und Kommunikation von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung: Leitbild der Konferenz der Informationsdienste (KID)*, 13.

³¹² Federal Council, "Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationverordnung," Article 23; Federal Chancellery, "Bereich Kommunikation und Strategie."

³¹³ The chart depicts the agency's 2017 organization. The author has not been able to acquire organizational charts of earlier periods of time. While it is unlikely that the communication agency's setup has changed much, it would have been of interest to compare the agency's contributions in the two case studies presented in Chapter III with their respective contemporary setup.




Figure 1. Organizational Chart of DDPS Communication Agency.³¹⁴

The agency is led by the head of departmental communication, who presides over the entire agency. The deputy head of departmental communication (DHDC-DDPS) is the head of all information operations as well as the strategy unit. The eight employees concerned with media relations, web content management, and those of the back office make part of the information unit that the DHDC-DDPS manages. The strategy unit with a total of two full-time employees and a collegial trainee is even smaller. While a communication agency's size alone does not necessarily reflect on its contribution and performance, it is likely that a small agency with finite resources is more limited in its actions. The author can, therefore, understand why the DDPS communication agency does not produce reports on strategic control, or monitoring, or on the analysis of communication policies and security discussions in the media.

b. Goals

The DDPS communication agency has a mission statement in which it has defined two overarching goals and five objectives to achieve those goals. At the departmental

³¹⁴ Adapted from email to author by Renato Kalbermatten, DHDC-DDPS, 3 October 2017.

level, the DDPS communication agency is the significant point of information in many matters of national security; with its concept of integrated communication, the agency strives for coordination among its offices.³¹⁵ To achieve this overarching goal the DDPS communication agency has defined two sub-goals. *First*, it aims to communicate resolutely in matters of national security. DDPS wants to be the topic leader in public discourse for matters of security policy.³¹⁶ *Second*, DDPS strives for consistency in content. DDPS communication efforts target the Swiss public sphere in all its breadth. Thus, citizens receive the same coherent messages that are simple and easy to comprehend.³¹⁷

Based on the previous two overarching goals, the DDPS communication agency has defined five operative objectives. They must be implemented by DDPS communication and all sub-agencies. *Objective One* holds that all communication must stress the relevant DDPS contributions to national security. The means to convey this content are simple, precise, understandable, and targeted messages that promote the performance and missions of all DDPS offices. *Objective Two* holds that DDPS communication be the topic leader in all matters of national security through the ongoing analysis of the communication situation, the anticipation of adequate measures, and professional advice to the head of the department and the heads of offices. The *Third Objective* is to promote DDPS credibility through immediate, transparent, comprehensible, and fact-based content. To achieve such credibility, internal coordination and consolidation are essential for the agency. *Objective Four*, less relevant for matters of security policy, promotes the importance of sport in politics and society. *Objective Five*, finally, holds that DDPS and its sub-office communication agencies must be prepared for extraordinary situations. Due to this objective, all DDPS communication

³¹⁵ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, General Secretariat, “VBS—Sicherheit—Vertrauen—Zuverlässigkeit: Kommunikationskonzept VBS,” (DDPS—Security—Trust—Reliability: Plan for DDPS communications) received from Renato Kalbermatten, Head of Communication DDPS, email message to author, 19 June 2017, 4.

³¹⁶ While the same is the case for matters of sport policies, another thematic branch in DDPS, it is of less relevance for this work. Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, General Secretariat, “VBS—Sicherheit—Vertrauen—Zuverlässigkeit: Kommunikationskonzept VBS,” 4.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

agencies must establish processes to communicate fast, efficiently, and in a coordinated manner.³¹⁸ In all their actions, DDPS communication agencies, as governmental communication agencies, fall under the same legal restrictions as the federal communication agencies. As the departmental agencies are subordinates of the federal communication agencies, they also have to respect all executive orders of TF CIS. The DDPS communication agency's mission statement reflects its intent to communicate strategically.

4. Communication Agencies on the Office Level: Armed Forces Communication

The armed forces communication agency (depicted in Figure 2) is one of the subordinate agencies to DDPS. It is thus positioned at the office level. The armed forces communication agency aligns its contents with the DDPS communication office and pursues the same communication goals.³¹⁹ On the defense office level, the *Komm V* (an abbreviation of *Kommunikation Verteidigung*, literally meaning Defense Communication)³²⁰ handles communication concerning the armed forces. With the armed forces as the main tool of Swiss national security, the armed forces communication agency is of relevance to all security matters.³²¹

³¹⁸ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, General Secretariat, “VBS—Sicherheit—Vertrauen—Zuverlässigkeit: Kommunikationskonzept VBS (DDPS—Security—Trust—Reliability: Plan for DDPS communications),” 5.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

³²⁰ To improve distinguishability, the author from here on refers to armed forces communication.

³²¹ The chart shown reflects the organization as of 2014, the time of the Gripen campaign. While the author has also received the organizational charts of earlier stages, the structure has not changed significantly.




Figure 2. Organizational Chart of the Armed Forces Communication Agency.³²²

The head of armed forces communication presides over the entire agency. Two employees (1.4 full-time equivalents (FTE)) work for the CHAF directly and are subordinated for administrative reasons only: the scientific consultant and his colleague are providing direct support to the CHAF personally. Three employees are concerned with the media relations. Five employees (3.8 FTE) manage internal communication and are thus prepared to communicate with troops. With 4.9 FTE, the largest unit is concerned with leadership communication. They are, thus, most concerned with the messaging necessary to align the armed forces communication agency's work with other agencies.³²³ The need for alignment includes the superior agency of DDPS but also the other offices' agencies on par with armed forces communication. However, the head of the public relations project also makes part of this unit and brings some external

³²² Adapted from email to author from Christoph Brunner, Scientific Consultant to Chief of Armed Forces, 9 August 2017.

³²³ Czerwick, "Verwaltungskommunikation," 490.

communication capacity into this unit. Also, there is one person who is tasked with the control of communication processes; he or she is also responsible for preparing the foundational principles of defense communication and planning of future communication campaigns. Thus, it seems clear to the author that the head of foundational principles/planning/and control is not able to spend much time on the analysis of past communication campaigns. The limitation of capacities in workforce in this specific area explains, in the author's opinion, why the defense communication agency does not produce relevant reports on strategic control of DDPS and armed forces communication, on monitoring and analysis of communication policies, and on security discussions in the media.

5. Conclusion

The communication agencies are set up to communicate strategically as is implied by the way that the federal, departmental, and office communication agencies interact. This author takes as a given the factors of her initial definition of strategic communication:³²⁴ the aspects of coordination and the spread of correct and discursive information are clearly stated.

The agencies, however, are well kept in check through legal restrictions and the limited available workforce that agencies are granted. While the legal restrictions apply to all levels of administration, they go even further for DDPS. With respect to the political side's requirement for a strict mandate of non-interference from the military, the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies widely respect their increased limitations. Although crippling the potential of strategic communications in the defense sector, these limitations—in Swiss understanding—are proof of functioning checks and balances in civil-military relations.

³²⁴ Strategic communications are coordinated informational, persuasive, and discursive actions, messages, images, and other forms of signaling or engagement intended to create an organization's purposeful interaction with its environment. Author's definition based on Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 17; Paul, *Strategic Communication*, 3.

III. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS IN PRACTICE

This chapter analyzes whether the Swiss communication agencies' limitations and inefficiencies create unwanted outcomes for DDPS. Specifically, it takes up two contrasting case studies: With the voters' refusal to accept the 2013 initiative on the abolition of conscription service, DDPS achieved its desired outcome. On the other hand, the voters' acceptance of the 2014 referendum against the Gripen procurement left DDPS without much needed new fighter jets.

A. 2013 INITIATIVE "YES TO THE ABOLITION OF CONSCRIPTION SERVICE"

Conscription service is a topic of ongoing discussion in several European states. France, the motherland of the *levée en masse*, abolished conscription in 2001.³²⁵ Italy followed in 2005.³²⁶ Germany suspended the draft in 2011. In line with these developments, the promoters of the *Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht*³²⁷ (Yes to the abolition of conscription service) initiative tried to get rid of the draft in Switzerland. On 22 September 2013, however, the Swiss electorate refused to amend Article 59 of the Federal Constitution, and conscription remained in force.³²⁸ Shortly afterward, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden considered reestablishing conscription, notably after Russia's annexation of Crimea. Without an imminent threat at their borders, though, the Swiss must have seen other values in the draft. The question then arises: Why, given the personnel recruitment trends in Switzerland's vicinity, have the Swiss remained so supportive of their draft?

³²⁵ Ian Phillips, "Conscription Drummed out as France Gets Professional," *Independent*, accessed 26 September 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/conscription-drummed-out-as-france-gets-professional-1349677.html>.

³²⁶ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, "Italien schafft Wehrpflicht ab," (Italy Abolishes Conscription) accessed 26 September 2017, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/rom-italien-schafft-wehrpflicht-ab-1.641691>.

³²⁷ "Bundesgesetz über die Armee und die Militärverwaltung," (Federal Law on the Armed Forces and the Military Administration) accessed 11 June 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis391.html>.

³²⁸ Swiss citizens had voted with a clear 73.2 percent majority against the initiative for the abolition of conscription service. Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, "Armee-relevante Abstimmungen."

One line of argument holds that the executive branch, given its preference for keeping the draft to man its armed forces,³²⁹ influenced the vote in favor of maintaining conscription.³³⁰ If so, this vote would make a case for successful governmental communication. This author is particularly interested in determining how, and, to what extent, the democratically constrained Swiss senior leadership and its governmental communication agencies as part of the executive branch influenced the citizens during the period of decision making.

1. Initiative Content and Outcome

Article 59 of the Swiss Constitution requires that “every Swiss man ... do[es] military service.”³³¹ Those men who, for moral reasons, claim to be unable to serve in the armed forces, can substitute military service with civilian service, while those men who do not serve at all or fail to fully fulfill their military obligations pay compensation.³³² This compensation is sometimes also called the “exemption from the obligation to serve tax.”³³³ By law, female Swiss citizens are allowed, but not required, to serve in the

³²⁹ Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 22. September 2013: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” (National vote of 22 September 2013: Explanations from the Federal Council) accessed 21 October 2017, <https://www.bk.admin.ch/themen/pore/va/20130922/index.html?lang=de>, 5.

³³⁰ *Aargauer Zeitung*, “Kritik an Armee- ‘Propaganda:’ Hohe Offiziere werben im WK für die Wehrpflicht,” (Critique of Armed Forces-‘Propaganda:’ Senior Leadership Promotes Conscription during Repetition Courses), last modified 16 August 2013, <https://www.aargauerzeitung.ch/schweiz/kritik-an-armee-propaganda-hohe-offiziere-werben-im-wk-fuer-die-wehrpflicht-126668239>; Ruedi Studer, “Armee-Gegner kritisieren Polit-Propaganda am Feldschiessen: Schützen wollen GSoA-Initiative Abschiessen,” (Opponents of the Armed Forces Criticize Political Propaganda at a Shooting Event: Marksmen Try to Shoot Down the Initiative Brought to Vote by the Group for Switzerland without an Armed Forces) *Blick*, last modified 31 May 2013, <https://www.blick.ch/news/schweiz/armee-gegner-kritisieren-polit-propaganda-am-feldschiessen-schuetzen-wollen-gsoa-initiative-abschiessen-id2321625.html>; Federal Council, Balthasar Glättli, National Councilor, *Frage an den Bundesrat 13.5917: Verhinderung von Propaganda gegen die Wehrpflicht-Initiative im Militärdienst* (Question for the Federal Council No. 13.5917: Avoidance of Propaganda against the Conscription-Initiative During Military Service), 13.5917, (Bern, Switzerland: 4 June 2013), <https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaefft?AffairId=20135197>.

³³¹ Swiss Confederation, *Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation* (Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 1999): Article 59.

³³² Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 22. September 2013: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 5.

³³³ Organisation of the Swiss Abroad (OSA), “Military Service Exemption Tax,” accessed 23 October 2017, <http://aso.ch/en/consultation/living-abroad/military-service/military-service-exemption-tax>.

military or civilian service. Also, female citizens, who choose not to serve, do not pay any taxes to compensate for any form of service.³³⁴

On 5 January 2012, the *Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee* (GSoA) (Group for a Switzerland without Armed Forces) formally, through the demand for an initiative vote, requested that the Swiss government abolish conscription service.³³⁵ In the view of GSoA, the Swiss Armed Forces should no longer consist of conscripts but volunteer militia soldiers. To succeed, GSoA had to collect the verified signatures of 100,000 citizens.³³⁶ On 31 January 2012, the Federal Chancellery declared the initiative valid, meaning that it had checked the signatures for their validity.³³⁷

The Federal Council requested the two chambers of the Federal Assembly to advise the electorate to repudiate the initiative,³³⁸ to which both chambers agreed. In the ballot pamphlet, the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly claimed that if the initiative were accepted at the ballot box, the armed forces could no longer guarantee Switzerland's security.³³⁹ They claimed the initiative was irresponsible and would make Switzerland dependent on the uncertainty of finding the necessary number of volunteers. The executive and the legislative branches also highlighted that the Swiss Armed Forces, at the time, were well trusted because of large parts of the society serving; also, the society supported the armed forces that, in turn, furthered solidarity and cohesion within

³³⁴ Federal Chancellery, "Volksabstimmung vom 22. September 2013: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates," 5.

³³⁵ Federal Chancellery, "Eidgenössische Volksinitiative 'Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht,'" (Federal Initiative 'Yes to the Abolition of Conscription') accessed 21 October 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis391.html>.

³³⁶ Swiss Confederation, *Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation*, Article 138-139.

³³⁷ Federal Chancellery, "Eidgenössische Volksinitiative 'Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht.'"

³³⁸ Federal Council, "Botschaft zur Volksinitiative 'Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht,'" (Message with Regard to the Popular Initiative Initiative 'Yes to the Abolition of Conscription') accessed 21 October 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2012/8285.pdf>; Maximilian Schubiger, "Volksinitiative 'Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht,'" (Initiative 'Yes to the Abolition of Conscription') *Année Politique Suisse*, last modified 1 July 2016, https://anneepolitique.swiss/articles?keywords%5B%5D=140&start_date=2011-12-31&stop_date=2013-09-30.

³³⁹ Federal Chancellery, "Volksabstimmung vom 22. September 2013: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates," 5.

society.³⁴⁰ The national elites argued that all these factors could not be relied upon after a switch to a volunteer militia force. Hence, they claimed that, overall, the advantages of the conscription force status quo well outweighed a volunteer militia force. On 22 September 2013, the Swiss electorate confirmed the executive and the legislative branches' views at the ballot box: 73.2 percent of all voters and all 26 cantons rejected the initiative, confirming their support for the recruitment through conscription.³⁴¹

a. Arguments of the Supporters

The initiators, GSoA, made the following points to explain their attempt to abolish conscription: conscription is a costlier form of armed forces' recruitment than reliance on volunteers, and a force without conscription would be smaller and less expensive.³⁴² Further, they argued conscription be senseless and outdated, so the Swiss Armed Forces should be organized with volunteers (who would keep the militia principle). Another point they cited was that only around 50 percent of all draftees are incorporated in the armed forces. According to GSoA, this percentage proved that the armed forces do not need all draftees to serve. Swiss citizens should be allowed more freedom and personal choice and, thus, decide for themselves whether they want to serve. Finally, they argued laws that discriminate between men and women are outdated and, hence, conscription, being such a law, should be abandoned.³⁴³

b. Arguments of the Opponents

Since the administration is restricted in its campaigning, there was need for a committee to form. A cross-party committee constituted the core of opponents of the initiative, that is, the supporters of conscription. The committee operated with five main

³⁴⁰ Federal Chancellery, "Volksabstimmung vom 22. September 2013: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates," 5.

³⁴¹ Federal Chancellery, "Volksabstimmung vom 22.09.2013."

³⁴² GSoA, "Wehrpflicht aufheben! Argumente (Abolish Conscription! Arguments)," accessed 6 October 2017, <http://www.gsoa.ch/themen/wehrpflicht/argumente/>.

³⁴³ Ibid.

arguments to counter the initiator's explanations.³⁴⁴ Also, the committee referred to the initiative as the "insecurity-initiative," stressing what they perceived would be the effect of the initiative, rather than calling the initiative by its official name. The con committee brought up the following arguments. *First*, to rely on an all-volunteer militia force would be impractical in the Swiss economic context; the Swiss could not find enough volunteers for the armed forces to fulfill the armed forces' constitutional duties. *Second*, without conscription, not only the armed forces but also the branches of Civil Protection and Civil Service, would no longer function. The committee urged the electorate not to undertake experiments over national security. *Third*, in the case of an emergency, a force made up of volunteers would not be ready to engage. At such a time, a return to conscription would be more than challenging. *Fourth*, conscription and the militia principle allow the Swiss authorities to adjust the armed forces' size to current needs and levels of security. *Fifth*, and finally, to build a professional force would be an unrealistic scenario for a neutral and alliance-free country such as Switzerland because of the costs, the size of the recruitment pool, the potential for a civil-military gap, as well as a lack of political support.³⁴⁵ The underlying argument thus was that the abolition of conscription would, in its final outcome, mean the complete abolition of the armed forces.

2. Overall Attitude toward the Armed Forces

The general mood within society influences votes. The author of this thesis argues that the overall attitude of the electorate toward the armed forces can serve as a general indicator of outcomes of a specific, armed forces-related vote. Since 1999, the "Center for Security Studies (CSS), *Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH) Zürich und die Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich*" (CSS at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich and the Military Academy at ETH Zurich) assess such security-specific mood and have published their yearly security studies.

³⁴⁴ Überparteiliches Komitee NEIN zur Unsicherheits-Initiative, NEIN zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht (Cross-party Committee NO to the Initiative that Causes Insecurity, NO to the Abolition of Conscription), "Nein zur schädlichen Unsicherheits-Initiative," (No to the Harmful Initiative that Causes Insecurity) accessed 6 October 2017, <https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/medienmappe-contra.pdf>.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

The authors of *Security 2013*, the pivotal study in the field of Swiss security policy, analyzed seven areas to measure Swiss opinion on the armed forces. The researchers based their analysis on a statistically significant data-set to assess the Swiss voters' opinion on security matters.³⁴⁶ Among other categories,³⁴⁷ the researchers specifically assessed the Swiss voters' support for the established form of personnel recruitment.³⁴⁸ The main finding of the study demonstrated that a majority of Swiss voters find the armed forces relevant, and trustworthy, and have an overall positive stance toward the armed forces.³⁴⁹ Moreover, in the study's 2013 survey, 56 percent of all persons questioned favored the conscript force. With an increase of four percentage points in comparison with the 2012 survey, this finding was statistically significant.³⁵⁰ It seems clear that the committee against the abolition of the draft profited from this supportive attitude.

3. Strategy of DDPS / Armed Forces Communication

DDPS communication practitioners planned meticulously for their strategic communications' campaign, leading to the vote on 22 September 2013.³⁵¹ The authors of the plan were positioned at the departmental level; this plan, however, was valid for all communication sub-units, including armed forces communication.³⁵² The practitioners'

³⁴⁶ Szvircsev Tresch et al., *Sicherheit 2014*, 7.

³⁴⁷ The researchers measured seven categories in total. (1) Judgment on the necessity of the armed forces, (2) how the interviewees would like to see their armed forces trained and equipped, (3) the societal valuation of the armed forces, (4) the level of contentment with the armed forces performance, (5) the understanding of the armed forces' relevance, (6) the interviewee's agreement with military expenditures, and finally (7) their accord with the form of recruitment.

³⁴⁸ Tibor Szvircsev Tresch et al., *Sicherheit 2013*, (Security 2013) (Zürich: Center for Security Studies, 2013), 147.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 160-63. During the 1990s, with regard to the method of recruitment, the Swiss had become more divided and the approval of a professional rather than Armed Forces consisting of conscripts grew steadily. However, in 2013 this development seemed to have come to a halt.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 163.

³⁵¹ The DDPS communication agency prepared a 19-page strategy paper that analyzed the communication mission, the current (political) environment, the communication target groups, political and communication goals, key messages, the communication methods, as well as analysis, and control of the communication environment for the, then, ongoing campaign.

³⁵² Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, General Secretariat, "Kommunikationskonzept Wehrpflicht," (Communication Plan Conscription) received from Renato Kalbermatten, Head of Communication DDPS, email message to author, 19 June 2017, 3.

plan, while focused mainly on external communication, was also meant to include internal communications. The plan for the conscription campaign fully acknowledged the areas of authorization and the restrictions imposed on all governmental communication, as previously described. The plan's authors also stressed their intent not only to transmit facts but to actively promote the government's stance on the issue. At the time that this thesis is written, the communication practitioners could only provide parts of the strategy for the government's pro-conscription campaign.^{353,354} Hence, this author has only fragmentary information available on the 2013 campaign plan.

The outcome of the DDPS communication agency's detailed analysis were two leading messages: one reflects a focus on security policy; the other stresses the broader effects on Switzerland as a nation. Through a media content analysis, the author tests the government's lines of argument for their reflection in the national news media. If the relevant outlets mirror the arguments, one can assume that the governmental communication agencies did a good job in promoting the government's stance. Hence, they serve this author to assess the communication agencies' efficiency. Also, the author compares the agencies' course of action with the 2014 Gripen campaign. This comparison should then allow determining whether the communication agencies contributed to the 2014 campaign loss.

One of the government's leading line of arguments focused on conscription's relevance to maintain security. Figure 3 shows this line of arguments.

³⁵³ Information received from Renato Kalbermatten, Head of Communication DDPS, email message to author, 6 November 2017.

³⁵⁴ The DDPS communication agency had only a corrupted document available. Therefore, only parts of the 19-page document are legible.




Figure 3. Security Argument during the Conscription Campaign.³⁵⁵

The communication practitioners based the first line of argument mainly on their interpretation that the abolition of conscription, in the long term, meant nothing short of the complete abolition of the Swiss Armed Forces. Although not directly stated by those who initiated the vote, it is safe to assume that the practitioners were right in their analysis of the initiator's long-term goal, given the group's name: Group for a Switzerland without Armed Forces (GSoA).

The second collection of governmental arguments highlighted effects of a potential abolition of conscription on national cohesion (depicted in Figure 4).

³⁵⁵ Adapted from Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, "Initiative zur Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht, Hauptargumente gegen die Initiative," (Initiative to Abolish Conscription, Main Arguments Against the Initiative) document received from Renato Kalbermatten, Head of Communication DDPS, email message to author, 19 June 2017.




Figure 4. National Cohesion Argument during the Conscription Campaign.³⁵⁶

The second, broader line of the argument focused on negative effects of the abolition of conscription besides security. The communication practitioners' underlying argument here was: you do not want to change something that works fine when you are not confident that the benefits of the change outweigh the risks. While it is impossible to assess hypothetical outcomes, the practitioners might have had a point with their argument of cohesion and integration, given that Switzerland as a nation with four national languages is deeply dependent on mutual understanding.

4. Departmental Communication and Media Coverage

In this section, the author analyzes how the media reflected the agencies' messaging during the campaign. The author provides the details of the media analysis in Appendix A, the media content analysis on the conscription campaign. Here the author describes the key attributes of the campaign, which consisted of three phases: 1) a long and rather calm first phase from the time when the Federal Chancellery announced the initiative's validity until both camps started campaigning; 2) in the second phase, the arguments of the pro and con committees are reported in a balanced way; and 3) in the

³⁵⁶ Adapted from Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, "Initiative zur Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht, Hauptargumente gegen die Initiative."

third phase, the media mainly report on the government's arguments and, hence, write against the abolition of conscription.

The period between the Federal Chancellery's validity judgment in January 2012 and the date of the vote in September 2013 is too long to analyze the communication agencies' influence since opponents and supporters did not start their campaign immediately after validity was confirmed. The author, therefore, decided to limit the analyzed timeframe from 22 March 2013, when the Federal Assembly published its stance on the vote until the voting day on 22 September 2013.³⁵⁷

a. Phase One: Before Either Side Starts Campaigning—Or Not?

From 22 March until 30 July 2013, neither the supporters nor the opponents of the initiative had officially started campaigning: Accordingly, in the first two months after the Federal Assembly had published its stance, the reporting situation was calm. Until the end of May, the print media outlets only wrote on the date of the vote and the government stance, which, of course, was already known at that time. Both the Minister of Defense, Ueli Maurer, and the CHAF, however, took every opportunity to establish their key messages: A voluntary militia, so they said, was unsuitable to provide security and consequently, the armed forces would no longer be capable of fulfilling their constitutional missions.³⁵⁸ As early as January 2012, immediately after GSoA had submitted its initiative,³⁵⁹ the CHAF had started to make conscription a topic in his speeches. While, at that time, the communication agencies had not yet fully honed their messages, by March 2013, the communication strategists' influence was discernible.

By the end of May 2013, a tabloid called *Blick* intended to disrupt the calm reporting: It started to accuse the federal authorities of allowing campaigning at state-

³⁵⁷ The author carried out a media content analysis through Argus Data Insights, Argus Avenue. All articles / broadcasts of the selected outlets were scanned for the keywords: Wehrpflicht / conscription / service militaire / service militaire obligatoire / servizio militare obbligatorio / servizio militare (conscription), and Abstimmung / votation / votazione (vote). The author accessed the data through a Swiss government issued account, <https://www.argusdatainsights.ch/de/homepage/>.

³⁵⁸ See Appendix A. Phase 1. The author has analyzed the content of all articles published by the media outlets named in Chapter I, E 3.

³⁵⁹ The initiative was submitted on 5 January 2012 and announced valid on 31 January 2012. Federal Chancellery, "Eidgenössische Volksinitiative 'Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht.'"

organized events, specifically, at the *Feldschiessen*, a marksmanship event where Swiss soldiers annually prove their shooting capabilities and that is, therefore, partially sponsored by DDPS.³⁶⁰ In speeches that followed this flare-up, neither Federal Councilor Maurer nor the CHAF showed any reaction to *Blick's* accusations.³⁶¹ The other media outlets did not take up *Blick's* critical stance;³⁶² instead, they went back to reporting the voting trends and the pros and cons of the initiative at stake. By early July 2013, the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ)* was the first newspaper to reveal its editorial stance—not surprisingly, in favor of conscription.³⁶³

When in mid-July, DDPS invited journalists to see the armed forces from the inside and organized a “media boot camp,” *Blick* and *Aargauer Zeitung* mockingly announced that they were immune to propaganda. Both outlets, however, did not pursue this initial critical reporting further and only published some first-hand reporting on the media boot camp.³⁶⁴

b. Phase Two: GSoA and the Con Committee Enter the Campaign

In phase two, from 30 July until 15 August 2013, the supporters and opponents of conscription launched their campaigns. On 30 July 2013, around two months before the vote, GSoA launched its campaign for its initiative to abolish conscription.³⁶⁵ The media outlets reported both on the launch itself and on GSoA's arguments, that is a balanced report. *NZZ*, for example, allowed Jo Lang, one of GSoA's founding members, to explain

³⁶⁰ See Appendix A. Phase 1. *Blick* on 31 May and 1 June 2013.

³⁶¹ The defense minister's speeches were retrieved from: Federal Council, “Reden der Bundesräte,” (Speeches of Federal Councilors), accessed 11 June 2017, https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/reden/reden-der-bundesraete.html?_organization=1&_startDate=01.01.2001&_pageIndex=0. The 2013 CHAF agreed for the author to receive his speaking notes. Chief of Armed Forces, Speaking Notes During Conscription Campaign. Unpublished. Bern, 2012–2013. Received through email to author by Christoph Brunner, Scientific Consultant to Chief of Armed Forces (CHAF), 24 March 2017.

³⁶² See Appendix A. Phase 1.

³⁶³ See Appendix A. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 3 July to 5 July 2013.

³⁶⁴ See Appendix A. *Blick* and *Aargauer Zeitung*, 19 and 20 July 2013.

³⁶⁵ See Appendix A. *Berner Zeitung*, *Corriere del Ticino*, 31 July 2013.

his view in a lengthy article on 5 August 2013,³⁶⁶ even though his opinion went against the newspaper's editorial stance.

On 9 August 2013, only about six weeks before the vote, the con committee started its campaign. It seems that the con committee and the Federal Council, who, at that time had not yet held its press conference, were reasonably sure to win the vote: The *Security 2013* study, conducted by ETHZ, gave them enough reason to assess the situation as favorable. Still, a six-week campaign period is comparatively short.³⁶⁷ From then on, the media outlets mostly reported on the pros and cons of the abolition of conscription and put the arguments of both, the initiators and the con committee, against each other.

During phase two, Federal Councilor Maurer did not speak about conscription specifically during his public appearances. However, when some GSoA activists tried to mock his speech on the Swiss National Day in Biel, Federal Councilor Maurer made his point when he said that he liked the activists' engagement since Switzerland relied on those who were willing to do more for society in their spare time.³⁶⁸ The CHAF spoke publicly on two occasions during this timeframe, which was normal, given the summer holiday period. While he claimed not wanting to interfere with the political decision-making process, he still repeated the armed forces' key messages and referred to both, national cohesion and the security-relevant aspects of conscription.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁶ See Appendix A. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 5 August 2013.

³⁶⁷ Hanspeter Kriesi, in his broad study on three national votes, covered campaign periods between 13 and 16 weeks. In his study, the campaigning for the more complex vote started 16 weeks before the vote, for the simpler votes 13 weeks ahead. Hence, in this case, six weeks, that additionally fall in the summer holiday period, are a significantly short campaign period. For Kriesi's study see Kriesi, *Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns: Enlightening or Manipulating?* 45.

³⁶⁸ See Appendix A. *Berner Zeitung*, 2 August 2013.

³⁶⁹ The author has analyzed the speaking notes. It is, of course, possible that other topics had been discussed at the event as well.

c. Phase Three: DDPS Presents its Stance

On 16 August 2013, hence approximately one month before the vote, the Federal Council held its press conference.³⁷⁰ While the late date of the conference implies that the Federal Council expected to win the vote, the composition of DDPS group that met with the journalists, reflected the importance that DDPS gave the vote.³⁷¹ In the aftermath of the conference, most media outlets presented their audiences with both sides of the issues but wrote mostly in favor of the maintenance of conscription. Media outlets widely picked up the DDPS arguments and reported that the Swiss should a) avoid insecurity and not allow for unsure recruiting numbers, and b) maintain a well-functioning tradition that promotes national cohesion.³⁷²

In mid-August, Denis Froidevaux, president of the Swiss officers' society at that time, and member of the con committee, claimed that the British Armed Forces recruited from the British prison population. Froidevaux attempted to assert that the lack of conscription would lead to difficulties in finding enough suitable personnel. However, British officials claimed his arguments to be untrue.³⁷³ Given the con committee's comfortable lead in the campaign—at that time only approximately 35 percent of all

³⁷⁰ At the Press Conference of the Federal Council, the following officials were present: President of the Swiss Confederacy and Defense Minister Maurer; Secretary General of DDPS, Mrs. Rindlisbacher; Chief of Armed Forces Blattmann; Press Speaker Suini.

³⁷¹ Since the DDPS secretary general and the CHAF were present, it seems evident that the DDPS saw press conference as important. Also, the Task Force of Governmental communication practitioners, in 2001, stated that important topics were often presented by one of the Federal Council's spokespersons. Mrs. Suini was present at the time of conference. The author takes this as another sign that the DDPS was well aware of the campaign's importance. For the relevance of the spokesperson's presence, see: Federal Chancellery, Task Force Conference of Information Services, *Das Engagement von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung im Vorfeld von Eidgenössischen Abstimmungen*, 35.

³⁷² See Appendix A. Phase 3.

³⁷³ Lorenz Honegger, "England rekrutiert laut GSoA-Gegnern im Knast—London Dementiert," (According to GSoA-Opponents, the British Recruit From Their Prison Population—London Denies) *Nordwestschweiz*, last updated 16 August 2013, <https://www.aargauerzeitung.ch/schweiz/england-rekrutiert-laut-gsoa-gegnern-im-knast-london-dementiert-127063137>.

voters had the intent to vote to abolish conscription,³⁷⁴—some journalists could not understand why the con committee did not rectify its *faux-pas* and reported critically on this incident.³⁷⁵

Overall, in the third phase, the media outlets presented balanced reporting. DDPS and armed forces communication agencies' key messages resonated well with the media, and both the idea of avoiding insecurity and the national cohesion argument were the most regularly stated.³⁷⁶ Federal Councilor Maurer, during phase three, spoke publicly twice. At the *SVP Delegiertenversammlung*, thus, the annual meeting of the delegates of the Swiss People's Party—Maurer's party—Federal Councilor Maurer stressed the key messages against the abolition of conscription.³⁷⁷ Surprisingly, given the current positive reflection of the government's stance on the conscription initiative, Maurer criticized the media for being too uncritical of the administration's work in his 13 September speech at the Swiss Media Congress. Maurer argued that the media not portray the people's will but followed their own agenda.³⁷⁸ Either Federal Councilor Maurer, at that time, was absolutely confident to win the vote or had not evaluated potential negative repercussions. The CHAF during that time, spoke at six events, three of which were armed forces-internal.³⁷⁹ When speaking publicly, the CHAF stressed his apolitical

³⁷⁴ Polling results were provided by Schweizerische Radio und Fernsehgesellschaft, (SRG). The federal communication offices, hence, had not acted against their agreement within the Communication Task Force (TF CIS) for governmental communication agencies. Members of TF CIS had limited themselves on the use of tools with which other market researchers or opinion leaders usually engage. The TF CIS suggests not excluding opinion polling entirely, but to use surveys only to assess the voters' level of education. Hence, members of TF CIS agreed to restrain from using surveys to influence the citizens' vote. Federal Chancellery, Task Force Conference of Information Services, *Das Engagement von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung im Vorfeld von Eidgenössischen Abstimmungen*, 24.

³⁷⁵ See Appendix A. For example, *Aargauer Zeitung*, 16 August 2013.

³⁷⁶ See Appendix A. Phase 3.

³⁷⁷ Federal Council, "Reden der Bundesräte: Leistung Belohnen, Eigenverantwortung Stärken," (Speeches of Federal Councilors: Reward Performance, Improve Self-Responsibility) accessed 18 November 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/reden/reden-der-bundesraete.msg-id-50032.html>.

³⁷⁸ Federal Council, "Reden der Bundesräte: Die Aufgaben der Medien in der Liberalen Demokratie," (Speeches of Federal Councilors: The Role of the Media in Liberal Democracy) accessed 18 November 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/reden/reden-der-bundesraete.msg-id-50232.html>.

³⁷⁹ The author has analyzed the speaking notes. It is, of course, possible that other topics had been discussed at the event as well.

role³⁸⁰ while promoting the governmental agencies' key messages. While he stayed with the latter, at internal events, the CHAF did not stress his apolitical role.³⁸¹

B. 2014 REFERENDUM AGAINST THE “FEDERAL LAW TO CREATE A FUND FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF THE GRIPEN FIGHTER JET”

The 2014 campaign went less smoothly than the 2013 campaign for the Swiss governmental communication practitioners. Parts of the Swiss electorate decided to call a referendum against the funding and consequent procurement of the new fighter jet, the Saab Gripen. On 18 May 2014, a 53.4 percent³⁸² majority of the Swiss electorate voted for the referendum and thus decided against the acquisition of the Swedish multirole fighter jet. The government had decided to acquire 22 Gripen fighter jets to replace 54 antiquated U.S.-made F-5 Tigers.³⁸³ Armed forces senior leadership had decided to take the Tigers, a product of the 1960s,³⁸⁴ out of service by 2016. Beginning in November 2018, the Tigers were to be partially replaced by Gripens. The procurement of the Gripen would have cost 3,126 billion Swiss Francs over 11 years, money that would have come from the regular defense budget but that financial planners would have pooled through the creation of a fund.³⁸⁵

In a representative post-vote analysis found that six percent of the “No” voters claimed the campaign and insufficient information directly as the reason for their

³⁸⁰ For example, when speaking to the officers' society in Schaffhausen (hence, speaking to citizen-officers, being at the event as private citizens), the CHAF would say that he only repeats the arguments of the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly, and the Armed Forces. Chief of Armed Forces, Speaking Notes During Conscription Campaign: 21 August Speech at Schaffhausen Officers' Society. Unpublished. Bern, 2012–2013. Received through email to author by Christoph Brunner, Scientific Consultant to Chief of Armed Forces (CHAF), 24 March 2017.

³⁸¹ The author has analyzed the speaking notes. It is, of course, possible that other topics had been discussed at the event as well.

³⁸² Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18.05.2014,” (National vote of 18 May 2014) accessed 2 June 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20140518/>.

³⁸³ Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” (National vote of 18 May 2014: Explanations from the Federal Council) accessed 10 May 2017, <https://www.bk.admin.ch/themen/pore/va/20140518/index.html?lang=de>, 37–39, 42–43.

³⁸⁴ Northrop Grumman Corporation, “F-5 Tiger Program Overview,” accessed 12 September 2017, <http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/F5Tiger/Pages/default.aspx>.

³⁸⁵ Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 38.

choice.³⁸⁶ Another 13 percent declared that they were insecure about the chosen jet type and complained about an opaque selection process that also related to insufficient information.³⁸⁷ The questions then arise: How did Swiss traditional media (print media and national television) cover the referendum campaign for the procurement of a new fighter jet? What led to increasingly critical media coverage potentially affecting the defeat of the 18 May 2014 referendum vote? Did the governmental communication agencies commit a blunder?

During this 2014 campaign, the traditional Swiss media reports created enough insecurity within the electorate to contribute to the defeat of the Gripen vote. The media did so in response to the leak of a questionable procurement evaluation process, a perceived lack of elite consensus, and tactically controversial moves, such as the “Plan B,” by members of the pro campaign.

1. Referendum Content and Outcome

On 27 September 2013, the Federal Assembly decided to implement the Gripen fund law.³⁸⁸ Because the Federal Council proposed³⁸⁹ and both chambers of the Federal Assembly³⁹⁰ confirmed the creation of the funding through a change of existing federal law, the ruling became contestable by optional referendum. Usually, for purposes of governmental spending transparency, the funding of procurements for the armed forces

³⁸⁶ Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen, SRF, “Gegen den Gripen, aber für die Armee,” (Against the Gripen but for the Armed Forces) accessed 10 February 2017, <http://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/gegen-den-gripen-aber-fuer-die-armee>.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation. “Bundesgesetz über den Fonds zur Beschaffung des Kampfflugzeugs Gripen (Gripen-Fonds-Gesetz),” (Federal Law to Create a Fund for the Procurement of the Gripen Fighter Jets (Gripen Fund Law)) (Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 2013).

³⁸⁹ Federal Council, “Medienmitteilung: Botschaft zur Beschaffung des Kampfflugzeugs Gripen (Rüstungsprogramm 2012 und Gripen-Fondsgesetz),” (Press Release: Message Concerning the Procurement of the Gripen Fighter Jets (Procurement Program 2012 and Gripen Fund Law) accessed 12 September 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen/bundesrat.msg-id-46698.html>.

³⁹⁰ The Council of States agreed on the funding with 25 against 17 votes and no abstentions. The National Council voted yes with 119 against 71 no and 4 abstentions on funding the Gripens as proposed by the Federal Council. Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014.”

through funds is uncommon.³⁹¹ Nevertheless, in the case of the Gripen procurement, it was the Federal Council's chosen way of funding. Given the fact that this created the opportunity for the optional referendum, why did the Federal Council decide to opt for this way of funding? The Federal Council argued that the fund were the best of all other examined options.

The Federal Council also considered but, ultimately refused, the remaining three options, including: *leasing*, a solution that the Federal Council rejected because of its projected higher costs compared to buying the fighter jets.³⁹² Through a *public-private partnership*, the needed Gripens would be owned by a third party. However, to create an economically favorable partnership for all partners, this third party would have to be allowed to rent out the fighter jets to other users. This setting then would disregard the security needs of the Swiss state, and therefore, was also rejected.³⁹³ The third possible way to finance the Gripens was through an *extraordinary funding*. This method, however, was incompatible with the conditions that the law for extraordinary funding imposes, and, consequently, was also turned down as an option.³⁹⁴ Finally, a *special financing* was assessed. This way of funding, however, would legally require new taxes, an option that did not make sense, given that the Federal Council did not want to raise the overall armed forces budget.³⁹⁵

Therefore, the Federal Council decided to pay for the new jets through a fund. As previously mentioned, this solution required a change of federal law, which presented the possibility for an optional referendum. Indeed, by 16 January 2014,³⁹⁶ the committee against the Gripen procurement had convinced at least 50,000 citizens to sign for the referendum vote to be held. Later in the month, on 28 January, the Federal Chancellery

³⁹¹ Federal Council, "Botschaft zur Beschaffung des Kampfflugzeugs Gripen (Rüstungsprogramm 2012 und Gripen-Fondsgesetz)," 45.

³⁹² Ibid., 44.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., 45.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Timeline from Federal Chancellery, "Bundesgesetz über den Fonds zur Beschaffung des Kampfflugzeugs Gripen (Gripen-Fonds-Gesetz)," (Federal Law to Create a Fund for the Procurement of the Gripen Fighter Jet) accessed 10 May 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/rf/cr/2012/20121820.html>.

announced the referendum to be valid. Thus, 28 January 2014 can be seen as the start of the campaigning period. On 18 May 2014, the Swiss electorate decided, at the ballot box, against the allocation of funds for the procurement of the Gripen fighter jet. Ahead of the vote, as usual, the different lines of argument for and against the referendum, including the government's stance, were sent out to all Swiss voters in the form of a ballot pamphlet.³⁹⁷

a. Arguments of the Supporters

The referendum opposed a change of federal law, proposed by the Federal Assembly, that would have created the funds to procure the Gripen fighter jets. The role of the supporters was thus taken by the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly supported by the *Gripen Ja* (Gripen Yes) committee. The government rested its argument for the implementation of the law on the following main points: a) the new fighter jets will be needed to assure an effective air force to maintain security for Switzerland because the new jet types were to replace an older jet that has reached the end of its military lifespan; b) the procurement of this specific fighter jet is financially responsible because the Gripen is the most cost-efficient solution within all evaluated jet types; c) return business deals (so-called offset agreements) will further minimize the net costs of the acquisition; d) the chosen jet type meets the technical needs of the air force best while imposing acceptable costs on the armed forces budget.³⁹⁸ The evaluation committee had tested all three jets types in a multi-annual selection process and had taken into account the costs for the procurement and operation of the jets.³⁹⁹ In addition to the ballot

³⁹⁷ As for any other vote, the government was legally allowed to briefly outline its opinion but was expected to do so with certain restraint. Both sides of the competing campaign committees are granted an equal amount of space to lay out their argumentation.

³⁹⁸ Federal Chancellery, "Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates," 37–39, 42–43.

³⁹⁹ In short, the main lines of argument were: a) aerial defense, b) most cost-efficient jet type, c) the Swiss economy will profit from return business deals, and d) the government claimed to buy the best fighter jet for technical and financial reasons. Federal Chancellery, "Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates," 37–39, 42–43.

pamphlet, the government posted its arguments for the Gripen on its web pages.⁴⁰⁰ Also, a non-party committee made up of different members of parliament and interest groups—a committee whose members were thus not restricted by their official functions—formed the Gripen Yes committee. The committee followed and supported the official arguments of the Federal Council.⁴⁰¹

b. Arguments of the Opponents

Two committees opposed the procurement of the Gripen: the liberal committee, “No to Gripen,” and the committee, “No to billions for the fighter jet Gripen.”⁴⁰² Each committee maintained a homepage.⁴⁰³ The committees’ reasons for opposing the change of law and, ultimately, the procurement of the new jets was as follows: a) unreasonable for financial policy reasons⁴⁰⁴ and irrational costs, given that other policy areas lack money;⁴⁰⁵ b) not needed to achieve security policy goals; the F/A-18 jets are sufficient for the current air policing missions;⁴⁰⁶ c) the jets are paper planes; many components are not yet built.⁴⁰⁷ The risk of paying 40 percent of the total amount of purchase upfront is too high.⁴⁰⁸ To sum up, the opponents argued primarily with objections against the costs

⁴⁰⁰ Federal Council, “Bundesrat Beschliesst Beschaffung von 22 Gripen,” (Federal Council Decides on Procurement of 22 Gripen) accessed 15 May 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-42470.html>.

⁴⁰¹ Ja zum Gripen, Komitee “Ja zum Gripen,” (Yes to Gripen) accessed 20 May 2017, <http://www.gripen-ja.ch/de/willkommen.html>.

⁴⁰² Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 41.

⁴⁰³ www.nein-zum-gripen.ch and www.stop-gripen.ch as published in Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 41. Both websites are no longer active.

⁴⁰⁴ Liberal committee “Nein zum Gripen,” (No to Gripen) as published in Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 41.

⁴⁰⁵ Committee “Nein zu den Kampfjet-Milliarden,” (No to Billions for the Fighter Jets) as published in Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 41. In other words also the Liberal committee “Nein zum Gripen,” as published in Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 41.

⁴⁰⁶ Liberal Committee “Nein zum Gripen,” as published in Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 41.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Committee “Nein zu den Kampfjet-Milliarden,” as published in Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 41. To sum up, the main lines of arguments against the Gripen were: the Gripens are a) too costly, b) not needed to safeguard the integrity of Swiss air space, and c) too risky for taxpayers.

and the absence of an operational need, a judgment that, this author argues, stems from shortcomings in the the armed forces' strategic orientation.

2. Overall Attitude toward the Armed Forces

In 2014, the Swiss population has a positive attitude toward its armed forces. The 2014 security study left those Swiss who were in favor of the Gripen hope for the rejection of the referendum and, thus, for the future procurement of the Gripen. The polls to achieve the necessary data for the study were conducted in late 2013. The study, then, was published in January 2014. The report left a positive impression on the opponents of the referendum; After all, in comparison to the previous year, voters were significantly more approving of the armed forces, and convinced of their necessity.⁴⁰⁹ Also, the Swiss gave their armed forces significantly higher performance ratings.⁴¹⁰ Hence, one could expect the Swiss to reject the referendum and support the armed forces. In 2014, however, this was not the case.

3. Strategy of DDPS / Armed Forces Communication

Similar to its 2013 proceedings, the DDPS communication agency prepared a case-specific communications plan for the vote on 18 May 2014. While conceived at the departmental level, the plan was valid for all communication sub-units, including defense communication, air force communication, and communication of Armasuisse, the federal procurement office.⁴¹¹ While focusing on external communication, the plan also included internal communication. The Gripen plan fully respected the areas of authorization and the restrictions imposed on all governmental communication, as the author has described in Chapter II B. Some of the overall communication goals were repeated in its case-specific plan. Additionally, with the complexity of the issue at the center of the vote, the practitioners strove to visualize and to talk with one voice.⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁹ Szvircsev Tresch et al, *Sicherheit 2014*, 10.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., 25.

⁴¹¹ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport. General Secretariat, "Kommunikationskonzept Gripen," (Communication Plan Gripen) received from Renato Kalbermatten, Head of Communication DDPS, email message to author, 19 June 2017, 3.

⁴¹² Ibid.

The authors of the plan divided the responsibilities among the different agencies. The DDPS communication agency, according to the plan, was to take the overall topic lead and the lead in political communications specifically.⁴¹³ The armed forces communication agency should support the DDPS communication agency and only communicate along the guidelines enforced by DDPS. Also, the armed forces communication agency was to ensure that the CHAF, as well as the commanders of the Air and Ground Forces, would transmit the core messages of the Gripen campaign whenever they spoke publicly, no matter whether the main topic was the vote on Gripen or any other topic. Also, the armed forces communication agency was responsible for aligning public appearances of the CHAF, and the commanders of the Air and Ground Forces with DDPS communication agency, regarding content and schedule.⁴¹⁴

The DDPS communication agency had analyzed the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats with regard to the Gripen procurement and came up with threefold communication goals. *First*, the communication agencies would deepen the target groups' level of knowledge about Gripen, as well as the armed forces' and the air force's mission. Also, the communication agencies wanted to confirm that any discussion was based on facts rather than assumptions. *Second*, clear and trustworthy arguments would strengthen the target group's acceptance of the Gripen. According to the DDPS plan, *finally*, approval rates for the procurement of the Gripen would improve.⁴¹⁵

The departmental communication agency analyzed all campaign stakeholders in detail. Target groups comprised: the electorate, and its subgroups of the undecided, as well as supporting and opposing voters; the media; political parties and the subgroups of undecided, supporting and opposing influencers; interest groups, divided in pro and con camps; topic leaders such as experts, national, and cantonal politicians; leading figures in commerce and industry; employees of DDPS; conscript members of the armed forces; other departments of the Swiss authorities; and finally, Saab, the producer of the Gripen

⁴¹³ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport. General Secretariat, "Kommunikationskonzept Gripen," 3.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., 4.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., 8.

jet. As a result of this meticulous analysis, the DDPS communication agency identified five groups as priority target groups. Four of these five were important as influencers: parties that had not yet taken a side on the topic, interest groups in support of the Gripen procurement, experts in their role as topic leaders, and with regard to the offset agreements, trade associations. Finally, one of the five groups was undecided women, who, as part of the electorate, were decision makers.⁴¹⁶

The DDPS communication agency then constructed two leading messages and additional key supporting messages. The argument for the two leading messages went as follows: Switzerland, as a neutral state, neither can nor is allowed to, rely on others (institutions, states) to safeguard the integrity of its airspace. Also, the majority of the people want strong armed forces, which includes a strong air force. The air force can only be strong and reliable if it is equipped with the Gripen.⁴¹⁷ The line of argument went as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Line of Argument during the Gripen Campaign.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁶ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, General Secretariat, "Kommunikationskonzept Gripen," 9.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

⁴¹⁸ Adapted from Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, General Secretariat, "Kommunikationskonzept Gripen."

The DDPS communication agency then defined suitable measures to communicate its messages to the target groups. The five measures included: *electronic communication*, which comprised the Internet and intranet, social media, photos, videoclips, and video messages; *print publications*, including directly addressed letters, printed rationales, a Gripen handbook, flyers, and article in journals and magazines, some of which were issued to conscripts; *events*, during which a standardized brief would be given, visits of senior leadership to promote the leading messages, as well as demonstrations of the Gripen; *testimonials*, mostly by independent experts, former generals, especially those related to the air force, by Swedish officials, by current Swiss military experts, and by Saab officials; and finally, *media relations*, with special information events, through interviews, background discussions, press releases, media conferences, and a media day, held by Saab and the Swedish Air Force.⁴¹⁹

Hence, in theory, the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies presented a complete and coherent plan for their endeavors during the campaign. The author cannot find any significant options missing from these agencies' proposed plan. The agencies clearly strove for the coherent, unifying, and integrative patterns one might expect from any attempt of strategic communication. Yet, from a direct democratic point of view, one can argue that the DDPS communication agency interpreted its rights to inform the public rather extensively. A critical reader of such a plan could see it as a governmental attempt to influence the electorate's voting behavior. Consequently, the communication agencies did not implement all of their options during the campaign, as the media content analysis revealed. Of course, the plan was neither published during the campaign nor broadly spread after the campaign period. Hence, communication agencies' could only be measured and potentially criticized for their actions and not their plans.

4. Departmental Communication and Media Coverage

Since the author could not find any gaps in the DDPS communication agency's planning that would explain why the armed forces lost the Gripen vote, this section

⁴¹⁹ Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, General Secretariat, "Kommunikationskonzept Gripen," 14–15.

analyzes the applied communication measures. Could it be that effective plans had been ineptly executed? In this section, the author analyzes the messaging during the campaign and how the media reporting changed over the period of the campaign. Such headlines as “Final Offensive before the Vote on the Gripen: Many Half-Truths,”⁴²⁰ “Swedish Backup for Maurer,”⁴²¹ The “Secret Plan” for Gripen-Lobbying,”⁴²² and “How Swiss Taxpayers Subsidize Swedish Billionaires,”⁴²³ reflect the critical stance that the media developed during the campaign and thus suggest a spin.

Although the details of the media analysis are provided in Appendix B, here the author describes key attributes of the campaign, which consisted of five phases: 1) during the first phase, the respect for Swiss democratic processes on behalf of Swedish officials and Saab was questioned; 2) during the second phase, a hijacked airplane led to a credibility crisis for the Swiss Air Force; 3) in the third phase, some media outlets attacked government officials for their potential disrespect of direct democratic decisions; 4) in the forth phase, some journalists revived their critical stance toward Swedish officials, and accused the Minister of Defense of making a sexist joke; and 5) in the fifth phase, shortly before the vote, most media outlets returned to the basic arguments.

a. Pre-Campaign Discussions

From 28 January 2014, when the Federal Chancellery announced the validity of the referendum demand set for a vote on 18 May 2014, the general narrative in some media outlets changed. Instead of reporting basic facts, the media outlets got increasingly distracted by the stream of events during the campaign. The author bases the following

⁴²⁰ René Zeller, “Gripen Schlussoffensive: Viele Halbwahrheiten,” (Final Offensive for the Gripen: Many Half-Truths) *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, accessed 6 April 2017, <https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/viele-halbwahrheiten-1.18298582>.

⁴²¹ Federal Councilor Ueli Maurer was the Minister of Defense at the time of the campaign.

⁴²² Ingrid Meissl Årebo, “Schützenhilfe für Maurer aus Schweden: ‘Geheimplan’ für Gripen-Lobbying,” (Backup for Maurer from Sweden: “Secret Plan” for Gripen-Lobbying) *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, accessed 6 April 2017, <https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/koordiniertes-lobbying-aus-schweden-1.18241655>.

⁴²³ Hubert Mooser, “Wie Schweizer Steuerzahler Schwedische Milliardäre Subventionieren,” (How Swiss Taxpayers Subsidize Swedish Billionaires) *Tages Anzeiger*, accessed 6 April 2017, http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Wie-Schweizer-Steuerzahler-schwedische-Milliardaere-subventionieren/story/29843222?dossier_id=2575.

findings on the analysis of all contributions of the selected media outlets during the indicated time span.⁴²⁴

Even before the campaign started with the declaration of a valid referendum, the public was involved in the process. On 30 November 2011, the Federal Council announced it would proceed with the procurement process for the Swedish Gripen.⁴²⁵ The Federal Council's decision on the jet type, followed a technical evaluation of several years. The Swiss Air Force had started testing possible jet types already in 2008.⁴²⁶ In February 2012, the confidential report on the results of the evaluation tests was leaked to the Swiss press.⁴²⁷ Also, members of the National Council, primarily Thomas Hurter and Roland Borer, two former fighter jet pilots, publicly criticized the Federal Council's choice.⁴²⁸ Consequently, parts of the media assumed that the entire air force was not satisfied with the performance of the new fighter jet, seeding the ground for a perceived lack of elite consensus. Soon after, some media outlets questioned the quality of the chosen jet type.

After this leak, some journalists opposed to the jet referred to the Gripen as the "paper plane" or the "Ikea fighter jet."⁴²⁹ The paper plane referred to the Gripen type C/D

⁴²⁴ The author carried out a media content analysis through Argus Data Insights, Argus Avenue. All articles / broadcasts of the selected outlets were scanned for the keywords: Gripen, Abstimmung / votation / votazione (vote), and Gesetz / loi / legge (law). The author accessed the data through a Swiss Government issued account, <https://www.argusdatainsights.ch/de/homepage/>. While all analysis stems from these outlets, the author used some further reports of other outlets to inquire on the relevant events during the campaign.

⁴²⁵ Federal Council, "Bundesrat Beschliesst Beschaffung von 22 Gripen."

⁴²⁶ Swiss Air Force, Operational Test and Evaluation, "SAF / OT&E Flight Test Effectiveness Report NFA Evaluation 2008/2009," Scribd, accessed 27 May 2017, <https://de.scribd.com/doc/81390363/Swiss-Air-Force-Confidential-Report-on-the-Evaluation-of-the-Eurofighter-the-Gripen-NG-and-the-Rafale>.

⁴²⁷ Markus Häfliger, "Maurer Kontert Kritik am Gripen: Verteidigungsminister und Armeespitze Verteidigen den Kaufentscheid und das Evaluationsverfahren," (Maurer Speaks counters Gripen Critique: Minister of Defense and High Officials of the Armed Forces Defend the Decision for the Jet Type and Evaluation Process) *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, accessed 27 May 2017, https://www.nzz.ch/maurer_kontert_kritik_am_gripen-1.15058870.

⁴²⁸ See, for example, Claudia Blumer, "Piloten Wollen Gripen Abschiessen," (Pilots Try to Shoot Down Gripen) *Berner Zeitung*, accessed 23 October 2017, <https://www.bernerzeitung.ch/schweiz/standard/Piloten-wollen-Gripen-abschiessen/story/19277795?track>.

⁴²⁹ See for example Renat Kuenzi, "Der Gripen Fliegt erst in den Köpfen," (Until Now Gripen Only Flies Theoretically) Swissinfo, last modified 1 December 2011, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/der-gripen-fliegt-erst-in-den-koepfen/31675822>; Gareth Jennings, "Gripen E Not Reliant on Swiss Referendum," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 51 (2014), ProQuest 1507956163.

that the Swiss Air Force had evaluated, not the Gripen type E, which the Federal Council had proposed acquiring. Because several components of the Gripen E were still in development during the procurement process, some critics assessed that it existed only on paper. The Gripen got its second unpleasant name, the Ikea fighter jet, due to its country of origin and the fact that the Gripen scored lowest out of the three evaluated aircraft in the technical assessment. Additionally, In December 2012, a confidential parliamentary report on the procurement was leaked to the press. The report claimed that Saab, the producer of the Gripen, could not achieve the promised operational efficiency.⁴³⁰ To the author's knowledge, authorities were able to attribute neither of the leaks to a source. According to rumors passed among members of the armed forces, however, some pilots were so unhappy about their potential new jet that they allegedly used illegal means to force the Federal Council to go back on its decision. While not attributable to a specific person or group, the leak's impact on the public perception of the procurement seems unquestioned. Hence, even well before the actual Gripen campaign started, the public was under the impression that members of the air force, and pilots specifically, were dissatisfied with the chosen jet type. This made the need for the chosen strategy of speaking with one voice even more important, though, difficult to achieve.

b. Phase One: Swedish Meddling

The author identified five phases of reporting through the media content analysis of the selected media outlets in the period from 28 January 2014 to 18 May 2014:⁴³¹ the first phase of the campaign was marked by the electorate's criticism of the perceived lack of respect for the Swiss democratic processes as shown by foreign agents, such as Swedish government officials and employees of Saab. The Swiss electorate had some impressions on the procurement already at hand when the official campaign started, as previously described. On 11 February 2014, the Swiss Defense Minister launched the

⁴³⁰ Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen, DOK, "Die Beste Armee der Welt," (The World's Best Armed Forces) Zürich: SRF I, 13 December 2012, <https://www.srf.ch/play/tv/dok/video/die-beste-armee-der-welt?id=a43caa8d-72fb-401a-afe8-2b10d29f9704>.

⁴³¹ The results are based on the analysis of 246 hits in Argus Data Insights. The search produced some more hits: the author filtered for multi-references and did not consider hits that referred to reader's letters.

campaign with an official media conference.⁴³² The conference was presented by one of the spokespersons of the Federal Council, and one of the Gripen test pilots of the Swiss Air Force was present.⁴³³ Given the security specific content of the issue at stake, it seems logical, that DDPS handled the press conference and that no other head of department was present at the time. Since TF CIS, in 2001, however, stated that important topics were often presented by one of the Federal Council's spokespersons, and this was the case on 11 February, one can infer that the Federal Council wanted to stress the importance of the event.⁴³⁴ Also, one can assume that the communication agencies had effectively discerned the political controversy surrounding the topic. The DDPS press releases confirmed this impression: the 11 January 2014 press release particularly demonstrated the DDPS communication agency's willingness to promote the political line of argument.⁴³⁵ It perfectly followed the agency's planned communication strategy. Also, during this initial phase of the campaign, the CHAF publicly spoke at four events organized by either private organizations or military institutions,⁴³⁶ and perfectly followed the DDPS communication strategy.⁴³⁷

Until the 11 February 2014 official media conference to launch the campaign, most media outlets had only reported on the date of the vote itself. Of course, the evaluation process, as described, was, at the time, still in the people's minds. The media's initial reserve changed quickly. Soon, the *Aargauer Zeitung* questioned the role of Saab, the producer of the Gripens, which attempted to support the pro-campaign with a

⁴³² Federal Council, "Medienkonferenz 11.02.2014," (Media Conference 11 February 2014) accessed 15 October 2017, https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienkonferenzen/2014/2/11_02_2014_935.html.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Federal Chancellery, Task Force Conference of Information Services, *Das Engagement von Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung im Vorfeld von Eidgenössischen Abstimmungen*, 35.

⁴³⁵ Federal Council, "Medienmitteilung: Der Gripen gehört zum Gesamtpaket Armee," (Press Release: Gripen is Part of an Armed Forces' System of a Whole) accessed 12 September 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen/bundesrat.msg-id-46698.html>.

⁴³⁶ The 2014 CHAF agreed for the author to receive his speaking notes. Chief of Armed Forces. Speaking Notes During Gripen Campaign. Unpublished. Bern, 2013–2014. Received through email to author by Christoph Brunner, Scientific Consultant to Chief of Armed Forces (CHAF), 24 March 2017.

⁴³⁷ The author has analyzed the speaking notes. It is, of course, possible that other topics had been discussed as well.

monetary contribution.⁴³⁸ While other media outlets still remained calm in this case, in mid-February, when the Swedish national radio announced that Saab was trying to influence the democratic process in Switzerland,⁴³⁹ most media outlets reacted aggressively. The planned Swedish influence produced an outcry which peaked just after the revelation. The argument and the suspicion towards Saab and Swedish government officials, however, remained a point of interest in most media outlets throughout the entire campaign.⁴⁴⁰ Some outlets took the DDPS decision to stop planned Gripen displays during the Ski World Cup finals as proof of guilt for dishonest campaigning.⁴⁴¹

c. Phase Two: The Air Force Operates During Office Hours Only

One can recap the second phase of the campaign as a loss of credibility by the Swiss Air Force. It started on 17 February 2014 when an Ethiopian co-pilot hijacked his airplane, and French and Italian fighter jets had to enforce the landing of this Ethiopian plane at the Swiss airport in Geneva in the early morning hours. The Swiss Air Force was not ready to engage at the time, revealing that the Swiss Air Force did not have capacities to conduct air policing missions from 5 p.m. to 8 a.m.⁴⁴² Some media outlets took the incident as an argument to increase the capabilities and, hence, security of the Swiss airspace,⁴⁴³ whereas others emphasized the lack of credibility in mission readiness, and mocked the air force for being mission-ready only during “office hours.”⁴⁴⁴ Until the day of the vote, outlets reported contradictorily on this topic, and many outlets framed it

⁴³⁸ See Appendix B. Phase 1. The author has analyzed the content of all articles published by the media outlets named Chapter I E 3. The list of articles was retrieved via ARGUS Avenue Medienbeobachtung. <https://www.argusdatainsights.ch/de/homepage/>.

⁴³⁹ Sveriges Radio, “Sweden’s Plan to Impact Swiss Gripen Deal,” Stockholm: Radio Sweden, 12 February 2014, <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=5782183>.

⁴⁴⁰ See Appendix B. Phase 1.

⁴⁴¹ See Appendix B. *Aargauer Zeitung* on 8 March 2014.

⁴⁴² *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, “Flugzeug Entführung: Schweizer Luftwaffe nur zu Bürozeiten einsetzbar,” (Hijacked Airplane: Swiss Air Force Only Ready to Engage During Office Hours) accessed 27 May 2017, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/kriminalitaet/flugzeug-entfuehrung-schweizer-luftwaffe-nur-zu-buerozeiten-einsetzbar-12807384.html>.

⁴⁴³ See Appendix B. *Berner Zeitung* on 1 March 2014.

⁴⁴⁴ See Appendix B. *Le Temps* on 4 March 2014. Also, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, “Flugzeug Entführung: Schweizer Luftwaffe nur zu Bürozeiten einsetzbar.”

critically. The critical outlets did not see the necessity for new fighter jets when the air force with its current posture could not even engage during night hours.

In reaction to this event, the Defense Minister claimed that the air force's readiness could be significantly increased with the new Gripen jets.⁴⁴⁵ However, it seems that the departmental communication agency was merely reacting to this incident rather than actively taking it up to support its line of argument. Accordingly, DDPS made no press release with regard to the hijacked airplane.⁴⁴⁶ Also, during this phase of the campaign, the CHAF publicly spoke at 15 events.⁴⁴⁷ During all these events, he followed DDPS communication strategy and stayed apolitical; however, the hijacking incident was not integrated into the line of argument.⁴⁴⁸ Of course, to do so would have meant that senior leadership would have had to admit the current air force's weakness. Nevertheless, later, several print media outlets expected the incident to help the supporters of the Gripen procurement.⁴⁴⁹ In this author's opinion, the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies' decision not to advise the Defense Minister and the CHAF to talk about this incident or to use it more proactively was a missed opportunity. Hence, the DDPS never effectively employed this incident as an argument for its cause, and, instead, the air force lost some of its credibility.

d. Phase Three: Is There a Plan B?

The analysis of the time between 6 and 28 April 2014 revealed predominant media coverage of "Plan B."⁴⁵⁰ The third phase was, thus, dominated by the tactically

⁴⁴⁵ See Appendix B. *Le Temps* on 18 February 2014.

⁴⁴⁶ Federal Council, "Medienmitteilungen," (Press Releases) accessed 15 October 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.html>.

⁴⁴⁷ Chief of Armed Forces. Speaking Notes During Gripen Campaign.

⁴⁴⁸ The author has analyzed the speaking notes. It is, of course, possible that the current event had been discussed as well. However, if so, it happened spontaneously and, most likely due to the speaker's intuition, rather than due to strategic planning.

⁴⁴⁹ For examples, see Appendix B: *Le Temps* on 18 February 2014, *Corriere del Ticino* on 19 February 2014, *Tages-Anzeiger* on 1 March 2014.

⁴⁵⁰ The name "Plan B" had come up earlier during the campaign already, when the rumor circulated in the national media, that DDPS planned on leasing Gripen in the case of a no at the ballot box. Therefore, when Hurter's proposition was made public, some media outlets were fast to pick up the former mistrust and started reusing the name.

controversial move of a politician—the “Plan B”—and included accusations of governmental disrespect of democratic processes. It started with a proposition made by National Councilor and President of the security policy commission of the National Council, Thomas Hurter. On 6 April, he publicly disclosed that even if the Swiss electorate should vote no on 18 May, the armed forces could buy Gripens, financed through its regular budget.⁴⁵¹ Hurter, a former fighter jet pilot of the Swiss Air Force, was often depicted in a flight suit in articles in the print media. Thus, many readers assumed Hurter was directly tied to the armed forces, rather than to his current political role.

At one level, Hurter was correct; the use of the regular budget of the military is decided through armaments programs, which, in turn, are subject to approval by the Federal Assembly.⁴⁵² However, citizens clearly understood the wording in the ballot pamphlet that the government would abide by the vote of the people for or against buying the jet and not merely about how to finance it.⁴⁵³ Consequently, many citizens felt that Hurter’s proposition undermined a democratic decision. Because of his role as head of the security policy commission and his personal history as an air force pilot, Hurter appeared to be working with the support of the DDPS.

“Plan B” created an outcry among the electorate because of its apparent disrespect for democratic processes. The DDPS communication agency answered to the Sunday press revelation on the same day and was quick to assure that no Plan B existed.⁴⁵⁴ As government agencies usually do not react on Sundays, the communication practitioners had well understood the negative impact of Hurter’s proposition. Also, the governmental communication agencies acted as swiftly as one might expect to counter this false

⁴⁵¹ See Appendix B. *Sonntagszeitung* on 6 April 2014.

⁴⁵² Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, “Rüstungsprogramme,” (Armament Programs) accessed 28 May 2017, <http://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/aktuell/themen/ruestungsprogramme.html>.

⁴⁵³ Federal Chancellery, “Volksabstimmung vom 18. Mai 2014: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates,” 39.

⁴⁵⁴ Federal Council, “Medienmitteilung: VBS distanziert sich von ‘Plan B’ für Beschaffung von Kampfflugzeugen,” (Press Release: DDPS Distances itself from any “Plan B” for the Procurement of Fighterjets) accessed 12 September 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-52574.html>. Also, see Appendix B. *Aargauer Zeitung* on 7 April 2014. The *Aargauer Zeitung* stated that the DDPS reacted directly on Sunday 6 April 2014.

information.⁴⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the narrative of public bodies being disrespectful of democratic decisions remained in the media throughout the rest of the campaign and was reflected in several claims of fraudulent government campaigning.

The CHAF remained quiet on the topic of Plan B. During this time, the CHAF publicly spoke at five events.⁴⁵⁶ During all these events, he followed DDPS communication strategy; however, he did not counter Hurter's statement of an existing Plan B.⁴⁵⁷ Again, while following the general strategy of having the head of DDPS conduct all political communication, and the CHAF focusing on the basic and technical arguments, the CHAF's failure to deny the existence of a plan B at these events was a missed opportunity. Although these opportunities went unused, DDPS senior leadership sent out an email to all employees, imposing guidelines on when and how to speak in public to avoid any similar future miscommunications.⁴⁵⁸ The email authors did not rule out employees making critical comments in public, but employees were instructed to do so only in their role as private citizens, not as federal employees.⁴⁵⁹

e. Phase Four: A Sexist Joke

The fourth phase began with yet another leaking of Swedish embassy documents and a sexist campaign joke made by the Minister of Defense.⁴⁶⁰ The first line of argument played to the main argument of phase one: disrespect for Swiss democratic processes by foreign agents. With his joke, Minister of Defense Maurer created an opportunity for criticism on a personal level, which did not help his cause. In reference to the aging fighter jets, Maurer quipped that nothing in his comparably old household

⁴⁵⁵ The governmental bodies' authority to counter false contents derives from Federal Court rulings. *Direkte Demokratie in der Informationsgesellschaft: Herausforderungen für den Kanton Aargau*, 13.

⁴⁵⁶ Chief of Armed Forces. Speaking Notes Gripen Campaign.

⁴⁵⁷ The author has analyzed the speaking notes. It is, of course, possible that the current event had been discussed as well. However, if so, it happened spontaneously and, arguably, rather due to the speaker's intuition than due to strategical planning.

⁴⁵⁸ Ronny Nicolussi, "Kodex für VBS-Angestellte im Abstimmungskampf," (Codex for DDPS Employees During the Campaign) *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 22 February 2014, <https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/kodex-fuer-vbs-angestellte-im-abstimmungskampf-1.18248893>.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ See Appendix B. *Tages-Anzeiger*, 16 May 2014.

really worked anymore, except his wife.⁴⁶¹ Not only did the joke not help his cause, but the thoughtless joke clearly went against DDPS communication strategy that had identified undecided women as first priority stakeholders for the campaign.

Also, the defense minister made the joke at the wrong time: the fourth phase matches the time when the municipal offices sent out the voting documents.⁴⁶² As about 80 percent of the Swiss electorate vote in advance by turning in their ballot paper via mail,⁴⁶³ the defense minister quipped when voters were just about to fill out their voting forms.

In the short fourth phase, the CHAF publicly spoke at only one event.⁴⁶⁴ On this occasion, he fully respected DDPS communication strategy. Also, in this case, the CHAF, in the canton of Geneva, the home canton of the affected airport, made an argument with regard to the hijacked airplane.⁴⁶⁵ During this time of the campaign, military commanders were tasked to explain the military necessity of the procurement of new fighter jets to their troops. While the DDPS presentation contained balanced information,⁴⁶⁶ it was often perceived very critically.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶¹ See Appendix B, *Blick* on 28 and 20 *Minuten* und *Le Temps* on 29 April 2014.

⁴⁶² Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, “Abstimmungsunterlagen,” (Voting Documents) Ch.ch, accessed 28 May 2017, <https://www.ch.ch/de/abstimmungsunterlagen/>.

⁴⁶³ Laurent Bernhard, “Message Delivery,” in *Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns*, ed. Hanspeter Kriesi (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2011), 83.

⁴⁶⁴ Chief of Armed Forces. Speaking Notes Gripen Campaign.

⁴⁶⁵ The author has analyzed the speaking notes. It is, of course, possible that other content had been discussed as well.

⁴⁶⁶ DDPS provided a standard PowerPoint presentation to military commanders. The presentation followed the communication agencies’ messages. It did not contain the opponents’ arguments. Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport, General Secretariat, “Standardreferat Gripen,” (Standard Presentation Gripen) received from Renato Kalbermatten, Head of Communication DDPS, email message to author, 19 June 2017.

⁴⁶⁷ Christof Vuille, “Gripen Offensive in der Kaserne: Soldaten Nerven sich über Getarnte Werbeveranstaltung,” (Gripen Campaign in the Barracks: Soldiers Annoyed by Hidden Selling Show) *Blick*, 28 April 2014, <http://www.blick.ch/news/politik/soldaten-nerven-sich-ueber-die-getarnte-werbeveranstaltung-gripen-offensive-in-der-kaserne-id2819533.html>.

f. Phase Five: Recap

The last phase, which started at the beginning of May, around three weeks before the vote, featured media outlets concentrated on publishing voting trends. Most outlets returned to the core arguments of the pro and con campaigns. *Blick*, a tabloid, and *Tages-Anzeiger*,⁴⁶⁸ a widely read regional newspaper, at some points during the fifth campaign phase, came back to events that happened earlier during the campaign. While *Blick* negatively framed its report on the events, *Tages-Anzeiger* published its report on the events as an editorial.⁴⁶⁹ During the final phase of the campaign, the DDPS communication agency, in line with the restrictions imposed on it for political reasons, widely abstained from publishing arguments. The only press release from this time drew a historical parallel from WWII for the current Swiss defense. It warned that Switzerland should, at all times, maintain armed forces' readiness. With this analogy, the release can be read as a voting proposition for the upcoming Gripen vote.⁴⁷⁰ During the same period, the CHAF publicly spoke at eight events.⁴⁷¹ Again, he restricted his contributions to the technical aspects and the general line of argument and, hence, fully respected DDPS communication strategy. In contrast, eight days before the vote, eight officers founded a committee called "officers against Gripen."⁴⁷² It is clear that this act encouraged those voters who already perceived an elite discontent.

C. CONCLUSION

The motivation for this thesis was this author's sense that weak governmental communication was the reason for the outcome of the 2014 vote, in which the Swiss electorate denied the armed forces their new fighter jets. The result of the vote was

⁴⁶⁸ See Appendix B, *Blick* on 6 May 2014 and *Tages-Anzeiger* on 10 May 2014.

⁴⁶⁹ See Appendix B, *Tages-Anzeiger* on 10 May 2014.

⁴⁷⁰ Federal Council, "Medienmitteilung: Wer Frieden will, Braucht eine Einsatzfähige Armee oder Was Wir aus Unserer Geschichte Lernen Können," (Press Release: Who Wants Peace, Should Maintain Armed Forces' Readiness: What We Can Learn from History) accessed 12 September 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-53209.html>.

⁴⁷¹ Chief of Armed Forces. Speaking Notes Gripen Campaign.

⁴⁷² Lorenz Honegger, "Offiziere Komitee gegen Gripen," (Officers' Committee Against Gripen) *Aargauer Zeitung*, 10 May 2014, <https://www.aargauerzeitung.ch/schweiz/russische-soldaten-sollen-wieder-kommen-wenn-sich-die-wogen-geglattet-haben-127962161>.

surprising, as, in 2014, the Swiss population's overall approval of the armed forces was significantly higher than in the 2013 campaign, in which the Swiss voted with 73.2 percent in favor of the armed forces, confirming their support for the recruitment through conscription. Hence, the comparison of a campaign in which the electorate decided in favor of DDPS with one in which DDPS lost, was enlightening for this inquiry about mass persuasion and defense affairs in Switzerland. Indeed, the communication agencies tried, but did not achieve similar topic leadership authority within the two campaigns.

During the 2013 conscription campaign, polling showed a favorable situation for DDPS. While the Swiss electorate had become more critical toward conscription in the preceding years, in 2013 this process seemed to have come to a standstill. Accordingly, the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies campaigned for only about two months and successfully promoted the government's line of argument in the national media outlets.

For the Gripen campaign, the situation was different. The overall evaluation process for the new fighter jet was the business of government as usual. Even more so, many factors that could potentially explain the voter's unwillingness to fund the Gripen procurement failed to do so. For example, in 2014, the Swiss population's overall attitude toward the armed forces was comparably high. Also, in light of the recent Russian annexation of Crimea in that year, the Swiss electorate was reminded of the possibility of geopolitical crisis within close proximity; this development should have increased the electorate's willingness to spend on armament. However, this was not the case.

In 2014, with the Gripen procurement, the Swiss media outlets had an idiosyncratic campaign to cover. Whereas media outlets would usually concentrate on the minister of the federal department in question and cover the arguments of the four major parties,⁴⁷³ during the Gripen campaign, the coverage was dominated by the controversial events that occurred. During the five phases of the campaign, critical media outlets had enough current events at hand to frame the Gripen negatively. Such events ranged from

⁴⁷³ Matthias A Gerth, Urs Dahinden, and Gabriele Siegert, "Coverage of the Campaigns in the Media," in *Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns*, ed. Hanspeter Kriesi (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2011), 123.

Swedish attempts to influence the outcome of the vote to a hijacked Ethiopian airplane forced to land on Swiss ground by French and Italian fighter jets leading to doubts about the credibility of the Swiss air force. There was also the implied existence of a Plan B, which could be framed as governmental disrespect of democratic processes and finally, the sexist joke by the Minister of Defense, and further leaks of Swedish campaigning.

Overall, the arguments of the opponents resonated more strongly with external events happening simultaneously. Where events could have promoted the supporters' narrative, such as the hijacked airliner, the governmental communication agencies showed too much hesitancy in exploiting the incident.

Both the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies, throughout the Gripen campaign, acted according to their agreed-upon strategy. Hence, the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies cannot be criticized for political influencing or acting against their own communication strategy. However, the author of this study can justifiably suggest room for improvement in how DDPS and armed forces communication agencies might react to current events. While there are reasons for not capitalizing more decidedly on current events such as the hijacked airplane or the denial of a Plan B, this author suggests the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies should respond to such events more rigorously.

In some occasions, the communication agencies could not act much differently than they did during the campaigns. Acting within their legal and cultural restrictions, and their limited resources with regard to available workforce, practitioners did what they could for the most part. While it is beyond this author's knowledge when exactly the DDPS communication strategy for the Gripen campaign was implemented, given the critical discussions in the pre-campaign period, one can argue that the communication practitioners took hold of the topic lead too late in the process. Also, the formation of the conscript officers' committee against the Gripen illustrates the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies' limitations: while they successfully shaped the messaging of their department and office for the most part, they could not influence conscript members of the armed forces as a semi-independent part of the strategic community in Switzerland. Also, their impact—at least during the Gripen campaign—on the head of department, was

limited. The author of this study, hence, sees the main accountability for the unsuccessful Gripen procurement vote in the undisciplined head of department, as well as the president of the National Council's security commission, and an air force elite, whose discussion on the qualities of the new jet type was too outspoken.

Having said this, the author largely refutes her initial hypothesis. Although the DDPS or armed forces communication agencies likely missed opportunities to support their stance, within their sphere of influence, they *did not* directly contribute to the defeat of the 2014 Gripen referendum. Instead, the head of department, the head of the National Council's security commission, and, likely, single actors within the armed forces are accountable for the defeat.

As Switzerland procured no new fighter jets in 2014, the country now faces the same challenge in 2017. In 2016, a *Begleitgruppe zur Evaluation und Beschaffung eines neuen Kampfflugzeugs*⁴⁷⁴ (Advisory Group for the Evaluation and Procurement of a new Fighter Jet) was tasked to inquire on the necessary steps to—this time—bring the project to success. The lessons learned within DDPS will be of utmost interest within the next months and years.

⁴⁷⁴ Andreas Schmid, "Kauf von Kampffjets Ohne Volksabstimmung," (Procurement of Fighter Jets without Public Vote) *Neue Zürcher Zeitung am Sonntag*, accessed 4 June 2017, <https://nzzas.nzz.ch/notizen/kampfjet-kauf-soll-ohne-volksabstimmung-erfolgen-ld.1297515>.

IV. CONCLUSION

This thesis should deepen the reader's understanding of how direct democracy and legal restrictions shape Switzerland's governmental communication within the domestic civil-military relations. The Swiss people's preference for consensus and compromise is deeply rooted and valued, even when one might well contend that such practices produce outcomes that potentially run contrary to Swiss security needs. Thus, the thesis has analyzed the origins and application of Swiss strategic communication in the realm of the department of defense and within the Swiss Armed Forces. In this context, the main hypothesis has been that the DDPS and the armed forces strategic communication practitioners do not employ their authorized methods as efficiently or politically effectively as possible. To test the central hypothesis, the author compared the DDPS and Swiss Armed Forces communication agencies' contributions during two noteworthy election campaigns fateful to the questions of policy and weapons in a pluralistic nation-state that in many significant aspects of statecraft offers an example to less fortunate nation-states in a violent world. The aim of the thesis has been to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the communication agencies and to deduce possible implications for Swiss security policy.

This final chapter covers two areas. First, it provides a short summary of the communication agencies' strengths in relation to the previously mentioned hypotheses. Second, it presents the communication agencies' weaknesses and possible implications for Swiss security policy.

A. STRENGTHS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE DEFENSE SECTOR

DDPS and armed forces strategic communications offices plan meticulously for upcoming voting campaigns, follow through, respect their legal and cultural limitations, and respond swiftly to false information. Strategic communication practitioners, mainly at the departmental level, come up with detailed plans ahead of national votes, if the topic is relevant to the DDPS. The agency defines communication goals, targets specific

groups selected through a case-specific analysis of the political environment, and comes up with precise and concise messages to promote its stance. Hence, in comparison with the author's initial definition of strategic communication,⁴⁷⁵ it is safe to claim that the departmental communication agency strives to communicate strategically with a wide national public. The elements of coordinated communication, the spread of correct and discursive information, and the will to support the Swiss government's stance are clearly discernible.

During the campaign, the agencies follow through with their plans, react swiftly when they must, and operate with the necessary constraint: DDPS and armed forces communication offices in the 2013 and 2014 voting campaigns carefully operated according to their plans. When media outlets spread false information, the agencies reacted rapidly and corrected the content. The Swiss direct democratic system makes the electorate especially wary of government influence. Hence, while communication practitioners dared to act firmly to counter false information, they were well aware of the lurking reproach by critics of the government that the state engages in propaganda and, therefore, self-censored. In this context, it is almost a natural course of action that the agencies carefully respect their legal restrictions and decide to restrict themselves by a binding agreement on communication practices that further limits their course of action.

The Swiss see a state-run communication office that is limited in its capacities and freedom of action as a decreased risk of a manipulative state bureaucracy. In their view, such a state bureaucracy imposes fewer risks to reliable information. In turn, it becomes more likely that the voters obtain the necessary information to make a well-informed decision. While in other countries such proceedings could be seen as an ineffective use of governmental capabilities, the Swiss take pride in such limitations and see them as proof of the functioning checks and balances in democratic civil-military relations, paying due respect to the long-standing history of the Swiss state.

⁴⁷⁵ Strategic communications are coordinated informational, persuasive, and discursive actions, messages, images, and other forms of signaling or engagement intended to create an organization's purposeful interaction with its environment. Author's definition based on Hallahan et al., "Defining Strategic Communication," 17; Paul, *Strategic Communication*, 3.

B. WEAKNESSES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

What is seen as the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies' strengths can turn into their weaknesses. A constrained use of governmental communication promotes the status quo—whether this outcome is wanted or not. Both governmental communication agencies operate from a weak position, are meagerly staffed and legally and culturally tightly constrained, which further limits the agencies' range of influence. Also, while planning is the agencies' strength, they show weaknesses in adapting their plans throughout a campaign and show hesitancy in the exploitation of current events.

First, the tendency to support the status quo is widely inherent in Switzerland's system of direct democratic rights and one can say in its political and strategic culture as compared to its neighbors. While it certainly makes sense that a democratic state and its leadership do not use their power overly to promote their parochial interests—or even engage in domestic propaganda—but instead assure a broad discussion within the voting public, this approach does not promote either progress or innovation. This situation exists for the entirety of the Swiss state bureaucracy. This author suggests that governmental communication agencies should not reinforce these tendencies by further constraining themselves, for example, as contributors at the 2001 Information and Communication Conference of the Federal Council and the Federal Administration had done. Rather, communication agencies should take advantage of the powers they have since politicians and the people will impose limitations soon enough.

Second, the way that the strategic communications offices are organized within the bureaucracy and how they are manned does not provide them with a position of strength. This fact happened not unintentionally: As the power lies in the Swiss people, practitioners of governmental strategic communications are expected to do their jobs with restraint so as not to become accused of employing government propaganda. To further decrease the risk of government propaganda, both agencies are meagerly staffed and lack direct influence both internally and externally. Both communication agencies are part of their department/office head's staff. As has proved disadvantageous in the Gripen-campaign, the agencies lack direct influence on the head of department/office, filling an advisory role only. This organizational practice is not a surprise, given all the domestic

Swiss discussions on whether the state is or should be allowed to address its citizens, and if so, in which way, to have a well-informed but unbiased electorate. Hence, the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies cannot be of much influence, even if functioning optimally.

Third, Switzerland has a unique, or one might even say peculiar, way of creating its national security strategy as compared to its neighbors; in many ways, members of the government and parliament among themselves disagree on the future direction of the armed forces. Hence, every attempt to define a strategy already is a compromise. Such an outcome is not, perforce, a suboptimal outcome, but in this case such compromise may tend to the lowest common denominator of bureaucratic politics and domestic interests that may not avail the armed forces and their operational effectiveness. Often, the federal politicians' inability to create a clear strategy has led to problematic organizational issues within the armed forces. Clear and consensual political directions on the fundamental questions would allow the armed forces to develop purposefully and to communicate such processes with the required political backing. Without constant political challenge, communication agencies could act more swiftly and get rid of some communicational hesitancy.

Also, due to the high degree of popular participation, which is unprecedented for any major democracy and its armed forces, Swiss strategic communication agencies within the armed forces are ill-equipped to make the messages that may be possible, say, in United Kingdom or the United States, albeit maritime democracies with a profoundly different interpretation of constitutions, civil-military relations, and entities of strategic communications as part of national life. However, with executive and legislative branches focusing on security strategy and an armed forces command left to coordinate the necessary military strategies, overall efficiency and coherence can be augmented to the benefit of national security, the public finances, and the security of the Swiss people. Also, communication practitioners would no longer have to dilute a powerful message to make it acceptable to all stakeholders.

Finally, in this author's opinion, the DDPS and armed forces communication agencies in both campaigns cannot be criticized for political influencing or violating their

communication strategies. However, this author suggests exploiting current events more courageously. With divided political decision makers providing limited guidance, there is a risk of delayed decisions and a tendency to maintain the status quo in an environment that already is very consensus-oriented. Consequently, there is not much innovation, but rather stagnation, a development that can prove dangerous in such a field as security that inevitably evolves and is currently devolving around Switzerland into growing insecurity which places the core principles of Swiss policy under ever greater stress. In a world where the means and ways of war evolve faster and faster, staying in one place is dangerous. Hence, the armed forces' cautious promotion of its interests holds the risk of being too little too late to counter security challenges that can emerge with sudden speed and fateful results.

C. FINAL REMARKS

While acknowledging the communication agencies' limitations, this author urges further assessment as to whether there is real political will to live with suboptimal outcomes, such as security gaps. If not, the governmental communication agencies should be granted more leeway to promote the government's stance. After all, there is already much consensus and compromise built into the Swiss political system.

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APPENDIX: MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSES

A. MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 2013 INITIATIVE

Color code	
	neutral
	rather negative/critical toward conscription / government stance
	negative / critical of conscription / government stance
	rather positive/supportive of maintenance of conscription / government stance
	positive / supportive of maintenance of conscription / government stance

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics	Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
PHASE 1					
15.04.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	government campaigning	Kommentar von Christian Dorer: Unschlagbare Milizarmee	“Dass nun ein ehemaliger Milizoffizier die Luftwaffe kommandiert, ist ein cleverer Schachzug - falls er den Job gut macht. Dann demonstriert er die Stärke und das Potenzial einer Milizarmee.”	
18.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning	SVP führt Kampagne gegen 1:12-Initiative	“Abstimmungen Die FDP hat neu den Lead bei der Kampagne gegen die Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht”	
19.04.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning	Miliz ein gefährdetes Prinzip	“Die Armee ist gemäss Bundesverfassung 'grundsätzlich nach dem Milizprinzip organisiert.' Bei jeder Armee reform wird darüber gestritten, ob sie dieser Vorgabe noch entspricht.”	
19.04.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning	Regierungskonferenz für Wehrpflicht		
20.04.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning	Libérale Sympathien für GSoA-Initiative	“Die Jungfreisinnigen könnten ihrer Mutterpartei den Kampagnenstart vermasseln”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics	Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
26.04.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	Ueli Maurers Reformpläne: Faktisch eine neue Armee	"Im politischen Gegenwind wird die Schweizer Armee neu konzipiert. Doch zu viele Unbekannte behindern die Realisierung über Gebühr" "Eine legitime direktdemokratische Hürde stellt die «Gruppe Schweiz ohne Armee» dem Verteidigungsminister in den Weg. Ihre Volksinitiative zur Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht kommt einem Frontalangriff auf die heutige Milizarmee gleich."	
26.04.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	"Die Miliz nicht schocken" Ueli Maurer zum Reformprozess	"Mit einer freiwilligen Miliz seien die heute von der Armee geforderten Leistungen 'unmöglich zu erfüllen.'"	
27.04.2013	<i>Berner Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	Armee steht vor massivem Umbau	"Mit einer freiwilligen Miliz sind laut dem Verteidigungsminister die heute von der Armee geforderten Leistungen unmöglich zu erfüllen."	
04.05.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	Lufwaffen-Chef glaubt an Milizarmee	"Es gebe für die Schweiz keine sinnvolle Alternative zu einer Milizarmee mit allgemeiner Wehrpflicht. Eine freiwillige Armee oder ein Berufsheer sei im Normalfall viel zu gross und im Bedarfsfall viel zu klein."	
06.05.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	security policy	Schweizer Armee unter der Lupe	"Die Zukunft der Armee kann nicht im stillen Kämmerlein geplant werden. Ein offener Diskurs ist notwendig, aus dem ein tragfähiger sicherheitspolitischer Konsens resultieren sollte." "In eingeweihten Kreisen ist man sich einig, dass die Milizarmee schweizerischen Zuschnitts ein ausserordentlich gutes und sinnvolles System ist. Es gilt, ihr Sorge zu tragen." "Der Armee fällt im Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz die Funktion der sicherheitspolitischen Reserve zu. Sie ist über das Milizsystem in der Lage, sowohl in quantitativer als auch in qualitativer Hinsicht im gesamten Aufgabengebiet Beiträge zu leisten."	
10.05.2013	<i>24 heures</i>	campaigning	Année, epidemies et shops au menu	"Le Conseil fédéral a fixé les trois objets des votations fédérales du 22 septembre."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
10.05.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		1:12-Initiative erst im November	“Den Abstimmungstermin vom 22. September reserviert der Bundesrat für drei andere eidgenössische Vorlagen. Es geht um die Wehrpflicht, die Tankstellenshops sowie Epidemien. Mit der Volksinitiative «Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht» will ein Bündnis um die Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee (GSoA) die Wehrpflicht in der Schweiz abschaffen.”	
14.05.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	security policy		Le délicat virage d'Ueli Maurer	“Dans la perspective d'une absence de conflit sur le continent dans les décennies à venir, c'est le soutien aux autorités et à la population civiles qui sera l'une des principales tâches de l'armée. Pour Ueli Maurer, le virage est délicat. D'une part il ne peut se mettre son parti à dos, d'autre part il doit éviter de fournir des arguments au Groupe pour une Suisse sans armée (GSsA) et aux partisans de la suppression de l'obligation de servir, avant la votation du 22 septembre, dit-on dans son entourage, qui confirme la prudente adaptation du ministre à l'absence de menace militaire directe.”	
31.05.2013	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning		Propaganda-Schützen abtreten!	“Am Eidgenössischen Feldschieszen startet heute die Abstimmungskampagne der Wehrpflicht-Befürworter. ... Den Schützen wird der Propaganda-Flyer des Vereins für eine sichere Schweiz in die Hand gedrückt. Dagegen wäre nichts einzuwenden, wäre das Feldschieszen ein rein privater Verbandsanlass. Das Feldschieszen gilt ... als «Bundesübung. ... Der Anlass hat also offiziellen oder zumindest offiziellen Charakter. ”	
31.05.2013	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning		Schützen wollen GSoA-Intiatie abschiessen: Armee-Gegner kritisieren Polit-Propaganda am Feldschieszen	“Die Berner Nationalrätin und Grünen-Co-Präsidentin Regula Rytz will Verteidigungsminister Ueli Maurer in der Fragestunde zur Rede stellen. 'Findet es der Bundesrat in Ordnung, dass ein vom Bund unterstützter Anlass für Abstimmungspropaganda missbraucht wird?’”	
01.06.2013	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning		Der Bummdesrat	“130 000 Schützen werden am grössten Schützenfest der Welt teilnehmen. Zum Standblatt erhalten sie dieses Jahr einen Flyer Argumente gegen die Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht (BLICK berichtete). Das dürfte gar nicht nötig sein: Wehrpflicht und Miliz erleben eine Renaissance, wie eine ETH Studie ... zeigt.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
01.06.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	government campaigning		L'armée et l'obligation de servir séduisent de plus en plus	“Les Suisses tiennent à leur armée de milice et à l'obligation de servir.” “Les Suisses tiennent à leur armée de milice et à l'obligation de servir. Alors que, l'an dernier, près d'un Suisse sur deux (48%) se déclarait favorable à la suppression du service militaire obligatoire, ils ne sont aujourd'hui plus qu'un tiers (33%) à approuver cette mesure. Le sondage consacre l'impact de la campagne médiatique très intense du ministre de la Défense, Ueli Maurer, pour vanter sa réforme de l'armée.”	
01.06. 2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	government campaigning		Zwei Drittel wollen Wehrpflicht	“Über 70 Prozent der Schweizerinnen und Schweizer erachten die Armee als notwendig, und eine Mehrheit will an der Wehrpflicht festhalten. Dies sind einige der Umfrageergebnisse der alljährlich durchgeführten Erhebungsstudie «Sicherheit» der Militärakademie und des Center for Security Studies der Eidgenössischen Technischen Hochschule Zürich. «Im Verlauf des letzten Jahres haben sich viele Wehrpflicht-Befürworter zusammengeschlossen und Kampagnen lanciert», erklärt Tibor Szvircsev Tresch. ... Auch die Medien, das Parlament und der Bundesrat hätten allenfalls zu dieser Entwicklung beigetragen.”	
03.06.2013	<i>Blick</i>	voting trends	government campaigning	Am Feldschiessen in Bubikon ZH: “Ein richtiger Mann geht ins Militär”	“Die Meinungen sind gemacht. «Natürlich werde ich Nein stimmen», sagt Nadja Meier. «Wir brauchen die Wehrpflicht. Das Militär bedeutet Schutz.»”	
21.06.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Zürcher FDP wider den antiliberalen Zeitgeist	“Mit 100 gegen 9 Stimmen folgten die Delegierten Nationalrätin Doris Fiala in der Ablehnung der eidgenössischen Initiative für die Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht.”	
24.06. 2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning		Secco no all'abolizione del servizio militare	“Partito evangelico svizzero (PEV), riunito sabato a Sciaffusa invita i cittadini a bocciare l'iniziativa popolare che chiede l'abolizione del servizio militare obbligatorio, in votazione in prossimo 22 settembre.”	
01.07.2013	<i>Berner Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Wehrpflicht: SP und Grüne für die Aufhebung	“Die Delegierten der SP und der Vorstand der Grünen haben am Wochenende erwartungsgemäss beschlossen, die Initiative zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht auch an der Urne zu unterstützen.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in <i>italics</i> are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
01.07.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning		Militare: Anche i Verdi con il GSsE	"I Verdi svizzeri sono favorevoli all'abolizione del servizio militare obbligatorio."	
01.07.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning		Verdi liberali «I volontari non bastano»	"I Verdi liberali svizzeri, riuniti sabato in assemblea a Ginevra, invitano i cittadini a bocciare l'iniziativa popolare che chiede l'abolizione del servizio militare obbligatorio, in votazione il prossimo 22 settembre."	
01.07.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning	costs	PS «Ci basta un esercito di milizia» Accolta la soppressione del servizio obbligatorio, al voto il 22 settembre	"La maggioranza dei socialisti ritiene che l'obbligo di prestare servizio militare provochi un'esplosione dei costi."	
03.07.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	pros and cons		Wehrpflicht im Fadenkreuz: Die Gruppe Schweiz ohne Armee verwickelt das militärfreundliche Lager in einen weiteren Abwehrkampf	"Die hartnäckigen Armeegeegner bauen in ihre Kampagne darauf, dass nicht alle jungen Männer Zeit hätten, «Krieg zu spielen»." "Wehrpflicht ist Bürgerpflicht", lautet die Devise des Bundesrats. Zudem mahnt er, ein Ja zur Initiative würde die Sicherheit von Land und Leuten gefährden." "Am 22. September stehen allerdings keine Varianten zur Abstimmung. Die Gegner der Initiative, die sich unter dem Titel «Gemeinsam für Sicherheit» zusammengeschlossen haben, können ihren Abwehrkampf ohne Seitenblicke auf das Nein fokussieren. Das überparteiliche Komitee, dem das Gros der bürgerlichen National- und Ständeräte beigetreten ist, spricht konsequent von einer «Unsicherheits-Initiative», deren Annahme die Armee in ihren Grundfesten erschüttern würde."	
03.07.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity		Milizprinzip im Crashtest	"Die Schweizer Armee soll nicht abgeschafft werden, aber nur noch Freiwillige sollen mittun. Die Forderung der Gruppe Schweiz ohne Armee ist untauglich." "Ob ein militärisches Korps von Freiwilligen die verfassungsmässigen Aufträge auch nur ansatzweise erfüllen könnte? Ausgereifte Überlegungen hierzu existieren nicht. ... Das belegt die fehlende Ernsthaftigkeit, mit der die Sicherheitsdebatte zur Linken geführt wird."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
05.07.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity		Die Wehrpflicht verteidigen: Armeechef spricht Klartext	“In der Schweiz gebe es keine echte Alternative zu Miliz und Militärdienstpflicht. Das betont Korpskommandant Andre Blattmann, Chef der Armee, im Interview mit der NZZ. Den Initianten des Volksbegehrens «Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht» wirft er vor, ihr Ruf nach einer auf Freiwilligkeit basierenden Armee sei «kein Unterfangen, das nicht ehrlich ist». ... Letztlich zielten die Initianten auf das, was im Namen GSoA enthalten sei, nämlich die schrittweise Abschaffung der Armee. Auf die Frage, ob er seine Verantwortung noch wahrnehmen könnte, falls das Volk eine Freiwilligenarmee gutheisse, sagte Blattmann: «Da kann ich definitiv Nein sagen.»”	
05.07.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	government campaigning	avoid insecurity	«Eine Freiwilligenarmee ist Wunschdenken» Korpskommandant Blattmann nimmt zur Anti-Wehrpflicht-Initiative und zur geplanten Armee reform Stellung	“ <i>Wie wird die Armeeführung im Abstimmungskampf agieren?</i> Als Armeechef orientiere ich mich an den Entscheiden von Bundesrat und Parlament. Die Armee selber hat sich nicht in die politische Debatte einzumischen. Aber ich habe meine Divisionäre und Brigadiers beauftragt, dass zu informieren ist über die Bedeutung der Sicherheit in unserem Land, über den Beitrag der Armee und über die Rolle der Milizarmee.” “ <i>Die Befürworter kritisieren, es gehe der Armee nicht um Information, sondern um Indoktrination der Truppe.</i> Unlängst hat ein Journalist gesagt, er wolle bei einer solchen Information der Truppe dabei sein. Danach konstatierte er, das gebe nichts her für einen Artikel. Wir sagen ja nicht, wie die Soldaten abstimmen müssen. Unsere Schweizer sind mündig genug. Sie erwarten aber, dass wir darlegen, welche Konsequenzen die Annahme der Initiative hätte.”	
17.07.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	no discrimination		GSoA bewirbt sich vergeblich	“Am 15. Juli ist die Bewerbungsfrist für den Stadtzürcher Gleichstellungspreis abgelaufen. Eine Bewerbung ist allerdings bereits abgelehnt worden: Die Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee (GSoA) hatte sich mit ihrer Initiative «Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht» beworben, und zwar mit der Begründung, das Volksbegehren verfolge <u>geschlechterpolitisch relevante Ziele.</u> ”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
19.07.2013	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning		Blick im Bootcamp: Reporterin Lanz bei der besten Armee der Welt	“Am 22. September stimmt die Schweiz über die Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht ab. Jetzt legt sich die Armee mächtig ins Zeug. Und lädt ins Bootcamp für Journalisten.” “Ich weiss jetzt, dass meine Freunde nicht gelogen haben mit dem Drill. Aber ein bisschen übertrieben vielleicht schon.”	
20.07.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	government campaigning		Im Bootcamp von Ueli Maurer: PR-Aktion Warum das Verteidigungsdepartement diese Woche ein gutes Dutzend junger Journalisten in die Kaserne einrücken liess.	“Vielleicht um zu retten, was noch zu retten ist, haben der Bundespräsident und seine Kommunikationsfachleute die Idee für ein Journalisten-Bootcamp entwickelt.” “Ein Berufskollege meinte kürzlich, Journalisten berichteten automatisch wohlwollender, wenn man sie im Hubschrauber mitfliegen lässt.”	
27.07.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity			“Aus Sicht der Schweiz sind die aktuellen Diskussionen in Schweden reizvoll. Es gibt zwar immer noch Parallelen: Beide Länder sind Mitglieder in der «Partnerschaft für den Frieden» der Nato. Beide Länder setzen in ihrer Sicherheitspolitik auf «Sicherheit durch Kooperation». Beide Länder haben ihr Masseneheer seit 1991 massiv verkleinert und den Anteil des Militärhaushalts am Bruttoinlandsprodukt halbiert. Der Mythos Neutralität ist in beiden Ländern in der Öffentlichkeit stark verankert und als Meta-Ideologie innenpolitisch sakrosankt.” “Die aktuelle verteidigungspolitische Debatte in Schweden demonstriert, dass eine offene Diskussion über die Vor- und Nachteile von kollektiver Verteidigung überfällig war.”	
29.07.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	avoid insecurity			“Feu nourri de Christophe Keckeis contre l'initiative du GSsA sur la milice.” “Ancien chef de l'Armée, Christophe Keckeis ne renie pas son attachement à la milice. ... Si nous voulons maintenir une armée, nous n'avons pas d'alternative. Une milice volontaire? Cela ne marchera pas. On l'a vu avec l'engagement des femmes depuis la réforme Armée XXI. Pendant plus de dix ans on a encouragé leur enrôlement volontaire. Sans succès.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
30.07.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	tradition	Der Brigadier der mit der GSoA ringt	“Einst war er Instruktionsoffizier. Heute instruiert Hans-Peter Wüthrich Schützenvereine, militärische Milizorganisationen und andere Verbände, wie der Frontalangriff auf die allgemeine Wehrpflicht zu kontern ist. Hans-Peter Wüthrich mahnt, ein Ja zur GSoA Initiative wäre fatal: «Ohne allgemeine Wehrpflicht stirbt die Armee.» Überdies sei ein Nein aus staatspolitischer Rason geboten. «Es geht nicht nur um die Armee, sondern um das Milizprinzip ganz allgemein», betont Wüthrich.”	
PHASE 2						
30.07.2013						Beginning of campaigning on behalf of GSoA, initiators of “For the Abolition of Conscription”
30.07.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	pros and cons		Le GSsA ne veut plus «jouer à la guerre»	“«On n'a pas tous le temps de jouer à la guerre.» Tel est le slogan du comité d'initiative pour «l'abrogation du service militaire obligatoire». Il lançait sa campagne en vue de la votation du 22 septembre, hier, à Berne.” “Cette initiative «n'est qu'un premier pas vers une abolition de l'armée», réagissait hier le comité pour le non (soutenu par l'UDC, le PDC, le PLR et le PBD).”	
31.07.2013	<i>Berner Zeitung</i>	costs	discrimination	Forsche Initianten: Wehrpflicht	“Militärdienst ist für die Befürworter der GSoA-Initiative zur Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht Zeitverschwendung. Das Komitee lancierte gestern den Abstimmungskampf.”	
31.07.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	senselessness	discrimination	Votazioni Soldati per scelta, non per obbligo	“Lanciata la campagna a favore della creazione di un esercito di milizia formato da soli volontari. È stata lanciata ieri a Berna la campagna a favore dell'iniziativa «Si all'abolizione del servizio militare obbligatorio», in votazione il 22 settembre.”	
30.07.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		Un début chaotique pour le GSsA	“Partie avec un taux d'acceptation de plus de 40% en 2012, selon les sondages, l'initiative pourrait s'effondrer le 22 septembre, malgré une certaine compréhension en dehors de la gauche, en raison d'une campagne mal préparée.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
31.07.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Das Militär als Zeitverschwendung	“Bunt gemischte Koalition lanciert Kampagne zur Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht” “Die Volksinitiative zur Aufhebung der Armee will die heutige Milizarmee durch eine Freiwilligenarmee ersetzen. Zu Grösse, Kosten oder Aufgaben einer solchen Armee machte die Koalition auch auf Nachfrage keine Angaben.”	
01.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		1.-August-Raketen	“Mit Wasserpistolen und Clownnasen sowie in Militäruniform gekleidet, störten rund ein Dutzend GSoA-Aktivisten und junge Grüne die Rede von Bundespräsident Ueli Maurer in Biel. Die Lacher erntete allerdings Verteidigungsminister Maurer. Er freute sich, dass die Störenfriede Uniformen trugen, und sagte: «Wir brauchen Leute, die sich in ihrer Freizeit engagieren.”	
02.08.2013	<i>Berner Zeitung</i>	campaigning		«Die Grossen erteilen uns Befehle»	“Einige Aktivisten ... warben in Uniform und mit Wasserpistolen ausgestattet für die Initiative zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht, über die im Herbst abgestimmt wird. «Wir brauchen Leute, die sich in ihrer Freizeit engagieren”	
02.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Rohrkrepiere bei der GSoA	“Frage an alle Referenten: Wie soll die Freiwilligenarmee, die Sie anstreben, denn konkret aussehen? Was soll sie kosten? Was soll sie können? Langes Schweigen, keine substanzielle Antwort. Nach der Pressekonferenz gab sich der grüne Nationalrat Balthasar Glättli in der Zeitung «Le Temps» selbstkritisch: «Die Lancierung unserer Kampagne ist nicht wirklich geglückt.» Ein Soldat würde sagen: ein Rohrkrepiere.”	
02.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Begriffswirrwarr rund um die Wehrmodelle	“Rund um die GSoA-Initiative zur Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht ranken sich zahlreiche Begriffe. Nachstehend ein Überblick über die unterschiedlichen Modelle.”	
02.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	tradition	avoid insecurity	Historisch verankerter Milizgedanke	“Ein Ja zur GSoA-Initiative würde bedeuten, dass mit einer jahrhundertealten Tradition gebrochen würde. Umfragen in Rekrutenschulen haben ergeben, dass keine zehn Prozent der Rekruten bereit wären, freiwillig Militärdienst zu leisten, und dies auch nur gegen teures Geld.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
03.08.2013	24 heures	ultimate goal of abolition		Le scénario d'une armée professionnelle fait débat	"L'initiative du GSsA ne précise rien sur l'avenir de l'armée. L'idée d'engager des pros fait bondir les partisans de la milice. Engager uniquement des miliciens volontaires? 'Cela ne fonctionnerait pas,' estime Denis Froidevaux, président de la Société suisse des officiers (SSO)."	
05.08.2013	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	pros and cons		Die Wehrpflicht abschaffen?	"Auf bürgerlicher Seite herrscht mindestens so weit Konsens, dass die Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht ein unverantwortlicher Schritt wäre."	
05.08.2013	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	costs	discrimination	Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht ermöglicht echte Reform (Author: Jo Lang, leading member of GSoA)	"Eine Annahme der Volksinitiative «Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht» wäre der Startschuss für jene tiefgreifende Reform, die durch die Wehrpflicht und wegen der mit ihr verbundenen Vorstellungen bis anhin verhindert worden ist."	
09.08.2013	SRF 1, Tagesschau Hauptausgabe	avoid insecurity		Soll in der Schweiz die allgemeine Wehrpflicht abgeschafft werden?	"Heute legten die Gegner der GSoA-Initiative ihre Argumente dar."	
10.08.2013	24 heures	avoid insecurity		«Jetman» et Nicollier volent au secours de notre armée	"Le GSsA utilise la tactique du salami."	
10.08.2013	Aargauer Zeitung	pros and cons		Die Militärdienstpflicht soll abgeschafft werden	"Wehrpflicht-Initiative Am 22. September stimmt das Volk ab die wichtigsten Fragen und Antworten zur Vorlage"	
10.08.2013	Aargauer Zeitung	pros and cons		Pro und Contra zur Abstimmung über die Initiative «Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht» vom 22. September	"Der Bürgersoldat entspricht dem schweizerischen Staatsverständnis" "Mit der Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht befände sich die Schweiz in bester Gesellschaft"	
10.08.2013	Aargauer Zeitung	tradition	avoid insecurity	«Erfolgsmodell» in Gefahr	"Ohne Wehrpflicht werde die Armee mangels Personal nicht mehr funktionieren oder zu teuer werden, worauf die Abschaffung folgen dürfte - das sei das Ziel der GSoA, sagte er." "Entsprechend sprechen die Gegner auch von der «Unsicherheitsinitiative»."	
09.08.2013						Beginning of campaigning on behalf of Con Committee

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
10.08.2013	<i>Blick</i>	campaigning		Olympiasieger kämpft für Armee	“Mit sportlicher Unterstützung eröffnete ein bürgerliches Komitee gestern den Abstimmungskampf um die Wehrpflicht-Initiative. «Ich bin sicher nicht der typische Armeebefürworter. Aber ich habe ihr viel zu verdanken», sagte der Berner Skicross-Olympiasieger Mike Schmid”	
10.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	national cohesion	Gegen eine tranchierte Armee	“Das Komitee gegen die GSoA Initiative sieht die Sicherheit der Schweiz bedroht, sollte die Wehrpflicht aufgehoben werden. Den Befürwortern wirft es vor, die Armee scheibchenweise abschaffen zu wollen.”	
15.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Verbale Mobilmachung	“In der Gruppe Giardino sitzen verbale Scharfschützen, die mit dem Kopf durch die Wand wollen. Sie tragen in ihrem Feueifer wenig Brauchbares zur sicherheitspolitischen Debatte bei. In der bierseligen Feldküche sass aber auch ein Journalist, der handwerkliche Sorgfaltspflichten schnöd beiseiteschob.”	
PHASE 3						
16.08.2013						Press Conference Federal Council. Present at the conference: President of the Swiss Confederacy and Defense Minister Maurer, Secretary General DDPS, Mrs. Rindlisbacher, Chief of armed forces Blattmann, Press Speaker Suini

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in <i>italics</i> are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
16.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		GSoA-Gegner kämpfen mit falschem Argument	“Trotz eindeutigen Dementi aus London wollen weder das Nein- Komitee noch der SOG-Präsident einen Fehler einräumen. «Wir sehen keinen Anlass, unsere Position zu ändern », sagt Kampagnenleiter und Brigadier a. D. Hans-Peter Wüthrich. Das ist aus drei Gründen unverständlich: Erstens stehen die Initiativgegner... so gut wie sicher auf der Siegerseite. Ein kurzes «Mea Culpa» gefährdet das Resultat mit Sicherheit nicht. Zweitens sollte es im Interesse jedes demokratisch engagierten Bürgers liegen, dass die Wahrheit in Abstimmungskämpfen nicht auf der Strecke bleibt. Drittens: Wer an seine Sache glaubt, muss nicht mit falschen Behauptungen auf Stimmenfang gehen.”	
16.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	senselessness		Soldaten werben für ein Ja am 22. September	“In Bern hat sich gestern Donnerstag eine Gruppe von Schweizer Soldaten, in Zürich ein Komitee «Bürgerliche gegen Wehrpflicht» in Stellung gebracht. ” Auch wenn jeder unterschiedliche Beweggründe angibt, in einem Punkt sind sich alle Mitglieder des «Soldatenkomitees gegen die Wehrpflicht» einig: Die Dienstzeit war sinnlos.”	
16.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		London wehrt sich gegen Befürworter der Wehrpflicht	“Die britische Armee dementiert, dass sie in Gefängnissen Soldaten rekrutiert.”	
16.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	senselessness		Schwierige Sinnsuche bei der aktiven Truppe	“Am Anfang haben sich schon einige gefragt, was das Ganze hier soll,' sagt Roger Mdros. Doch die Bedenkenseien verflogen. 'Die Ausbildung ist ernsthaft und die Vorgesetzten sind seriös. Das gefällt uns.”	
16.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity		Die Aufhebung der Dienstpflicht liegt im Trend	“Es müssen genügend Freiwillige angeworben werden, was sich nicht immer als einfach erweist.”	
16.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	tradition	avoidance of civil-military gap	Gastbeitrag zur Volksabstimmung über die Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht Als bestünde die Welt aus Gandhis.. (Author: Marianne Binder-Keller, Head of communication Swiss Christian Democratic Party)	“Unsere direkte Demokratie bildet eine ideale Balance zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft. Ich bin deshalb eine engagierte Verfechterin des Milizsystems. Ich bin gegen ein Berufsparlament und ich bin gegen eine Berufsarmee.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
16.08.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	pros and cons		Esercito Un gruppo di soldati contrario all'obbligo di servire	“Anche un gruppo di militi svizzeri è favorevole all'iniziativa «Sì all'abolizione del servizio militare obbligatorio», in votazione il 22 settembre prossimo” “Il Consiglio federale e il Parlamento raccomandano di votare «no». Secondo il Governo, senza l'obbligo di prestare servizio militare la sicurezza della Svizzera sarebbe in pericolo.”	
16.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	senselessness		Ungewöhnliche Allianz gegen die Wehrpflicht	“Das Komitee «Bürgerliche gegen Wehrpflicht» schlägt Werbetrommel für die freiwillige Miliz” “Er fühle sich angesichts der bürgerlichen Nein-Propaganda zur Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht beschämt, sagte der als Experte an eine Medienkonferenz geladene Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre Reiner Eichenberger. Der Zwang zum Militärdienst sei erschreckend «unliberal».”	
16.08.2013	<i>SRF 1, Tagesschau Hauptausgabe</i>	pros and cons	avoid insecurity	Die Trendumfrage zur GSoA	“So sind nur 35% der Befragten bestimmt oder eher für die Initiative zur Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht, eine Mehrheit von 57% ist bestimmt oder eher dagegen. Bericht mit Ausführungen von Martina Imfeld, GfS Bern: Die Gräben verlaufen ganz eindeutig parteipolitisch. Statements von Ueli Maurer, Verteidigungsminister: Freiwilligen-Armee werde Quantität und Qualität nicht bringen. / Nikolai Prawdzic, GSoA: Milizprinzip würde nicht aufgehoben.”	
17.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Abstimmung Maurer will Wehrpflicht behalten		
17.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		“Bundesräte mit Käse erschossen”	“Verbal-Attacke Soldaten-Präsident Hermann Suter fährt gegen Landesregierung grobes Geschütz auf” “«Diese Bundesräte sollte man alle erschiessen mit Ausnahme von Ueli Maurer.» Hermann Suter, Präsident der Gruppe «Giardino», einer Vereinigung von aktiven und pensionierten Soldaten, packte am letzten Wochenende in Birmensdorf AG gegenüber einem Journalisten der <i>Wochenzeitung</i> (WOZ) den verbalen Zweihänderaus. Gelinde gesagt.”	
17.08.2013	<i>Berner Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity		Ueli Maurer kämpft für die Wehrpflicht	“Eine Armee, die mangels Wehrpflicht aus Freiwilligen bestehe, sei ein riskantes Experiment, sagte Maurer. «Es gibt kein Land mit einer Freiwilligenmiliz.»”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
17.08.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	national cohesion		Votazione federale: Ueli Maurer: «L'obbligo di servire favorisce la coesione nazionale»	“L'obbligo di servire permette inoltre di reclutare giovani di ogni classe sociale, favorendo così la coesione nazionale.”	
17.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	national cohesion	Die Wehrpflicht verteidigen	“Bundespräsident Ueli Maurer will die Sicherheit des Landes keinesfalls an bezahlte Freiwillige delegieren” “Der Milizgedanke sei Bestandteil des schweizerischen Selbstverständnisses. Folgerichtig sei die Milizarmee ein Teil der schweizerischen Identität, argumentierte Maurer.”	
17.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	voting trends		Wehrpflicht scheint ungefährdet: SRG-Erhebung im Vorfeld der September-Abstimmungen	“Gemäss der ersten Trendumfrage des Instituts GfS Bern im Auftrag der SRG dürfte die Wehrpflicht am 22. September vom Stimmvolk nicht aufgehoben werden. Nur 35 Prozent haben in der Umfrage angegeben, sie würden die GSoA-Initiative unterstützen, 57 Prozent dagegen lehnen sie ab.”	
17.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	tradition	Zürcher Komitee für die Wehrpflicht	“Die Initiative aus links-pazifistischen Kreisen müsse am 22. September abgelehnt werden, weil sie ein Angriff auf das Erfolgsmodell Schweiz sei und der erste Schritt zur Abschaffung der Armee wäre.”	
20.08.2013	<i>20 Minuten</i>	pros and cons		Zu wenig Freiwillige für die Armee?	“Die deutsche Armee findet nicht genügend Freiwillige. Dies spielt den hiesigen Befürwortern der Wehrpflicht in die Hand.”	
22.08.2013	<i>24 heures</i>	avoid insecurity		Pierre Maudet: «L'armée suisse est prise en otage»	“Partisan d'une réforme totale de la grande muette, Pierre Maudet rejette toutefois l'initiative du GSsA.” “La question première n'est pas celle des effectifs ni celle du budget, mais de savoir comment assurer la sécurité du pays.”	4 weeks before the vote
24.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	discrimination	avoidance of civil-military gap	Nicht alle befürworten das freiwillige Militär	“Zu reden gab an der Delegiertenversammlung des Aargauer Gewerkschaftsbunds vom Donnerstag vor allem die Initiative zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht. Die Ja-Parole beschlossen die Delegierten dann aber trotzdem mit 21:15 Stimmen.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in <i>italics</i> are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
24.08.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	avoid insecurity	avoidance of civil-military gap	L'opinione Iris Canonica: E ora prendono di mira il cittadino-soldao	"L'iniziativa in oggetto è però insidiosa, perché non chiede direttamente l'abolizione dell'esercito, ma tenta di sdoganare una forma alternativa all'attuale esercito di milizia, basato sul servizio di leva obbligatorio, chiedendo di introdurre un servizio volontario che presterebbe il cittadino sulla base delle sue scelte individuali." "La sicurezza non dovrebbe essere negoziabile e non dovrebbe neppure essere politicamente monetizzabile."	
26.08.2013	<i>20 Minuten</i>	avoid insecurity		«In einer Freiwilligen-truppe wären auch Rambos dabei»	" <i>Ueli Maurer, Sie kämpfen gegen die Anti-Wehrpflicht-Initiative. Ist die Armee so unattraktiv, dass Sie zu wenig Leute für eine Freiwilligenmiliz fänden?</i> Nein, die Wirtschaft ist zu attraktiv."	
26.08.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	effects of military service / not directly related to vote		Ce service militaire qui pénalise les employés	"Les employeurs sont moins indulgents pour leurs collaborateurs astreints" "Le grade compte aussi beaucoup moins qu'avant"	
26.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Mit 202:1 gegen 1:12	"Die Delegierten der FDP haben die Volksinitiativen der Juso und der GSoA erwartungsgemäss deutlich abgelehnt."	
26.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning	costs	Brunner will Abstimmung zur EU-Frage	"Die SVP-Delegierten lehnen die GSoA-Initiative für die Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht und die «1:12»-Initiative der Juso ab." "Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht trage zur Qualität der Armee, zur flexiblen Verfügbarkeit und zu einer im Vergleich eher kostengünstigen Heeresorganisation bei. Und schliesslich stärke sie das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung in die Armee."	
27.08.2013	<i>Berner Zeitung</i>	outdated	discrimination	«Es finden sich sicher jährlich 5000 Freiwillige für die Armee» (Interview with Jo Lang, GSoA member)	"Seit Beginn seiner politischen Karriere [wehrt er sich] gegen die Militarisierung. Er ist überzeugt davon, dass die Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht Wirtschaft und Staat massive Einsparungen bringt."	
27.08.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	avoid insecurity	pros and cons	Votazione: La milizia non si tocca	"Per il comitato abolire l'obbligo di leva in realtà porterebbe a un esercito di professionisti" "L'iniziativa, se accolta, causerebbe la perdita di 750 posti di lavoro nel nostro cantone"	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
27.08.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	costs	outdated	«Si l'initiative aboutit, l'objectif de supprimer l'armée devient utopique»	“Pacifisme: Un fondateur du GSsA commente le texte soumis à votation” “Si l'abrogation du service militaire obligatoire est acceptée, c'est la base du Groupe pour une Suisse sans armée qui sera remise en cause”	
28.08.2013	<i>20 Minuten</i>	government campaigning		«Nur Beschäftigungs-therapie»	“VBS-Chef Ueli Maurer kämpft derzeit für ein Ja zur Wehrpflicht. Unter anderem mit dem Argument «Wenn Frauen einen Soldaten in Uniform kriegen, wissen sie: Dieser ist gesund, kann Schuhe putzen und Betten machen, das ist doch cool!» Viele User können da nur den Kopf schütteln.”	
29.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	tradition	Unbesiegbare Schweizer Armee	“Am 22. September starten die Armeegegner und Militärskeptiker vereint einen neuen Versuch, ihren Lieblingsfeind zu schwächen. Mit der Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht soll die Abschaffung der Armee präjudiziert werden. Doch so weit wird es nicht kommen: Wenn nicht ein Wunder geschieht, wird die Armee auch diesen Angriff unbeschadet überstehen. Die bürgerliche Schweiz steht zur Landesverteidigung und damit auch zur Wehrpflicht.”	
29.08.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	avoid insecurity		Ueli Maurer «In realtà il nostro esercito è il più moderno d'Europa»	“Non sappiamo se ci sarebbero abbastanza volontari, dunque ci sarebbe un problema di quantità, ma non sappiamo neppure quali persone si metterebbero a disposizione, dunque anche la qualità sarebbe un'incognita.”	
29.08.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	avoidance of civil-military gap		L'opinione Carlo Schirmeister: Noi Svizzeri, cittadini-soldati	“Come detto, la Svizzera siamo noi; posso perciò anche affermare che l'esercito siamo noi, grazie al fatto di aver noi stessi scelto di obbligarci tutti al servizio militare.” “Votiamo quindi compatti con un grande e deciso no in occasione della votazione del 22 settembre. Ne va della sicurezza di tutti noi.”	
30.08.2013	<i>24 heures</i>	costs		L'armée coûterait à la Suisse 9 milliards chaque année	“Une étude estime que les coûts réels de l'armée sont bien plus élevés que les chiffres officiels. Ueli Maurer conteste.”	
30.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	outdated		Bürgerliche Armereformer kritisieren Wehrpflicht	“Die Wehrpflicht sei heuchlerisch, sagt der Genfer Sicherheitsdirektor Pierre Maudet. Der FDP-Mann fordert die freie Wahl zwischen Militär und Zivildienst.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
31.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	costs		Kostet die Armee in Wirklichkeit neun Milliarden?	“Weniger als einen Monat vor der Abstimmung zur Wehrpflicht-Initiative widerspricht der Freiburger Wirtschaftsprofessor Reiner Eichenberger den offiziellen Zahlen zu den Globalkosten der Armee.” “Bundespräsident Ueli Maurer reagierte verärgert, als ihn die Westschweizer Zeitung «24 heures» kürzlich mit den Berechnungen Eichenbergers konfrontierte. «Diese Zahlen sind falsch. Die Studie der Milizkommission wurde von unabhängigen Expertenbüros realisiert.» Er glaube, der Professor wolle kurz vor der Abstimmung noch einmal eine «billige Attacke» gegen die Armee lancieren.”	
31.08.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	size	Offizier kämpft in Aarau für Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht	“«Solche Experimente mit der Armee lehne ich grundsätzlich ab.» Corina Eichenberger, Aargauer FDP-Nationalrätin” “Aus der Sicht von Offizier Amberg findet heute ein enormer Verschleiss an Ressourcen und Geldern statt. Jedes Jahr bilde die Armee 20 000 Leute aus, um sie bereits nach fünf Jahren wieder zu verabschieden.”	
31.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Konzeptloser Angriff auf die Wehrpflicht	"Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht ist ein taugliches Modell, das der vom Milizgedanken durchdrungenen Schweiz gleichsam auf den Leib geschneidert ist. Der Bundesrat und eine deutliche Mehrheit in National- und Ständerat sind deshalb richtigerweise nicht bereit, diesen bewährten Eckpfeiler der Armee zu schleifen."	
31.08.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Eidgenössische Abstimmung vom 22. September	“Die Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee (GSoA) will die Militärdienstpflicht für Schweizer Bürger abschaffen und die heutige Armee durch eine markant verkleinerte Freiwilligenmiliz ersetzen. Auch der Zivildienst soll auf freiwilliger Basis fortgeführt werden. Die Initiative «Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht» wird vom rot-grünen Lager unterstützt. Der Bundesrat und die bürgerlichen Parteien im eidgenössischen Parlament widersetzen sich dem Ansinnen, weil die Abschaffung der Militärdienstpflicht unakzeptable Konsequenzen für die Sicherheit der Schweiz habe. Die auf dem Milizprinzip aufgebaute Bürgerarmee habe sich bewährt. Die NZZ empfiehlt die Initiative zur Ablehnung.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
01.09.2013	<i>Blick</i>	pros and cons		Jakob Büchler (CVP) kämpft gegen die Wehrpflicht-Initiative, Cédric Wermuth (SP) dafür. Wieso sehen sie sich beide als Retter der Armee?		
02.09.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		CSP für Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht	“Die Delegierten der Christlich- Sozialen Partei (CSP) haben am Samstag die Ja-Parolen zur GSoA-Initiative und zum Epidemienengesetz gefasst.”	
02.09.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Nein der AL zur GSoA-Initiative	“Die Alternative Linke Schweiz (AL) hat nach intensiven Diskussionen entschieden, die GSoA-Initiative zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht abzulehnen. Auf der französischsprachigen Webseite begründet sie die Parole damit, dass heutzutage kein Schweizer Bürger Militärdienst mehr leisten müsse; er könne nämlich auch Zivildienst leisten.”	
03.09.2013	<i>20 Minuten</i>	campaigning		Wehrpflicht: Linke sind sich uneinig	“Zoff im linken Lager: Die Alternative Linke hält die Initiative für eine Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht für lächerlich.”	
03.09.2013	<i>24 heures</i>	avoid insecurity		Les entreprises face à l'obligation de servir	“La sécurité fait partie des conditions indispensables à toute activité économique”	
03.09.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	pros and cons		Votazione federale «Per una milizia su base volontaria»		
03.09.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	avoid insecurity		L'opinione Carlo Schirrmester: Esercito e specchietti per le allodole		
04.09.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	costs	discrimination	La conscription empêche notre armée de s'adapter au XXIe siècle	“Aujourd'hui déjà l'inégalité de traitement est flagrante entre les moins de 50% d'incorporés et les autres jeunes hommes.” “Ce qui est certain, c'est que le coût pour la Confédération, pour l'économie et pour les appelés eux-mêmes actuellement neuf millions de francs baissera fortement.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics	Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
04.09.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	Subsidiäre Einsätze und Wehrpflicht	“Die Abschaffung der Wehrpflicht würde die quantitativen und die qualitativen Kapazitäten für einen Einsatz unterhalb der Kriegsschwelle erheblich reduzieren. Dadurch würde die Sicherheit der Schweiz in einem Bedrohungsszenarium reduziert, das rasch und unerwartet eintreten kann. Es wäre deshalb unverantwortlich, die Wehrpflicht abzuschaffen.”	
04.09.2013	<i>SRF 1, Rundschau</i>	campaigning	Sprungbrett Offizierskarriere	“Jedes Jahr bekommt die Schweizer Armee bis zu 1200 neue Offiziere. Der Wunsch vieler junger Schweizer, Offiziersdolch und Offiziersspatten zu tragen, scheint ungebrochen. Doch fördert eine Offizierskarriere auch die zivile Karriere? Dazu die Reportage aus einer Offiziersschule.”	
06.09.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning	Regierungsrätin Hochuli verteidigt die Wehrpflicht GSoA-Initiative	“GSoA-Initiative Die grüne Militärdirektorin im Aargau fährt eine andere Linie als ihre Partei” “Hochuli ist gegen die Initiative der GSoA. «weil ich für eine allgemeine Dienstpflicht einstehe». Sie bezweifelt, dass eine freiwillige Armee funktionieren würde.”	
06.09.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning	«Alle müssen Dienst an der Gesellschaft leisten»	“GSoA-Initiative: Sind Sie dagegen, weil Sie eine allgemeine Dienstpflicht möchten, oder weil Sie finden, die Schweiz brauche eine Armee? Ich bin nicht davon überzeugt, dass eine freiwillige Armee, wie sich die GSoA dies vorstellt, wirklich funktioniert.”	
06.09.2013	<i>SRF 1, Arena</i>	pros and cons	Abstimmungsarena: Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht	“Am 22. September wird über die Initiative der GSoA abgestimmt. Es diskutieren: Nikolai Prawdzic, GSoA, Ueli Maurer, Verteidigungsminister, Barbara Gysi, Vizepräsidentin SP, Corina Eichenberger-Walther, Nationalrätin FDP/AG. Statements von: Reiner Eichenberger, Professor für Ökonomie, Universität Freiburg, André Blattmann, Chef der Armee, Valentin Vogt, Präsident Arbeitgeberverband.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics	Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
06.09.2013	<i>Berner Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	Oberst Hui: «Weit über die Hälfte will zu den Kampftruppen»	“Aber: Wie verhielte es sich mit der Armeefreundlichkeit, wenn die Wehrpflicht am 22. September an der Urne abgeschafft würde? Der Rekrutierungsoffizier lässt sich nicht zu Spekulationen hinreissen, zumal er in Uniform keinen Abstimmungskampf betreiben darf. Er verweist lediglich auf die Erfahrungen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien oder Spanien. Diese Länder haben keine obligatorische Wehrpflicht mehr. Sie alle bekunden Rekrutierungsprobleme.”	
06.09.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	national cohesion	L'opinione Gaetano Tozzo: Non vogliamo l'esercito dei volontari	“Tutte le diversità di noi svizzeri: il nostro piccolo Stato, la nostra neutralità armata, la nostra vocazione umanitaria di accoglienza e d'integrazione di molti stranieri, il plurilinguismo, la multiculturalità, la pluralità confessionale, oggi trovano nel servizio di leva obbligatorio non solo un momento di formazione e addestramento militare, ma un convivio ideale di civilizzazione di giovani provenienti da tutti i cantoni svizzeri fusi in fraterna coesione nazionale.”	
06.09.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	Sorgenvoll gesucht: Freiwillige Soldaten	“Fazit: Ob für eine Freiwilligenmiliz die notwendigen Bestandeszahlen erreicht werden könnten und ob diese wesentlich günstiger wäre als das heutige Wehrpflichtsystem, ist alles andere als sicher.” “In jedem Fall ist eine Art der Mobilisierung der Bürgerschaft unter Notfallbedingungen eine Möglichkeit, die nicht leichtfertig aufgegeben werden sollte. Unter diesem Blickwinkel ist die GSoA Initiative als untaugliche Radikallösung abzulehnen.”	
07.09.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	costs	L'opinione Daniele Lotti: Il cittadino-soldato e l'economia	“È in grado di fornire le prestazioni richieste in modo efficiente ed efficace e rafforza il dovere civico di ogni cittadina e cittadino.”	
07.09.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning	Parolen-Spiegel		
09.09.2013	<i>24 heures</i>	avoid insecurity	«Avec le volontariat, on aurait une armée d'excités commandés par des incapables»	“Officier de milice, le brigadier Denis Froidevaux ne croit pas au volontariat proposé par l'initiative du GSsA. Interview.” “En Suisse, toutes les fonctions sont ouvertes aux femmes dans l'armée: moins de cent se portent volontaires chaque année. Quelle architecture sécuritaire peut-on construire sur une base aussi incertaine?”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics	Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
09.09.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	Andre Blattmann Der Armeechef über die GSoA-Initiative gegen die Wehrpflicht und über seine Erfahrungen in WKs: «Die Wehrpflicht wird eine Renaissance erleben»	“Was wären die Folgen, wenn die GSoA-Initiative angenommen und die Wehrpflicht abgeschafft würde? De facto würde die Armee abgeschafft und damit die Sicherheit der Schweiz infrage gestellt. Dabei ist die Sicherheit die wichtigste Basis für unseren Wohlstand. Eine freiwillige Miliz würde niemals funktionieren, weil wir nicht genügend Leute hätten.”	
09.09.2013	<i>Berner Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	«Wir sind die beste praktische Kaderschule des Landes»	“Andre Blattmann: Im Vorfeld der Wehrpflichtabstimmung scheint er 'omnipräsent', in vielen Interviews und an unzähligen Anlässen weibelt er gegen deren Abschaffung. Man merkt ihm die argumentative Routine im Gespräch an: Inklar gestanzten, wohl bereits dutzendfach erfolgreich ins Feld geführten Sätzen formuliert er seine Botschaft.”	
09.09.2013	<i>Blick</i>	campaigning	Altes Muster statt echter Debatte	“Wer sich als Gripen-Gegner outet, wird zum Armeeabschaffer gestempelt. Das war vor zwanzig Jahren beim F/A-18 ebenso der Fall wie aktuell bei der Wehrpflicht-Initiative.”	
09.09.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning	Soutien au service civil	“En marge de la campagne de votation pour l'abolition du service militaire obligatoire, des appels pour un service civil volontaire se font entendre. Le Conseil suisse pour la paix, le Service civil international (Suisse) et la Fédération service civil (Civiva) ont publié dimanche une prise de position en sa faveur.”	
10.09.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	avoidance of civil-military gap	Parolen: Gewerbe steht zur Wehrpflicht	“Der Vorstand des Aargauischen Gewerbeverbands lehnt die Volksinitiative zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht einstimmig ab.” “Damit würden der Armee die personellen Ressourcen entzogen. Die Initiative würde nach Auffassung des Gewerbeverbands zur Berufsarmee führen. Einen solchen 'Staat im Staat' lehne man ab.”	
10.09.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	Leitartikel zur Volksinitiative «Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht» Für den Dienst an der Gemeinschaft	“Aus liberaler Sicht ist jeder staatliche Zwang kritisch zu hinterfragen. Ist er wirklich nötig? Die Antwort lautet in diesem Fall ja.” “Die Wehrpflicht ist ein wichtiges Element der schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik. Die Armeegegner wollen sie abschaffen und nicht etwa sistieren, wie dies zahlreiche europäische Staaten gemacht haben.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
10.09.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	costs		Die Wochenend-Krieger von Amerika	“Alternative Wie eine Miliz-Armee ohne Wehrpflicht aussieht, zeigt das Beispiel der US-Nationalgarde”	
10.09.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	pros and cons		Esercito Obbligo di servizio: la parola ai giovani		
11.09.2013	<i>Le Temps</i>	personal freedom		La conscription, c'est la violence	“Comme toute question politique, la question posée traite de l'usage légitime de la violence. La question posée est donc extrêmement simple: est-il légitime que l'Etat utilise la violence armée, soit la menace de la prison, pour contraindre un groupe arbitrairement défini (les personnes de nationalité suisse, d'un certain âge, et de sexe masculin) à accomplir une certaine activité, en l'occurrence un service militaire? Clairement, la réponse est non.”	
11.09.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Unterkühlte Erregung: Die Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee kämpft ziemlich einsam gegen die allgemeine Wehrpflicht	“Kommt die Volksinitiative «Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht» zur falschen Zeit? Die Gruppe Schweiz ohne Armee (GSoA) muss den Abstimmungskampf ohne sichtbaren Flankenschutz der rot-grünen Parteien führen.”	
12.09.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	voting trends		GSoA-Initiative scheint chancenlos	“Gemäss den Wissenschaftlern des Forschungsinstituts GfS Bern, welches die Umfrage im Auftrag der SRG durchgeführt hat, ist die Meinungsbildung weit fortgeschritten. Trotzdem verlaufen die Fronten nicht klar nach Parteibindungen.”	
12.09.2013	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	avoidance of civil-military gap		Noch fliegt der Gripen nicht	“ In zehn Tagen ist es so weit: Verteidigungsminister Ueli Maurer wird einen klaren Sieg über die Armeegeegner feiern können. Das Schweizervolk steht zur Milizarmee. Präziser: Es will eine Armee, die sich aus der Mitte der Gesellschaft rekrutiert. Die Abschaffung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht ist daher chancenlos.”	
12.09.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	avoid insecurity	national cohesion	L'opinione Alessandro von Wytenbach: Dobbiamo difenderci, la pace perpetua è un'illusione	“Prescindere dalle difficoltà pratiche che ciò comporterebbe, si pone la domanda se vi siano sufficienti candidati adatti e se questi avrebbero lo stesso spirito di dedizione al proprio Paese come i soldati di milizia, cittadini uniti da una causa comune.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
12.09.2013	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	national cohesion		L'opinione Roberto Badaracco: La milizia volontario è soltanto un'utopia	"Gli iniziattivisti lo sanno molto bene ma, pur di raggiungere i loro scopi, ci propinano un modello irrealizzabile" "Diverse culture e modi di sentire si avvicinano, si conoscono, fraternizzano. Si crea un'unione, un amalgama, la consapevolezza di appartenere ad una realtà nazionale dove accettazione del diverso e spirito di solidarietà sono valori imprescindibili."	
12.09.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning			"SVP, FDP und CVP haben in fast allen Sachbereichen verlernt, am gleichen Strick zu ziehen. Die BDP verkompliziert die Kompromissfindung zusätzlich. Die Armee ist gleichsam die Ausnahme, welche die neue Regel bestätigt: Bei der Frage, wie viel Geld für militärische Belange bereitgestellt werden sollen, bieten die genannten Parteien dem Bundesrat die Stirn. Sie widersetzen sich kollektiv dem Angriff der GSa auf die Wehrpflicht."	
13.09.2013	<i>24 heures</i>	pros and cons		Débat Pour ou contre l'abrogation du service militaire obligatoire? La contrainte, archaïsme prédémocratique		
14.09.2013	<i>24 heures</i>	personal freedom		Sans l'armée de milice, le service civil survivrait-il?	"Secrétaire général du GSa, Tobias Schnebli estime même que l'initiative - qui prévoit expressément un service civil volontaire - constitue le meilleur gage de développement. «Il faut libérer le service civil du carcan qui le lie au service militaire. Cela permettra d'élargir le recrutement au-delà de l'aptitude au service, aux femmes et aux jeunes étrangers.»"	
14.09.2013	<i>Berner Zeitung</i>	avoid insecurity	national cohesion	Die Armee muss weiterhin die Besten rekrutieren können BZ Kommentar	"Die Armee ist das einzige schweizweit einsetzbare Mittel bei Krisen, Katastrophen und Konflikten. Das Fundament dieser Armee bildet die Militärdienstpflicht."	
14.09.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Parolen-Spiegel		
21.09.2013	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Parolen-Spiegel		

B. MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 2014 REFERENDUM

Color code	
	neutral
	rather negative/critical of Gripen procurement / government stance
	negative / critical of Gripen procurement / government stance
	rather positive/supportive of Gripen procurement / government stance
	positive / supportive of Gripen procurement / government stance

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
11.02.2012	<i>Der Sonntag</i>					Reason for reports on “paper planes” http://web.archive.org/web/20120215105242/http://www.sonntagonline.ch/80/ressort/aktuell/2122/
13.12.2012	<i>SRF DOK</i>					Leak in Bern Leak of classified protocol of the parliamentary commission tasked with research on the Gripen jets. Content: Operational efficiency will not be achieved. https://www.srf.ch/play/tv/dok/video/die-beste-armee-der-welt?id=a43caa8d-72fb-401a-afe8-2b10d29f9704 (around minute 14)
PHASE 1						
30.01.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Gripen darf am Weltcup-Rennen fliegen		
30.01.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		On votera sur le Gripen le 18 mai		

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
30.01.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning		Referendum sui caccia Convalidate 65.384 firme	"Cancelleria federale, precisando che delle 65.797 firme presentate ne sono state convalidate 65.384. L'oggetto è in votazione il 18 maggio"	
31.01.2014	<i>Blick</i>	campaigning		Post: Gratis Werbung für Jets		
31.01.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Gripen à la parade	"Même si la démonstration a lieu deux mois avant la votation sur l'achat des avions, la Défense refuse de parler de propagande."	
31.01.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Zwei Gripen am Weltcup- Finale		
04.02.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	campaigning		SGV für Gripen		
08.02.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Saab soll sich zurückhalten		
08.02.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	campaigning		Gewerkschaftsbund Ja zum Mindestlohn, Nein zum Gripen		
11.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		Lendemain difficiles pour le centre	"Mais le centre droit sait aussi qu'il ne peut pas se permettre de snober l'UDC. Les ennemis de dimanche se réconcilieront très vite sur d'autres thèmes. Car à cette défaite succède une autre votation, celle de mai prochain sur l'achat des Gripen"	
11.02.2014	<i>RTS Un Le Journal</i>	campaigning		Votation sur le Gripen: Ueli Maurer lance la campagne	"Le ministre de la défense Ueli Maurer explique en quoi le Gripen est nécessaire pour la Suisse."	
12.02.2014	<i>Radio Sverige</i>					Swedish radio uncovers Saab's attempt to influence the Swiss vote http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=5782183 .

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
12.02.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Ueli Maurer startet Abstimmungskampf für Armee-Jets		
12.02.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	Security	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Die Gripen sind nötig		
12.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	return business deals	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Saab restera en marge du vote sure le Gripen	“La présence d’un stand Saab à la descente du Lauberhom, en janvier à Wengen, était “un accident,” selon Ueli Maurer; Ueli Maurer promet que la Suisse romande aura sa part de commandes Compensatoires.”	
12.02.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Saab beteiligt sich nicht an Gripen-Kampagne	“Maurer schloss aber nicht aus, dass bereits Geld von Saab geflossen ist. Dies bestätigte Kampagnenleiter Hans-Peter Wüthrich vom Verein für eine sichere Schweiz. Der “bescheidene” Betrag sei aber im Januar an Saab zurückbezahlt worden.”	
12.02.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		“Saab bezahlt nichts für den Abstimmungskampf” Verteidigungsminister Ueli Maurer eröffnet den Abstimmungskampf um den Gripen-Kauf. Die Befürworter beteuern, dass sich Hersteller Saab heraushält.	“Noch im Januar warb Saab am Lauberhornrennen mit Plakaten für das Kampfflugzeug Gripen. Doch mit der Einmischung des schwedischen Rüstungskonzerns in den schweizerischen Abstimmungskampf soll nun Schluss sein.”	
12.02.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security	return business deals	Gripen: Il prezzo della sicurezza	“Ueli Maurer: “L’acquisto dei nuovi caccia svedesi comporta vantaggi per tutte le regioni” Il capo del Dipartimento della difesa promette compensazioni per 2,5 miliardi di franchi”	
13.02.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Gripen: Schweden mischen mit	“Schweden mischen mit”	
13.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		Des élus pas si professionnels que cela	“Andrea Pilotti compare la très faible implication du parlement dans le processus d’achat des Mirage dans les années 1960 avec son implication sensiblement plus forte dans celle du Gripen cinquante ans plus tard. “	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
13.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		La Suède intensifie sa campagne pour le Gripen	“Radio Sweden a publié sur son site internet trois documents de l’ambassade de Suède à Berne. Dans ces textes rédigés entre octobre et décembre 2013, l’ambassadeur Per Thiresson fait état de contacts entre lui-même et d’autres officiels suédois et le Département fédéral de la défense (DDPS) au plus haut niveau, notamment avec le conseiller fédéral Ueli Maurer et le secrétaire général du département, Christian Catrina.”	
13.02.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	government campaigning	Schweden soll Ueli Maurer im Abstimmungskampf helfen	“Geheime Dokumente zeigen, dass der Schweizer Verteidigungsminister vom Herstellerland des Kampffjets Gripen Unterstützung anforderte.”	
13.02.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Schweden soll Kampffjet-Abstimmung beeinflussen	“Schweden soll Kampffjet-Abstimmung beeinflussen”; “geheime Briefe des schwedischen Botschafters”	
13.02.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Ueli Maurer erhält Schützenhilfe aus Schweden		
13.02.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Svezia e Svizzera collaborano per l’immagine dei Gripen		
14.02.2014	<i>Blick</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Der Ikea-Jet geht an der Urne bachab	“Nach Schwedens Laster-Arracke: Der Ikea Jet geht an der Urne bachab.” “Schwedische Diplomaten spotten über unsere Gripen-Politiker.”	
15.02.2014	<i>SRF 1, Tagesschau Hauptausgabe</i>	campaigning		Abstimmung über den Kauf von Gripen-Kampfflugzeugen	“Die CVP gibt die Führung in der Pro-Kampagne ab. Das VBS nimmt den Entscheid zur Kenntnis. “	
PHASE 2						
17.02.2014	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i>			Schweizer Luftwaffe nur zu Bürozeiten einsetzbar	“Als am Montagmorgen um 6 Uhr das vom Co-Piloten entführte Flugzeug der Ethiopian Airlines in Genf landete, wurde es von französischen Kampffjets begleitet. Die Luftwaffe der Schweiz war so früh am Morgen noch nicht einsatzbereit.”	Hijacked airplane reveals that Swiss Air Force can be engaged during office hours only http://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/kriminalitaet/flugzeug-entfuhrung-schweizer-luftwaffe-nur-zu-buerozeiten-einsetzbar-12807384.html

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in <i>italics</i> are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
17.02.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		CVP lässt Gripen fallen- nur die SVP will einspringen	“Die CVP erwischte ihre bürgerlichen Partner am Wochenende auf dem falschen Fuss. Ohne Vorwarnung gab die Mittepartei bekannt, die Führung und Koordination der Ja-Kampagne abzugeben. Als Grund nannte sie die «unbefriedigende Situation» rund um das Engagement des schwedischen Staates im Kampfjet-Abstimmungskampf. «Die Gefahr eines Imageschadens war gross», sagt Generalsekretärin Béatrice Wertli.”	
17.02.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Gripen Votazione del 18 maggio Il PPD non avrà un ruolo guida	“Il Dipartimento federale della difesa (DDPS) e l’ambasciata di Svezia a Berna hanno strettamente collaborato per preparare la votazione sull’acquisto degli aerei da combattimento Gripen, secondo la radio pubblica svedese.”	
17.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	campaigning	Le PDC prend ses distances avec les Gripen	“La présidence du parti a pris cette décision vendredi à l’unanimité, en raison des “discussions sur l’ingérence” de la Suède, du constructeur Saab et d’Ueli Maurer dans la campagne.”	
17.02.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	campaigning		CVP will Gripen- Kampagne nicht mehr anführen	“Grund für die Niederlegung sind Unklarheiten über die Einmischung Schwedens und des Flugzeugbauers Saab.”	
17.02.2014	<i>Blick</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Dieses Förlat reicht nicht, Herr Botschafter		
17.02.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	leading party in pro-campaign drops out		CVP gibt Führung der Kampagne ab		
18.02.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Gripen: Botschafter entschuldigt sich	“Das schwedische Radio hatte vergangene Woche die vertraulichen Dokumente aus der schwedischen Botschaft in der Schweiz veröffentlicht. Darin beschreibt die Botschaft ausführlich die Kampagne zur Gripen- Abstimmung und berichtet unter anderem über Kontakte mit dem Verteidigungsdepartement.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics	Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
18.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	credibility crisis: office hours	Les Forces aériennes suisses clouées au sol	“Nous n’avons pas la capacité d’intervenir 24h/24, concède Laurent Savary. Soit par manque de moyens financiers, soit pour des questions de voisinage.” “Sans surprise, le DDPS indique que, couplé au projet 'Ilana,' l’achat de Gripen 'permettra une surveillance aérienne efficace et continué.”	
18.02.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Schwedischer Botschafter entschuldigt sich		
18.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	voting trends	L’immigration reste en tête des préoccupations > Sondage Vimentis a pris la température sur trois thèmes: l’AVS, l’armée et les transports	“Concernant l’armée, l’achat du Gripen serait rejeté par 53% des citoyens. Mais dans le détail, on remarque que les sondés ont des réponses qui laissent l’issue du scrutin ouverte. “	
18.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Les excuses de l’ambassadeur de Suède au PDC > Avions de combat L’élue Ida Glanzmann avait été qualifiée de “non charismatique”	“L’ambassadeur de Suède à Berne a présenté ses excuses à la conseillère nationale Ida Glanzmann-Hunkeler (PDC/LU). L’élue avait été qualifiée de “non charismatique” dans des documents secrets en lien avec la future votation sur le Gripen.”	
18.02.2014	<i>Blick</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Schweden müssen lernen was Demokratie bedeutet		
19.02.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	campaigning	Brunners Kampftruppe soll den Gripen in die Luft bringen		
19.02.2014	<i>Blick</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Galladé fordert Gripen Transparenz		
19.02.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	credibility crisis: office hours	L'intervista Renato Kalbermatten: “Aerei part time? Ditelo ai politici” Da Berna la conferma: i caccia volano solo negli orari d’ufficio	“Effettivamente la collaborazione si è svolta in modo efficace. Ma allora perché la Svizzera deve avere le proprie forze aeree? “	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
19.02.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	security		Schmalspuriger Schutz		
19.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	campaigning	L'UDC pilotera la campagne pour le Gripen > Armée Le PDC avait annoncé renoncer	"Jusqu'à la fin de la semaine dernière, les démocrates-chrétiens ont dirigé la campagne en faveur de l'achat des Gripen. Cependant, en raison des "discussions sur l'ingérence" de la Suède, du constructeur Saab et d'Ueli Maurer dans la campagne"	
20.02.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	security				
22.02.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	government campaigning		Kodex für VBS-Angestellte im Gripen-Abstimmungskampf	"[Es] wird den Angestellten nahe gelegt, auf Zurückhaltung in vorderster Reihe zu achten."	
26.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	security		Des F/A-18 de haute volée	"Les Forces aériennes ne disposeraient en effet plus des moyens suffisants pour assurer leurs engagements de soutien de surveillance aérienne aux coir de police."	
28.02.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		Escapade suédoise pour Ueli Maurer > Campagne Sortie sur fond de Gripen		
01.03.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	security	jet type	Für Befürworter garantiert der Gripen die Sicherheit		
01.03.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	security	costs	Liefert der Konflikt Argumente für den Gripen?	"Im Appell an ein tiefer liegendes Sicherheitsbedürfnis sieht das Pro-Lager die Erfolg versprechende Strategie, weil so die umstrittene Dringlichkeit des Kampfjetkaufs und dessen Kosten in den Hintergrund rücken. Dass vor zwei Wochen französische Militärpiloten ein entführtes äthiopisches Flugzeug nach Genf eskortieren mussten, weil die Schweizer Luftwaffe nicht disponibel war, könnte jetzt zusammen mit der Ukraine-Krise durchaus den Gripen- Anhängern in die Hände spielen."	
01.03.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning	return business deals	Le Gripen espère séduire les PME	"La bataille du Gripen ne se livrera pas uniquement dans le ciel, sous l'angle de la sécurité, mais aussi sur les sites des entreprises susceptibles de bénéficier des contre-affaires"	
04.03.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	return business deals		Gripen-Vorlage: Die Ruag mischt mit	"Weshalb macht die Ruag den Auftrag überhaupt publik? "Es ist uns aufgrund des öffentlichen Interesses besonders wichtig, transparent zu sein," heisst es."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
04.03.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security	costs	Voto del 18 maggio: Giovani politici contro l'acquisto dei Gripen	"Un acquisto costoso, superfluo e schizofrenico" ma anche "sciagurato e contraddittorio": sono alcuni termini usati dal neonato Comitato ticinese giovani contro i Gripen"	
04.03.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	return business deals		Millionenauftrag für Ruag wegen Gripen		
04.03.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	return business deals		Un contratto da 68 milioni alla RUAG		
04.03.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	security	credibility crisis: office hours	Le Gripen peut profiter de la crise en Ukraine	"Comment veut on crédibiliser la nécessité d'une police aérienne efficace si l'on n'intervient que durant les heures de bureau." "C'est le plus mauvais service que l'on pouvait rendre à l'achat du Gripen."	
08.03.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Gripen: Doch kein Flug über das Ski- Weltcupfinale	"Um jeden Verdacht zu entkräften, die Abstimmung ... beeinflussen zu wollen, hat das VBS entschieden, dass keine Gripen- Kampfflugzeuge fliegen werden"	
08.03.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		Ueli Maurer désarme ses avions et ses chars blindés	"En cas de non au Gripen, le ministre confirme qu'il n'y a pas de plan B, mais n'exclut pas la possibilité d'une location. "	
10.03.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Maurer sagt Gripen- Flugshow auf der Lenzerheide ab	"Am Freitag vollzog Maurer die Kehrtwende: "Um jeden Verdacht zu entkräften, die Abstimmung vom 18. Mai beeinflussen zu wollen, hat das VBS entschieden, dass keine Gripen fliegen""	
10.03.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Gripen-Vorführung abgesagt		
14.03.2014	<i>SRF 1 Tagesschau Hauptausgabe</i>	Will of people undermined		Die Schweiz und Schweden intensivieren die Zusammenarbeit bei der militärischen Ausbildung	"Bundesrat Ueli Maurer und die schwedische Verteidigungsministerin Karin Enström haben in Bern das Abkommen dazu unterschrieben. Unabhängig davon, ob die Schweiz 22 Gripen Kampfjets kauft, die beiden Länder werden künftig militärisch verstärkt zusammenarbeiten. Maurer dementiert Gerüchte, es gebe einen Vertrag, bei einem Volks-Nein zum Gripen schwedische Kampfjets zu mieten."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
14.03.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	security	internal disaccord elites	Die Krim, der Gripen und die Schweiz: Ist es nötig, den Luftraum rund um die Uhr zu schützen? Wozu genau will die Luftwaffe neue Flugzeuge? Was man mit Blick auf die Gripen-Abstimmung vom 18. Mai unbedingt wissen sollten.	“Die Frage, ob die Schweiz neue Kampfflugzeuge braucht, wird mit Verve diskutiert, jeder fühlt sich als kleiner Experte.”	
14.03.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	will of people undermined		Der Plan B für ein Gripen-Nein		
15.03.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Ueli Maurer und Schwedens Ministerin werben für Gripen		
15.03.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Schwedischer Besuch für Ueli Maurer		
15.03.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Schweiz und Schweden erneuern Zusammenarbeit	“Wir wollen gewinnen und wir werden gewinnen” (Federal Councilor Maurer)	
15.03.2014	<i>Blick</i>	costs		So wollen die Gegner den Gripen gründen	“Die Debatte soll sich nicht um die Sicherheit der Schweiz drehen, sondern ums Geld.”	
15.03.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	will of people undermined		Ueli Maurer exclut avoir un plan B en cas d'échec du Gripen	“Il n'est pas prévu ... de louer des appareils suédois.”	
15.03.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security		Istruzione militare, siglato un accordo con la Svezia	“Svizzera e Svezia rafforzano la loro collaborazione strategica e militare.”	
17.03.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	voting trends		Gripen droht der Absturz an der Urne		
17.03.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	voting trends		Primo sondaggio: Il 18 maggio salario minimo sì, Gripen no		
17.03.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	voting trends		Le texte de la Marche Blanche semble séduire: Votation Sondage sur trois objets		

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in <i>italics</i> are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
18.03.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	government campaigning	costs	Die Gripen- wird zur Armeefrage 62 Prozent sprechen sich in einer Umfrage gegen den Gripen aus. Nun wollen die Freunde des Kampfjets die Abstimmung zu einer über Sinn und Zweck der Armee machen. Das hat schon früher funktioniert.	“Es ist falsch, wenn man neue Flugzeuge kauft, bevor man diskutiert hat, wie die Armee sich weiterentwickeln soll.” “Dass sich die Armee weiterentwickeln soll, steht für Fischer ausser Frage. Der Nationalrat hat ungezählte Dienstage als Hauptmann hinter sich. Und das ausgerechnet bei der Flugabwehr.”	
21.03.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	return business deals		Recentré sur le civil, Ruag se bat aussi pour les contrat liés au Gripen		
21.03.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	return business deals		Votazioni l'aiti: dice no al salario minimo e sì ai Gripen	“L’associazione per contro è favorevole ai nuovi velivoli da combattimento Gripen, “in quanto saranno garantite controprestazioni interessanti per imprese svizzere e ticinesi”“	
22.03.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	pros and cons		Braucht die Schweiz neue Kampfflugzeuge?	“Für die Armee aber gegen den Gripen.” “Es geht um die Glaubwürdigkeit der Armee.”	
24.03.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	security		Die Abstimmung werde schwierig, sagt der Armeechef		
24.03.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	security		Maurer droht: ohne Gripen keine 24-Stunden-Bereitschaft	“Maurer will die 24-Stunden-Einsatzbereitschaft bei der Luftwaffe nur einführen, wenn das Stimmvolk am 18.Mai Ja sagt zum Gripen.”	
24.03.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	credibility crisis: office hours		Dann gibt es keine 24-Stunden-Bereitschaft	“ <i>Können sie nachvollziehen, dass eine Luftwaffe, die nur zu Bürozeiten fliegt, in der Bevölkerung unglaublich wirkt?</i> ”	
24.03.2014	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning		Armee-Chef startet Angst Initiative	“Dem Armeechef sind offenbar sämtliche Mittel recht, um die Abstimmung zu beeinflussen.”	
24.03.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	pros and cons		Neue Kampfflugzeuge für die Luftwaffe?		

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
25.03.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	discussion of jet type	credibility crisis: office hours	Le blues du pilote de l'armée suisse	"Le porte-parole des Forces aériennes, Laurent Savary, talonnant le visiteur dans les moindres recoins de la base de Payerne, tient à le répéter : 'Le pilote n'a pas de journée type.'" "Dernier épisode en date: le détournement d'un Boeing d'Ethiopian Airlines, à Genève. Les F/A-18 étant cloués au sol hors des heures de bureau pour des raisons budgétaires, des avions italiens et français ont dû accompagner l'appareil jusqu'à l'aéroport de Cointrin."	
25.03.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	government campaigning		Ueli Maurers leere Gripen-Drohung	"Es handelt sich um eine absichtliche Dramatisierung, um das Stimmvolk gefügig zu machen."	
26.03.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	government campaigning		Maurer: F/A-18 sollten bis 2030 in Betrieb sein	"Die F/A-18 -Flotte wird ohne Gripen so stark beansprucht, dass sie früher altern würde."	
26.03.2014	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning		Ich mache keine Propaganda	"Ich mache keine Propaganda, ich informiere nur." (Federal Councilor Maurer)	
26.03.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	government campaigning	costs	Ueli Maurer legt für seinen neuen Flieger einen Redemarathon hin	"Maurer selbst sieht sich keinesfalls als Propagandist. Seine Mission sei die 'Information,' sagt er." "Maurers Argumentarium baut in jedem Fall nicht nur auf das Sicherheitsbedürfnis, sondern auch den Geschäftssinn des Stimmvolks."	
26.03.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	security	Armed Forces stationing concept	Plaidoyer pour le Gripen sur le tarmac de Payerne		
26.03.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	ROE of airforce questioned	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Eine Luftwaffe ohne Waffen		
27.03.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning		Magadino Giubileo a "Cielo aperto"	"E sulla concomitanza con la votazione federale del 18 maggio che vede, tra i vari temi, la creazione di un fondo per l'acquisto dei Gripen? 'Si tratta di una semplice coincidenza dovuta al caso, che non deve arrecare un pregiudizio alla nostra manifestazione,' ha voluto specificare Ponti."	
28.03.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security		Esercito: Maurer in Ticino: "Ecco perché ci servono i Gripen"	"Senza i Gripen, dal 2030 la Svizzera non avrebbe più un tetto."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
29.03.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	return business deals	government campaigning	Pilatus-Deal im Vorfeld der Abstimmung über den Gripen	“Dass Pilatus und Saab weniger als zwei Monate vor dem Abstimmungstermin eine Übereinkunft getroffen haben, stösst den Gripen-Gegnern sauer auf. <i>Ich glaube nicht an Zufälle: Die Absichtserklärung suggeriert, dass 100 Stellen und ein 500-Millionen-Auftrag für die Schweizer Wirtschaft gefährdet wären, wenn das Volk dem Gripen-Kauf nicht zustimmt.</i> ”	
29.03.2014	<i>Blick</i>	return business deals	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Gripen-Gegengeschäft enthüllt	“Ueli Maurer machte einen Super-Deal mit den Schweden: Sie wollen 20 Pilatus-Flieger kaufen, wenn wir bei ihnen Gripen bestellen. Wo bleibt der Volkswille?”	
31.03.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	campaigning			“Entscheidend wird sein, ob man den Gripen in einem Gesamtkonzept begründen kann.” (Daniel Eckmann, Interviewee)	
31.03.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning	security	PLR No al salario minimo Si all'acquisto dei Gripen	“Il credito di 3,126 miliardi per l'acquisto di 22 caccia Gripen è invece stato approvato con 244 voti contro 10. Per i delegati la sostituzione degli obsoleti aerei Tiger è necessaria per garantire la sicurezza dello spazio aereo.”	
31.03.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	discussion of jet type		Des mouchards américains dans les Gripen: Armée Nouveau coup dur pour Ueli Maurer, en pleine campagne de votation	“Encore une mauvaise nouvelle pour Ueli Maurer et le projet de Gripen suisse. A quelques semaines du vote crucial sur l'acquisition des 22 avions de Saab, la presse dominicale révèle que le fournisseur des précieux logiciels radio sera américain. “	
01.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	costs		Gripen “I caccia sono inutile e per di più troppo costosi) I contrari presentano le proprie tesi nell'imminenza del voto	“Lo afferma il comitato “No ai miliardi per i caccia” che ieri ha lanciato la campagna per la votazione popolare del 18 maggio. “	
01.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	costs		Gripen: Ein teures und unnötiges Risiko	“Angesichts leerer Kassen ... kommt für das Bündnis 'Nein zu den Kampfjet-Milliarden' der Kauf von 22 Gripen-Kampfflugzeugen nicht infrage.”	
01.04.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	costs		“Finanzpolitisch absurd”	“Das Anti-Gripen-Bündnis erachtet Investitionen in die Luftwaffe als unnötig.”	
02.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	security		Wie der Eigenesswert einigen sauer aufstiess	Die Militärdirektorin betont: ‘Die Gripen-Beschaffung ist unnötig.’”	
03.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	security		CVP hält nichts von Mindestlohn.	“Die CVP unterstützt die Kampfflugzeug-Beschaffung”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
03.04.2014	<i>Blick</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		So schafft sich Saab Gripen-Fans	“Die Spendengelder des Jet-Herstellers sind aber schon geflossen.” “Ein schaler Beigeschmack.”	
03.04.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		“Wir werden die gemeinsame Reise fortsetzen” Die schwedisch-schweizerische Militärkooperation soll nicht allein vom Gripen abhängen	“Aus “Respekt für die demokratischen Prozesse” in der Schweiz nehmen (schwedische) Politiker ... mittlerweile nicht mehr Stellung zur Gripen-Abstimmung.”	
04.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	costs	security	Votazione: I caccia Gripen “sono troppo cari e inutili”	“La Svizzera farebbe infatti meglio ad investire i miliardi di franchi previsti per i velivoli in settori come la mobilità, la ricerca e la formazione”	
04.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Saab finanziert Museum in Payerne	“Das Sponsoring hat eine gewisse Brisanz im Lichte der Abstimmung zur Beschaffung von 22 Gripen-Kampffjets, die im Mai stattfinden wird.”	
04.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Saab spendet Geld		
PHASE 3						
06.04.2014	<i>Sonntagszeitung</i>	will of people undermined		“Plan B: Bund soll auch gegen den Volkswillen neue Kampffjets kaufen	“Unter Führung des einflussreichen Präsidenten der Sicherheitspolitischen Kommission, SVP-Nationalrat Thomas Hurter, arbeiten die Gripen-Freunde bereist an einem entsprechenden Plan B.”	Plan B: Hurter implied that the Swiss Government could buy Gripen even if the people vote “No.”
07.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	government campaigning	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Ex-Kontrolleur kritisiert	“Saab versucht, sich mit möglichst vielen abgeschlossenen Offset-Geschäften vor der Abstimmung im Mai Goodwill zu verschaffen,” sagt der Rüstungsexperte Albert Gaide im Gespräch mit dem TA. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, habe Saab auch Druck auf das Offset-Büro ausgeübt. “	
07.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security	will of people undermined	UDC “Neutralità possibile grazie ai Gripen” Secondo i delegati il nuovo aereo è necessario per la sicurezza e l'indipendenza del Paese	“La Svizzera, in quanto Paese neutrale, può essere credibile soltanto se è in grado di proteggere il suo territorio.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics	Title	Quotes (quotes in <i>italics</i> are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
07.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	will of people undermined	Gegengeschäfte für Gripen-Kauf	“Das VBS distanziert sich von Plänen der Gripen-Befürworter.”	
07.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning	Serata informative domani a Manno: Gli ufficiali e i Gripen		
07.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	will of people undermined	Un plan B pour l'achat du Gripen controversé: Armée Le DDPS se distancie de la solution esquissée par le parlementaire UDC Thomas Hurter	“Des partisans du Gripen sortent du bois avec un plan B sous la main, au cas où le peuple refuserait l'achat des avions de combat le 18 mai. Du côté du Département de la défense (DDPS) d'Ueli Maurer, on se distancie clairement des propositions faites par Thomas Hurter.”	
07.04.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	government campaigning	Ein abgesetzter Rüstungsexperte sagt, der Bund wolle die	“Thomas Hurter, Präsident der Sicherheitspolitischen Kommission im Nationalrat schlägt vor, die Jets (im Falle einer Ablehnung an der Urne) durch das ordentliche Armeebudget der Luftwaffe zu kaufen.” “Das Verteidigungsdepartement distanzierte sich von Hurters Überlegungen zu einem Plan B.”	
07.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	will of people undermined	Aufsicht schwächen. Er warnt vor einem Kontrollverlust	“Das VBS hat bereits gestern auf Medienberichte reagiert, wonach ein Plan B existiert.” “Das VBS werde sich in jedem Fall an demokratisch herbeigeführte Entscheide halten.”	
07.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	will of people undermined	Ein Plan B sorgt für Turbulenzen	“Ankündigung von SVP-Nationalrat Thomas Hurter, man habe bereits einen Plan B in der Hinterhand.” “Ungewöhnlich schnell und deutlich reagierte das Verteidigungsdepartement.”	
07.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	will of people undermined	Hurter und Co. arbeiten an Plan B	(Image: Hurter in uniform.) “Die Kampffjet-Befürworter haben bereits einen Plan B in der Hinterhand.” “VBS distanziert sich.”	
07.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	will of people undermined	Un plan B pour l'achat du Gripen controversé	“Le DDPS se distancie de la solution esquissée par le palamentaire UDC Thomas Hurter.”	
07.04.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning	Die BDP überdenkt ihr Marketing	“Die BDP-Delegierten haben ... die JA-Parole zur Beschaffung des Gripen gefasst.”	
07.04.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning	Die SVP im Hoch	“Zur Beschaffung des Kampffjets Gripen sagten sie ... ja.”	
07.04.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning	Streiff-Feller führt die EVP	“Sie beschloss ... Stimmfreigabe für das Gripen-Fonds-Gesetz”	
08.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning	Schiesst Hochuli im Gripen-Streit den Vogel ab?	“Die Aargauer Militärdirektorin engagiert sich an vorderster Front gegen die Beschaffung neuer Kampfflugzeuge”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
08.04.2014	<i>SRF 1 Tagesschau Hauptausgabe</i>	will of people undermined		Was, wenn das Schweizer Volk den Gripen-Kauf ablehnt?	“Selten gab es vor einem Urnengang so viele Gerüchte, Indiskretionen und Alternativvorschläge. Heute hat sich die SIK des Ständerats klar und unmissverständlich gegen den sogenannten Plan B, der letzten Sonntag in der Presse herumgeisterte, ausgesprochen.”	
09.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	jet type	internal disaccord elites	Parteifreunde im Luftkampf	“Im Gripen-Ja-Komitee ist man enttäuscht und verärgert über Hurters Plan-B-Spekulationen.” “Viele seiner (Hurters) Kommissionskollegen glauben indes, er wäre nicht unglücklich, wenn der Gripen scheitert.” “Unter Piloten gilt der Gripen als Disount-Lösung.”	
09.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	will of people undermined		Thomas Hurter désavoué par ses amis de l'UDC		
09.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	voting trends		Sondaggio SSR: Si delinea un no per i Gripen e i salari minimi		
10.04.2014	<i>Blick</i>	internal disaccord elites		Ueli Maurer im Sinkflug: Abstimmung eine Lachnummer	“Gripen-Befürworter haben sich zerstritten, die Pro-Kampagne verpufft, und die Pannenserie um Ueli Maurer reisst nicht ab.”	
11.04.2014	<i>SRF 1 Tagesschau Hauptausgabe</i>	voting trends		In gut fünf Wochen wird über den Gripen-Kauf abgestimmt	“Würde heute schon entschieden, geriete der Jet in ordentliche Turbulenzen. Das besagt eine erste Umfrage im Auftrag der SRG. Claude Longchamp, GFS Bern, hat die Einzelheiten dazu.”	
12.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	voting trends		Gripen- Gegner liegen leicht vorne		
12.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Eine Regierungsrätin von der Rolle	“Wochenkommentar über das Engagement von Militärdirektorin Susanne Hochuli gegen den Gripen.” “Leider befindet sich Hochuli selbst auf dem falschen Dampfer. Nicht wegen ihrer Position: Es gibt gute Gründe gegen die Beschaffung des Gripen, auch die <i>az</i> hat das Vorhaben kritisch kommentiert. Und es ist auch einer Regierungsrätin unbenommen, eine Meinung zu nationalen Vorlagen zu äussern. Es gehört nicht zur Rolle einer Regierungsrätin, sich an vorderster Front für eine nationale Abstimmung zu engagieren.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in <i>italics</i> are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
12.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	voting trends		Gripen-Befürworter müssen Gas geben	“Auf der Kippe steht die Beschaffung von 22 schwedischen Kampfflugzeugen für rund 3,1 Milliarden Franken. 52 Prozent wollen ein Nein in die Urne legen.” “42 Prozent sind dafür. Auffallend: Verhältnismässig viele Sympathisanten von CVP und FDP lehnen die Gripen-Beschaffung ab. Die Parteispitzen setzen sich für den Jet ein. Anhänger von SP und Grünen sind klar gegen, die SVP-Basis deutlich für den Gripen. 45 Prozent wollen an der Abstimmung teilnehmen.”	
12.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Nur wenig Schützenhilfe für Hochuli: Gripen Engagement der Militärdirektorin gegen Kampfflugzeug löst kontroverse Reaktionen aus		
12.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	voting trends		Gripen droht der Absturz		
12.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	voting trends	internal disaccord elites	Gripen und Mindestlohn: Gegner haben Nase vorne	“Mitteparteien sind beim Gripen gespalten.”	
12.04.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	current events	pro and con	“Niemand will in einem Haus ohne Dach wohnen” Bundesrat Ueli Maurer setzt darauf, dass das Stimmvolk am 18. Mai die sicherheitspolitische Tragweite der Gripen-Vorlage erkennt		
12.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	government campaigning	security	Editorial : Le Gripen, toit aérien sur une maison branlante	“La question de la sécurité de la Suisse ne peut se résumer à des cris, des émotions et des applaudissements. Voyons la réalité.”	
12.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	voting trends		Le Gripen échoue encore sous le mur du oui		
14.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	campaigning		CVP sagt knapp Nein zur Pädophileninitiative	“Ja sagt die CVP zum Kampfjet Gripen und zur Hausarztmedizin, Nein zu gesetzlichen Mindestlöhnen.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
14.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		Le président du PDC désavoué par sa base: Votation, Le PDC refuse l'initiative de la Marche blanche, soutenue par Christophe Darbellay	"Au reste, par 171 voix contre 60, les délégués PDC ont accepté l'achat des Gripen, 'bon avion au bon prix,' selon les défenseurs de cette idée au sein du parti."	
14.04.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	campaigning		Armeechef rät Bürgern einen Notvorrat anzulegen	"Die Idee eines Notvorrats von Armeechef Andre Blattmann erntet Kritik - findet aber auch Unterstützung." "SP-Nationalrat Cédric Wermuth schrieb auf Twitter: 'Jetzt ist der CdA übergeschnappt.'"	
14.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	campaigning		Schlappe für Darbellay	"Die Ja-Parole zum Gripen- Fonds- Gesetz fassten die Delegierten der CVP mit 171 zu 60 Stimmen."	
14.04.2014	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning		Angstmacher vom Dienst	"Die Gegner einer Beschaffung von neuen Gripen-Kampffjets, über die am 18. Mai abgestimmt wird, sind erzürnt. Allen voran die Zürcher SP-Nationalrätin Chantal Galladé: 'Die Aussagen im Interview zeigen, dass die Verantwortlichen im VBS nach den schlechten Umfrageergebnissen die Nerven verloren haben.'" "Nationalrätin Corina Eichenberger (FDP, AG): 'Ich finde es positiv, dass Armeechef Blattmann die breiten Facetten der Sicherheit so handfest und praktisch darlegen konnte.'"	
14.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		Déjeuner avec Christophe Keckeis: Une campagne trop frileuse !"		
14.04.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		CVP-Nein zur Pädophilie-Initiative gegen die Parteileitung, Ja zum Kauf von Gripen Kampfflugzeugen Nein zur Einheitskrankenkasse		
15.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning	government campaigning	Pro und Contra zum Rat von Armeechef Andre Blattmann, Notvorräte zu bunkern	"Notvorräte sind sinnvoll - gerade in einer hoch vernetzten Welt." "Keine Angstmacherei vor der Gripen-Abstimmung."	
15.04.2014	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning		Armeechef macht Notvorräte	"Armeechef André Blattmann wirbt für den Gripen, indem er die Sicherheit des Landes hinterfragt. Sein Rat: Notvorrat."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
15.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning		Dibattito Scontro frontale sull'acquisto dei Gripen : A confronto questa sera fautori e oppositori del fondo per il nuovo aereo in votazione il prossimo 18 maggio		
15.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning	security	L'opinione Iris Canonica: Il fondo per i Gripen: Sicurezza necessaria	"Il controllo dello spazio aereo resta un tassello importante nella protezione globale e nella sicurezza del nostro Paese"	
16.04.2014	<i>SRF 1 Rundschaue</i>	not needed to assure air space	costs	Schweizer Armeepiloten üben bereits seit Monaten in Schweden mit dem Gripen	"Wie sinnvoll ist dieses Training? Bericht mit Auskünften von Martin Hess, Testpilot Schweizer Luftwaffe, Lutz Unterseher, Sicherheitsberater, und Karl Gruber, Kommandant der österreichischen Luftwaffe. Angesprochen: WEF, F/A 18-Flotte, Eurofighter der österreichischen Luftwaffe, Armasuisse"	
17.04.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	critique of media		Maurer rastet in Interview aus	"Aufgebracht warf Maurer der SRF- Sendung <i>Rundschaue</i> 'tendenziöse Berichterstattung' und eine 'schwache journalistische Leistung' vor. Geärgert hatte Maurer vor allem, dass die <i>Rundschaue</i> berichtet hatte, dass Österreich mit deutlich weniger Kampfflugzeugen auskomme als die Schweiz."	
19.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	risks for taxpayers		Schicksalstage für Saab	"Diese Geschäfte sind sehr schwierig. Es ist unsicher, ob Saab den Auftrag von Brasilien am Ende auch bekommt." "Für Saab ist der Gripen sehr wichtig. Er ist ihre Zukunft, das wichtigste militärische Produkt für die nächsten 20 bis 30 Jahre," sagt Siemon Wezeman vom Stockholmer Friedensforschungsinstitut Sipri. Der Kampfjet steht für etwa ein Drittel des Gesamtumsatzes von Saab."	4 weeks before the vote
19.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning		PPD: Tre sì per le votazioni cantonalida Generazione giovani		
19.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	critique of media		<i>Rundschaue</i> -Beitrag erzürnt Gripen-Befürworter	"Die meisten Zuschauer geisselten den <i>Rundschaue</i> -Beitrag als Anti-Gripen-Propaganda."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
19.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	government campaigning		Gripen-Streit: Burkart will neue Regeln für die Regierung	“Der öffentliche Schlagabtausch von Regierungsmitgliedern und deren aktives Engagement in gegensätzlichen Komitees bei eidgenössischen Abstimmungen ist der Glaubwürdigkeit des Regierungsrates nicht eben zuträglich.”	
20.04.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	critique of media		Maurer: “Ich bin mir sicher, wir gewinnen.”	“VBS-Chef Ueli Maurer bereut kein Wort seiner Medienschelte im SRF. Er ist überzeugt, das Gripen-Votum zu gewinnen.”	
22.04.2014	<i>RTS Un Le Journal</i>	pros and cons		Votation du 18 mai: la campagne bat son plein sur le Gripen	“Le Groupe pour une Suisse sans armée (GSsA) se fait toutefois discret. Commentaire de Pierre-Alain Fridez (conseiller national PS), Jean-René Fournier (conseiller aux Etats PDC), Amanda Gavilanes (GSsA)”	
23.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	discussion of jet type		Editorial: Aviation militaire : pas si vite M. Maurer !	“Nos doutes commencent avec la procédure.”	
23.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	discussion of jet type	return business deals	Au coeur de “Saab City,” où il faut 36 mois pour fabriquer un Gripen	“A Linköping, Saab fabrique les Gripen C et D. Un prototype du modèle E, qui intéresse la Suisse, est en phase de test; Saab affirme que plus de 400 millions de francs sur les 2,2 milliards requis ont fait l’objet de contrats en Suisse.”	
24.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	jet type	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Die Kampfjet-Saga	“Beispiellose mehrjährige Grosskampagne. Heiss umkämpft war bereits die Wahl des Flugzeugs, das die Schweiz kaufen soll.”	
24.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	government campaigning	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	Der Gripen - ein Lehrstück über die Schweiz	“Eine für die Schweiz beispiellose Grosskampagne begleitet das Beschaffungs-geschäft. Nie zuvor wurde so viel Geld und Personal eingesetzt, um auf einen Entscheid des Bundesrats einzuwirken. Die PR-Maschinerie ist längst angelaufen, als der Bundesrat 2007 das Projekt für den Ersatz der Tiger-Jets offiziell startet.”	
24.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning	security	L’opinione Carlo Schirrmeyer: Gripen necessary al nostro esercito		
25.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	government campaigning		Hochuli verteidigt Kampf gegen Gripen		

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
25.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security		Intervista Ueli Maurer: "Il sì al Gripen è un sì alla nostra sicurezza"		
25.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security	government campaigning	"Il minimo necessario per la nostra sicurezza" Il consigliere federale torna pure sul reportage della SF "Argomentazioni inaccettabili per il servizio pubblico"	"Il Consiglio federale grazie all'acquisto dei Gripen sarà possibile garantire un servizio di sorveglianza dello spazio aereo 24 ore su 24 e non solo, come avviene oggi, durante gli orari d'ufficio."	
25.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	costs	Saab wirbt bereits mit Schweizer Gripen-Ja	"Dies führte zu Diskussionen, ob die Schweiz im internationalen Vergleich nicht zu viel für den Gripen bezahle."	
25.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	campaigning		SVP sagt dreimal Ja und dreimal Nein		
25.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	security	costs	Gastbeitrag zur Abstimmung über die Beschaffung von 22 Kampfflugzeugen	"Diese Abstimmung bildet keine Entscheidung über die Frage, ob die drei Milliarden für die Beschaffung des Gripen anderen Staatsaufgaben zufließen, sondern lediglich darüber, ob man sie innerhalb der Armee anders einsetzen soll. Wenn also behauptet wird, das Geld könne für die Bildung umgelagert werden, die AHV oder gar den Bau einer Gotthardröhre, ist die Behauptung falsch."	
25.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	government campaigning		"Der Regierungsrat braucht keine Belehrung" Abstimmungskampf Darum setzt sich Militärdirektorin Susanne Hochuli gegen den Gripen-Kauf ein	Interview mit S. Hochuli	
25.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	Will of people undermined		Gripen: Kommt der Kampfjet auch bei einem Nein? Das Geld für den umstrittenen Plan B stünde bereit	"Verteidigungsminister Ueli Maurer sorgte selber dafür, dass Gerüchte über einen Plan B kursieren."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
25.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	security	government campaigning	Leitartikel zur eidgenössischen Abstimmung über den Kauf neuer Kampf-flugzeuge: Für die Armee gegen den Gripen	"Für den Luftpolizeidienst - die einzige realistische Aufgabe der Luftwaffe- genügen 32 moderne Jets längstens." "Misstrausch macht weiter die Hüst-und-Hott-Politik von Bundesrat Ueli Maurer."	
25.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	security	credibility crisis: office hours	Peter Regli: "Also ich werde am 18. Mai Ja stimmen."		
26.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	government campaigning		L'intervista Peter Studer: "Un ministro ha il diritto di criticare la SSR." Caso Maurer/ <i>Rundschau</i> : le ragioni di stampa e politica	"Al servizio si rimprovera di essere una vera e propria operazione di propaganda anti-Gripen, a poche settimane dal voto popolare."	
26.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	government campaigning		Campagna per i Gripen: Giornale gratuito, I consiglieri federali si mobilitano	"Da ieri il comitato di sostegno all'acquisto del Gripen distribuisce materiale propagandistico - un giornale gratuito in tutte le case in vista della votazione popolare del 18 maggio. Fatto eccezionale: nel tentativo di convincere i cittadini sulla bontà del progetto, si esprimono ben tre consiglieri federali ossia Ueli Maurer, ministro della Difesa cui danno man forte Doris Leuthard e Didier Burkhalter."	
26.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	government campaigning		Ma semaine suisse : Le Gripen et la sécurité nationale	"La logique serait d'identifier les menaces réelles de façon crédible, de lister les besoins et de décider des moyens que le pays est prêt à investir pour sa sécurité. De là devraient découler la hiérarchisation et la répartition des missions entre tous les acteurs, puis le choix des instruments appropriés. Le projet d'acheter le Gripen est irritant en ce sens qu'il renverse la procédure."	
26.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	government campaigning		Doris Leuthard et Didier Burkhalter engagés dans la patrouille Gripen	"Fait particulier : outre le ministre de la Défense Ueli Maurer, deux autres conseillers fédéraux, Doris Leuthard et Didier Burkhalter, s'expriment dans cette publication comme l'a révélé le Blick jeudi. C'est assez inhabituel du point de vue formel, mais il n'y a rien d'exceptionnel à voir plusieurs conseillers fédéraux s'engager avant une votation."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in <i>italics</i> are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
26.04.2014	<i>RSI La Una, Telegiornale sera</i>	campaigning		Votazione del 18 maggio: Gripen o non Gripen	"Il servizio con informazioni sull'aviazione militare svizzera e le sue missioni future. Fabio Antognini, pilota Forze Aeree, Corina Eichenberger, consigliera nazionale PLR /AG (pro), Christian van Singer, consigliere nazionale Verdi /VD (contrario), Roland Fischer Verdiliberale /LU (contrario)"	
26.04.2014	<i>SRF 1, Arena</i>			Arena zum Gripen: Schweizer Luftflotte droht das Grounding		
26.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	jet type	security	Leitartikel: Ohne Not und ohne Grundsatzdebatte risikobehaftete Jets zu kaufen, ist unklug. Die Beschaffung kann warten. Der Gripen ist das falsche Flugzeug.	"Kommt hinzu, dass der Kauf des Gripen besonders risikobehaftet ist und dass der Jet fliegerische Mängel aufweist." "Nach einem Nein am 18. Mai ist die Schweiz nicht schutzlos. Die 32 F/A-18- Jets können auch nach Ausmusterung der Tiger-Jets die Luftpolizeiaufgaben bis gegen 2030 erfüllen."	
26.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	pros and cons		Die Abstimmungsvorlagen auf einen Blick		
26.04.2014	<i>RSI I, LA I, Telegiornale sera</i>	pros and cons		Votazione del 18 maggio: Gripen o non Gripen	"Il servizio con informazioni sull'aviazione militare svizzera e le sue missioni future. Fabio Antognini, pilota Forze Aeree, Corina Eichenberger, consigliera nazionale PLR /AG (pro), Christian van Singer, consigliere nazionale Verdi /VD (contrario), Roland Fischer Verdiliberale /LU (contrario)"	
28.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Wo Ueli Maurer sich wie ein Popstar vorkommen muss: Holziken, Der Bundesrat hatte in der SVP-Hochburg ein Gripen-Heimspiel	"Meinung bilden? Meinung festigen! Das gelingt Ueli Maurer in seinem frei vorgetragenen Referat vorzüglich. Er landet auch Lacherfolge. Mit Blick auf die zu ersetzenden Flugzeuge meint er: 'Überlegen Sie sich, was zu Hause nach 30 Jahren noch funktioniert, bei mir ist es nur noch die Frau.'"	
28.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	security		Drohnen als Teilersatz für Kampffjets möglich	"Interview mit der 'Schweiz am Sonntag' sagt Maurer nun, die Armee habe ein Projekt zur Boden-Luft-Abwehr gestartet." "Es sei denkbar, dass ein Teil der F/A-18 'durch Drohnen und ein Raketenabwehrsystem' ersetzt werde, so Maurer."	
PHASE 4						

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
28.04.2014	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning	sexist joke	Soldaten nerven sich über die getarnte Werbeveranstaltung: Gripen-Offensive in der Kaserne	“Die Armee spricht von 'sachgerechter' Information. Die Gripen-Gegner finden es 'unzulässig.'” “Dabei verglich Maurer die Jets mit Haushaltsgegenständen und fragte das Publikum: “Wie viele Gebrauchtgegenstände, die 30 Jahre alt sind, haben Sie noch zu Hause?” Seine Antwort sei beim konservativen Männerpublikum gut angekommen: 'Bei uns sind das nicht mehr viele, ausser natürlich die Frau, die den Haushalt schmeisst.’”	
29.04.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	sexist joke		“Patriarch Maurer schoss ein Eigentor”	“Ueli Maurer hat einen frauenfeindlichen Spruch gemacht. Die Gripen-Gegner hoffen, davon zu profitieren.”	
29.04.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	sexist joke		“‘‘Utensiles hors d’usage,’’ la blague qui gêne		
30.04.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		“Vorgehen des schwedischen Botschafters ist dilettantisch”	“Neue Geheimdokumente zeigen wie der Schwedische Botschafter versucht hat, die Gripen-Abstimmung zu beeinflussen indem er die Mitglieder der Sicherheitspolitischen Kommission des Nationalrats auf seine Seite bringen wollte.”	
30.04.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security	return business deals	L'opinione Piergiorgio Fornera: Senza i Gripen l'esercito è vulnerabile.	“Concludendo, non solo abbiamo bisogno di un Esercito, ma di un Esercito forte e credibile : senza aviazione non potrà esserlo. Dobbiamo essere coscienti che un no al Gripen è un no all'Esercito.”	
30.04.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Wo ist das Leck der Gripen-Geheimpapiere?	“Nach Kontakten mit den wichtigsten Akteuren in den letzten Wochen kommen wir zum Schluss, dass sich die Situation verbessert hat. (...) Ein klares Nein zur Beschaffung ist so gut wie ausgeschlossen und eine Verschiebung ist unwahrscheinlich.' Diese Worte mit dem Vermerk “sehr dringend” sandte der schwedische Botschafter in der Schweiz, Per Thöresson, am 22. August 2013 in die Heimat. Das schwedische Radio hat entsprechende Geheimunterlagen gestern auf seiner Website aufgeschaltet.”	
30.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Schwedens Botschafter in der Kritik	“Der schwedische Botschafter in der Schweiz setzt sich mit seinem Engagement für den Gripen-Kampfjet erneut in die Nesseln. “	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
30.04.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)		Er macht sich unbeliebt	“Der schwedische Botschafter in der Schweiz hat getan, was seine Aufgabe ist: für den schwedischen Kampffjet Gripen geweielt. Doch mit seinem saloppen Ton verärgert Per Thöresson die Schweizer Bevölkerung und die Politiker.”	
30.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	risks for taxpayers	Swedish role in campaigning (Saab and / or officials)	“Jetbeschaffungen sind oft dreckige Geschäfte”	“Der schwedische Journalist Mikael Holmström ist nicht erstaunt über die neusten Enthüllungen zum Gripen. Indiskretionen seien bei Jetbeschaffungen üblich. Die Abstimmung ist sehr wichtig. Ohne Partner kann Saab den Gripen C/D nicht weiterentwickeln und den Gripen E herstellen.”	
31.04.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	internal disaccord elites	government campaigning	Rätsel Maurer: Je mehr Ueli Maurer austellt, desto undurchschaubarer wird er. Wie viel Kalkül steckt hinter den Provokationen des Verteidigungsministers?	“Gleichzeitig weiss man bis heute nicht genau, ob Maurer den Gripen wirklich will oder ob er mit einem Absturz an der Urne liebäugelt.”	
PHASE 5						
01.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	security		L'achat des Gripen profitera aussi à notre économie.	“Spécial article by Flavien Valloccia, Avocat, responsable communication pour le comité 'Ensemble pour la sécurité - Genève dit OUI au Gripen”	
01.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	security	return business deals	L'achat des Gripen profitera aussi à notre économie	“Aujourd'hui, personne ne saurait prédire l'avenir, encore moins un avenir exempt de crises ou de situations extraordinaires dans les prochaines années; partant, une armée de l'air moderne est une assurance sur le long terme.”	
02.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	pros and cons		Deux experts de la sécurité débattent du Gripen		
02.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	security	costs	Le Gripen est-il si indispensable pour la sécurité du pays ?	“Barbara Haering et Alexandre Vautravers d'accord sur un point: garantir la souveraineté de l'espace aérien suisse est une nécessité.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in <i>italics</i> are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
02.05.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	costs		Abstimmung: Für den Gripen sieht es immer düsterer aus	“Die Gripen-Gegner punkten vor allem mit einem Argument: Die 3,126 Milliarden sollten in die Bildung oder die AHV fliessen statt in die Rüstung. Dazu kommt, dass die Gripen-Befürworter Pannen aneinanderreihen. Die letzten Fehltritte, der frauenfeindliche Witz Maurers und die Enthüllungen über das Lobbying der Schweden sind dabei noch gar nicht in die Resultate eingeflossen.”	
03.05.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	jet type		“Nur Papierexperten sprechen von Papierfliegern”		
03.05.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	security	personal role Federal Councillor Maurer: sexism, critique of media	Interview Bundesrat Ueli Maurer “Wenn wir jetzt nicht bestellen, stehen wir in zehn Jahren ohne Luftwaffe da”	“Verteidigungsminister Ueli Maurer erwartet bei der Abstimmung zum Gripen-Kauf einen knappen Ausgang. Der VBS-Chef über Nebenschauplätze, Papierexperten und die Frage, welchen Preis unsere Sicherheit hat.”	
03.05.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Matchbericht zum Mindestlohn	“...während in der Debatte über den Kampfjet Gripen eine Peinlichkeit auf die andere folgt.”	
03.05.2014	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>	security		Kampfjet Gripen	“Bundesrat und Parlament befürworten die Modernisierung der Luftwaffe, weil sie den Schutz des Luftraums durch die Armee als unabdingbar für die Sicherheit der Schweiz erachten. Die NZZ unterstützt dieses Ansinnen.”	
03.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security		L'opinione Norman Gobbi: I nuovi caccia necessari all'esercito	“Il mancato acquisto dei 22 Gripen rappresenterebbe una sorta di abolizione occulta e progressiva del nostro Esercito e la sua incapacità ad adempiere a uno dei compiti fondamentali: quello di garantire la sovranità del nostro spazio aereo.”	
05.05.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	fiscal reflections		Gripen-Befürworter holen auf	“Wohin mit den Gripen-Millionen? Falls das Volk das Gripen-Fonds- Gesetz ablehnt, müsste der Bundesrat über die Verwendung der eingeplanten Gelder entscheiden.”	
05.05.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	voting trends		Gegner sind laut Umfragen voraus		
05.05.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	fiscal reflections		Armee muss bangen	“Sagt das Volk Nein zum Kauf des Kampfjets Gripen, entscheidet der Bundesrat über die Verwendung der dafür eingeplanten Gelder.”	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
05.05.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	security		Ein Ja zum Gripen ist ein Ja zur Sicherheit des Landes, BZ Kommentar	"Es ist nicht die Zeit für sicherheitspolitische Experimente."	
05.05.2014	<i>Blick</i>	voting trends		Gripen Kampagne droht ein Flop		
05.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	pros and cons		Difesa: Dalla colletta per i primi aerie al fondo speciale per i Gripen	"Investimento per la sicurezza." "Per i favorevoli ci sarà bisogno anche in futuro di un controllo attivo dei cieli." "Un acquisto del tutto inadatto alla Svizzera" Per i contrari la proposta della Saab è costosa e al contempo inefficace"	
05.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning		Minusio: Dibattito sui Gripen in attesa del voto		
05.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	campaigning		L'opinione Oreste Pejman: E imparzialità della TV Svizzera	"Dopo la trasmissione <i>Rundschau</i> che ha suscitato molte critiche poiché considerata anti Gripen, ora si potrebbe essere davanti a un altro caso dove la neutralità della Televisione svizzera potrebbe venire messa in discussione."	
06.05.2014	<i>Blick</i>	government campaigning		Macht der Nachrichtendienst Gripen-Propaganda? Seiler senkt Kriegs-Vorwarnzeit	"Markus Seiler zeichnete gestern bei der Präsentation des jährlichen Lageberichts zur Sicherheit das Bild eines unsicheren Europas, berichtete über den Konflikt in der Ukraine. Und stellte dabei die heute gültige Reaktionszeit für einen Krieg in Mitteleuropa in Frage: 'Gilt die Vorwarnzeit von zehn Jahren noch?'"	
06.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security	costs	L'opinione Fausto de Marchi: Acquisto dei Gripen, un po' di chiarezza	"Questo scritto vuol essere un semplice contributo alla chiarezza e all'approfondimento cercando di dare risposte ad alcune voci critiche sul progetto."	
06.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security		L'opinione Giorgio Ghiringhelli: I pacifisti e I Gripen: la storia si ripete		
07.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	return business deals		L'opinione Antonio Brina: Un'opportunità per l'industria	"Gli affari di compensazione che, per il Ticino, significheranno posti di lavoro aggiuntivi, investimenti supplementari, accesso a nuove tecnologie e concrete opportunità per oltre 120 milioni di franchi."	
07.05.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	security		"Hochulis Idee ist schon fast kristallkugelmässig" Replik Armeechef Blattmann zu Susanne Hochulis Kampf gegen den Gripen		

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
08.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	voting trends		Sondaggio Sui ventidue Gripen sarà una caccia all'ultimo voto		
08.05.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	voting trends		Für den Gripen bleibt es eng		
08.05.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	voting trends		Chancen des Gripen sind intakt		
08.05.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	voting trends		Harter Schlusskampf um den Gripen		
08.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	voting trends		L'ultime offensive des partisans du Gripen pour arracher un oui	"Pour la première fois de leur histoire, les Suisses pourraient dire non le 18 mai prochain à l'acquisition d'un matériel militaire par leur armée."	
08.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	voting trends	campaigning	Le sort très incertain du Gripen	"L'ultime sondage avant la votation donne toujours le non en tête ; Bastion de l'opposition à l'achat des avions, la Suisse romande pourrait faire la différence; Les partisans du Gripen utilisent la crise et le soutien à l'armée pour emporter la décision"	
08.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security		L'opinione Maurizio Agustoni: La sinistra vuole abolire l'esercito	"Quel che è certo è che gli esperti incaricati dalla Confederazione hanno concluso che il Gripen E è l'aereo giusto per la Svizzera : adempie pienamente le nostre necessità operative e presenta il miglior rapporto tra qualità e prezzo."	
09.05.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	government campaigning		Blattmann mobilisiert Offiziere		
09.05.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	risks for taxpayers		Droht Gripen-Hersteller ein Grounding?	"Just in dieser Schlüsselpase kommen neue Zweifel an der Zukunftsfähigkeit des Gripen-Herstellers Saab auf." "Schwedischer Militärexperte sieht Saab unter Druck VBS und Saab widersprechen."	
09.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security		L'intervista Aldo Schellenberg: "Indispensabile contributo alla sicurezza"	"Il servizio di polizia aerea può essere garantito solo da aerei da combattimento."	
09.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		Quatre présidents prennent l'air pour sauver les avions de combat	"On espérait que le débat sur le Gripen prenne un peu de hauteur, à huit jours de la votation. Mais on ne s'attendait sans doute pas à voir quatre présidents de parti perchés sur un escabeau."	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
10.05.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	government campaigning	discussion of jet type	Offiziers-Komitee gegen Gripen	“Heute, acht Tage vor der Abstimmung über den Kauf des Kampffjets Gripen, schliesst sich eine Gruppe von Armeeoffizieren im überparteilichen Komitee 'Offiziere gegen den Gripen' zusammen.”	
10.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	campaigning		En vol avec la Patrouille Suisse	“La formation de voltige aérienne fête ses 50 ans en 2014, tandis que son avenir est encore incertain pour l'après-2016”	
12.05.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	costs		Papier-Gripen fliegt durch die Bahnhofstrasse		
12.05.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	government campaigning		Gastbeitrag zur Kampagne des Verteidigungsministers für den Gripen: Ueli, der Meister am Schachbrett	“Dank seinem gerissenen Plan hat sich eine Phalanx von Offizieren, konservativen Sicherheitspolitikern, Flugzeugfans, kalten Kriegern und Schützenvereinen formiert. Sie haben den Auftrag verinnerlicht und marschieren.”	
12.05.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	campaigning		Bürgerlichen Parteichefs droht Anzeige	“Die Pro-Gripen-Aktion der vier bürgerlichen Parteichefs auf dem Bundesplatz könnte Folgen haben: Die Berner Polizei will gegen Toni Brunner (SVP), Philipp Müller (FDP), Christophe Darbellay (CVP) und Martin Landolt (BDP) Strafanzeige einreichen.”	
12.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	pros and cons		Les Gripen voleront-ils dans le ciel suisse? Les Suisse décideront s'ils veulent acquérir à terme 22 nouveaux avions de combat d'origine suédoise. Un objet de votation très controversé > L'enjeu du 18 mai ? Construire un toit sur la maison suisse >Des avions peu performants et inutiles à notre sécurité	“Le 18 mai, nous devons construire un toit sur la maison suisse. Nous devons donner une sécurité aérienne à l'armée de milice essentiellement terrestre que nous avons plébiscitée l'an dernier ; Cet achat, non seulement serait superflu, mais plomberait notre armée pendant 35 ans avec des avions peu performants. “	
13.05.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Gripen-Appell an Aargauer Schützen Freiamt Grossrats- präsident Thierry Burkart eröffnete das Feldschieszen und warb für das Flugzeug		

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
13.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security		L'opinione Fabio Regazzi: Chi non vuole i Gripen, non vuole l'esercito	"Chi invece, come me, ritiene che la sicurezza del nostro Paese è importante, il 18 maggio deve votare sì all'acquisto dei Gripen."	
13.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security	return business deals	L'opinione Giordano Bizziero: Tre motivi per dire Sì ai Gripen	"Sono convinto che si debba votare a favore dell'acquisto dei Gripen per almeno tre ragioni : per assicurare anche in futuro la nostra sicurezza e la nostra indipendenza; per aiutare la nostra economia"	
14.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	security		L'opinione Lorenzo Quadri: Votazione sui Gripen: è in gioco l'esercito	"Non prendiamo alla leggera la sicurezza del nostro Paese: perché c'è chi è pronto ad approfittarsene. Il 18 maggio votiamo quindi sì al fondo per i Gripen."	
14.05.2014	<i>Aargauer Zeitung</i>	campaigning		Am Feldschiessen kams fast zum Eklat, Wegen Gripen? Susanne Hochulis Maulkorb stösst sauer auf; Schützen in der Defensive		
15.05.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	risks for taxpayers		"Ein Nein wir sehr bedauern" Saab-Präsident Marcus Wallenberg glaubt, dass ein allfälliges Nein der Schweiz am Sonntag zum Gripen nicht das Ende des Kampffjets wäre. Von der Kritik, sein Unternehmen sei für die Herstellung eines Kampfflugzeugs zu klein, hält er nichts.		
15.05.2014	<i>Corriere del Ticino</i>	internal disaccord of elites	security	L'intervista Marco Lucchini: "La scelta dell'aereo non si può rimandare"	"Ma l'ufficialità è unita ? Negli ultimi giorni, a livello svizzero, qualcuno si è dissociato. "Certo che è unita, in Svizzera come in Ticino. Abbiamo anche organizzato diverse serate informative. D'altra parte, in un esercito di milizia che conta migliaia di ufficiali, è normale che qualcuno sia contrario."	
15.05.2014	<i>Le Temps</i>	government campaigning		Du Mirage au Gripen : l'épreuve du carcan financier	"Défense De nouveaux documents racontent les débuts de "l'affaire du Mirage" il y a tout juste cinquante ans. Des ingrédients de la crise des Mirage ont une résonance avec le feuilleton de l'achat des Gripen"	

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Source	Topics		Title	Quotes (quotes in italics are journalist's questions)	Relevant Events
16.05.2014	<i>20 Minuten</i>	voting trends		"Armee Freunde und Pazifisten mobilisiert"	"Das ungeschickte Vorgehen der Kampfjet-Befürworter habe wohl ebenfalls eine Rolle gespielt."	
16.05.2014	<i>Tages-Anzeiger</i>	government campaigning		Politblog Von Felix Schindler: Bitte nicht überreden	"Sommaruga, Maurer und Schneider-Ammann mischen tüchtig in den Abstimmungskämpfen mit, die ihre Departemente betreffen." "Auch Armeechef André Blattmann stellte seine Überzeugungskraft unter Beweis, als er letzte Woche 18 000 Offizieren einen Brief schickte - mit dem Aufruf, sich im Abstimmungskampf zu engagieren." "Und stets berufen sich die staatlichen Kommunikationsabteilungen darauf, die Magistraten würden lediglich ihre Informationspflicht wahrnehmen. Das zeugt von einer ähnlichen Arglist wie das Versprechen von Andre' Blattmann, sich aus der politischen Diskussion herauszuhalten."	
16.05.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	voting trends		Berner Kinder gegen den Gripen	"An seiner gestrigen Sitzung überreichte das Berner Kinderparlament den Plämpu-Preis an den Stadtrat. Den Gripen- Kampfjet lehnen die Berner Kinder deutlich ab."	
17.05.2014	<i>Berner Zeitung BZ</i>	voting trends		Gripen-Nein sorgt für Ärger, Kinderparlament	"Weil sich das Kinderparlament am Donnerstag negativ zum Gripen-Kauf äusserte, geht die SVP auf die Barrikaden. Im Extremfall fordert sie sogar die Abschaffung des Parlaments."	

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