


AU/ACSC/2017

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**SECURING THE HOMELAND:  
The Role That the DoD Should Play to Combat the Domestic Threat  
Posed by ISIS**



Ryan A. McKinsey, Capt, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisors: Dr. Gregory F. Intoccia  
Dr. Richard Smith

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

February 2017

DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

### **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
DISCLAIMER .....	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ii
LIST OF FIGURES .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
I. Introduction .....	1
II. Background .....	6
A. The Origins of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).....	6
B. The Goals of ISIS.....	10
C. The Resources available to ISIS .....	11
III. The Domestic Threat Posed by ISIS .....	14
A. ISIS’s most likely course of action .....	15
B. ISIS’s Most Deadly Course of Action .....	15
IV. Interaction Between Department of Defense (DoD) and Domestic Antiterrorism Agencies .....	17
A. The Role of Domestic Antiterrorism Agencies .....	17
B. The Role of the DoD.....	18
C. Challenges Posed by the Posse Comitatus Act .....	20
V. Recommendations .....	22
A. Recommended Changes to the Posse Comitatus Act .....	22
B. Future DoD Focus.....	24
C. The Future Focus of Domestic Antiterrorism Agencies .....	25
VI. Conclusion .....	27
NOTES.....	30
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	34

# LIST OF FIGURES

	<i>Page</i>
Figure 1: Timeline Leading to Declaration of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) Caliphate .....	9
Figure 2: ISIS Territory as of April 2016 .....	13



## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to show that domestic antiterrorism forces are becoming ever more fragmented, lacking resources and capabilities, as well as stifling the flow of information and intelligence relating to the domestic threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, the Department of Defense (DoD) is uniquely postured to combat this threat, but is limited by the *Posse Comitatus Act* (PCA).

This paper will utilize a mixed approach framework. First it will identify the problem with the current domestic antiterrorism structure. It will then provide two possible courses of action ISIS may take within the borders of the United States to further identify limitations of domestic agencies. Finally, an analysis will provide recommendations.

Its key findings are that the limitations imposed by the PCA are too restrictive upon the DoD with regards to collaborating with domestic antiterrorism agencies. Additionally, the fragmentation of the current structure of domestic antiterrorism agencies leads to a stifling of information and intelligence creating gaps in security.

Its key recommendations include a modification of the PCA, allowing for greater collaboration between domestic antiterrorism agencies and DoD entities, utilization of National Guard forces in a Title 32 United States Code role, as well as a reorganization of certain domestic antiterrorism entities and offices. This would result in a unified whole-of-government approach to ensure the security of the United States.

## I. Introduction

*Violent extremism and an evolving terrorist threat raise a persistent risk of attacks on America and our allies... nowhere is the violence more tragic and destabilizing than in the sectarian conflict from Beirut to Baghdad, which has given rise to new terrorist groups such as ISIL.*

-President Barack Obama, *2015 National Security Strategy*

The modern world has never seen a terrorist threat that is as significant as the current threat posed by The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While the name ISIS has only been around since the declaration of the caliphate in 2014, the origins of the group and its leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi can be traced to Al Qaeda (Now known as ISIS the terrorist group occupying a large portion of Iraq and Syria has called itself by various names including Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), The Islamic State (IS), and The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)). Just prior to the declaration of the caliphate, Al Qaeda separated all ties and affiliation with ISIS. Among other reasons, Al Qaeda felt that the ideology of ISIS was too barbaric and brutal against the people they considered infidels. Additionally, Al Qaeda was fearful of ISIS's "uncompromising ideology and imposition of strict Sharia law on the areas it holds."<sup>1</sup> A statement like this, from the group responsible for the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 attacks and multiple other terrorist attacks throughout the world, should be extremely concerning. Moreover, it should be of extreme concern to the citizens of the United States. ISIS continues to state that its goal is to see a world, specifically the land of the "apostates," in which every person is scared of the other.<sup>2</sup>

ISIS has its origins in Al Qaeda, the group responsible for the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon. In his 2013 "General Guidelines for Jihad," the current leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri stated, Al Qaeda first

targets the heads of disbelieving nations, specifically America and its ally Israel, and secondly targets local allies that rule the countries Al Qaeda operates out of. Al-Zawahiri continued to specify that the targeting of America is to exhaust and bleed it to death by forcing the United States to overreact causing substantial human and financial losses.<sup>3</sup> ISIS originating from Al Qaeda is more fanatical and more determined to wage jihad against the apostates than its predecessor.

In the recent past, since the declaration of the caliphate, there has been a rise in attacks carried out by ISIS, or sympathizers of ISIS. Some examples include the truck attacks in Berlin, Germany and Nice, France, the significant bombing attacks throughout Iraq, Syria, and Turkey as well as the numerous attacks throughout Europe. Additionally, the recent “lone wolf” attacks within the United States in Columbus, Ohio, Orlando, Florida, and San Bernardino, California and the constant propaganda produced from ISIS indicate that these attacks are only the beginning. ISIS continues to call upon its followers and sympathizers to take up arms or any means necessary to wage jihad in the name of Allah and ISIS. As the United States continues to lead the coalition against ISIS within Iraq and Syria, ISIS can be expected to more eagerly attempt to carry out attacks within the domestic United States. The assertion of ISIS’s willingness and capability is reflected in a recent ISIS publication stating that, if an “individual cannot flee to Iraq and Syria, he can execute terror attacks in Europe and America.”<sup>4</sup>

More concerning still is that the recent attacks within the United States suggest a possible growing disconnect between Department of Defense (DoD) entities and domestic antiterrorist organizations, to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as state and local law enforcement. In a 2014 RAND Corporation National Security Research Division conference, a participant commented on the fragmentation within the

intelligence community, stating that “we’re not leveraging all the capability of the local and state entities (much less the federal); there’s no true whole-of-government approach.”<sup>5</sup> The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and technology that the DoD utilize, need to be adopted and applied within the domestic antiterrorism effort to stop terrorist attacks from happening on United States soil.

A 2014 article by the Congressional Research Service shows that while the United States has not detected a specific plot against the homeland, the leaders of ISIS continue to threaten attacks.<sup>6</sup> Since that statement, there have been several attacks both domestically and internationally against coalition partners. Moreover, former President Barack Obama has acknowledged the threat posed by ISIS and declared that our end state will be the degradation and ultimate destruction of ISIS.<sup>7</sup> Due to the growing domestic threat posed by ISIS, the United States must focus its resources and develop partnerships between domestic antiterrorism intelligence and security services with those in the DoD to effectively prevent future domestic attacks.

What is the current threat to the domestic United States posed by ISIS, and how can the DoD collaborate with state and federal antiterrorism entities to combat and mitigate this domestic threat?

As ISIS continues to lose territory throughout Iraq and Syria, they will grow ever more emboldened and desperate to inflict terror on the United States. In order to prevent future terrorist attacks within the United States, the DoD and domestic antiterrorism units must collaborate to create open lines of communication that are key to identifying threats and vulnerabilities. Additionally, the DoD and domestic antiterrorism units must train together,

sharing TTPs and technology that the DoD has developed in the sixteen years of conflict since September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001.

As this paper will show, the United States domestic antiterrorism forces are unprepared, fragmented, and lack the resources and training required to detect and contain the growing domestic threat posed by ISIS. Despite a significant aerial bombardment campaign, ISIS continues to effectively recruit new jihadists as well as increase its revenue sources.<sup>8</sup>

The fight against ISIS will require an asymmetric response across the entire spectrum of war, using both kinetic means abroad and non-kinetic means within the borders of the United States. The DoD is uniquely capable of both of these means and should be leveraged to collaborate with domestic antiterrorism agencies. A potential challenge to collaboration between the DoD and domestic antiterrorism entities is the *Posse Comitatus* Act (PCA). The PCA was originally drafted to stop the use of federal troops from policing elections within former confederate states and limits the Army and Air Force role in executing civil laws.<sup>9</sup> To ensure that the DoD can collaborate with and support domestic antiterrorism units without violating the PCA, a congressional review of the PCA is needed to properly allow DoD and domestic antiterrorism collaboration, while still keeping intact the spirit of the original act.

In addition to a review of the PCA, better collaboration between DoD intelligence agencies and domestic intelligence agencies is needed. A few ways in which the DoD and domestic intelligence agencies could streamline communication would be the following:

- Adoption of an intelligence structure similar to the United States Air Force's Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) for processing, fusing, exploiting, and disseminating intelligence.

- Development of a common computer network for rapid exchange of information between federal, state, and local entities.
- Collaborative joint training between DoD, federal, state, and local antiterrorism forces.

This paper will use a mixed framework to conduct and present a rigorous study into the current threat posed by ISIS. First, this paper will present a background on the foundation and growth of ISIS, the goals of ISIS, and the resources available to ISIS. Following the background, an in depth look at domestic vulnerabilities will be researched identifying shortfalls in homeland security capabilities and resources. Next, potential scenarios for ISIS's most likely course of action and most dangerous course of action with regards to attacks within the United States will be explored. From these scenarios, shortfalls within domestic antiterrorism forces will be identified, as well as, an assessment of limitations imposed by the PCA. Once these shortfalls and limitations are identified, a recommendation for collaboration and policy change will be made to mitigate the ability of ISIS to carry out terrorist attacks within the United States.

## II. Background

Prior to the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 attacks carried out by Al Qaeda, the general public of the United States had little to no awareness of terrorist activities throughout the Middle East. Since then, the United States has been engaged in a global war on terrorism that continues to shift based on an evolving enemy. What started in Afghanistan has now shifted and multiplied throughout Iraq and Syria and is continuing to spread throughout Northern Africa, Yemen, and the Philippines. A new group has emerged, calling itself “The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.” But how new is this group? Where did it come from and how did ISIS become one of the largest and most feared Islamic terrorist organizations ever? While almost every person in the United States knows about the atrocities carried out by ISIS, very few know its origins, goals, resources, capabilities, and most importantly the domestic threat it poses to the United States. This section will identify and explain those topics.

### A. The Origins of ISIS

On June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi addressed his followers stating that the requirements for an Islamic caliphate had been fulfilled and that he was the caliph, or leader of the group now known as ISIS.<sup>10</sup> While this was the beginning of using the name ISIS, it was not the beginning of ISIS as a terrorist organization. There is a common misunderstanding reported on by the media after the fall of Mosul to ISIS and the subsequent declaration of a caliphate, that ISIS had appeared out of nowhere and was a brand-new terrorist organization.<sup>11</sup> When in fact, the foundations of ISIS started within Al Qaeda well before the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 attacks.

The original mastermind behind the organization that would become ISIS was a Jordanian national named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 1990, al-Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan to aid the Taliban in the fight against the Afghan government that broke out after the Soviet


withdrawal.<sup>12</sup> It was in Afghanistan that al-Zarqawi met radical Islamic leaders and started his jihad. In 1993, Zarqawi would travel back to Jordan where he would be arrested for terrorism charges and sent to prison for nine years. After his time in prison where he became even more radicalized, Zarqawi traveled back to Afghanistan to set up a terrorist training camp, reluctantly funded by Usama Bin Ladin.<sup>13</sup> Bin Ladin and the other leaders within Al Qaeda hoped that Zarqawi could potentially start a group in Iraq or Syria, however, “within weeks of setting up the camp, Sayf (an Al Qaeda leader) came to realize that al-Zarqawi was not simply acquiring military training; he was also keen on building a complete social structure.”<sup>14</sup> After the United States invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi traveled to Iraq, set up a training camp, and eventually founded a group called “Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad” (later named Al Qaeda in Iraq), and declared allegiance to Al Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden.<sup>15</sup> Following the death of Zarqawi in 2006, his successor assured Bin Laden of continued support, but later declared allegiance to the newly formed Islamic State in Iraq. This group was made up of several organizations in Iraq, and led by Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi (not to be confused with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi).<sup>16</sup> This organization is where the traditional jihadist mold was broken with respect to how ISIS is organized. Not only was the Islamic State in Iraq engaged in jihad, at the same time it was began to form a governance and ten ministers were appointed over varying offices including health, oil, agriculture, and fisheries.<sup>17</sup> In 2010, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq was killed and replaced by the current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In 2011, al-Baghdadi began to expand the Islamic State in Iraq by quietly sending a group of fighters across the Syrian border to aid in the growing civil war there. This group, however, fought under the name Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and not the Islamic State.<sup>18</sup> It was in 2013 that the name ISIS was finally established, when al-Baghdadi declared JN as part of ISIS.<sup>19</sup> This

declaration was met with anger by JN who wanted to remain part of Al Qaeda and a fight between JN and ISIS ensued costing the lives of thousands of jihadists.<sup>20</sup> Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan sent a mediator to end the conflict, after the execution of the mediator, Al Qaeda cut all ties with ISIS. ISIS then began an assault throughout Iraq and Syria and shortly thereafter, declared the caliphate, fulfilling the original goal set forth by Al-Zarqawi.<sup>21</sup>

The origins of ISIS identify some key differences that separate them from a traditional Islamic jihadist organization. The declaration of an “Islamic State,” requires ISIS to provide governance. This governance, as twisted as it is, is a brutal and violent rule. The actions leading up to and after the declaration of the caliphate show the lengths to which ISIS is willing to go to spread its ideology. From this foundation, ISIS has set goals and established a vision for the future actions of the terrorist group.





**Figure 1: Timeline Leading to Declaration of ISIS's caliphate** (Reprinted from "Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism." Saltman, Erin Marie, and Charlie Winter. Quilliam Foundation, (November 2014)).

## **B. The Goals of ISIS**

By declaring a caliphate, ISIS is attempting to declare a sovereign territory ruled by their interpretation of Islam. Unlike former terrorist organizations that survived in the shadows, only to appear for an attack and then disappear, ISIS acting as a “state” cannot survive “underground; it seeks – and, to an extent, has – a popular legitimacy.”<sup>22</sup> The danger in this shift is that ISIS has gone from an organization to an “Islamic State,” “something which renders it ever more appealing to extremists in the outside world who adhere to the extremist Islamist cause.”<sup>23</sup> This fact is one of the challenges facing the United States when it comes to being able to identify potential individuals within the United States that may sympathize with and share the ideology of ISIS.

Perhaps the most disturbing goal of ISIS is to carry out jihad until ISIS either controls the Earth or until the final judgement day prophesized in the Quran.<sup>24</sup> Additionally, as noted earlier, ISIS wants to see a world that is rid of “apostates” and one in which neighbor is afraid of neighbor.<sup>25</sup> This goal originates from the ideology of Al Qaeda which, as outlined above, is where ISIS foundations were established. Another goal originally stated by Al Qaeda was to target the United States directly, and that, “the purpose of targeting America is to exhaust her and bleed her to death” by, in part, baiting the United States to overreact so that it suffered substantial human and financial losses.”<sup>26</sup> This is the core ideology that lies within Al Qaeda and the ideology ISIS was founded upon. ISIS, however, has twisted that ideology to an even greater extreme. These goals and ideologies present multiple challenges to defending the domestic United States against ISIS attacks. This difficulty in combatting this threat is due to the nature of ideology and how it spreads. ISIS does not have to move fighters from within Syria and Iraq to the United States (although they are seeking to do this which will be discussed later in this

paper). All that is required to spread the ideology and beliefs of ISIS in today's digitally connected world is access to the internet. ISIS possesses a media arm with a substantial infrastructure, able to produce high-quality, relevant products in multiple languages targeting specific audiences around the globe.<sup>27</sup> This propaganda is spread in multiple formats to include social media, blogs, websites, radio and television broadcasts, as well as print and allows ISIS to not only recruit sympathizers and create fighters, but also to bring in resources.<sup>28</sup>

### **C. Resources Available to ISIS**


Another aspect that sets ISIS apart from other terrorist organizations is the amount of resources that ISIS has at its disposal. Key to the success that ISIS has had and instrumental in ISIS's ability to establish a caliphate, is the ability of ISIS to extract, manage, and employ resources. These resources include finances, personnel, and arms. Without these three things, ISIS is unable to maintain its rule over the territory it has claimed.

ISIS has a significant history of conflict but it also has a history of efficiently managing finances.<sup>29</sup> As an organization that seeks to maintain a sovereign "state," maintaining a steady flow of funding is critical to ISIS's ability to function. There are several ways that ISIS generates funding, including oil-smuggling, sales of stolen goods, extortion, taxation, sales of looted antiquities, kidnapping, and even taking a cut of the money that the Iraqi government sent to its employees within ISIS's territory.<sup>30</sup> In a conservative estimate of the revenues generated by oil alone, ISIS is said to bring in close to \$263 million annually.<sup>31</sup> In another estimate on extortion and taxation, ISIS is estimated to generate \$1 million a month from Mosul alone.<sup>32</sup> This is a staggering amount of financial resources for a terrorist organization, only adding to the ability of ISIS to carry out attacks outside of its caliphate and within the domestic United States. Not only

are the financial resources of ISIS staggering, but also the amount of personnel that belong to the group.

ISIS manpower, relative to other terrorist organizations is significant. In a 2014 estimate, the CIA put the number of fighters within ISIS at 20,000 to 31,500 with an additional 15,000 foreign fighters. By 2015, this estimate had increased to 20,000 foreign fighters.<sup>33</sup> ISIS is reliant on foreign fighters to maintain its territory and current intelligence indicates that foreign fighters are continuing to flow into Iraq and Syria at staggering rates.<sup>34</sup> As foreign fighters are considered to be more fanatical and committed to jihad than local fighters, foreign fighters are typically recruited as suicide bombers. However, documents obtained from ISIS indicate that a large group of foreign fighters were trained in military operations, bomb making, and improvised explosive devices (IED). This could potentially indicate an effort to develop a base of battle hardened foreign fighters that could return to their home country and carry out attacks.<sup>35</sup> Additionally, as stated earlier, ISIS possesses a media wing that is well connected and modernized to produce propaganda and recruit beyond the borders of its territory.

The United States and the coalition, continue to combat this influx of fighters by restricting travel to and from areas with known ISIS presence. As the restrictions become tighter, ISIS will continue to call upon sympathizers abroad to carry out attacks in their own neighborhoods, to include within the United States. The ability of ISIS to recruit personnel both within Iraq and Syria as well as abroad adds to the complicated problem facing domestic antiterrorism units in predicting future attacks against the United States.



**Figure 2: ISIS Territory as of April 2016** (Reprinted from "ISIS Sanctuary: April 22, 2016." *Understandingwar.org*. Institute for the Study of War, 22 Apr. 2016.)

### III. The Domestic Threat Posed by ISIS

By far, the worst terrorist attack within the domestic United States was the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, organized and executed by Al Qaeda. Since this attack, the terrorist threat posed to the United States has evolved significantly.<sup>36</sup> As stated earlier, ISIS was originally affiliated with Al Qaeda, however, that affiliation was quickly terminated when ISIS began setting up its caliphate and imposing an even more extreme jihadist ideology. Al Qaeda leadership at that time referred to ISIS as “extremists” and separated itself from the group.<sup>37</sup> While Al Qaeda was able to successfully carry out the attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, their organization was relatively small compared to ISIS. ISIS is the most well-funded terrorist organization the world has ever seen.<sup>38</sup> According to recent estimates, ISIS has approximately 30,000 foreign fighters not including fighters that originated within the caliphate. Combine ISIS’s size with its funding and stated goals as outlined earlier and ISIS poses a more significant threat to the United States than Al Qaeda did previously.

ISIS is not only waging a war within Iraq and Syria, but also a complex operation within the cyber domain through the use of social media to encourage attacks abroad.<sup>39</sup> The recent attacks carried out by ISIS include a broad spectrum of violence, methods, and targets. These attacks range from the use of large trucks driven into crowds, knife and small arms attacks on unsuspecting civilians, to well-planned coordinated attacks on police and military forces utilizing a mixture of small arms and IEDs. While the largest and most complex attacks are carried out in close proximity to the caliphate (i.e. Turkey, Germany, France, etc.), ISIS leadership continues to call for attacks on the United States. There are two scenarios to explore regarding the future of ISIS attacks within the United States: the most likely course of action that ISIS could take and the most dangerous course of action.

### **A. ISIS's Most Likely Course of Action**

As the United States and its allies make it harder for people to travel to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS, it is likely that these individuals who sympathize with and share the ideology of ISIS will carry out attacks within the United States in the areas and communities in which they live.<sup>40</sup> The most likely course of action that ISIS could take within the United States is a continuation of "lone wolf" attacks. These "lone wolf" attacks are not carried out by true members of ISIS that have come from the caliphate, but rather by home grown sympathizers radicalized and inspired by ISIS propaganda.

One of the first "lone wolf" attacks attributed to ISIS within the United States was the May 2015 attack in Garland, Texas against an exhibition featuring cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.<sup>41</sup> Following this attack, there have been several more attacks within the United States. In December 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik claimed allegiance to ISIS and shot 35 people, killing 14 in San Bernardino, California.<sup>42</sup> In June 2016, Omar Mateen, pledging allegiance to ISIS and opened fire in a night club in Orlando, Florida killing 49 people.<sup>43</sup> In November 2016, a man drove his car into a group of pedestrians at Ohio State University then exited his car and proceeded to attack people using a butcher's knife. The common thread between these attacks is that the individuals who carried them out were not directly controlled or linked to ISIS, but instead sympathized with and were inspired by ISIS. "Lone wolf" attacks are less dependent on operational support directly from ISIS making them more difficult to identify and predict.<sup>44</sup>

### **B. ISIS's Most Dangerous Course of Action**

The most dangerous course of action that ISIS could take against the United States would be a large scale coordinated attack in multiple locations. If ISIS is able to bring fighters from

within Iraq and Syria to the United States, the level of sophistication of attacks could significantly change.<sup>45</sup> Even if ISIS was only able to bring over a few personnel from Iraq and Syria, they would then be able to train and spread the knowledge and ideology learned from the heart of ISIS. As outlined in the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, ISIS encourages fighters and sympathizers through websites, chat rooms, and social media to produce IEDs as well as to enhance planning, target surveillance, and attack execution via commonly available communications and information technology.<sup>46</sup> From such communications, coordinated attacks from operational cells spread throughout major population centers within the United States could be executed. These attacks could encompass a variety of TTPs, from IEDs, to knives, to semi-trucks, to small arms. If ISIS were able to carry out coordinated attacks simultaneously in multiple locations, there would be mass panic and chaos created throughout the United States. This would achieve ISIS's stated goal of a world in which every person is suspicious of the other.<sup>47</sup>

These two scenarios, the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action that ISIS could take within the United States, present different ways in which the DoD and domestic antiterrorism entities could interact to identify and prevent these scenarios. Additionally, because the two scenarios take place within the United States, limitations on DoD entities are imposed by the PCA. These limitations highlight the need to review the PCA in an effort to facilitate better collaboration between Federal and local entities.

## **IV. Interaction Between DoD and Domestic Antiterrorism Agencies**

As identified in the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, integrating counterterrorism efforts between federal, state, and local entities is challenging.<sup>48</sup> In order to ensure a unity of effort and to avoid wasted time and resources, an identification of roles that pertain to DoD and domestic antiterrorism entities needs to be identified.

### **A. The Role of Domestic Antiterrorism Agencies**

Domestic antiterrorism forces are comprised of a vast array of organizations at varying levels of government. Principle among these is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS is a federal organization created in response to the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 terrorist attacks. The role of the DHS is to coordinate national homeland security efforts and to develop a comprehensive national security strategy to deter and respond to future terrorist attacks.<sup>49</sup> This includes training law enforcement officials at all levels: state, local, tribal, and federal. As a domestic agency, the DHS is responsible for the area within the borders of the United States. Given this role, its personnel are uniquely trained on enforcing the laws within the United States and specifically trained to interact with civilians, using deadly force as a last resort.

Outlined in the *2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, “preventing terrorist attacks on the Nation is and should remain the cornerstone of homeland security.”<sup>50</sup> With respect to the two scenarios outlined earlier, the DHS is and should be primarily responsible to counter “lone wolf” attacks, or the most likely course of action from ISIS. As an organization that is embedded at all levels of law enforcement, the DHS has the ability to leverage local communities. The DHS identifies that their emphasis in deterring violent extremism is to “prioritize disrupting and deterring recruitment...by supporting community-based problem solving and local law enforcement programs.”<sup>51</sup> As identified in the most likely scenario, ISIS

attempts to recruit or radicalize local sympathizers within communities through propaganda. This level of threat is something that the DHS is uniquely capable of handling, yet at the same time, the fact that ISIS leadership and operational territory is located outside the borders of the United States presents challenges and limitations to the DHS. The beginning of intelligence and the source of ISIS's propaganda are located in an area that the DHS does not have representation.

In an effort to mitigate this challenge, the United States established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004. The intent of the NCTC was to create a central organization to fuse together all intelligence nationwide regarding counterterrorism, as well as integrating the instruments of national power at all levels of government including the DoD to ensure unity of effort.<sup>52</sup> Although the concept of a centralized organization to fuse intelligence and combat terrorism was at the time a novel idea, it has proven to be difficult to effectively manage and execute. The problem lies in the design of the NCTC, a small organization that partners with the entire spectrum of state, local, and federal organizations in an effort to consolidate information related to the threat of terrorism against the Nation. In essence, it is supposed to be the organization to contain and network existing organizations. However, the organizations that the NCTC partners with are often leery to share sensitive information, and it has been difficult to manage the tremendous size and amount of information gathered across the spectrum of intelligence organizations due to the size and scope of influence of the NCTC.<sup>53</sup>

## **B. The Role of The DoD**

Shifting from the domestic antiterrorism realm, the role of the DoD is to provide forces needed to deter and protect the security of the United States. The DoD's mission is to train and equip forces to perform warfighting, peacekeeping, and disaster assistance tasks. The DoD is an enormous entity encompassing every role required to defend the United States. Unlike the DHS

which is responsible for security within the borders of the United States, the DoD is primarily responsible for defense of the United States outside of its borders. The unique technology, equipment, training, and resources that the DoD possesses enable this mission.

In its mission abroad, the DoD is required to carry out all aspects required to fight the enemies of the United States. By gathering and analyzing intelligence, selecting the correct force and units to carry out a mission, and providing every aspect of support including logistical supplies and medical treatment, the DoD possesses a vast set of capabilities. With its role being external to the borders of the United States, it operates in the same geographical area as ISIS. This allows for a significant capability to exploit intelligence from within ISIS's area of influence and to identify and strike at the source of ISIS ideology.

In the two scenarios outlined earlier in this paper, the DoD would take an active role in the most dangerous course of action scenario regarding a large coordinated attack in multiple locations throughout the United States. As outlined in Joint Publication 3-28 *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, if requested, federal forces may provide support to civil law enforcement agencies in antiterrorism operations and during civil disturbances within the limits imposed by Congress through the PCA.<sup>54</sup> The DoD's unique capabilities and resources are able to contain and handle a scenario as chaotic and complex as ISIS's most dangerous course of action. The challenge lies within the PCA and the restrictions it imposes on federal troops within the borders of the United States.

One capability that is unique to the DoD is the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS). The DCGS is a system developed for the Air Force and the Army in an effort to centralize the gathering, interpretation, exploitation, dissemination, and implementation of intelligence.<sup>55</sup> Developed throughout the 1990s, the DCGS is composed of 27 globally

networked sites.<sup>56</sup> These sites provide worldwide command and control of intelligence gathering, processing, and disseminating functions allowing for incredibly accurate actionable intelligence.<sup>57</sup> The DCGS network is operated, owned, and manned by a mixture of Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard (NG) forces.<sup>58</sup> Currently, the NG is responsible for operating eight of these systems.

The military entities within the DoD can be divided into three categories: Active Duty, Reserve, and NG. As federal forces, the Active Duty and Reserve forces are governed by Title 10 of the United States Code (USC). NG forces are more flexible and can fulfill both Title 10, USC roles, and Title 32 USC roles in addition to State Active Duty roles. State Active Duty can be activated by a state's Governor in response to natural disasters or in a homeland defense role such as a large-scale terrorist attack.<sup>59</sup> Because this status is funded and governed by state laws, NG forces in a Title 32 USC role or State Active Duty role are exempt from the PCA and may take part in law enforcement actions. This is significant with respect to the PCA and the role that the DoD can take in preventing domestic terrorism.

### **C. Challenges Posed by the Posse Comitatus Act**

The *Posse Comitatus* Act (PCA) was passed in 1878, in order to limit the ability of the government to use any part of the military to execute the law of the United States unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress.<sup>60</sup> The challenges to combating ISIS lie in the fact that ISIS is an international organization. While the DoD is the primary intelligence gatherer overseas, within the United States the DoD must coordinate with the FBI as they have the primary responsibility within the borders of the United States.<sup>61</sup> The limitations that the PCA places on federal organizations make the sharing of information, intelligence, and resources difficult. In addition to limiting the ability of DoD entities to operate with the United

State, the PCA limits the involvement of military personnel in the scale of training provided to civilian law enforcement operations.<sup>62</sup> That being the case, the Secretary of Defense has directed that Military Departments and DoD agencies may provide expert advice as long as military personnel are not directly involved in activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations.<sup>63</sup>

While the PCA applies to DoD personnel in a Title 10 USC status, it does not apply to members of the National Guard (NG) in a Title 32 USC status, or State Active Duty status.<sup>64</sup> The ability of the NG to transition between Title 10 USC and Title 32 USC status can be used as a force multiplier in the prevention of domestic attacks against the United States by ISIS. In a title 10 USC role, members of the NG are federal troops. They are able to train along with the entire spectrum of DoD entities and develop specific skills not available to civilian law enforcement. When they are then activated in a Title 32 USC status or State Active Duty status, they are no longer considered federal forces and the PCA does not apply to them.<sup>65</sup> This allows NG forces to take the training and skills provided by the DoD and apply them within the borders of the United States and still preserve the original intent of the PCA. Additionally, serving in a Title 10 USC role, members of the NG may serve abroad within the geographical location of ISIS identifying the TTPs and examining the intelligence gathered at the source. This knowledge can transition back to the states as the NG forces return home to Title 32 USC roles.

## **V. Recommendations**

The challenges identified in the previous section expose several areas where the DoD and domestic antiterrorism entities can better cooperate in an effort to combat the domestic threat posed by ISIS. First, a congressional review of the PCA is needed. Next, the role of the NCTC needs to be examined in an effort to provide better collaboration between DoD intelligence agencies and domestic intelligence agencies. Additionally, official documentation should clearly identify DoD and domestic antiterrorism force's role in combating ISIS. Finally, a look into joint training is needed along with the role that NG forces should take to combat ISIS. In this section, recommendations are developed related to those needs.

### **A. Recommended Changes to the Posse Comitatus Act**

The original intent of the PCA is foundational to the system of government in place in the United States because it imposed important limitations on the use of federal forces for domestic law enforcement purposes. However, there have been significant strategic security changes that have been imposed upon the United States since the PCA was written 140 years ago that must be recognized. Consequently, a modification to the PCA that both retains the underlying purpose but adjusts to new security realities is needed.

The threat of global terrorism not present when the PCA was written presents one of the greatest strategic challenges to the defense of the United States that the country has ever faced. In relation to this as stated earlier, the DoD has unique capabilities, resources, skills, and technologies that could prove to be quite useful to the defense of the domestic United States. Based on the evolving threat posed by ISIS to the United States, it would be prudent for Congress to review and update the PCA to allow the DoD to better collaborate with domestic antiterrorism entities.

In 1981, Congress amended the PCA to allow more cooperation between DoD and law enforcement officials in the wake of a growing drug epidemic. The amendment encouraged cooperation between the military (DoD) with regards to sharing of intelligence, equipment, and training to civilian police.<sup>66</sup> This sharing of information and training was specific to the threat at the time which was the “war on drugs.” Similar to the review and subsequent changes to adapt the PCA to the threats of the 1980s, Congress should create a specific allowance for collaboration between DoD entities and domestic antiterrorism entities. The original intent of the PCA must remain intact and federal troops (DoD members) should not be in the streets arresting civilians or executing the laws of the United States. However, a provision should be made with specific regards to terrorism allowing DoD entities the ability to operate on actionable intelligence in conjunction with domestic agencies.

In addition to a provision allowing for collaboration between DoD and domestic entities to combat terrorism, an amendment should be included allowing for greater training of domestic agencies from DoD entities. Identified in Joint Publication 3-28, “Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, allows the Military Departments and DoD agencies to provide training that is not large scale or elaborate.”<sup>67</sup> This allows for training of domestic antiterrorism entities by DoD entities but this limits the scale and frequency of the training provided. In a 2014 RAND Corporation study, it was identified that there was no true whole-of-government approach when it comes to leveraging state, local, and federal entities to combat terrorism.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, it was identified that more analysis, exercises, and more frequent interaction between federal (DoD) entities and domestic entities is needed to effectively prepare for and prevent domestic terrorism.<sup>69</sup> Communication and collaboration between DoD personnel and domestic agencies is essential in developing unity of effort and eliminating duplication of

efforts.<sup>70</sup> A provision to the PCA should allow for regular training between DoD and domestic entities to be established, building a base of knowledge within domestic antiterrorism units and allowing for a true whole-of-government approach to combat the domestic threat posed by ISIS.

These two amendments to the PCA are simple steps that can be taken to combat the domestic threat posed by ISIS. The first draws on previous amendments made to the PCA at a time in history when the nature of the threat to the United States demanded action. The current threat posed to the United States by ISIS could never have been imagined by the founding fathers as they were establishing the foundation for the United States. The second proposed provision allows for better training and collaboration between DoD and domestic agencies, establishing a base of knowledge and skills paramount to the deterrence and in response of the domestic threat that ISIS poses. These two amendments would still preserve the original intent of the PCA, barring federal troops from enforcing law on civilians while at the same time allowing for the safeguarding of citizens of the United States.

### **B. Future DoD Focus**

The DoD must maintain its mission to train and equip the forces that defend the United States. The DoD should continue its focus on defeating ISIS and other terrorist threats where they live. This focus provides the DoD a unique access to intelligence at the source of the threat. Additionally, DoD entities have exclusive access to foreign intelligence from strategic allies, as well as, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that domestic agencies do not possess.<sup>71</sup> While the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) operates the NCTC and has access to most intelligence derived from DoD sources, the DoD owns the assets and has the responsibility for determining the targets of intelligence. Furthermore, the DoD has established and continues to maintain an array of foreign intelligence

capabilities that it shares with the FBI and other domestic agencies in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States.<sup>72</sup> Through this network of intelligence and through ISR assets monitoring ISIS from within its caliphate, actionable intelligence can be gathered and shared with the FBI for use within the United States. In addition to the DoD mission abroad, the DoD must continue its role in assisting domestic antiterrorism agencies in preventing terrorist attacks at home as outlined in the *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*.<sup>73</sup> But, as demonstrated by the Boston Marathon bombing and the recent “lone wolf” attacks within the United States, additional intelligence from within the United States is needed to detect and identify low level and home grown plots from ISIS.<sup>74</sup>

### **C. The Future Focus of Domestic Antiterrorism Agencies**

As the DoD maintains its focus outside the borders of the United States, the domestic antiterrorism forces must refocus their efforts at home. A RAND Corporation study identified that in the 16 years since the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks there has been significant terrorism fatigue, serious budget constraints, and mounting attacks imposed on domestic intelligence operations.<sup>75</sup> In other words, the domestic intelligence agencies are now fragmented, facing serious shortfalls in funding, and growing further divided in their antiterrorism efforts. A large contributor to the growing fragmentation within domestic antiterrorism efforts is the sheer number of agencies and offices that are responsible for this mission. In addition to the number of agencies, the varying levels of effort required also contribute to the fragmentation.

In the current institutional structure, terrorism-related intelligence moves from the local level to the federal level primarily through the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force. The NCTC and DHS do not directly receive local intelligence.<sup>76</sup> This local intelligence is key to combating the “lone wolf” threat from ISIS. Often, local authorities are better able to gain trust and intermix

within the local population gaining valuable human intelligence that organizations such as the FBI or DHS would otherwise be unable to obtain.<sup>77</sup> The current structure, however, causes local authorities to be oversaturated with generalized reports from larger agencies. This stifles their ability to elevate intelligence collected at their level.

To combat the inability to relay information, it would benefit domestic agencies to consolidate efforts and forces. A single information system would allow for ease of information flow as well as allow rapid access to this information and intelligence. This could be achieved by reorganizing the DHS, NCTC, and FBI into a collaborative entity. This restructuring would allow for a single structure, focusing funding and allowing for more focused training and integration with state, local, and tribal law enforcement. This single organization should also be set up with an intelligence structure to mirror the DoD's DCGS. The NCTC has attempted this with its fusion centers, but with the current structure, no two centers are the same.<sup>78</sup> They use differing processes, products, priorities, metrics, and methods.<sup>79</sup> A standardized system and organizational structure is required to execute this concept. Restructuring domestic antiterrorism organizations and centralizing intelligence efforts could be further enhanced through leveraging the NG.

The NG should be leveraged domestically as a force multiplier for homeland defense. As identified previously, the NG in a Title 32 USC role is exempt from the PCA. Within the DoD structure, the NG operates eight DCGS sites.<sup>80</sup> These sites could fulfil the intelligence hub identified in the previous section, since they have existing TTPs, they have proven results within the DoD, and are already in place and operational.

## VI. Conclusion

*The threat from terrorism is real, but we will overcome it. We will destroy ISIL and any other organization that tries to harm us. Our success won't depend on tough talk, or abandoning our values, or giving into fear. That's what groups like ISIL are hoping for. Instead, we will prevail by being strong and smart, resilient and relentless, and by drawing upon every aspect of American power.*

-President Barack Obama

The United States has never before seen a terrorist threat like that posed by ISIS. From its origins within the ranks of Al Qaeda, ISIS's ideology is more extreme, its fighters more committed, and its capabilities greater than Al Qaeda ever was. The stated goals of ISIS are to create a world where each neighbor is afraid of each other and to eventually conquer Rome and seize the earth or be destroyed in the process.<sup>81</sup>

ISIS is the most well-funded terrorist organization the world has ever seen. It continues to recruit fighters to its declared caliphate within Iraq and Syria, and calls on its sympathizers unable to travel to the caliphate to carry out jihad by any means in their home countries.<sup>82</sup> As the battle against ISIS continues within Iraq and Syria, ISIS can be expected to grow ever more desperate to carry out attacks abroad. This is especially true within the domestic United States given its role as the leader of the coalition against ISIS.

This research has highlighted the threat posed by ISIS and outlined what the future might entail. In the most likely course of action, ISIS will continue to call for local "lone wolves" to attack by any means available. In the most dangerous course of action, ISIS would be able to carry out a coordinated attack in multiple locations throughout the United States causing mass casualties and chaos.

As shown in this paper, domestic antiterrorism forces are unprepared and incorrectly postured to defeat or contain the growing asymmetric threat posed by ISIS. Better collaboration is needed between DoD entities and domestic antiterrorism agencies. In order for this to occur, a congressional review of the *Posse Comitatus* Act must be accomplished.

The original intent of the PCA must not be infringed upon; Federal troops should not be enforcing domestic laws. However, similar to the amendment of the PCA in 1981 allowing federal agencies to take a more active role in the “war on drugs,” a similar amendment should be introduced with regards to terrorism. This amendment would extend to the DoD, the ability to more extensively collaborate with and train domestic antiterrorism forces. The founding fathers could never have imagined a threat like ISIS when they drafted and implemented the PCA.

In addition to a review of the PCA, the DoD must maintain its focus abroad combatting terrorism at its source. Specifically, with regards to ISIS, the DoD should focus on kinetic operations within Iraq and Syria, combined with an extensive intelligence gathering effort. This intelligence should be shared with domestic entities to help combat the domestic threat posed by ISIS. Additionally, the DoD should engage in continued and focused training with domestic antiterrorism agencies allowing for a unity of effort if ISIS is able to accomplish something close to the most dangerous course of action presented in this research.

National Guard forces should be utilized with their ability to operate in both Title 10 USC and Title 32 USC capacities. The NG should be leveraged as a force multiplier with domestic antiterrorism agencies in every aspect of the homeland security mission. The NG has the ability to take the skills and assets provided by the DoD and apply them within their state. In addition to leveraging the NG, a reorganization of domestic agencies is needed.

To better employ a whole-of-government approach to combat domestic terrorism, the multiple agencies and organizations should be combined. This would create a single structure that would ultimately facilitate the implementation of a single information system for gathering, processing, analyzing, and distributing intelligence related to terrorism. This system could mirror the DoD's DCGS network, or leverage the eight DCGS's already in operation by the NG. Implementing these proposals would consolidate efforts, information, and funding, allowing for a more focused campaign to combat the domestic threat posed by ISIS.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ibrahim, Azeem. "The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq." *The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq*. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, May 2014. Web. 14 Jan. 2017.

<sup>2</sup> Ogun, Mehmet Nesip. "ISIS: Less Territory, More Dangerous." *The National Interest*. N.p., 17 Nov. 2016. Web. 08 Jan. 2017.

<sup>3</sup> Jones, Seth G.. *A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR637.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.html).

<sup>4</sup> Ogun, Mehmet Nesip. "ISIS: Less Territory, More Dangerous." *The National Interest*. N.p., 17 Nov. 2016. Web. 08 Jan. 2017.

<sup>5</sup> Jenkins, Brian Michael, Andrew Liepman and Henry H. Willis. *Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF317.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF317.html).

<sup>6</sup> Katzman, Kenneth, Blanchard, Christopher M., Humud, Carla, E., Weed, Matthew, C., Margesson, Rhoda, Tiersky, Alex. "The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy." *Congressional Research Service*. 11 September 2014.

<sup>7</sup> "President Obama: 'We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL'" *U.S. Department of State*. U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web. 16 Sept. 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Bahney, Benjamin, and Patrick Johnston B. "To Defeat ISIS, Focus on Its Real Sources of Strength." Rand Corporation, 4 Dec. 2015. Web. 24 Sept. 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Larson, Eric V. and John E. Peters. *Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1251.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251.html).

<sup>10</sup> Johnston, Patrick B., Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard J. Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick Ryan and Jonathan Wallace. *Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1192.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html).

<sup>11</sup> Saltman, Erin Marie, and Charlie Winter. "Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism." Quilliam Foundation, (November 2014): n. p. Print.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. "The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Dec. 2014.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Saltman, Erin Marie, and Charlie Winter. "Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism." Quilliam Foundation, (November 2014): n. p. Print.

<sup>16</sup> Al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. "The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Dec. 2014.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Saltman, Erin Marie, and Charlie Winter. "Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism." Quilliam Foundation, (November 2014): n. p. Print.

## Notes

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. "The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Dec. 2014.

<sup>22</sup> Saltman, Erin Marie, and Charlie Winter. "Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism." Quilliam Foundation, (November 2014): n. p. Print.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ogun, Mehmet Nesip. "ISIS: Less Territory, More Dangerous." *The National Interest*. N.p., 17 Nov. 2016. Web. 08 Jan. 2017.

<sup>26</sup> Jones, Seth G.. *A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR637.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.html).

<sup>27</sup> Al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. "The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Dec. 2014.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Johnston, Patrick B., Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard J. Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick Ryan and Jonathan Wallace. *Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1192.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html).

<sup>31</sup> Al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. "The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Dec. 2014.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Johnston, Patrick B., Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard J. Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick Ryan and Jonathan Wallace. *Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1192.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html).

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Department of Defense, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington DC, 4 March 2013.

<sup>37</sup> Al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. "The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Dec. 2014.

<sup>38</sup> Frenkel, S. (2014), "How ISIS Became the Richest Terrorist Group in the World", BuzzFeed, [www.buzzfeed.com/sheerafrenkel/how-did-isis-become-the-richest-terrorist-group-in-the-world#.ju1WkW9Xb](http://www.buzzfeed.com/sheerafrenkel/how-did-isis-become-the-richest-terrorist-group-in-the-world#.ju1WkW9Xb).

<sup>39</sup> Norwood, Paul R., Benjamin M. Jensen, and Justin Barnes. "Capturing the Character of Future War." *Parameters* 46 (2016): 81-92. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press.

## Notes

<sup>40</sup> Al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. "The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Dec. 2014.

<sup>41</sup> Lister, Tim, Ray Sanchez, Mark Bixler, Sean O'Key, Michael Hogenmiller, and Mohammed Tawfeeq. "ISIS Goes Global: 143 Attacks in 29 Countries Have Killed 2,043." *CNN*. Cable News Network, 16 Jan. 2017. Web. 28 Jan. 2017.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, Washington DC, February 2013.

<sup>45</sup> Jenkins, Brian Michael, Andrew Liepman and Henry H. Willis. *Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF317.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF317.html). Also available in print form.

<sup>46</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, Washington DC, February 2013.

<sup>47</sup> Ogun, Mehmet Nesip. "ISIS: Less Territory, More Dangerous." *The National Interest*. N.p., 17 Nov. 2016. Web. 08 Jan. 2017.

<sup>48</sup> Obama, Barack H. *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2011.

<sup>49</sup> "Creation of the Department of Homeland Security." The Department of Homeland Security, 25 Sept. 2015. Web. 04 Feb. 2017. <https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security>.

<sup>50</sup> Department of Homeland Security, *2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, Washington DC, 2014.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> "National Counterterrorism Center Overview." *National Counterterrorism Center*. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Web. 28 Jan. 2017. <https://www.nctc.gov/overview.html>.

<sup>53</sup> Jenkins, Brian Michael, Andrew Liepman and Henry H. Willis. *Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF317.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF317.html).

<sup>54</sup> Joint Publication 3-28: *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 31 July 2013.

<sup>55</sup> "Air Force Distributed Common Ground System." *Af.mil*. United States Air Force, 13 Oct. 2015. Web. 14 Feb. 2017. <http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104525/air-force-distributed-common-ground-system.aspx>.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> "Understanding the Guard's Duty Status." Understanding the Guard's Duty Status (n.d.): n. pag. *National Guard Association of the United States*. Web. <http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20Statues.pdf>.

<sup>60</sup> Doyle, Charles, and Jennifer K. Elsea. "The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law." Congressional Research Service, 16 Aug. 2012.

## Notes

<sup>61</sup> Joint Publication 3-28: *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 31 July 2013.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Kealy, Sean J. (2003) "Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement," *Yale Law & Policy Review*: Vol. 21: Iss. 2, Article 3.

<sup>67</sup> Joint Publication 3-28: *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 31 July 2013.

<sup>68</sup> Jenkins, Brian Michael, Andrew Liepman and Henry H. Willis. *Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF317.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF317.html).

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Joint Publication 3-28: *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 31 July 2013.

<sup>71</sup> Jenkins, Brian Michael, Andrew Liepman and Henry H. Willis. *Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF317.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF317.html).

<sup>72</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, Washington DC, February 2013.

<sup>73</sup> Department of Defense, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington DC, 4 March 2013.

<sup>74</sup> Jenkins, Brian Michael, Andrew Liepman and Henry H. Willis. *Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF317.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF317.html).

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> "Air Force Distributed Common Ground System." *Af.mil*. U.S. Air Force, 13 Oct. 2015. Web. 11 Feb. 2017.  
<http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104525/air-force-distributed-common-ground-system.aspx>.

<sup>81</sup> Al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. "The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State." *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, Dec. 2014.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "Air Force Distributed Common Ground System." *Af.mil*. U.S. Air Force, 13 Oct. 2015. Web. 11 Feb. 2017. <http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104525/air-force-distributed-common-ground-system.aspx>.
- Al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. "The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Dec. 2014.
- Ayalon, Amichay and Brian Michael Jenkins. War by What Means, According to Whose Rules? The Challenge for Democracies Facing Asymmetric Conflicts: Proceedings of a RAND–Israel Democracy Institute Workshop, December 3–4, 2014. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF334.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF334.html).
- Bahney, Benjamin, and Patrick Johnston B. "To Defeat ISIS, Focus on Its Real Sources of Strength." Rand Corporation, 4 Dec. 2015. Web. 24 Sept. 2016.
- Bunker, R. J., & Chair, M. (2014). The complexity of modern asymmetric warfare. *Parameters*, 43(4), 144-145.
- "Creation of the Department of Homeland Security." The Department of Homeland Security, 25 Sept. 2015. Web. 04 Feb. 2017. <https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security>.
- Davis, Lynn E., Michael J. McNERNEY, James S. Chow, Thomas Hamilton, Sarah Harting and Daniel Byman. Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and U.S. Security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR449.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR449.html).
- Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, Washington DC, February 2013.
- Department of Defense, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington DC, 4 March 2013.
- Department of Homeland Security, *2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, Washington DC, 2014.
- Department of Homeland Security, *Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2014-2018*, Washington DC, 13 January 2015.
- Frenkel, S. (2014), "How ISIS Became the Richest Terrorist Group in the World", BuzzFeed, [www.buzzfeed.com/sheerafrenkel/how-did-isis-become-the-richest-terrorist-group-in-the-world#.ju1WkW9Xb](http://www.buzzfeed.com/sheerafrenkel/how-did-isis-become-the-richest-terrorist-group-in-the-world#.ju1WkW9Xb).
- Goss, Thomas, "'Who's in Charge?'" New Challenges in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security." *Homeland Security Affairs* 2, Article 2 (April 2006). <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/173>.

- Ibrahim, Azeem. "The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq." *The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq*. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, May 2014. Web. 14 Jan. 2017.
- "ISIS Sanctuary: April 22, 2016." *Understandingwar.org*. Institute for the Study of War, 22 Apr. 2016. Web.  
[http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20Sanctuary%20April%2022-01\\_9.png](http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20Sanctuary%20April%2022-01_9.png).
- Jenkins, Brian Michael, Andrew Liepman and Henry H. Willis. Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF317.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF317.html).
- Johnson, David E. "Fighting the 'Islamic State' The Case for US Ground Forces." Spring 2015. pp 7-18.
- Johnston, Patrick B., Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard J. Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick Ryan and Jonathan Wallace. Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1192.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html).
- Jones, Seth G.. A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR637.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.html).
- Joint Publication 3-27: *Homeland Defense*, 29 July 2013.
- Joint Publication 3-28: *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 31 July 2013.
- Kathleen Bouzis . Countering the Islamic State: U.S. Counterterrorism Measures. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume 38, Number 10 (October 2015), pp. 885-897,  
<http://ejournals.ebsco.com.aufric.idm.oclc.org/direct.asp?ArticleID=47E3A64D73708F238506>.
- Katzman, Kenneth, Blanchard, Christopher M., Humud, Carla, E., Weed, Matthew, C., Margesson, Rhoda, Tiersky, Alex. "The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy." *Congressional Research Service*. 11 September 2014.
- Kayyem, Juliette and Steven E. Roberts. "War on Terrorism Will Compel Revisions to Posse Comitatus." *National Defense Magazine*, (November 30, 2002).
- Kealy, Sean J. (2003) "Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement," *Yale Law & Policy Review*: Vol. 21: Iss. 2, Article 3.
- Larson, Eric V. and John E. Peters. Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001.  
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1251.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251.html).
- Lister, Tim, Ray Sanchez, Mark Bixler, Sean O'Key, Michael Hogenmiller, and Mohammed

- Tawfeeq. "ISIS Goes Global: 143 Attacks in 29 Countries Have Killed 2,043." *CNN*. Cable News Network, 16 Jan. 2017. Web. 28 Jan. 2017.
- Lundberg, Russell and Henry Willis, "Assessing Homeland Security Risks: A Comparative Assessment of Ten Hazards." *Homeland Security Affairs* 11, Article 10 (December 2015). <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/7707>.
- Madden, Dan, Dick Hoffmann, Michael Johnson, Fred Krawchuk, Bruce R. Nardulli, John E. Peters, Linda Robinson and Abby Doll. *Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR779.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR779.html).
- McCauley, J. (2016). The future of asymmetric warfare in middle east. *Defence Journal*, 19(10), 63-65.
- McMaster, H. R. (2008). Asymmetric warfare: Threat and response in the 21st century. *Survival*, 50(5), 206.
- "National Counterterrorism Center Overview." *National Counterterrorism Center*. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Web. 28 Jan. 2017. <https://www.nctc.gov/overview.html>.
- Norwood, Paul R., Benjamin M. Jensen, and Justin Barnes. "Capturing the Character of Future War." *Parameters* 46 (2016): 81-92. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press.
- Obama, Barack H. *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2011.
- Obama, Barack H. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2015.
- Ogun, Mehmet Nesip. "ISIS: Less Territory, More Dangerous." *The National Interest*. N.p., 17 Nov. 2016. Web. 08 Jan. 2017.
- Robinson, Linda, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwille and Raphael S. Cohen. *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR816.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR816.html).
- Saltman, Erin Marie, and Charlie Winter. "Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism." Quilliam Foundation, (November 2014): n. p. Print.
- Telhami, Shibley. "American Public Attitudes Toward ISIS and Syria." Brookings Institution, 8 Jan. 2015.
- "Terrorism." *fbi.gov*. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 03 May 2016. Web. 28 Jan. 2017.
- The Heritage Foundation, "2016 Index of US Military Strength.", Web. <http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/assessments/us-military-power/us-air-force/>.

"Transcript: President Obama's Address to the Nation on the San Bernardino Terror Attack and the War on ISIS." *CNN*. Cable News Network, 7 Dec. 2015. Web. 11 Feb. 2017.  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/06/politics/transcript-obama-san-bernardino-isis-address/>.

Tucker, J. B. (1999). Asymmetric warfare. *Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy*, 14(2), 32-38.

"Understanding the Guard's Duty Status." Understanding the Guard's Duty Status (n.d.): n. pag. *National Guard Association of the United States*. Web.  
<http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20Statues.pdf>.

Wechsler, William F., Mark Katz N., Charles Lister, and Audrey Cronin Kurth. "The ISIS Threat to U.S. National Security: Policy Choices." *Middle East Policy*, Volume XXIII, No. 1 (Spring 2016). *Middle East Policy Council*.

Whiteside, C.. New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement (2002-2016). *Perspectives on Terrorism, North America*, 10, aug. 2016.  
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/523>.

