



**THE AIR FORCE BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY PROBLEM: ARE
WE ENGAGED IN THE RIGHT PARTNERSHIPS?**

GRADUATE RESEARCH PAPER

Mark A. Heil, Major, USAF

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Abstract

The NSS, NMS, and Air Force Global Partnership Strategy discuss multinational engagements becoming normal operations as the military services downsize and shift to a capability based force, versus threat based. One of the Air Force's strategic priorities is Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) with key nations. This is a huge leveraging opportunity for TRANSCOM, and the Air Force specifically, as both require uninterrupted worldwide access to realize Global Reach. Through analysis of guiding regulations and the objectives of major Air Force stakeholders, this research will identify several key variables that each BPC partnership exhibits. These variables will be measured in a model that will determine the relative partnership strength of that nation with the United States. Partnerships will be categorized based on the relative scoring of each variable. By providing a model to determine partnership strength, this paper will define what the 'right' partnerships consist of as well as provide an insight into what the United States values when building relationships with strategic allies.

This thesis is dedicated to my wife and boys. Throughout this research project, you always provided me with a foundation to return back to neutral; thank you.

“We have learned that we cannot live alone at peace. We have learned that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations far away. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.”

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt

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Mark A. Heil

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THE AIR FORCE BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY PROBLEM: ARE WE ENGAGED IN THE RIGHT PARTNERSHIPS?

I. Introduction and Problem Statement

Introduction

Airpower is more than dropping bombs, strafing targets, firing missiles, providing precision navigation and timing, or protecting networks. It is also a way of influencing world situations in ways which support national objectives. . . . Through careful building of partnerships, Air Force forces can favorably shape the strategic environment by assessing, advising, training, and assisting host nation air forces in their efforts to counter internal or external threats.

—Volume I, Basic Doctrine

A major challenge facing the United States military is the ability to respond to an increasing amount of threats globally as organic resources continue to dwindle. The style of warfare is ever changing, and the days of two large Armies facing each other on the battlefield have come and gone. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have propelled the need for active partnering and capacity building as present day wars shift from a conventional style, where Armies fight head-to-head on the battlefield, to that of a more asymmetric form, where success is determined by a nation's ability to counteract a counterinsurgency, influence the local population, and effectively set conditions prior to an event commencing.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) (Obama, 2015), National Military Strategy (NMS) (Dempsey, 2015) and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) International Engagement Strategy (Selva, 2015) reflect this difference in fighting wars and therefore all discuss the strategic importance of multinational operations as the United States military downsizes and shifts to a capability-based force as opposed to a

threat-based force. A change in the way wars are fought, as well as recent multinational operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, precipitated the need to approach this new style of warfare from a combined front. Due to this, and the fact that the United States military is downsizing, it becomes necessary to approach future conflicts with a multinational solution. Due in large part to the United States impact on global operations, the U.S. has been and will continue to be the lead agent for such an operation. The challenge therefore becomes identifying the strategic role that the Air Force exercises and if this organization can achieve global mobility with multinational support, within a downsized force.

As Gates (2006) writes, the shift in emphasis/strategic direction is manifested by changing the Department of Defense approach, for example: from vertical structures and processes to more transparent, horizontal integration; from fragmented assistance to civilian agencies to an integrated homeland security approach; from static alliances to dynamic partnerships; from the U.S. military performing tasks to a focus on building partner capabilities; and from Department of Defense solutions to interagency solutions. This critical shift in ideology becomes a huge leveraging opportunity for the Air Force, as their mission set requires uninterrupted worldwide access in order to achieve Global Reach. As the Joint Community continues and therefore expands on existing partnerships with strategic nations, there will be an ever growing demand to ensure that the right partnerships are effectively maintained in order to promote global freedom of navigation, guarantee future access to bases/airfields, and ultimately enhance supply chain replenishment. According to Klausner (2011), building partnerships as the ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor or adversary leaders, military

forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities. This “partnership” is a key element in assuring our allies and partners, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression, countering coercion, and ensuring access to critical locations while assisting the United States in forming coalitions to defeat adversaries, real or potential.

United States Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) global distribution capability depends upon access to allied, friendly, and cooperating nations’ territory and infrastructure. This access is essential to our readiness and hinges on the relationships we establish and maintain with representatives of these foreign nations. Our engagement efforts are also key to the support provided to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC), along with the deployment, distribution, sustainment, and redeployment of joint forces operating globally (Selva, 2015). For instance, Bossert (2003) noted, Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) are required to deploy and place “bombs on target” (Bossert, 2003) just 48-hours after receiving an execution order. However, current logistics processes are unable to support this aggressive timeline, and a recent RAND study suggested that global infrastructure preparation is “a central function of planning expeditionary support.” This study recommended prepositioning support as far forward as possible to greatly help in meeting this timeline and discussed the need to field numerous FOLs to “provide a range of employment time lines for operational use.” (Shapiro, 2012) This is where Building Partnerships dovetails into this equation. By setting an aggressive security cooperation plan and establishing the ‘right’ relationships ahead of time, the environment and conditions can be appropriately set prior to an incident even happening.

In the 2015 NMS, Dempsey posits that security cooperation activities are at the heart of our efforts to provide a stabilizing presence in forward theaters and these relationships serve mutual security interests. They also develop partner military capabilities for self-defense and support to multinational operations. Through such activities, we coordinate with other U.S. agencies and mission partners to build cultural awareness and affirm relationships that increase regional stability.

In Selva's (2015) International Engagement Strategy, Building Partnerships lays the foundation for USTRANSCOM's engagement approach and places renewed emphasis on promoting international relationships and interoperability. The establishment and preservation of relationships is a continuous process highlighted by dynamic changes within a strategic environment that requires continuous attention and collaboration. Engagement efforts should enhance defense and security relationships with international partners that promote U.S. security interests, support the objectives of the GCCs, strengthen and improve international partnerships and alliances to facilitate greater access to international ports, airspace, facilities, and movement capabilities, and enable access to more direct distribution routes to minimize transportation costs.

Achieving the nation's strategic objectives in a cost-effective manner demands Security Cooperation engagement and relationship building efforts with allied, friendly, and cooperating nations. This is a fundamental tenet of national security. As we plan to support the future employment of military power with our many international partners, we must take advantage of emerging opportunities to secure the operational access we must have to support global distribution needs. The International Engagement Strategy considers several engagement questions in building our strategic approach: "with whom

should we engage, why should we engage with them, and what means do we use to develop and sustain relationships with friends and allies?” In an effort to answer these questions, functional equities will need to be addressed, as well as an assessment of engagement priorities, engagement opportunities, and potential engagement activities (Selva, 2015).

As the United States transitions from a decade of war, it is clear that the task of maintaining global stability and addressing global challenges must be a shared responsibility. But the increased interconnectedness associated with global economic advances, while bringing prosperity to more countries and regions, has also meant that the security of the United States can be affected by events in more places, more countries, and more regions. This has led to an increased demand to expand our partnerships and deepen our security relationships (Shapiro, 2012).

According to Self et al (2010), the Air Force already possesses unique expertise in many expeditionary skills that will prove critical to growing U.S. military missions such as irregular warfare (IW) and building partnerships (BP). Planned modifications to Contingency Response Groups that call for adding a BP mission send a strong signal that the Air Force is ready to leverage a valuable mobility capability to meet current and future missions.

Like many areas involving the United States government or military, a myriad of confusing, overlapping terminology is associated with assistance to other nations. In general, the different terms reflect a combination of who offers the assistance, its purpose or desired outcome, and/or the authority or law under which it is provided. The best

overarching term to describe the work that the Air Force is often tasked to support or help execute when it assists other nations is *security cooperation* (Rolleston et al, 2014).

In an effort to clarify terminology, Paul et al (2013) define the differences between the definitions of security assistance, building partnership capacity, and security force assistance.

- Security assistance consists of “a group of programs, authorized by law that allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign governments.” The U.S. strategy for security assistance is set forth as a multi-year plan developed by the U.S. Department of State and coordinated with key elements of DOD.
- Building partner capacity (BPC) is a generic term used to describe efforts to build the security and defense capabilities of partner countries, which will enable them to make valuable contributions to coalition operations and subsequently improve their own capabilities.
- Security force assistance (SFA) is defined as “DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the [U.S. government] to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”

The Air Force’s combined efforts to support U.S. Security Cooperation, *cost the service only about \$35 million a year in discretionary operation and maintenance (O&M) funding and 400–500 billets*. This tiny expenditure leverages billions of dollars of U.S. government and partner nation spending, making Security Cooperation one of the Air Force’s most potent investments. For example, the service influences over \$135

billion of its partner nations' spending for capability development through 2,600 foreign military sales cases with 95 nations. Moreover, since fiscal year (FY) 2008, the Air Force has negotiated and signed 162 international agreements with 37 nations, leveraging \$13.2 billion in total foreign contributions (Rolleston et al, 2014).

The nation's strategic objectives are unattainable without a unified approach among capable partners at home and with key friends and allies abroad. The challenge remains effectively integrating DOD's contribution with those of other instruments of national power, as well as with international partners (Gates, 2006).

Problem Statement

The United States faces a diverse set of security challenges and a wider range of adversaries than any time in recent history. The international environment is characterized by significant instability, insecurity, and uncertainty and America faces substantial strategic challenges as it attempts to maintain an effective international presence in such an environment while facing mounting resource constraints. Thus, American leaders must balance national desires, responsibilities, and ideals to meet America's strategic ends while harmonizing the ways and means at their disposal. The problem therefore becomes, with so few resources to go around, how the United States Air Force therefore must ensure it is partnering with the right nations, while strategically preventing conflicts from occurring.

Research Question

The research question thus follows:

Is the United States Air Force engaged in the ‘right’ partnerships?

The following questions are addressed:

1. Who are the Air Force’s primary stakeholders in building partnerships?
2. What are the stakeholders’ objectives for building partnerships?
3. What constitutes the ‘right’ partnerships?

After this data is captured and analyzed, the following questions are answered:

4. What differentiates between successful and unsuccessful partnerships?
5. Do any current partnership models, from either the commercial or military sector, provide clarity into what comprises strong partnerships?

Research Objective and Focus

From an Air Force perspective, the current method for determining partnerships and coordinating efforts is vague. There are numerous lines of effort, ranging from Combatant Commanders’ Campaign Plans to Ambassadors’ Country Plans. Each has a voice when it comes to determining which effort receives funding in support of their primary objectives. However, it is unclear what factors are important for building relationships with respective countries or how those relationships correlate to current defense strategy. The literature review will provide a historical analysis on partnership theory, the Air Force stakeholders and their objectives in Building Partnership Capacity, and the elements that strong partnerships consist of. This research will be used to measure relative partnership strength based on the objectives that strong partnerships are comprised of. Ultimately, this research project will provide Air Force leadership with an analysis tool that will estimate the relative partnership strength of global countries.

Methodology

The primary method of data collection was through an analysis of previous research conducted on Air Force Building Partnerships and on current stakeholder objectives. Special emphasis was placed on identifying who the primary stakeholders were as well as identifying what role they played in the overall strategy. Through content analysis, common themes presented themselves for each of the stakeholder's objectives, some to a lesser degree than others. In addition, the researcher examined the theory behind why partnership occurs. These results were taken into consideration for selecting the appropriate partnership model that most closely defined the Air Force Building Partnership strategy.

Next, a review of all pre-existing partnership models were considered, with an emphasis on models that target relationship building. The model chosen was tailored to incorporate building partnership terminology, to include the common themes that were identified from each of the primary stakeholders. The model's output gauges partnership strength based on the desire to partner as well as ease of coordination.

Assumptions/Limitations

The major assumption of this research is that there is a need to identify the relative strength of the Air Force's current partnerships, and that building partnerships is the unanimous decision to conduct multinational operations now, and into the future. This leads to the second major assumption that the Air Force currently does not identify if it is engaged with the "right" partners. Finally, this research assumes that a partnership

model is the correct course of action for weighing and identifying relative partner strength.

There are three limitations to this research: time, lack of available previous research, and the amount of classified info that was considered, but redacted, to maintain this research in an unclassified manner. The largest limitation is the amount of time to conduct independent research on such a broad topic while still maintaining educational requirements for ASAM. The sheer scope of this topic made this research project very challenging. Secondly, there was a very limited amount of research that had previously been conducted and documented on this topic. Building Partnerships is still in its infancy stage in terms of harnessing it to manipulate conditions prior to a conflict. Lastly, there is a vast amount of classified information available that elaborates on employing the force, country/theater specific plans, and the strategic importance of specific countries; however, due to the sensitive nature of that information, that data was not used.

Implications

The findings from this research may be suitable to provide Senior Air Force Leadership with a partnership tool that can be subjectively manipulated to determine the relative partnership strength for each country we are currently, or have intentions to engage with. Additionally, the partnership model may serve as a roadmap to make decisions based off the intelligence that is presented at this moment in time. Every partnership is unique; therefore, these recommendations are not to be taken as guidance, but more as an initial framework for commanders needing to make informed decisions.

Utilizing theater specific data, and modeling it to leverage partnerships will ultimately develop a more effective engagement and partnership strategy.

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview

This chapter looks at several different factors affecting the Air Force Security Cooperation / Building Partnership (SC/BP) framework. It addresses the overarching theory behind why partnerships form, what makes them successful, and what has been learned from partnerships. Next, it reviews pertinent guidance that determines how the Air Force conducts SC/BP. In addition, this chapter will identify who the major stakeholders are within the SC/BP field as well as what are the objectives of partnering. Finally, a review of the current partnership model will be outlined and analyzed for applicability.

Partnership Theory

The term “partnership” has become ubiquitous in foreign policy discourse. Presidents and diplomats from many countries, not just the United States, invoke the term to describe the kind of relationship they have—or wish to have—with other, presumably more special, nations (Corrales, 2015). The world is changing in ways that make partnerships more important, if not essential, to achieving success in virtually every kind of professional endeavor...partnerships simply represent a better way of doing things (Prytula, 2013).

A partnership is a Strategic Alliance between two or more parties to pursue a set of agreed upon goals. It occurs because two or more organizations come together to add value to each other’s mission or institution. Although originating from business, different types of partnerships are increasingly being used to meet complex needs in today’s

society. Partnerships offer accomplished work that could not be done alone, build a shared sense of commitment, ensure all who are affected are represented in the planning, avoid service organization duplication, and provide opportunities to learn from one another (Prytula, 2013).

Multi-stakeholder partnerships have received growing academic interest as innovative ways to further both corporate social responsibility and societal objectives. Partnerships differ in size, foci, and types of participants and issues tackled, but principally stem from a “win-win” philosophy to merge divergent interests and create value for society, organizations, and individuals. The idea is that partners from different sectors (business, government, and civil society) bring complementary resources, skills, and competencies and share risks and responsibilities to help address complex societal problems (e.g., poverty alleviation, climate change, social equity, economic development) that a single actor cannot solve (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015).

Two overarching theories that define why entities choose to partner include the Theory of Scarcity and the Theory of Plenty. The Theory of Scarcity says that there is a shortage of resources to meet demands, and you must pick the highest priority programs and wait on the rest. The Theory of Plenty, however, suggests that you can form partnerships to maximize your resources across the board (Prytula, 2013).

In addition, Sridharamurthy & Ganesan, (2015) contest that relationships are induced either by a single contingency (exclusive) or by the combination of contingencies (simultaneous). They have identified the following contingencies as to why partnerships form.

1. Compulsion: Essentiality of relationship is determined by either internal or external factors. External may be a government policy mandating a relationship or market need such as intense competition or the need for competitive advantage or survival itself. Internal factors include the lack of resources, to augment capacity or to discover new opportunities. It is a situation in which the relationship is necessitated or mandated by the higher authority. The higher authority may be the government, industry regulatory body or professional regulatory bodies.
2. Control: Reflects the superiority or the potential of one organization to exercise power or control over another organization or its resources. Lack of adequate resources motivates organizations to collaborate with other organizations.
3. Complementarity: It involves the various roles played by the members of the collaboration and how equitably these roles are played. It comprises of activities such as the mutual use of knowledge and skills and the sharing of risks. High level of complementarity is required to ensure autonomy of the partners in collaborations. Reciprocity aides in building mutual social capital.
4. Competitive Advantage: This contingency is prompted by an organization's need to improve its efficiency. Therefore, efficiency contingencies are oriented internally to improve their input-output ratio rather than exerting control over external resources or pursuing interorganizational reciprocal benefits.
5. Certainty: This is also known as the predictability contingent and is an organizational response aimed at adapting to organizational uncertainty. Scarcity of resources, lack of adequate knowledge about environmental fluctuations

creates environmental uncertainty. Uncertainty encourages an organization to establish and manage relationships in order to achieve stability, predictability, and dependability.

6. Credibility: The need for improving organizational credibility has been mentioned as an important motive for collaborations. According to Institutional theory, the institutional environments impose pressures on organizations to justify their activities or outputs, thus motivating organizations to improve their legitimacy in order to appear in agreement with the prevailing norms, rules, beliefs, or expectations.

7. Contribution: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) forces some organizations/firms to collaborate with other organizations. Many firms commit to spend huge amount of resources on building laboratories or other facilities in the communities as a part of their CSR activity. Research related to mandated collaborations has emphasized that government and corporate funding for community programs often come with the need to engage in interorganizational collaboration.

While there are many nationally recognized benefits and advantages to partnership development, the answer to why one seeks to establish partnerships is relatively simple. There is added value in working with other organizations. The benefits of effective partnerships do not appear overnight. Establishing effective and inclusive partnerships takes time, and it is important for you to create the right framework from the start and review the structure and process of the partnership on an ongoing basis to measure its success or failure (Compassion Capital Fund, 2010).

A third theory that adds much to the idea of partnerships is Matching Theory. Mitsuhashi and Greve (2009) content that for a match to occur, it is not enough that a given organization needs to obtain a certain resource—an organization holding that resource must also need something that the given organization can provide in return. The concepts of complementarity and compatibility are important parts of our extension of matching theory to alliances because they help specify the match quality of potential partners. Complementarity gives match quality through *differences*—capabilities are complementary if they are different in a way that can be combined to create greater value. Examples of complementarity are research and development (R&D) and commercialization capabilities, or terminal facilities in two ports that can be connected with a route. Compatibility gives match quality through *similarities*—capabilities can be combined to create value because they are similar or share a standard interface. Examples of compatibility are use of the same methodology by two software development teams, or the exchangeability of ships with the same operational characteristics. Complementarity and compatibility are independent criteria for assessing the match quality of a specific capability or resource combination, and either or both of them may be relevant, depending on the goals of an alliance. (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009)

Establishing partnerships must be done carefully (Prytula, 2013). According to the Compassion Capital Fund (2010), partnerships are inherently complex vehicles for the delivery of practical solutions on the ground and at the strategic level. Several studies of how partnerships operate indicate that practitioners manage the complexity by adopting a long-term, flexible, and organic approach. Partnerships imply a shared leadership among

respected individuals who are recognized and empowered by their own organizations and trusted by partners to build consensus and resolve conflicts.

According to Corrales (2015), contrary to traditional strands of realism, which see the rise of a new power as a source of friction with an existing power, the theory of partnership contends that power transitions offer new opportunities for rapprochement when the potential contributions of the growing power dovetail with the needs of the established power. In order for a partnership to form, the rising nation will need to pass some tests of reliability. If the rising partner lacks the capacity to deliver collective goods, trust declines. The regional security environment also needs to meet certain conditions. If it is too peaceful, the status quo power will have no incentive to seek a rapprochement. If it is too dangerous, the stronger power will be reluctant to delegate too much authority to the rising power. But if conditions are satisfactory, then the status quo power may see the rising nation as a potential partner that can share some of the costs of regional leadership. The less powerful nation views association with the existing power as a mechanism for making the greater power more trusting. This allows the rising power greater latitude in implementing a more independent foreign policy. Partnerships differ from the traditional view of bandwagoning in that the less powerful, nonthreatened nation values the benefits of association with a greater power not just as insurance against injury but also as a way to obtain more autonomy in foreign policy. The weaker new partner will not necessarily become a mere rule taker—it can also demand and obtain concessions from the larger partner.

The goal of partnerships is to achieve more than individual organizations can achieve on their own. In other words, the whole of the partnership adds more than the

sum of the individual parts. Bear in mind that the partnership should not be the end in and of itself but a means to an end (Compassion Capital Fund, 2013).

According to Prytula (2013) the reasons partnerships succeed include having a clear sense of direction, establishing a commitment to learning, clarifying values, using effective communication, engaging in mutual care, establishing egalitarianism, and having nurturing leadership at all levels. In addition, a partnership process will be successful when it generates positive results both for the partners and for society at large and when both partners are satisfied with those results. In general terms, the theory of relationship marketing, centered on the relational attributes of a partnership, suggests that successful business–NGO partnership processes are the result of relationships that have such characteristics as communication, trust, and commitment. (Barroso-Mendez et al, 2013).

Figure 1 gives more detail into the attributes that successful partnerships exhibit.




Figure 1. Successful Business-NGO Partnership Traits (Barroso-Mendez et al, 2013)

Conversely, the reasons partnerships don't succeed include superficial agreements, inequitable power, mismatched goals, mismatched values, and lack of commitment (Prytula, 2013).

In an age of limited resources, partnerships offer expanded capabilities. In an age of intense change, partnerships enable organizations to be flexible, leverage competencies, and expand resources. In an age of increased globalization, partnerships offer diversity with individuality. In an age of impersonality, partnerships fulfill the need for community and interdependence. Partnerships as alliances allow organizations to benefit from each other's knowledge, resources, and skills. Partnerships offer benefits not only to the organizations but to the larger community. International research acknowledges that partnerships result in higher success rates than going at it alone (Prytula, 2013).

Partnership Guidance

In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Execution Roadmap, Gates (2006), states the nation's strategic objectives are unattainable without a unified approach among capable partners at home and with key friends and allies abroad. The challenge will be effectively integrating the Department of Defense's (DOD's) contribution with those of other instruments of national power. Figure 2 below depicts where building partnerships, often referred to as security cooperation, would occur at.




Figure 2. Range of Military Operations (JP 3-16, 2013)

As DOD Directive 5132.03 and Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 explain, the building partnership activities undertaken by the Department of Defense encourages and enables international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific US security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) provides the foundation for all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments and supports the President’s National Security Strategy. With respect to building partnerships, the GEF provides guidance on building partner capacity and capability, relationships, and facilitating access

(under the premise that the primary entity of foreign engagement is the nation state and the means which geographic combatant commanders influence nation states is through their defense establishments). The GEF outlines building partnership activities that aim to build partner capacity in the following focus areas: Sustain defense through a partner's human capacity, operational capacity, institutional capacity, civil sector capacity, combined operations capacity, operational access, intelligence sharing, and assuring regional confidence and international collaboration. Additionally, the GEF established processes for assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces to the geographic combatant commanders. Ideally, building partnership activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention (JP 3-16, 2013).

The Department of Defense requires a long-term, focused approach to build the capacity and capability of its mission-critical partnerships. Executing the BPC Roadmap tasks is the way the Department will generate increased partnership capacity for its high priority missions (Gates, 2006).

Over the next twenty years, the world is projected to become more populated and urbanized. Profound cultural and demographic tensions (the youth bulge), rising demands for resources, widespread underemployment, refugees, and rapid urbanization could reshape both individual countries and entire regions. Most of the anticipated population growth is expected to occur in developing regions of the world like Africa and Asia. At the same time, populations in more developed areas of the globe are projected to decline and age. These population and urbanization trends may increase water scarcity, especially in rapidly developing and underdeveloped regions of the world. This water scarcity may

contribute to changes in human migration patterns, driving social, economic, and health related impacts that may present significant governance challenges to the affected states. These changes in human migration patterns may also introduce previously isolated diseases to the global community, increasing the risk of pandemic disease outbreaks. Additionally, the uncertain impact of global climate change combined with increased population centers in or near coastal environments may challenge the ability of weak or developing states to respond effectively to natural disasters (Donley & Schwartz, 2011)

Just as the Second World War posed immense challenges that spurred Combined and Joint Operations within the military, today's environment demands that all agencies of government become adept at integrating efforts into a unified strategy. The Department's efforts must nest within a larger national security context, and must contribute directly to US foreign policy and strategic objectives. Figure 3 describes some of the challenges facing partner nations today. (Gates, 2006).



Figure 3. Factors Affecting Military Capabilities of Nations (JP 3-16, 2013)

Whenever advisable, the United States will work with or through others: enabling allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity and developing collaborative mechanisms to share the decisions, risks and responsibilities of today's complex challenges. The United States must work with new international partners in less familiar areas of the world to reduce the drivers of instability, prevent terrorist attacks or disrupt their networks, to deny sanctuary to terrorists anywhere in the world, to separate terrorists from host populations and ultimately to defeat them (Gates, 2006). The intent of this assistance is to help nations acquire, maintain, and, if necessary, employ a self-defense capability. The principal objective of building partnerships is to establish secure environments in which foreign governments can pursue social, economic, and political initiatives to relieve tensions in their nations (AFDD 3-22, 2011).

These relationships enable the achievement of strategic end states through a variety of means enumerated later in this document. Cultivating these partnerships broadens access in times of need, strengthens national and regional effectiveness, and increases combined US-partner effectiveness through specialization and shared expertise. Accommodating this new reality will require the USAF to account for the impact of varying levels of future resource decisions in an increasingly resource constrained environment. Any operational risk assessments must be made in the context of the broader national security spectrum of activities (Donley & Schwartz, 2011).

Gates (2006) writes, the DOD undertakes a number of security cooperation activities to enable and encourage our foreign partners to work with us to achieve our common strategic objectives. Security cooperation activities are aimed at preventing future crises and, should preventative efforts fail, ensuring that the Department and its

partners are sufficiently trained, equipped, and positioned to respond when necessary. The Department must also ensure that we are reinforcing, and not duplicating, efforts with international partners in our capacity building initiatives. Joint Publication 3-16 (2011) lists what these activities may involve.

1. Provide training, education, and equipment to build the capacity and capability of partner nations and organizations;
2. Conduct activities with partner nations to confront threats and challenges before they mature into a crisis;
3. Conduct military-to-military senior leader and staff talks and exchanges;
4. Promote regional cooperation to meet shared challenges as well as decrease tension and rivalries;
5. Conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises; and
6. Conclude formal arrangements for the use of facilities, basing, or transit of military forces.

Air Force Doctrine Document 3-22 (2011) prescribes that Air Force building partnership efforts should focus on defense equipment and services that reduce host-nation dependency on continuous in-country supervision and support by the US. Recipient nations' personnel should be trained to operate and maintain the systems provided. In some cases, they should also be shown how to employ these systems for specific operations. As host nation proficiency in air operations improves, developing internal training capabilities within host-aviation units can reduce dependence on in-

country Air Force assistance. To overcome sustainability problems inherent in maintaining older generation aircraft and systems, Air Force security assistance operations may also include administration and logistics support of nonstandard items. From an Air Force perspective, building partnership engagements activities include education and training; global force posture; US Security Cooperation Personnel; personnel exchanges; exercises; equipping activities; technology transfer and disclosure; information sharing; cooperative relationships and agreements; partner Air Force engagements; and humanitarian initiatives.

As Donley and Schwartz (2011) write, the current and future operating environments are extremely complex, and these environments will continue evolving. In this environment no single nation can address every challenge and priority alone. With this in mind, the United States Air Force must actively partner with the global community of airmen to further United States and partner nation mutual interests in air, space, and cyberspace. These partnerships could act as a force multiplier in future crises. By relying on multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of our actions will surely be greater than if we act unilaterally. In addition, the Air Force must not limit itself to the relationships of the past and must broaden its scope to include partnerships for new situations and circumstances. This includes expanding the scope of the security cooperation focus to include building the security capabilities of at-risk and underdeveloped partner nations so that these partners are able to defend themselves against the threats of today and tomorrow. The security of the United States is increasingly bound to the security of the broader International community.

Stakeholders & Objectives

The US National Security Strategy directs a comprehensive, whole-of-government engagement strategy. To realize this vision, the national defense strategy—outlined in the document *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*—directs the Department of Defense to “build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense.” Similarly, one of six key missions in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2010 involves “build[ing] the security capacity of partner states.” According to Defense Planning Guidance, “The US will work closely with allies and partners to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.” Finally, in support of this guidance, the National Military Strategy directs the services to “strengthen and . . . enable partner capacity to enhance security” (Zedalis, 2011).

According to President Obama, Zedalis (2011) writes, “Our Nation’s security is in substantial measure dependent upon our success in building partnerships and partner capacity, and countering irregular and asymmetric threats.” In addition, he stated that “one of our most significant tasks that we face is helping to prepare our partners to defend sovereignty and govern effectively.”

To this end, the Air Force maintains staff positions to plan and execute building partnership or security cooperation activities. One hundred fifty nine officers serve on country teams as members of the Office of Defense Cooperation and similar organizations as liaisons with other nations. The Air Force’s lead agency for all things related to building partnerships, security cooperation and security force assistance is the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA).

It maintains a workforce of roughly 100 Airmen to support US arms sales and manage the community of building partnership practitioners comprised of personnel exchange officers, regional affairs strategists, and political military affairs strategists. SAF/IA also has a staff that develops building partnership and security cooperation for the Air Force and authors policy guidance to implement SC governing directives of the State Department and Congress (Rolleston et al, 2014).

Additionally, other agencies that have a vested interest in advancing the Air Force's building partnership initiative include, but are not limited to, the Air National Guard's State Partnership Program, the 621st Contingency Response Wing, the 6th Special Operations Squadron, the Air Force Expeditionary Center, the Air Advisor Academy, Air Mobility Command, etc. (Donley & Schwartz, 2011).

According to Rolleston et al (2014), Defense activities are charged to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. The recently released Air Force strategy acknowledges that "the Air Force must increasingly look internationally to effectively deliver *Global Vigilance—Global Reach—Global Power*. Partnerships enhance deterrence, build regional stability, offset costs, increase capability and capacity, and ensure access."

The US Air Force performs building partner capacity and security force assistance through the air-advising function. In so doing, it enables foreign counterparts to conduct irregular warfare activities—including counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense—and other foreign security force activities, such as countering external threats, in line with

US national interests. As such, air advising fully encompasses the Air Force's efforts to build partner nation capability and plays a key role in building relationships and enabling interoperability. Although these disciplines include many players, the air advisor, in essence, is the face of the Air Force's engagement effort (Zedalis, 2011).

The community generally accepts the idea that four pillars support the Air Force's engagement effort: (1) building relationships, (2) building capability, (3) enabling interoperability, and (4) gaining access. Building partnerships and security cooperation both fully encompass these pillars, filling what one might refer to as the Air Force engagement space. Security assistance, which includes foreign military sales, foreign military financing, and the International Military and Education Training program, cuts across the first three pillars, filling a portion of the space and serving as an important subset of building partnerships and security cooperation. Building partner capacity and security force assistance are directly tied to developing the capability of a foreign military force and, for the US Air Force, developing a partner nation's aviation enterprise (Zedalis, 2011).

Rolleston et al (2011) explain how strategic guidance from the president, secretary of defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff offers consistent, detailed language describing the importance of building partner capacity and shaping the global environment to support and realize enduring US strategic interests against both traditional and nontraditional challenges. Taken together at the unclassified level, these sources of guidance boil down to the following related points.

1. *Security Cooperation enhances homeland security*, enabling partner nations to counter threats to US interests and reducing the likelihood that these threats will reach America's shores. Indeed, the United States cannot counter these threats alone and needs the assistance of other nations.
2. *Security Cooperation reduces the odds of the United States sending forces abroad to address future crises by enabling partner nations to act when military force is necessary in a crisis.* Consequently, the US military can turn its attention to the more serious threats to its interests.
3. *Security Cooperation improves the odds of US access to, interoperability with, and/or cooperation with partner nations in future crises.* Security Cooperation often marks the start of an enduring defense relationship between the United States and the partner nation. For example, given that the life cycles of aviation-related platforms and infrastructure often exceed 30 years, these relationships help build the long-term trust that translates to enhanced access and interoperability.
4. *Security Cooperation enhances regional security and stability relevant to US interests* by improving a partner nation's ability to gain or maintain internal security and/or contribute directly to regional stability.
5. *Security Cooperation helps the United States shape the global environment and increase its influence* by promoting partner support for US interests and shared universal values.

Heidi Grant, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs describes five objectives of International Arms Cooperation that also resonate with the

building partnership community. The U.S. Air Force typically concludes International Arms Cooperation agreements with nations or organizations that have solid, long-term political and economic ties with the U.S. and a reasonably robust defense science and technology base. The core objectives of International Arms Cooperation activities include the following.

1. Operational - Increase military effectiveness through interoperability
2. Economic - Reduce weapons acquisition outlays by sharing costs or avoiding duplication of development efforts
3. Technical - Access the best defense technology and help to minimize capability gaps
4. Political - Strengthen alliances and relationships
5. Industrial - Bolster domestic and allied defense industrial bases

International Arms Cooperation development programs allow an equitable distribution of cost and risk among partners, foster interoperability, share technology, and develop new markets (Grant, 2011).

In addition, there is an abundant amount of literature available that details what it expects the Air Force building partnership mission objectives to be. In no predetermined order, they range from power projection; freedom of action in air, space, and cyberspace; global situational awareness; Air diplomacy; and military support to civil authorities (Shaud & Lowher, 2011). A RAND study conducted in 2013 believed the objectives were resources, authorities, programs, processes, and organizational relationships

(Moroney et al, 2013). The 2006 Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap listed the objectives as improve integrated strategy development and planning, improve complex interagency operations at home, improve complex interagency operations abroad, improve security cooperation effectiveness, leverage security cooperation in support of homeland defense and civil support missions, strengthen regional centers for outreach and network-building, improve international partners' capabilities, and work with the department of state and other interagency partners to reform foreign and security assistance (Gates, 2006). Additionally, Donley & Schwartz (2011) discussed the objectives in the Air Force Global Partnership Strategy to be employ Air Force security cooperation activities in support of coalition efforts to counter violent extremism, collaborate with partner nation Air Forces to deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional security, and shape the future coalition Air Force. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote in the National Military Strategy explained the objectives to be counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional security, and shape the future force (Dempsey, 2015). Likewise, the Air Force (Moroney, et al., 2010) guidance governing Military Personnel Exchange Program discussed the objectives to be promote mutual understand and trust; enhance interoperability through mutual understanding of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures of both air forces; strengthen air force-to-air force ties; and develop long term professional and personal relationships (AFI 16-107). Also, the Air National Guard's State Partnership Program reveals the objectives of promote stability and security cooperation, build partner capacity, advance human rights, advance public diplomacy and strengthen regional security capabilities (Bergeron, 2013). And finally, a

RAND paper lists the Air Force's building partnership capacity objectives as promote mutual understanding and trust; enhance interoperability through mutual understanding of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures of both air forces; strengthen air-force-to-air-force ties; and develop long-term professional and personal relationships (Moroney et al, 2010).

Partnership Model

Security cooperation remains a key line of effort for the U.S. Department of Defense. Traditionally, security cooperation has been an area in which predicting success is difficult, but increasing fiscal constraints have amplified pressure for greater efficiency. Recent research has made progress in identifying conditions and approaches most likely to lead to security cooperation success. This research effort developed a diagnostic tool that enables a preliminary assessment of the match between a partner's (or a potential partner's) propensity for security cooperation success and current (or planned) investment in—or priority for—that partner, with the goal of identifying possible mismatches for further scrutiny and policy analysis (Paul et al, 2013).

According to Paul et al (2013), security cooperation remains a key line of effort for the U.S. Department of Defense. Traditionally, security cooperation has been an area in which predicting success is difficult, but increasing fiscal constraints have amplified pressure for greater efficiency. Recent research has made progress in identifying conditions and approaches most likely to lead to security cooperation success. This research effort developed a diagnostic tool that enables a preliminary assessment of the match between a partner's (or a potential partner's) propensity for security cooperation

success and current (or planned) investment in—or priority for—that partner, with the goal of identifying possible mismatches for further scrutiny and policy analysis.

The strongest and most consistent correlations found were for factors related to the alignment of interests and the matching of capacity-building activities to partner objectives and to the ability of the partner nation to absorb and retain the materiel and training provided (Paul et al, 2013).

Recent RAND research identified practices and contextual factors associated with greater or lesser degrees of success in security cooperation. Figure 4 portrays an assessment that was based on systematic analyses of 29 historical case studies of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity since the end of the Cold War, as shown in figure 4. Building partner capacity (BPC) is a complicated endeavor that takes place in complex and nuanced environments, but the study found that there are some clear best approaches to BPC, clear best traits for desirable partners, and clear best practices for recipient partners. The results demonstrate that when an effort is consistently funded and delivered, supported and sustained, well matched to partner capabilities and interests, and shared with a partner that supports it and is healthy economically and in terms of governance, prospects for effectiveness are very good. The results also suggest that BPC can still be effective when only some practices are followed or when only some conditions are met. BPC done well, done consistently, and matched to partner absorptive capacity and interests can be effective even when the partner is not particularly robust in any dimension at the outset (Paul et al, 2013).

Case	Spent/did more	Consistency in funding and providing BPC	BPC matched PN objectives and absorptive capacity	BPC included a sustainment component	PN Invested its own funds	PN had sufficient absorptive capacity	PN had high governance indicators (WBGI in top two-thirds)	PN had strong economy (GDP top 50th percentile)	Shared PN and U.S. security interests	Sum of positive indicators	BPC in last phase assessed as effective
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
6	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	8	1
7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	8	1
8	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
9	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
10	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
11	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
12	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
13	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
14	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
15	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
16	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	7	1
17	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	7	1
18	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	7	1
19	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	7	1
20	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	6	1
21	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	6	1
22	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	6	1
23	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	6	0
24	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	5	1
25	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	4	0
26	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	0
27	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
28	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
29	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

NOTE: The table is sorted based on the descending sum of positive indicators. WBGI = World Bank Governance Indicator.

Figure 4. Summaries of Case Studies, Factors, BPC Engagements (Paul et al, 2013)

Building on prior research efforts, this report describes a preliminary diagnostic tool developed from global public-use data sets to systematically assess the propensity for successful U.S. security cooperation in any country in comparison with current (or

planned) security cooperation funding levels and priorities. The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool is a diagnostic tool built in Microsoft Excel® that will help DoD decision makers preliminarily identify mismatches between the importance of a country to U.S. interests, U.S. security cooperation funding to that country, and the propensity for successful U.S. security cooperation with that country. For each of the world's 195 countries, the tool produces an overall security cooperation propensity score. These scores can then be compared with U.S. security cooperation funding levels and country prioritization.

The tool includes 27 constructs drawn from hypotheses and evidence about factors that might increase or decrease the effectiveness of security cooperation, according to the existing literature; this is the analytic core of the tool. Each construct has an associated weight representing strength in terms of propensity for effective security cooperation and the strength of the research contributing to that construct. We then grouped the 27 constructs into ten categories to present the information in a more succinct way (Paul et al, 2013).

Each of the 27 constructs is represented by one or more measures or proxies. There are 66 measures in total (presented in Appendix A), derived from publicly accessible databases with global or nearly global coverage. Results of the tool's validation criteria and outcomes can be found in Appendix B.

For each of the 195 countries, the tool provides an overall security cooperation propensity score, which aggregates the propensity scores for ten categories. These categories summarize results for 27 constructs, which synthesize one or more of a total of 66 measures (figure 5).




Figure 5. Relationships between layers of the RAND Partner Tool (Paul et al, 2013)

The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool is a diagnostic tool built in Microsoft Excel® that will help DOD decision makers preliminarily identify mismatches between the importance of a country to U.S. interests, U.S. security cooperation funding to that country, and the likelihood that the United States will be successful in achieving its objectives vis-à-vis that country. The tool contains data for the world's 195 countries on 66 measures that inform 27 constructs in ten categories and produce an overall security cooperation propensity score for each country. These scores can be compared with U.S. security cooperation funding levels and country prioritization. The main contribution of the tool is that it estimates the likelihood that security cooperation will be effective with a given country for every country in the

world. In addition, it gives users the ability to easily compare countries on a range of factors and measures related to security cooperation. Figure 6 is a screen shot depicting the tool.

According to Lambert (1996), beyond documentation of the advantages and disadvantages of partnerships, research has focused on the development of partnership models, which themselves may be part of larger models of organizational relationships. The basic goal of these models is to provide structure for the factors that influence partnership formation, management over time, and outcomes. The model is comprised of four steps: examination of the drivers of partnership, examination of the facilitators of partnership, calibration of the components of partnership, and the measurement of outcomes. Drivers are the compelling reasons to partner, and must be examined first when approaching a potential partner. Facilitators are characteristics of the two firms that will help or hinder the partnership development process. It is the combination of facilitators and drivers that prescribes the appropriate type of partnership. Components are the managerially controllable elements that can be implemented at various levels depending on the amount of partnership present. How they are actually implemented will determine the ultimate type of partnership that exists. Outcomes are the extent to which each firm has achieved its expected performance, as depicted in figure 7.




Figure 7. The Partnership Model (Lambert et al, 1996)

Summary

There is no question that as resource constraints continue to mount and as global threats continue to rise, there needs to be a breakeven point in terms of the level of involvement that the United States plays in world affairs. To that end, the United States has formed an aggressive partnering campaign that maximizes its presence by building relationships with key allies in an attempt to extend influence, build on mutual interests, and ultimately avert conflict.

Building Partnerships is a force multiplying capability that extends the United States' sphere of influence in order to get out in front of potential skirmishes. The

relatively small amount of people and huge foreign impact creates a high return on investment for the Department of Defense.

This chapter briefly discussed several different factors affecting the Air Force Security Cooperation / Building Partnership (SC/BP) framework. It addresses the overarching theory behind why partnerships form, what makes them successful, and what has been learned from partnerships. Next, it reviews pertinent guidance that determines how the Air Force conducts SC/BP. In addition, this chapter will identify who the major stakeholders are within the SC/BP field as well as what are the objectives of partnering. Finally, a review of the current partnership model will be outlined and analyzed for applicability.

III. Methodology

Chapter Overview

The United States Air Force currently has a robust partnership strategy that utilizes several agencies within the service to execute this relatively small, but important mission. However, it isn't well known why specific partnerships occur or if they are the right ones. In an effort to understand this dynamic and attempt to better determine if the Air Force is engaged in the highest impact partnerships, the author determined to find the best mix of each line of effort. Next, the author reviewed the attributes that attract partnerships as well as what makes them successful. Finally, the author compared the models currently available that address partnerships and examined them for applicability in an attempt to streamline why we partner, and who we partner with.

Reasons for Partnership

Throughout the course of this research, multiple articles were referenced which highlighted the importance of partnering, the reasons for partnership, and the factors that determine if they're successful.

The author analyzed partnership theories and journal articles to determine what the foremost reason was in forming partnerships. The major factor here was determining what attracted two entities to each other as well as why they were attracted in the first place. This will be referred to as the "need" or the required prerequisite for nations to partner. Next, an analysis was conducted on the factors that determined the successful outcome of a partnership. The key objective here was the length of the partnership. The longer the partnership length, it was assumed the more successful it was. Several factors

were found to positively affect the outcome of a strong partnership. These will be referred to as the “facilitators” or factors that enhance the quality of the partnership.

Comparing Partnership Objectives

The next data set that the author investigated were the objectives that the military uses for partnering with nations. There was some variability in consistency between articles, Department of Defense guidance, and prior research; however, through analysis and grouping of like terms, common themes were found. In addition, an article was found from the Air Force’s head of International Affairs that confirmed the grouping. There were five main objectives that partnerships were built around. These points surfaced to varying degrees in each instance and prevailed throughout the research. The objectives that nations use to partner with each other will be referred to as “drivers”, or the reasons to partner.

As the partnership endures, there will need to be a determined amount of maintenance that needs to take place in order for the partnership to be successful. The activities or “components” that are worked into the partnership will ensure the relationship is sustained.

Partnership Model

The RAND Prioritization and Propensity to Partner Tool was discovered as the author was nearing the conclusion of the research project. This tool proves to be extremely valuable and timely, considering its ability to be edited for situational

anomalies. Together with the Lambert Partnership Model, it can be utilized to decipher if key allies are the “right” partners.

The author identified one main partnership model that surfaced during the research process. Lambert’s Partnership Model is widely distributed and utilized in the Supply Chain Management sector. This model was chosen in large part to the level of importance that relationships have when building a Supply Chain Network as well as how closely that correlates to the Air Force’s building partnerships mission. In addition, Global Supply Chains face strikingly similar challenges (global market, flexibility, responsiveness, level of complexity, trustworthiness, communication, and capacity/capability gaps) as the Air Force’s building partnership mission set.

Lambert’s Partnership Model was developed through in-depth case studies of relationships involving members of the Global Supply Chain Forum and the attributes they believed reflected good partnerships. The model has been used to structure more than 100 partnerships; 20 of which were used for validation. The model consists of four parts: the drivers of partnership, the facilitators of partnership, the components of partnerships, and the outcomes of partnership (Lambert, 1996).

The author did note one flaw with the Lambert Partnership Model. It did not account for the “need” of two entities to partner. The author made note of this and added this step into the adjusted model, noted in Chapter 4.

Comparing Lambert’s Model to the RAND Tool

Both the adjusted Lambert Model and the RAND Tool were utilized in determining the partnership strength of a respective nation. Beginning with the adjusted

Lambert Model, the initial process takes place with identifying the “need” to partner, the presence of “facilitators”, and the degree to which the partnership “drivers” are accommodated in the partnership. The “components” are determined over time as a means to maintaining the relationship with the partner nation.

The RAND Prioritization and Propensity Partnering Tool utilizes more refined measures, that when used in conjunction with the Lambert Partnership Model, further clarify the relative partner strength of a prospective country. The ten categories of refined measures consist of the following.

1. Historical quality of us SC/SFA/BPC provision: SC is more likely to be effective when the US provides an adequate amount of consistent SC funding to the PN.
2. Historical track record of success with PN: SC is more likely to be effective with a PN that has successfully implemented and sustained US or other foreign assistance in the past.
3. US-PN relationship: SC is more likely to be effective when the US and PN have a long-term relationship built on shared interests and a history of cooperation and where the US is viewed favorably by the PN.
4. Support for military in/by the PN: SC is more likely to be successful when the PN government and public support their military.
5. Absorptive capacity of PN military: SC is more likely to be successful when the PN military has sufficient capacity to absorb the SC being provided.
6. Strength of PN government: SC is more likely to be successful when the PN government has competent and strong institutions.

7. PN governance: SC is more likely to be successful with PNs that have good governments that are stable, not corrupt, and accountable to their people.
8. PN economic strength: SC is more likely to be effective with PNs with stable economies and a minimum level of economic development.
9. PN security situation: SC is more likely to be successful in PNs without internal instability or other serious security threats (though these may increase their need for SC).
10. Practical ease of engaging with PN: SC is more likely to be successful with PNs that are easier to work with because they are small, speak English, have good infrastructure, and have signed all necessary agreements with the US.

The results of this analysis are found in Chapter 4.

Summary

This methodology analyzed the reasons, factors, objectives, and models for partnering. It assessed what mattered the most and returned the most for the investment. From these findings, further analysis created assumptions into how the reasons, factors, and objectives of partnering attributed to the military's partnership strategy. Using these simplified assumptions, the next chapter will highlight a proposed model for use by the Air Force in further determining partnership strategy.

IV. Analysis and Results

Chapter Overview

This chapter explores the results that were captured from the analysis in previous sections. It will analyze the holistic aspect of partnering and what was determined to encompass a strong partnership. The final chapter of this paper will assess the significance of these findings.

Partnership Factors & Modeling

As previously discussed, the Lambert Partnership Tool is the instrument of choice for determining the initial steps of the relative partnership strength of a prospective nation. The author added a “need” process for the model to fully encapsulate the military building partnership process. The following is a step-by-step account of the initial steps for determining the strength of a partnership, as depicted in figure 8.




Figure 8. The Military Partnership Model (Author, 2016)

In order for a partnership to form, there needs to be a mutual “need” on both sides of the partnership. First, the two countries need to determine if they are compatible with each other. Or said another way, the ability to work together, exchange ideas, and innovate constructively. If so, the next step will be partnering in ways that complement

each other. The key here will be finding the resource that country A has, but country B needs.

Once the “need” is established, the next step will be identifying the major “driver’s or objectives in the partnership. Analysis determined through prior research and DOD guidance that the five major drivers that the U.S. has historically formed partnerships with other nations over has been Operational, or to increase effectiveness through interoperability; Economic, or sharing costs and avoiding duplication of development; Technological, or minimizing capability gaps between the countries; Political, or strengthening alliances and relationships; and Industrial, or bolstering domestic and allied defense industrial bases. These factors were validated in Grant’s 2011 article “Building Partnerships Through International Arms Cooperation.”

The next step is determining the degree to which the key “facilitators” are present in the partnership. Similar to the drivers, analysis determined that the key points in maintaining a partnership are Communication, or ensuring a constant flow of information; Trust, or placing a reliance on the other for support; Commitment, or backing up words with action; and Cooperation, or aiding the partner nation in their shortcomings.

Finally, as the partnership matures, it must be consistently maintained. These “components” are key events and can singlehandedly determine the success or failure of a partnership. From a military standpoint, Air Force building partnership engagement activities include education and training, global force posture, personnel exchanges, joint exercises, equipping activities, technology transfer and disclosure, information sharing, cooperative relationships and agreements, partner Air Force engagements, and

humanitarian initiatives. These acts, coupled with commitment, trust, and a constructive communication loop will ensure a highly functioning and strong partnership.

After the initial process of determining eligibility for partnership strength, the RAND Prioritization and Propensity to Partner Tool, when used in conjunction with the improved Lambert Partnership Tool, may be utilized to confirm eligibility, relative strength, and long term partner nation prospects, in accordance with the ten categories mentioned in Chapter 3. The full listing of the worlds' countries and their propensity to partner can be found in Appendix C.

Investigative Questions Answered

1. Is the United States Air Force engaged in the 'right' partnerships?

Although subjective in nature and dependent on current world situations, an action officer can answer the above question by applying the above model and propensity tool to a given country.

2. Who are the Air Force's primary stakeholders in building partnerships?

The Air Force's primary stakeholders include, but are not limited to SAF/IA, the 621st CRW, 6th SOS, Air National Guard's State Partnership Program, the Air Force Expeditionary Center, the Air Advisor Academy, and Air Mobility Command.

3. What are the stakeholders' objectives for building partnerships?

The U.S. has historically formed partnerships with other nations over the basis of Operational, or to increase effectiveness through interoperability; Economic, or sharing costs and avoiding duplication of development; Technological, or minimizing capability

gaps between the countries; Political, or strengthening alliances and relationships; and Industrial, or bolstering domestic and allied defense industrial bases.

4. What constitutes the ‘right’ partnerships?

“Right” is determined by the factors consisting of “needs”, “drivers”, “facilitators”, and “components” matching up and resulting in a long term sustainable relationship.

5. What differentiates between successful and unsuccessful partnerships?

The reasons partnerships succeed include having a clear sense of direction, establishing a commitment to learning, clarifying values, using effective communication, engaging in mutual care, establishing egalitarianism, and having nurturing leadership at all levels.

Conversely, the reasons partnerships don’t succeed include superficial agreements, inequitable power, mismatched goals, mismatched values, and lack of commitment

6. Do any current partnership models, from either the commercial or military sector, provide clarity into what comprises strong partnerships?

The Lambert Partnership Model was selected and edited to be applied to the Air Force’s building partnership strategy. In addition, the RAND Prioritization and Propensity to Partner Tool provides additional guidance into the relative strength of the partnership being considered.

Summary

This chapter presented an update to Lambert’s Partnership Model by describing a formalized method for determining relative partner eligibility, strength, and sustainability. Although very difficult to quantify in terms of impact, building

partnerships provides a huge return on investment for the small amount of the DOD budget invested into the program.

Additionally, when used in conjunction with the updated Lambert Partnership Model, the RAND Prioritization and Propensity to Partner Tool serves as an effective device to further identify the relative partner strength of planned relationship.

The impact that these tools could have on the community will be discussed in the next chapter.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter Overview

In today's fiscally constrained environment, the United States Air Force must ensure it is engaged in the right partnerships to maximize its impact. A potential way to do just that is by leveraging the improved Lambert Partnership Model and using it in conjunction with the RAND Prioritization and Propensity to Partner Tool.

This chapter assesses the significance of these findings and makes recommendations for future building partnership strategy.

Conclusions of Research

As mentioned by overarching U.S. strategic guidance, the goal of the Air Force is to maximize the extent to which it conducts multinational operations. Partnering with nations has several benefits, to include interoperability, sharing of information, economies of scale, increased diplomatic ties, and ultimately an increased security posture. Partnering with the most appropriate nations has become the current phenomenon, and considering fiscal constraints and the changing nature of warfare, it must be done correctly, and well in advance. Considering the small amount of money invested into not only the DOD, but also the Air Force building partnership appropriations, it returns huge dividends that cannot be overlooked.

Through a historical perspective, the author was able to determine the five objectives, some used more often than others that the U.S. has relied upon when deciding to partner with nations. These five objectives, coupled with a definitive "need," define the basis for a partnership, provided that the partnership contains open communication, trust,

and commitment from both nations. The partnership is then maintained through a variety of means, but most commonly through joint exercises, diplomatic visits, and economic trade. Although very difficult to quantify in perceived dollar figures, the measure of success for defining if the U.S. Air Force is engaged in the “right” partnerships is not measured by what’s occurred, but rather what hasn’t occurred. Said another way, there’s evidence to suggest the “right” partnerships would prevent small conflicts from becoming large wars, thwart terrorist attacks, minimize loss of life, decrease response time to disasters, and control local skirmishes.

Although the improved Partnership Model and RAND Propensity to Partner Tool suggest partnering with the strongest partners, sometimes it may be necessary to partner with nations that don’t meet the criteria in an “ideal” state. For example, the countries that may score the lowest by using the above tools, may offer the largest return on investment. The research suggests partnering with nations that are relatively more stable than others. However, the first countries to sponsor terrorism, suffer from large scale poverty, and are most likely to breed infighting are the countries that don’t necessarily score high on the above tools. They in turn are the countries that offer a large return on investment, depending on the world situation.

The “right” partnerships take time and must be well thought out considering a multitude of factors. It takes time to build a relationship, especially between countries who may share different values, cultures, and languages. The U.S. Marine Corps Commandant, General James Amos said it best when he remarked, “You can’t surge trust” when asked about the importance of presence in a region. Due to the changing nature of warfare and speed at which situations mature, the U.S. must continuously live

in a world in which it is constantly prepared to respond. Therefore approaching the world's security environment from a multinational approach is not only the most cost effective, but it is also paves the way to be the most responsive and that element matters to the U.S. Air Force. To revisit a quote from the 2011 Air Force Partnership Strategy, "You can't have Global Reach, Global Vigilance, and Global Power without Global Partnerships."

Significance of Research

This topic is very timely considering the nature of the world in which we live. After a decade plus of war, there's no appetite in the United States to engage in another war anytime soon. In addition, wars are expensive. To that end, there's a better, more agreed upon method for realizing peace and prosperity without sacrificing morals.

The model and tool that was presented in this research is significant for its timing. Understanding world dynamics has become, and is an important part of the role not only the Air Force, but national government play on the world stage. These products serve as an asset for senior leaders to make a more informed decision concerning world engagements.

Recommendations for Action

At an unclassified level, the Air Force should relook at the mobility partnerships that they are currently engaged in. Although situations may dictate who the U.S. may be required to partner with (i.e. politics, state-sponsored terrorism, etc.), there still should be

a formal process for identifying who are strongest and key partners are. The following recommendation outlines this thought.

Implement the improved Partnership Model and RAND Propensity to Partner Tool and ‘measure’ each country that we currently engage with from a building partnership capacity perspective. This will attempt to document the partnership process in a manner to become more streamlined and transparent. Again, politics may play a part in determining who the U.S. engages with much math behind the suggestion; however, those decisions should prove to be the exception and not the norm.

The benefits of implementing a formalized process for determining partnerships can be captured by tangible outcomes in world events, such as preventing small conflicts from becoming large wars, thwarting terrorist attacks, minimizing loss of life, decreasing response time to disasters, and controlling local skirmishes. In order to achieve these results through coordinating efforts and unifying objectives, will still require further research.

Recommendations for Future Research

This research highlighted several areas that would benefit from further study that would serve beneficial for the Air Force, USTRANSCOM, and the DOD in general. Since the topic mainly focused on discovering the makeup of the “right” partnerships, a couple other factors were discovered to be ripe for research.

First, formalizing the partnership process would ensure the U.S. is headed down the right path with a partner nation. However, one area that exceeded the scope of research for this problem was coordinating the partnership engagements between not just

the several entities within the U.S. Air Force, but also sister services, and the national government as a whole. There are numerous lines of effort at work to build capacity with the world's countries, but it is unclear how or where those lines of effort come to an apex. Future research would help to coordinate efforts between multiple agencies and ensure minimal redundancies.

Additionally, this research suggested that the U.S. has historically fallen back on five main objectives for engaging in partnerships. The issue that surfaced is that each of the major Air Force stakeholders, regulatory guidance, and prior research differ in terms of similar objectives and how they interrelate. Future research would ensure minimal duplication of efforts and capability gaps between not only U.S. Air Force stakeholders, but especially the joint and interagency partners as well.

Summary

The fiscal constraints and increasing threat base around the world have paved the way for an adaptive Air Force that prides itself on responsiveness. To achieve that goal requires a great deal of strategic planning and partnership that ensures not only worldwide access but also partners that are willing to commit to global security. Reexamining the partnerships of today will help ensure the global reach needed for tomorrow. Whether realized or not, the traditional face of warfare has changed and therefore require a softer approach to realize goals.

Appendix A: RAND Prioritization and Propensity Tool List of Categories, Constructs, and Measures

Table A.1
Full List of Categories, Constructs, and Measures

CATEGORY 1: HISTORICAL QUALITY OF US SC/SFA/BPC PROVISION SC is more likely to be effective when the US provides an adequate amount of consistent SC funding to the PN Construct 1.1: US SC/SFA/BPC funding consistent Measure 1.1.1: Normalized sum of annual decreases in US SC/SFA/BPC funding below median during 5-year span (Source: USAID Greenbook) Construct 1.2: US SC/SFA/BPC funding sufficient Measure 1.2.1: US SC/SFA/BPC funding plus PN military spending per PN troop (average over 5-year span) (Sources: USAID Greenbook, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, World Bank World Development Indicators)
CATEGORY 2: HISTORICAL TRACK RECORD OF SUCCESS WITH PN SC is more likely to be effective with a PN that has successfully implemented and sustained US or other foreign assistance in the past Construct 2.1: US historical success with SC/BPC/SFA Measure 2.1.1: Lag correlation between US SC/SFA/BPC funding and PN military expenditure (Sources: USAID Greenbook and SIPRI) Measure 2.1.2: Lag correlation between US SC/SFA/BPC funding and PN military sophistication (Sources: USAID Greenbook and Global Peace Index) Measure 2.1.3: Lag correlation between US SC/SFA/BPC funding and PN security force efficacy (Sources: USAID Greenbook and Jane's) Construct 2.2: Historical success with foreign aid Measure 2.2.1: Lag correlation between all foreign aid to PN and PN HDI (Sources: OECD and UNDP)
CATEGORY 3: US-PN RELATIONSHIP SC is more likely to be effective when the US and PN have a long-term relationship built on shared interests and a history of cooperation and where the US is viewed favorably by the PN Construct 3.1: PN cooperation with US Measure 3.1.1: PN troop contributions per capita (millions) to coalition operations, last 10 years (Sources: Georgetown University, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and World Bank) Measure 3.1.2: PN involvement with multilateral institutions (Source: Jane's) Construct 3.2: PN citizen perception of US Measure 3.2.1: Percentage of PN population that approves of US leadership (Source: Gallup) Measure 3.2.2: US-PN travel (ratio of US total travel and PN size) (Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration) Measure 3.2.3: Nonimmigrant admissions to the US per capita (Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security) Construct 3.3: Long-term relationship between US and PN Measure 3.3.1: US Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows (E + 1) to PN as a % of PN GDP (Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis) Measure 3.3.2: Trade between US and PN as a % of PN GDP (Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade Division)

Source: The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool, 2013.

Appendix A-1: RAND Prioritization and Propensity Tool List of Categories, Constructs, and Measures

Table A.1—Continued

CATEGORY 3: US-PN RELATIONSHIP (cont.) SC is more likely to be effective when the US and PN have a long-term relationship built on shared interests and a history of cooperation and where the US is viewed favorably by the PN
Measure 3.3.3: Sum of PN university exchange students in US and US university exchange students in PN per PN capita (Source: Institute of International Education)
Measure 3.3.4: Treaties with the US: defense, nonaggression, and visa (Sources: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, and Leeds et al., 2002)
Construct 3.4: Shared interests between US and PN
Measure 3.4.1: Voting coincidence w/US (previous two years), UN General Assembly important resolutions and consensus actions (Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organizations)
CATEGORY 4: SUPPORT FOR MILITARY IN/BY THE PN SC is more likely to be successful when the PN government and public support their military
Construct 4.1: PN government invests in military
Measure 4.1.1: Total military expenditure in millions constant US \$
Measure 4.1.2: PN military budget as % of GDP
Construct 4.2: PN public support for military
Measure 4.2.1: Pew/World Values polling data
CATEGORY 5: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF PN MILITARY SC is more likely to be successful when the PN military has sufficient capacity to absorb the SC being provided
Construct 5.1: PN military forces' absorptive capacity
Measure 5.1.1: PN military sophistication (Source: Global Peace Index)
Measure 5.1.2: PN military spending in millions constant US \$ per troop
Measure 5.1.3: Efficacy of security forces (Source: Jane's)
Construct 5.2: PN absorptive capacity—technical
Measure 5.2.1: US patents granted annually to PN residents per capita
Measure 5.2.2: Royalty and license fees/payments per GDP
Measure 5.2.3: Secondary enrollment ratio (% gross)
Measure 5.2.4: Adult literacy rate
Measure 5.2.5: Tertiary enrollment ratio (% gross)
Construct 5.3: PN absorptive capacity—ministerial
Measure 5.3.1: WGI Government Effectiveness rating
Measure 5.3.2: GDP per capita growth, average over last 5 years
Measure 5.3.3: State control of security forces
Measure 5.3.4: Professionalism of security forces

Source: The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool, 2013.

Appendix A-2: RAND Prioritization and Propensity Tool List of Categories, Constructs, and Measures

Table A.1—Continued

CATEGORY 6: STRENGTH OF PN GOVERNMENT SC is more likely to be successful when the PN government has competent and strong institutions
Construct 6.1: PN government competency/strength
Measure 6.1.1: WGI Government Effectiveness Index
Measure 6.1.2: WGI Regulatory Quality Index
Measure 6.1.3: WGI Rule of Law Index
CATEGORY 7: PN GOVERNANCE SC is more likely to be successful with PNs that have good governments that are stable, not corrupt, and accountable to their people
Construct 7.1: PN democratic
Measure 7.1.1: Polity IV Project Democracy Index
Construct 7.2: PN government stability
Measure 7.2.1: Political Stability/No Violence Index (Source: World Bank)
Construct 7.3: PN government legitimacy
Measure 7.3.1: Legitimacy sub-Index of the State Fragility Index
Construct 7.4: PN governance
Measure 7.4.1: Government Effectiveness Index (Source: World Bank)
Construct 7.5: Lack of PN government corruption
Measure 7.5.1: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
Construct 7.6: PN human rights record
Measure 7.6.1: Political Terror Scale (Source: Amnesty International)
Measure 7.6.2: Political Terror Scale (Source: U.S. Department of State via Amnesty International)
CATEGORY 8: PN ECONOMIC STRENGTH SC is more likely to be effective with PNs with stable economies and a minimum level of economic development
Construct 8.1: PN economy
Measure 8.1.1: Percentage of population in poverty
Measure 8.1.2: Multidimensional Poverty Index
Measure 8.1.3: Percentage of population living on less than \$1.25 (US) per day
Measure 8.1.4: Human Development Index (HDI)
Measure 8.1.5: Gender Gap Index
Measure 8.1.6: GDP per capita (PPP)
Measure 8.1.7: Economy sub-Index of Legatum Prosperity Index
Measure 8.1.8: Global Competitiveness Index

Source: The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool, 2013.

Appendix A-3: RAND Prioritization and Propensity Tool List of Categories, Constructs, and Measures

Table A.1—Continued

CATEGORY 9: PN SECURITY SITUATION SC is more likely to be successful in PNs without internal instability or other serious security threats (though these may increase their need for SC)
Construct 9.1: PN security
Measure 9.1.1: Number of external and internal conflicts fought
Measure 9.1.2: Level of organized conflict (internal)
Measure 9.1.3: Likelihood of violent demonstrations
Measure 9.1.4: Relations with neighboring countries
Measure 9.1.5: Major episodes of political violence
Measure 9.1.6: Internal Security Stability Rating (Source: Jane's)
Measure 9.1.7: External Security Stability Rating (Source: Jane's)
CATEGORY 10: PRACTICAL EASE OF ENGAGING WITH PN SC is more likely to be successful with PNs that are easier to work with because they are small, speak English, have good infrastructure, and have signed all necessary agreements with the US
Construct 10.1: US-PN agreements—information sharing
Measure 10.1.1: No proxy measure identified
Construct 10.2: US-PN agreements—legal status of US forces
Measure 10.2.1: PN status of forces (SOFA) agreements with the US
Construct 10.3: US-PN common language
Measure 10.3.1: English is an official language (yes/no)
Construct 10.4: PN transportation infrastructure
Measure 10.4.1: Railways, goods transported (million ton-km) per 100K people
Measure 10.4.2: Quality of port infrastructure
Measure 10.4.3: Air transport, freight (million ton-km) per 100K people
Measure 10.4.4: Number of C-130/C-17-compatible runways
Construct 10.5: PN communications infrastructure
Measure 10.5.1: Telephone lines per 100 people
Measure 10.5.2: Cell phone subscriptions per 100 people
Measure 10.5.3: Internet users per 100 people
NOTE: HDI = Human Development Index. OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. PPP = purchasing power parity. SC = security cooperation. SIPRI = Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. UNDP = United Nations Development Programme. WGI = Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Source: The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool, 2013.

Appendix B: Results of the RAND Tool Validation Test

Table B.1
Results of the Tool Validation Test

Construct	Average Absolute Value of Deviation	Number of Cases with Deviation > 0.33
1.1: US SC/SFA/BPC funding consistent	0.27	6
1.2: US SC/SFA/BPC funding sufficient	0.21	2
2.1: US historical success with SC/BPC/SFA	0.19	4
2.2: Historical success with foreign aid	0.23	5
3.1: PN cooperation with US	0.20	5
3.2: PN citizen perception of US	0.16	2
3.3: Long-term relationship between US and PN	0.15	3
3.4: Shared interests between US and PN	0.26	9
4.1: PN government invests in military	0.19	4
4.2: PN public support for military	0.13	3
5.1: PN military forces' absorptive capacity	0.18	4
5.2: PN absorptive capacity—technical	0.25	6
5.3: PN absorptive capacity—ministerial	0.22	6
6.1: PN government competence/strength	0.14	1
7.1: PN democratic	0.13	0
7.2: PN government stability	0.23	4
7.3: PN government legitimacy	0.29	9
7.4: PN governance	0.12	1
7.5: Lack of PN government corruption	0.14	4
7.6: PN human rights record	0.18	6
8.1: PN economy	0.18	6
9.1: PN security	0.12	0
10.2: US-PN agreements — legal status of US forces	0.26	7
10.3: US-PN common language	0.37	12
10.4: PN transportation infrastructure	0.15	3
10.5: PN communications infrastructure	0.16	4

NOTE: For construct 10.1, "US-PN agreements—information sharing," no measure was identified for the tool, so no validation was necessary.

Source: The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool, 2013.

Appendix C: Propensity to Partner Country Ranking

Overall					
Sort by					
Country	▲	▼	Category #1	▲	▼
COCOM	▲	▼	Category #2	▲	▼
Overall Score	▲	▼	Category #3	▲	▼
Priority	▲	▼	Category #4	▲	▼
SC/SFA/BPC Expenditures	▲	▼	Category #5	▲	▼
SC/SFA/BPC Expenditures by PN Troop	▲	▼	Category #6	▲	▼
	▲	▼	Category #7	▲	▼
			Category #8	▲	▼
			Category #9	▲	▼
			Category #10	▲	▼
			▲	▼	
#	Country or Territory		ISO	FIPS	COCOM
187	United States		USA	US	NORTHCOM
186	United Kingdom (Britain)		GBR	UK	EUCOM
9	Australia		AUS	AS	PACOM
31	Canada		CAN	CA	NORTHCOM
47	Denmark		DNK	DA	EUCOM
100	Liechtenstein		LIE	LS	EUCOM
59	Finland		FIN	FI	EUCOM
129	Norway		NOR	NO	EUCOM
125	New Zealand		NZL	NZ	PACOM
10	Austria		AUT	AU	EUCOM
124	Netherlands		NLD	NL	EUCOM
81	Israel		ISR	IS	EUCOM
80	Ireland		IRL	EI	EUCOM
168	Sweden		SWE	SW	EUCOM
64	Germany		DEU	GM	EUCOM
60	France		FRA	FR	EUCOM
4	Andorra		ADO	AN	EUCOM

84	Japan	JPN	JA	PACOM	<u>0.75</u>
90	Korea (Seoul). Republic of Korea	KOR	KS	PACOM	<u>0.75</u>
15	Barbados	BRB	BB	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.74</u>
116	Monaco	MCO	MN	EUCOM	<u>0.74</u>
169	Switzerland	CHE	SZ	EUCOM	<u>0.74</u>
17	Belgium	BEL	BE	EUCOM	<u>0.73</u>
102	Luxembourg	LUX	LU	EUCOM	<u>0.72</u>
149	San Marino	SMR	SM	EUCOM	<u>0.72</u>
156	Singapore	SGP	SN	PACOM	<u>0.72</u>
139	Poland	POL	PL	EUCOM	<u>0.72</u>
158	Slovenia	SVN	SI	EUCOM	<u>0.70</u>
35	Chile	CHL	CI	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.70</u>
140	Portugal	PRT	PO	EUCOM	<u>0.70</u>
163	Spain	ESP	SP	EUCOM	<u>0.70</u>
109	Malta	MLT	MT	EUCOM	<u>0.70</u>
157	Slovakia (Slovak Republic)	SVK	LO	EUCOM	<u>0.69</u>
171	Taiwan	0	TW	PACOM	<u>0.69</u>
56	Estonia	EST	EN	EUCOM	<u>0.69</u>
43	Croatia	HRV	HR	EUCOM	<u>0.69</u>
66	Greece	GRC	GR	EUCOM	<u>0.69</u>
46	Czech Republic	CZE	EZ	EUCOM	<u>0.68</u>
82	Italy	ITA	IT	EUCOM	<u>0.68</u>
45	Cyprus	CYP	CY	EUCOM	<u>0.68</u>
74	Hungary	HUN	HU	EUCOM	<u>0.67</u>
12	Bahamas	BHS	BF	NORTHCOM	<u>0.67</u>
75	Iceland	ISL	IC	EUCOM	<u>0.67</u>
148	Samoa	WSM	WS	PACOM	<u>0.67</u>
185	United Arab Emirates	ARE	AE	CENTCOM	<u>0.66</u>
118	Montenegro	MNE	MJ	EUCOM	<u>0.66</u>
132	Palau	PLW	PS	PACOM	<u>0.65</u>
188	Uruguay	URY	UY	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.65</u>
147	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	VCT	VC	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.65</u>
101	Lithuania	LTU	LH	EUCOM	<u>0.65</u>

110	Marshall Islands	MHL	RM	PACOM	<u>0.65</u>
146	Saint Lucia	LCA	ST	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.62</u>
95	Latvia	LVA	LG	EUCOM	<u>0.62</u>
145	Saint Kitts and Nevis	KNA	SC	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.62</u>
142	Romania	ROM	RO	EUCOM	<u>0.62</u>
178	Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	TD	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.60</u>
114	Micronesia	FSM	FM	PACOM	<u>0.60</u>
26	Bulgaria	BGR	BU	EUCOM	<u>0.60</u>
141	Qatar	QAT	QA	CENTCOM	<u>0.60</u>
180	Turkey	TUR	TU	EUCOM	<u>0.59</u>
153	Serbia (Republic of Serbia)	SRB	RI	EUCOM	<u>0.59</u>
23	Botswana	BWA	BC	AFRICOM	<u>0.59</u>
106	Malaysia	MYS	MY	PACOM	<u>0.59</u>
25	Brunei (Brunei Darussalam)	BRN	BX	PACOM	<u>0.58</u>
92	Kuwait	KWT	KU	CENTCOM	<u>0.58</u>
37	Colombia	COL	CO	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.57</u>
24	Brazil	BRA	BR	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.57</u>
85	Jordan	JOR	JO	CENTCOM	<u>0.57</u>
161	South Africa	ZAF	SF	AFRICOM	<u>0.57</u>
41	Costa Rica	CRI	CS	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.57</u>
112	Mauritius	MUS	MP	AFRICOM	<u>0.56</u>
113	Mexico	MEX	MX	NORTHCOM	<u>0.56</u>
2	Albania	ALB	AL	EUCOM	<u>0.56</u>
130	Oman	OMN	MU	CENTCOM	<u>0.56</u>
6	Antigua and Barbuda	ATG	AC	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.56</u>
151	Saudi Arabia	SAU	SA	CENTCOM	<u>0.56</u>
67	Grenada	GRD	GJ	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.55</u>
63	Georgia	GEO	GG	EUCOM	<u>0.55</u>
154	Seychelles	SYC	SE	AFRICOM	<u>0.55</u>
122	Namibia	NAM	WA	AFRICOM	<u>0.55</u>
177	Tonga	TON	TN	PACOM	<u>0.55</u>
134	Panama	PAN	PM	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.54</u>
103	Macedonia, FYROM	MKD	MK	EUCOM	<u>0.53</u>

190	Vanuatu	VUT	NH	PACOM	<u>0.52</u>
13	Bahrain	BHR	BA	CENTCOM	<u>0.52</u>
83	Jamaica	JAM	JM	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.52</u>
119	Morocco	MAR	MO	AFRICOM	<u>0.52</u>
7	Argentina	ARG	AR	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.52</u>
143	Russia	RUS	RS	EUCOM	<u>0.52</u>
76	India	IND	IN	PACOM	<u>0.52</u>
36	China	CHN	CH	PACOM	<u>0.52</u>
49	Dominica	DMA	DO	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.50</u>
97	Lesotho	LSO	LT	AFRICOM	<u>0.50</u>
77	Indonesia	IDN	ID	PACOM	<u>0.50</u>
179	Tunisia	TUN	TS	AFRICOM	<u>0.50</u>
184	Ukraine	UKR	UP	EUCOM	<u>0.50</u>
192	Vietnam	VNM	VM	PACOM	<u>0.50</u>
8	Armenia	ARM	AM	EUCOM	<u>0.50</u>
58	Fiji	FJI	FJ	PACOM	<u>0.49</u>
174	Thailand	THA	TH	PACOM	<u>0.49</u>
65	Ghana	GHA	GH	AFRICOM	<u>0.49</u>
137	Peru	PER	PE	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.48</u>
138	Philippines	PHL	RP	PACOM	<u>0.47</u>
88	Kiribati	KIR	KR	PACOM	<u>0.47</u>
11	Azerbaijan	AZE	AJ	EUCOM	<u>0.46</u>
87	Kenya	KEN	KE	AFRICOM	<u>0.46</u>
71	Guyana	GUY	GY	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.46</u>
20	Bhutan	BTN	BT	PACOM	<u>0.46</u>
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	BK	EUCOM	<u>0.46</u>
73	Honduras	HND	HO	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.46</u>
166	Suriname	SUR	NS	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.45</u>
53	El Salvador	SLV	ES	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.45</u>
3	Algeria	DZA	AG	AFRICOM	<u>0.45</u>
32	Cape Verde	CPV	CV	AFRICOM	<u>0.45</u>
50	Dominican Republic	DOM	DR	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.45</u>
167	Swaziland	SWZ	WZ	AFRICOM	<u>0.44</u>


51	Ecuador	ECU	EC	SOUTHCAM	<u>0.44</u>
117	Mongolia	MNG	MG	PACOM	<u>0.44</u>
108	Mali	MLI	ML	AFRICOM	<u>0.44</u>
194	Zambia	ZMB	ZA	AFRICOM	<u>0.43</u>
86	Kazakhstan	KAZ	KZ	CENTCOM	<u>0.43</u>
173	Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania)	TZA	TZ	AFRICOM	<u>0.43</u>
96	Lebanon	LBN	LE	CENTCOM	<u>0.43</u>
5	Angola	AGO	AO	AFRICOM	<u>0.43</u>
135	Papua New Guinea	PNG	PP	PACOM	<u>0.43</u>
107	Maldives	MDV	MV	PACOM	<u>0.43</u>
164	Sri Lanka	LKA	CE	PACOM	<u>0.42</u>
52	Egypt	EGY	EG	CENTCOM	<u>0.42</u>
68	Guatemala	GTM	GT	SOUTHCAM	<u>0.42</u>
136	Paraguay	PRY	PA	SOUTHCAM	<u>0.41</u>
18	Belize	BLZ	BH	SOUTHCAM	<u>0.41</u>
27	Burkina Faso	BFA	UV	AFRICOM	<u>0.41</u>
115	Moldova (Republic of Moldova)	MDA	MD	EUCOM	<u>0.41</u>
61	Gabon	GAB	GB	AFRICOM	<u>0.41</u>
48	Djibouti	DJI	DJ	AFRICOM	<u>0.41</u>
79	Iraq	IRQ	IZ	CENTCOM	<u>0.40</u>
99	Libya	LBY	LY	AFRICOM	<u>0.39</u>
30	Cameroon	CMR	CM	AFRICOM	<u>0.39</u>
144	Rwanda	RWA	RW	AFRICOM	<u>0.39</u>
182	Tuvalu	TUV	TV	PACOM	<u>0.39</u>
131	Pakistan	PAK	PK	CENTCOM	<u>0.39</u>
29	Cambodia	KHM	CB	PACOM	<u>0.39</u>
152	Senegal	SEN	SG	AFRICOM	<u>0.38</u>
16	Belarus	BLR	BO	EUCOM	<u>0.38</u>
93	Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	KG	CENTCOM	<u>0.38</u>
183	Uganda	UGA	UG	AFRICOM	<u>0.38</u>
21	Bolivia	BOL	BL	SOUTHCAM	<u>0.37</u>
19	Benin	BEN	BN	AFRICOM	<u>0.37</u>
105	Malawi	MWI	MI	AFRICOM	<u>0.37</u>

98	Liberia	LBR	LI	AFRICOM	<u>0.37</u>
42	Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	CIV	IV	AFRICOM	<u>0.37</u>
162	South Sudan	SSD	OD	AFRICOM	<u>0.37</u>
159	Solomon Islands	SLB	BP	PACOM	<u>0.37</u>
28	Burundi	BDI	BY	AFRICOM	<u>0.37</u>
91	Kosovo	KSV	KV	EUCOM	<u>0.37</u>
175	Timor-Leste (East Timor)	TMP	TT	PACOM	<u>0.36</u>
189	Uzbekistan	UZB	UZ	CENTCOM	<u>0.36</u>
62	Gambia, The	GMB	GA	AFRICOM	<u>0.36</u>
1	Afghanistan	AFG	AF	CENTCOM	<u>0.36</u>
128	Nigeria	NGA	NI	AFRICOM	<u>0.36</u>
78	Iran	IRN	IR	CENTCOM	<u>0.36</u>
14	Bangladesh	BGD	BG	PACOM	<u>0.35</u>
126	Nicaragua	NIC	NU	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.35</u>
170	Syria (Syrian Arab Republic)	SYR	SY	CENTCOM	<u>0.35</u>
155	Sierra Leone	SLE	SL	AFRICOM	<u>0.35</u>
191	Venezuela	VEN	VE	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.34</u>
33	Central African Republic	CAF	CT	AFRICOM	<u>0.34</u>
44	Cuba	CUB	CU	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.33</u>
176	Togo	TGO	TO	AFRICOM	<u>0.32</u>
40	Congo (Kinshasa)/ Democratic Republic of the Congo	ZAR	CG	AFRICOM	<u>0.32</u>
123	Nepal	NPL	NP	PACOM	<u>0.32</u>
150	Sao Tome and Principe	STP	TP	AFRICOM	<u>0.32</u>
57	Ethiopia	ETH	ET	AFRICOM	<u>0.30</u>
39	Congo (Brazzaville)/ Republic of Congo	COG	CF	AFRICOM	<u>0.30</u>
120	Mozambique	MOZ	MZ	AFRICOM	<u>0.30</u>
193	Yemen	YEM	YM	CENTCOM	<u>0.30</u>
111	Mauritania	MRT	MR	AFRICOM	<u>0.29</u>
38	Comoros	COM	CN	AFRICOM	<u>0.29</u>
121	Myanmar (Burma)	MMR	BM	PACOM	<u>0.29</u>
94	Lao People's Democratic Republic	LAO	LA	PACOM	<u>0.28</u>
72	Haiti	HTI	HA	SOUTHCOM	<u>0.27</u>
172	Tajikistan	TJK	TI	CENTCOM	<u>0.27</u>

127	Niger	NER	NG	AFRICOM	<u>0.27</u>
70	Guinea-Bissau	GNB	PU	AFRICOM	<u>0.27</u>
34	Chad	TCD	CD	AFRICOM	<u>0.26</u>
104	Madagascar	MDG	MA	AFRICOM	<u>0.26</u>
181	Turkmenistan	TKM	TX	CENTCOM	<u>0.25</u>
54	Equatorial Guinea	GNQ	EK	AFRICOM	<u>0.24</u>
165	Sudan	SDN	SU	AFRICOM	<u>0.24</u>
195	Zimbabwe	ZWE	ZI	AFRICOM	<u>0.24</u>
133	Palestinian Authority (Palestinian Territories)	WBG	0	CENTCOM	<u>0.23</u>
69	Guinea	GIN	GV	AFRICOM	<u>0.22</u>
55	Eritrea	ERI	ER	AFRICOM	<u>0.22</u>
89	Korea (North), Democratic People's Republic of Korea	PRK	KN	PACOM	<u>0.16</u>
160	Somalia	SOM	SO	AFRICOM	<u>0.12</u>

Source: The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool, 2013.

Appendix D: GRP Storyboard



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14. ABSTRACT The NSS, NMS, and Air Force Global Partnership Strategy discuss multinational engagements becoming normal operations as the military services downsize and shift to a capability based force, versus threat based. One of the Air Force's strategic priorities is Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) with key nations. This is a huge leveraging opportunity for TRANSCOM, and the Air Force specifically, as both require uninterrupted worldwide access to realize Global Reach. Through analysis of guiding regulations and the objectives of major Air Force stakeholders, this research will identify several key variables that each BPC partnership exhibits. These variables will be measured in a model that will determine the relative partnership strength of that nation with the United States. Partnerships will be categorized based on the relative scoring of each variable. By providing a model to determine partnership strength, this paper will define what the 'right' partnerships consist of as well as provide an insight into what the United States values when building relationships with strategic allies.					
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