Game Theory for Adaptive Defensive Cyber Deception
Abstract
In prior game theory work, cyber deception games have generally been modeled as non-cooperative, sequential games, where the quality and authenticity of the signal is being manipulated. This work relies on a signal, which can be deceptive, being actively pushed to the attacker. We have formulated a new framework for cyber deception games in which each player has their own perception of the game being played and the moves being taken. A particular player may manipulate other players perceived payoffs to induce them to take sub-optimal actions. This model of deception seeks to address defender interactions with an attacker following the initial deployment of cyber defenses addressed by previous work. Our primary contribution is a model of defensive cyber deception that incorporates defender control of attacker perception of the cyber environment. Our ultimate goal is to inform future cyber defense systems, enabling more sophisticated responses to attacker behaviors and improving defensive posture.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 01, 2018
- Accession Number
- AD1056000
Entities
People
- Justin Mauger
- Kimberly Ferguson-walter
- Maxine Major
- Sunny Fugate
Organizations
- Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific