


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**WINNING THE PEACE: HOW CAN THE MILITARY MORE
EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY INTEGRATE CIVILIANS IN
POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS TO ACHIEVE STABILITY?**



by

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ABSTRACT

The long, drawn out wars of Iraq and Afghanistan have proved the need for quick stabilization of conflict areas. In Iraq, initial plans were to withdraw a large majority of troops months into the operation, but a stable environment required almost a decade to achieve. Stabilization in such a scenario requires Political, Social, Justice, Economic and Security needs to be met. The military has not been equipped to meet these needs by themselves and required civilian agencies and organizations to help accomplish that goal. These civil-military operations (CMO) must be properly integrated at the outset to be successful. Considering the constrained funding environment of the US, this research report sought to answer the question, “How can the military more effectively and efficiently integrate civilians in post-conflict operations to achieve stability?” Using the problem/solution framework, four solutions to improve civil-military integration were evaluated: Standing Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), use of Phase IV (stability) objectives for the military’s end-state, creation of interorganizational positions and use of wargaming for stability operations. Each was evaluated using cost, schedule and performance as determinate factors where cost and schedule corresponded to efficiency and performance with effectiveness. The research concluded that planning for a Phase IV end-state and wargaming were the most efficient and effective solutions and recommended them for immediate implementation. Based on recent conflicts, the military must not only be focused on winning the war, but also winning the peace.

Introduction

Many people may remember the fateful “Mission Accomplished” banner that hung behind President George W. Bush after the Iraqi Army had been defeated in May 2003?¹ Most believed it to be the end of the war at that time; however, that was not to be the case. It would be another eight years before the official end of the war.² Additionally, three years after that, the US sent 300 “advisors” to help Iraq fight ISIS.³ This was not how the US imagined the Iraq War would go. More than any other conflicts, Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the importance the end-state is to a nation. War must no longer be about simply defeating the enemy. It must be about what the US wants the world to look like when the fighting has stopped.

Some reading this report may be aware of von Clausewitz’s seminal writing *On War* which stated “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”⁴ In this simple quote, he exposed the interrelated nature of civil-military affairs. War is a subset of civilian politics conducted by the military. Additionally, the Military is one of four Instruments of Power (IOPs) available to civilian authorities with the others being Diplomacy, Information and Economics.⁵ With so many options available, one would have expected a nation to utilize all four to accomplish its political goals. For most cases in the US, that has been true; however, they have seldom been used effectively in unison.

Given the fact that the military takes the lead, it is dependent upon them to quickly transfer the lead to appropriate civilian agencies and organizations.

Research Question

Based upon the introduction, the question which was answered is this: How can the military more effectively and efficiently integrate civilians in post-conflict operations to achieve stability?

Research Evidence

The military needs more effective integration of civilian organizations to ensure stability after conflict. Many stabilization/reconstruction efforts are inherently civilian responsibilities and a poor transfer of responsibility could negatively affect the course of the entire operation. Case in point, the US military planned to drawdown its forces in Iraq approximately four months after the invasion, but could not leave until the situation had stabilized eight years later.⁶⁷ Some would argue that it is the civilian organizations that need to take the lead in their own stability/reconstruction missions; however, it is the military that holds the greatest political power and resources to accomplish the job.

Framework

This research report used the problem/solution framework to determine how civilians could be integrated to the greatest effect and least cost for post-conflict operations. The background section was used to familiarize the reader with the differences between civil and military responsibilities. Next, the five guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction were reviewed: Economic, Political, Justice, Social and Security. Following that, the efforts executed in Iraq and Afghanistan by the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), US Agency for International Development (USAID), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) were reviewed. The reader was then introduced to the criteria used to assess alternative integration methods of civilians to enhance stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The research report concluded with an analysis of the methods and recommendations on the way forward.

Background

As noted earlier, war is politics by other means which is why civilian authorities preside over the military. There are many aspects of a nation's policies. The end goal of our nation's policies could be to enhance trade relations in a region, minimize another nation's influence or simply to enhance our own security. Military force is typically utilized when one or more of the other IOPs fail to accomplish those objectives.

Once military force is used to such an extent that it occupies another country, it is required by the 1907 Hague Convention to "restore and maintain public order and public life."⁸ Because of this fact, nations must not only focus on winning the war, but also the peace that will hopefully follow. Therefore, a nation must consider the entire spectrum of conflict from beginning to end-state. In joint planning terms, all six phases must be considered: Phase 0/Shape, Phase I/Deter, Phase II/Seize the initiative, Phase III/Dominate, Phase IV/Stabilize and Phase V/Enable Civil Authority.⁹

Post-Conflict Operations, also known as Phases IV and V, include those efforts following the end of combat operations. Sometimes they have been formally announced, but that has not always the case. Therefore, it can be an ill-defined transition from conflict termination to final resolution. Additionally, the end of the formal combat operations has not always meant belligerents ceased their efforts (such as through terrorism, guerilla warfare, etc.) which adds to the ambiguity.¹⁰ These stages of a conflict have included both reconstruction efforts and military operations. Although doctrine was written to address this ambiguous situation, gaps still exist today.

The military's goal for Post-Conflict Operations has been to help establish the host nation's legitimate government.¹¹ However, this has mainly been a civil issue and not a military one. Establishing a legitimate government includes addressing the "political, social and

economic development” which has been in the purview of civilians unlike security which has been the military’s domain.¹² Rule of Law should also be included to maintain a just order of the population.¹³ That being said, neither side can operate independently and be effective.

Therefore, stabilization and reconstruction efforts require an integrated approach between the two.

The U.S. military has been involved in Post-Conflict Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the better part of a decade at a cost of trillions of dollars. However, civilians still hold little influence as compared to the military when it comes to post-conflict operations. Even ten years after initial hostilities began in Afghanistan, civilian personnel only averaged about 1% of the US personnel.¹⁴ Additionally, USAID funding only accounted for less than 5% of U.S. government spending in Afghanistan.¹⁵ With civilian agencies accounting for up to three-quarters of the United States’ IOPs, it is striking the little amount of resources dedicated to their missions.

The arguments, however, for the military taking such a large role have included the fact that security conditions do not allow for civilians to operate and the military was the only U.S. institution capable of leading the effort (due to adequate resources). However, post-conflict operations require a fully integrated approach in order to achieve a stable government and populace. Security is obtained not just through coercive force, but also by ensuring a populace’s social, justice, economic and political security as well. This can only be achieved through greater use of civilian personnel and their expertise in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The military holds more power in today’s political environment than civilian organizations such as the State Department; therefore, if one hopes to expand civilian personnel utilization, the military themselves must drive this change.

Civil-Military Affairs

In any operation, it is necessary to coordinate forces to ensure unity of effort, avoid duplication or conflicting missions and of course maintain the safety of personnel. This includes not just other branches of the armed forces, but other elements of the government and beyond.

For the nation as a whole, the National Security Council (NSC) has been responsible for the coordination of US military and civilian agencies.¹⁶ A common method used has been the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) or Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).¹⁷

At the task force level, a common way the military has coordinated with other agencies/organizations was the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).¹⁸ The CMOC provided a centralized coordination cell in a Task Force (e.g. Joint, Combined, etc.) for US civilian agencies, NGOs and IOs.¹⁹ In addition to the CMOC, some task forces incorporated a Civil Affairs element. These elements consisted of military personnel who coordinated with civilian organizations and provided expertise on traditionally civilian components of post-conflict operations such as humanitarian efforts and establishing a new government.²⁰

Lastly, at the tactical level there existed civil-military teams such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).²¹

Stabilization

The guidelines for stabilization outlined by the Department of State were: Safe and Secure Environment, Rule of Law, Social Well-Being, Stable Government and Sustainable Economy.²² The military adopted these principles that directly correspond with the actions required for the JFLCC in August 2016 via JP 3-07 Stability under the categories: Establish Security, Establish Transitional Public Security, Restore Essential Service, Support to Governance and Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development.²³

Out of these categories, only one was clearly within the primary domain of the military— Safe and Secure Environment/Establish Security. The tasks listed under DOS’s Establish Security included: cessation of large scale violence, public order, physical security and territorial security.²⁴ Rule of Law/Establish Transitional Public Security was more complicated because it involved public order (security) along with a just legal system (governance).²⁵ The other areas clearly lent themselves to other civilian agencies and organizations. To simplify terms, Economic, Political and Social were used. These categories were what determined the suitability of civilian personnel to a task. The area of Justice was less categorical and therefore was split along civilian and military lines.

Now, this is not to say the military has not or could not perform any of the tasks described in the categories above. Additionally, just like the rest of the US government, there have been areas that overlapped others. The point of this section was to show the primary section of government which was most suitable to the task at hand.

The economic category essentially refers to the ability of a nation to have properly managed its resources (e.g. people and material). In a post-conflict society, a thriving economy has been vital to reconstruction and sustainability of the peace. Per the DOS, the economic goal for a post-conflict society has been to create a sustainable economy.²⁶ Tasks included in this effort are stabilization of the currency, establishment/re-establishment of fiscal policies, facilitation of economic development, improvement of employment and the re-integration of ex-combatants into the labor force.²⁷ These clearly have not been typical tasks for which the military trained. In fact, joint doctrine stated, “Economic and infrastructure security and development are inherently civilian undertakings.”²⁸ In these matters, the military has taken a supporting role unless civilians could not perform the aforementioned tasks. An example would

be if civilians are not yet in country or the security situation does not allow for civilians to operate.²⁹

It is also important to understand the way the military and civilians have prioritized economic tasks. The immediate effort was performed to maintain stability.³⁰ According to the State Department, short-term goals helped continue the stability, but they must be done with long-term goals in mind.³¹ Conversely, the military has focused on short-term efforts because stability was their goal, yet they were required to align their efforts with civilian agencies which ensured long-term economic sustainability.³² Lastly, a major key to success in economic efforts has been to act early and appropriately while resistance is low.³³

The political category describes the governance of a nation. Governance refers to how the state has served its people, the laws which governed how one participates in the state, how the state has given authority and how laws were made and enforced.³⁴ This typically has included the political parties, elections, civil service, lawmaking bodies and even the media of a nation.³⁵ The political category, in essence, describes the civilian control of a nation; therefore, it would seem most appropriate to ensure civilians were directing these efforts.

The justice category refers to the Rule of Law of a nation. Included in this category were the entire population and its institutions having been accountable to the state's rules.³⁶ The justice system, enforcement of laws, equal treatment under the law and access to justice all have contributed to cultures that would embrace justice.³⁷ Without these elements in place, a nation would threaten its own legitimacy and authority over its populace leading to widespread lawlessness.³⁸

The Social category refers to a myriad of basic services the state needed to provide to its citizens. Included in this category would be food, water, sewage, electricity, medical treatment,

shelter and education.³⁹ The military could provide these services; however, differences between the military and civilians doing so would exist. Some of these efforts would include humanitarian work. One of the principles of humanitarian work was they have been “independent and impartial.”⁴⁰ In other words, it was done for humanity’s sake and not on behalf of a foreign power to influence a population.⁴¹ Additionally, those seen as having received support from an occupying military could be seen negatively by the rest of the population (i.e. collaborators). If people feared receiving help, then humanitarian efforts would likely to fail.

Lastly, one must also be aware of the reality of the situation. Even though a specific organization would more appropriately lead a task, circumstances could prevent it from occurring. In particular, resources such as funding or the operational environment (OE) could be too dangerous for civilians to function.

Civilian Agencies/Organizations

With regard to civilian agencies and organizations, it would be helpful to understand the roles/missions of those greatest involved in stability and reconstruction: DOS, USAID, DOJ, NGOs and IOs.

The Department of State has been one of the most critical components of the US government and most representative of its diplomatic mission. DOS maintained embassies and sent envoys around the world to convey the US government’s policies, stances and desires to other governments. The DOS negotiated agreements such as treaties and status of forces agreements (SOFAs) with the US and other governments. It served as spokesman to other countries on behalf of the US government especially in its promotion of democracy and human rights. While the focus of DOS would be on the political category of stabilization, its efforts

would touch on all categories. Lastly, two of its greatest supporters in its mission have been the DOD and USAID. The DOD provided deterrence and sometimes the resolve of US positions through military force. USAID, alternatively, provided a “softer” coercive force by providing economic aid.

USAID has been the lead government agency in providing foreign aid in accordance with US goals. Funds have been used for necessities such as food, clean water and medical services.⁴² Additionally, education and economic development in foreign countries were funded as well. USAID’s projects also included more philosophical efforts around the globe such as the promotion of democratic institutions, human rights, gender equality, environmental protection and conflict resolution (a.k.a. “peace”). The projects USAID would fund in a post-conflict environment could cover the spectrum of stabilization categories.

DOJ’s mission has been “to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States” at its most basic level.⁴³ Also included in the mission was DOJ’s “fair and impartial administration of justice.” The knowledge DOJ has in administering a civilian justice system has been invaluable in the establishment or reconstitution of a new one after a post-conflict situation.

NGOs have historically been non-profit, independent organizations which routinely operated in post-conflict areas.⁴⁴ Many times, NGOs have been there long before and long after a military conflict in order to promote their cause.⁴⁵ Many times their efforts were for humanitarian reasons such as providing food and medical treatment, but many efforts also included economic development and the promotion of democracy.⁴⁶ Due to the wide range of efforts, NGO effects crossed the spectrum of the US government’s IOPs.

IOs are international organizations, but for this report they refer specifically to Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). IGOs have been those organizations formed by “a

formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments.”⁴⁷ The most notable example would be the United Nations (UN). The UN has been especially important to post-conflict areas because of how it has organized international aid funds (much like USAID on a global scale) and secured international partners to help with stability and reconstruction efforts.

Iraq

The war in Iraq began on 27 November 2001 when the Secretary of Defense ordered U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to plan for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.⁴⁸ Despite recognizing post-conflict operations were needed at that time, interagency meetings did not begin until September 2002, almost a full year after war preparations started.⁴⁹ Additionally, the military focused almost exclusively on Phase III operations. General Tommy Franks, Commander of CENTCOM at the time, felt Phase IV operations should be civilian led.⁵⁰ While Gen Franks was generally considered correct in this view, it also helped create a wall between the military and other agencies with regard to integration and transition planning.⁵¹

In January 2003, roughly two months before the start of the ground war, the leader for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was appointed.⁵² Retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner led what was supposed to be a “civilian rapid reaction force.”⁵³ However, when ORHA personnel deployed to Kuwait at the start of the war, they were not allowed to be on base (Camp Doha).⁵⁴ Instead they were forced to stay almost an hour away at the Kuwait Hilton without expected military support in areas such as communications.⁵⁵ Communications did not improve after this because the ORHA was not aware of military plans which made “many of ORHA’s plans obsolete.”⁵⁶

Garner was eventually able to enter Iraq on 21 April 2003, but three days later the successor to the ORHA, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), appointed its leader, former

ambassador Mr. Paul Bremer.⁵⁷ Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12 May 2003.⁵⁸ During this time very little work could be accomplished, a month had transpired since the fall of Baghdad, a transition to a transition occurred and looting prevailed.

During post-conflict periods, there exists a “Golden Hour” in which stabilization can occur most efficiently. The “Golden Hour” typically is available during the first to third months after conflict has ended and allows for an easier transition to reconstruction due to lack of resistance.⁵⁹

During the turbulent time immediately after the fall of Baghdad, numerous issues came to light—some foreseen and some not. The first of which was the speed in which Coalition Forces overtook the Iraqi Army. During WWII, the US had years to plan for a post-conflict phase whereas in Iraq, it was a matter of weeks before that phase began. In one case in particular, a civil affairs unit was charged with establishing a stabilization plan in 24 hours.⁶⁰ While pre-planning occurred, it mostly centered on humanitarian relief which did not materialize and gave little thought to the security efforts to combat looting.⁶¹

Security, which became the largest issue, included the military, police forces, infrastructure protection and border security that all but disintegrated after Iraq fell.⁶² Additionally, it was thought that Iraq’s bureaucracy would remain in place, but many from top ministers to mayors fled the country leaving a “political power vacuum.”⁶³ Other issues included the Iraqi infrastructure being either out of date or pillaged, the schools and universities were closed and the Iraqi economy was a house of cards that fell apart once the Baath party left.⁶⁴

Afghanistan

The US involvement in Afghanistan differed from Iraq in many ways. While the invasion of Iraq took well over a year to matriculate, the US responded to the September 11th

attacks a little over a month later which left little time for planning (post-conflict or otherwise). In fact, the initial plan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) did not even contain a stabilization phase.⁶⁵ The operation planned only to have combat operations coupled with humanitarian aid.⁶⁶

Additionally, this was an international effort started at the United Nations with the Bonn Agreement which outlined a 30-month plan to provide sovereignty back to Afghanistan.⁶⁷ The effort was undertaken by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)⁶⁸ which consisted of 39 countries.⁶⁹ Planning combat operations with this multitude of countries was difficult, but even more so with conducting the humanitarian efforts. In order to organize these efforts, a Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) was used.⁷⁰

The CJCMOTF was initially understaffed, inexperienced, did not contain all the necessary stakeholders and lacked the proper Civil-Military Operations (CMO) skillset.⁷¹ In Bosnia and Kosovo operations, training for CMO was required prior to deployment.⁷² In contrast, no such programs were implemented for those troops in Afghanistan a year into the conflict.⁷³

Also, issues concerning coordination and lack of CMO priority came to light during this time. In some cases, NGOs had to find their own transportation, Civil Affairs (CA) officers lacked proper equipment, and funding projects had no overall strategic vision.⁷⁴ With regard to strategic vision, a lack of an interagency plan contributed to that outcome along with the US's overall aversion to be seen as "nation-building."⁷⁵ Additionally, security concerns with sharing information hampered coordination with NGOs/IGOs.⁷⁶ In May 2002, the focus of operations switched from providing humanitarian aid to stabilization (almost 6 months after the fall of

Kabul).⁷⁷⁸ At that time, the realization that greater integration of US military and civilian agencies was needed.

In December 2002, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, were created to address this lack of coordination.⁷⁹ PRTs consisted of mainly military, DOS, USAID and USDA personnel.⁸⁰ The goal was for the military to provide civilian agencies with security so they could advance US interests in unsecure environments.⁸¹ PRTs enabled CMO to flourish at a tactical level, but this occurred almost a year after combat operations had begun. It would be another 12 years before the US drew down forces in Afghanistan.

Criteria

The criteria for assessing the alternative methods of integrating civilians in post-conflict operations were Cost, Schedule and Performance. Successful program managers have used these criteria as a basis for any project, but they also realized there were tradeoffs between them. An oft used phrase of acquisition managers which highlights that fact is, “Cheap, fast or good...pick two.”

Cost refers to the resources required to implement a project. People tend to think this criteria just referred to money, but it could point to other costs as well. In the government, most are aware that funding has been distributed annually and used for supplies and equipment; however, it could encompass personnel as well. Especially with regard to integrating personnel, it would be likely personnel costs would be the largest cost. Salary must be accounted, but also so should opportunity costs (the cost of doing one action instead of another). If one person was assigned to another organization, a commander essentially lost one person to accomplish the mission.

Schedule refers to time which is a concept most people understand quite easily. If a project took longer to accomplish than the time available, then it was not a feasible solution. With regard to integration of civilians, there are two aspects which must be addressed. The first was the time for an alternative to be created and the second was time for the alternative to be readied for use. If an alternative required changes to law or policy, that would take much longer than just having to schedule a meeting. However, once that change to law or policy took effect, it could possibly take less time to implement than other alternatives.

The performance is the expected effectiveness of the alternative. Did one foresee an alternative solving a large number of issues or the greatest issue? Or, on the other hand, did one expect it to have affected only a minor or small number of issues? It could be viewed as subjective with regard to major or minor (or direct or indirect effect), but its end goal would be the enhancement of stability. The major shortfalls of civil-military operations presented in this report stemmed from the following (as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan): organization, coordination, communication, planning, knowledge and experience.

Lastly, each of the criteria were weighed on a scale of one (1) to five (5). Cost was rated on a scale where one was expensive and five was inexpensive. An alternative with schedule rated as one was a time-consuming effort whereas a rating of five was quickly implemented. Performance was rated with one being poor results expected versus a five that had excellent results expected. All ratings for each alternative were equally weighted and resulted in an overall score.

Analysis of Alternatives

The following four alternatives are presented in order to address the gaps which currently exist today: Standing JIATFs, Focus on Phase IV Objectives, Interorganizational Positions and Wargaming.

Standing JIATFs

A Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) has been a management structure in which the DOD and at least one other USG department or agency would work together toward a specific mission.⁸² This means its means members were not just liaisons coordinating issues, rather they were a “focal point” for that mission.⁸³ JIATFS should have a clear and specific mission or objective for which they could, for example, provide coordination channels, plans, training and policy. One notable attribute of JIATFs were that (depending on how the charter is written) resources could be required of the agency or department.⁸⁴ This type of organization would not simply dissipate if members did not show up. In some cases, it would not be an option for it to falter.

JIATFs have had a long tradition of being formed to solve the problem of inter-organization communication and coordination. Often, they were created to address a need during a specific operation, but a few have been continuous. JIATF-South (JIATF-S) has been one such example. It was considered the “gold standard” for interagency success and has been operating under one name or another since the 1980s. Other examples would include JIATF West, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and Joint Interagency Homeland Security Task Force (JIHSTF).⁸⁵

Using this framework, continuous JIATFs could be utilized for stabilization and reconstruction. One method of using the JIATF structure would be to essentially have all aspects of stabilization in one overarching continuous JIATF. However, such a large number of tasks

would likely make the organization too convoluted to accomplish its mission. Alternatively, ensuring each of the stabilization guiding principles (Economic, Political, Justice, Social and Security) had its own JIATF would seem inefficient. The best choice for this alternative method would be to group some of the functions to ensure there was some integration not just with the military, but also with other organizations.

There are many overlapping responsibilities within each of the stabilization principles but Economic/Social and Political/Justice appeared to be the most intertwined. Security had some cross-over to the Justice department; however, it was still largely a military function. Therefore, the civilian aspects should fall under the Political/Justice category.

The proposed JIATF-Economic/Social (JIATF-ES) would focus on those elements of stabilization and comprise functions which would include the following: humanitarian efforts, (re)building infrastructure, ensuring basic needs (food, water, shelter, medical treatment etc.) and education. The organizations which would comprise the JIATF-ES would mainly be the DOD and USAID. USAID would be the primary liaison with NGOs and IOs. Although, Interaction (an organization representing numerous NGOs) would be welcome, most NGOs preferred to deal with USAID directly and valued their image as independent and impartial.

JIATF-Political/Justice would focus their efforts on providing assistance to restructuring government, political parties, legislative processes, judicial system, police forces and border security as necessary. DOD, DOS, DOJ and DHS would be the primary members of the JIATF-PJ.

The costs of implementing a JIATF-ES and JIATF-PJ would include funding for personnel, office space, supplies and equipment (phones, computers etc.). The costs could be reduced by having initial organization part of an existing unit in Washington DC based on the

location of USAID, DOS, DOJ and DHS locations; however, the costs were rated at a one because it has historically been expensive to set up a new organization.

The initial start-up time could be quick by making a dual-hatted commander, but personnel moves and securing funding could take years. In contingency operations, it could be done faster. Once up and running, the JIATF would be able to provide immediate support for planning and execution of Phase IV operations. Based on initial capability followed by full capability, this option was rated as a two.

Performance was dependent upon multiple factors with participation being the largest. In order for a JIATF to succeed, members would first need to be present. If the DOD provided offices, supplies and equipment, it would certainly remove the barrier of financial burdens preventing participation of civilian agencies. Intelligence would be more readily available being part of a JIATF which would allow for better Phase IV planning. Additionally, two JIATFs could be called for pre-warplanning instead of an ad hoc meeting planned with multiple agencies and organizations. This would place civilians in a readily accessible bucket the military could easily assimilate into their framework and cultural understanding. This solution addressed gaps in communication, organization, coordination and planning and was rated at a five.

In summary, cost would be rated at a one because significant resources would need to be dedicated to achieving the end result. Schedule for full capability was long but an initial capability could be achieved earlier so it received a rating of two. Performance was rated at a five because it addressed multiple gaps. Overall, this alternative received a score of eight.

Standing JIATFs	
Cost	1
Schedule	2
Performance	5
Overall	8

Figure 1. Standing JIATFs Rating

Phase IV Objectives

Planning was a key gap that needed to be addressed. According to the RAND Corporation, one major flaw of the Iraq campaign was the military planned to end their operations at Phase III.⁸⁶ Phase IV was mostly left to the civilian agencies.⁸⁷ This situation was not a mistake, but rather it followed doctrine to the letter. Joint Publication 5-0 (Joint Operation Planning) declares the end state is “the set of conditions to meet conflict termination criteria.”⁸⁸

Imagine if having established stability (Phase IV) was the end state. How would the military have planned differently? Would the military have forced civilian agencies to be more involved? Would there have been as much lawlessness in Iraq after major combat operations ceased? Would the US military have been in Iraq for 8 years? It is not a given that the issues in post-war Iraq and Afghanistan would have been solved by this method, but it would have certainly helped address the planning gap which existed.

Additionally, Iraq and Afghanistan combat operations in Phase III were relatively short allowing little time for planning during Phase III for Phase IV. A plan and resources for Phase IV operations needed to be in place immediately to ensure stability was achieved. It is reasonable to expect that future operations could occur in the same manner.

The cost of implementing this doctrine change would be relatively low. It would take personnel writing the updates, reviewing the publications, approving final versions and adjusting training courses. These, however, would not be new tasks for the DOD. These personnel would already be performing this mission for a great many of DOD documents. The cost was rated at a four because this type of work already had a process in place to change doctrine, yet it would come at the expense of doing other doctrinal changes.

The standard schedule for implementing a change to joint doctrine has been 17.5 months which would consume a fair amount of time.⁸⁹ In addition, the schedule would likely take longer as it would fundamentally change joint planning; therefore, this criteria was rated at a one.

Performance was rated high because it addressed multiple issues. Focusing the end state at Phase IV would force joint operational planners to coordinate, communicate, organize and plan with other agencies/organizations to achieve stability. Based on that assessment, performance was rated at five.

The overall rating of changing the end state in joint planning doctrine from Phase III to Phase IV was rated at 10.

Phase IV Objectives	
Cost	4
Schedule	1
Performance	5
Overall	10

Figure 2. Phase IV Objectives Rating

Interorganizational Positions

Greater DOD knowledge of other US agencies, NGOs and IOs was needed to address the key gap of expertise. The creation of “Interorganizational Positions” would solve that problem. Much like the joint concept developed for DOD, the US government as a whole should seek methods to better understand other organizations in stability operations.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created a requirement for promotion to Flag Officer (O-7 and above) as having served in at least one joint assignment.⁹⁰ This created an incentive for all officers to seek joint assignments. Likewise, an interorganizational requirement by DOD could spur a similar interest in operating with other US agencies and organizations.

In order to make interorganizational positions a reality, the DOD would have to establish a policy requiring it for promotions (an act of congress would not be necessary). In addition,

these assignments would have to be taken from the current pool of personnel. This would increase the burden on offices that lost personnel to these assignments or require additional personnel to take their place thus increasing DOD personnel overall.

Thankfully, a program has already been developed to take advantage of these interorganizational assignments. The Training With Industry (TWI) program would allow for career broadening assignments while remaining DOD personnel.⁹¹ Utilization of this program for interorganizational assignments would be fairly easy to implement if policy existed.

While the benefits to the DOD as a whole would be great for the understanding of other agencies, it could encompass too large a group of personnel who would never utilize that knowledge. A targeted pool of military would best serve the military's needs.

Civil Affairs (CA) personnel currently perform similar missions to many US agencies and NGOs and work closely with them in stability operations.⁹² Using this targeted group of personnel would be the most efficient use of DOD's resources for interorganizational assignments. Agreements could be worked out with US agencies such as DOS and USAID fairly easily due to shared national goals; however, agreements with organizations such as NGOs could be more difficult due to differing perspectives, but worth the investment.

The cost of implementation of an interorganizational position would include the opportunity cost of CA personnel performing other jobs and efforts by CA personnel used to change policy for CA promotions. Also, this solution would take advantage of pre-existing programs thereby limiting the cost of implementation. Based on those factors, cost was rated as a three.

The schedule for implementing an organizational policy would be less than the minimum of 17.5 months for changing joint planning doctrine. A conservative estimate of 12 months was

used. Additionally, forming memoranda of agreements (MOAs) with NGOs for TWI purposes would be outside the norm and be expected to take the same amount of time. Therefore, schedule was rated as three.

Performance was expected to be moderate upon the military as a whole based on the targeted nature of the positions. However, the expected return on investment (ROI) for CA personnel would be significant. Performance was rated at a three accordingly.

The overall rating for implementing interorganizational positions for CA personnel was a nine.

Interorganizational Positions	
Cost	3
Schedule	3
Performance	3
Overall	9

Figure 3. Interorganizational Positions Rating

Wargaming

There is no better teacher in life than experience. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided invaluable lessons learned for future stability and reconstruction efforts. While one would not want to repeat those conflicts to properly impart those experiences to future personnel, training could be an acceptable substitute.

One of the largest training exercises for the Air Force has been “Red Flag.” Red Flag has brought multiple platforms together to test integration and interoperability.⁹³ By flying aircraft that have not typically flown together on a regular basis, lessons learned could be gleaned from the experience.

Every individual that belonged to a unit involved in an exercise has benefitted from wargaming exercises. Greater knowledge could be gained through realistic scenarios. Having learned theory, principles and rules in a classroom setting provided personnel with a strong

foundation, but having performed those duties in real-life has proved to be invaluable for success. Additionally, consistent repetitive exercises have produced “muscle memory” in which the tasks performed in practice became easier when done in a real world environment.

Unfortunately, exercises have not been an inexpensive option. The costs associated with personnel, travel, fuel, etc. have left only what has been deemed the most critical to the mission to have exercises. In the case of the Air Force, that would be combat operations.

Since stabilization and reconstruction operations have not been seen as critical a function, it should not be surprising that less funds would be available for that purpose. Therefore, a plausible alternative would be wargaming. Wargaming would consist of the military and US agencies reacting to a scenario and applying imaginary resources to solve the issue. Wargaming would provide the practice of exercises without the exorbitant costs.

Ideally, wargaming would be conducted with all organizations in the same room; however, a virtual meeting, via multiple types of telecommunications methods, could also serve the purpose as well. Given the proximity of the Pentagon, DOS, USAID and DOJ in Washington D.C., it would be quite possible to have all agencies represented in person.

Wargaming could be done on a regular basis such as once a year and on an as needed basis. Having an annual exercise would have the effect of keeping stability operations in the minds of those who would perform them. In addition, having wargames could help planners on operations which would allow for a great deal of time. Iraq, for example, had many months to plan. Wargaming could be used in such situations to ensure proper integration of government agencies provided realistic scenarios were given.

The cost of wargaming would consist solely of opportunity costs. It would require personnel from the DOD, DOS, USAID and DOJ to divert their attention for one week annually

from other work they would need to perform. Additionally, as needed wargames for operational planning would be considered part of the planning process which would already have been performed anyway. Due to the relatively low cost of implementation, wargaming was rated as a five.

The time to implement wargames could be done in a relatively short amount of time. It was estimated that to sign MOAs for the purpose of implementing interagency wargames would take six months to a year. Based on the timeframe, schedule was rated at a four.

While wargames helped provide the foundation for interagency integration, the performance was rated low because they would be held only once a year and did not contain a high degree of fidelity. For those reasons, performance was rated at a one.

Based on the cost, schedule and performance ratings, the overall rating for wargaming was 10.

Wargaming	
Cost	5
Schedule	4
Performance	1
Overall	10

Figure 4. Wargaming Rating

Conclusion

New Perspective for War

During the 2016 Presidential election, candidate (now President) Donald Trump said, “We don’t win anymore. As a country, we don’t win.”⁹⁴ Right or wrong, that was the perception shared by many who witnessed the approximately decade-long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US did not have the decisive victory it desired. Historians have noted that a decisive victory has not been achievable since Napoleon’s victory at Jena/Auerstadt in 1806.⁹⁵ Yet, it has still been pursued 200 years later.

War has become more complex than simply defeating the enemy on the battlefield. While conventional warfare has always been a threat, conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan have become the norm. Nation-building and winning “hearts and minds” have become more commonplace in war.⁹⁶ The US population and the US military must understand that war has now encompassed stability and reconstruction.⁹⁷ In order to adjust to this changing dynamic, the US military must not only be forced to maintain conventional forces and strategies, but also to create new methods for stability and reconstruction.

New Perspective of CMO

Post-Conflict operations were not considered responsibilities of the military at the outset in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, stabilization after conflict has been a uniquely civilian endeavor that has depended on the military mostly for logistical support. In a post-conflict environment, the following have been identified as critical areas to be addressed: Economic, Political, Justice, Social and Security. While those categories could be divided into civilian, military or shared responsibilities, the reality has been that they have all been interconnected.

A simple hand-off or transfer of authority from military to civilians after conflict termination could not be done without great risk to stability. Specifically, the areas of deficiencies in civil-military coordination in Iraq and Afghanistan were: organization, coordination, communication, planning, knowledge and experience. Proper integration of military and civilian personnel was needed to achieve stability. Stability should be a team sport in which all a nation’s organizations strive for the same goal.

This fact has been recognized by the military as well. Recently, the president’s budget proposal was provided which greatly reduced funding for the State Department, but a large cadre of retired generals spoke against that decision.⁹⁸ Those generals recognized the part other

government agencies played in the advancement of the US national goals. Four-Star General George Casey, who commanded forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan from 2004-2011, stated “It’s important not to see this as just a nice thing to do...It’s an important tool of national policy.”⁹⁹ The military has recognized the integral nature of CMO and has taken it upon themselves to push for further integration.

New Methods

The US Military created many different methods to address CMO via both organizational and doctrinal changes. CMOC, PRTs and interagency coordination have been stressed, but knowledge and experience has been easily lost between conflicts. It could be relearned as a brand new concept every time and be expected to succeed. Vince Lombardi, a well-known football coach, summarized the thought best when he said, “Winning is not a sometime thing, it is an all time thing.”¹⁰⁰ Therefore, new methods would be required to ensure the US was prepared for the next post-conflict situation.

More evolution of the methods used by the military would be needed to achieve stabilization during the first three months of post-conflict situations or what has been called the “Golden Hour.” Possible solutions presented which address the issue were: standing JIATFs, Phase IV end state planning, interorganizational positions and wargaming. However, the military should ensure its efforts would not go too far either. The danger would be to place the burden of stabilization solely on the military and not have civilian organizations integrated into the overall planning.

When relying only on the military, they would be seen as the Walmart of government action and the nation would be “asking our military to take on an ever-expanding range of nontraditional tasks.”¹⁰¹ In this scenario, the lines between military and civilian tasks would

become blurred. The independence of each government agency and military must be observed while at the same time having integrated their efforts in unison. Pragmatically, the responsibility has fallen to the military to help enhance civilian capabilities; however, it should be tempered with the fact that the military cannot take on those roles in their entirety.

Effectiveness and Efficiency

The realities of a limited US budget and its resources have affected its ability to enact changes. Effectiveness and efficiency were the measures used to evaluate CMO integration solutions. Effectiveness, the ability to accomplish the goal, was measured by the performance criteria. Additionally, efficiency, the ability to accomplish a goal using least amount of resources, was measured by cost and schedule. The importance of both qualities must be addressed for any future changes in determining their likelihood of implementation.

Key Findings

A need for greater integration of civilian and military efforts has been proven; however, those methods would have to be effective and efficient if they were to be implemented. The findings of the four options presented are summarized in the table below:

Overall Ratings of Alternatives	
Standing JIATFs	8
Phase IV Objectives	10
Interorganizational Positions	9
Wargaming	10

Figure 5. Overall Ratings of Alternatives

If implemented all alternatives, would solve some issues, but it should be determined which ones would provide the greatest value to the government while expending the least amount of resources.

Overall, both Phase IV Objectives and Wargaming achieved the highest scores of 10 each. While standing JIATFs and Interorganizational Positions have value, they did not score as high as the other two.

Final Conclusions

After the four solutions were rated, it was necessary to evaluate the practicality of their implementation. One must weigh both the funding limitations affecting each option and the expected benefit of implementing it.

If implemented, the Standing JIATFs would be costly, but would likely solve performance gaps of communication, organization, coordination and planning. This was clearly seen in Figure 1: Standing JIATFs Rating (page 17). Such an expensive move to solve a problem that could reemerge in the future seemed unlikely to gain traction in today's political environment.

If joint planners instead focused on the end state at Phase IV, it would be relatively inexpensive and would likely solve the same performance gaps as the Standing JIATFs: communication, organization, coordination and planning. The ratings for which could be seen on Figure 2: Phase IV Objectives Rating (page 19).

Of the two solutions solving the same performance gaps, using Phase IV to plan the end state seemed to be the cheaper option to address the same performance issues.

Interorganizational Positions solution addressed the performance gap of knowledge (targeted specifically to CA personnel). The knowledge gained would be a helpful foundation upon which to build greater integration of CMO; however, it would be a secondary measure supporting direct integration methods such as Phase IV Planning and JIATFs. Overall, creation

of those positions would be moderately effective and of moderate cost as could be seen from Figure 3: Interorganizational Positions Rating (page 21).

Lastly, Wargaming would solve the lack of civil-military integration experience performance gap. Much like the Interorganizational Positions option, it would be a secondary measure to enhance integration of civilian and military efforts but cost much less to implement which was evident from Figure 4: Wargaming Rating (page 23).

Recommendations

The recommendation of this report was that both Phase IV Objectives and Wargaming should be implemented as primary and secondary solutions to civilian and military integration performance gaps. It would be important to implement them together as both options complement each other. Once doctrinal changes have been made to joint publications, Wargaming could be used to maintain the concept throughout the military and US agencies.

Interorganizational Positions could still be pursued, but it would be dependent upon further study by CA organizations in its determinate value. Also, it would be recommended that further study of standing JIATFs occur. The large cost associated with such an undertaking would necessitate an intensive review of its value. One must have determined if the trend of Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts would continue and necessitate their need. In any case, the US government must be prepared in the future to not only win the battle, but the peace as well.

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