Viewing Jihadist-Extremism Through War Theory: The Case for National Humility
Abstract
Criticisms of US policy ventures against jihadist-extremist threats in the Middle East are useful but incomplete. Criticizing the formulation and execution of policy overlooks a more fundamental source of missteps: theoretical attitudes on the role of war. Perhaps American attitudes obstruct the ability to view war from a theoretically justifiable perspective. Theory tells us war is uncontrollable, despite efforts by some theorists and practitioners to control it. This article suggests American leaders often mistakenly believe they can control war in the uniquely uncontrollable context of jihadist extremism in the Middle East. American attitudes toward war generate and develop through the nation's inaugural acts of war policy, the communications of the commander-in-chief. Analysis of commander-in-chief messages justifying the 2003 invasion of Iraq and 2011 intervention in Libya reveal questionable theoretical perspectives and mistaken expectations that American power and influence would ensure control of war and its outcomes. Commander-in-chief communications justifying the Counter-DA'ISH intervention of 2014 communicated something different: humility, by theoretically recognizing uncontrollable war in the jihadist-extremist context and articulating measured, prudent expectations. The relationship between national humility and achievement of national expectations and goals suggests there is value in a fundamental re-assessment of theoretical attitudes on the role of war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2017
- Accession Number
- AD1055007
Entities
People
- John J. Zavage
Organizations
- Air War College