Deterring the Russian Tactical Nuclear Arsenal
Abstract
Russia has aggressively pursed its national objectives. Crimea in 2014 and continued support of separatist forces in Ukraine have Allied commanders concerned that Russia could launch a conventional attack on a NATO state and use a tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) to de-escalate any NATO military response. This research formulates and tests an expected utility theory model of conditions affecting the Russian decision to use TNWs in a conventional conflict. The model attempts to qualitatively predict the effects a specific western action has on manipulating Russia's TNW decision making process in an effort to deter their use. Actions that minimize the utility associated with TNW use, minimize Russia's perceived probability of losing the conflict, and maximize the utility of actions other than TNW use are predicted to provide deterrent value. Interview responses from Russian experts challenge the models underlying assumptions and provide an independent list of recommended actions to deter Russia from using TNWs. Most recommendations could be categorized in only one of the three types of actions predicted to provide deterrent value. This comparison suggests there may be other actions, not considered through a traditional deterrence lens, which could be exploited to provide a deterrent effect and warrants further research.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2017
- Accession Number
- AD1055422
Entities
People
- Jeremy D Dawson
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology