



**AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INDICATORS OF A SUCCESSFUL  
TOTAL FORCE ASSOCIATION**

THESIS

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AFIT-ENS-MS-17-M-133

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
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THESIS

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Greg E. Hoyt, BS

Captain, USAF

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### **Abstract**

The Air Force, since adopting and subsequently developing the Total Force concept in the early 1970s, has not thoroughly outlined clear objectives by which the progress toward and realization of this strategic vision should be defined and measured. Without clear definition, direction, and method of evaluation, the ability to credibly claim any subsequent successes or failures in the pursuit of this vision become vulnerable to challenge. Indeed, the mere claim that a single, clear vision exists may be challenged.

The Total Force concept's degree of success has, on multiple occasions through its history, been critiqued with the most recent instance occurring with the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force's report, delivered to the President and Congress, specifying 42 recommended improvements. The relatively brief history of the Total Force concept has led to a gap in knowledge with respect to this topic. While the SecAF and CSAF have employed language implicitly claiming successful integration of the Total Force and all the stated benefits thereof, these benefits as well as the key success factors for attaining them at the tactical level have yet to be quantified.

Therefore, through the semi-structured interviewing of tactical level Total Force leaders, this research provides an assessment of the "perceived" local Total Force Association health, highlights strategic and tactical level communication and perception disconnects with regards to the Total Force concept, and provides the Headquarters Air Force Total Force Continuum office an actionable listing of tactical level obstacles and concerns as well as a collection of best practices and innovative solutions.

*Non Nobis Domine Non Nobis Sed Nomini Tuo Da Gloriam  
In Nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti*

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-Greg Hoyt

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# AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INDICATORS OF A SUCCESSFUL TOTAL FORCE ASSOCIATION

## I. INTRODUCTION

### *Background*

The Air Force (AF), since adopting and subsequently developing the Total Force concept (TFC), has not thoroughly outlined clear objectives by which the progress toward and realization of this strategic vision should be defined and measured. Without clear definition, direction, and method of evaluation, the ability to credibly claim any subsequent successes or failures in the pursuit of this vision become vulnerable to challenge. Indeed, the mere claim that a single, clear vision exists may be challenged.

Regarding the Total Force and the TFC, the language and wording choices of the AF's most senior leaders is of interest to follow. These senior leaders, the Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), annually report and deliver statements to the Senate's Committee on Armed Services. These *USAF Posture Statements*, as they are commonly referred, cover a spectrum of topics; but have, since 2005, included strategic intent with respect to the Total Force (USAF Posture Statement, 2005). The significant point of interest in following the wording of these statements is the apparent movement of these most senior AF leaders from an introduction and explanation of what it means to be "Total Force" (i.e. what organizations/components comprise this coined phrase); to a recommendation for integration of the Total Force components; to a push for continued integration; and finally, to an implicit assumption of successful integration (i.e. association).

Some might argue such a verbal progression is, indeed, natural and healthy development of a strategic vision over time. Arguably, to lead an organization such as the AF into a new way of doing business, given its size and scope of responsibility, requires a patient, persistent pushing of a consistent agenda. Such perspectives might even complement the *Unity of Effort* displayed by the AF's senior leaders from 2005 to the present, given the fact that the United States has seen multiple persons respectively fill the chairs of both SecAF and CSAF.

Yet, proclamations of healthy development of a strategic vision can only be claimed if the language choice or strategic intent of the AF's senior leaders is substantiated by measured progress of the organization toward the defined goal. Put simply, if the walk does not reflect the talk, then discussions of "progress", "development", and "change" are meaningless. Contrarily, if over time, reality does not reflect the stated assertions; then, unfortunately, those words lose their meanings and very possibly undermine the credibility of those same senior leaders.

This negative effect presents an opportunity for thoughtful consideration since the degree of success of the TFC has, on multiple occasions throughout its history, been critiqued. As one of the most recent examples, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF) established by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014, Section 362 was charged to "undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Air Force and to determine whether, and how, the Air Force structure should be modified to best fulfill current and anticipated mission requirements in a manner consistent with available resources" (DAF, 2015). In January 2014 the NCSAF delivered to the President and Congress a report specifying 42 separate, recommended actions promoting an integrated Total Air Force and a focus of improving the TFC from its current state.

The relatively brief history of the TFC has led to a gap in knowledge with respect to this topic. Despite the fact that “the uniformed members of today’s Total Force consist of approximately 327,600 Regular Air Force Airmen [RegAF], 105,400 Air National Guard [ANG] Airmen, and 70,400 Air Force Reserve [AFR] Airmen actively serving in the Selected Reserve” (USAF Posture Statement, 2014) and that many have been both directly and indirectly affected by this strategic vision, little has been written evaluating the shared perspectives of strategic and tactical leaders concerning the acquired benefits and challenges associated with its implementation. This prefacing context leads to the stated problem at hand.

### ***Problem Statement***

The SecAF and CSAF have employed language implicitly claiming successful integration of the Total Force and all the stated benefits thereof. However, these benefits as well as the key success factors to attain them at the tactical level have yet to be quantified.

### ***Research Purpose***

This research will attempt to highlight disconnects in communication and perception by comparing and contrasting the statements of the Air Force’s most strategic leaders to the statements, opinions, and perspectives of tactical Total Force leaders.

### ***Research Question***


What success factors allow tactical level Total Force leaders to share a common objective and means of evaluating the Total Force *Active Association*?

### *Understanding Total Force*

Before delving into the relationships linking the component members of the Total Force and subsequently the specific research focus, a benefit exists to understanding what personnel categories make up the component members which in turn collectively represent the Total Force.

Total Force is not a concept strictly consigned for AF use. To the contrary, all branches of the military employ some form of the TFC. However for the purposes of this research, the discussion of the contextual literature has been narrowed to include only those sources pertinent to the AF's development on the subject. That said, Total Force as defined by AF Doctrine "consists of the people who make up the Air Force" including RegAF or Active Duty (AD) members, ANG members, AFR personnel, United States Air Force (USAF) military retired members, USAF civilian personnel (including foreign national direct and indirect-hire, as well as non-appropriated fund employees), contractor staff, host-nation support personnel, and the Civil Air Patrol as the official Air Force Auxiliary (The Total Force, 2015).

This Total Force listing, being quite extensive, is depicted below through the usage of an organizational chart in the following Figure 1.



**Figure 1 – Components of the Total Force (DoD, 1990)**

Figure 1 gives the full spectrum of personnel categories which collectively represent the Total Force. Within the “Research Focus” section of this chapter an explanation is given for further winnowing down the Total Force to an examination of the two overarching components of *Active Forces* and the *Reserve Forces* highlighted, along with their pertinent subcategories, in blue. The blue and purple arrows, pointing to the distinct *Active* and *Reserve Forces*’ category columns, provide the common use acronyms of RegAF or AD Component and Air Reserve Component (ARC) respectively.

### *Total Force Associations (TFAs)*

Per the newly published Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-1001, *Planning Total Force Associations*, the AF formally partners Active and Reserve component organizations through Total Force Associations (TFAs) in which “two or more USAF component organizations agree to share resources to perform a common mission” (AFI 90-1001, 2017). These TFAs are CSAF-approved operational constructs with the purpose of organizing, training, and equipping USAF forces.

There are, as also defined by AFI 90-1001, two Total Force Association types:

- *Classic Associations* in which a RegAF Sponsor organization shares a mission with one or more ARC Associate organizations
- *Active Associations* in which an ARC Sponsor organization shares a mission with one or more RegAF Associate organizations

### ***Research Focus***

An evaluation of all AF TFAs since the earliest Reserve Associate example in 1968 would, doubtless, bear fruit; however, this research scopes its focus to those instances with *Active Associate* organizations. In *Active Associations* “the sponsor organization [i.e. the ARC] is the organization with primary responsibility for mission accomplishment and normally assigned the preponderance of the primary physical resources (e.g. aircraft, weapon system equipment, weapon system support, and production facilities)” (AFI 90-1001, 2017). At the same time, “the associate organization [i.e. the AD Component] shares the primary physical resources assigned to the sponsor organization, and may provide additional physical resources necessary to support the shared mission” (AFI 90-1001, 2017). Some confusion may stem from the fact that associate and sponsor organizations will “vary from full or tailored wings to groups, squadrons, and detachments


depending on the scope of the shared mission” (AFI 90-1001, 2017). It is important to note, however, that the TFA “sponsor organization status does not imply ownership of an installation” (AFI 90-1001, 2017).

Furthermore, TFAs not being limited to one organizational career field, this research scopes the focus to those *Active Associations* comprised of aircraft maintenance organizations.

Finally as previously stated and demonstrated, since the Total Force consists of such a diverse spectrum of personnel categories, the specific TFAs and aircraft maintenance organizations of interest for this study are those solely comprised of AD personnel supplementing either partner AFR or ANG components (i.e. the ARC).

*Total Force Active Association Example*

In an effort to make this information more tangible, the following Figure 2 gives a real world example of a Total Force Active Association.



**Figure 2 – Total Force Active Association**

This example depicts two separate Wings and their subordinate Groups (i.e. the 15th comprised of AD members and the 154th comprised of ANG members) partnering to conduct the single mission of flying and maintaining a fleet of F-22 aircraft. Since, in this case, the aircraft maintenance TFA is an *Active Association* the AD component functions as the “Associate” sending personnel (depicted by the blue arrow) to comprise 20 percent of the F-22 maintenance effort. The ANG component functioning as the “Sponsor” is the organization with primary responsibility for mission accomplishment; and is, therefore, assigned the preponderance of the primary physical resources (i.e. aircraft, weapon system support, and production facilities) and administers 80 percent of the manpower (depicted by the purple arrow) for the F-22 maintenance effort.

## ***Investigative Questions***

The following investigative questions seek to comprehensively flesh out and provide the means for answering the overarching research question as it pertains to the stated problem:

- IQ 1: What, *collectively*, do leaders understand the TFC to mean at the tactical level?
- IQ 2: On which topics, respecting employment of the TFC, do tactical level Total Force leaders *collectively* perceive similar benefits as those lauded by the AF's most strategic leaders?
- IQ 3: What unforeseen, symptomatic problems (with discernable root causes) do tactical level Total Force leaders perceive employment of the TFC introducing?
- IQ 4: Regarding the listed root causes, do tactical level Total Force leaders believe decision making and subsequent solution generating to be more appropriately handled by higher organizational levels?
- IQ 5: In what ways do tactical level Total Force leaders perceive a lack of adequate training, resources, and/or guidance to address Total Force concerns?
- IQ 6: From whom or what entity do tactical level Total Force leaders seek Total Force specific guidance?
- IQ 7: What is the *collective* wisdom from tactical level Total Force leaders for sustaining and/or improving employment of the TFC?

## ***Methodology***

### ***Data Collection Method***

To thoroughly assess the tactical Total Force leader perspectives, a qualitative approach must be applied to multiple topics which fall under their purview. The qualitative data gathering

method employed in this research is the *Interview* process. Much of the information regarding Total Force benefits and challenges resides in those personnel who currently have or formerly have had hands-on experience within associated organizations. Thus, the target population of the study will include Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) currently serving within TFAs as well as possibly having prior TFA experience. Interviews, conducted in person, would, of course, be the preferred data collection approach, but due to the limitations of both time and cost, the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured, impersonal manner via telephone conference calls. By using the interview method with its direct, focused nature of communication, the researcher had the ability to capitalize on such strengths as the opportunities for feedback, for additional probing of complex answers, and for garnering high subject participation (i.e. 94 percent).

#### *Data Analysis Method*

The collection of the data from the subjects was accomplished through the digital recording of the interviews of all responses as well as note taking during each interview. Once collected, the responses were then transcribed and coded to afford the opportunity for trend and theme analysis. The discerned themes and trends were assessed with respect to their bearing on the study's previously listed investigative questions and research question.

#### *Assumptions/Limitations*

Although most certainly beneficial to study the implementation benefits and challenges of all the AF's currently existing 112 TFAs (see Appendix A), this research was limited to nine (see Appendix B) of the total 25 *Active Associations*. An assumption then of this research is that the research results are transferable to the other 11 *Active Associations* as well as the 22 *Classic Associations* directly conducting aircraft maintenance. The constriction to nine TFAs is a

limitation, as previously stated, largely to the time and resource constraints associated with the study. The bottom line assumption, therefore, is that this research has direct and indirect implications for 42 of the 53 (i.e. 79 percent) aircraft maintenance TFAs (see Appendix C).

### ***Implications***

Three related implications emerge at the outset of this research. The first implication is that the interviews provide an assessment of the tactical level's "perceived" local TFA health. Secondly, this research highlights strategic and tactical level communication and perception disconnects with regards to the TFC. Finally, this research provides the Headquarters Air Force (HAF) Total Force Continuum office an actionable listing of tactical level obstacles and concerns as well as a collection of tactical level best practices and innovative solutions.

In this way, the research better equips the Total Force community both up and down the chain of command with a clearer understanding of how the strategic vision for the Total Force concept is being realized and/or hindered while promoting greater transparency of the common stress points and success factors.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### *Chapter Overview*

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the literature highlighting the development of the Department of Defense (DoD) and more particularly the Air Force's Total Force "concept to policy" over the course of the past 44 years as well as the push for association of some of the major component members: Active Duty (AD), Air Force Reserve (AFR), and Air National Guard (ANG).

### *Description*

#### *History of the Total Force Concept (TFC)*

In 1970, with the end of the draft and the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Melvin Laird introduced and the DoD adopted the "Total Force Concept" (Buchalter & Elan, 2007). This initiative came on the heels of and is arguably linked to Congressional cuts in defense spending at the time. (RAND, 1993) A full nine years after the TFC's introduction the Comptroller General, a position appointed by the President of the United States (POTUS) responsible for the fiscal activities of the United States government, reported to Congress regarding the status of the Total Force in, *DoD "Total Force Management" – Fact or Rhetoric?*. Within this report the Comptroller General observed developing implementation disparities between the services, called for standardized guidance, and requested a means of measuring Total Force benefits. At the time, he stated the "present total force policy is vague and incomplete [...] the services have developed independent policies and management systems with different manpower and cost elements. [...] The [DoD] should issue comprehensive guidance for a uniform total force policy and for effectively measuring its benefits" (Staats, 1979). The

impetus driving such statements and calls for action stemmed from a “Congressional interest in reducing military costs without sacrificing readiness” (Staats, 1979). This stated balance of a desire for reducing costs without sacrificing readiness sets the stage for the next 30 years of Total Force Management discussion and efforts.

*Origin of the Total Force Policy (TFP)*

Three years after the introduction of the TFC, new SecDef, James Schlesinger, heralded the TFP. He declared that “Total Force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogeneous whole” (Correll, 2011). Of particular interest, despite the SecDef’s sentiment, was the discarding of the TFP draft the same year as its inception rendering his statement “essentially an expression of support rather than a change of substance” (RAND, 1993), (Correll, 2011).

The discarding of the TFP serves as a significant point to note because future senior leaders heavily reference the policy as if it has lasted the tests of time. In 2002 SecDef Rumsfeld references the TFP stating that it is “hampering his ability to deploy forces” and suggesting he would seek changes (Jones, 2004). Yet, if the concept never legally matured from *concept* to codified *policy* except in “expression of support rather than change in substance”, then, for 30 years, the progression of this topic/strategy is grounded on a subjectively sentimental foundation. Much overarching wartime strategy depends on the TFP’s effectiveness. A solely sentimental foundation jeopardizes the success of this wartime strategy.

In more recent years, the progression of language from the references by senior leaders becomes easier to note as they quickly evolve and build upon one another. First, in 2005 comes a strategic level introduction:

- “We have developed a long-range plan to allocate resources, balance risks, and shape the force to protect our nation – a comprehensive Future Total Force (FTF)” (USAF Posture Statement, 2005).

While not truly a new concept as this statement implies, having its origins reaching back to the early 1970s, this introduction quickly shifts to an emphasis for greater use with the CSAF directing Major Command (MAJCOM) “commanders to provide plans [...] for more closely integrating [ARC] assets into active duty units and operations” (Buchalter & Elan, 2007). As the years progress and with the publication of an Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-10 outlining command policy, this language emphasizing greater degrees of employment continues:

- “We will continue transforming to meet the challenges of a dynamic world by rebalancing the force and realigning our structure into a Total Force that meets increased demands for persistent intelligence, rapid mobility and precision strike capabilities” (USAF Posture Statement, 2006).
- “Your Air Force today is a seamless Total Force [...] We will continue [...] rebalancing [...] and realigning our structure into a Total Force that meets increased demands for persistent intelligence, rapid mobility and precision strike capabilities” (USAF Posture Statement, 2007).

As the senior leaders’ strategic vision progresses, certain key terms simultaneously transform. For example, “Future Total Force”, introduced as new terminology in the previous 2005 senior leader quote, is discarded in favor of “Total Force” and the strategic level begins

heavily using the term “integration”. In fact, in 2007 HAF publishes AFI 90-1001 outlining and directing the *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration (TFI)*. (AFI 90-1001, 2017)

By 2008, the emphasis of increased employment persists with the subtle language shift now giving validation and continued support of current Total Force integrative efforts:

- “A distinguishing hallmark of the Air Force is the ease with which Total Force Airmen work seamlessly together at home and abroad” (USAF Posture Statement, 2008).

The next progression in the language occurs when the push and validation of “seamless integration” shifts to the recognition and promotion of greater interdependence between the Total Force contributing members:

- “We are one Air Force [...] There is great interdependence between Active, Guard, and Reserve forces. [...] It is essential that we manage the health of the Total Force holistically, and we are committed, now more than ever, to strengthen our integration of effort” (USAF Posture Statement, 2013).
- “The Air Force has made great strides in understanding how a three-component structure can operate as a powerful, efficient, and cost-effective Service that maximizes the integrated power of our air, space, and cyberspace forces. This needs to be the way we do business, without even thinking about it” (USAF Posture Statement, 2014).

By 2014 and accompanying this recognition and promotion language, HAF introduces new terminology such as “Total Force Integration Association (TFIA)” with the publishing of the *interim* Air Force Guidance Memorandum (AFGM) to AFI 90-1001 (AFI 90-1001 AFGM 2014-01, 2014). While Total Force Integration (TFI) still remains in relevant usage this addition to the jargon does foreshadow future changes.

The strategic language, ultimately, recognizes the progression of the concept to the way of doing business and promotes the strategy’s continued vector:

- “Put simply, our goal is to render obsolete the need for the term ‘Total Force’ – but maintain its premise. This can only be considered a success when the lines have blurred sufficiently to optimize Active, Guard, and Reserve contributions (both uniformed and civilian) to the Air Force mission, while recognizing and leveraging their unique characteristics.” (America's Air Force: A Call to the Future, 2014)
- “We must further blur the lines between the components where appropriate, while retaining their strengths. In addition to current associate unit models, we must identify additional opportunities for integration between Active and Reserve Components” (USAF Strategic Master Plan, 2015).

With the 2016 publication of the *updated* but still *interim* guidance to AFI 90-1001, HAF mostly discontinues its use of the apparently transitional term, TFIA, in favor of the now more familiar Total Force Association (TFA) (AFI 90-1001 AFGM 2016-01, 2016). One year later and possibly in response to the #12 recommendation for policy revisions from the NCSAF report, the final altering of terms takes place with the most recent publication of AFI 90-1001

(DAF, 2015). HAF officially defines the formerly described TFIs as TFAs retitling, in fact, AFI 90-1001 to the current *Planning Total Force Associations (TFAs)* and ridding the Total Force community completely of such in-between language as Total Force Integration Association (TFIA) (AFI 90-1001, 2017). Any future progression of the term TFI, though, whether to transform again or simply disappear, remains indeterminate.

At some unknown point during the course of this timeline, the previously stated 2006 AFPD 90-10 which outlined and directed command policy for Total Force Integration is removed from the AF electronic Publishing Site. This website more commonly known as “AF e-Pubs” serves as the central repository for all AF Publications currently in effect. This recall or removal of a publication directing Total Force Integration activity, shares remarkable similarity to the fate enjoyed by SecDef Schlesinger’s TFP some 30 years previous (i.e. the TFP draft was discarded the same year as its inception). Simply put, both instances are similar in that the strategic level drafts policy directing tactical level action followed by senior leaders claiming developmental progress of the Total Force concept only to, then, later discard that same directive policy. The historical observer is left asking, “What drives such behavior?”

Air Force Policy Memorandum (AFPM) 90-10, a document which is temporary in nature, is published in 2016 giving an overview of the now removed AFPD 90-10 outlining TFI governance. Yet this memorandum merely points to an AFPD that “will be codified” in “*the first instance of a to-be published Air Force publication [emphasis added]*” (AFPM 90-10, 2016). In other words, over the years, current TFIs have assumed and now bear the name, TFA, with its implied development of status. And while this development garners the support from the strategic leaders’ language, the codified guidance for how TFIs should be conducted *has yet to be written*. It appears as if the senior leaders are waiting for the tactical leaders to figure out how

to conduct Total Force Integration/Association efforts before they write the policy directing those efforts. Put simply, the tail appears to be wagging the dog.

### ***Total Force Strategic Level Guidance and Management***

#### *DoD Strategic Level Total Force Oversight*

Pivoting to discuss oversight and management of the Total Force, two counselor lanes exist to advise the SecDef: one speaking to Total Force issues and the other to Total Force mixture. The principal advisors to the SecDef for the first lane of counsel (i.e. Total Force issues) are the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (DoD, 1990).

The second lane of counsel (i.e. Total Force mixture) comes from “the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) [who] serves as advisor to the SecDef on existing and projected military threats and the mix of the Total Force needed to meet the threat” (DoD, 1990). This task is neither simple nor easy. In fact, a number of very dynamic and fluid concepts emerge steering “choices about the size of the Total Force and the mix of active and reserve forces [depending] on the nature of current and potential threats to the nation, the military capabilities required to meet those threats, the ability of different types of forces to accomplish their wartime missions, the availability of defense resources, and the willingness to accept the greater or lesser risks associated with various levels of defense spending” (DoD, 1990)(Total Force Policy Study, 1990).

The CJCS, therefore, “provides strategic direction to the armed forces and develops operational plans” (DoD, 1990). The CJCS must strategize with the entire DoD in mind and not just a single service such as the AF. The AF fits into the strategic picture of Total Force

management by developing “its programs on the basis of top-down guidance. National military objectives established by the President, the Defense Planning Guidance, the DoD Total Force Policy, and fiscal constraints provide the framework for force development” (DoD, 1990).

The consideration given to “fiscal constraints” later becomes a focal point of discussion for this research since “the criteria are used to provide the most cost-effective force to meet stated warfighting levels [with key] considerations [including] availability, supportability, and mission capabilities” (DoD, 1990). As previously stated, “there is great interdependence between Active, Guard, and Reserve forces.” Given this interdependence and fiscal consideration, it affords little wonder, when coupled with the oversight framework, that the CSAF and SecAF warn of the importance of “[ensuring] the right balance between [Total Force members]” (USAF Posture Statement, 2013). They specifically state that

“too much force structure in the Active component does not capitalize on potential lower operational costs of personnel and installations in the Reserve component. Too little force structure in the Active component requires Guardsmen and Reservists to deploy more often—even in peacetime—which breaks the model of a part-time force, threatens the sustainability of the Total Force, and increases costs significantly” (USAF Posture Statement, 2013).

This warning then raises the question as to how, over the course of time, the AF chooses to manage this development of the Total Force.

#### *USAF Strategic Level Total Force Oversight*

The CSAF in 2006 directed the formation of the *Total Force Integration Directorate* an agency “responsible for future force structure, emerging-mission beddown and development of Total Force organizational constructs. Working with [the] partners in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, the Air Force [maximizes] overall Joint combat capability” (USAF Posture Statement, 2006).

In 2013 strategic AF leaders charter a new entity known as the *Total Force Task Force*. This entity, representing a “team led by three two-star general officers from the Regular Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve”, assumed the task of “leading a reassessment of the Air Force’s efforts to develop the appropriate Active and Reserve component balance through processes that enable the Department of the Air Force to leverage the inherent strengths, unique aspects, and characteristics of each component” (USAF Posture Statement, 2013). The “*Total Force Task Force*, [charged with] conducting a comprehensive review of Total Force requirements and [developing] strategic options to ensure that the Air Force balances the strengths of each component while sustaining necessary capabilities in the years ahead”, served as “a focal point for the [Congressionally directed NCSAF review]” (USAF Posture Statement, 2013).

The temporary nature of the *Total Force Task Force* was later realized when repurposed in 2014 as the current *Total Force Continuum*, an office located in the Pentagon, with the defined role “to explore and leverage the unique strengths and characteristics of each component” (USAF Posture Statement, 2014). The *Total Force Task Force*, despite the short-lived extent of their oversight had “conducted a comprehensive review of Total Force requirements, offered ideas for improving collaboration between the three components, and gave [strategic leadership] a starting point for future Total Force analysis and assessment efforts” (USAF Posture Statement, 2014). The *Total Force Continuum* continues “the body of work initiated by the *Total Force Task Force* [by] continuing to develop and refine decision support tools that will help shape and inform the [future] budget deliberations” (USAF Posture Statement, 2014).

Overall, the *Total Force Continuum* focuses on two primary lines of effort: *Balance* and *One Air Force*. *Balance* is tasked to develop strategic Force Mix Options that ensure Total Force

capabilities meet future requirements. *One Air Force* is tasked to identify legal, policy, operational, and organizational changes to enhance the Total Force integration to include management and oversight of the TFAs. This role mimics the previously described two counselor lanes which advise the SecDef on Total Force issues and Total Force mixture.

Thus, while the changes in their names and the adjustments to their purposes follow the same pattern as the previously discussed Total Force terminology, clearly agencies have and do exist at the strategic level to conduct Total Force oversight.

### ***Total Force Concept Stated Benefits***

Stepping away from the discussions of Total Force origin and oversight, the prevailing question which persists throughout this literary journey is, “Why employ a Total Force model?” Previous allusions to fiscal consideration, readiness, and the like are sprinkled throughout the above discussion, but this question demands direct addressing and attention.

In the most basic and strategic terms, the Total Force concept presents the SecDef with a risk versus reward decision. Stated plainly, since 1980 (and arguably earlier), while “reducing the size of the active forces, [...] DoD has steadily increased the size of its reserves and the number of missions assigned them [in] an attempt to hold down defense costs” (GAO, 1989). Yet, collecting these costs savings comes with the risk of decreasing “military effectiveness” (GAO, 1989).

If, in its simplest form, this risk versus reward balance reflects the true choice set before the SecDef, then the answer for “why employ a Total Force model” is logically decided by properly identifying and choosing the path in which benefits outweigh costs. The discussion then becomes one of identifying the benefits of employing the Total Force model. Senior AF leaders

describe these benefits in terms of *Synergistic Effects* which are “the proper application of a coordinated force across multiple domains [producing] effects that exceed the contributions of forces employed individually” (Synergistic Effects, 2015). They state that partnering Total Force organizations claim these *Synergistic Effects* through a *Unity of Effort* defined as “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization” (JP 1-0 Joint Personnel Support, 2016).

The following list comprehensively provides the *Synergistic Effects* gained through the employment of the Total Force concept as lauded by the AF’s most senior leaders:

- Improved and Streamlined Training (USAF Posture Statement, 2006)
- Increased Capacity (USAF Posture Statement, 2008)
- Increased Retention (USAF Posture Statement, 2008), (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)
- Enhanced Readiness (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)
- Improved Efficiency (USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2008), (USAF Posture Statement, 2011), (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)
- Improved Flexibility (DoD, 1990), (USAF Posture Statement, 2005), (USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2008)
- Decreased Mobilization (USAF Posture Statement, 2005), (USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture Statement, 2008)
- Increased Cost Savings (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)
- Improved and Streamlined Resource Usage (USAF Posture Statement, 2007)


- Increased Personnel Stability (USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2007)
- Increased Military Capability (USAF Posture Statement, 2005), (USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture Statement, 2008), (USAF Posture Statement, 2011); (USAF Posture Statement, 2013), (DAF, 2014)
- Reduced Duplication of Efforts (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)
- Improved Balance of Experience (DoD, 1990), (USAF Posture Statement, 2005), (USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)
- Improved Leadership Development (USAF Posture Statement, 2006)
- Improved Operational Effectiveness (USAF Posture Statement, 2005), (USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture Statement, 2008), (USAF Posture Statement, 2011), (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)

One may critique the arbitrary nature of these findings and their lack of context. Yet, as mentioned in the previous chapter, multiple independent studies over the years have taken on this challenge of measuring the effectiveness of the Total Force with differing approaches and ultimately critiquing the AF's level of success. This approach merely presents the most senior AF leaders' quoted benefits of employing the Total Force concept.

## ***Total Force Complexities***

### *Total Force Component Legal Distinctions*

Having in the previous chapter defined the component members of the Total Force and specified the categories of interest, a general understanding of the legal distinctions within these two categories (i.e. *Active Forces* and *Reserve Forces*) is now warranted. Another useful mode of viewing these personnel categories is through the lens of their manpower percentages. Figure 3 depicts a percentage makeup of the previously discussed Total Force personnel categories. Readers should keep in mind that these numbers continually change and do not present exact, current day figures but a “ballpark” sense of the proportional sizes.



**Figure 3 – Composition of the Total Force (DoD, 1990)**

As identified by the blue and purple arrows, *Active Forces* and *Reserve Forces* are the personnel categories or Total Force components (i.e. AD and ARC) of interest for this research. Of note from Figure 3 is that, while the overall Total Force percentage mixture (discussed in the

previous *DoD Strategic Level Total Force Oversight* section) of the *Active Forces* and *Reserve Forces* is non-static, the research narrowed Total Force components represent the two largest manpower contributors. In other words, the AD component and ARC are relatively big organizations.

Another important concept depicted in Figure 3 are the distinctions between United States Code (USC) Titles 10 and 32:

- Title 10, USC refers to the *Federal Mission* to staff, equip, and train flying and support units that augment the AF to conduct training in support of Total Force requirements, perform peacetime missions compatible with training requirements, maintain mobilization readiness, and support contingency and wartime taskings.
- Title 32, USC refers to the *State Mission* to provide trained and equipped units to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order, and public safety as directed by the governor.

*Active Forces* are defined “as the component of the Air Force that consists of persons whose continuous service on active duty in both peace and war is contemplated by law” (The Total Force, 2015). Simply put, an AD member serves in the military full time under Title 10, USC.

*Reserve Forces* consists of both AFR and ANG members. The AFR “a component of the [AF] as prescribed by law. They are represented by a mix of [personnel categories]” (The Total Force, 2015). The ANG is an “organized state militia and a reserve component of the Air Force” (The Total Force, 2015). However, the ANG is also “a federal organization [as] a reserve

component of the [AF]. [ANG] Airmen serve in both organizations, and can move between [the *State and Federal Missions*] as duty requires” (The Total Force, 2015).

Depending on the circumstances and setting, either Title 10 or Title 32, USC can govern the *Reserve Forces*. In other words, depending on the situation, an ARC member can have a chain of command that extends to either the governor of the state or the POTUS. These chains of command are legally distinct; and, thus, introduces variability and status consideration complexities. In a hierarchical and dynamic setting, members and/or leaders find themselves asking “who is in charge?”

The means of navigating these legally driven, status complexities take the form of *Operational Direction (OPDIR)* and *Administrative Control (ADCON)*:

- *OPDIR* “describes the authority of a member of one component to designate objectives, assign tasks, and provide direction to members of another component necessary to accomplish steady-state duties other than operational missions and ensure unity of effort” (AFI 90-1001, 2017).
- *ADCON* refers to “direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.” (AFI 90-1001 AFGM 2016-01, 2016).

Of note, *OPDIR* authority should not be confused with *Operational Control (OPCON)* “authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning task, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission” (Air Force Glossary, 2015). *OPDIR*, rather, “enables functional supervisors from any component to direct personnel from another component detailed under their supervision, and does not apply in the context of military operations under the command and control of a Combatant Commander” (AFI 90-1001, 2017). Simply put, *OPCON* grants a more comprehensive scope of authority of which *OPDIR* is a part.

In a TFA setting, “sponsor and associate organizations retain [*ADCON*] of their own forces separate organizational structures to include Unit Manning Documents (UMDs) and chains of command. ANG organizations [still] must respond to requests from the governor of their state/territory and must fulfill those tasks consistent with provisions of public law” (AFI 90-1001, 2017).

#### *Total Force Cultural Comparison*

As previously stated, the AD component and ARC are relatively large organizations with, in some cases, independent missions, legal distinctions, and fiscal distinctions. With this observation in mind, it is little wonder that they develop cultural distinctions as well. These cultural distinctions further add intricacy to an already complex environment. Reflecting, on the necessity of Total Force leaders *to be aware* of the status (i.e. Title 10 or 32) of all personnel under their control and the requirement (due to *ADCON* distinctions) that they *coordinate* with partnering component leaders for exercise of certain types of authority (e.g. discipline over subordinates), one can appreciate how additional, relational tensions might generate between component members due to cultural differences.

In the below Figure 4, a number of areas are identified in which the cultures of the AD and the ANG prove disparate:

■ AD culture	■ ANG culture
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ More formal unit atmosphere</li> <li>■ Significant number of disciplinary actions</li> <li>■ Large group of under age personnel</li> <li>■ Dormitory living for single junior enlisted</li> <li>■ No UMD slot required for promotion</li> <li>■ Frequent PCS enhances career</li> <li>■ EPR's responsibility growth IAW rank</li> <li>■ Primary worker is SSGT or below</li> <li>■ TSGTs are supervisors not workers</li> <li>■ SMSGTs are not assigned at shop level</li> <li>■ Nightshift supervised by junior ranks</li> <li>■ Officers are primary supervisors</li> <li>■ Rank overages do not affect promotions</li> <li>■ Excess personnel do not affect promotions</li> <li>■ Active rank ratio is lower than ANG</li> <li>■ Separation from AF normally slow</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ More casual unit atmosphere</li> <li>■ Few disciplinary actions</li> <li>■ Rarely have under age personnel</li> <li>■ No one has to live in government quarters</li> <li>■ Must hold UMD position to promote</li> <li>■ No PCS likely during career</li> <li>■ EPR's emphasize potential for growth</li> <li>■ WG/WL employees are primary workers</li> <li>■ WG/WL worker frequently is a MSGT</li> <li>■ SMSGT assigned at shop level</li> <li>■ Nightshift supervision same as day</li> <li>■ Enlisted are primary supervisors</li> <li>■ Rank overages not authorized</li> <li>■ Excess personnel affect promotions</li> <li>■ ANG rank ratio is higher than AD</li> <li>■ Separation from ANG very quick</li> </ul>

**Figure 4 – Cultural Comparison (Lamothe, 2015)**

The above Figure 4 does not necessarily present an exhaustive listing of the cultural distinctions. Yet, coupling these additional complexities with those of the legal, monetary, and governing distinctions sets the stage for discussing the possible obstacles hindering the progression of the Total Force concept.

***Force Field Theory***

In light of the preceding historical and contextual revelations, *Force Field Theory* serves as a useful lens for discussing the current state of the Total Force concept and setting the stage for analyzing its progression.

*Force Field Theory* contends that an issue is held in balance by the interaction of two opposing sets of forces – those seeking to promote change (i.e. *Driving Forces*) and those

attempting to maintain the status quo (i.e. *Restraining Forces*) (Lewin, 2015). The following Figure 5 presents a pictorial demonstration of this theoretical claim:




Figure 5 – Force Field Analysis (Lewin, 2015)

The above Figure 5 depicts a center field representing the *Present* or *Desired State*. In this paper’s discussion the *Desired State* refers to promotion and successful realization of the AF’s senior leaders’ vision for the Total Force concept. Exerting from the left side of this field are positive *Driving Forces* for change. Resisting from the right side of the field are *Restraining Forces* as obstacles to change. The preceding sections of this chapter have, at length, produced examples of *Restraining Forces*. One force, not yet directly discussed, though, can, without proper guidance, transform from a *Driving Force* to a *Restraining Force*.

This changeable force, the tactical level leader, serves in a “rubber meets the road” capacity for employing the vision of the Total Force concept. These agents are the frontline drivers for implementing change. The AF’s strategic leaders call for these frontline agents to

move with the previously defined *Unity of Effort*. The senior leaders contend, that to do otherwise sacrifices the beneficial *Synergistic Effects* of employing the Total Force concept.

The net result of movement without *Unity of Effort* is tactical level leaders pitting their energies and efforts against one another. These tactical leaders may fully agree and support the success of the Total Force concept yet only differ in their ideas of how to employ it. Having a clear understanding, therefore, of the *Desired State* as well as the strength and/or means to overcome the obstacles resisting these tactical leaders' efforts is essential for securing a successful transition. This research, in the subsequent chapters, examines those very leaders in order to determine which side of the *Field* they, regardless of intentions, exert the greatest *Force*.

### **III. METHODOLOGY**

#### ***Chapter Overview***

This chapter introduces and defines the methodology whereby data, pertinent to the problem statement, are collected and analyzed for their significance. Since the overall approach is qualitative in nature, the specific, chosen method of data collection was impersonal, semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews served as the best means of discussing the problem statement as guided by the framework of the outlined research and investigative questions. The pool of interview participants was, out of practical necessity, limited to a couple, key individuals holding certain unique positions, authority, and perspectives at each of the respective TFAs under scrutiny.

#### ***Materials and Equipment***

Due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, very little equipment is required to collect the data. Interview subject responses are documented through two forms: digital, audio recording and manual note taking. A digital recording device serves as the primary medium for acquiring bulk data. Note taking by the researcher serves as the secondary and supplemental form of capturing nuances of meaning within responses or circumstantial anomalies. In addition to the digital, audio recording device and software used to transcribe the collected audio files, Microsoft's Word® and Excel® are used to segment, code, and analyze the bulk data. No further specialized equipment is required to accomplish the data collection and analysis.

## ***Process and Procedures***

### *Target Population*

As foreshadowed in Chapter 1, this research studies Total Force partnerships in which the primary contributors are AD members partnered with members from the ANG or AFR.

Additionally, the data collection focuses, specifically, on those Air Force bases (AFBs) with Total Force *Active Associations* in which AFR or ANG members direct the local operation and AD members supplement with manpower and perspective. Twenty-five Total Force Associations of Chapter 1's aforementioned 112 AF TFAs (see Appendix A) fit this description.


These 25 TFAs were further filtered to the final listing of nine TFAs (see Appendix B) at nine bases using a standardized, repeatable logic. First, only those Total Force *Active Associations* in which the partnering units conducted aircraft maintenance of various Mission Design Series (MDS) are included. A TFA with a Red Horse civil engineering mission would be an example of a TFA that is not a part of the research focus and, therefore, excluded. Second, aircraft maintenance of unique airframes such as E-8s and C-40s were not included. Third, only TFAs which had already moved from planning through initiation were considered. Finally, due to certain practical limitations tied to the study, only those Total Force *Active Associations* hosted at Air Force or Air Reserve Bases (ARBs) were included. Despite these stated bounds to the research scope, the study still achieved topic saturation.

The final selected nine TFAs at their respective nine bases form the focal point of this study and are listed below:

- Barksdale AFB, Louisiana ; MDS: B-52
- Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona ; MDS: A-10
- Homestead ARB, Florida ; MDS: F-16

- Joint Base Pearl Harbor – Hickam, Hawaii ; MDS: F-22
- March Joint ARB, California ; MDS: KC-135
- Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth , Texas ; MDS: F-16
- Scott AFB, Illinois ; MDS: KC-135
- Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina ; MDS: KC-135
- Whiteman AFB, Missouri ; MDS: A-10

The following Figure 6 depicts the geographic location of each of these bases while highlighting the diverse range of base ownership and structure. Those bases represented by blue stars are AFBs while those represented by purple stars are ARBs.



**Figure 6 – Research Narrowed Total Force Active Associations**

It is important to note from the above Figure 6 the convergence and overlap of multiple layers of authority. These nine TFAs reflect the vested interests of not only multiple partnering units, but also partnering MAJCOMs (with their subordinate Numbered Air Forces), and partnering military services along both *Federal* and (multiple) *State* lines. In other words, looking to JB Pearl Harbor – Hickam, Hawaii as an example, the aircraft maintenance Total

Force *Active Association* must answer to and/or work with/through, at least, three distinct higher level agencies: the National Guard Bureau, the USAF, and the US Navy. Each of these agencies have different pots of money and different processes they follow. The complexity of partnerships is further demonstrated in the following Figure 7 with five MAJCOMs, five AFBs, three ARBs, and two Joint bases listed with multiple instances of categories overlapping. Additionally significant, but not listed in Figure 7, is the fact that six of these selected TFAs are examples where parallel TFA aircraft maintenance operations are conducted. In other words, at six of the geographic locations a combination of *Classic* and *Active Associations* for aircraft maintenance simultaneously exist.

Base Name	MAJCOM	
	Sponsor	Assoc
Homestead Air Reserve Base	AFRC	ACC
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base	AFRC	AMC
Barksdale Air Force Base	AFRC	AFGSC
Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth	AFRC	ACC
Scott Air Force Base	IL ANG	AMC
Whiteman Air Force Base	AFRC	ACC
Davis–Monthan Air Force Base	AFRC	ACC
March Joint Air Reserve Base	AFRC	AMC
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	HI ANG	PACAF

**Figure 7 – Authoritative Complexities of Selected TFAs**

Within each of these chosen bases two individuals were identified as the target interview population: a senior tactical level ANG or AFR maintenance authority (e.g. Squadron Commander, Superintendent, or Maintenance Operations Officer) and, dependent on the local construct, his closest AD counterpart. Due to the diversity of local TFA maintenance organizational setups, this range of acceptable interviewee participation gave the study necessary flexibility while preserving a standardized, transparent methodology.

Much of the information regarding Total Force implementation benefits and challenges reside with those personnel who currently have or have had hands-on experience in associated organizations. Thus, the objects or target population of the study include the above identified Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) since they currently serve within and, in the majority of cases, have previously served in Total Force constructs. In-person interviews would, of course, be the preferred approach to collect data from these SMEs, but due to the limitations of both time and cost, all interviews were conducted in an impersonal, semi-structured manner via telephone and computer communication.

Interviews are pertinent and advantageous for this method of study because much of the desired data takes the form of “people’s beliefs and perspectives about facts”, “feelings”, “standards for behavior (i.e., what people think *should* be done in certain situations)”, and “conscious reasons for actions or feelings (e.g., why people think that engaging in a particular behavior is desirable or undesirable)” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The researcher can thus, with the interview methodology, tailor the interview questions in such a way to access this wealth and diversity of perspectives and harness them as a source of credible data.

#### *Semi-Structured Interview Method Benefits*

A number of benefits accompany administering a semi-structured interview to this particular research (Creswell, 2014):

- Opportunity for Feedback – The interviewer can provide direct feedback to the respondent, give clarifications, and help alleviate any misconceptions or apprehensions (e.g. confidentiality) the respondent may have in answering the interviewer’s questions.

- Probing Complex Answers – The interviewer can probe if the respondent’s answer is too brief or unclear. This option gives the interviewer flexibility in dealing with unstructured questions and is especially suited for handling complex questions.
- Length of Interview – If the questionnaire is deemed lengthy, the more personal nature of an interview is the best technique for getting respondents to cooperate, without overtaxing their patience.
- Complete Questionnaires – This method is the best way to ensure that the respondent will answer all questions asked.
- High Participation – Interviewing respondents personally increases the likelihood of participation, as many people prefer to communicate directly, verbally, and sharing information and insights with interviewers.

#### *Impersonal Interview Method Challenges*


Despite the heightened advantages, none of the interviews were administered by the researcher in person thereby introducing some challenges (Creswell, 2014):

- Necessity for Callbacks – When a person selected for interview cannot be reached the first time, a callback has to be scheduled which results in extra cost and time spent.
- Personal Style – The interviewer’s individual questioning style, techniques, approach and demeanor may influence the respondents’ answers. This vulnerability while generally true of the Interview methodology is arguably heightened by the lack of in-person interview and respondent interaction.

### ***Methodology Roadmap***

As previously stated, recorded interview audio data was transcribed and analyzed using appropriate computer software. Ultimately, the interview responses served as the basis for individually addressing the study's overarching research and investigative questions. The 16 interview questions available for review in Appendix D were formed with the dual purpose of 1) providing the respondents with a clear medium for expressing comprehensive Total Force perspectives as well as 2) providing the researcher a mechanism for teasing out full nuances of the investigative and research questions. In this way, the respondent's recorded answers when appropriately segmented serve as the data source for answering the foundational investigative questions. In other words, the interview questions function as a framework to pursue desired topic depth while simultaneously preserving a standardized approach and clarity for both the respondents and researcher.

The following Figure 8 gives a visual representation of how each investigative question fed into the interview questions:



**Figure 8 – Connection of Investigative Questions to Interview Questions**

All the interview questions were disseminated beforehand to the respondents in an effort to afford the greatest level of transparency of process, honesty in responses, and forethought in answers. The average length of each interview was 39 minutes and collectively generated 11

hours and 23 minutes of audio recordings. These recordings transcribed to a collective 182 pages of text which, as stated previously, served as the primary data source for the entire study.

Finally, after all the interview responses were segmented using open coding in accordance with their respective investigative question, the data were axially and selectively coded to allow for content, sentiment, and descriptive analysis which respectively collect similar phrases and themes, group topic sentiments and opinions, and summarize stated responses (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The results of this coding and subsequent analysis provided the means by which the investigative and research questions were answered as Chapter 4 will demonstrate.

### ***Summary***

In summary, a total of 18 SMEs comprising an equal distribution of AD and ARC personnel from a total of nine TFAs at nine bases across five MAJCOMs leading the efforts in maintaining over 150 airframes comprising five MDS aircraft were approached to be interviewed via a semi-structured impersonal interview method. These individuals supplied the data, which once transcribed, coded, and analyzed, served as the basis for answering the study's core research and investigative questions.

## IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

### *Chapter Overview*

This chapter reintroduces and subsequently answers the study's core investigative questions. The data analyzed in order to answer each of the questions comes from the interviews conducted by the researcher. The data, in order to preserve respondent anonymity and trust, is analyzed and discussed at the aggregate level. Ultimately, the answers generated through the data analysis serve as the means for answering the overarching research question and addressing the originally presented problem statement.

### *Investigative Question #1*

*What, collectively, do leaders understand the Total Force concept to mean at the tactical level?*

The first point of interest emerging from the data is the evident lack of consensus in the answers given to the interview question. No two answers from respondents share complete overlap in their definitions. Yet the data reflects two basic response styles: one expressing the Total Force concept as having an intrinsic, definable identity and the other expressing the Total Force concept as a means of achieving some benefit(s). The researcher notes, however, a distinction in the respondents' understanding of the interview question as some give answers using the lens of what the Total Force concept was "intended" to do versus what they "observe" it to do. Recognizing this distinction calls into question the extent to which response conclusions are valid.

The *majority* of responses reflect the former style (i.e. the Total Force concept having an intrinsic, definable identity) and while the words vary with each respondent they convey the similar claim that the Total Force concept represents “two different organizations working seamlessly together as one to achieve the same, assigned mission.”

The latter response style, represented by the *minority* of respondents, defined the Total Force concept as a means of achieving the following *collective* listing of benefits:


- Reduced costs
- Increased manpower
- Increased aircraft utilization
- Maximization of aircraft availability
- Increased efficiencies of partnering organizations
- Additional capabilities provided to combatant commanders
- Improved training making younger maintainers more efficient
- Synergistic effects from the combination of AD flexibility and perspective with ARC knowledge and experience

No single answer of this latter style provides a comprehensive listing of all the benefits. In fact, the *majority* of responses of this type provide only one benefit with the final benefit in this listing receiving the greatest independently repeated affirmation. Yet, this observation does not necessarily connote that, if provided this comprehensive benefit listing, these same respondents would dispute them. Additionally, in a greater number of instances than the latter style, but still not the *majority*, the respondents give answers expressing some combination of both styles of answer.

## ***Investigative Question #2***

*On which topics, respecting employment of the Total Force concept, do tactical level Total Force leaders collectively perceive similar benefits as those lauded by the AF's most strategic leaders?*

Chapter 2's review of the relevant literature presents 16 benefits that the CSAF and/or SecAF laud employment of the Total Force concept garnering. In order to answer this investigative question, therefore, the researcher presented these 16 benefits divested of their contextual qualifiers to the tactical Total Force leaders in the interview question depicted in the following Figure 9.

- 
2. Of the following list, has your unit experienced *Increased, Decreased, or No Change* in behavior due to the employment of the Total Force concept? Can you elaborate?
- Training
  - Capacity
  - Retention
  - Readiness
  - Efficiency
  - Flexibility
  - Mobilization
  - Cost Savings
  - Resource Usage
  - Personnel Stability
  - Military Capability
  - Duplication of Efforts
  - Balance of Experience
  - Leadership Development
  - Operational Effectiveness
  - Other Synergistic Effects

**Figure 9 – Total Force Interview Question #2**

The *collective* responses demonstrate no consensus for any of the 16 benefits listed in Figure 9 with the exceptions of *Resource Usage, Duplication of Efforts, and Operational Effectiveness*. With these three exceptions, the consensus reflects a simple *majority* and no instances of unanimous respondent opinion. Furthermore, the *majority* tactical level Total Force perspective claims an opposite movement with regards to *Duplication of Efforts* than does the AF's most strategic leaders.

The researcher, similar to the first investigative question, posits a validity caveat with regards to observations of differing interpretations of the interview question. Examples of these differences include discussions of an increased *need* for training versus an increased *quality* of training or, in another instance, a decreased *ability* to mobilize versus a decreased *need* to mobilize. This observation arguably limits the response conclusions since these varied responses to the current form of the interview question drives, through lack of context, the researcher to ask not a single, standardized question of all respondents; but, instead, multiple questions depending on the respondent's respective paradigm.

### ***Investigative Question #3***


*What unforeseen, symptomatic problems (with discernable root causes) do tactical level Total Force leaders perceive employment of the Total Force concept introducing?*

Two questions within the interview frame the basis for answering this investigative question:

- *Do you see the Total Force concept introducing any unforeseen, symptomatic problems?*
- *Of these symptomatic problems, what do you see as the root cause(s)?*

Of observational note, while answering these two interview questions, respondents mostly chose this opportunity to voice their support of continued employment of the Total Force concept. Several respondents, in fact, went further to describe their local TFA partnerships in very positive terms reflecting on when “communication is good and the units are properly resourced” few to no symptomatic problems are present. That stated, the *majority* of respondents did contribute thoughts and observations for both symptomatic problems and root causes. In

some instances, one respondent cites the same topic(s) as a symptomatic problem that another respondent cites as a root cause and vice versa. Additionally, rarely do any of the respondents express the same pairings of observed symptomatic problems and root causes. Due to the convoluted nature of assigning terms, therefore, the researcher grouped the various topics into larger categories demonstrated in the below Figure 10:



**Figure 10 – Synthesized List of Identified Symptomatic Problems and Root Causes**

The above Figure 10 respectively depicts the full listing of topics respondents observe as *Symptomatic*, *Mixture* (i.e. convoluted application of terms), and *Root Cause* in three distinct columns (depicted by Figure 10’s top yellow, orange, and red blocks). Within each column four subcategories were established thereby grouping the similar concepts together. Since much of the

data respondents provide for these interview questions is anecdotal in nature, several specific examples are included as bullets within each subcategory.

While some might critique the particular grouping of certain topics, the respondent content remains valid rendering the argument largely moot. The bottom line analysis points to a wide ranging spectrum of topics which hinder the Total Force concept and are, in some instances, believed to be a result of its employment.


#### ***Investigative Question #4***

*Regarding the listed root causes, do tactical level Total Force leaders believe decision making and subsequent solution generating to be more appropriately handled by higher organizational levels?*

Teasing out the full intent of this investigative question required the respondents to answer two interview questions:

- *At your level, are you equipped and able to engage root causes or are you relegated solely to managing the symptomatic problems?*
- *At what organizational level should these root causes be addressed?*

The following Figure 11 depicts the summation of their responses to these two questions:



**Figure 11 – Respondent Investigation Question #4 Summation**

The *majority* position of the respondents (depicted by Figure 11's top left, red block) consider themselves relegated solely to managing the Total Force symptomatic problems and not equipped and/or able to engage root causes. This respondent *majority* lists a number of agencies (depicted by Figure 11's gray blocks) above the Wing level at which engagement of root causes should more properly be addressed. Of these listed higher headquarter agencies, the one most often voiced as the appropriate agent of change is HAF.

For the respondent *minority* position in which tactical level Total Force leaders consider themselves equipped and/or able to go beyond symptomatic problems and engage root causes (depicted by Figure 11's top right, green block), the listed appropriate agencies of change (depicted by Figure 11's blue blocks) are those at or below the Wing level and ultimately closest to the issue (i.e. at the lowest level).

Returning to the investigative question, the *majority* of the interviewed tactical level Total Force leaders do believe it more appropriate that the root causes of Total Force symptomatic problems be engaged at a higher organizational level with specific weight placed on HAF for this ownership.

### ***Investigative Question #5***

*In what ways do tactical level Total Force leaders perceive a lack of adequate training, resources, and/or guidance to address Total Force concerns?*


Predominately when addressing Total Force concerns, the respondents believe sufficient *Resources* and *Guidance* currently exists. Of note, in these “adequate” instances, is the fact that the interview question, presented as it is (i.e. in binary “yes/no” response terms), limits the degree of further insights possible. For those cases in which the *minority* of respondents express a lack of *Resources*, they do so in two overarching forms: a lack in necessary funding and/or facilities in the initial stand-up of a TFA and a lack in maintenance manpower, exacerbated in a TFA setting, due to the stand-up of the F-35 aircraft.

While the barest *majority* does perceive a lack of adequate *Training*, differences of opinion emerge as to what form any additions need take. One school of thought promotes “on the job” training as the only true and required Total Force teacher while an alternate position recommends developing some type of formalized, introductory training for those entering a TFA context for the first time. In both cases, the respondents express a need for the training to reach above and beyond the Wing level into the MAJCOMs.

### ***Investigative Question #6***

*From whom or what entity do tactical level Total Force leaders seek Total Force specific guidance?*

The following Figure 12 depicts the respondents' ordered listing of Total Force specific guidance references.



**Figure 12 – Referenced Sources of Total Force Specific Guidance**

The immediate chain including Total Force SMEs within the unit and up to the Wing level serve as the primary source of Total Force guidance. Respondents cite this reference source providing as much as 80 percent of necessary day to day Total Force guidance. AFI 90-1001 mandated Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), which codify the respective responsibilities of the TFA partnering components, serve for the *minority* of respondents as the next source of Total Force guidance. Interestingly, the *majority* of respondents note the MOAs / MOUs specific to their particular TFA are non-existent, in draft, in rewrite, and/or outdated. A Numbered Air Force (NAF) or MAJCOM followed by AFI 90-1001 take the final two “sparingly” referenced positions. Some respondents do note, however, that the

AFI does take a more prominent position in the reference line up in the earliest stages of a TFA standing up.

### ***Investigative Question #7***

*What is the collective wisdom from tactical level Total Force leaders for sustaining and/or improving employment of the Total Force concept?*

In order to approach answering this investigative question, three separate interview questions were posed the tactical level Total Force leaders:

- *Describe what perfect integration/association at your unit would look like?*
- *Describe what integration/association at your unit currently looks like?*
- *What needs to happen to move integration/association at your unit from what it is now to the desired goal?*


Three tactical level recommendations emerge from the analysis of the data as expressed by the *majority* of respondents. First, the respondents most prominently express a need and/or desire for a single, clear chain of command in which the appointed decision makers have authority over matters currently segmented into distinct *ADCON* and *OPDIR* realms.

Maintaining segregation of these areas, they argue, negatively limits and/or impacts many areas within the organizations such as funding, flexibility, and personnel accountability. Second, the *majority* of respondents observe, within their local TFAs, duplicated positions particularly amongst administrative/supervisory roles. These respondents, therefore, advise TFAs promote and pursue full *functional* integration/association at all levels. Third, following in a similar vein of thought, the *majority* of respondents advise full *locational* integration commenting that to do otherwise dooms the TFA to continued relational tension and strife.

Four tactical level recommendations also emerge from the analysis of the data not necessarily repeated by all but finding their voice amongst the respondent *minority*. First, respondents recognize an increased relational pressure within TFAs drives a comparable increased need to openly and clearly communicate amongst partner components. In the words of one respondent, the TFA context generates an “increased pressure or need to communicate, while, simultaneously, [generating] an increased vulnerability to communication barriers.”

Second, multiple responses mention needs with regards to manpower. Several of these instances refer to the drain on manpower due to the draw from standing up the F-35 community. Others express the general shortage of available skilled aircraft maintainers in general. An interesting and pertinent observation arose from some respondents with regards to this manpower draw. These respondents note that percent mixture changes seem to generate a seasonal nature to the available work pool. In the times immediately following significant decreases to the Total Force end strength, efforts in finding and hiring skilled labor, specifically in the ARC, exhibit greater levels of success temporarily. Third, several respondents speak to the need to fully fund the mandated training requirement. In these instances, harkening back to the first recommendation, respondents express the challenges of accessing funding from multiple sources or streams of money (e.g. *State vs. Federal*). Finally, some respondents posit the need to choose either a *Classic* or *Active* TFA, and not place both at a single base. “By having both,” one respondent argues, “you cancel out the benefits of both of those programs [essentially trading] active duty bodies for reserve bodies [making] those active duty bodies less useful, and [trading] active duty bodies with reserve bodies that [in turn become] less useful.” The end result produces “two organizations less efficient, instead of just making one organization less efficient.”

The following Figure 13 gives a visual depiction of this *collective* wisdom from the tactical level Total Force leaders with regards to sustaining and/or improving the Total Force concept.



**Figure 13 – Collective Recommendations for Sustaining and/or Improving the TFC**

The reader must bear in mind that the above Figure 13 reflects the *collective* wisdom of the independently interviewed tactical level Total Force leaders and not a comprehensive listing of all the ways the Total Force concept might be sustained and/or improved. While they all might agree with the *collective* recommendations, no single respondent individually promoted or provided the entire list. This list, however, does garner greater credibility by observing the obvious overlap between it and the AF doctrine published within its Aircraft Maintenance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) 3.3, Table 15.3 *Total Force Integration “Best Practices”* encouraging the following behavior excerpts:

- Fully integrate personnel at all levels.

- Positive/Cordial relationships are key to a successful TFI partnership. Realize and understand the role personalities, unit identity, conflict and culture play in the creation/sustainment of a successful, functionally integrated organization.
- Place personnel of associate units in positions of like rank and responsibility.
- Request fiscal year MPA needs and funding by June of the previous year.
- Consider per diem and travel needs for TR/TG/DSG as part of the funding.
- Integrate associate unit personnel in deployment planning; and utilize them to support AEF rotations.
- Quickly notify associate unit of individual taskings to best utilize volunteerism.
- Active and consistent lines of communication are hallmark to successful TFI units.

### *Summary*

Ultimately, by reintroducing the study's core investigative questions, this chapter explores the synthesis of analyzed data in order to, then, answer those same questions. The data analyzed to answer each question comes from the interviews conducted by the researcher. The data analysis, discussed in this chapter at the aggregate level, provides, in the subsequent and final chapter, the necessary insights for answering the overarching research question and addressing the originally presented, problem statement.

## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### *Chapter Overview*

This chapter presents the research's aggregated findings and final conclusions as well as the recommendations for action and future research. The conclusions and recommendations for action find their basis in the analysis, the answering of the investigative questions, and culminate in the answering of the overarching research question. The recommendations for future research stem from the manifestation, throughout the course of the study, of certain important questions which fall outside of the originally defined research scope.

### *Discussion*

Aggregating the responses to the investigative questions result in a number of findings regarding the *collective* and *majority* perspectives of the tactical level Total Force leaders.

First, there appears to be great variance in the leaders' summations of the Total Force concept. While these summations can be grouped into two basic types, the lack of consensus emerges as the central conclusive feature with no one respondent answer completely matching another. This observation implies an absence of a clear Total Force concept vision and objective.

Second, *collectively*, tactical level Total Force leaders greatly differ from the AF's most strategic leaders in their appreciation of the previously identified 16 Total Force benefits. Again, the lack of consensus amongst the tactical leaders, as to the unit level effects of employing the Total Force concept, materializes as the most significant observation. This lack of consensus points to an absence of clear tools for measuring the effectiveness of the TFA at the tactical level.

Third, tactical level Total Force leaders identify, at least, eight categories of symptomatic problems tied with varying root causes resultant from employment of the TFA construct. The degree of readily evident challenges does not categorically drive the conclusion that the TFA construct is intrinsically flawed; but, rather, highlights the plethora of opportunities tactical level Total Force leaders identify as areas for improvement. This finding, though, does afford a greater level of concern when juxtaposed with the subsequent findings stemming from the tactical level Total Force leaders' *majority* opinions.

Leaders, from the *majority* perspective, believe themselves relegated solely to managing symptomatic problems. These leaders, even when they are properly equipped, consider the root causes more appropriately addressed at levels above the Wing. In most cases, then, this observation connected with the previous finding points to a community of leaders able to *identify* but ill equipped to *solve* the challenges manifesting in their local TFAs. Despite this perceived powerlessness to affect lasting changes or fundamental improvements to the Total Force concept, the *majority* of tactical level Total Force leaders advocate for the TFA construct and promote its continued employment and success.

Finally, the *majority* of leaders in the Total Force community do claim an adequate amount of guidance and resources to address Total Force concerns. These leaders largely seek their guidance from within their immediate chain. Mostly they do this to address challenges at the lowest feasible level; but, often, they seek guidance at lower levels because they confront recurring frustrations in a lack of empathy and engagement from any level above the Wing.

## *Conclusions of Research*

Reflection back to Chapter 1's stated research implications provides the framework for introducing the final conclusions. The first of the three implications, is the provision of an assessment of the tactical level's "perceived" local TFA health. The findings of this research drive the conclusion of a "mixed bag" with regards to this perception. On the one hand, many respondents express clear, unadulterated support for continued employment of the Total Force concept. These respondents state that things continue well within their local TFAs and that communication is good and relationships strong. Yet, conversely, the *collective* attempts of the respondents to define the Total Force concept are completely disparate. Furthermore, the respondents generate no consensus regarding the effects of the lauded benefits which supposedly signal the successful employment of the Total Force concept. In other words, multiple TFAs "perceive" themselves as healthy but only have the subjective nature of the current relationship as the prevailing method for making this assessment.

With no measuring stick for evaluating the effectiveness of a TFA and no *collective* tactical level appreciation of its benefits, the AF postures to repeat the challenges of the past. The Comptroller General reported to Congress in 1979 that the DoD "should issue comprehensive guidance for a uniform total force policy and for effectively measuring its benefits" (Staats, 1979). Yet, despite over 35 years of Total Force maturation, this call remains unanswered. Additionally, with the *majority* of tactical level leaders believing themselves relegated solely to managing symptomatic problems and not equipped to engage the root causes, their vocal advocating on behalf of the TFA construct and promotion of its continued success bears remarkable similarity to the events surrounding SecDef Schlesinger in 1973. As previously mentioned, SecDef Schlesinger, claiming that the "Total Force is no longer a 'concept' [but] is

now the Total Force Policy” (Correll, 2011) and then witnessing the discarding of the TFP draft in the same year as its inception, voiced an “expression of support rather than a change of substance” (RAND, 1993)(Correll, 2011).

Without strategic leaders providing a clear objective for the Total Force concept, they sacrifice tactical clarity for tactical diversity; and, at best, they hinder its developmental success and, at worst, they guarantee its failure. Political and monetary ties within this complex context arguably drive much of their strategic choices. Yet, vague strategic policy, when viewed through the lens of the previously discussed *Force Field Theory*, increases the obstacles to change by preventing what should be *Driving Forces* (i.e. tactical level Total Force leaders) from knowing uniformly where they should go. By way of analogy, astronauts taking turns piloting a space ship will eventually get somewhere; but will likely miss the moon, regardless of each helmsman’s skill and finesse, unless they recognize the moon as the intended target. Even then, they will still require significant, external levels of support along the way.

### ***Research Question Answered***

*What success factors are needed to allow tactical level Total Force leaders to share a common objective and means of evaluating the Total Force Active Association?*

In light of the aggregated findings to the investigative questions and the subsequent research conclusions, four success factors emerge as necessary for allowing tactical level Total Force leaders to share a common objective and means of evaluating the Total Force *Active Association*. The first success factor requires clear HAF direction defining and driving the *Unity of Effort* for the Total Force concept. Such action requires removal of what this research reveals as communication and perception disconnects between the strategic and tactical levels (i.e.

second research implication). The second success factor requires the removal of current *State* and *Federal* legal barriers. Without the means to feasibly and legally align agendas, *State* and *Federal* partners will inevitably struggle with one another and their objectives remain disparate. The third success factor requires the strengthening of the support ties between the local TFA and its governing higher headquarter entities. The *majority* of respondents recognize these higher headquarter entities as the appropriate agents for affecting lasting change to the root causes of Total Force symptomatic problems. Therefore, without these agencies involvement, definitions of the objective and selections for the means of evaluation will remain non-standard, decentralized, and subjective in nature. The fourth success factor requires time. When dealing with organizations *as large* as the ARC and AD component with their differing cultures and differing agendas in an authoritatively complex setting, it would be naïve to expect an immediate shift in their character, nature, and/or direction.

### ***Recommendations for Action***

Echoing the call of the 1979 Comptroller General's report to Congress, the researcher recommends standardizing the Total Force concept governing approach. This recommendation requires the codifying of the TFA objective and the answering of whether the strategy is intended to be a permanent. On the heels of defining this objective for the TFA should be the development of a measurement system for evaluating each TFA's effectiveness in their efforts to reach the now defined target. The researcher recommends the continued promotion of the I-Wing since its recent introduction represents a positive step toward enhancing *functional* integration at all organizational levels as well as a strengthening of the empathetic ties of agencies above the tactical level. As an additional step beyond this effort, though, the researcher recommends

empowering, incentivizing, and requiring both the NAFs and MAJCOMs to better understand and champion Wing level TFA obstacles.

### ***Recommendations for Future Research***

Throughout the course of this research a number of questions emerge which fall outside of the initially defined research scope. These five areas are recommended as future topics:

- Has the ARC shifted from its traditional role as a strategic reserve and can it truly provide a surge capacity as defined by AF Doctrine within the aircraft maintenance community?
- Do *Classic* and *Active Associations* conducting maintenance at the same base diminish or cancel one another's integration benefits by their proximity?
- What influence have *State* unions had on the AF's ability to generate airpower?
- Has the integration *State* and *Federal* funds decreased, shifted, or disguised the monetary cost burden of aircraft maintenance?
- What benefits versus challenges are produced by the relatively recent introduction of full time uniform wear for the Dual Status ANG Technician?

### ***Summary***

Optimizing the employment of the Total Force concept requires more than a cursory understanding of the subject matter. Much of this understanding must be gained through harnessing experience and improving the relationships formed in TFAs. Strategic leaders must

understand the challenges of the past to promote effective visions for the future. Before claiming success the AF must first define its objective for TFAs and develop a means for periodically evaluating their performance. By taking these steps and continually finding ways to access the tactical level perspectives and lessons learned, the obstacles can and will be overcome by the greater driving forces of a *Unity of Effort* realized.

- THE END -

## Appendix A: Air Force Total Force Associations

Current as of: 14 Jun 2016	<b>KEY:</b>	Base MDS/Mission Units Associating Host Associate	<b>Total Active = 25</b>	<b>Total Classic = 87</b>	<b>Total TFAs = 112</b>																	
<b>FOC (82)</b>						<b>IOC (7)</b>			<b>Pre-IOC (13)</b>													
Altus C-17/KC-135 FTU 97 AMW - 730 AMTS AETC AFRC	Burlington F-16 158FW-315 FS/495FG ANG ACC	Elmendorf F-22 3 WG - 477 FG PACAF AFRC	Hurlburt Red Horse 823 RHS - 556 RHS ACC AFRC	Langley LSC 735 SCMG - 192 SCMS AFMC ANG	McEntire F-16 Ops & Mx 169FW-316 FS/495FG ANG ACC	Randolph Specialized UPT 12FTW-340FTG/39FTS AETC AFRC	Seymour-J KC-135 916 ARW - 911 ARS AFRC AMC	Whiteman A-10 917 FG - 358 FS/495 FG AFRC ACC	Davis-Monthan SECURITY FORCES 355 SFS - 720 SFS ACC AFRC	Buckley F-16 140FW-Det120,495FG ANG ACC	Schriever SBIRS 115WS-8SWS (Det 1) AFSPC AFRC											
Andersen Red Horse 554 RHS - 254 RHS PACAF ANG	Charleston C-17 437 AW - 315 AW AMC AFRC	Fairchild KC-135 92 ARW - 141 ARW AMC ANG	Kingsley Field F-15C FTU 173 FW-Det2, 56 FW ANG AETC	Langley CAF Targeting 36 IS - 42 IS ACC AFRC	McGuire C-17 & KC-10 305 AMW-514AMW AMC AFRC	Robins E-8 116 ACW - 461 ACW ANG ACC	Seymour-J Red Horse 567 RHS - 4 CES AFRC ACC	Whiteman B-2 509 BW - 131 BW AFGSC ANG	Davis-Monthan A-10 FTU 924 FG - 355 FW AFRC ACC	Dannelly F-16 187FW-Det100,495FG AFRC ACC	Sioux Falls F-16 114FW-Det175, 495FG ANG ACC											
Barksdale B-52 Ops, Mx, CP 2 BW - 307 BW AFGSC AFRC	Charleston Red Horse 560 RHS - 437 CES AFRC AMC	Ft Meade Signal & Cyber ISR Ops 70 ISRW - 16 IS ACC AFRC	Kirtland CSAR FTU 58 SOW - 150 WG AETC ANG	Langley DGS-1 USAF Spt 497 ISRG - 63 IS ACC AFRC	Minot Security Forces 91 SFG - 219 SFS AFGSC ANG	Rosecrans C-130 AATTC 139AW-AATTC/Det 5 ANG AMC	Seymour-J F-15E FTU 4 FW-307 FS, Det 3 ACC AFRC	Wright-Patt GEO-MASINT G/MINT Sqdns & 71 IS ACC AFRC	Ft Gordon CSS 31 IS - 139 IS ACC ANG	Duke Field Non-Standard Aviation 524 SOS - 859 SOS AFSOC AFRC												
Barksdale B-52 FTU 307 BW - 2 BW AFRC AFGSC	Columbus UPT 14 FTW - 43 FTS AETC AFRC	Ft Worth F-16 301 FW-355FS/495FG AFRC ACC	Lackland E_Aircrew CoE 344TRS-433TRS+ANG AETC AFRC/ANG	Langley DGS-1 COCOM Spt 497 ISRG - 718 IS ACC AFRC	Moody A-10 Ops & Mx 23 WG - 476 FG ACC AFRC	Schriever ASOps/NSSI ASOps/NSSI-RNSSI AFSPC AFRC	Sheppard Specialized UPT 80 FTW - 97 FTS AETC AFRC	Wright-Patt HUMINT NASIC/GAS, Det6-64 IS ACC AFRC	Hurlburt MQT - Training Ctr AFSOTC/19SOS-5SOS AFSOC AFRC	Duluth F-16 148FW-Det179,495FG ANG ACC												
Beale DGS-2/GEoint 548 ISRG - 50 IS ACC AFRC	Creech MQ-1/9 432 WG - 78 ATKS ACC AFRC	Hickam CSS 324 IS - 201 IS ACC ANG	Lackland Info Operations 23 IOS/346TS-273 IOS AFSPC ANG	Laughlin Specialized UPT 47 FTW-340FTG/96 FTS AETC AFRC	Nellis Red Horse 820 RHS - 555 RHS ACC AFRC	Schriever GPS Satellite Ops 2 SOPS - 19 SOPS AFSPC AFRC	Tinker E-3A C2 Missions 552 ACW - 513 ACG ACC AFRC		Hurlburt RPA - MQ-1/9 Ops 350S-2 SOS AFSOC AFRC	Dyess AFB B-1B 7 BW - Det 1, 307 BW AFGSC AFRC												
Beale DGS-2/SIGINT/DART 548 ISRG - 38 IS ACC AFRC	Creech MQ-1/9 FTU 432 WG - 232 OS ACC ANG	Hickam F-22 154 WG - 15 WG ANG PACAF	Lackland Cyber Ops Center 624 OC-854 COS AFSPC AFRC	Luke F-16 FTU 56 OG - 944 FW AETC AFRC	Nellis Test/Tactics/Training USAFWC - 926 Group ACC AFRC	Schriever Satellite Ops Center 1 SOPS - 7 SOPS AFSPC AFRC	Travis C-17/C-5/KC-10 60 AMW - 349 AMW AMC AFRC		Shaw F-16 CJ 20 FW - 482 OG, Det 1 ACC AFRC	Ft Meade Cyber ISR Operations 41 IS - TBD ACC AFRC												
Beale RQ-4 FTU, Mx 9 RW - 13 RS ACC AFRC	Davis-Monthan A-10 FTU 355 FW - 924 FG ACC AFRC	Hickam AOC 613 AOC - 109 AOG PACAF ANG	Lackland BMT 37 TRW - 433 TRS AETC AFRC	MacDill KC-135 6 AMW - 927 ARW AMC AFRC	Offutt Ops Spt & Aircrew Trng 55WG-170GP, 238CTS ACC ANG	Schriever Space Ops Test & Eval 17 TS - 14 TS ACC AFRC	Tyndall F-22 FTU & Cmbt Ops 325FW-44FG+FLANG ACC AFRC/ANG		Wright-Patt Acq Intel 21 IS - 14 IS AFMC AFRC	Grand Forks MQ-1/9 119WG-9RW/69RG ANG ACC												
Beale RQ-4, Comm Mx 9 RW - 222 CMXF ACC ANG	Dover C-5 & C-17 Ops & Mx 436 AW - 512 AW AMC AFRC	Hickam C-17 15 WG - 154 WG PACAF ANG	Lackland Comp Network Def 33 NWS - 426 NWS AFSPC AFRC	Malmstrom Red Horse 819 RHS - 219 RHS ACC ANG	Offutt Arbrn Crypto-lingst Int 97 IS - 49 IS ACC AFRC	Schriever Space Test & Training 25 SRS - 379 SRS ACC AFRC	USAFA Aviation Training 306 FTG - 70 FTS AETC AFRC															
Beale DGS-2, Grnd Comm Mx 548 ISRG - 234 IS ACC ANG	Duke Field AvFID 1 SOW-919 SOMXG AFSOC AFRC	Hill F-16 388 FW - 419 FW ACC AFRC	Langley DGS-1 497ISRG/30IS - 192 IS ACC ANG	March KC-135 452 AMW - 912 ARS AFRC AMC	Pease KC-135 157 ARW - 64 ARS ANG AMC	Scott C-40 932 AW - 54 AS AFRC AMC	Vance UPT 71 FTW-340FTG/5 FTS AETC AFRC															
Birmingham KC-135 117 ARW - 99 ARS ANG AMC	Eglin OT&E 53 WG - 84 TES ACC AFRC	Holloman MQ-1/9 FTU 49FW-44FG, 429 ACTS ACC AFRC	Langley F-22 Ops & Mx 1FW/633ABW - 192 FW ACC ANG	McChord C-17 Ops & Mx 62 AW - 446 AW AMC AFRC	Peterson Network Ops/Security 561 NOS/960 NOS AFSPC AFRC	Scott KC-135 126 ARW - 906 ARS ANG AMC	Vandenberg JSPOC 614 AOC - 9 SOPS AFSPC AFRC															
Buckley SBIRS 2 SWS - 8 SWS AFSPC AFRC	Elmendorf C-17 517 AS - 249 AS PACAF ANG	Homestead F-16 482FW-Det93, 495FG AFRC ACC	Langley Network Ops/Security 83 NOS-860 NOS AFSPC AFRC	McConnell KC-135 22 ARW - 931 ARG AMC AFRC	Peterson RAIDRS 16 SCS - 380 SCS AFSPC AFRC	Scott LSC 635 SCMW-126ARW AFMC ANG	Vandenberg MILSTAR Comms 4 SOPS - 148 SOPS AFSPC ANG															

## Appendix B: Selected Total Force Associations

<b>KEY:</b>		Base MDS/Mission Units Associating Host Associate	Total Associations = 112	Total <i>Classic</i> Associations = 87	Total <i>Active</i> Associations = 25	Selected <i>Active</i> Associations = 9								
<b>FOC (92)</b>											<b>IOC (7)</b>		<b>Pre-IOC (13)</b>	
Altus C-17/KC-135 FTU 97 AMW - 730 AMTS AETC AFRC	Burlington F-16 158FW-315 FS/495 FG ANG ACC	Elmendorf F-22 3 WG - 477 FG PACAF AFRC	Hurlburt Red Horse 823 RHS - 556 RHS ACC AFRC	Langley LSC 735 SCMG - 192 SCMS AFMC ANG	McEntire F-16 Ops & Mx 169FW-316 FS/495FG ANG ACC	Randolph Specialized UPT 12FTW-340FTG/39FTS AETC AFRC	Seymour-J KC-135 916 ARW - 911 ARS AFRC AMC	Whiteman A-10 917 FG - 358 FS/495 FG AFRC ACC			Davis-Monthan SECURITY FORCES 355 SFS - 720 SFS ACC AFRC	Buckley F-16 140FW-Det120,495FG ANG ACC	Schriever SBIRS 11SWS-8SWS (Det 1) AFSPC AFRC	
Andersen Red Horse 554 RHS - 254 RHS PACAF ANG	Charleston C-17 437 AW - 315 AW AMC AFRC	Fairchild KC-135 92 ARW - 141 ARW AMC ANG	Kingsley Field F-15C FTU 173 FW-Det2, 56 FW ANG AETC	Langley CAF Targeting 36 IS - 42 IS ACC AFRC	McGuire C-17 & KC-10 305 AMW-514 AMW AMC AFRC	Robins E-8 116 ACW - 461 ACW ANG ACC	Seymour-J Red Horse 567 RHS - 4 CES AFRC ACC	Whiteman B-2 509 BW - 131 BW AFGSC ANG		Davis-Monthan A-10 FTU 924 FG-355 FW AFRC ACC	Dannelly F-16 187FW-Det100,495FG ANG ACC	Sioux Falls F-16 114FW-Det175, 495FG ANG ACC		
Barksdale B-52 Ops, Mx, CP 2 BW - 307 BW AFGSC AFRC	Charleston Red Horse 560 RHS - 437 CES AFRC AMC	Ft Meade Signal & Cyber ISR Ops 70 ISRW - 16 IS ACC AFRC	Kirtland CSAR FTU 58 SOW - 150 WG AETC ANG	Langley DGS-1 USAF Spt 497 ISRG - 63 IS ACC AFRC	Minot Security Forces 91 SFG - 219 SFS AFGSC ANG	Rosecrans C-130 AATTC 139AW-AATTC/Det 5 ANG AMC	Seymour-J F-15E FTU 4 FW-307 FS, Det 3 ACC AFRC	Wright-Patt GEO-MASINT 5/MINT Sqdns & 71 IS ACC AFRC		Ft Gordon CSS 31 IS - 139 IS ACC ANG	Duke Field Non-Standard Aviation 524 SOS - 859 SOS AFSOC AFRC			
Barksdale B-52 FTU 307 BW - 2 BW AFRC AFGSC	Columbus UPT 14 FTW - 43 FTS AETC AFRC	Ft Worth F-16 301 FW-355FS/495FG AFRC ACC	Lackland E_Aircrew CoE 344TRS-433TRS+ANG AETC AFRC/ANG	Langley DGS-1 COCOM Spt 497 ISRG - 718 IS ACC AFRC	Moody A-10 Ops & Mx 23 WG - 476 FG ACC AFRC	Schriever ASOps/NSSI ASOps/NSSI-RNSSI AFSPC AFRC	Sheppard Specialized UPT 80 FTW - 97 FTS AETC AFRC	Wright-Patt HUMINT NASIC/GAS,Det6-64IS ACC AFRC		Hurlburt MQT - Training Ctr AFSOTC/19SOS-5SOS AFSOC AFRC	Duluth F-16 148FW-Det179,495FG ANG ACC			
Beale DGS-2/ GEOINT 548 ISRG - 501S ACC AFRC	Creech MQ-1/9 432 WG - 78 ATKS ACC AFRC	Hickam CSS 324 IS - 201 IS ACC ANG	Lackland Info Operations 23 IOS/346TS-273IOS AFSPC ANG	Laughlin Specialized UPT 47 FTW-340FTG/96 FTS AETC AFRC	Nellis Red Horse 820 RHS - 555 RHS ACC AFRC	Schriever GPS Satellite Ops 2 SOPS - 19 SOPS AFSPC AFRC	Tinker E-3A C2 Missions 552 ACW - 513 ACG ACC AFRC			Hurlburt RPA - MQ-1/9 Ops 3SOS - 2 SOS AFSOC AFRC	Dyess AFB B-1B 7 BW - Det 1, 307 BW AFGSC AFRC			
Beale DGS-2/SIGINT/DART 548 ISRG - 38 IS ACC AFRC	Creech MQ-1/9 FTU 432 WG - 232 OS ACC ANG	Hickam F-22 154 WG - 15 WG ANG PACAF	Lackland Cyber Ops Center 624 OC-854 COS AFSPC AFRC	Luke F-16 FTU 56 OG - 944 FW AETC AFRC	Nellis Test/Tactics/Training USAFWC - 926 Group ACC AFRC	Schriever Satellite Ops Center 1 SOPS - 7 SOPS AFSPC AFRC	Travis C-17/C-5/KC-10 60 AMW - 349 AMW AMC AFRC			Shaw F-16 CJ 20 FW - 482 OG, Det 1 ACC AFRC	Ft Meade Cyber ISR Operations 41 IS - TBD ACC AFRC			
Beale RQ-4 FTU, Mx 9 RW - 13 RS ACC AFRC	Davis-Monthan A-10 FTU 355 FW - 924 FG PACAF ANG	Hickam AOC 613 AOC - 109AOG PACAF ANG	Lackland BMT 37 TRW - 433 TRS AETC AFRC	MacDill KC-135 6 AMW - 927 ARW AMC AFRC	Offutt Ops Spt & Aircrew Trng 55WG-170GP,238CTS ACC ANG	Schriever Space Ops Test & Eval 17 TS - 14 TS ACC AFRC	Tyndall F-22 FTU & Cmbt Ops 325FW-44FG+FLANG ACC AFRC/ANG			Wright-Patt Acq Intel 21 IS - 14 IS AFMC AFRC	Grand Forks MQ-1/9 119WG-9RW/69RG ANG ACC			
Beale RQ-4, Comm Mx 9 RW - 222 CMXF ACC ANG	Dover C-5 & C-17 Ops & Mx 436 AW - 512 AW AMC AFRC	Hickam C-17 15 WG - 154 WG PACAF ANG	Lackland Comp Network Def 33 NWS - 426 NWS AFSPC AFRC	Malmstrom Red Horse 819 RHS - 219 RHS ACC ANG	Offutt Arbrn Crypto-lingstInt 97 IS - 49 IS ACC AFRC	Schriever Space Test & Training 25 SRS - 379 SRS ACC AFRC	USAF Aviation Training 306 FTG - 70 FTS AETC AFRC				Hurlburt Intel 25 IS - 28 IS ACC AFRC			
Beale DGS-2,Grnd Comm Mx 548 ISRG - 234 IS ACC ANG	Duke Field AvFID 1 SOW-919 SOMXG AFSOC AFRC	Hill F-16 388 FW - 419 FW ACC AFRC	Langley DGS-1 497ISRG/30IS - 192 IS ACC ANG	March KC-135 452 AMW - 912 ARS AFRC AMC	Pease KC-135 157 ARW - 64 ARS ANG AMC	Scott C-40 932 AW - 54 AS AFRC AMC	Vance UPT 71 FTW-340FTG/5 FTS AETC AFRC				Lackland Cyber Defense 26 NOS-Det1, 960th cyOG AFSPC AFRC			
Birmingham KC-135 117 ARW - 99 ARS ANG AMC	Eglin OT&E 53 WG - 84 TES ACC AFRC	Holloman MQ-1/9 FTU 49FW-44FG, 429ACTS ACC AFRC	Langley F-22 Ops & Mx 1FW/633ABW - 192 FW ACC ANG	McChord C-17 Ops & Mx 62 AW - 446 AW AMC AFRC	Peterson Network Ops/Security 561 NOS/960 NOS AFSPC AFRC	Scott KC-135 126 ARW - 906 ARS ANG AMC	Vandenberg JSPC 614 AOC - 9 SOPS AMC AFRC				Madison F-16 Ops & Mx 115FW-378 FS/495 FG ANG ACC			
Buckley SBIRS 2 SWS - 8 SWS AFSPC AFRC	Elmendorf C-17 517 AS - 249 AS PACAF ANG	Homestead F-16 482FW-Det93, 495FG AFRC ACC	Langley Network Ops/Security 83 NOS-860 NOS AFSPC AFRC	McConnell KC-135 22 ARW - 931 ARG AMC AFRC	Peterson RAIDRS 16 SCS - 380 SCS AFSPC AFRC	Scott LSC 635 SCMW-126 ARW AFMC ANG	Vandenberg MILSTAR Comms 4 SOPS - 148 SOPS AFSPC ANG				Offutt Intel 20 IS - 23 IS ACC AFRC			

## Appendix C: Impacted Total Force Associations

<b>KEY:</b>		Base MDS/Mission Units Associating Host Associate	Total Assoc = 112	Total <i>Classic</i> = 87	Total Active = 25	Selected Active = 9	Impacted Assoc = 33				
FOC (92)									IOC (7)	Pre-IOC (13)	
Altus C-17/KC-135 FTU 97 AMW - 730 AMTS AETC AFRC	Burlington F-16 158FW-315 FS/495FG ANG ACC	Elmendorf F-22 3 WG - 477 FG PACAF AFRC	Hurlburt Red Horse 823 RHS - 556 RHS ACC AFRC	Langley LSC 735 SCMG - 192 SCMS AFMC ANG	McEntire F-16 Ops & Mx 169FW-316 FS/495FG ANG ACC	Randolph Specialized UPT 12FTW-340FTG/39FTS AETC AFRC	Seymour-J KC-135 916 ARW - 911 ARS AFRC AMC	Whiteman A-10 917 FG - 358 FS/495 FG AFRC ACC	Davis-Monthan SECURITY FORCES 355 SFS - 720 SFS ACC AFRC	Buckley F-16 140FW-Det 120,495FG ANG ACC	Schriever SBIRS 11SWS-8SWS (Det 1) AFSPC AFRC
Andersen Red Horse 554 RHS - 254 RHS PACAF ANG	Charleston C-17 437 AW - 315 AW AMC AFRC	Fairchild KC-135 92 ARW - 141 ARW AMC ANG	Kingsley Field F-15C FTU 173 FW-Det2, 56 FW ANG AETC	Langley CAF Targeting 36 IS - 42 IS ACC AFRC	McGuire C-17 & KC-10 305 AMW-514 AMW AMC AFRC	Robins E-8 116 ACW - 461 ACW ANG ACC	Seymour-J Red Horse 567 RHS - 4 CES AFRC ACC	Whiteman B-2 509 BW - 131 BW AFGSC ANG	Davis-Monthan A-10 FTU 924 FG - 355 FW AFRC ACC	Dannelly F-16 187FW-Det100,495FG ANG ACC	Sioux Falls F-16 114FW-Det175, 495FG ANG ACC
Barksdale B-52 Ops, Mx, CP 2 BW - 307 BW AFGSC AFRC	Charleston Red Horse 560 RHS - 437 CES AFRC AMC	Ft Meade Signal & Cyber ISR Ops 70 ISRW - 16 IS ACC AFRC	Kirtland CSAR FTU 58 SOW - 150 WG AETC ANG	Langley DGS-1 USAF Spt 497 ISRG - 63 IS ACC AFRC	Minot Security Forces 91 SFG - 219 SFS AFGSC ANG	Rosecrans C-130 AATTC 139AW-AATTC/Det 5 ANG AMC	Seymour-J F-15E FTU 4 FW-307 FS, Det 3 ACC AFRC	Wright-Patt GEO-MASINT 3/MINT Sqdns & 71 IS ACC AFRC	Ft Gordon CSS 31 IS - 139 IS ACC ANG	Duke Field Non-Standard Aviation 524 SOS - 859 SOS AFSOC AFRC	
Barksdale B-52 FTU 307 BW - 2 BW AFRC AFGSC	Columbus UPT 14 FTW - 43 FTs AETC AFRC	Ft Worth F-16 301 FW-355 FS/495FG AFRC ACC	Lackland E_Aircrew CoE 344TRS-433TRS+ANG AETC AFRC/ANG	Langley DGS-1 COCOM Spt 497 ISRG - 718 IS ACC AFRC	Moody A-10 Ops & Mx 23 WG - 476 FG ACC AFRC	Schriever ASOps/NSSI ASOps/NSSI-RNSSI AFSPC AFRC	Sheppard Specialized UPT 80 FTW - 97 FTs AETC AFRC	Wright-Patt HUMINT NASIC/GAS,Det6-64IS ACC AFRC	Hurlburt MQT - Training Ctr AFSOTC/1950S-5S0S AFSOC AFRC	Duluth F-16 148FW-Det179,495FG ANG ACC	
Beale DGS-2/ GEOINT 548 ISRG - 50 IS ACC AFRC	Creech MQ-1/9 432 WG - 78 ATKS ACC AFRC	Hickam CSS 324 IS - 201 IS ACC ANG	Lackland Info Operations 23 IOS/346TS-273IOS AFSPC ANG	Laughlin Specialized UPT 47 FTW-340FTG/96 FTS AETC AFRC	Nellis Red Horse 820 RHS - 555 RHS ACC AFRC	Schriever GPS Satellite Ops 2 SOPS - 19 SOPS AFSPC AFRC	Tinker E-3A C2 Missions 552 ACW - 513 ACG ACC AFRC	Hurlburt RPA - MQ-1/9 Ops 3SOS-2 SOS AFSOC AFRC	Shaw F-16 CJ 20 FW - 482 OG, Det 1 ACC AFRC	Ft Meade Cyber ISR Operations 41 IS - TBD ACC AFRC	
Beale DGS-2/SIGINT/DART 548 ISRG - 38 IS ACC AFRC	Creech MQ-1/9 FTU 432 WG - 232 OS ACC ANG	Hickam F-22 154 WG - 15 WG ANG PACAF	Lackland Cyber Ops Center 624 OC-854 COS AFSPC AFRC	Luke F-16 FTU 56 OG - 944 FW AETC AFRC	Nellis Test/Tactics/Training USAFWC - 926 Group ACC AFRC	Schriever Satellite Ops Center 1 SOPS - 7 SOPS AFSPC AFRC	Travis C-17/C-5/KC-10 60 AMW - 349 AMW AMC AFRC	Wright-Patt Acq Intel 21 IS - 14 IS AFMC AFRC	Grand Forks MQ-1/9 119WG-9RW/69RG ANG ACC		
Beale RQ-4 FTU, Mx 9 RW - 13 RS ACC AFRC	Davis-Monthan A-10 FTU 355 FW - 924 FG ACC AFRC	Hickam AOC 613 AOC - 109 AOG PACAF ANG	Lackland BMT 37 TRW - 433 TRS AETC AFRC	MacDill KC-135 6 AMW - 927 ARW AMC AFRC	Offutt Ops Spt & Aircrew Trng 55WG-170GP,238 CTS ACC ANG	Schriever Space Ops Test & Eval 17 TS - 14 TS ACC AFRC	Tyndall F-22 FTU & Cmbt Ops 325FW-44FG+FLANG ACC AFRC/ANG	Hurlburt Intel 25 IS - 28 IS ACC AFRC			
Beale RQ-4, Comm Mx 9 RW - 222 CMXF ACC ANG	Dover C-5 & C-17 Ops & Mx 436 AW - 512 AW AMC AFRC	Hickam C-17 15 WG - 154 WG PACAF ANG	Lackland Comp Network Def 33 NWS - 426 NWS AFSPC AFRC	Malmstrom Red Horse 819 RHS - 219 RHS ACC ANG	Offutt Arbrn Crypto-lingst Int 97 IS - 49 IS ACC AFRC	Schriever Space Test & Training 25 SRS - 379 SRS ACC AFRC	USAF Aviation Training 306 FTG - 70 FTs AETC AFRC	Lackland Cyber Defense 26 NOS-Det 1, 960th CyOG AFSPC AFRC			
Beale DGS-2, Grnd Comm Mx 548 ISRG - 234 IS ACC ANG	Duke Field AvFID 1 SOW-919 SOMXG AFSOC AFRC	Hill F-16 388 FW - 419 FW ACC AFRC	Langley DGS-1 497ISRG/30IS - 192 IS ACC ANG	March KC-135 452 AMW - 912 ARS AFRC AMC	Pease KC-135 157 ARW - 64 ARS ANG AMC	Scott C-40 932 AW - 54 AS AFRC AMC	Vance UPT 71 FTW-340FTG/5 FTs AETC AFRC	Madison F-16 Ops & Mx 115FW-378 FS/495 FG ANG ACC			
Birmingham KC-135 117 ARW - 99 ARS ANG AMC	Eglin OT&E 53 WG - 84 TES ACC AFRC	Holloman MQ-1/9 FTU 49FW-44FG, 429 ACTS ACC AFRC	Langley F-22 Ops & Mx 1FW/633ABW - 192 FW ACC ANG	McChord C-17 Ops & Mx 62 AW - 446 AW AMC AFRC	Peterson Network Ops/Security 561 NOS/960 NOS AFSPC AFRC	Scott KC-135 126 ARW - 906 ARS ANG AMC	Vandenberg JSPOC 614 AOC - 9 SOPS AFSPC AFRC	Offutt Intel 20 IS - 23 IS ACC AFRC			
Buckley SBIRS 2 SWS - 8 SWS AFSPC AFRC	Elmendorf C-17 517 AS - 249 AS PACAF ANG	Homestead F-16 482FW-Det93, 495FG AFRC ACC	Langley Network Ops/Security 83 NOS-860 NOS AFSPC AFRC	McConnell KC-135 22 ARW - 931 ARG AMC AFRC	Peterson RAIDRs 16 SCS - 380 SCS AFSPC AFRC	Scott LSC 635 SCMW-126 ARW AFMC ANG	Vandenberg MILSTAR Comms 4 SOPS - 148 SOPS AFSPC AFRC				

## Appendix D: Total Force Interview Questions

1. What do you understand the “Total Force concept” to mean for your unit?
2. Of the following list, has your unit experienced *Increased*, *Decreased*, or *No Change* in behavior due to the employment of the Total Force concept? Can you elaborate?
  - Training
  - Capacity
  - Retention
  - Readiness
  - Efficiency
  - Flexibility
  - Mobilization
  - Cost Savings
  - Resource Usage
  - Personnel Stability
  - Military Capability
  - Duplication of Efforts
  - Balance of Experience
  - Leadership Development
  - Operational Effectiveness
  - Other Synergistic Effects
3. Do you see the Total Force concept introducing any unforeseen, symptomatic problems?
4. Of these symptomatic problems, what do you see as the root cause(s)?
5. At your level, are you equipped and able to engage root causes or are you relegated solely to managing the symptomatic problems?
6. At what organizational level should these root causes be addressed?
7. Regardless of whether symptomatic or a root cause, are you equipped with adequate *training* to address Total Force concerns?
8. Regardless of whether symptomatic or a root cause, are you equipped with adequate *resources* to address Total Force concerns?
9. Regardless of whether symptomatic or a root cause, are you equipped with adequate *guidance* to address Total Force concerns?
10. From whom or what entity do you look for Total Force specific guidance?
11. How often do you refer to the following guidance:
  - AFI 90-1001: *Responsibilities For Total Force Integration*
  - AFGM 2016-01: *Interim Guidance to AFI 90-1001*
  - Commander’s Integration Guide
  - Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) / Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
12. What differences of opinion arise concerning topics falling under the purview of Operational Direction (OPDIR) versus Administrative Control (ADCON)?
  - i. At what level are such differences resolved?
13. Describe what *perfect* integration/association at your unit would look like?
14. Describe what integration/association at your unit *currently* looks like?
15. What needs to happen to move integration/association at your unit from what it is now to the desired goal?
16. Do you have additional/other Total Force thoughts/comments not fully covered through these questions?

## Appendix E: Acronyms

AD – Active Duty	NCSAF – National Commission on the
ADCON – Administrative Control	Structure of the Air Force
AF – Air Force	NDAA – National Defense
AFB – Air Force Base	Authorization Act
AFGM – Air Force Guidance	NAF – Numbered Air Force
Memorandum	OPCON – Operational Control
AFI – Air Force Instruction	OPDIR – Operational Direction
AFPD – Air Force Policy Directive	POTUS – President of the United States
AFPM – Air Force Policy Memorandum	RegAF – Regular Air Force
AFR – Air Force Reserve	SecDef – Secretary of Defense
ANG – Air National Guard	SME – Subject Matter Expert
ARC – Air Reserve Component	TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and
CJCS – Chairman of the Joint Chief of	Procedures
Staff	TFA – Total Force Association
CSAF – Chief of Staff of the Air Force	TFC – Total Force Concept
DoD – Department of Defense	TFI – Total Force Integration
FTF – Future Total Force	TFIA – Total Force Integration
HAF – Headquarters Air Force	Association
MAJCOM – Major Command	TFP – Total Force Policy
MOA – Memorandum of Agreement	UMD – Unit Manning Document
MOU – Memorandum of Understanding	USAF – United States Air Force
MDS – Mission Design Series	USC – United States Code

## Appendix F: Consent to Participate Questionnaire

### *An Investigation into the Indicators of a Successful Total Force Association*

You have been asked to participate in a study conducted by researchers from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Department of Operational Sciences. The main objective of this project is to explore the experience and perspectives of unit leaders currently serving in Total Force Active Associations across the Air Force (AF). This effort stems from a desire to better enable the Total Force Continuum (TF-C) in understanding unit-level observed stress points of Total Force integrative efforts. You were selected as a participant in this study because of your leadership role within a Total Force Active Association. You should read the information below and ask questions about anything you do not understand before deciding whether or not to participate.

- This interview is voluntary. You have the right to decline answering any question. I expect the interview will take approximately 60 minutes.
- You will not be compensated for this interview.
- The information you tell us will be kept confidential. All data will be presented at an aggregate level.
- I would like to record this interview so I can transcribe it and use it for analysis as part of this study. I will not record this interview without your permission. If you grant permission for this conversation to be recorded, you have the right to revoke permission and/or end the interview at any time.
- This project will be completed by May 2017. All interview documents will be stored in a secure work space until one year after that date. The documents will then be destroyed.

I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

(Please initial)

[  ] I give permission for this interview to be recorded and transcribed.

Name of Subject: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of Subject: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of Investigator: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Please contact Maj Hazen with any questions or concerns at [benjamin.hazen@afit.edu](mailto:benjamin.hazen@afit.edu) or 937-255-3636 x4337.

## Appendix G: Investigation Review Board Exemption Letter

MEMORANDUM FOR AFIT IRB Reviewer

30 September 2016

FROM: AFIT/ENS  
2950 Hobson Way  
Wright Patterson AFB OH 45433-7765

SUBJECT: Request for exemption from human experimentation requirements (32 CFR 219, DoDD 3216.2 and AFI 40-402) for a study for AFIT Thesis Research Study

1. The objective of this study is to more fully understand and define the perceptions of the Active Duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard Aircraft Maintenance (21A) officers regarding the Total Force concept and integration/associative efforts. Unit leaders from the three Total Force components will be interviewed as a part of this study regarding their experience and perspectives serving in their respective leadership positions within current Total Force Active Associations. The research project is designed as partial fulfillment of the Logistics and Supply Chain Management program.

2. This request is based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 101, paragraph (b) (2) Research activities that involve the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior unless: (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) Any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

3. Methodology to mitigate personal identifiers/demographic information.

- a) The data collected from the in-person interviews and phone interviews will also be stored in a password protected database. Any reference to the information collected from the subjects in any published document will exclude personal identifiers.
- b) I understand that the names and associated data I collect must be protected at all times, only be known to the researcher, and managed according to the AFIT interview protocol. All interview data will only be handled by the following researchers: Maj Ben Hazen and Capt Greg Hoyt. At the conclusion of the study, all data will be retained and protected by the principal investigator (Maj Ben Hazen).

4. The following information is provided to show cause for such an exemption:

- a) Equipment and facilities: Interviews will be conducted in the subjects' office or work location in-person or over the phone. A researcher will use an audio recording device to record the interviews and a laptop computer or notebook to take notes during each interview. The web based survey requires no facilities or equipment.
- b) Subjects: Individuals chosen to be interviewed and surveyed will be between the rank of Capt – Col within the 21A communities. It will include individuals from multiple levels

of leadership (group, squadron, unit). A minimum of 15 people will be selected from the career field for interviews in order to gain insight from multiple perspectives. A web-based survey will be sent to all personnel within the career fields after AFPC approves it.

- i. Source of subjects: Active Duty, Air National Guard, or Air Force Reserve squadron and/or group commanders with ranks of Capt – Col with core Air Force Specialty Codes of 21A.
    - ii. Total number of subjects: Maximum of 20 personnel for the interviews
    - iii. Inclusion criteria: None
  - c) Timeframe: Interviews will be accomplished during the months of October and November 2016.
  - d) Data collected:
    - i. Interview: Individual name, work organization, experience and responses to interview questions (Attachment 3). The data requested will be based on opinions/evaluations of the respondents' experience and perspectives serving in a Total Force integrated unit. No personal information will be collected or used. Only the results of the interviews will be used to characterize the current retention intents of the respondents and opinions on how their career fields could be managed differently to affect their intentions.
  - e) Risks to Subjects: Minimal. Any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside of the research will not place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
  - f) Informed consent: All subjects are self-selected to volunteer to participate in the interview. No adverse action is taken against those who choose not to participate. Subjects are made aware of the nature and purpose of the research, sponsors of the research, and disposition of the survey results. For the interview, this will be communicated to the subjects in a consent form, which will require their signature (Attachment 4).
5. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Maj Benjamin Hazen (principal investigator) – Phone 785-3636, ext. 4337; E-mail – benjamin.hazen@afit.edu.

BENJAMIN T. HAZEN, Maj, USAF  
Principal Investigator

Attachments:

- 1) CITI Completion Certificate
- 2) Researcher CV
- 3) Total Force Interview Questions
- 4) Research Topic Description & Interview Consent Form

## Appendix H: Summary Slide



# An Investigation into the Indicators of a Successful Total Force Association



**Captain Greg E. Hoyt**  
**Advisor: Maj Benjamin T. Hazen, PhD**  
**Reader: Lt Col Matthew A. Douglas, PhD**  
 Department of Operational Sciences (ENS)  
 Air Force Institute of Technology

**Problem Statement:**

The SecAF and CSAF have employed language implicitly claiming successful integration of the Total Force and all the stated benefits thereof. However, these benefits as well as the key success factors to attain them at the tactical level have yet to be quantified.

**Methodology:**

**Data Population:** 18 SMEs (i.e. Squadron-level Total Force leaders) from nine Total Force *Active Associations* conducting aircraft maintenance (e.g. AMXS)

**Data Collection Method:** Semi-structured interviews (17/18 conducted) via impersonal (i.e. teleconference). Interviews were 16 questions in length (disseminated beforehand) with audio digitally recorded (11.23 hours total) for an average interview length of 39 minutes. The audio was then transcribed (182 pages).

**Data Analysis Method:** Coding (i.e. Open, Axial, and Selective) – trend, pattern, and theme analysis

**Purpose Statement:**

This research will attempt to highlight disconnects in communication and perception by comparing and contrasting the statements of the Air Force's most strategic leaders to the statements, opinions, and perspectives of tactical Total Force leaders.

**Research Question:**

What success factors allow tactical level Total Force leaders to share a common objective and means of evaluating the Total Force *Active Association*?

**Investigative Questions:**

IQ 1: What, *collectively*, do leaders understand the Total Force Concept (TFC) to mean at the tactical level?

IQ 2: On which topics, respecting employment of the TFC, do tactical level Total Force leaders *collectively* perceive similar benefits as those lauded by the AF's most strategic leaders?

IQ 3: What unforeseen, symptomatic problems (with discernable root causes) do tactical level Total Force leaders perceive employment of the TFC introducing?

IQ 4: Regarding the listed root causes, do tactical level Total Force leaders believe decision making and subsequent solution generating to be more appropriately handled by higher organizational levels?

IQ 5: In what ways do tactical level Total Force leaders perceive a lack of adequate training, resources, and/or guidance to address Total Force concerns?

IQ 6: From whom or what entity do tactical level Total Force leaders seek Total Force specific guidance?

IQ 7: What is the *collective* wisdom from tactical level Total Force leaders for sustaining and/or improving employment of the TFC?

**Results & Analysis:**

- Tactical Total Force leaders *collectively* 1) Vary greatly in their summations of the Total Force concept 2) Differ greatly in their appreciation of Total Force benefits 3) List, at least, 8 categories of *Symptomatic Problems* tied with varying *Root Causes* resultant from Total Force Association (TFA) construct
- Tactical Total Force leaders *majority* 1) Believe they manage *Symptomatic Problems* and not equipped to engage *Root Causes* 2) Seek most Total Force guidance from the immediate chain 3) Have *collective* wisdom for improving the employment of the Total Force concept 4) Voice frustration at the lack of empathy/engagement from headquarter-levels above the Wing

**Implications:**

- Provides "perceived" local TFA health
- Highlights strategic and tactical level communication and perception disconnects with regards to the TFC
- Provides the HAF *Total Force Continuum* office an actionable listing of tactical level obstacles and concerns as well as a collection of best practices and innovative solutions.

**Conclusions & Recommendations:**

- Multiple TFAs "perceive" themselves as healthy but only through relationally subjective lens
- With no measuring stick for evaluating TFA effectiveness and no *collective* tactical level appreciation of its benefits, the AF postures to repeat the historical challenges
- Vague strategic policy increases *Restraining Forces* to change by preventing *Driving Forces* (i.e. tactical level Total Force leaders) from knowing the objective

**Four success factors:** 1) Clear HAF direction defining and driving Total Force concept *Unity of Effort* 2) Removal of current *State* and *Federal* legal barriers 3) Strengthening of the support ties between the local TFA and its governing higher headquarter entities 4) Time

**Recommendations:** 1) Standardizing the Total Force concept governing approach codifying TFA objective and answering whether the strategy is intended to be a permanent 2) Developing a measurement system for evaluating each TFA's effectiveness 3) Continued promotion of the I-Wing 4) Empowering, incentivizing, and requiring both the NAFs and MAJCOMs to better understand and champion Wing level TFA obstacles.



**Figure 1**

Majority believe they are Managing Symptomatic Problems

Minority believe they are Equipped to Engage Root Causes

DoD, HAF, MAJCOM, Wing + NAF, Wing - Lowest Level

Appropriate Ownership Level

**Figure 2**

AF, NAF/MAJCOM, MCOA/MOUs, Immediate Chain (SMEs/Peers - Wing)

Leadership Assessment, Most Stated, Least Stated

**Figure 3**

Single Chain of Command (MCOA & OPIR), Full Functional Integration (W/AF Levels) - Remove Duplicated Positions, Full Location Integration (No Segregation), Open / Clear Communication, Full Manning, Fully Funded by Training Requirements, Classic Active

Most Stated, Least Stated

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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> The Air Force, since adopting and subsequently developing the Total Force concept in the early 1970s, has not thoroughly outlined clear objectives by which the progress toward and realization of this strategic vision should be defined and measured. Without clear definition, direction, and method of evaluation, the ability to credibly claim any subsequent successes or failures in the pursuit of this vision become vulnerable to challenge. Indeed, the mere claim that a single, clear vision exists may be challenged. The Total Force concept's degree of success has, on multiple occasions through its history, been critiqued with the most recent instance occurring with the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force's report, delivered to the President and Congress, specifying 42 recommended improvements. The relatively brief history of the Total Force concept has led to a gap in knowledge with respect to this topic. While the SecAF and CSAF have employed language implicitly claiming successful integration of the Total Force and all the stated benefits thereof, these benefits as well as the key success factors for attaining them at the tactical level have yet to be quantified. Therefore, through the semi-structured interviewing of tactical level Total Force leaders, this research provides an assessment of the "perceived" local Total Force Association health, highlights strategic and tactical level communication and perception disconnects with regards to the Total Force concept, and provides the Headquarters Air Force Total Force Continuum office an actionable listing of tactical level obstacles and concerns as well as a collection of best practices and innovative solutions.					
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