



Finding the Right Balance

Department of Defense Roles in Stabilization

Linda Robinson, Sean Mann, Jeffrey Martini, Stephanie Pezard

For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2441

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

ISBN: 978-1-9774-0046-8

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

© Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation

R® is a registered trademark.

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.

RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

Support RAND

Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at
www.rand.org/giving/contribute

www.rand.org

Preface

This report comes at an important juncture for U.S. policymaking. The report evaluates the nature and appropriateness of tasks the U.S. military must be prepared to undertake in stability activities. Historically, the U.S. military has shied away from stabilization activities, only to find itself tasked with performing this role. This proved the case since 2001: The U.S. military found itself unprepared for stabilization in both Afghanistan and Iraq and then expanded its focus and spending enormously as the U.S. Department of Defense directed the military to develop proficiency in a wide range of stabilization tasks. That focus has waned as near-peer military challenges have grown and the defense budget and manpower have shrunk. At the same time, the incidence of fragile and conflict-plagued states remains high. The combined military and civilian experience of the past 15 years provides valuable insights into the tasks that the U.S. military should and should not be expected to undertake and, more generally, into how a more effective and efficient approach to stabilization might be developed. This report surveys these insights, assesses capacity and capability, and recommends adjustments to Department of Defense policy and operational approaches to stabilization efforts.

This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html> or contact the director (contact information is provided on the webpage).

Contents

Preface.....	iii
Figures.....	vi
Tables.....	vii
Summary.....	viii
Abbreviations.....	xv
Acknowledgments.....	xvii
1. Introduction.....	1
Purpose of the Study.....	1
Research Approach and Organization of the Report.....	3
2. Understanding Stabilization.....	6
Defining <i>Stabilization</i>	6
Proliferation of Terms and Activities.....	6
Stability Functions.....	8
3. Stabilization Lessons from Recent Experience.....	14
Lessons from Recent Experience.....	14
Military Versus Civilian Core Competencies.....	23
4. Current DoD Capacity and Capability for Stabilization.....	31
The Joint Force.....	31
Key Military Enablers for Stabilization.....	41
5. Rescoping DoD Roles in Stabilization.....	56
Security Function: DoD Has a Unique Responsibility to Provide Security and Build	
Security Capacity.....	56
Military Support to Public Order.....	58
Immediate Human Needs.....	59
Support to Governance.....	60
Support to Economic Stability.....	61
Three Crosscutting Functions.....	62
Enacting a Civilian-Led Stabilization Model.....	64
6. Gaps in DoD Capacity and Capability.....	67
Joint Force Capacity.....	67
Key Enabler Capacity or Capability Gaps.....	68
The Ability to Regenerate or Expand.....	71

7. Conclusion: Risks, Mitigations, and Recommendations	74
Risks and Possible Mitigations	75
Recommendations	78
Conclusion	78
Appendix A. Interagency Considerations for DoD Stabilization Requirements	80
Appendix B. Key International Partners’ Capacity, Capabilities, and Approaches to Stabilization	89
Bibliography	110

Figures

Figure 3.1. Number of Ongoing Conflicts, by Type, 1946–2015	16
Figure 3.2. Number of Fatalities in Intrastate Conflict, 1989–2015	17
Figure 3.3. Interagency Expenditures on Stabilization-Related Activities, FY 2000 to FY 2015	27
Figure 4.1. Number of U.S. Military Personnel by Service and Component in FY 2009 Compared with FY 2016.....	33
Figure 4.2. Number of Authorized Active Army CA Personnel by Unit/Formation in FY 2010, FY 2015, and FY 2016	43
Figure 4.3. Number of Authorized CA Personnel by Service and Component in FY 2010, FY 2015, and FY 2016.....	45
Figure 4.4. Number of Authorized Engineers in Army Units, FY 2009 and FY 2016.....	47
Figure 4.5. Number of Medical Personnel by Service and Component, FY 2009 and FY 2015	51
Figure 4.6. Number of Army and Marine Corps Military Police, Navy Master-at-Arms, and Air Force Security Forces, FY 2009 and FY 2015	53
Figure 4.7. Number of JAG Personnel by Service and Component, FY 2009 and FY 2015	55
Figure 5.1. Proposed DoD Roles in Stabilization	66
Figure A.1. DoS Bureaus with Significant Roles in Stabilization Activities.....	81
Figure A.2. USAID Office with Significant Roles in Stabilization.....	85

Tables

Table 2.1. Organization of Stabilization Activities in Joint Doctrine.....	8
Table 4.1. Defense Institution-Building Program Budgets, FY 2009 to FY 2015	38
Table 4.2. Number of Active Army Construction-Related Engineering Companies	49

Summary

The Purpose of the Study

The pendulum regarding the level of U.S. military participation in stabilization efforts has swung dramatically in the past 17 years, from a low level of preparation and participation in the early days of the Afghanistan and Iraq operations, to widespread stabilization activities costing billions of dollars in the ensuing years, to significantly scaled-back forces and resources devoted to stabilization in recent years. To remedy the initial lack of preparation, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued a directive with guidance on stabilization requirements in 2005 and then updated it with more expansive requirements in 2009.¹ This report supports DoD efforts to update this guidance by assessing the accumulated experience of the past 17 years and evaluating the appropriate roles for the U.S. military and its ability to execute them in conjunction with interagency and other key partners.

In recent years, the U.S. military has sought to reorient its primary focus from conducting major stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to maintaining combat readiness to deter or defeat state adversaries. This shift has been codified in strategic guidance and has driven recent decisions about force structure, training, and modernization. Sequestration and reduction in overseas contingency funding have led to cuts in personnel and changes in force structure, which in turn carry implications for the U.S. military's ability to carry out stabilization. The U.S. military nonetheless continues to engage in stabilization efforts throughout the world, although these are smaller and more diffuse than they were in 2009. Major operations ended in Iraq 2011 and in Afghanistan in 2014; however, both countries are currently hosting smaller, U.S.-led missions that include a stabilization component.² Since 2009, the United States has also been involved in missions in Central America, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Libya, the Philippines, Syria, Somalia, and elsewhere, all of which included a stabilization component either led or supported by the military.³

This report arrives at an important time for stabilization policy. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, Special Operations/Low

¹ DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005, was superseded by DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009.

² The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) combat mission in Afghanistan ended in December 31, 2014, and was replaced with a continuing mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces. Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, *Operation Freedom's Sentinel: Report to the U.S. Congress*, Washington, D.C., 2017, p. 12.

³ Barbara Salazar Torreon, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2017*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 12, 2017, pp. 24–38.

Intensity Conflict, requested this report in support of its assessment mandated by the 2009 DoDI 3000.05, *Stability Operations*.⁴ DoDI 3000.05, which codified the current list of DoD stabilization requirements, was issued at the peak of large-scale military stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵ The strategic environment, national policy priorities, and resource availability have all changed in the years since. In addition, the accumulated experience of both small- and large-scale stabilization efforts provides a variety of instructive lessons. The objective of this report is to inform revisions to DoD stabilization policy to improve the department's ability to effectively conduct and support such missions.

Research Approach

This short-turn report aims to answer the question: What should DoD's role in stabilization be? It does so by (1) examining lessons from recent experience and (2) assessing the current capacity and capability that the joint force possesses for stabilization tasks. The two-pronged approach to answering this question begins with a survey of studies of what DoD and the U.S. government did in the past 15 years. This survey allowed the research team to formulate propositions regarding DoD competencies in stabilization and appropriate divisions of labor among the military and nonmilitary actors in this space. Then, we evaluated DoD's posture to determine what it can do now, and we created a model for conducting stabilization that more clearly defines the roles DoD should play. We also identified some possible gaps in needed DoD capabilities and recommendations for policy guidance for DoD roles in stabilization.

The team's analysis relied on three sources of data: in-depth interviews with senior practitioners, official documents and academic studies, and government databases, which we used to assess current capacity and capability compared with the peak period of large-scale stabilization missions. This comparative assessment drew on manpower data from joint, U.S. Army, and branch-level databases and on reports about military exercises, training, education, and centers of excellence. The team developed findings regarding good practices based on recent experience, core competencies that inform a military and civilian division of labor, and the requirements for the U.S. military to perform the proposed roles in stabilization. The team also recommended changes in current guidance to clarify and scope DoD's role to improve its contribution to stabilization and to the success of the overall effort. We also identified numerous risks to the proposed course and possible corresponding mitigations.

⁴ DoDI 3000.05, 2009.

⁵ The combined number of U.S. armed forces personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan reached its all-time peak of 191,500 troops during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009; DoDI 3000.05 (2009) was issued at the end of the same quarter. Heidi M. Peters, Moshe Schwartz, and Lawrence Kapp, *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007–2016*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2016.

Principal Findings

The research team's review of documents; interviews with highly qualified experts from DoD, the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and allied countries; and its capacity and capability assessment indicated a common pattern of *forgetting* that stabilization is a vital function that must be performed across the range of military operations. The second finding is that the military has a vital role to play, particularly in security and in supporting the stabilization activities of others. Third, those roles that the military is expected to perform should be more clearly defined. If DoD took a more focused approach to performing key functions and supporting others (rather than trying to do too many functions itself), it could be more effective and efficient. Fourth, the coordination mechanisms for unified action and a comprehensive approach remain a work in progress, but civilian entities, allies, and others do possess substantial expertise and capacity, albeit with some gaps. Finally, a more focused approach to stabilization overall avoids waste and counterproductive effects, such as fueling corruption and conflict.

Conflict trends show that intrastate conflict is on the rise, and the incidence of conflict at a level that requires U.S. involvement remains high. The lessons from the past 15 years of war suggest that, to conclude these conflicts successfully, as well as to prevent or mitigate emerging conflicts, stabilization must be embraced as a U.S. policy priority. Given the resources of the U.S. military and the fact that demand for stabilization often arises in insecure environments, there is a likely requirement for some types of military participation. Nonetheless, given that the roots of instability are often political in nature, and that most stability tasks are nonmilitary activities, civilian expertise is essential to undertake them. This generates a requirement for the military to work effectively with civilians in accomplishing this mission. Indeed, the more effectively that the military can work with others to enable them, the less the burden of actually conducting stabilization activities directly will fall on the military. These insights are derived from numerous studies of the past years' experience.⁶

This concept of the military role in stabilization as primarily supporting civilian entities is explicit in the 2009 DoDI 3000.05 and the earlier DoD directive, 3000.05 (2005), on stabilization. However, recent official assessments and the team's interviews and document review suggest that this practice has not been completely or sufficiently operationalized. In addition, the 2009 DoDI levies an additional high-bar requirement for the military to perform a wide array of stabilization tasks at the same level of proficiency as combat operations. Therefore, this report seeks to clarify the appropriate DoD roles in stabilization, specify the exact nature of

⁶ These include Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015; Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Decade of War*, Vol. 1: *Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, Suffolk, Va., 2012; and Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwille, and Raphael S. Cohen, *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-816-A, 2014.

the DoD supporting functions, and thus provide more-detailed and clearly scoped requirements for the DoD roles in stabilization.

We recognize that, for DoD to assume a more scoped and a primarily supporting role for most stabilization efforts, other actors need to be willing and able to perform a central role. To provide a concrete picture of what non-DoD actors are currently able to do in the stabilization arena, the study team surveyed the assigned stabilization missions; funding and capability of U.S. civilian actors, primarily USAID and the Department of State's relevant bureaus; and the funding and capability of three close U.S. allies, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. These actors rely on and work with and through multiple international, nongovernmental, and private-sector organizations, which provide significant implementation manpower and expertise.

U.S. civilian entities and these three frequent coalition partners have specific stabilization roles and capabilities. When a sufficiently secure environment is established or forces provide sufficient protection, civilian entities, such as USAID, have been able to assume substantial and even leading roles in post-conflict environments, to cite post-Islamic State Iraq and Syria as two recent examples.⁷ USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) conducts a worldwide portfolio of roughly \$3 billion in annual activities. DCHA's Office of Transition Initiatives currently implements approximately \$250 million in projects in fragile or conflict environments outside major war theaters, including Cameroon, Colombia, Honduras, Libya, Macedonia, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and Ukraine. The preferred model for stabilization, according to the majority of our interviewees, is to rely on local capacity, with a relatively small footprint of outside implementers. USAID—and the Office of Transition Initiatives, in particular—works closely with civil affairs teams and other special operations forces in many conflict environments where military transport and force protection provide vital support to their activities. One senior USAID official told us: “We look at the future of stabilization as smaller teams, in austere places, [operating] without tons of military hardware. That is why we get along well with [special operations forces]; they approach things with teams of four people, not brigades—just like us.”

The United Kingdom, Germany, and France have been active in coalition stabilization operations since the Balkans conflict. The United Kingdom has developed several innovations that may be useful for the United States to consider. It has created the combined Stabilisation Unit of civilian and military experts who can be quickly deployed to fragile or conflict states, as well as the Conflict Stability and Security Fund, which requires defense, development, and

⁷ USAID implemented its largest-ever programs in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, although these programs of approximately \$7 billion were dwarfed by the U.S. military spending on stabilization projects (more than \$50 billion). More recently, in Iraq during the counter-Islamic State campaign, the U.S. military has not engaged in stabilization activities beyond the training and advising of security forces. U.S. stabilization activities funded by USAID have been largely carried out through the United Nations Development Programme and local implementers. See United Nations Development Programme in Iraq, *Funding Facility for Stabilization: 2017 Q3 Report*, 2017. In Syria, the Department of State and USAID have formed a combined team for implementing stabilization activities, with support and equipment supplied by the U.S. military.

foreign affairs ministries to work together. Stabilization is a core competence of the German military, and the government has been a large contributor to stabilization programs in Iraq. France has taken the lead in stabilization missions in Africa, and its military is expected to perform advisory roles as part of a normal career path. These allies' participation in stabilization efforts requires approval from appropriate government authorities, and resources or competing missions, such as domestic counterterrorism tasks, may limit their availability. Some gaps in stabilization expertise remain—for example, in meeting the need for civilian police training, although NATO's Stability Policing Center of Excellence has increased capacity and capability through its training center.

Principal Recommendations

We recommend restoring due emphasis on defense strategic guidance and geographic combatant command plans for stabilization as vital to strategic success. Without stabilization, successful warfighting often does not produce desired political outcomes. Yet warfighters are not the most capable actors for many stabilization tasks. Therefore, we recommend a shift in the 2009 DoD guidance on stabilization away from requiring high levels of proficiency in a large number of tasks to emphasizing three key roles for DoD: (1) a leading role in the provision of security and building security capacity; (2) a supporting role in nonmilitary stability functions; and (3) a supporting role in the crosscutting functions of information, planning, coordination, and physical support. We recommend this shift based on our review of recent experience, evolving doctrine, and operational approaches, as well as our evaluation of the current DoD capacity and capability. Adopting this more scoped approach, in practice, would provide multiple cost-saving benefits. First, it would reduce the demand for large-scale military-led stabilization efforts by more effectively harnessing and leveraging the considerable civilian expertise that exists among interagency and international partners. Second, cost-effective results may be obtained through a more proactive focus on stabilizing fragile or failing states where the United States and its allies possess significant national security interests. Third, the substantive change in this paradigm is to focus on supporting legitimate governance and fulfilling needs identified by the population, rather than on spending large sums on a fixed set of projects that may or may not be conducive to stabilization.⁸

Under this new approach, DoD would still need to reintroduce stabilization acumen in the joint force as a whole (much of this acumen was gained in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it has been underemphasized in recent years). It also requires a reinvestment in certain specialized capabilities, but this represents a more targeted set of requirements. Even if the overall role and

⁸ A senior USAID official observed to the RAND team: "The military wants to bring stuff in, get the lights on and things running. You can flood Helmand with as many projects as you want, but if there isn't security and government legitimacy among the population, you won't get anywhere." He noted that adversary groups, such as the Taliban, the Islamic State, and al Nusra in Syria, all focused on court systems as a primary service to deliver.

footprint of DoD in stabilization become more focused and clearly defined, its role in multiple smaller-scale endeavors, likely carried out simultaneously in several locations, will still require significant capacity and capability. Finally, DoD will need to be a consistent advocate for civilian interagency capability to assume the lead in stabilization programs and for the needed civilian-military coordination mechanisms.

This report makes the following specific recommendations regarding DoD policy guidance on stabilization, noting that these recommendations require further study to refine the additional needed investments and policy, procedural, organizational, and legislative changes:

1. DoD should prioritize security and building security capacity to transition successfully to host-nation providers. This entails ensuring that the U.S. military is fully capable of performing all security-related stability functions required by the joint doctrine on stability.
2. DoD should scope the specific tasks and capabilities required for each of the four remaining joint stability functions (public order, immediate human needs, governance, and economic stability).
3. The U.S. military should reorient so civilian interagency and international stability providers perform more supporting functions, rather than providing duplicative capabilities. The Department of State and USAID are the most appropriate leads for this effort, given the nonmilitary nature of most stabilization activities. This requires DoD to increase training and education that focus specifically on supporting interagency and international partners and integrating *its* activities into those entities' methods and structures.
4. DoD should improve coordination mechanisms to realize the much-touted yet rarely achieved unity of effort among military and civilian partners. The gaps have been repeatedly identified by official assessments, but greater progress toward eliminating friction and increasing synergy is needed. A policy-level coordinating body, such as a working group or interagency task force, should be designated to focus efforts and delegate responsibilities.⁹
5. A new approach to stabilization should be refined and adopted to incorporate the insights that experience has shown to be central to achieving lasting stability. Operating “by, with, and through” indigenous actors is the soundest method to ensure appropriate and lasting stabilization. This new approach would spend less, build less, and focus more on addressing the political drivers of conflict and building governing capacity and legitimacy.
6. Under this recommended approach, key DoD enabling capabilities—including civil affairs, military police, and construction engineers—play critical roles across the stability functions and in both conflict and preconflict environments. This assessment suggests a

⁹ Numerous studies have suggested options for national-level coordination mechanisms. Options include the Department of State–led model stipulated in National Security Presidential Directive 44 in 2005, an NSC-led model advocated in Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009, or a FEMA-like agency advocated by former Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Stuart Bowen (SIGIR, *Learning from Iraq: Final Report of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction*, Washington, D.C., March 2013).

need to rebuild, reorganize, and improve these capabilities to support and conduct stability functions successfully.

The research team's evaluation of what the U.S. military did do, and what it is currently postured to do, led us to formulate a several propositions about what DoD should do in the realm of stabilization. Specifically, the team concluded that DoD should prioritize security tasks, provide support to other stability functions, and perform crosscutting informational, planning, coordination, and physical support roles.

These recommended changes in DoD guidance entail several risks or potential risks, but there are possible mitigations. The chief risk in adopting an approach that relies on civilian agencies, partners, and indigenous capacity is that those other entities will fail to perform their roles. Recent U.S. government decisions heighten the risk that civilian agencies' capability and capacity will be degraded by further reductions in budgets of the Department of State and USAID—in particular, the bureaus and offices that house the critical expertise for planning, overseeing, and executing the majority of stabilization functions. Increasing capability and capacity in NATO, other allies, and international organizations can partly offset such a risk, but the most reliable mitigation would be continued funding of the requisite U.S. government civilian capability and capacity.

Abbreviations

AFD	Agence Française de Développement (French Agency for Development)
BCT	brigade combat team
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
CA	civil affairs
CIAE	Centre interarmées des actions sur l'environnement (Joint Center for Actions on the Environment)
CSSF	Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement
CSO	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
DCSD	Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de defense (Directorate of Security and Defense Cooperation)
DCHA	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DoDI	U.S. Department of Defense instruction
DoS	U.S. Department of State
DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
FCO	Foreign Commonwealth Office
FY	fiscal year
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for International Cooperation)
IDP	internally displaced person
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JP	joint publication

MAEDI	Ministère des affaires étrangères et du développement international (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development)
MP	military police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSC	National Security Council
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction
SFAB	security force assistance brigade
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
THW	Technisches Hilfswerk (Agency for Technical Relief)
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID/OTI	U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the many current and former U.S. and allied officials, both military and civilian, who generously agreed to lengthy interviews regarding their experiences in directing and conducting stabilization activities. These reflections significantly enriched and complemented the documentary and statistical research carried out by the team. We would like to thank the sponsors of this project for their extensive engagement and advice throughout. In particular, we are grateful to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stabilization and Humanitarian Affairs Mark Swayne; his predecessor, Anne A. Witkowsky; Pat Antonietti, director of peacekeeping and stabilization operations; COL Aaron Reisinger; LTC Jason Taliaferro, Kelly Uribe; Adam Mausner; the director of the U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), COL Gregory DeWitt; and the entire PKSOI staff. Magdalena Kirchner provided valuable research assistance and generously shared her European contacts. British, French, and German officials provided interviews, as did dozens of U.S. military and civilian officials. We are grateful to Beth Cole and Jeffrey Marquis for thorough peer reviews of our draft document and the many helpful suggestions they provided. Austin Long provided additional comments and editing assistance. The leadership of the RAND National Security Research Division and its International Security and Defense Policy Center supported this work throughout, and the publication editors Beth Bernstein and Rebecca Fowler assisted in the final preparation of this report.

1. Introduction

Purpose of the Study

The U.S. military continues to engage in stabilization efforts throughout the world, although these are smaller and more diffuse than they were in 2009. Major operations in Iraq ended in 2010 and in Afghanistan in 2014; however, both countries currently host smaller U.S.-led missions that include a stabilization component. Since 2009, the United States has also been involved in missions in Central America, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Libya, the Philippines, Syria, Somalia, and elsewhere, all of which included a stabilization component either led or supported by the military.

During this same period, the U.S. military has sought to reorient its primary focus from conducting major stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to maintaining combat readiness to deter or defeat state adversaries. This shift has been codified in strategic guidance and has driven recent decisions about force structure, training, and modernization. Resource constraints stemming from the reduction in overseas contingency funding, as well as sequestration, have led to cuts in personnel and force structure. All these changes have implications for the U.S. military's ability to carry out stabilization.

This report examines the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) approach to stabilization as codified in the 2009 DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations*.¹ It is intended to assess the continued utility of the current approach to stabilization and the capacity and capability of the DoD to execute stability operations.

This report arrives at an important time for stabilization policy. DoDI 3000.05, which codified the current list of DoD stabilization requirements, was issued at the peak of large-scale military stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.² National policy priorities, resource availability, and the strategic environment have all changed in the years since. These changes necessitate a review of stabilization requirements and the DoD capability and capacity available to meet them.

While stabilization is still a vital aspect of achieving lasting peace and acceptable security outcomes, the policy guidance for DoD to provide effective support to civilian efforts in what is a largely nonmilitary endeavor has not been adequately realized in practice. Rather than remedy these deficiencies, however, DoD has downgraded its focus on stabilization as it has shifted to

¹ DoDI 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009.

² The combined number of U.S. armed forces personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan reached its all-time peak of 191,500 troops during the fourth quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2009; DoDI 3000.05 was issued at the end of this same quarter. See Heidi M. Peters, Moshe Schwartz, and Lawrence Kapp, *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007–2016*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2016.

increasing capability and readiness to conduct major combat operations against near-peer adversaries.³ Although the requirement to conduct stabilization activities may be implicit in some high-level policy guidance, other guidance and plans notably omit any discussion of the need for this vital mission and the military's roles in accomplishing it.

Recent experience suggests that neglecting stabilization can result in increased or renewed conflict and a consequent demand for more-robust military measures. Both the civilian and the military communities of practitioners interviewed for this study suggested that more-effective and more-efficient ways of conducting stabilization activities with a variety of partners exist. This report offers a conceptual model for conducting stabilization, with DoD playing a major role in security and assuming support roles in other tasks. DoD can contribute vitally in the crosscutting functions of understanding the environment, planning and coordination, and various types of material support to civilian actors. In cases where the environment is too hostile for civilian actors to play the roles for which they are best suited by expertise and experience, or where the indigenous security forces are not able to provide the necessary security, the DoD role will need to be more extensive—from outright providing security to guaranteeing public order and possibly governance, as well as playing greater roles in providing for the population's immediate needs and economic stability. But—and this is perhaps the most powerful argument for scoping the DoD role—by focusing on its core mission of security and building indigenous security capacity, DoD can hasten and increase the ability of other actors to perform their roles and decrease its own direct involvement.

The primary implication of adopting this approach requires a fundamental shift in DoD focus to supporting activities, as opposed to conducting them. This, in turn, entails changes in DoD approaches to planning, coordination, organization, training and education, and force management so that it can adopt this new role. DoD is not without experience in supporting roles, and the major shift in practice is required primarily in postconflict and other large stabilization efforts. DoD already plays a supporting role in some contexts, including activities carried out as part of theater security cooperation plans. DoD has also carried out small-scale missions in mostly functional states, such as in Colombia (as part of Plan Colombia) and the Philippines (Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines), with varying degrees of civilian-military cooperation.⁴

Although the proposed alternative approach will reduce the need for the joint force to conduct some stabilization activities, DoD would need to provide more support across the

³ See, for example, the shift in emphasis at the National Training Center to “decisive action”; Dean A. Nowowiejski, “Regaining the Edge in Combined Arms,” *Army Magazine*, March 2013. For an in-depth discussion of the similar post-Vietnam shift, see David Fitzgerald, *Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2013.

⁴ Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1236-OSD, 2016; Christopher W. Muller, *USMILGP Colombia: Transforming Security Cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism*, thesis, Monterrey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2006.

stabilization spectrum in a variety of ways. To accomplish this, DoD's key enabling capabilities will be needed across the spectrum of stabilization. Currently, there are high levels of employment of these enabling capabilities, suggesting that certain ones may be insufficiently robust or difficult to access quickly or for extended periods (for example, if the capabilities reside in the reserve component). The lead time required for expansion of these key enablers is a matter of years. Therefore, maintaining a core of trained and ready stabilization capabilities will constitute a significant hedge against risk, given substantial global turbulence, as well as provide the means of regenerating additional key enablers. Finally, ensuring that routine training and core educational curricula for the entire joint force include substantial stabilization components will permit the U.S. military as a whole to maintain a level of understanding and preparedness as the direct experience of the large-scale stabilization operations of the 2002–2014 period fades.

Research Approach and Organization of the Report

This short-term study sought to answer the question: What should DoD's role in stabilization be? The RAND study team employed two approaches to answer this question. The first was to evaluate the lessons from the past 15 years to determine areas in which U.S. military capabilities were best employed. The second approach was to evaluate the current capabilities resident in the joint force as a whole and in those particular *key enablers* most often sought for stabilization tasks.

First, to evaluate lessons from the experience of the past 15 years of stabilization efforts, the team conducted practitioner interviews and reviewed the findings of official documents and assessments, inspector general reports, academic studies, and revised doctrine to derive a set of basic principles that capture how stabilization might best be conducted and with what division of labor between civilians and the military. Second, the team compiled a comparative assessment of joint force capacity and capability drawn from manpower data provided in joint, U.S. Army, and branch-level databases and published reports. From this assessment, the team drew several broad conclusions about DoD's ability to conduct and support stabilization. The team then formulated a revised approach for DoD's role in stabilization based on historical lessons and current capacity and capability within DoD. The report identifies several potential DoD capacity and capability gaps that would require further research to verify and quantify. The report concludes with recommendations for revised policy guidance.

The three main data sources for the analysis are interviews, documents, and a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the joint force. The study team conducted extensive semistructured interviews with 52 DoD, interagency, and key partner officials involved in stabilization policy and practice over the past 15 years. Almost half (23) of our interviews were conducted with uniformed military members; 14 were with civilian agency officials; 12 were with DoD civilians; and three were with foreign military officials with experience and portfolios in stabilization. Interviewees were current or recent officials of the U.S. Department of State (DoS); the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID); DoD; and the governments of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, which have participated in major stabilization efforts undertaken by coalitions and United Nations missions. The interviewees were senior personnel who led bureaus, commands, offices, and missions. In accordance with human-subject protection guidelines, the interviewees are not identified by name or position, to minimize risk to them. Interviewees were asked to identify specific cases of successful or unsuccessful stabilization efforts, the main factors involved, and deductions regarding core competencies and capability or capacity gaps. The responses were coded and cataloged. Documentary evidence supports interviewee assertions, and only assertions that a substantial number (more than five, and usually many more) of interviewees agreed on are used. In issues involving a particular military occupational specialty, such as engineering or civil affairs (CA), the expert interviewees were considered the most-knowledgeable sources. Interviews were conducted in 2016 and 2017 in person and by phone, and they are referred to by number.

The team conducted a review of more than 250 official and academic documents and reports to derive lessons to inform a set of synthesized findings and resultant recommendations. A very robust literature exists on the experience of stabilization in 2001–2016. For example, the RAND Corporation has conducted a large number of studies commissioned by the U.S. government on both military and civilian stabilization efforts, capacity, and capability. The U.S. government has conducted official assessments as required by DoDI 3000.05, which the team reviewed; most of these are not publicly available. However, the full archives of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports are available, as are dozens of other reports by inspectors general, the Government Accountability Office, and Army headquarters and DoD reports mandated by Congress. In addition, a large body of academic studies exist which provided useful data and analysis. Finally, the study team participated in two workshops organized by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

To determine what stabilization activities DoD is currently able to carry out, the team compiled data from U.S. government databases that document the budgets, manpower, and expertise of the U.S. military and other entities. We used 2009–2010 as the year of peak capacity and capability as a comparative reference point for the data available on the force as of 2016. This comparative assessment was supplemented with a survey of the current training, education, stabilization-related centers of excellence, and other specialized cells enabled the team to formulate judgments about the current capability and capacity of the joint force for conducting stabilization.

The remainder of the report is organized as follows: Chapter Two explains stabilization terms and definitions employed or adopted. Chapter Three evaluates historical experience and evolving concepts regarding stabilization. Chapter Four is a quick-turn assessment of the current capacity and capability of the joint force, compared with 2009, when large-scale stability operations were under way and capability and capacity reached peak levels. The findings from Chapter Three and

Four are used in Chapter Five to delineate the principal roles for DoD in conducting and supporting civilian-led stabilization. Chapter Six identifies potential gaps in DoD capacity and capability to carry out the envisioned roles and recommends measures to address them. Chapter Seven identifies several risks in adopting a civilian-led stabilization model, posits potential mitigations, and offers recommendations for potential revisions of DoD policy on stabilization. The two appendixes provide additional information on interagency and allied roles, capabilities, and approaches to stabilization.

2. Understanding Stabilization

Defining *Stabilization*

Stabilization is a term used to describe military and civilian efforts to prevent or address instability in a foreign country. This term has replaced *stability operations* in the 2016 joint doctrine.⁵ Varied definitions exist in the United States and international community, in part because of the multifaceted nature of stabilization activities, which range from early relief to address basic needs to support for the resumption of governance functions and economic activity.⁶ Also, these activities may be undertaken in conditions of latent or incipient conflict and instability or following major conflict or combat operations. Furthermore, the lines between the various categories and tasks may be fuzzy, such as security and policing. The actions in one category interact with others to produce synergistic effects. For example, providing immediate sources of employment for youth may increase security by reducing the number of youth attracted to engaging in armed conflict. As stabilization expert and USAID official Mona Yacoubian has written, “The relief-to-development trajectory is essentially a Venn diagram of overlapping circles rather than a straight line between two points.”⁷

This report relies on, as a starting point for assessing policy, the definition of *stabilization* in current U.S. joint military doctrine:

Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security.⁸

This definition applies across the range of military operations and the conflict continuum.

Proliferation of Terms and Activities

The 2009 DoDI (DoDI 3000.05) enunciated a very robust set of requirements for the DoD role in stabilization, expanding on the more circumscribed guidance issued in 2005. This instruction states that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct *with proficiency equivalent to combat operations*”

⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 3, 2016, p. iii.

⁶ On the challenges of defining and measuring stabilization, see Daniel Egel and Peter Glick, *Assessing the Stabilizing Effects of Development Programming: A Review of USAID’s Evaluation Efforts in Afghanistan*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, WR-1106-MSI, 2016.

⁷ Mona Yacoubian, *Lessons Learned for Stabilization in Syria*, Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, June 2014.

⁸ JP 3-07, 2016, p. ix.

(emphasis added). Moreover, DoD shall be prepared to conduct stability operations activities “throughout all phases of conflict,” at any scale and duration, and “across the range of potential military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments.”⁹ This robust requirement was intended to drive the department to embrace stabilization as a co-equal mission with combat operations.

The 2009 DoDI 3000.05 directed that DoD be prepared to lead these four activities:

1. establish civil security and civil control
2. restore or provide essential services
3. repair critical infrastructure
4. provide humanitarian assistance.

In addition, DoDI 3000.05 created a second category in which DoD must be prepared to assist in

1. disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society
2. rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces
3. strengthening governance and rule of law
4. fostering economic stability and development.

The RAND research team analyzed the categorization of eight activities used in DoDI 3000.05 and found that it contains overlapping tasks that do not closely align with current joint doctrine or the terms used by civilian U.S. entities. The most recent official document is JP 3-07, *Stability*, published in August 2016. Therefore, for purposes of analysis, this study adopted a categorization based on current joint doctrine. The various subcategories of stabilization activities used by the U.S. government are shown in Table 2.1. From left to right, Table 2.1 depicts activities as defined by Army doctrine, joint doctrine, and interagency guidelines. Joint doctrine published in 2016 is the most recent U.S. government guidance issues, so these terms are used as a starting point for this report.

⁹ DoDI 3000.05, 2009, pp. 2–3.

Table 2.1. Organization of Stabilization Activities in Joint Doctrine

Land Component Stability Actions	Joint Stability Functions	U.S. Government Stability Sectors
Establish security	Security	Security
Establish transitional public security	Rule of law	Justice and reconciliation
Restore essential services	Foreign humanitarian assistance	Foreign humanitarian assistance and social well-being
Support to governance	Governance and participation	Governance and participation
Support to economic stabilization and infrastructure	Economic stabilization and infrastructure	Economic stabilization and infrastructure

SOURCE: These actions, functions, and sectors are taken from JP 3-07, 2016, pp. II-10–II-12, III-1.

Stability Functions

Description of Stability-Related Terms Used in This Report

This section reviews the stabilization terms in Army, joint, or U.S. interagency guidelines. The team conducted this review to arrive at a clear framework for its own analysis of the constituent elements of stabilization. We found that official documents do not always specify the relevant subactivities in a particular category. Most of the confusion stems from the ways that the rule-of-law function overlaps with both the security and governance functions, although other functions overlap somewhat as well.

To address this, we adopted a slightly modified set of five stability functions to avoid any overlap, drawing on the slightly more narrowly defined actions described in Army doctrine (see the first column in Table 2.1). Clarifying which activities belong under which functions would be a recommended step for future revision of policy and doctrine. Our rescoping of functions follows these general criteria:

- **The functions should be comprehensive**, meaning that they encompass all types of activities that the military might carry out in stabilization.
- **The functions should be clear, simple, and limited in number**, to the extent that this is possible without leaving out important aspects of stabilization.
- **The functions should be distinctive**, meaning that they can be clearly distinguished from each other and that any particular stabilization activity falls primarily within just one of the functions.
- **The functions should be based on existing joint doctrine** as much as possible to maintain a common lexicon.

Five Revised Stability Functions

The five stability functions used in this report are based on the five joint stability functions and interagency stability sectors in current doctrine, although these have been slightly modified to reduce overlap. This section describes what each of these functions entails.

The revised stability functions used in this study are

1. security
2. public order
3. immediate human needs
4. governance
5. economic stability.

The following sections describe the activities that fall into each of the five functions that will be analyzed in this report.

Security

As defined in doctrine, the security stability function focuses on protection of the local civilian population, institutions, and infrastructure from a broad range of threats to reduce violence “to tolerable levels that can be addressed by indigenous forces and allow normal patterns of life to resume.”¹⁰

Although DoDI 3000.05 combined civil security and civil control within a single assigned activity, these functions should be maintained as distinct, given that they involve different types of capabilities. The security function includes those stabilization activities that, in functioning states, would traditionally fall to indigenous military forces. These activities generally involve combat capabilities and are focused on protecting civilian populations and institutions by controlling territory or addressing specific threats.

Security efforts in stabilization can include counterinsurgency, peace operations, clearance of explosive ordnance, and assistance to host-nation military and paramilitary forces. It also can include collecting, identifying, and disposing of weapons collected during disarmament processes, as well as ensuring the protection of demobilized former belligerents.¹¹ The security function also includes U.S. efforts to build the capacity of indigenous military forces.¹²

¹⁰ JP 3-07, 2016, pp. III-4; also see p. III-11.

¹¹ Given their specificity, these two aspects of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are best included as part of civil security, rather than as stand-alone functions, as in DoDI 3000.05. Although DDR can be very important, it rarely features in preventive stabilization and only sometimes in postcrisis stabilization efforts. Moreover, the technical military capabilities required to conduct disarmament and demobilization are also required for other civil security activities.

¹² JP 3-07, 2016, pp. I-21, III-18–III-21.

Public Order

Public order entails protecting local civilian populations from violence and crime by supporting indigenous police, judiciary, and corrections systems or by performing these functions if local institutions no longer exist. This proposed stability function somewhat aligns with the rule-of-law joint stability function in doctrine but is much narrower in focus in our scoping of this function.

Public order is similar to the civil control task assigned in DoDI 3000.05 and described in Army doctrine.¹³ It is also similar to the “transitional public security” task described in current joint doctrine:

In transitional public security, US and multinational military forces promote, restore, and maintain public order. The purpose of transitional public security is to protect civilian populations from violence when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent. . . .

Transitional public security will typically require the joint force to perform functions normally reserved for the civilian justice sector on an interim basis, including policing, law enforcement, investigations, corrections, and courts.¹⁴

Our scoping of the public-order function focuses on the police, judiciary, and corrections systems that directly maintain public order. The U.S. military has provided ample support to building these capacities in host-nation forces in the past 15 years. However, the functions are inherently civilian functions. U.S. authorization is required for the U.S. military to provide police training. DoS and Department of Justice programs provide civilian capacity-building programs largely through contracted implementing partners.

Immediate Human Needs

Stabilization efforts often involve situations where civilians face extreme privation. Addressing their immediate needs can save lives and reduce suffering. In doing so, it can also remove a potential source of popular grievance and thus reduce instability. The activities in this category are understood in this report as prioritizing the immediate provision of lifesaving aid to affected civilians—especially food, water, shelter, and medical assistance.¹⁵ Provision of this assistance may also require repair of lines of communication and facilities for delivery. Other types of infrastructure repair, beyond that required to deliver assistance to meet immediate needs, would be included under the economic-stability function. Improvement of infrastructure would

¹³ Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2008, p. 2-10.

¹⁴ JP 3-07, 2016, p. III-5–III-6.

¹⁵ This is similar to the narrower view of essential services found in joint doctrine as meaning the provision of “minimum levels of . . . food, water, shelter, and medical treatment.” JP 3-07, 2016, pp. V-6, D-12. Essential services can be defined in ways that overlap with and cause confusion regarding restoration of services and infrastructure, which we have placed in the economic stability category.

be considered, by this analysis, as belonging to the longer-term category of economic development.

The terms *humanitarian assistance* and *foreign humanitarian assistance*, while similar, are not used in this report. This is done to distinguish the stabilization efforts to address immediate civilian needs from the activity of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief that is undertaken in response to natural or manmade disasters. That activity is conducted, at times, in otherwise stable environments and is a discrete and well-understood mission with well-established organizational and procedural guidelines, as well as capabilities. It is important to distinguish humanitarian assistance, which is defined as the impartial provision of assistance *based strictly on need*, from stabilization, which includes a range of activities, including peace-building and furthering political and economic objectives. To avoid confusion, this report proposes that *immediate human needs* be used in a stabilization context in lieu of *humanitarian assistance*. Using this term can help resolve impediments that can arise when aid agencies are required to implement programs based on their strict need-based standards and protocols. It also preserves the clarity that has been achieved regarding humanitarian assistance missions and protocols. In addition, for clarity of definition, this category of immediate needs is scoped to focus on food, water, shelter, and medical attention and does not include governance, education, or sociocultural restoration aspects that doctrine includes in its more-expansive descriptions of these activities.¹⁶ These aspects are rather considered as part of the governance stability function.

Governance

Joint doctrine identifies *governance and participation* as a joint stability function and defines *governance* as “the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society.”¹⁷ Participation is defined in joint doctrine as “a process by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make rules and by which those rules are enforced and modified, and refers to programs conducted to help the people to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation.”¹⁸

Support to governance is also identified as one of the five land component stability actions in Army doctrine (see Table 2.1). Support to governance entails a diverse set of activities that may be undertaken:

- support transitional administrations
- support the development of local governance
- support anticorruption initiatives

¹⁶ JP 3-07, 2016, p. III-22.

¹⁷ JP 3-07, 2016, p. xiv.

¹⁸ JP 3-07, 2016, p. III-52.

- support elections.¹⁹

As the list makes clear, the land component envisions a supporting role to these inherently civilian activities. In the most extreme case, the U.S. military may assume direct responsibility for governance, as in situations of military occupation. International law requires occupying powers to provide security and governance, as addressed in greater detail in the following chapter.

The governance-stability function has both an institution-building and a political power-sharing and conflict-resolution aspect to it. It focuses on indigenous institutions of all kinds and at both national and local levels. It includes technical aspects of governance focused on such issues as service delivery and electoral administration, as well as broader issues of legitimacy, representation, and rule of law.

Economic Stability

The economic stability function is largely equivalent to the economic stabilization and infrastructure joint function:

The economic stabilization and infrastructure function includes programs conducted to ensure an economy in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law. . . .

Economic stabilization consists of restoring employment opportunities, initiating market reform, mobilizing domestic and foreign investment, supervising monetary reform, and rebuilding public structures and HN [host-nation] economic capacity-building systems.²⁰

It is also similar to the fostering economic stability and development activity assigned in DoDI 3000.05 and encompasses much of the repair critical infrastructure activity as well. The major scoping proposed in this report's definition is to focus on those urgent economic stabilization tasks and stipulate that development is a longer-term endeavor that is best viewed as a successor activity to stabilization. Economic stability activities will, however, lay the groundwork for follow-on development efforts, most likely led by bilateral, regional, and multilateral development organizations; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

As with governance, the economic stability function involves tasks that are generally civilian in nature, such as supporting economic reform, managing natural resources, or mobilizing private investment. This function will sometimes include more-technical activities, such as repairing or rebuilding damaged electrical, water, and transportation infrastructure.²¹ In areas

¹⁹ JP 3-07, 2016, p. II-11.

²⁰ JP 3-07, 2016, pp. III-29–III-30.

²¹ JP 3-07, 2016, p. III-36.

where unemployment may be a driver of insecurity, cash-for-work programs may also be carried out as part of this function.²²

These five revised functions provide the basis for subsequent analysis. While perhaps not perfect, they provide sufficient definitional clarity for subsequent debate on programmatic decisions. At the same time, they clear away some of the conceptual tangle that has accumulated around stability operations.

²² JP 3-07, 2016, p. III-35, III-38.

3. Stabilization Lessons from Recent Experience

This chapter examines recent experience as one approach to determining how the U.S. military can best contribute to stabilization efforts. A great number of studies have explored the record to determine what DoD and the U.S. government as a whole have done well, and not as well, in operations that include stabilization. The exact roles for DoD to play are in large measure a matter for policymakers to decide—and for the DoD to then implement. However, it is important to note that some legal injunctions do apply in this realm.

Although the analysis in this report is designed to support clarification of DoD roles in stabilization as a matter of policy, it is important to note that the U.S. military also has a legal requirement to carry out stabilization activities in certain circumstances. International law requires the military to carry out significant stabilization efforts in any populated territory over which the military has gained control. The DoD General Counsel’s *Law of War Manual* is the guide to U.S. military responsibilities under international law, including the Geneva Convention and Hague regulations on military occupation.²³ These responsibilities include the following stabilization duties in the event that the U.S. military gains control over any foreign territory:

- ensuring public order and safety, including protection of civilians and property
- protecting cultural property
- ensuring sufficient food and medical supplies for the population
- providing and maintaining health services for the population
- facilitating care and education of children.

As noted in the previous chapter, DoDI 3000.05 espouses a very robust list of requirements for the U.S. military to be able to conduct with the same proficiency as combat.²⁴ This mandated high bar for proficiency in a wide range of nonmilitary activities constitutes a significant departure from past policy and is a major focal point of this analysis.

Lessons from Recent Experience

The study team synthesized key lessons regarding stabilization from an array of studies and official reports. Although this compendium does not encompass every lesson identified, it does seek to frame those most pertinent to answering the following questions: What are the primary stabilization lessons in general and for the U.S. military in particular? What does experience suggest are the primary roles for the U.S. military? How can civilians and the military work

²³ DoD, Office of the General Counsel, *Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, Washington, D.C., 2015.

²⁴ DoDI 3000.05, 2009.

together most productively? What guidelines might establish a basic division of labor between the civilians and the military?

The most comprehensive official assessment of the Iraq war was conducted by SIGIR, which produced a vast array of regular reports based on extensive investigation. SIGAR followed suit and continues to issue periodic reports. The SIGIR final report identified these lessons:

- Create an integrated civilian-military office to plan, execute, and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during stabilization and reconstruction operations.
- Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security, and focus first on small programs and projects.
- Ensure full host-country engagement in program and project selection, securing commitments to share costs (possibly through loans) and agreements to sustain completed projects after their transfer.
- Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information management systems that all stabilization and reconstruction operations participants use. Require robust oversight of stabilization and reconstruction operations activities from the operation's inception.
- Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Team program, that produced successes when used judiciously.
- Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated fashion, and have backup plans ready to go.²⁵


The Demand for Stabilization Efforts Has Been and Will Likely Remain Significant

The first lesson is that the U.S. government will likely be called on to engage in stabilization efforts given the ongoing level of conflict, including in many regions where significant U.S. national interests are at stake. The incidence of intrastate type of conflict is quite common, as shown in Figure 3.1. This type of conflict has occurred far more frequently than has direct conflict between states, and it has increased since 2012.²⁶

²⁵ SIGIR, *Learning from Iraq: Final Report of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction*, Washington, D.C., March 2013.

²⁶ Erik Melander, Therese Pettersson, and Lotta Themner, "Organized Violence, 1989–2015," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2016, p. 729.

Figure 3.1. Number of Ongoing Conflicts, by Type, 1946–2015



SOURCES: Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4-2014; see Marie Allansson, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér, "Organized Violence, 1989–2016," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2017; Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2002.

RAND RR2441-3.1


The increased incidence has been accompanied by a significant increase in the intensity of such conflicts, as shown in Figure 3.2. While most of these increases have been driven by the conflict in Syria and the related emergence of the Islamic State, the overall trends of relatively frequent intrastate conflict and greater international involvement in such conflicts predate this phenomenon.²⁷

Of course, not every conflict or fragile state will be the object of U.S. or other stabilization efforts. However, recent history includes extensive U.S. military involvement in stabilization. This includes efforts following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which included an internationally recognized U.S. military occupation and a long-term counterinsurgency campaign. Stabilization was a major part of efforts in Afghanistan as well, although the United States never officially assumed the responsibilities of an occupying power.²⁸ The U.S. military has also played a supporting role in stabilization efforts led by NATO, the United Nations, the African Union, and others.

²⁷ Melander, Pettersson, and Themner, 2016, pp. 728–729.

²⁸ David Scheffer, "The Security Council and International Law on Military Occupations," in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, eds., *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Figure 3.2. Number of Fatalities in Intrastate Conflict, 1989–2015



SOURCE: UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, version 17.2; see Allansson, Melander, and Themnér, 2017.

NOTE: Includes battle deaths in both intrastate and international intrastate conflicts.

RAND RR2441-3.2

Stabilization activities can occur across the range of military operations to address state fragility or conflict. Perhaps the most frequent type of U.S. military stabilization efforts comes in the form of assistance to security forces in fragile states, which is intended to build their capacity to prevent or address local instability. This type of stabilization includes relatively small-scale efforts around the world: in the Sahel, Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and other parts of Africa; the Philippines; Central America; Colombia; some Eurasian countries; and parts of South Asia. Most geographic combatant commands include some stabilization activities as part of their theater campaign plans, carried out in nonwar environments with the support of the civilian U.S. country team.²⁹

Implication: The incidence of conflict and the track record of U.S. involvement in stabilization efforts suggest that the U.S. government must retain, recreate, or improve its ability to participate in stabilization.

²⁹ These programs range widely, from institution- and capacity-building and military education to demining, humanitarian assistance, and other forms of assistance. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency website, www.dsca.mil, lists many of these activities, funding level, and recipient countries (also see Alexandra Kerr and Michael Miklaucic, eds., *Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense Institution Building*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2017). Some defense security cooperation programs are carried out for objectives other than stabilization—for example, to build alliances and interoperability and secure access.

Stabilization Is Very Often Critical to Consolidating Military Gains and Achieving Strategic Success, and Military Participation Is Essential

When the United States does conduct military interventions, the need for a plan to conduct stabilization in concert with other partners is indicated by recent experience if the ultimate objectives of the military campaign are to be realized. Perhaps the most searing lesson that the joint force and the U.S. government have been forced to confront as they reviewed the record of the past 15 years of war is the failure to achieve strategic success despite winning many military battles. The inability to consolidate tactical and operational gains into strategic, lasting success has been the subject of numerous official and academic publications, including two volumes sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Decade of War and Lessons Encountered*, and the official Army history of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), *On Point II*.³⁰

On Point II concludes, “[T]he DoD and the Army lacked a coherent plan to translate the rapid, narrow-front attack that avoided populated areas wherever possible, into strategic success. Soldiers and commanders at nearly every level did not know what was expected of them once Saddam Hussein was deposed and his military forces destroyed.”³¹ It tartly observed, “The oft-stated goal of regime change implied some degree of postwar steps to build a new Iraqi government in place of the Saddam regime. Regime removal might have been a more accurate description of the goal that the design of OIF was best suited to accomplish.”³²

A corollary of this lesson is that some degree of military participation will likely be required, at least in cases where security is lacking. The Army Operating Concept (2014) explicitly frames this imperative as a part of the military objective of consolidating gains.³³ To their credit, the Army and the joint force made major efforts to develop doctrine, training, education, and centers of excellence to improve its their to perform a variety of stabilization tasks.³⁴ According to one senior Army leader, however, this has not yet been accomplished in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. For example, he noted: “ISIL [the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant] took advantage of communal conflict, weak governance, and the failure to consolidate military gains achieved in

³⁰ Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Decade of War*, Vol. 1: *Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, Suffolk, Va., 2012; Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, eds., *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015; Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003–January 2005*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008.

³¹ Wright and Reese, 2008, pp. 572–573.

³² Wright and Reese, 2008, p. 569.

³³ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept, Win in a Complex World, 2020–2040*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Fort Eustis, Va., October 14, 2014.

³⁴ Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-646-A, 2007. Many other RAND reports examined and proposed changes to enable the joint force to perform stabilization roles. In recent years, this focus has waned in practice as new policy priorities were adopted, leading to a reallocation of resources and attention.

Iraq from 2007–2010.”³⁵ This tendency to abandon the focus on stabilization as part of an overall mission set is not a recent phenomenon. According to two studies with a broader historical scope, the U.S. military repeatedly found itself tasked with stabilization missions, despite its proclivity for warfighting.³⁶

Despite this tendency, history suggests that the U.S. military will continue to be called on to play a significant role—particularly in security-related stabilization activities, such as providing security to the population in the aftermath of hostilities, and in restoring a country’s ability to provide security for itself.³⁷ The U.S. military also played these roles in interventions earlier in its history.³⁸

Implication: DoD should direct that stabilization considerations be part of strategic guidance, theater campaigns, and contingency plans. RAND published *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*, which distilled seven overarching lessons from the U.S. experience. Lesson 5 concluded that “interventions should not be conducted without a plan to conduct stability operations, capacity-building, transition and, if necessary, counterinsurgency.”³⁹ Stabilization requirements, though distinct from conventional warfighting, should also guide planning and operations in all phases of military operations. For example, consideration of stabilization requirements should be factored into combat plans to minimize civilian impact and costs of infrastructure repair.

Interagency and Other Civilian Partners Will Often Require DoD Support in Information, Transportation, Sustainment, and Force Protection, Especially in Austere, Semipermissive, or Hostile Environments

As a general rule, the more insecure and austere the environment, the more likely it is that civilians may require military support for protection and possibly secure transport. Although DoS, USAID, and other civilian entities possess functional expertise in the rule of law, basic needs, governance, and economic stability, they may require discrete forms of support that DoD

³⁵ Interview 53, October 23, 2016.

³⁶ See, for example, 15 case studies in Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017, and 28 case studies in Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.

³⁷ In addition, see Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, 2012; Hooker and Collins, 2015; Wright and Reese, 2008, see SIGAR, *Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*, Arlington, Va.: September 2017.

³⁸ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Combat Studies Institute, *Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives*, proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2006 Military History Symposium, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.

³⁹ Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwille, and Raphael S. Cohen, *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-816-A, 2014.

can provide to enable their activities.⁴⁰ In Afghanistan and Iraq—as well as in some less violent environments, such as Africa and the southern Philippines—U.S. civilian government personnel benefited from the force protection, information, transportation, and various other types of logistic support to their stabilization activities, but they have also operated without such assistance in Somalia and South Sudan.⁴¹ In some cases, the civilian personnel have operated from secure U.S. facilities or bases.⁴²

Implication: DoD should routinely permit civilian personnel to use its bases and support U.S. civilian stabilization missions, and DoD should integrate its relevant activities with those missions via civilian-military teams.

Mechanisms to Achieve Civil-Military Coordination and Support Civilian Lead Agencies Are Needed

Numerous studies have documented the need for coordination of civilian and military stabilization activities to establish objectives and plans and guide the overall effort at the national level. Operational coordination is also needed by commanders and embassy country teams, down to tactical coordination, which is what gave rise to the provincial reconstruction teams. This coordination requirement is explicitly and implicitly identified in most of the lessons in Iraq, as compiled by SIGIR.⁴³ National Security Presidential Directives 24, 36, and 44 all sought to establish better coordination at the national level by naming first DoD, and then DoS, as the lead for this coordination;⁴⁴ however, assessments conducted by DoD indicated that U.S. coordination mechanisms have been insufficient or insufficiently implemented.⁴⁵ At the national level, a “war

⁴⁰ Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, Nora Bensahel, Derek Eaton, S. Jamie Gayton, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Jeffrey Martini, John L. Nasir, Sandra Reyna, Michelle Parker, Jerry Sollinger, and Kayla M. Williams, *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-633-A, 2009.

⁴¹ See Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009; Terrence K. Kelly, Ellen E. Tunstall, Thomas S. Szayna, and Deanna Weber Prine, *Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-580-RC, 2008; Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004; and Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, 2016.

⁴² For example, see the account of one DoS officer operating in Helmand Province in Afghanistan: Carter Malkasian, *War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

⁴³ SIGIR, 2013; see also Michael Miklaucic, ed., *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Complex Operations, 2009.

⁴⁴ National Security Presidential Directive 24, “The Iraq Post War Planning Office,” Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 20, 2003; National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 11, 2004; National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 7, 2005.

⁴⁵ These assessments, reviewed by the project team, are not publicly available.

czar” in the White House oversaw coordination of Iraq and Afghanistan efforts, but that position was sometimes in competition with the special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and ambassadors and generals in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁶

The creation of the Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at DoS in 2004 led to development of a deployable civilian staff, an interagency planning system, and an assessment framework. These mechanisms were not fully implemented, because of inadequate funding by Congress and bureaucratic rivalries within DoS and with USAID. The S/CRS successor, the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, has evolved to focus on planning and analysis, in recognition of USAID’s significant expertise in programs to implement stabilization efforts. As senior USAID official James Kunder noted, the U.S. government still lacks an effective mechanism to coordinate across all relevant government agencies and departments, particularly DoS, USAID, and DoD.⁴⁷ Provincial reconstruction teams, such as those formed in Iraq, may be a model of civilian-military coordination in the field; these teams were led by civilians and augmented as needed by military members.⁴⁸

The RAND report *Improving Strategic Competence* concluded, “The joint force requires nonmilitary and multinational partners, as well as structures for coordinated implementation among agencies, allies, and international organizations.”⁴⁹ In addition, this report documented that many efforts to create greater coordination and unity of effort had been discontinued or severely cut back, including the Civilian Response Corps, provincial reconstruction teams, the Army Counterinsurgency Center, the Center for Complex Operations, and a variety of civilian-military training programs and advisory groups.

Implications: At the policy level, an interagency committee or task force may be required at the National Security Council level to plan and coordinate actions of different agencies. At the operational and tactical levels, integrated civil-military teams may be required.

A More Scoped Approach to Stabilization May Be Less Wasteful and Counterproductive; Civilian Practitioners Focus on Legitimate Governance Rather Than Spending

Many of the reports produced by SIGIR and SIGAR, as well as inquiries into contracting, document the hazards of injecting large amounts of funds into fragile or little-understood

⁴⁶ SIGIR, 2013.

⁴⁷ Jon Gunderson and Melanne A. Civic, eds., *Unity of Mission: Civilian-Military Teams in War and Peace*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 2016.

⁴⁸ See John K. Naland, *Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011; SIGIR, 2013; and Gunderson and Civic, 2016.

⁴⁹ Robinson et al., 2014.

environments.⁵⁰ According to the two inspectors general, \$60 billion was spent on Iraq reconstruction (\$25 billion of that on security forces), and \$117 billion has been spent on Afghan reconstruction (\$70 billion of that on Afghan security forces).⁵¹ Both SIGIR and SIGAR spent a great deal of time investigating corruption, waste, and fraud, and these continue to be key high-risk factors to success in Afghanistan. Partly in reaction to these concerns, the current stabilization effort run by the United Nations in Iraq is highly scoped to four windows of activity, time-limited, and capped at 6 percent overhead.⁵² Other localized or scoped stabilization programs have been carried out in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas and northern Nigeria.

Civilian practitioners interviewed strongly emphasized that they have embraced smaller-scale, bottom-up approaches to stabilization that work through local actors and aim to build local capacity at a sustainable pace.

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) applies four criteria that must be met for USAID/OTI to commit resources to its core mission of facilitating political transitions in conflict environments:

- Is the opportunity or threat an important **U.S. foreign policy interest**?
- Is there a **window of opportunity**: a decisive shift in the political landscape that creates an opening to support viable local political will?
- Can USAID/OTI's model bring a **comparative advantage** to support positive political momentum during the crucial period?
- Does the **operating environment** allow for USAID/OTI's systems and processes to be optimized?⁵³

In practice, differences can arise over the exact pace and timing of stabilization in postconflict environments. Given the political effects of aid delivery, well-intentioned acts can empower some groups or individuals with unforeseen negative effects. Civilian practitioners emphasize the importance of addressing needs that the population identifies as important, which can take some time to ascertain. For example, in 2016, USAID was reluctant to deliver aid to parts of Syria before ascertaining the needs and the most-appropriate local actors, while the U.S. military sought Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid funds to deliver rapid aid. While anecdotal, this recent example indicates an ongoing debate over the desirable sequencing, scale, and danger of intended effects of stabilization activities.

⁵⁰ SIGIR, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, Washington, D.C., 2009; online reports posted at SIGIR, "All Reports," webpage, undated.

⁵¹ SIGIR, 2013; and SIGAR, 2017, Table B-1, p. 222.

⁵² See the program description in United Nations Development Programme in Iraq, *Funding Facility for Stabilization: 2017 Q3 Report*, 2017.

⁵³ USAID/OTI, "Criteria for Engagement: USAID/OTI's Engagement Criteria," webpage, last updated June 22, 2017, emphasis in the original.

U.S. allies have incorporated the idea of legitimate governance as a central pillar of stabilization (as opposed to service delivery or construction of things). The United States, the United Kingdom, and France all define *stabilization* as aiming to achieve an ultimate political outcome, through activities that resolve drivers of conflict and promote legitimate governance. For example, the UK Stabilisation Unit defines *stabilization* as “one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, reestablish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability.”⁵⁴ France’s joint doctrine on the contribution of the armed forces to stabilization notes that stabilization is primarily a political process to be led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁵

Implication: If the lead agent for a stabilization efforts is DoS, USAID, the United Nations or the host government, DoD must be prepared to support that entity’s conceptual approaches, plans, and activities. The potential for small-scale, bottom-up approaches can be further developed. DoS, NGOs, and special operations forces have all implemented stabilization programs geared toward local governance councils (Syria), reduction of conflict (Iraq), and local security (Afghanistan) with some degree of success.

Military Versus Civilian Core Competencies

This chapter’s review of recent U.S. experience in stabilization suggests that the U.S. military may be better suited for some tasks than others. International partners and a wide array of civilian actors from the U.S. government have played significant roles in stabilization efforts; their roles are also examined in much of the literature reviewed for this study. Based on the lessons derived from recent experience, this section proposes a division of labor between military and civilian entities based on competencies inherent to those entities.

Security: The Military’s Core Competence

The provision of security was recognized by virtually all interlocutors consulted for this study as first and foremost the province of the military, because it is the entity possessing the core competence to secure populations against violent threats. Military forces are uniquely designed to confront heavily armed, highly violent actors. To the extent that the military has a core competency in stabilization, it is in the provision of security and the related activity of building security forces and institutions. Paramilitary police, police, and private security

⁵⁴ Stabilisation Unit, *The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation (2014)*, London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, and Department for International Development, May 2014.

⁵⁵ French Ministry of Defense, *Contribution des forces armées à la Stabilisation*, Paris: Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations, February 2, 2010.

companies can also provide security at varied levels of competency in less violent environments or in combination with military forces.

U.S. military doctrine recognizes the role that the military can play in providing security. *Wide area security* is the current Army doctrinal term for tasks encompassing stability functions. It is defined as the “application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.”⁵⁶ This definition clearly connects these tasks and this overall wide area security function to combined arms maneuver as a means to consolidate gains achieved through that combat-oriented function.⁵⁷ This definition emphasizes the military role of *protection* as part of *unified action*, which entails actions by other nonmilitary actors.

The provision of security is also considered of vital foundational importance for stabilization efforts to succeed. Virtually all experts and stakeholders interviewed for this study agreed that establishing a modicum of security is a prerequisite for the conduct of other stabilization activities. Assistance activities to meet basic needs, restore essential services, and reinstate basic governance require a certain level of calm, and many civilian actors—whether they are from international organizations, civilian agencies, or the host nation—will not or cannot function in circumstances of open conflict. Stabilization activities in preconflict environments do not encounter this same difficulty, because the degree of violence is by definition lower.

The basic argument made by many of our interviewees is that a modicum of security is required for most other stabilization activities to be initiated and to succeed. The level of required security may be determined by local standards. A “high-risk list” published by SIGAR cites factors that put stabilization at risk, which cannot be addressed without sufficient security.⁵⁸ To highlight the importance of security is not to say that security can be established in a vacuum; creating secure conditions is a complex process. For example, the existence of a large pool of unemployed and discontented youth constitutes a potential supply of foot soldiers for insurgency. Thus, in many cases, the military has implemented short-term cash-for-work programs as temporary measures undertaken in tandem with security operations.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011.

⁵⁷ Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, 2011, defines combined arms maneuver as “[t]he application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative.”

⁵⁸ SIGAR found that lack of security impeded civilians from conducting oversight and management of stabilization programs, because of the inability of civilian personnel to visit sites and monitor local government. SIGAR, 2017.

⁵⁹ SIGIR, 2013. The report also noted (p. 65) that the Commanders Emergency Response Program was used later for large multimillion-dollar projects, which SIGIR considered to be out of scope and not a judicious use of the program.

Thus, of the eight activities in the DoDI 3000.05, security is the only one clearly pertaining to military competence. A second one, disarmament and demobilization, can be considered a subset of the security function, although they might more appropriately be considered as improving governance, because reintegration is the culminating task. The rest of the activities involve nonmilitary competencies, although specialized military units have some competencies that can support those functions. Military units can be temporarily trained to perform those roles—for example, during World War II, the U.S. Army opened a school in Charlottesville, Virginia, to train soldiers to function as city administrators for occupied Europe and Japan.⁶⁰

As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, in addition to possessing the capability to establish security, certain military units and personnel have specialized capabilities that are particularly useful in stabilization efforts. Military engineers can undertake construction projects and support facilities for other stabilization activities. Active-duty CA units possess the capability to conduct civil reconnaissance and area assessments and plan and coordinate with civilians to provide population services and support the transition to civilian agencies and the host-nation government. Reserve CA personnel may have functional specialties deriving from their civilian occupational training and careers. Medical units have also provided support for meeting immediate human needs and critical health services. In the area of rule of law and public order, military police (MP) and judge advocates are primarily designed to secure military installations and conduct military justice processes, but they can also provide support to or operate in lieu of civilian rule of law programs.

Civilian Core Competencies

Most of those interviewed by the RAND research team agreed on one key point: Stabilization should be led by civilians and not the military, except in the military's core competence of security. Appendix A discusses this expert input in greater detail. The two arguments most often made for putting civilians in the lead were (1) the four stability functions other than security are essentially nonmilitary (public order, which entails policing and rule of law; provision of immediate human needs; governance; and economic stability) and (2) the objectives of stabilization are to resolve political conflicts and increase the host government's legitimacy.

Interagency Roles

The primary civilian entities charged with stabilization in the U.S. government are DoS and USAID. At the policy level, DoS, particularly the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), has supported the development of the overall U.S. government approach to

⁶⁰ Schadlow, 2017.

stabilization, as well as planning for specific efforts.⁶¹ The department also coordinates with international partners to respond to stabilization needs. The DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) leads most U.S. efforts to assist foreign police and justice systems; some of these efforts, though not all, support U.S. stabilization goals. The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism has expanded to include extensive programs to counter violent extremism.

The DoS regional bureaus, particularly the Bureaus of African Affairs and Near East Affairs, also coordinate stabilization-focused assistance efforts in a number of conflict-affected countries, including Syria and Yemen. Both DoS and USAID jointly lead the Syrian stabilization and humanitarian assistance effort for the U.S. government. The Bureau of Africa Affairs oversees the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program, the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, and the Counter-Boko Haram Working Group.⁶² These programs are combined initiatives with USAID and DoD that aim to increase civilian, law enforcement, and military capacity in the host countries.

USAID frequently implements stabilization programs. Although these often focus on providing humanitarian assistance and supporting economic stability, many USAID efforts are also intended to support governance and rule of law in conflict-affected states. The Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) leads much of USAID's stabilization efforts, and the agency's regional bureaus also play key roles. Key DCHA offices with stabilization programs are USAID/OTI; the Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management; Food for Peace; the Center of Excellence for Democracy, Rights and Governance; and the Office of Civilian Military Cooperation. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance funds humanitarian assistance through implementing partners and oversees it through field teams.


DoS and, particularly, USAID possess subject-matter experts with years or even decades of experience in stabilization, regions, and project design and oversight. Stabilization platforms in Syria and the Counter-Violent Extremism Unit in Africa are staffed with permanent staff with the requisite subject-matter and technical expertise. In many cases, USAID and DoS execute stabilization programs primarily through implementing partners and local nationals. Because of

⁶¹ CSO's predecessor, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, developed the five U.S. government stability sectors in 2005, which are still used to organize the military's doctrinal approach to stabilization. Although DoS has not maintained the stabilization-related essential task list that contains these sectors, these were reaffirmed in U.S. Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Washington D.C., 2009, which DoS still refers to as the "first strategic 'doctrine' ever produced for civilians engaged in peacebuilding missions." DoS, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix*, Washington, D.C., April 1, 2005; DoS, "Resources," webpage, undated-c.

⁶² The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program are designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors and includes programs to bolster rule of law, border security, counter-illicit financing, and counterradicalization.

this reliance on outside entities for implementation of programs, funding plus staffing levels provide the best rough measure of their capacity and level of activity. These agencies' spending on such stabilization-related activities grew significantly from 2000 to 2005, as shown in Figure 3.3. From 2005 to 2015, overall spending levels for stabilization-related activities held roughly steady, despite some year-to-year fluctuations.

Figure 3.3. Interagency Expenditures on Stabilization-Related Activities, FY 2000 to FY 2015



SOURCE: USAID, "Foreign Aid Explorer," last updated December 12, 2017.

NOTES: This includes expenditures in the "conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security" and the "reconstruction relief and rehabilitation" sectors. Expenditure levels are denominated in inflation-adjusted constant U.S. dollars.

RAND RR2441-3.3

To summarize, civilian U.S. agencies have received funding and demonstrated the ability to implement programs in the stabilization realm. USAID programs include monitoring and evaluation requirements as a matter of course. Since many DoS and USAID execute their programs through implementing partners, the key question is not the capacity of their agencies in terms of personnel. In other words, the capacity to execute programs must be assessed in terms of direct staff and implementing partners. As Figure 3.3 shows, DoS and USAID have been able to mobilize at least \$1 billion of implementing partner capacity since 2006, with a peak of over \$1.7 billion.

The critical question is thus not personnel but rather whether the personnel possess the requisite expertise to understand the conflicts and obstacles to progress—and then design and oversee appropriate responses that resolve or mitigate sources of conflict and enhance governing capacity and legitimacy. DoS and USAID possess some of the deepest expertise on countries and regions that is to be found within the U.S. government; this expertise is directed toward a variety of objectives. Given that DoS focuses on many different political objectives and USAID (other than the DHCA bureau) on many different development objectives, the case can be made that more of these two key entities' expertise may need to be directed to pre- and postconflict stabilization. Administration proposals to cut one-third of the overall budgets of DoS and USAID represent the most important barrier to DoS and USAID assuming larger and leading roles in stabilization within the U.S. government.⁶³

For a detailed discussion on the DoS and USAID roles in stabilization, see Appendix A. Although this report focuses on DoS and USAID as the civilian U.S. government entities with the primary roles in stabilization, there are additional programs that contribute significant capability. Rule-of-law programs at the Department of Justice support the public order capacity-building function. For example, the Department of Justice runs a police investigative training program, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, and it runs the Office Of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training, which supports trainers, resident legal advisers, and programs in 92 countries aimed at organized crime, money laundering, corruption, trafficking, and justice-sector development.⁶⁴ The Federal Bureau of Investigation also supplied personnel to stand up and assist the Major Crimes Task Force in Afghanistan, a new entity that investigates financial crimes and corruption.⁶⁵

Allies and International Organizations

This study's scope did not permit a comprehensive survey of the capabilities and capacity for stabilization carried out by all U.S. allies and international organizations, but this brief compendium illustrates the considerable role that other countries and international organizations can and do play in stabilization activities around the world. Expertise exists in many quarters, and, in many cases, these entities have successfully led or materially contributed to stabilization after major operations.

Appendix B surveys the stabilization practices and capabilities of three close U.S. allies who have played significant roles in postconflict stabilization and other coalition operations in recent decades: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The United Kingdom has pioneered an

⁶³ Conor Finnegan, "Trump Proposes Deep Cuts in State Budget," *abcnews.go.com*, February 12, 2018.

⁶⁴ Current program descriptions can be found at the Department of Justice website; see U.S. Department of Justice, "Our Programs," webpage, last updated January 23, 2018; U.S. Department of Justice, "About the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance And Training," webpage, last updated May 26, 2015.

⁶⁵ Stephen Cyrus, "The Major Crimes Task Force-Afghanistan: A Case Study and Examination of Implications for Future FBI Capacity Building Programs," *Homeland Security Affairs Journal*, December 2014.

institutionalized approach to interagency and civil-military stabilization. France has been in the forefront of conflict-mitigation activities in northwest Africa. Germany serves as the co-lead, along with the United Arab Emirates, of the counter-ISIS coalition working group on humanitarian and stabilization assistance. Of note, several U.S. allies, including France and Italy, have national-level police forces with significant paramilitary capabilities (the Gendarmerie nationale and Carabinieri respectively).⁶⁶

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is leading the stabilization program for Iraq as part of the counter-Islamic State campaign. The U.S. government and other coalition members provide funding to UNDP, which has overseen \$332 million in stabilization activity on behalf of the Iraqi government. In this program, Iraq has authorized the governors in each conflict-affected province to assemble local notables and officials to nominate specific projects, which are then approved and funded. UNDP contracts with an implementing partner to carry out the projects. As of October 2017, the UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilization had conducted more than 1,208 projects in 23 areas of Iraq, facilitating the return of more than 2.2 million Iraqis to their homes, by rehabilitating vital infrastructure in areas of water, health, and education and by assisting municipal functions and providing cash for work and other livelihood opportunities.⁶⁷ As of January 2018, according to documents provided by UNDP, it had expanded the effort by another 400 projects, with significant donations from European governments, including the European Union, and USAID.

In addition to stabilization work by discrete United Nations agencies, United Nations special envoys have often played critical mediation roles to resolve intrastate political conflicts around the world. Finally, although the United Nations has traditionally focused on peacekeeping missions worldwide, in recent decades, it has taken on missions in countries where conflict is still prevalent. These missions include the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. The United Nations has not formally defined what it means by *stabilization*, but it has extended its activities to a wide range of tasks, from the restoration and extension of state authority to security and justice sector reform, beyond the traditional peacekeeping role of the protection of civilians. Beginning with Kosovo and East Timor, United Nations peacekeeping missions have included rule-of-law programs with correction-system development.

⁶⁶ Italian Carabinieri police are performing a major role in training police in Iraq, and Italy is the seat of the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence. NATO recognized the gap in policing requirements during the stabilization effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997 and created the NATO Multinational Specialized Unit, made up of *gendarmerie* forces, which are military forces with a full police capability. The NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence developed doctrine and provided training to contributing nations' forces for deployments to Afghanistan and elsewhere. Canada, Australia, and France are other U.S. allies with national police forces that have contributed to police training in stabilization efforts.

⁶⁷ United Nations Development Programme in Iraq, 2017.

Shortfalls in civilian capacity to implement stabilization are sometimes cited as reasons for delegating tasks to the military. A preferred alternative would be to build capacity among those entities with the demonstrated competence or expertise in nonmilitary functions. It is true, however, that reliance on civilian entities to carry out stabilization activities requires those entities to possess sufficient qualified personnel and budgetary resources to accomplish their missions. As has been outlined here and argued in more detail in the appendixes, the civilian personnel at DoS, USAID, and other agencies are subject-matter experts who conduct program design and oversight; many of those who execute the programs are implementing partners and local personnel. The funding must exist to hire those personnel and the permanent staff. Proposed budget cuts, if enacted, will certainly reduce civilian entities' ability to perform as many stabilization activities and could put the success of those efforts at risk. The stabilization model described here, and recommended by the civilian agencies, relies less on U.S. personnel building things or delivering services than on enabling locals to conduct those activities. The key activities or methods bolster legitimate actors, increase local capacity, and improve capabilities. The desired end state is to enable local entities to address conflicts, provide governance, and restart economic activities through support and seed grants.

4. Current DoD Capacity and Capability for Stabilization

This chapter provides an overview of current DoD capability and capacity and evaluates the military's ability to perform stabilization functions. *Capability* refers to units' doctrinally assigned roles and the validated ability through training and education to perform them. *Capacity* refers to the number of available personnel and units that are available to perform the assigned roles. The study team collected the readily available data on current capability and capacity levels and compared them with those of 2009 or 2010 to highlight changes that have occurred in the years since DoDI 3000.05 (2009) was issued. In some cases, personnel data were available; in other cases, unit-level data were available.

The chapter first describes the overall capacity and capability of the joint force as a whole. The U.S. Army receives particular attention, because it is the largest land component of the military and is the designated joint proponent for stability operations.⁶⁸ This chapter then discusses key military enablers that can perform specialized roles in stabilization efforts. For each of these key enablers, current capacity and relevant capabilities to carry out particular stabilization activities are considered. These enablers have been identified in academic and official assessments as particularly critical for stabilization.⁶⁹ They are

1. CA
2. engineers
3. medical
4. MP
5. Judge Advocate General (JAG).

The Joint Force

The two major changes that have occurred in the joint force since 2010 are a reduction in overall capacity (manpower) and a reorientation away from stabilization activities as part of its current missions. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance maintained stability and counterinsurgency operations as one of ten primary military missions, with the caveat that "U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations."⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Chuck Hagel, "Memorandum: Designation of United States Army as Joint Proponent for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations," U.S. Department of Defense, June 11, 2013.

⁶⁹ These military occupational specialties are also considered to be particularly vital in stabilization by a number of academic and government studies. See, for example, Binnendijk and Johnson, 2004.

⁷⁰ DoD, *Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Defense*, Washington, D.C., January 2012, p. 6.

Military manpower is, in broad terms, a fungible resource. If national decisionmakers determine that stabilization emerges as a new priority, they can direct that the joint force undertake such a mission and reorient away from the current focus on preparation for major war contingencies with near-peer competitors. The reduction in the size of the joint force does impose outside limits, however, on the number, scale, and duration of missions that the U.S. military can undertake and sustain.


Total Capacity

Overall U.S. military capacity, measured in manpower, fell from 2009 to 2016. As of August 2016, there were 114,359 fewer military personnel in the active component than there were in 2009, driven primarily by a drop of 78,572 personnel in the Army and 19,416 in the Marine Corps, as shown in Figure 4.1. Given the importance of land forces to stabilization, these cuts have an effect on the capacity in the joint force to conduct multiple large-scale operations of extended duration, including stabilization, but improvements in capability or operational approaches can offset the implications of force reductions to some degree and in some respects. Reserve component land force manpower has fallen more slowly and continues to provide some capacity for longer-duration stabilization efforts. Reserve forces, however, are less immediately available to respond to contingencies because of readiness and mobilization constraints.

With a total active joint force of 1,281,900 service members, should the U.S. government decide to prioritize stabilization missions over others, the sheer quantity of joint forces available would be sufficient to accomplish missions of some scale. These would occur at the expense of other missions and overall readiness. As the largest single service, the Army has traditionally played the largest role in stabilization. From a peak of 566,000 in 2011, the Army's active-duty end strength shrank to 476,000 by March 2017, according to the Army personnel office's official statistics.⁷¹ This reduction limits the total number of missions that the force can undertake and sustain at any given time.

⁷¹ U.S. Army G-1, "End Strength Increase," webpage, March 20, 2017.

Figure 4.1. Number of U.S. Military Personnel by Service and Component in FY 2009 Compared with FY 2016



SOURCES: Analysis of personnel data from Defense Manpower Data Center, "Active Duty Military Strength by Service (Updated Monthly)," webpage, undated (see "Current Strength," "Selected Reserve Personnel June 2016" and "Active Duty Historical Reports FY 1994–2012"); DoD, *Demographics 2009: Profile of the Military Community*, Washington, D.C., 2009.

RAND RR2441-4.1

Reduced Exercise of Stabilization Capabilities at Training Centers

The data collected by the research team indicate that the joint force capability—i.e., expertise, proficiency, and readiness—to conduct stabilization activities has by and large declined since its peak in 2009–2010. The training centers could easily adopt a more robust stabilization component to the training scenarios, should DoD decide it is necessary. Although training can be increased on short notice, the knowledge base will be much harder to regenerate quickly. Therefore, the joint force must maintain the core expertise in stabilization in professional military education schools and centers of excellence.

The maintenance of U.S. military capabilities specifically tailored to meet stabilization demands has largely decreased since 2009, as would be expected given the end of major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the related changes in force-planning guidance described

above. This is evident in the U.S. military land component training centers, which reflect priorities for training and capability development across the force. Army Combat Training Centers, for example, officially serve as “the engine of change,” host culminating exercises in the Army force-generation process, and drive “training across the army.”⁷²

In 2009, the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center exercises had a strong focus on stabilization, owing to their focus on mission rehearsal for units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. These exercises involved civil-military reconstruction teams, how to build the capacity of host-nation security forces, and village stability operations.⁷³ Although mock villages and towns still provide the opportunity to train for operations in populated areas at the Joint Readiness Training Center, the focus of exercises has since shifted away from counterinsurgency and stability operations. The Joint Readiness Training Center held its first decisive-action exercise rotation in 2010; this was followed in 2013 by what one observer referred to as “the full-scale tsunami of change” that was implementation of the Decisive Action Training Environment.⁷⁴ This environment focuses on hybrid threats and hostile near-peer conventional forces; Joint Readiness Training Center exercises now often include airborne operations, tank battles, and cyber warfare.⁷⁵ The typical Joint Readiness Training Center Decisive Action Training Environment scenario involves no activities in any of the stability functions; the main activities that do not involve direct combat are limited to coordination with the U.S. embassy, combined defensive operations with a host-nation security force, and noncombatant evacuation of U.S. citizens.⁷⁶

There are two other Army combat training centers, which have similarly shifted from counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan toward training for decisive action. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center instituted Decisive Action Training Environment rotations in 2012, which “strongly resemble the 1990s era force on force rotations,” with an additional focus on multinational interoperability with NATO allies.⁷⁷ Each rotation is generally seven to ten days, most of which focus on defensive and offensive operations against an enemy brigade, including tanks, attack helicopters, and artillery. A few days are also focused on “reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance operations” and stability operations, which include “civil-military operations and area security.”⁷⁸ The Joint Multinational Readiness Center

⁷² Army Regulation 350-50, *Combat Training Center Program*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 3, 2013, p. 3.

⁷³ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Decisive Action Training Environment at the JRTC*, Vol. 18: *Whole of Government, Interagency, and Engagement*, Leavenworth, Kan., August 2016a, p. 4.

⁷⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2016a, p. 4.

⁷⁵ C. Todd Lopez, “Army Training for DATE with Hybrid Threats,” U.S. Army, November 14, 2012.

⁷⁶ Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2016a, pp. 23–32.

⁷⁷ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Decisive Action Training Environment at the JMRC*, Vol. 3: *Multinational Interoperability*, Leavenworth, Kan., September 2016b, pp. 11–12.

⁷⁸ Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2016b, p. 13.

also hosts the Kosovo Force mission rehearsal exercise, which has an emphasis on stabilization—particularly civil security, public order, and building partner capacity.⁷⁹

The National Training Center includes more stabilization aspects than does the Joint Readiness Training Center Decisive Action Training Environment, although it is still largely focused on direct combat. As of late 2015, a unit on a National Training Center rotation typically could “expect to conduct an attack to seize key terrain, defend an international border from a hostile nation, conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation, contend with displaced persons and execute personnel recovery missions.”⁸⁰ Army CA teams tend to tackle the stabilization aspects of the exercise: coordination with interagency and multinational actors, humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, and supporting host-nation authorities. The bulk of the military forces that participate must prioritize major combat operations, along with a limited requirement to provide security support to stabilization efforts.⁸¹

The same trajectory holds for training at the U.S. Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center. The Enhanced Mojave Viper exercise, which ran from 2009 to 2012, was designed to prepare Marine Corps units for counterinsurgency and stability-operations deployments. This exercise was replaced by the Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) in 2013. In the initial order laying out the ITX plan, most of the exercise (21 days) focused on offensive and defensive operations consisting of “high to mid-intensity combat, integrated combined arms live-fire and maneuver, [and] mechanized/heliborne/motorized/dismounted operations.” A smaller portion of the ITX (eight days) focused on stability operations consisting of “low to mid intensity combat, stability operations and counterinsurgency environment, non live-fire maneuver, [and] role players/force-on-force.”⁸²

By 2015, the purpose of the ITX had become “to prepare units for combat, under the most realistic conditions possible. . . . ITX will be heavily reliant on combined arms training events that incorporate live fire and maneuver.”⁸³ Marine Corps CA detachments are not directed to participate in the ITX, although they may support a Marine ground Combat Element battalion “when required for a mission rehearsal exercise in support of a designated operational deployment.”⁸⁴ As one observer stated, “While retaining a vestigial focus on stability operations,

⁷⁹ Interview 30.

⁸⁰ Joseph M. Martin, “NTC: The Army’s Training Oasis in the Mojave,” *ARMY Magazine*, November 12, 2015.

⁸¹ U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, *Training for Decisive Action: Collected Insights from Commanders and Leaders on their Experience and the National Training Center*, Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014; Nicholas Ashley, “Civil Affairs Support to Decisive Action: Challenges and Opportunities,” Civil Affairs Association, June 7, 2016.

⁸² Marine Corps Training and Education Command, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Plan, Enclosure 1: MAGTF Training Program Overview*, Training and Education Command Order 3502.2, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va., February 26, 2013.

⁸³ Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command Integrated Training Exercise Order*, Twentynine Palms, Calif., Combat Center Order 35000.14A, April 9, 2015, p. 6.

⁸⁴ Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 2015, p. 6.

the primary focus of collective MAGTF [Marine Air Ground Task Force] training [at the ITX] has shifted back to combined arms maneuver and fire support coordination in the offense and defense.”⁸⁵

In addition to the reduced focus on stabilization in training—except for discrete events, such as the Kosovo Force training—many of the military educational centers of excellence and organizations focused on creating and maintain stabilization expertise have been reduced or eliminated. These include the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center, the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Center and Advisory Training Group, the Air Force Air Advisor Academy, the Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, and Human Terrain Teams.⁸⁶

Capabilities to Engage in the Stability Functions

This section assesses the current capability of the joint force to perform the key stability functions as defined in this report.

Providing Security

Because the provision of security is a core competence and a central part of U.S. military doctrine, the land forces, in particular, possess capabilities that are relevant to the security stability function, especially regarding protecting civilian populations, institutions, and infrastructure from a variety of threats.⁸⁷ Protecting the civilian population is not necessarily an easy undertaking, however, as the experience of stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests. Large-scale and long-duration efforts to establish security during stabilization will tax military ground forces, which provide presence in populated areas and tend to have the closest interaction with both civilians and indigenous forces. Ground forces are also often best positioned to deal with threats to civil security, including insurgent and terrorist threats.

Building Partner Security Capacity

The U.S. military has retained some capability to build partner security forces that it developed during intensive efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq.⁸⁸ Some of the transitional or training teams have been temporary organizational constructs, but the U.S. military has continued to seek ways to institutionalize capabilities for providing security force assistance, even as the number of units involved in training foreign security forces has fallen with the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept laid out in 2013 was intended to support “theater security cooperation and contingency response” and

⁸⁵ Jonathan M. Donigan, “Intelligence and the Integrated Training Exercise,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 2015.

⁸⁶ Robinson et al., 2014, p. 118.

⁸⁷ Interview 24; Interview 29.

⁸⁸ SIGAR, 2017.

required “some understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.”⁸⁹

RAF missions do not always include a stabilization component. In some areas, such as in Europe, the RAF concept often focuses on interoperability and “conventional warfighting under a NATO umbrella,” while elsewhere (especially in Africa and the Middle East) it includes stabilization-relevant efforts to build partner capacity in fragile states.⁹⁰ As of 2015, only four out of 38 active brigade combat teams (BCTs) had deployed under RAF, along with elements of one Army National Guard BCT, and there has been “far less engagement at the division and corps levels.”⁹¹ This trend of RAF implementation involving only a limited number of Army units continued through 2017.⁹² The original RAF intent of developing Army units with regional and security force assistance expertise developed through habitual engagements has, largely, not been realized.⁹³

Current efforts also include developing security force assistance brigades (SFABs). These units are intended to provide security force assistance capabilities in both stabilization and nonstabilization missions. One active component and one National Guard SFAB are planned for establishment by FY 2018, followed by four additional SFABs and potentially a corps or division headquarters by 2024. Each SFAB would be staffed primarily by officers and noncommissioned officers, rather than more-junior personnel, to provide more-experienced advisers and trainers.⁹⁴

In addition to the RAF and SFAB programs designed emphasize building the operational and tactical capacity of foreign security forces, DoD also engages in regular efforts to build defense institutions in fragile states. These efforts include the Increasing Partner Capacity Building in Rule of Law Context program run by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative, and the Ministry of Defense Advisors program. Although these programs are relatively small on a monetary basis, they do help DoD maintain the important capability to assist the defense institutions that plan, oversee, and support security forces conducting internal stabilization activities.⁹⁵ From 2009 to 2015, these programs grew

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, Washington, D.C., 2013, p. 5.

⁹⁰ M. Wade Markel, Bryan W. Hallmark, Peter Schirmer, Louay Constant, Jaime L. Hastings, Henry A. Leonard, Kristin Leuschner, Lauren A. Mayer, Caolionn O'Connell, Christina Panis, Jose Rodriguez, Lisa Saum-Manning, and Jonathan Welch, *A Preliminary Assessment of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) Concept's Implications for Army Personnel Management*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1065-A, 2015, pp. 10–11.

⁹¹ Markel et al., 2015, p. 10.

⁹² Interview 12; Interview 25.

⁹³ Interview 12; Interview 25.

⁹⁴ Jen Judson, “Army Chief Taking Hard Look at Building Advise-and-Assist Brigades,” *Defense News*, January 21, 2016; Interview 12.

⁹⁵ Kerr and Miklaucic, 2017.

while defense institution-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan decreased, as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Defense Institution-Building Program Budgets, FY 2009 to FY 2015 (in thousands)

Program	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies	N/A	1,514	1,597	1,737	917	2,125	2,071
Defense Institutional Reform Initiative	N/A	5,779	6,544	12,821	10,962	17,908	12,052
Ministry of Defense Advisors	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	2,247	7,446	10,651

SOURCES: Defense Security Cooperation Agency budget estimates for FY 2009 to FY 2016. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/FY 2009 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2007; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Estimates*, May 2009; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2010; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2011; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2012; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., April 2013; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., March 2014; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2015.

Support to Public Order

The military's capabilities to engage in the public-order function are less well developed than are capabilities to support the security function, however. Military forces can conduct predeployment training for specific public-order capabilities, such as crowd control and the use of nonlethal force, but these are not a core competency.⁹⁶ Even the National Guard, which may be called on to support public order in the United States when acting under state authority, has limited capabilities in this function.⁹⁷ There is also a general statutory prohibition on military assistance to foreign police forces, but there have been exceptions to this in practice, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹⁸ Although the U.S. military is better able to work with indigenous military forces in support of the security function, it is more limited in its ability to

⁹⁶ Interview 30.

⁹⁷ Interview 15; Interview 25; Interview 8.

⁹⁸ JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 22, 2013, p. B-4.

support indigenous police forces that focus on public order.⁹⁹ The SIGAR report on the Afghan security force development highlighted the shortfalls in the U.S. military effort to develop police in its 12 findings, including the lack of an initial plan, the reliance on militias, treatment of police development as a secondary security mission, and constant turnover in U.S. and NATO trainers.¹⁰⁰

Both the U.S. military and civilian departments have struggled to develop adequate police training and rule-of-law programs. The military capability deficiencies reside largely in the fact that it does not have any inherent skill or competence in community or constabulary policing—or the warrant-based operations that are the bread and butter of law enforcement entities.¹⁰¹ U.S. special operations forces have developed a number of special police and paramilitary units, however. The U.S. civilian shortfalls have been due, in large part, to the inadequacies of DoS’s model for contracting police trainers, which does not identify and sufficiently train qualified civilians for the needed training roles in unfamiliar and nonpermissive or semipermissive environments.¹⁰² There is no national police to task with this mission, as Italy, Canada, and Australia have done.

Immediate Human Needs

The U.S. military has significant logistics and transportation capabilities available to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance in stabilization. In some cases, these may be the only capabilities available to effectively reach civilians in austere and nonpermissive environments. The value of such capabilities was evident in 2014, when civilians fled the Islamic State’s advance and were stranded on Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq. Military airdrops of humanitarian aid, followed by helicopter insertion of U.S. special operations forces and USAID personnel to assess civilian needs and evacuation routes, were essential to the response to an internationally recognized humanitarian emergency.¹⁰³ Although the military is a “master of logistics and transportation,” civilian interviewees stated that it may be a more expensive option for delivering humanitarian assistance than are local contractors or service providers, when those are available.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Robert Perito, *Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009; Interview 15; Interview 4.

¹⁰⁰ SIGIR, *Long-Standing Weaknesses in Department of State’s Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program*, Washington, D.C., January 25, 2010.

¹⁰¹ SIGAR, 2017.

¹⁰² Civilian shortfalls are documented in the following reports: SIGIR, 2010; Atos Consulting and Technology Services, *Evaluation of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan: Phase V Report*, April 17, 2012; Kelly et al., 2008.

¹⁰³ Interview 3. Also see “Iraq Crisis: US Says Mount Sinjar Evacuation Unlikely,” *BBC*, August 14, 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Interview 3; Interview 10.

Support to Governance and Economic Stability

U.S. military forces can also support the governance and economic stability functions. Military forces were often asked to carry out activities as part of these functions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Civil-military teams, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), were tasked to support governance and economic development. These were often staffed and commanded by officers from the military, some of whom had no previous experience with such activities.¹⁰⁵ More generally, U.S. military units also engaged with local authorities to support governance and economic stability as a means to enable greater security. They were provided significant funding through the Commander's Emergency Response Program to support this.¹⁰⁶ These civil-military structures—and dedicated funding streams and the predeployment training courses intended to support them—are now largely gone, although they could potentially be reconstituted if the need arose.

Among the most valuable support that the U.S. military can provide is intelligence to understand the complex political dynamics that can assist or impede stabilization efforts. The U.S. military conducted numerous focused programs during OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom to map complex political networks and their ties to foreign groups, armed groups, or corrupt actors. One of the most extensive efforts was Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force—Shafafiyat in Afghanistan; led by the military and housed at the coalition International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul, the task force included a wide array of intelligence analysts, as well as civilian law enforcement and other interagency personnel.¹⁰⁷

Supplemental efforts to improve understanding of the stabilization environment in Afghanistan did have some success, including Human Terrain Teams and the Stability Operations Information Center in southern Afghanistan, but these have not been institutionalized.¹⁰⁸

Similarly, U.S. military planners can supply vital functions in support of stabilization efforts. Military operational and contingency plans do not always include annexes that detail

¹⁰⁵ Interview 4.

¹⁰⁶ Daniel Egel, Charles P. Ries, Ben Connable, Todd C. Helmus, Eric Robinson, Isaac Baruffi, Melissa A. Bradley, Kurt Card, Kathleen Loa, Sean Mann, Fernando Sedano, Stephan B. Seabrook, and Robert Stewart, *Investing in the Fight: Assessing the Use of the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1508-OSD, 2016.

¹⁰⁷ Michelle Hughes and Michael Miklaucic, *Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and Transition*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2016.

¹⁰⁸ James Welch and Adam Stoddard, "Fixing Intelligence II: Why Army Intelligence Should Look Beyond the Enemy," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, January–March 2014; Christopher J. Lamb, James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies, and Theodore T. Pikulsky, "The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 70, 2013; Tom Vanden Brook, "Army Kills Controversial Social Science Program," *USA Today*, June 29, 2015; Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, January 2010.

stabilization activities or civil-military operations to be carried out (Annex G) or explicitly outline the interagency division of labor and coordination mechanisms (Annex V).¹⁰⁹

Key Military Enablers for Stabilization

Specialized military units and personnel play important roles in stabilization; these vital niche players are active-duty and reserve CA, engineers, MPs, JAGs, and medical personnel. These capabilities provide essential expertise to conduct certain stabilization activities and to support and coordinate whole-of-government or coalition efforts. We did find that some reduction in capacity or capability has occurred, which we recommend be addressed.

CA

CA capabilities are relevant to all stability functions, including those that other military forces have little specialized expertise in, such as governance. CA personnel also are trained specifically to coordinate civil-military operations and to conduct area assessments that provide comprehensive understanding of the conflict environment. In general, CA personnel do not conduct stabilization independently but rather advise and support other military units or headquarters that provide the bulk of the capacity and capability to perform the needed stability tasks and other civil-military operations.

There are several different types of CA forces, each with a different focus on particular aspects of stabilization. The one full active-duty CA brigade, the 95th Brigade, is part of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and is assigned to support other special operations forces. The brigade may perform vital stability tasks in that capacity, as it did in Afghanistan in supporting Village Stability Operations and manning provincial-level coordination centers and the district support teams. These officers also operate at national levels—for example, as Civil Military Support Elements in U.S. embassies around the world, as liaisons to government ministries in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and to the USAID headquarters in Washington, D.C. The other active-duty CA brigade, the 85th Brigade, was established to provide dedicated CA support to conventional army forces and the geographic combatant commands.¹¹⁰ The 85th Brigade has been reduced to two companies. Active-duty CA forces are generalists who focus on conducting assessments, planning, and civil-military coordination. The CA reserves contain the functional specialists, who draw on their civilian jobs for competency in particular stabilization tasks.

Army Reserve CA forces are the largest in terms of manpower. Although, across services, reserve CA personnel take longer to mobilize, they sometimes possess specialized functional

¹⁰⁹ Interview 3; Interview 4; Interview 28; Interview 33.

¹¹⁰ Rachel Parks, “Civil Affairs Brigade Activates at Fort Hood,” U.S. Army, September 22, 2011.

capabilities relevant to stabilization efforts that they have developed in civilian job sectors, such as public administration, international development, or agriculture.¹¹¹

Finally, the Marine Corps retains a small number of both active-duty and reserve CA forces.

Although CA are charged with carrying out an expansive set of stabilization-related core tasks in doctrine, including direct responsibility for governance during military occupation, they are not always able to perform stabilization activities to a large extent or at a high level of proficiency. Some of the CA core tasks, such as support to civil administration, are not currently a major focus of active-duty CA.¹¹² In Iraq and Afghanistan, there were insufficient CA forces to fully meet requirements to reconstitute government offices, support local elections, collect civil information, or support governance and reconstruction.¹¹³ This led to the use of other military forces in structures, such as PRTs, as well as reliance on contractors in such programs as the Human Terrain Teams.¹¹⁴ Another factor is that the bulk of active-duty CA (i.e., the 95th Brigade) is focused on supporting special operations forces, many of which are increasingly focused on counterterrorism and other direct-action missions rather than stabilization.¹¹⁵

According to several interviewees, two particular capabilities are maintained at a relatively high level of proficiency among the active-duty CA units: (1) civil reconnaissance and assessment and (2) facilitating integration and coordination with interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, host-nation, and other organizations.¹¹⁶ As key parts of understanding the stabilization environment and supporting civil-military integration, these capabilities are relevant to all of the assigned stabilization activities. CA units collect, analyze, and share information on civilian infrastructure, populations, and organizations. CA units also assess immediate human needs, government services, and critical infrastructure.¹¹⁷ CA efforts in civil-military coordination are particularly important in facilitating military support to those stabilization activities led by nonmilitary organizations in the governance and economic stability functions. These two capabilities, and the high degree of priority placed on them by many CA commanders, suggest that CA may be better able to inform, coordinate, and support stabilization activities rather than carry them out directly.¹¹⁸

Prior to September 11, 2001, CA capacity resided mostly in the Army Reserve, with just a single active-component Army battalion that worked primarily in support of special operations

¹¹¹ Interview 2.

¹¹² Interview 6.

¹¹³ Interview 28.

¹¹⁴ Interview 28.

¹¹⁵ Interview 6; Interview 28.


¹¹⁶ Interview 2; Interview 4; Interview 6.

¹¹⁷ JP 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 11, 2013, p. C-2; Interview 4.

¹¹⁸ Interview 2; Interview 4.

forces. Active-component CA then grew significantly to try to meet large-scale stabilization requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan and expanding special operations requirements. By 2010, active-component Army CA forces included 661 personnel in the 95th Brigade supporting special operations forces and another 414 CA personnel supporting conventional forces. CA force structure continued to grow through 2015, as shown in Figure 4.2, with the expansion of authorized billets in the 95th Brigade and the standing up of the 85th Brigade. This has since begun to fall, with a 17 percent drop in authorized active-component personnel from 2015 to 2016. In 2017, the 85th CA Brigade shrank further to a single battalion.¹¹⁹ This reduced the active-duty CA forces aligned with each geographic combatant command to one company each from the 83rd Battalion, which replaced the 85th Brigade.¹²⁰

Figure 4.2. Number of Authorized Active Army CA Personnel by Unit/Formation in FY 2010, FY 2015, and FY 2016



SOURCE: Data provided by U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, "Civil Affairs Manning Data for FY 2010–2016," September 2016.

RAND RR2441-4.2

¹¹⁹ Interview 4; Interview 6.

¹²⁰ Parks, 2011. Data provided by U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, "Civil Affairs Manning Data for FY 2010–2016," September 2016.

Army CA reserve capacity has fluctuated less in recent years and still includes the majority of Army CA personnel, as shown in Figure 4.3. Although members of the Army Reserve possess a wide range of civilian skills relevant to stabilization, interviewees noted that many have not been validated in their respective functional specialties, such as public order and governance functions, and some have not been through CA training.¹²¹ The Special Operations Center of Excellence is currently leading an effort to validate, train, and track Army CA reservists in a newly designated specialty branch, 38G military support to governance. This effort has progressed slower than expected, however.¹²² Limited resources and difficulty attracting qualified applicants from outside the existing pool of CA reserve personnel have been significant challenges.¹²³

Although the Navy eliminated its CA program in 2014, Marine Corps capacity in CA remains small but has grown. In 2009, the Navy's Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command supported both active and reserve civil-military operations, with an additional focus on providing security force assistance.¹²⁴ This command consisted of roughly 300 personnel at the time, half from the active component and half from the reserve.¹²⁵ The Navy disestablished this command and its maritime CA capability in 2014, as part of "a comprehensive efficiency review to improve the department's combat and combat support capability and to reduce the total cost of ownership."¹²⁶ In contrast, CA capacity in the Marine Corps active component has stayed relatively constant, at roughly 200 authorized personnel since 2009. The Marine Corps reserve CA capacity has roughly doubled in this same period, to just over 700 authorized personnel in 2015.¹²⁷

Both the Army and the Marine Corps face challenges in attracting personnel to fill CA billets.¹²⁸ This is partly due to a perception among some that CA service is less likely to contribute to future promotions than service in a combat arms unit.¹²⁹ The Marine Corps specialized capabilities for CA are additionally limited by the fact that its active-component CA

¹²¹ Interview 2; Interview 5.

¹²² Interview 4; Interview 5. This measure to track and train such specialties was recommended in a congressionally directed report (Kathleen H. Hicks and Christine E. Wormuth, *The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2009).

¹²³ Interview 4; Interview 5.

¹²⁴ Matt Daniels, "Navy Disestablishes MCAST," U.S. Department of the Navy, May 16, 2014.

¹²⁵ Zakem and Mushen, 2015, p. 6.

¹²⁶ Daniels, 2014.


¹²⁷ Zakem and Mushen, 2015, p. 8.

¹²⁸ Interview 4; Interview 6; Interview 26.

¹²⁹ Interview 2; Interview 26.

personnel receive relatively short training for what is a temporary assignment rather than a primary military occupational specialty and career.¹³⁰

Figure 4.3. Number of Authorized CA Personnel by Service and Component in FY 2010, FY 2015, and FY 2016



SOURCES: Data provided by U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, "Civil Affairs Manning Data for FY 2010–2016," September 2016. Marine Corps and Navy personnel numbers are from Vera Zakem and Emily Mushen, *Charting the Course for Civil Affairs in the New Normal*, Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 2015.

RAND RR2441-4.5

Engineering

Military engineers are assigned to perform two basic functions: combat engineering and construction engineering. In addition, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers oversees projects that are executed by other contracted entities. Combat engineers, organized in brigade engineer battalions, generally focus on mobility and countermobility tasks to assist the brigade's military operations. Construction engineering tasks related to stabilization are often performed by the echelon-above-brigade formations. The majority of Army engineering capacity (74 percent) is in the reserve component (the Army Reserve and National Guard). Of the remaining 26 percent that is in the active-duty component, most are in the brigade engineer battalions.

¹³⁰ Interview 26.

Engineers possess highly developed capabilities for route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal, which can be important parts of stabilization efforts in the security function, particularly in areas where civilian population movement and economic activity are threatened by insurgency or explosive remnants of war. These capabilities were in high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan and continue to be a major focus for engineers today, given that ensuring mobility for combat troops remains a military readiness priority.¹³¹ Engineers also have specialized capabilities to deal with any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear threats that might be present in stabilization environments.¹³²

Military engineers maintain civil engineering capabilities to repair and construct power stations, water treatment plants, hospitals, sewage systems, and other infrastructure.¹³³ Military engineers are also able to restore critical transportation infrastructure—including ports, bridges, roads, and airfields—to enable nonmilitary actors to deliver timely assistance in the aftermath of conflict or natural disaster.¹³⁴ All these capabilities have been used extensively in support of stabilization efforts, particularly in the economic stability function. Military engineers found themselves repairing oil-production and power-generation facilities, as well as building schools, hospitals, and host-nation military barracks during stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade.¹³⁵ These efforts often relied heavily on the local workforce and were designed to both accomplish near-term infrastructure objectives and build private and governmental capacity to sustain projects after completion.¹³⁶

The Army and, to a lesser extent, the Navy provide the bulk of military engineering capabilities for stabilization. Army engineering units provide route clearance and construction capabilities that apply to expeditionary and austere environments, while the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides additional specialized capabilities to support power generation, water infrastructure, and disaster relief.¹³⁷ Navy construction engineers, known as Seabees, also provide civil engineering capabilities for stabilization; Seabees are now entirely in the reserve force. Air Force engineers “embed . . . within the garrison work force” rather than within a “separate combat service support force structure to support expeditionary missions.”¹³⁸ Although Air Force Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers squadrons

¹³¹ Interview 14.

¹³² Interview 26; JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 6, 2016, pp. B-1–B-2.

¹³³ Interview 29. These capabilities fall under *general engineering*, as laid out in JP 3-34, 2016.

¹³⁴ Interview 10; Interview 15. Also see JP 3-34, 2016.

¹³⁵ Interview 29; Interview 14.

¹³⁶ Interview 29.


¹³⁷ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Overseas Contingency Operations Playbook*. Leavenworth, Kan.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2015.

¹³⁸ JP 3-34, 2016, p. I-9. Also see Center for Army Lessons Learned, *The Brigade Engineer Battalion: A Leader's Guide*, Leavenworth, Kan., June 2015, p. 13.

still deploy in support of stabilization efforts, they possess fewer of the combat-related capabilities that support operations in less permissive stabilization environments.¹³⁹ Marine Corps engineers focus on the “internal engineering requirements” of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.¹⁴⁰

The number of Army engineers overall has fallen slightly since 2009, driven primarily by reductions in the active component (see Figure 4.4), where authorized engineering billets fell 16 percent from 20,413 to 17,224. In contrast, the number of engineers in the National Guard has remained constant and has actually risen in the Army Reserve. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is staffed primarily by civilians, has also faced reductions. While the corps had approximately 37,000 personnel from 2009 through 2014, this number fell to roughly 32,000 in 2016.¹⁴¹ The Navy Reserve’s Seabees also have less capacity now than they did in 2009. Three Seabees battalions were deactivated in 2013 because of budget cuts; 11 battalions are left as of 2017.¹⁴²

Figure 4.4. Number of Authorized Engineers in Army Units, FY 2009 and FY 2016



SOURCE: Data on all engineering billets from U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, FMSWeb, website, data pulled on October 10, 2016.

RAND RR2441-4.2

¹³⁹ JP 3-34, 2016, p. I-9; Interview 14.

¹⁴⁰ JP 3-34, 2016, pp. I-8–I-9. Also see Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2015, p. 13.

¹⁴¹ The 2009 numbers are from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Building Strong: Serving the Nation and Armed Forces*, 2010. The 2014 and 2016 numbers are from Interview 29.

¹⁴² Wernher C. Heyres, *Seabees: National Instrument of Power Projection*, Quantico, Va.: U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, May 6, 2013.

Additional changes in Army force structure have had an additional negative effect on engineering capacity for stabilization. The Army's focus on building combat power delivered at the level of BCTs has been accompanied by a recent move of more than half of active-duty engineers, and many National Guard engineers, to brigade engineering battalions.¹⁴³ These battalions assumed the duties of the preexisting brigade special troops battalions and are intended to provide "engineering, military intelligence, signal, planning, and execution capabilities to the BCT."¹⁴⁴ The engineering capabilities that brigade engineering battalions provide are focused on combat engineering, with their main relevance being route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal efforts in the security function. These battalions can provide "limited construction support" to their BCTs, including construction of protective berms or temporary detention facilities.¹⁴⁵ However, more-substantial construction efforts—including construction of permanent structures, surveying, and design—require engineering support from outside a BCT.¹⁴⁶

Army engineer construction capacity is concentrated in the dedicated engineering brigades and battalions held in the force pool at echelons above BCTs. The shift to brigade engineering battalions under the BCTs has meant that these units have fallen in number to four active engineering brigades, which are in charge of a dwindling number of battalions and construction companies.¹⁴⁷ This has especially affected the active component, where the number of construction-related engineering companies fell from 25 to 17 in the past two years, as shown in Table 4.2.¹⁴⁸ These cuts limit Army engineering capacity to repair infrastructure in support of either the immediate needs or economic stability functions.¹⁴⁹

Medical

The U.S. military possesses a wide range of highly developed medical capabilities provided by specialists distributed throughout the military services' force structure. Although most of these capabilities are designed to support the health of military forces, they are generally transferable to stabilization efforts in the immediate-needs function.¹⁵⁰ This includes battlefield medicine and general medicine, as well as more-specialized capabilities, such as epidemiology, tropical medicine, environmental medicine, and health administration.

¹⁴³ Interview 29; CALL, 2015, p. 1.

¹⁴⁴ CALL, 2015, p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ CALL, 2015, pp. 7–8, 29–31.

¹⁴⁶ CALL, 2015, pp. 9, 30–31.

¹⁴⁷ Interview 29.

¹⁴⁸ In contrast, the number of Army Reserve and National Guard companies related to engineer construction has barely changed, from a combined total of 171 in 2014 to 170 in 2016.

¹⁴⁹ Interview 14; Interview 29.

¹⁵⁰ Interview 11.

Table 4.2. Number of Active Army Construction-Related Engineering Companies

Type	FY 2014	FY 2016
Horizontal construction company	10	5
Vertical construction company	9	4
Engineer support company	6	4
Construction company	N/A	4

SOURCES: U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, 2016; U.S. Army, Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) historical database, accessed October 12, 2016.

NOTES: These and other engineering companies in the echelons above the brigade force pool are described in CALL, 2015, pp. 9–12. Data available to the study team only went back to FY 2014. This still provided a useful depiction of the effect of the brigade engineering battalion reorganization on Army active-duty construction engineering capabilities. In FY 2014, this reorganization had progressed to the point that there were 12 brigade engineering battalions; in FY 2016, the reorganization had resulted in a total of 32 brigade engineering battalions.

In 2010, DoDI 6000.16, on “military health support of stability operations,” was issued as a follow-on policy to DoDI 3000.05 (2009). It established medical stability operations as

a core U.S. military mission that the DoD Military Health System (MHS) shall be prepared to conduct throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. [Medical stability operations] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations. . . . The MHS shall be prepared to perform any tasks assigned to establish, reconstitute, and maintain health sector capacity and capability for the indigenous population when indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals cannot do so.¹⁵¹

This DoDI, however, does not appear to have resulted in any major changes in DoD medical capability development.¹⁵² The DoD medical corps does maintain significant capability and capacity to address civilian medical needs and offer direct support to local health providers. However, the medical corps has only limited capability to build local medical capacity or support the development of public health institutions in a partner nation, despite the requirement in DoDI

¹⁵¹ DoDI 6000.16, *Military Health Support for Stability Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 17, 2010.

¹⁵² Interview 11.

6000.¹⁶¹⁵³ There are some efforts to maintain this capability, such as supporting professional military education in global health administration and embedding DoD health system personnel with DoS stabilization planning teams, but these are small programs that involve only a few personnel at a time.¹⁵⁴

Total medical capacity in the U.S. military has fallen very slightly and at a slower rate than cuts in overall personnel for each service, as shown in Figure 4.5. Army medical capacity fell by 5 percent from 2009 to 2015, mostly because of cuts to medical personnel in the reserve component. Medical capacity in the Navy, which is also responsible for medical support to the Marine Corps, actually grew after 2009. For more than two decades, the Navy has also maintained two hospital ships, which have provided humanitarian assistance as part of missions in Iraq, Haiti, the Philippines, and elsewhere, often in efforts that included partner capacity-building and stabilization components.¹⁵⁵ Other Navy ships, including amphibious assault ships often accompanied by Marines, also possess well-equipped medical facilities and have supported stabilization.¹⁵⁶

MPs

U.S. MPs provide a range of unique capabilities in the security and, especially, the public-order stability functions. More than other troops, MPs are trained to work with civilian populations and exercise restraint in the use of force, including during stabilization.¹⁵⁷ They also have specific capabilities to conduct policing, investigations, and detentions. Although these capabilities are predominantly designed for use in garrison and in support of ground combat troops, they can also transfer to maintaining public order in stabilization environments.¹⁵⁸

MPs are generally more proficient at tactical law enforcement activities, such as setting up checkpoints to control civilian population movements or conducting police patrols. They are less able to support host-nation policing and correctional systems at the institutional level.¹⁵⁹ MPs have some capability to build the capacity of local security forces to establish public order, but

¹⁵³ Interview 11; Stephen Waller, Jose Fonseca, Joseph Anderson, James Fike, and Sean Murphy, “What Every Airman Needs to Know About Medical Stability Operations,” *Air & Space Power Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1, January–February 2012.

¹⁵⁴ Interview 11.

¹⁵⁵ Wyatt Olson, “USNS Mercy Set to Lead Pacific’s Largest Disaster-Relief Preparation,” *Stars and Stripes*, May 16, 2016; Terri Moon Cronk, “Hospital Ship USNS Comfort to Anchor in Haiti at 2015 Mission’s End,” U.S. Department of Defense News, September 10, 2015; U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command, “USNS Comfort (T-A H 20) Hospital Ship,” fact sheet, undated.

¹⁵⁶ Ann Scott Tyson and Spencer S. Hsu, “U.S. Military Dispatches Aircraft Carrier, Other Assets to Haiti,” *Washington Post*, January 13, 2010.


¹⁵⁷ Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, U.S. Army, August 2013, pp. 1-10–1-11.

¹⁵⁸ Interview 24.

¹⁵⁹ Interview 20; Interview 24.

this is less robust now than it was several years ago, when MPs were engaged in significant efforts to support Iraqi and Afghan police forces. MPs also have some capabilities to support disarmament and demobilization of belligerents, particularly when helping local authorities process belligerents and provide humane and secure detention facilities.¹⁶⁰ Army doctrine on military policing acknowledges that stabilization needs in postconflict environments may tax the MP corps, which will “typically need augmentation to provide the required capabilities to accomplish tasks associated with extensive stability.”¹⁶¹

Figure 4.5. Number of Medical Personnel by Service and Component, FY 2009 and FY 2015



SOURCE: Analysis of data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, undated (see “Current Strength,” “Selected Reserve Personnel June 2016” and “Active Duty Historical Reports FY 1994–2012”). Numbers include all military personnel with a designated primary DoD occupation code in either the medical series (260) or the environmental health series (132).

RAND RR2441-4.5

Of all the services, Army MPs are designed to provide the greatest range of capabilities in stabilization efforts, including enabling an interim criminal justice system, supporting host-nation police and corrections, conducting detention operations, and controlling and resettling

¹⁶⁰ Interview 20.

¹⁶¹ Field Manual 3-39, 2013.

displaced civilian populations. The Army MP strategic plan stresses the continued importance of these capabilities in the future, with an additional focus on MPs strengthening their ability to support public-order efforts by adopting international and U.S. standards for civilian policing.¹⁶² Reorganization of Army MP force structure since 2013 has affected the capacity for stabilization, however. BCTs no longer possess organic MP platoons, which have instead been placed under Army corps. This reduces the ability of BCTs—the primary deployable army unit—to provide security and, especially, public order during stabilization. Although a few (often very junior) MP planners support BCTs, and although MP companies and platoons are technically still aligned with (but no longer assigned to) many BCTs, these elements must be specifically requested through a request for forces and might not be available for predeployment training.¹⁶³

Both the smaller Navy and Marine Corps military police forces also maintain capabilities to support host-nation security forces as part of stabilization efforts. While Air Force security forces have some focus on law enforcement, as the Air Force’s primary ground element, they focus predominantly on force protection and air base security, with no specific capabilities maintained for stabilization.¹⁶⁴

MP capacity has generally fallen since 2009, as shown in Figure 4.6. This is particularly true of the active Army MP corps, which shrank by 26 percent between 2009 and 2015. Given that Army MPs provide the greatest capability to support public order as part of stabilization, this represents a significant reduction in overall military capacity for this stability function. The dramatic growth of active-duty master-at-arms personnel (the Navy’s equivalent of MPs) has few implications for stabilization capabilities, as it stems from a recent change to aircraft carrier security personnel’s career designation.¹⁶⁵

JAGs

JAGs provide legal capabilities in the U.S. military. Although JAGs often specialize in supporting the military’s internal justice system under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, they also have inherent capabilities to ensure that military efforts in all stability functions adhere to U.S. and international law and to build partner capacity as part of the governance and, especially, the public-order functions.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² U.S. Department of the Army and Provost Marshal General, *2025 Military Police Force Strategic Plan*, Washington, D.C., June 23, 2016; Interview 24.


¹⁶³ Interview 20; Interview 35.

¹⁶⁴ The services’ MP and security force capabilities for civil-military operations and stabilization are discussed in JP 3-57, 2013, pp. A-D-1–A-D-6.

¹⁶⁵ Mark D. Faram, “2015 Outlook: Master-at-Arms Ranks to Grow,” *Navy Times*, December 27, 2014.

¹⁶⁶ Interview 1.

Figure 4.6. Number of Army and Marine Corps Military Police, Navy Master-at-Arms, and Air Force Security Forces, FY 2009 and FY 2016



SOURCE: Analysis of data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, undated (see "Current Strength," "Selected Reserve Personnel June 2016" and "Active Duty Historical Reports FY 1994–2012").

NOTE: Numbers include all military personnel with a designated primary DoD occupation code of either law enforcement (18300) or police (270800).

RAND RR2441-4.6

JAGs advise joint force and unit commanders on international and host-nation legal considerations, including during the conduct of stabilization activities. These considerations include treatment of “civilian persons and property, including migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons; human rights aspects of law[;] . . . governance of occupied enemy territory; detention and interrogation operations; rule of law; Department of Defense support to other agencies for humanitarian operations.”¹⁶⁷ JAGs also have responsibility for “providing command guidance on any situations pertaining to child combatants,” including in stabilization generally and in military support to DDR activities specifically.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2, 2016, p. I-14. For a longer discussion of legal considerations in stabilization that can require JAG assistance, see “Appendix E: Legal and Fiscal Considerations” in JP 3-07, 2016, pp. E-1–E-14.

¹⁶⁸ JP 3-07, 2016, p. C-23.

JAG doctrinal responsibilities under stability operations and rule-of-law programs focus primarily on building the capacity of partner-nation military justice systems and the adherence of partner security forces to the rule of law.¹⁶⁹ Some of this is conducted by the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies program described earlier in this chapter, which is led and staffed by JAGs and includes rule-of-law capacity-building efforts with military forces in states that have grappled with instability, such as Burundi, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Honduras.¹⁷⁰

Although most JAG efforts focus on strengthening foreign military justice systems and on legal issues pertinent to military operations, the JAG corps has also, at times, supported stabilization efforts to reestablish civilian justice systems within the public-order and governance functions. This was the case during operations in Iraq, where the Staff Judge Advocate for the Multinational Force–Iraq Colonel (now BG) Mark Martins and “a fifty-five-person team staffed with Justice Department and military personnel worked with Iraqi authorities to create a ‘Rule of Law’ complex in central Baghdad [that] combined courts, jails, and a police academy.”¹⁷¹ In Afghanistan, from 2011 to 2014, Martins subsequently led the Rule of Law Field Force, which supported capacity-building programs for judges, prosecutors, and investigators within the criminal justice system.¹⁷² JAG legal support for stabilization efforts may also include assessing host-nation laws and justice systems, as well as supporting elections.¹⁷³ In Iraq and Afghanistan, JAGs supported stabilization as part of CA and civil-military teams, including as part of PRTs working on governance and rule-of-law issues.¹⁷⁴ Most of these JAG efforts to support civilian justice systems, including the Rule of Law Field Force, ended with the conclusion of major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, and have not been institutionalized in JAG doctrine or organizational structures.¹⁷⁵

The JAG corps is the one enabler for stabilization that has not reduced in size since DoDI 3000.05 was issued in 2009. The number of active-component JAG personnel actually grew by 9 percent between 2009 and 2015, with gains across all services, as shown in Figure 4.7. The number of reserve JAGs in the joint force also grew modestly during this time.

¹⁶⁹ JP 1-04, 2016, p. I-16.

¹⁷⁰ Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, *Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2014*, Newport, R.I., undated.

¹⁷¹ Peter R. Mansoor, *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013, p. 212.


¹⁷² Patrick J. Reinert and John F. Hussey, “The Military’s Role in Rule of Law,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 77, 2015.

¹⁷³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army War College, and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media*, Unified Action Handbook Series Book Two, February 19, 2016, pp. B-2, A-5; Center for Law and Military Operations, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, *Rule of Law Handbook*, Charlottesville, Va., 2011.

¹⁷⁴ JP 3-57, 2013, p. A-A-6.

¹⁷⁵ For an argument in favor of such institutionalization, see Ellen Klein, “Bridging the Potomac: How a Rule of Law Field Force Strikes Balance Between Security and Development Operations,” *Small Wars Journal*, March 25, 2013.

Figure 4.7. Number of JAG Personnel by Service and Component, FY 2009 and FY 2015



SOURCE: Analysis of data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, undated (see "Current Strength," "Selected Reserve Personnel June 2016" and "Active Duty Historical Reports FY 1994–2012").

NOTE: Numbers are for designated primary military occupation codes of Army JAG (27A and 55A), Marine Corps JAG (4402), Navy JAG (250), or USAF JAG (51J).

RAND RR2441-4.7

5. Rescoping DoD Roles in Stabilization

This chapter combines the lessons from the past and their implications for core competencies (Chapter Three) with the analysis of current capabilities and capacity (Chapter Four) to project from what DoD has done, and can currently do, to a model of what DoD should do going forward. Our analysis finds that DoD policy on stability should be revised to reflect lessons from recent experience and current capacity and capability, as well as a more refined understanding of military and civilian core competencies. The revised policy should affirm the continuing vital role of stability and of DoD's role in fostering it across the conflict continuum. Revisions should reflect all requirements specified by law and resolve discrepancies in extant guidance and plans to ensure that the U.S. military has a precise understanding of its obligations and the tasks it must be prepared to perform.

This chapter is organized according to the five stability functions defined in Chapter Two. The analysis of Chapters Three and Four suggests that the joint force's role in stabilization can be usefully rescoped to focus on the security function as its primary activity, to specific roles in support of civilian interagency and international activities and across the functions to achieve the necessary civilian-military coordination and synergy. Certain key enablers within the joint force are also vital to continued conduct of stabilization efforts by the U.S. government.

Security Function: DoD Has a Unique Responsibility to Provide Security and Build Security Capacity

DoD Should Take the Lead in Providing Security

The military should focus on ensuring adequate capacity, capability, and readiness to perform all relevant responsibilities in the security sector. Our interlocutors were unanimous that DoD must have the lead on establishing security during stabilization. All interviewees saw DoD as indispensable in this mission. This is the one capability that the U.S. military uniquely possesses, as opposed to civilian entities. And most interviewees saw this as the critical need on which all other stabilization activities depend. As one civilian official recalled, he and his civilian colleagues landed under fire in U.S. military helicopters in Afghanistan because he had been ordered to commence stabilization programs there, yet no such activity was possible under the circumstances. Joint doctrine supports this conclusion, stating that “the joint force provides the security on which stability can be built” and that “the security of the indigenous population and institutions is central to the success of stabilization efforts.”¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ JP 3-07, 2016, p. III-4.

DoD Should Take the Lead in Building Partners' Security Capacity

This task should be reinstated in new DoD guidance. The task was included in the original DoD directive, 3000.05, issued in 2005.¹⁷⁷ In the 2009 DoDI 3000.05, this was eliminated as a core task. Building sustainable security capacity in indigenous forces is *the* critical stability task for the military, because it will guarantee the ultimate and lasting success of a stabilization endeavor. One senior Army leader, LTG H. R. McMaster, recently described this as the key factor in consolidating gains and achieving a sustainable political outcome: “It always has been military support to indigenous security forces who take on increasing responsibility, the development of security forces that are capable but also legitimate . . . [who are] trusted by the population.”¹⁷⁸

Building partner capacity serves to strengthen other indigenous actors' ability to carry out stabilization activities.¹⁷⁹ This is also the primary means by which the U.S. military can transition out of a country.¹⁸⁰ Finally, it is also a critical component of preventive stabilization efforts, because professional competent indigenous security forces can address brewing instability and provide space for the local government to address the root causes. Joint doctrine, which was updated in 2016, identifies building host-nation capacity as one of the four “fundamentals” of stabilization.¹⁸¹

Building partner security capacity comprises a number of activities, all of which take time. It often includes institutional development, rather than just development of tactical units. In recent years, the United States has developed a more holistic approach to security capacity development, including security sector reform and defense institution building with transitional security sector assistance.¹⁸² This latter program develops institutional capacity to build and maintain administrative and oversight functions—such as personnel management, financial management, logistics, and strategy development—which enable the effective generation, employment, and sustainment of security forces. During stabilization, DoD may at times need to work with indigenous security forces that are themselves a potential source of instability; in these

¹⁷⁷ DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005.

¹⁷⁸ Quoted in Patrick Tucker, “How McMaster Could Change the Way the US Goes to War,” *Defense One*, February 20, 2017.

¹⁷⁹ Jefferson P. Marquis, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Justin Beck, Derek Eaton, Scott Hiromoto, David R. Howell, Janet Lewis, Charlotte Lynch, Michael J. Neumann, and Cathryn Quantic Thurston, *Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-942-A, 2010.

¹⁸⁰ T. X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in Hooker and Collins, 2015.

¹⁸¹ JP 3-07, 2016, p. I-21.

¹⁸² JP 3-07, 2016, pp. II-3, III-6–III-8, C-1–C-23; DoD Directive 5205.82, *Defense Institution Building*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 27, 2016.

instances in particular, DoD support for institutional reform is a difficult but necessary part of stabilization.¹⁸³

This function can involve building host-nation security forces and institutions from scratch, as the United States and allies have done in Afghanistan since 2001. This is a very resource-intensive and difficult task, however, leading to a general preference to rely on existing security forces as much as possible. Other, smaller efforts have been successful with limited resources, such as the U.S.-supported effort in Liberia.¹⁸⁴ Another example includes assistance to the Salvadoran military (albeit an example that took more than a decade to bear fruit).¹⁸⁵

Scope and Refine Military Tasks in the Other Four Functions

The military should scope its efforts sharply in each of the remaining four stability tasks, to ensure (1) that it is trained and ready to perform specific tasks that it is ideally suited to do and (2) that its primary focus in each of these categories is supporting and enabling others, including U.S. agency actors, contractors, international actors, or host-nation actors who will perform the majority of the duties.

Reducing the array of tasks that the military is charged to perform in each of the four stability functions will allow it to focus on delivering higher-quality capability across a more limited range of functions. It will also reduce competition with civilian partners, allowing the military to focus more on a support role in those functions.

Military Support to Public Order

Policing, justice, and correctional-system activities are inherently civilian tasks that require civilian competence to perform and to teach. At times, if the scale of the effort is large or the environment too insecure, the joint force may be directed and authorized to build indigenous capacity for policing and possibly judiciary and correctional systems.

DoS plays an important role in the public-order stability function, particularly given the focus of INL on building the capacity of host-nation police, judiciary, and correctional institutions. The other important interagency contribution to the public-order and security functions are diplomatic efforts that create the initial conditions allowing for stabilization or that reinforce stabilization once under way. As noted, key U.S. allies also possess significant competence in the public-order realm and have supplied police and related capabilities in many recent operations.

The joint force may be called on to *provide* public order in hostile conditions, particularly where no competent indigenous police force exists. Under international law, the occupying force

¹⁸³ JP 3-07, 2016, pp. III-6, III-21, C-16.

¹⁸⁴ Sean McFate, "Lessons Learned from Liberia: Security Sector Reform in a Failed State," *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 153, No. 1, 2008.

¹⁸⁵ See Walter Ladwig, *The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017, Chapter Six.

is obligated to provide public order. If no multinational peacekeeping force or other entity is assigned this duty, the joint force will have to provide it. The MPs possess the most-specific doctrine and training for this duty, although they are principally trained for policing military installations.

In addition, the military may be directed to train public-order entities. In large-scale stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military did play roles in training or supporting indigenous capacity building in public order. Police training teams were deployed to train and mentor Iraqi police. This was not entirely successful, because the police were heavily infiltrated with politically motivated groups and militias. A particular example of this is the Ministry of Interior in Iraq for much of the period after 2003, when Shiite militia forces largely ran the ministry.¹⁸⁶ In other cases, the military may be directed to retrain or mentor existing forces rather than build them anew.¹⁸⁷

Some JAGs have received training in rule-of-law functions, and the DoD maintains the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies as a source of expertise. Large-scale U.S. military programs were implemented to improve both Iraqi and Afghan courts and jails.¹⁸⁸ Yet the joint force does not train large numbers of personnel in these functions. It would be most efficient to reframe this function to focus those appropriately trained JAGs on supporting the civilian U.S. and international rule-of-law programs.

Immediate Human Needs

The U.S. military's robust capabilities in transportation (lift), logistics (sustainment), and communications enable it to quickly provide basic assistance to meet immediate human needs at a large scale, in hostile environments, remote areas, or austere conditions. Because of this ability to move goods, the U.S. military may play a vital role in delivering food, water, and medical supplies. In addition, its expeditionary medical capability may be used to treat civilians on an emergency basis. Military construction capabilities can be employed to construct or repair shelters and infrastructure to deliver goods and basic services. Some civilian agencies, such as the World Food Program, also possess excellent logistics capabilities, and some interviewees noted that, in certain environments, the United Nations excels in transporting relief supplies over the "last mile," because of its familiarity with local distribution networks and lines of communication. Transportation supplied by the U.S. military can often be more expensive than are contracted alternatives.¹⁸⁹ NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières and CARE, also provide

¹⁸⁶ See Ned Parker, "Torture by Iraqi Militias: The Report Washington Did Not Want You to See," Reuters, December 14, 2015.

¹⁸⁷ JP 3-07, 2016, p. III-6.

¹⁸⁸ Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, undated.

¹⁸⁹ Interview 10.

medical care to civilian populations in conflict zones. However, in hostile or semipermissive environments, the U.S. military has an unparalleled ability to rapidly provide assistance to meet immediate needs, particularly on a large scale.

Support to Governance

DoD has no natural competence in the realm of civilian governance. Aspects of governance that are inherently civilian in nature include political development, rule of law, and provision of public services (such as education); these are more appropriately supported by U.S. civilian agencies or other nonmilitary actors.

DoD can provide security, logistics, and intelligence support to this set of activities. For example, through key leader engagements and intelligence collection and analysis, DoD may be able to inform civilian partners regarding those actors who may be engaged in violent or criminal activities and who appear to enjoy significant popular support or legitimacy among local populations. The civil reconnaissance and assessment activities of CA units can provide useful information. Governance programs themselves, however, should be undertaken by DCHA; the DoS bureaus that report to the Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights; and the regional bureaus within both DoS and USAID.

Active-duty CA personnel are generalists whose primary roles are to conduct assessments and create plans that reflect all the needed environmental factors and serve as advisers to ensure the needed civil-military coordination. Functional specialists reside in the reserve component. However, civilian expertise in U.S. law enforcement, courts, or municipal administration may not readily translate to foreign countries and cultures without additional training. The CA proponent is currently conducting a comprehensive effort to validate and record all duly qualified functional specialists.¹⁹⁰

The military must nevertheless have some ability to engage throughout the governance stability sector. As noted, the U.S. military has a legal obligation to provide governance when it is the occupying power. U.S. CA forces, by doctrine, are charged with the responsibility of supporting military governance in cases of U.S. military occupation. They are also charged with supporting civil administration and supporting the conduct of elections.¹⁹¹ Other support roles in governance may be providing protection, logistics, or lift to civilians engaged in governance tasks.

¹⁹⁰ Christopher Holshek, ed., *PKSOI Paper*, Vol. 3: *2016–2017 Civil Affairs Issue Papers: Leveraging Civil Affairs*, Carlisle, Pa.: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2017; and RAND interviews with senior CA officers.

¹⁹¹ “The law of war requires occupying powers to restore public order and safety while respecting, to the extent possible, the laws of the occupied country; and to establish a civil administration and to control or conduct governmental matters during and after hostilities.” JP 3-57, 2013, p. I-3.

DDR is a realm in which DoD may reach a division of labor with civilian entities, with the DoD role primarily involving technical and security-focused activities. DoD may not be the most appropriate actor to lead reintegration. The scope of DoD's role on disarming and demobilizing former belligerents depends on whether the key obstacle is a political one (i.e., convincing belligerents to lay down their weapons) or a technical one (i.e., actually collecting and potentially destroying the arms).

Specific DDR tasks necessarily flow from a political agreement that sets the basis for DDR programs. Although DoDI 3500.05 (2009) characterizes this as a "secondary" responsibility, DoD may be the only actor capable of reintegration in a combat or hostile environment when forces on the ground are transitioning from irregular status to formal actors under the host nation's ministry of defense. In other environments, civilian actors—including, ideally, the host-nation government—will take the lead in reintegration. Specific in-depth knowledge of the belligerent force and subsidiary factions, as well as decisions regarding the desired pathways for reintegration into the society, can critically affect the success rate of such programs. In the case of the Philippines, USAID supported reintegration programs designed by the Philippine government for the Mindanao region.

DoD has an enabling role to play in providing civilian agencies the security envelope, logistics, and intelligence support to carry out rehabilitation of former belligerents, as with other activities. However, beyond those functions, it is not clear whether DoD has a role to play in the rehabilitation of former belligerents. To the extent the objective is to reintegrate these belligerents into civilian life, U.S. civilian agencies and NGOs are more appropriate conduits for this programming, as has occurred through USAID in the southern Philippines, for example.

Support to Economic Stability

The appropriate role for DoD in economic stability also appears to be supporting the activities of other entities. In some specific areas, however, DoD brings unique capabilities because of its ability to operate in active conflict zones. DoD also has the ability to marshal large and technically proficient bodies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. But absent the condition of conflict or overwhelming scale, civilian agencies (and, in particular, the regional offices of USAID operating through essential-service contracts) possess this capability, as do foreign partners and multilateral organizations. USAID's essential-service contracting mechanism is designed for repair and rehabilitation. Moreover, it is often desirable for the host nation—or a U.S. civilian agency in partnership with a local subcontractor—to undertake restoration and provision of essential services. Indeed, it may be a decisive consideration when the provision of those services is also intended to be a job program for a labor force displaced by conflict.

The Army reorganized its engineers to stand up brigade engineering battalions, which has reduced the construction engineering capacity available to support the immediate needs and

economic stability functions. Combat engineering support remains available to conduct route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal and deal with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, whether in combat or in stabilization efforts to protect civilian populations. Yet this reorganization has resulted in the loss of many construction-focused engineering units, particularly in the Army active component, and has reduced engineering capacity to perform a vital array of infrastructure functions in support of stabilization. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and nonmilitary engineers also have specialized capabilities to perform many of these functions but will not be able to fully replace this lost capacity.¹⁹²

The primary role of the joint force in economic stabilization should be supporting civilian entities with secure basing, force protection, transportation, logistics, and information (including intelligence on threats to stability providers). Short-term cash-for-work programs may be administered by the joint force after major combat operations as a means to employ youth who might otherwise become combatants or insurgents; however, in general, even expedient and short-term economic measures can have myriad untoward second- and third-order effects. The civilian experts in stabilization are best positioned to assess what urgent needs must be met and how best to do so without jeopardizing the medium-term stabilization objectives, which center on political stability, and the long-term goals of development programs, which seek to raise the population's standard of living (a different goal from stabilization).

The trend within the stabilization community is toward restoring economic activity rather than engaging in massive projects to upgrade the level of activity. The implication for the revision of DoD policy on stabilization is that DoD should follow suit and separate economic stabilization from development functions.

Three Crosscutting Functions

Beyond the above contributions to the five stability functions, this report identifies three crosscutting functions as crucial to efforts in all five stability functions. These three functions are:

1. understanding the stabilization environment
2. civil-military planning and coordination
3. material support to civilian partners.

Understanding the Stabilization Environment

Understanding the stabilization environment is essential for all five stability functions to ensure that they effectively address drivers of instability and avoid unintended negative consequences. This function involves intelligence, information collection and analysis, and

¹⁹² U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2015; RAND interviews with senior U.S. engineering officers and subject-matter experts.

assessment capabilities. Key aspects of the stabilization environment include the root causes of conflict; the interests and capacity of potential partners; and the security, economic, and political conditions necessary to create sustainable stability. This function also includes anticipating the potential consequences of U.S. actions during stabilization.

The U.S. military has substantial capabilities to assist civilian entities in this task. It can supplement civilian entities' country-, region-, and population-focused research and analysis capabilities. To support civilian-led stabilization efforts, the military can and should devote some of its intelligence collection and analytic capability to a collective effort to map the sources of conflict and assess the impact of stabilization activities. The U.S. military will need to be directed and prepared to orient its capabilities to the stabilization effort, as needed: Governance, economics, and related considerations are included in the doctrinal function of understanding the operational environment, but, in most cases, the military will focus its collection and analysis on enemy forces, terrain, and other combat-related considerations, even during stability operations.¹⁹³ Although this may be appropriate in some cases, civilian agencies, as a rule, do not possess adequate or similar capabilities and may benefit from this assistance.¹⁹⁴

The U.S. military should also take into account stabilization requirements when planning and conducting its own operations. Major combat, counterterrorism, and other operations will have an impact on subsequent stabilization efforts. Joint doctrine recognizes that taking stability considerations into account during the planning and execution of other operations “may be a critical element of success.”¹⁹⁵ The importance of this is particularly evident in the wake of the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where U.S. forces found themselves lacking the requisite understanding to effectively engage in stabilization when they were directed to do so following combat operations.¹⁹⁶

Civil-Military Planning and Coordination

The importance of civil-military planning and coordination is recognized in current doctrine, as well as by DoDI 3000.05, which declares that “integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations.”¹⁹⁷ However, several official assessments have concluded that inadequate coordination mechanisms for planning and

¹⁹³ Doctrinal responsibilities are in JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, pp. III-8–III-10. On the tendency to focus on military targets, see Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, 2010.

¹⁹⁴ See, for example, the discussion of U.S. Marine Corps efforts to collect noncombat intelligence in Iraq in Austin Long, *The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Culture in the US and UK*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2016, Chapter Nine.

¹⁹⁵ JP 3-07, 2016, p. V-6.

¹⁹⁶ Robinson et al., 2014, p. 60.

¹⁹⁷ JP 3-07, 2016, pp. I-19, II-1; DoDI 3000.05, 2009, p. 2.

executing activities have been developed. A forcing function is required to ensure the needed planning and coordination does in fact occur.

Stabilization, more than almost any other mission that involves the military, inherently requires close planning and coordination with U.S. civilian agencies, particularly DoS and USAID. The need to integrate DoD and civilian interagency efforts is true in all stability functions, even when DoD carries out stability tasks that are clearly military in nature.

Civil-military planning and coordination should occur across all stability functions but can vary in extent. Where DoD is in charge of implementation, such as in the security arena, integration may occur mostly at the higher levels of planning, management, and oversight.¹⁹⁸ Activities in other stability functions often involve close integration at all levels, including during implementation, and may require the formation of either formal or ad hoc civil-military teams. At other times, the military may be called on to simply provide security, intelligence, transportation, housing, or other support to purely civilian stabilization efforts, particularly in the governance and economic stability functions.

Civil-military coordination can be enhanced by standing mechanisms at all echelons, from the national to the tactical, which include deployed civil-military teams, liaison cells, and interagency working groups. Civil-military coordination can also involve interagency training, personnel exchanges, and integrated planning and assessment processes. More generally, leadership and education can emphasize adopting a default orientation toward knowledge sharing, close communication, and collaborative decisionmaking.¹⁹⁹

Material Support to Civilian Partners

The military possesses more capability to provide material support, including logistics, lift, and force protection, than does any other entity. As several civilian experts interviewed noted, the most-valuable support roles that the U.S. military can play, in addition to providing security and building indigenous security capacity, are providing very specific support to civilians to enable them to conduct the vital nonmilitary roles that they are trained to undertake. This type of concrete support includes the provision of secure basing, force protection, transportation, and resupply.

Enacting a Civilian-Led Stabilization Model

To some degree, doctrine and policy have articulated the model of civilian-led stabilization outlined here. However, it has not been implemented consistently, and it has not been applied in large-scale stabilization efforts until the recent counter-Islamic State efforts in Iraq and Syria.

¹⁹⁸ For example, although DoD may be in charge of implementing security sector assistance to a host-nation military, presidential guidance still holds that DoS has lead responsibility for “policy, supervision, and general management” of these efforts. DoS, “Plans and Policy Division,” undated-b.

¹⁹⁹ JP 3-07, 2016, p. I-19.

The cases in which it has been more commonly implemented are small-scale nonwar settings in Central America, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Libya, the Philippines, Syria, Somalia, and elsewhere.²⁰⁰ Embracing this shift as the standard DoD practice for stabilization throughout the conflict spectrum would entail the following principal features:


- Recognize that the legitimacy of a government is the principal determinant of stability, which makes stabilization an inherently political activity. Thus, civilian entities would be the appropriate implementers of an approach geared toward identifying and supporting legitimate governing structures. DoD would integrate its stabilization efforts with those of interagency actors.
- The U.S. government, including DoD, will work by, with, and through international, nongovernmental, and (especially) indigenous partners during stabilization efforts, to the maximum degree possible. This will usually involve a heavy focus on building the capacity of indigenous actors, given their ultimate responsibility for guaranteeing future stability.
- DoD will sometimes engage in stabilization more directly. In these cases, DoD will be responsible for only those stabilization activities to which it brings unique capabilities and capacity. This usually includes security, often includes public order, and only sometimes includes activities in other functions. DoD will nevertheless need to support—or, at a minimum, actively avoid causing harm to—the stabilization activities of interagency and other actors in all stability functions.
- U.S. stabilization efforts should have modest, rather than expansive, goals. Stabilization efforts in all functions should adopt the limited goal of reducing instability to “tolerable levels that can be addressed by indigenous forces [and institutions] and allow normal patterns of life to resume.”²⁰¹ What is considered “tolerable levels” and “normal patterns of life” will depend on local context and will generally be very modest, given that the countries most likely to experience instability are often both poor and poorly governed even when stable. More-expansive goals of long-term economic or political development should be undertaken as subsequent objectives once stabilization objectives are met.

Figure 5.1 graphically depicts the model proposed for implementation in this report. It entails a leading role for DoD in the security function and supporting roles in the other stability functions. It also proposes formal articulation of the three crosscutting functions as required for DoD in stabilization.

²⁰⁰ Barbara Salazar Torreon, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2017*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 12, 2017, pp. 24–38.

²⁰¹ This phrasing is already contained in joint doctrine, although it is only explicitly applied there to the security function. See JP 3-07, 2016, p. III-4.

Figure 5.1. Proposed DoD Roles in Stabilization



RAND RR2441-5.1

6. Gaps in DoD Capacity and Capability

This chapter identifies the ramifications of a smaller joint force and specific units or specialties that may possess insufficient capacity or capability to perform the roles envisioned in the stabilization model set out in the previous chapter. More-detailed quantitative analysis and modeling are needed to determine the precise force levels required to implement this approach. The evidence examined here suggests that key enabler shortfalls exist.

Recent reductions and reorganization in key enablers of stabilization mean that the U.S. military may experience difficulty in conducting discrete, critical stabilization tasks. As a senior military engineer stated to the research team, “We have limited capacity in the active component to conduct stability operations.” A senior CA officer characterized the available capacity for public-order tasks as “onesies and twosies. . . . We are not conducting these tasks at the same proficiency as combat operations.” And the movement of MPs into the reserve component has restricted their availability for sustained stabilization activities. Some services have entirely eliminated key enablers—for example, the Navy’s CA personnel. Reorganization of the Army’s engineers reduced the number of active-duty construction engineer brigades.

In general, two broad options exist to improve the U.S. military’s ability to perform stabilization activities. The first option would be to increase and reinstate the previous emphasis on stabilization training and readiness for large-scale stabilization activities. The second option is to adopt a more scoped approach, as argued for here, to focus on a trained, ready, and more developed capability to perform the security function (providing security and building the security capacity of other countries) and on specific supporting functions and specialized stability capabilities in certain units.

Joint Force Capacity

The question of whether the joint force has sufficient *capacity* to perform stabilization efforts depends on the number, scale, and duration of stabilization missions to be undertaken at any one time—which is also a function of the number of other missions that the force is simultaneously tasked to perform. The availability of forces for stabilization, especially large-scale security missions, could be significantly limited. Providing stability is a labor-intensive endeavor. Binnendijk and Johnson provided useful notional sizing scenarios, which range from 5,000 to 60,000 per contingency, and multiple contingencies might occur at one time.²⁰² As another point of reference, in a very violent environment, the manpower requirements may be much higher; at the peak of U.S. involvement in Iraq, 170,000 troops and 174,000 DoD contractors were

²⁰² Binnendijk and Johnson, 2004, p. 47.

deployed.²⁰³ Building a new security force from the ground up, as the United States chose to do in Iraq, creates a longer-term demand for external stabilization forces.

As the previous chapter described in detail, the overall manning of the U.S. military has contracted since DoDI 3000.05 was issued in 2009. This contraction potentially limits the ability of the U.S. military to conduct large-scale stabilization missions, assuming that it must also conduct multiple other missions simultaneously and maintain sufficient dwell time to rest and refit forces. Given these multiple missions, it is highly unlikely that the current active-duty Army of 476,000 could spare the forces necessary for a stabilization force of 250,000, as originally estimated to be needed in Iraq in 2003. Even with full mobilization of the National Guard and Army Reserve, which could be politically difficult, sustaining a stabilization force of this size would be challenging.

In addition, the current ability of the joint force to perform security stabilization functions is lower than in previous years. This report documents a decided shift in U.S. military training away from stabilization and wide-area security to emphasize combined arms maneuver and other capabilities to deter and fight near-peer adversaries.

As the 2016 National Commission on the Future of the Army noted, “[U]nder current strategic guidance, the Army and other Defense components are directed not to size themselves for large-scale, long-duration stability operations. The Commission concluded that the Army has complied with this guidance. Using directed planning assumptions and with its planned fiscal year 2017 force, the Army is, in fact, neither sized nor shaped for conducting any kind of large-scale, long duration mission at acceptable risk.” The commission, in examining the future of the Army, clearly viewed even smaller-scale stabilization operations as a distant second to more-conventional warfighting challenges.²⁰⁴ The same seems to be broadly true of the other services.

Key Enabler Capacity or Capability Gaps

Recent force structure changes and personnel cuts have reduced the capacity of MP, engineer, and CA forces to serve as key enablers of U.S. stabilization efforts. This is particularly true in the active-duty Army, where the number of MPs has fallen by 26 percent, where the number of construction-focused engineer companies has fallen by a third, and where one of two CA brigades is set to deactivate. These enablers are critical to meeting DoD requirements to support a wide range of ongoing and potential stabilization efforts, including in capacity building, conflict prevention, and support to interagency-led missions.

The following broad conclusions require detailed quantitative analysis based on comprehensive, current data. The short timeline of this study prohibited reaching definitive

²⁰³ SIGIR, 2013.

²⁰⁴ National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States, January 28, 2016*, Arlington, Va., January 28, 2016 (quotation on p. 52).

judgments, but the data collected and analyzed suggest that some distinct shortfalls exist in capacity or, potentially, the ability to readily access the capacity in the reserve component.

Despite the fact that this report endorses a civilian-led approach to stabilization, key military capabilities enable that civilian effort and play critical roles in that support mode, as well as in the less frequent cases in which DoD may be expected to play a robust role in activities outside the security function. CA, in particular, is a critical capability for conducting assessments and civil-military planning and coordination, in civilian-led and DoD-led stabilization in both preconflict and postconflict environments.

CA

An analysis of the U.S. government conducted by the Center for Army Analysis showed that the CA force structure was insufficient to meet the planned demand. This lack of capacity was compounded by a subsequent decision to reduce the 85th Brigade to a company-size formation. The Navy eliminated its CA units entirely. These reductions exacerbate organizational issues that complicate the ability of this critical enabler to perform stabilization activities in optimal fashion.²⁰⁵

Army CA forces are organized in three distinct elements. The largest element, the 95th Brigade, is devoted to supporting special operations missions. These can include stabilization activities, as occurred in 2009–2012 in Afghanistan, when special operations forces conducted village stability operations on a nationwide basis. At present, however, most of the 95th Brigade capacity is absorbed in supporting critical preconflict stabilization activities, primarily through deployments to embassies as civil-military support elements. The 85th Brigade reduction deprived the Army of a regionally aligned CA element devoted to supporting the general-purpose forces. Finally, the reserve CA component suffers from significant shortfalls in providing the functional specialties that are specifically needed for stabilization.

Given the range of critical stabilization missions that CA forces perform, an increase in capacity and a rationalization of their organizational structure (such as regenerating a brigade for general-purpose force support) is desirable to provide the niche capabilities that the U.S. military should offer. Active-duty CA units assigned to support the conventional forces have been greatly reduced and should be rebuilt, because these are the primary units tasked with general stabilization-related duties. They are vital to civil-military coordination, civil-military operations, and assessments of conditions and populations.

Given their vital assessment, advisory, planning, and coordination roles, the rebuilding of CA capacity appears more than warranted, although a full assessment of the appropriate level of CA capacity is beyond the scope of this report. In addition, a focus on improved capability and understanding of how they are to be employed is imperative. U.S. Special Operations Command

²⁰⁵ Holshek, 2017.

has, according to one interviewee, provided insufficient funding to create a fully updated and operable civil information management system and database. Effective stabilization relies critically on deep, timely, and high-quality information that is readily accessible to all stakeholders.

The reserve component CA is the sole repository of functional specialties, and the validation and training of these forces should be expedited. Reserve-component CA forces should receive the needed attention to complete the creation of small but competent functional specialties. In addition, a more robust qualification regimen is required for reserve CA.

MPs

MPs, by doctrine, play a key role in providing public order and building capacity for public order. Our brief survey suggested that the number of MPs may be insufficient and that, more obviously, the accessibility of MPs may be limited by their removal from BCTs and their migration to the reserve component. For example, the Army's self-assessment of its stability operations capabilities noted that key elements of those capabilities for executing public-order tasks of civil security and, especially, civil control were insufficient as of 2011. To remedy these shortfalls, the assessment recommended that the Army

Improve mechanisms for managing transition for Civil Security and Civil Control from DOD to other USG [U.S. government] and partner nation organizations. Continue to [seek] increases in active duty military police, civil affairs and ordnance. Improve access to the RC [reserve component] for Stability Operations. Continue to integrate Rule of Law training throughout Professional Military Education (PME). Incorporate training with other USG agencies.²⁰⁶

Construction Engineers

Engineers perform construction roles, outside the combat engineering tasks, that vitally support the provision of immediate needs, repair of infrastructure, and support of civilian-led stabilization more generally. A recent Army report noted:

Much of the Army's capability to restore or provide essential services is found in the Reserve Component (RC), limiting flexibility. While the Army has the capability to support partner nations in restoring essential services, its ability to provide essential services is limited to small scale, short term efforts. The Army is neither manned nor equipped to provide large scale, long term essential services without assistance from the JIIM [joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational] community and host nation support. . . . The Army possesses limited capacity to conduct direct, large scale repair of critical infrastructure

²⁰⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, G-35, DAMO-SSO, *Army Stability Operations Self Assessment: Report on Implementation of DoDI 3000.05*, Washington, D.C., March 2011, p. 6.

within a host country and must work with JIIM partners, private industry and the host nation to accomplish this task.²⁰⁷

The Army report noted other shortfalls in engineering capacity to provide or restore essential services and repair critical infrastructure. The reduction in this active-duty capacity should be reversed to some degree, based on further analysis, and the appropriate balance between active and reserve engineering capacity evaluated.

SFABs

Given the importance this analysis places on the building of security and public-order capacity, the current capacity and capability of the joint force to train, advise, and assist indigenous forces, including as part of stabilization efforts, appears to be inadequate. In February 2017, the Army announced a plan to develop SFABs specifically tailored to this mission. The first of six planned units and the new Military Advisor Training Academy have been established. Previous Army efforts to provide this capability were ad hoc elements, such as military transition teams in Iraq or advisory teams carved out of full brigades (security force advisory and assistance teams in Afghanistan). Although the initiative fills a documented gap, the pace of the units' creation is slow. The Army currently aims to produce one active-duty brigade in FY 2018 and one National Guard brigade the following year.

The SFAB unit has a force of 500 officers and senior noncommissioned officers, in recognition of the maturity and skills needed to perform this function. To incentivize personnel to join the SFABs, the Army has offered a \$5,000 enlistment bonus. However, to be successful, service in these units must receive equal consideration for promotion and other career opportunities.

The Ability to Regenerate or Expand

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review called for DoD to maintain expertise in stabilization and the ability to regenerate capability:

Although our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations, we will preserve the expertise gained during the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will also protect the ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands.²⁰⁸

Historically, the U.S. military has demonstrated the ability to generate and mobilize forces in emergencies. The U.S. military has developed the capabilities needed to conduct large-scale stabilization *after* major combat operations. In the most recent wars, it did so at first

²⁰⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-35, DAMO-SSO, 2011, pp. 6–7.

²⁰⁸ DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, D.C., 2014, p. vii.

provisionally in OIF and eventually on a larger scale, producing and providing predeployment training to military and police transition teams and PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan. During World War II, the U.S. Army undertook even more-extensive and more-systematic efforts to organize, train, educate, and field stabilization forces to conduct both civil administration and civil policing.²⁰⁹ It is an open question whether maintaining more of these structures and capabilities might have resulted in better, faster, or more-lasting results.

As our analysis has shown, U.S. military capability and capacity for stabilization have generally fallen since 2009. Overall training and force structure have reoriented away from a focus on stability operations to high-end combat. Manpower of key enablers, such as CA, engineers, and MPs, is currently in decline. Fewer officers and enlisted personnel are engaged in stabilization now than in the past, and many of those who did gain hard-won experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have since left the force. These trends appear likely to continue. Yet DoD still faces requirements to engage in stabilization, and these requirements may even increase. Given current and future gaps between DoD stabilization capabilities and requirements, it is useful to understand what expanding or regenerating needed stabilization capabilities might take.

Increasing DoD capability and capacity to conduct stabilization would require money, time, and a foundation to build on. Although the U.S. military can develop some capabilities and capacity on the fly, the record suggests that maintaining some capabilities in at least limited numbers in the active force will enable these forces to perform much more proficiently and to serve as trainers if a larger cadre is needed.²¹⁰ It is easier to recruit and train new personnel to fill junior ranks than it is to generate more-experienced officers; this suggests that it may be useful to retain a slightly top-heavy rank structure among units that may be needed more to meet future requirements than to fulfill current missions. The proposed SFABs follow this model—they have the same top-heavy force structure that allows experienced personnel to support partner capacity building.²¹¹

The lead time for regenerating the key enabling capabilities of CA, engineers, and MPs is measured in years. Given the need for these enablers across the range of expected stabilization tasks, this report recommends that they be regenerated now, subject to further detailed analysis.

Maintaining expertise in the joint force will require more stabilization content in core educational curricula and preservation of relevant centers of excellence at professional military educational institutions. Maintaining a foundation to expand from requires retaining experienced personnel, incentivizing service in fields that might appear less relevant to current priorities,

²⁰⁹ Kendall Gott, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946–1953*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, 2005.

²¹⁰ For a discussion of many of the issues surrounding regeneration and expansion of stabilization-relevant capabilities, see Stephen Watts, J. Michael Polich, and Derek Eaton, “Rapid Regeneration of Irregular Warfare Capacity,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 78, July 2015.

²¹¹ Judson, 2016.

seeking out opportunities for employment, and maintaining a focus on increasing proficiency in the absence of capacity gains.

This is particularly a concern in the less frequently exercised stability functions of public order, governance, and economic stability. In these cases, having robust systems to retain lessons learned, educational curricula, training courses, doctrine, and standard operating procedures is key. Tracking language, cultural, and functional skills throughout the DoD and military workforce is also important for monitoring capability gaps and effectively employing personnel to meet current and emerging stabilization requirements. Recruiting a broad range of civilian expertise into the reserve component can be another relatively cost-effective way to maintain standing specialized capabilities for stabilization; the United Kingdom has implemented this practice, as noted in Appendix B.

7. Conclusion: Risks, Mitigations, and Recommendations

This chapter identifies risks, mitigations, and recommendations for adopting a revised approach to DoD roles in stabilization. The research team identified risks that may result from adopting the model of stabilization endorsed here, as well as possible ways to address those risks. We drew on our interviews with experts and veteran practitioners, the extensive historical and lessons-learned literature, and two workshops organized by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These risks are identified from various sources, including recent reductions in capacity or capability; continuing inadequate coordination mechanisms; lack of detailed plans; and lack of authorizations for the needed personnel, funding, or permissions.

One primary risk in more narrowly scoping the military's role in stabilization is that the joint force will interpret this as further indication of the low priority placed on stability functions and stabilization as a mission for which it bears partial but critical responsibilities. That would gravely imperil DoD's ability to perform its vital roles and take the necessary steps to be trained, equipped, and ready to do so. The report urges military plans to make it clear that U.S. military forces do play a continuing role in ensuring successful stabilization. Substantial stabilization activities may be inferred from the national guidance, such as the National Military Strategy, even if they are not explicit tasks in formal theater or contingency plans. Current theater campaign plans and the five priority challenges contain numerous implied stabilization tasks. These should be made explicit.

Another risk of a more sharply scoped U.S. military role is that it places a greater burden on other actors to provide the nonmilitary stabilization effects needed. A related risk is that any revision in policy will be inadequately communicated and implemented, thus increasing the risk that civilian interagency and international partners are unaware of the more-scoped efforts and the increased emphasis on supporting those civilian entities. DoD will need to communicate changes, such as the reduced list of required military tasks suggested in this report, to its interagency and international partners. Partners need to know what the United States regards as core military tasks and what tasks it will not be attempting to undertake as a routine matter, given its understanding that civilian actors possess the greatest competence in these nonmilitary tasks. The joint force must also make a concerted effort to be prepared to perform an array of supporting tasks and to improve its ability to synchronize with civilian interagency and international actors to assess, plan, and operate together effectively. Finally, concerted efforts will be necessary to educate the joint force on the new approach to stabilization that relies on facilitating local efforts, capacity building, and organic stabilizing forces (such as local market mechanisms), rather than large-scale endeavors and approaches based on rapid and large-scale spending.

Risks and Possible Mitigations

The following list of ten additional risks and possible mitigations is primarily based on our synthesis of interviews. The timeline and scope of the study did not permit the team to validate the risks or comprehensively evaluate all possible remedies to the identified shortfalls in the preceding chapters. More-extensive study would be desirable to quantify and validate the identified shortfalls and conduct a comparative assessment of possible mitigations.

Risk 1: Insufficient key enabling capacity to meet current or projected need on a flexible and sustainable basis.

Possible mitigation: Rebuild more active-duty CA and combat engineering units (the latter as independently deployable units rather than dual-hatted as special troop battalions in BCTs).

Responsible party: Services, particularly the Army.

Risk 2: Insufficient active-component capability to conduct current or projected need.

Possible mitigation: Devise more-flexible means for accessing functional specialists and other needed enablers in the reserve component. Greater reliance on the reserve component will require congressional and funding adjustments, if further study indicates the viability of this option.

Responsible party: DoD, services, Congress.

Risk 3: Maneuver units lack sufficient time for training on or executing stabilization tasks.

Possible mitigations: Increase stabilization content in required (versus elective) professional military education. Maintain funding and manning for centers and platforms for collecting and sharing information and processing lessons from recent experience (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, National Defense University Center for Complex Operations, Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System).

Responsible parties: Joint Staff J-7 (Joint Force Development), services.

Risk 4: The next generation of senior military leadership does not possess direct experience leading or integrating with others' stabilization efforts.²¹²

Possible mitigation: Require rising officers (those on track for general officer) to seek a one-year tour with a civilian interagency, international, or nongovernmental organization to gain insight into and experience with collaboration and coordination in assessing, planning, and implementing complex noncombat missions.

Responsible parties: DoD (to establish policy), J-1 (to expand definition of joint credit), services (to execute and incentivize).

²¹² Interview 28.

Risk 5: Existing policy decision process and planning and coordination mechanisms do not provide sufficient guidance for determining priority stabilization missions, designated roles, and coordinated effort.

Possible mitigations: Expand purview and duties of the National Security Council's (NSC's) Fragile States Interagency Policy Committee/Policy Coordinating Committee, including the prioritization of stabilization missions and assignment of responsibility. A presidential directive may establish standing lead roles for DoS (policy planning) and USAID (implementation).

Responsible party: NSC.

Risk 6: DoD is not prepared to support civilian interagency and international requests to support stabilization activities, possibly because the standing plan's required Annex V is not complete or up-to-date for a given country or region when the need for stabilization activities arises.

Possible mitigations: Establish a standing interagency "tiger team" with responsibility for (1) harmonizing and synchronizing DoS, USAID, and DoD plans and (2) identifying civilian interagency and international anticipated or actual requirements for DoD support, including security, transportation, logistics, and information.

Responsible parties: NSC, DoS, USAID, DoD, geographic combatant commands.

Risk 7: Civilian or military experts are not readily available to support mixed teams assigned to assess, plan, and conduct stabilization activities.

Possible mitigation: A standing executive secretary order should be approved to cover the seconding (detailing) of individual military or civilian personnel to civilian-military teams that will often be needed for steady-state or small-scale stabilization activities. Large-scale stabilization efforts may require the revival of a large-scale PRT-type program for which recruitment and training are needed. The OIF model of civilian-led PRTs should be the norm to ensure that civilian stabilization expertise in the overwhelmingly nonmilitary tasks is prioritized.

Responsible parties: DoD, DoS.

Risk 8: A chronic gap in stabilization is the development of indigenous law enforcement capability. Unless explicitly authorized by Congress, the U.S. military is barred by law from training, advising, and assisting partner-nation law enforcement and other internal security forces and institutions.²¹³ In the past 15 years, contingency funding has permitted the U.S. military to do so on a case-by-case basis, but this remains a gap in U.S. capabilities. The military skill set is

²¹³ U.S. Code, Title 22, Section 2420, Police Training Prohibition, January 7, 2011.

more suited to development of paramilitary police than constabulary police, who conduct community policing.

Possible mitigations: Negotiate memoranda of understanding and conduct routine exercises for incorporating allies' police training capacity into coalition stabilization activities. This would include, for example, the national police forces of Australia and Italy and the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers. Provide funding, logistic, or other support to enhance the DoS INL and the DoS Bureau for Political Military Affairs' Global Peace Operations Initiative police programs.

Responsible party: DoD.

Risk 9: Other urgent stabilization tasks might not be undertaken because of lack of appropriate authorities or funding for the relevant agency or entity executing the activities.

Possible mitigation: Expansion of existing authorities, such as Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid funds or Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity (Section 333 of the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act), to permit a wider array of contingency funding, with appropriate reporting requirements, may receive greater support in Congress than earlier proposals for transfer authority or new legislative proposals.²¹⁴

Responsible parties: DoD, Office of Management and Budget, Congress.

Risk 10: Further funding cuts, force development, and policy decisions will reduce available capacity and capability to levels insufficient to meet stabilization demands.

Possible mitigations: Re-create a deployable civilian expeditionary force, such as the Civilian Response Corps; support the creation of regional stabilization forces formed by regional multilateral organizations; and support the expansion of United Nations peacekeeping forces' mandates and capabilities, including stabilization activities.

Responsible parties: DoS, DoD.

The principal findings of this study are that the U.S. military continues to possess the capability to conduct stability functions, albeit with reduced capacity, particularly in some critical specialties. The U.S. government's highest-level policy documents still articulate the importance of addressing sources of instability, but the U.S. military has turned its focus to fighting and winning the nation's wars as its primary task. Current DoD guidance and practice emphasize readiness for combat operations, including against near-peer competitors, leading to a concomitant reduction in focus on the critical postcombat stabilization tasks. The absence of specified stabilization tasks in military plans and the redirection of funds and training priorities

²¹⁴ Public Law 114-328, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Sec. 333, Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity, December 23, 2016.

away from stabilization hamper the ability of the joint force to prepare for stability activities and increase the risk of mission failure and potentially costly consequences.

Recommendations

This report makes the following specific recommendations regarding the content and prioritization of new guidance, noting that these recommendations require further study to refine the additional needed investments, policy, procedural, organizational, and legislative changes. The recommendations, in summary form, are

1. DoD should prioritize the provision of security and building security capacity to transition successfully to host-nation providers. This entails ensuring that the military is fully capable of performing all security-related stability functions required by the new joint doctrine on stability, including remedying specific gaps identified here and in official assessments.
2. DoD should scope the specific tasks and capabilities required for each of the four remaining joint stability functions so the joint force can perform those specific tasks at a high level in all needed environments, scales, and durations.
3. The U.S. military should, as a general rule, reorient to perform more supporting functions to civilian interagency and international stability providers, rather than seek to compete with them by providing duplicative capabilities.
4. DoD should improve coordination mechanisms to realize the much-touted and little-achieved unity of effort among military and civilian partners. The gaps have been repeatedly identified by numerous official assessments, but progress in eliminating friction and increasing synergy should continue.
5. A new model for stabilization should be refined and adopted to incorporate the insights that the civilian partners recommend as central to achieving lasting stability. Operating by, with, and through indigenous actors is the soundest method to ensure appropriate and lasting stabilization. This includes reinstating building partner capacity as a key focus of stabilization efforts in future DoD policy. Spend less, build less, and focus on political methods and goals: Those are the watchwords of this approach.
6. The force reductions and organization of key enablers—CA, MPs, and engineers—merit review and possible revision. Security force assistance capability creation should be accelerated. CA and engineering are two military capabilities that may need to be rebuilt to adequately perform joint stability functions specified in doctrine and to achieve the necessary civil-military coordination. CA as a specialty should be rationalized and upgraded with additional attention and resources, as well as expanded. Army engineering units focused on construction should be retained at their current numbers and potentially expanded, particularly in the active component.

Conclusion

The current turbulence in the world confronts the United States with multiple challenges at a time when government resources are limited. The temptation may exist to ignore stabilization requirements as a dispensable luxury, but such an attitude misreads the costly lessons of recent

U.S. history. Indeed, many studies point the way to a more economical and effective approach to stabilization. There is little doubt that near-peer, emerging, and irregular threats require responses that will likely include some degree of stabilization activities—and some demand on the U.S. military to perform them. This report puts forward a coherent approach to performing stabilization with a smaller joint force in support of a more coordinated interagency and international partnership. The U.S. military need not do it all, but it should not opt out. Fighting and winning the nation's wars must necessarily include winning the peace. Embracing this imperative provides the best assurance of achieving lasting, strategic success.

Appendix A. Interagency Considerations for DoD Stabilization Requirements

As DoD revises its instructions on the stabilization activities that the department will be responsible for, it is useful for DoD to consider how these missions overlap or are complementary with the activities of DoD's interagency partners. The benefit is twofold. First, where DoD has the lead in a stabilization task, the exact scope of DoD's activities and the proficiency at which they will prepare to execute those activities should be informed by how interagency partners are contributing to the mission. Second, where DoD has a secondary responsibility as an enabler of stabilization activities, interagency input into how DoD could best support civilian-led missions can lead to more-effective delivery of DoD support in these areas.


As illustrative examples, one of DoD's stabilization responsibilities is to repair critical infrastructure in support of the immediate needs and economic stability functions. So an understanding of other agencies—in particular, USAID's capabilities in this area—should inform how DoD defines this requirement and what level of proficiency DoD maintains to execute it. A secondary DoD responsibility identified in DoDI 3000.05 (2009) and in current doctrine is strengthening governance. So a clear understanding of what support civilian agencies need is critical to DoD playing an effective enabler role.

DoD's Interagency Partners on Stabilization Activities: DoS

Many U.S. government agencies contribute niche capabilities to stabilization activities, including the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Treasury, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, but for reasons of time and scope, our review focused on DoD's two main interagency partners for stabilization: DoS and USAID. These are the agencies that, along with DoD, have the greatest capability, capacity, and remit for the five U.S. government stability sectors.

Like DoD, DoS stabilization capabilities do not reside in a single entity within the department. The bureau with the most direct connection to the mission is CSO, formerly known as S/CRS. The office previously reported directly to the Secretary of State, whereas it now sits under the Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, who oversees several other bureaus that contribute to stabilization activities, including INL; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); and the Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Bureau. See Figure A.1.

Figure A.1. DoS Bureaus with Significant Roles in Stabilization Activities



SOURCE: DoS, "Department of State Organization Chart: November 2016," webpage, November 2016b.

RAND RR2441-A.1

The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review established CSO as a full bureau—as opposed to an office—and endowed it with the remit of operating as “[t]he new institutional locus for policy and operational solutions for crisis, conflict, and instability. . . . As the Secretary’s senior adviser on conflict and instability, the Assistant Secretary of CSO will coordinate early efforts at conflict prevention and rapid deployment of civilian responders as crises unfold.”²¹⁵ Although this review specified that CSO should lead stability operations in the department, that vision has not been fully realized. Since the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review was drafted, CSO has seen reductions in both personnel and budget, and the bureau has moved away from operations to focus on analysis and planning.²¹⁶ The implication for DoD is that CSO is an appropriate node for planning stabilization activities, but the manpower and resources for implementing programs rest elsewhere in DoS and USAID.

The bureaus with greater programming capacity are CSO’s sister functional bureaus, such as INL, which commands a budget in excess of a billion dollars.²¹⁷ As a point of comparison, CSO commands a budget in the low tens of millions of dollars. However, although INL has greater resources and overall capacity, only a small portion of INL’s activities is stabilization-specific.²¹⁸ Thus, INL has the capacity to support the development of a criminal justice system in foreign countries—including those emerging from conflict—but its rule-of-law programming is not specific to postconflict cases. The same general rule applies to INL’s sister bureau, DRL, which, although smaller than INL in terms of personnel and resources, exceeds CSO’s programming capabilities. But, like INL, DRL’s programming is not specific to stabilization cases.

Both DoS and USAID can carry out preventive activities that decrease the demand for stabilization activities or improve the resilience of societies so that they bounce back from conflict more quickly. A current interagency point of focus is what can be done preventively to combat violent extremism, which CSO is pushing forward within DoS, with an early emphasis on East Africa.²¹⁹ USAID/OTI also does preventive programming under the rationale that avoiding conflict is a less costly means of addressing it than postoccurrence interventions are.

As for PRM, it is the designated DoS lead in providing humanitarian assistance to refugees—rather than internally displaced persons (IDPs)—although PRM does provide assistance to IDPs

²¹⁵ DoS and USAID, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, Washington, D.C., 2010, pp. 135–136.

²¹⁶ In FY 2012, CSO received nearly 84 million in funds through a direct account, Overseas Contingency Operation, Section 1207, and 451 Authority. This excludes a further \$22 million in carryover. In FY 2016, CSO received \$13 million in funding between its direct account and overseas response fund. Data on FY 2012 are reported by DoS, Office of the Inspector General, *Inspection of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations*, Washington, D.C., March 2014, p. 16. Personnel reductions were noted in an interview with a former DoS official, conducted October 1, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²¹⁷ In FY 2015, INL’s budget was \$1.29 billion. DoS, *Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2017*, Washington, D.C., February 9, 2016a.

²¹⁸ Interview with INL official, October 7, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²¹⁹ Interview with DoS officials, October 7, 2016.

in coordination with USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, when the source of the crisis is man-made as opposed to a natural disaster.²²⁰ PRM is staffed by more than 100 civil service and foreign service officers; however, the bureau's capabilities should not be reduced to that metric.²²¹ This is because PRM is not a direct provider of assistance; rather, the bureau works through other organizations to provide support to refugees and IDPs displaced by conflict. In particular, PRM works through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and a variety of NGOs operating in this space.

In addition to functional bureaus, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) warrants specific mention as a regional bureau that is a crucial interagency partner on stabilization. The reasons are several. First, NEA effectively controls DoS access to many of the candidate countries for stabilization activities, including Libya, Syria, and Yemen. This remains true even in instances in which embassies are closed or evacuated, as is the case for all three of the aforementioned cases. Second, NEA has traditionally had more resources and discretion than other regional bureaus had to undertake programming. And, third, NEA has a specific office, NEA Assistance Coordination, which operates as the main player within DoS for providing stabilization assistance to "liberated areas" in Western Syria.²²² Much of this programming is focused on using service provision to build the legitimacy of local councils.

Operating in a similar bureaucratic space to DoS's regional bureaus are the various special envoy offices created by the department for priority crises. These include the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Special Envoy for Syria, the Special Envoy for Libya, and the Special Envoy for the Counter-ISIL campaign, among others. The logic is to empower a single point person who has a direct line of communication to the secretary and can focus on a specific case, while the assistant secretary of the regional bureau, such as NEA or South and Central Asia, manages the broader regional portfolio, which may include several crises at any one time.

Finally, the Bureau for Political Military Affairs should be flagged, given the focus in current stabilization cases on explosive remnants of war, which is a particular concern in Syria and Iraq, and unexploded ordnance, which is a major issue in Yemen. This bureau has unique authorities in this area, and it has a specific office, Weapons Removal and Abatement, that can assist in addressing issues regarding explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnance that emerge in postconflict environments.

The distribution of DoS's stabilization capabilities across bureaus means there is no one-stop shop for DoD to plug into DoS on stabilization. Moreover, the part of the DoS bureaucracy that specializes in stabilization activities, CSO, is not a programming bureau per se, whereas the

²²⁰ DoS, *Foreign Affairs Manual*, Washington, D.C., 2013.

²²¹ DoS, "About PRM," webpage, undated-a.

²²² This program used to reside in CSO and helps explain why that bureau had much greater resources in prior years.

bureaus that do programming (e.g., INL, DRL) are not stabilization specialists per se. This complicates DoD's secondary mission of supporting the governance stability function, which DoS has the lead on, but without a single office for DoD to coordinate through.

DoD's Interagency Partners on Stabilization Activities: USAID

Although DoD and USAID are the leads on different pillars in the diplomacy, development, defense framework,²²³ there is significant overlap between DoD and USAID in the realm of stabilization missions. USAID often implements stabilization programs in the immediate needs, economic stability, and governance functions, all of which DoD can also play a role in.

As for the organization of these activities within USAID, as Figure A.2 notes, they mainly fall within DCHA and within the regional bureaus, with USAID's Bureau for the Middle East—like NEA at DoS—playing an outsized role given the location of recent stabilization challenges. Within DCHA, which oversees roughly \$3 billion annually,²²⁴ USAID/OTI aims to facilitate political transitions in fragile or conflict-ridden countries.

USAID/OTI emerged during the conflict in the Balkans, predating offices that were stood up—such as CSO's predecessor, S/CRS—as part of civilian surge efforts during the large counterinsurgency wars of the 2000s. USAID/OTI has 224 staff members, works in 12–16 countries at any one time, and manages roughly \$250 million annually.²²⁵ Because USAID/OTI prioritizes adaptability, its programming cannot easily be characterized as falling within a single lane. Rather, USAID/OTI does quick assessments—often by piloting small lines of effort—and then focuses on efforts it judges to have the greatest influence on stabilization. This means that it may conduct rubble removal in one environment and build local governance capacity in another. This also means that USAID/OTI is not easily identified with core programming competencies. For example, USAID/OTI oversight of a rubble-removal program after the Haitian earthquake was the first time the office had engaged in this activity.²²⁶


²²³ USAID, *USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense*, Washington, D.C., June 2015, p. 3.

²²⁴ Interview with former USAID official, September 14, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²²⁵ Interview with USAID officials, October 5, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²²⁶ Interview with USAID officials, October 5, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

Figure A.2. USAID Office with Significant Roles in Stabilization



SOURCE: USAID, "Organization," webpage, last updated February 16, 2018.

RAND RR2441-A.2

It is important to keep in mind that USAID/OTI possesses greater capability than is apparent based on a quick read of its personnel and budget. This is because USAID/OTI primarily operates through a network of contractors who do implementation—and in turn use local subcontractors. And USAID/OTI's budget, in terms of what it receives through their direct account and overseas contingency operations, understates its total resources, since its main funding stream is from other sources (such as the Complex Crises Fund; other funding mechanisms within USAID and DoS; partner agencies, including the United Kingdom's Department for International Development; and international financial institutions, including the World Bank).

Along with USAID/OTI, another main player in USAID's stabilization activities, is the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which also sits within DCHA. OFDA provides humanitarian assistance in response to a wide range of crises, frequently including natural disasters. These sometimes, but not always, are properly considered as part of stabilization—specifically when they take place in fragile states that face potential instability as a result of humanitarian crisis, as discussed in Chapter Three. Even here, OFDA prioritizes the neutral provision of lifesaving aid to all who need it.²²⁷ In terms of resources, OFDA has

²²⁷ Interview 3; Interview 10.

approximately 300 staff based in the United States and in regional and field offices.²²⁸ And in a given year, OFDA oversees close to \$1 billion in humanitarian assistance, with that assistance distributed across dozens of crises.²²⁹

In terms of coordination mechanisms, the Mission Tasking Matrix is the primary means by which DoS and USAID may request DoD support and track task execution and provision of support.

Finally, like DoS, the regional offices at USAID play an important role in the agency's stabilization work. Many contribute to stabilization activities through a mechanism called *essential services* contracts, which allow USAID to use funds to rehabilitate existing infrastructure in these cases. This puts USAID squarely within DoD's second core requirement, as delineated by the DoDI 3000.05 (2009)—repair critical infrastructure. The key differences in the civilian and military capabilities are DoD's greater ability to operate in nonpermissive and semipermissive environments. In addition, DoD has greater leeway to obtain waivers that allow for infrastructure construction, whereas USAID's essential services contracts restrict the agency to rehabilitating existing infrastructure.²³⁰

Key Differences in Interagency Approaches to Stabilization

An important theme from our interviews with DoS and USAID stakeholders is that, as institutions, DoS and USAID see stabilization as an inherently political mission as opposed to only a purely technical mission. So whereas policy guidance defines other missions as targeting recipients based on need alone, DoS and USAID see stabilization as supporting the legitimacy of the recipient groups that distribute that assistance. Delivering food aid, creating jobs, and rehabilitating infrastructure are not just ends in and of themselves; they are means to the end of building the support base of governing authorities. And which aspiring authorities receive aid is a choice the U.S. government makes based on the alignment of its approach to governing with U.S. interests and values. Incentivizing legitimate governance is an important consideration for stabilization across bureaus at DoS, and it figures prominently in USAID/OTI's thinking as well.

Although DoD doctrine may also define *stabilization* in these terms, there have been differences over how this choice should be made in some cases. In general, DoD is eager for quick action to consolidate military gains, while the civilian agencies express preferences for deliberate action to determine which actors are most representative or otherwise worthy of support. In addition, the civilian interviewees believe that faster delivery of aid or services can have more-deleterious effects than a deliberate approach can. These differences were cited by

²²⁸ USAID, "USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance Fact Sheet," undated.

²²⁹ USAID, undated.

²³⁰ Interview with USAID officials, October 18, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

interviewees regarding recent interagency discussions about stabilization activities in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.²³¹

A second theme from our interviews is that civilian agencies' model of using contractors and subcontractors as their implementation partners on the ground provides them a different view of stabilization requirements than DoD has, which is more likely to deploy U.S. personnel even in instances in which DoD is operating "by, with, and through."

A third theme that emerged in our discussions with USAID and DoS is that interagency partners consistently identify DoD's provision of a "security envelope" as the key DoD enabling activity for their work.²³² In addition, interviewees cited the need for DoD to provide logistics support (transportation and housing) in semipermissive environments. And when DoD has a force presence, interviewees cited intelligence provided by the military as particularly beneficial for their situational awareness.²³³

In addition, many interviewees cited organizational culture as an important differentiator between DoS and USAID on the one hand and DoD on the other. This was often cited in the context of a perception that DoD has a focus on actions—e.g., distributing generators—that might not reflect adequate planning.²³⁴ USAID and DoS, on the other hand, are quick to cite their planning and assessment processes and assistance that requires a minimal footprint and leaves significant choice to the recipients. An example from the Syrian context is the disbursement of cash over in-kind assistance, or, at a minimum, the desire to source procurement locally from such places as Hasakah Governorate. Another example is USAID's (and international organizations') approach to IDPs, in which it defers to IDPs to self-select their destination based on a personal decision of where they feel most secure, rather than channeling them into camps or single locations. USAID mandates that at least 5 percent of program funds go to monitoring and evaluation—an example of how the agency institutionalizes evaluation into its framework.²³⁵

A final crosscutting theme of the interviews was that there are sufficient mechanisms for interagency communication; it is coordination and collaboration between civilian agencies and DoD that are still challenging.²³⁶ A welcome advance made in the past 15 years is a common practice of posting USAID development and humanitarian assistance advisers and DoS political

²³¹ The experience of U.S. military support to indigenous actors at the local level as part of the Afghan Local Police and the Village Stability Operations program in Afghanistan also reflects this dynamic. Here, the U.S. military commander initially moved ahead in the face of opposition from the embassy, although this opposition was eventually dropped. See Mark Moyer, *Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police*, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.: Joint Special Operations University, October 2014, p. 11. Also, interviews with USAID officials, September 23 and October 5, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²³² Interviews with USAID officials, October 5, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²³³ Interviews with USAID officials, October 5, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²³⁴ Interview with USAID official, September 23, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²³⁵ Interview with former USAID official, September 14, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²³⁶ The distinctions between communication, coordination, and collaboration are laid out in USAID, 2015, p. 4.

advisers to the global combatant commands, deploying them alongside their military counterparts in major operations, and embedding them in the Pentagon. This is in addition to dedicated offices in civilian agencies that oversee the liaison function with the military, such as the DoS Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Bureau's Military Coordination and Operations Policy Office or USAID's Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation, which sits within DCHA.

Given these mechanisms for civilian-military communication, interviewees did not argue for additional nodes in this realm. Rather, the concerns that were raised fell within coordination and collaboration. On coordination, two specific issues were raised. One was simply that civilian agencies' smaller footprints in the field, particularly in non- and semipermissive environments, mean that civilians downrange can be overwhelmed by the requirements of coordination with a much larger counterpart.²³⁷ The second issue is that some of the processes that helped provide the interagency—and, more specifically, DoS, USAID, and DoD—with shared understandings of a problem, such as the Integrated Conflict Assessment Framework—are no longer in wide use.²³⁸ On the other hand, newer planning processes, such as the introduction of integrated country strategies, can be vehicles to join civilian and military planning.

As for actual civilian-military collaboration, multiple interviewees raised the need to institutionalize memorandums of understanding that allow for civilians to be embedded in missions where DoD has the lead.²³⁹ The interviewees, at both DoD and USAID, noted positive examples of embedding their personnel within DoD-led overseas operations, but said that the precedent was difficult to scale up because each required one-off memorandums of understanding that were time-consuming and carefully negotiated. An executive order that routinely provides for embedding civilian personnel in military formations would allow more-agile and responsive civilian-military coordination.

²³⁷ Interview with USAID officials, October 5, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²³⁸ Interview with former USAID official, September 14, 2016, in Washington, D.C.

²³⁹ Interview with USAID officials, October 5, 2016, in Washington D.C.; interview with DoS officials, October 7, 2016.

Appendix B. Key International Partners' Capacity, Capabilities, and Approaches to Stabilization

This appendix describes the current capacity, capabilities, and stabilization approaches of three key U.S. allies that have often participated in such activities as part of multinational coalitions or as leading providers. This brief survey is intended to illustrate the types of international partners with which the U.S. military and civilian interagency community may hope to collaborate in refining a common approach to stabilization. U.S. efforts to clarify best practices, refine the comprehensive approach, and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its stabilization efforts should take into account the factors outlined here. A fuller survey of partners' capabilities, capacity, and approaches—including the results of their individual efforts to innovate—can contribute to more-effective overall approaches and thus outcomes.

France

The French military has a long history of stabilization missions involving a mix of security operations and civil-military activities, such as providing essential services, dating back to the colonial era.²⁴⁰ France is currently involved in a large number of stabilization missions, particularly in Africa (e.g., Sahel, Central African Republic). A 2016 French Senate report on France's overseas military operations underlined the importance of such capabilities as influence, communication, and civil-military actions “to allow local populations to perceive directly the benefit of French forces that play a protective, rather than predatory, role.”²⁴¹

Similar to the United States and the United Kingdom, France formalized the current concept of stabilization in light of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. In 2007, a French Army manual built on the lessons learned in these conflicts to define *stabilization* as a phase between intervention and normalization.²⁴² To tackle stabilization missions, France adopted a “comprehensive approach” that emphasizes the need for coordination between all military and civilian actors involved in stabilization.²⁴³ According to this approach, the military seeks to establish a

²⁴⁰ See, for example, David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958*, 2nd ed., Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-478-1-ARPA/RC, 2006.

²⁴¹ Jacques Gautier, Daniel Reiner, Jean-Marie Bockel, Jeanny Lorgeoux, Cédric Perrin, and Gilbert Roger, *Interventions extérieures de la France: Renforcer l'efficacité militaire par une approche globale coordonnée*, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Armed Forces Commission, French Senate, July 17, 2016b, p. 100; RAND's translation.

²⁴² French Army, *Gagner la bataille, conduire à la paix: Les forces terrestres dans les conflits aujourd'hui et demain*, Paris: Centre de doctrine d'emploi des forces, FT 01, January 2007, pp. 12–13.

²⁴³ French Ministry of Defense, *French White Paper on Defense and National Security*, Paris, 2013, p. 94.

sufficient level of security for nonmilitary actors to be able to fulfill their roles in the two other pillars of the approach—governance and development.²⁴⁴ This does not necessarily mean that these three pillars are to be addressed sequentially—or even by different actors. As a 2012 guidance document on civil-military affairs notes, “There are no clean and well-defined borders between [development and rebuilding] and the armed forces’ civil-military actions. Consequently, crisis management is most often carried out in a multinational and inter-ministerial framework.”²⁴⁵ The armed forces’ involvement in stabilization tasks, however, is generally shorter term than that of civilian actors.²⁴⁶

Primary Military and Civilian Organizations Tasked with Stabilization Activities

Since the end of the Cold War, the French Ministry of Defense has promoted joint structures instead of service-specific ones in an effort to develop interoperability (both within the French military and with international partners) and to utilize resources more efficiently.²⁴⁷ Civil-military action has been part of this trend, with the creation, in July 2001, of the Joint Group for Civil-Military Actions (Groupement inter-armées des actions civilo-militaires). In 2012, the group merged with the Joint Group for Military Operations of Influence (Groupement inter-armées des opérations militaires d’influence) to create the Joint Center for Actions on the Environment (Centre interarmées des actions sur l’environnement, CIAE). The objective of the CIAE is to provide the military command with an understanding of the human terrain—rather than intelligence per se, which falls under the Military Intelligence Directorate (Direction du renseignement militaire).²⁴⁸

Placed under the authority of the General Staff, the CIAE covers civil-military actions, information operations, and psychological operations. It has a pool of skilled personnel who can be deployed in theater, either to provide special skills or to reinforce the civil-military staff already deployed. Its typical missions include reconstruction, civil infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, and economic and social affairs.²⁴⁹ It has a planned capacity of 170 personnel from the French Army, Air Force, Navy, and National Gendarmerie, both from the active and reserve components.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁴ French Ministry of Defense, *Coopération civilo-militaire*, Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations, No. 174/DEF/CICDE/NP, July 17, 2012a, para. 112–114.

²⁴⁵ French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, para. 116; RAND’s translation.

²⁴⁶ French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, para. 204.

²⁴⁷ Jean-Pierre Maulny, Sylvie Matelly, and Fabio Liberti, *Les perspectives de coopération (nationale, européenne) et d’interarmisation de l’outil de défense: quels partages capacitaires possibles et quelles conséquences pour l’Armée de terre?* Paris : Institut de Relations Internationales et de Stratégie, March 2007, pp. 8–20.

²⁴⁸ Phone interview with French defense official, October 14, 2016.

²⁴⁹ Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Propagande sur le web: l’armée tâtonne,” *L’Opinion*, February 5, 2015.

²⁵⁰ French Ministry of Defense, “Le Centre interarmées des actions sur l’environnement,” webpage, August 29, 2012b; phone interview with French defense official, October 14, 2016.

French doctrine underlines the importance of a broad set of military capabilities—including logistics, engineering, health, and communications—in civil-military coordination.²⁵¹ For instance, demining is largely done, during the combat phase, by Army engineers for whom it is a core competency. Although these units are still involved in demining during the stabilization phase, they also try to transition their role to the United Nations, NGOs, or other relevant civilian organizations.²⁵² The Joint Staff and Army General Staff can also rely on their own civil-military coordination teams.²⁵³ Because of their hybrid nature between military and development, civil-military coordination activities are funded by a variety of military and civilian funding sources, including from the French Agency for Development (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) and international organizations.²⁵⁴

Regarding the training of foreign forces, the Ministry of Defense is in charge of operational training, which covers activities aimed at improving the operational readiness and interoperability of foreign armed forces. The Joint Staff deploys small teams of instructors to partner countries, usually for a very specific purpose (for instance, administering a course or training module) and a limited time. Many of these activities take place in fragile countries.

In 2012, the ministries for foreign affairs and for development were merged into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development (Ministère des affaires étrangères et du développement international, MAEDI). The MAEDI's Directorate of Security and Defense Cooperation (Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense, DCSD) is in charge of *institutional cooperation*, which is defined as longer-term projects focusing on building the defense institutions—through education, advice, or expertise—of partner nations. The DCSD is also in charge of the regionally oriented national schools effort, which supports the development of local educational facilities that provide high-quality instruction on regional issues, ranging from demining to policing and maritime security. The DCSD's capacity is falling, however, with the planned loss of 14 percent of its staff from 2015 to 2017, along with a substantial decrease in funding.²⁵⁵

Finally, the MAEDI also has a structure dedicated to the management of foreign crises and stabilization crisis management. The Crisis and Support Center was created in 2008 and includes, since 2014, the Mission for Stabilization that provides expertise on short notice and funds quick-impact projects in countries emerging from crises, thanks to a dedicated stabilization fund.²⁵⁶

²⁵¹ French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, para. 324.

²⁵² Phone interview with French defense official, October 14, 2016.

²⁵³ French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, para. 327.

²⁵⁴ French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, para. 331–333.

²⁵⁵ Gautier et al., 2016b, p. 205.

²⁵⁶ This fund amounted to 7.5 million euros in 2016. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Stabiliser les pays en sortie de crise,” October 2016; Gautier et al., 2016b, p. 194.

For longer-term stabilization and development projects, a key institutional actor is the AFD, which defines itself as an “implementing agency for France’s development aid policy” and also works as a development bank.²⁵⁷ Another important implementing agency is Expertise France, which manages the MAEDI’s pool of experts on governance and development. These experts are generally embedded for a limited period in the institutions of partner countries to provide advice and mentoring, as part of the MAEDI’s institutional cooperation effort.²⁵⁸

Coordination Mechanisms and Models

Interagency Relations

The CIAE interacts with civilian agencies involved in stabilization missions, including in the predeployment phase.²⁵⁹ The MAEDI oversees the coordination between all ministries involved in crisis response. A cross-departmental strategy for the civil-military management of foreign crises was elaborated in 2009, along with the creation of a dedicated cross-departmental task force. However, by 2016, they had both been abandoned and replaced by ad hoc coordination mechanisms for each crisis.²⁶⁰ France put together, in particular, a coordinated, cross-departmental strategy for the Sahel (“Sahel strategy”) and for the Gulf of Guinea.²⁶¹ The French military involvement in Afghanistan led to the creation of an Afghanistan-Pakistan cell devoted exclusively to this intervention, as well as the Stability Task Force (Pôle stabilité) in theater.²⁶² Civilian cooperation activities were put under the supervision of the Afghanistan-Pakistan cell, the French embassy in Kabul, the AFD, the Task Force Lafayette (which comprises almost all of France’s troop contribution), and Afghan authorities.²⁶³ As of July 2016, France had ad hoc cross-departmental task forces for the Central African Republic, Burundi, and Boko Haram.²⁶⁴

Cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and the AFD has generally been ad hoc and limited. In Afghanistan, the AFD was not included in the Stability Task Force, and, as a general principle, it has somewhat maintained a distance from the French military in theaters where they were both involved, partly out of concern that its perceived association with the military might

²⁵⁷ AFD, “Historique et statuts,” webpage, July 2016.

²⁵⁸ Gautier et al., 2016b, p. 198.

²⁵⁹ Phone interview with French defense official, October 14, 2016; Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, *CIMIC Capabilities*, Brussels, July 2013, p. 22.

²⁶⁰ Gautier et al., 2016b, p. 186. For a more detailed view of the originally intended cross-department structure, see French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, Annex B, para. B03–B06.

²⁶¹ Gautier et al., 2016b, pp. 187–190.

²⁶² French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, Annex B, para. B07.

²⁶³ Amaury de Féligonde, *Caveats to Civilian Aid Programs in Counterinsurgency: The French Experience in Afghanistan*, Paris: French Institute of International Relations, Focus Stratégique No. 24, December 2010, p. 9.

²⁶⁴ Gautier et al., 2016b, p. 194.

jeopardize its action and endanger its staff.²⁶⁵ This is slowly changing, however. In July 2016, the AFD and the Ministry of Defense signed a framework agreement to formalize a number of their interactions in such areas as information exchange, training, and operational concertation in theaters of operations. In July 2016, a report from the French Senate recommended further coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the AFD—in particular, to transition, when appropriate, the management of development projects undertaken by the military in the Ministry of Defense’s civil-military coordination role to the AFD in an effort to increase its long-term impact and make it more sustainable.²⁶⁶

With regard to building partner capacity more generally, the Ministry of Defense and the MAEDI have established a clear division of labor, with the Joint Staff being in charge of operational training, while the DCSD at the MAEDI is in charge of longer-term, institutional-level cooperation. Yet a number of channels of communication exist between the two. The Joint Staff supplies staff to the DCSD for its cooperation activities, and it is, at times, involved in the selection of high-level advisers. Finally, DCSD directors are systematically chosen among French military officers. Strategic anticipation groups (*groupes d’anticipation stratégique*), including the MAEDI, intelligence services, and the Joint Staff, meet up regularly to discuss future strategic orientations of France’s security cooperation activities.²⁶⁷

Relations with External Actors in Charge of Stabilization

Although France has shown a capacity to undertake interventions on its own, as in Mali (Operation Serval) or the Central African Republic (Operation Sangaris) in 2013, the end state for such interventions is almost always a handover of the larger stabilization tasks to a multinational mission. United Nations– and European Union–led missions present decisive advantages in this regard: They command larger budgets; have recognized expertise in particular fields important for the stabilization phase (for instance, disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion); and, when a large presence in country is needed, they trigger fewer political sensitivities than the former colonial power does.²⁶⁸ Coordination with these multilateral missions takes place at different levels. In Mali, for instance, the French military is present in the General Staff of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, which is led by a French general.²⁶⁹ The French military is also present in the European Union Training Mission–Mali. In the Central African Republic, the European Union created—under the

²⁶⁵ Pascal Airault, “Militaires et spécialistes français du développement cherchent comment travailler ensemble en Afrique,” *L’Opinion*, October 9, 2016; de Féligonde 2010, p. 27.

²⁶⁶ Gautier et al., 2016b, p. 201.

²⁶⁷ Michael J. McNerney, Stuart Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, David Stebbins, Renanah Miles, Angela O’Mahony, Chaoling Feng, and Tim Oliver, *Defense Institution Building in Africa: An Assessment*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1232-OSD, 2016, p. 133.

²⁶⁸ McNerney et al., 2016, p. 137.

²⁶⁹ French Ministry of Defense, *Dossier de presse: Opération Barkhane*, Paris, July 2016, p. 4.

impulsion of the AFD—a multidonor trust fund (Bêkou Trust Fund) for postcrisis development and reconstruction projects.²⁷⁰

Coordination of action also takes place with partner countries. The cross-Sahel counterterrorism Operation Barkhane involves a number of civil-military activities—for instance, the rebuilding of a school in Gao—some of which are undertaken in coordination with the armies of the G5 Sahel countries in an effort to build trust not only between local populations and the French military but also between local populations and their own militaries.²⁷¹ Between August 2014 and July 2016, France invested 575,000 euros in civil-military projects through Barkhane.²⁷² A report from the French Senate noted, in 2016, that cooperation between Barkhane and the European Union could go further and recommended that Barkhane involve European Union Training Mission–Mali instructors in some of Barkhane’s operations so these instructors could gain a better understanding of the terrain and the constraints under which their trainees operate.²⁷³

In any given operation, a key challenge to coordination is the sheer number of actors involved. In Afghanistan, for instance, France’s civil-military missions were coordinated with various actors that included, depending on the domain (e.g., rural development, health, security, governance), NGOs, the European Commission, the French Embassy, the Japanese Embassy, the U.S. Army, USAID, and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan—in addition to local or national Afghan authorities.²⁷⁴ France’s civil-military actions in Afghanistan received substantial funding from non-French sources (such as the European Union) and key partners (such as the United States and Japan). These external sources amounted to 25 percent of France’s total budget spent in 2002–2012 for this purpose.²⁷⁵

Yet France has developed ways to institutionalize the relationship, in theater, with its international partners. A number of civil-military coordination officers act as liaisons with various civilian organizations active in theater to facilitate coordination of action.²⁷⁶ A civil-military coordination liaison may also be included, when appropriate, in the cross-department task force deployed in theater, or the local French Embassy could be included. A civil-military

²⁷⁰ Gautier et al., 2016b, p. 201. On the Bêkou Trust Fund, see, for instance, European Commission, “Central African Republic: EU Launches Its First Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development,” press release, July 14, 2014.

²⁷¹ French Ministry of Defense, 2016, p. 6. G5 Sahel countries are Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso.

²⁷² French Ministry of Defense, 2016, p. 6.

²⁷³ Gautier et al., 2016b, p. 149.

²⁷⁴ Olivier Duboulet, *Les actions civilo-militaires et la prise en compte de l’environnement humain dans les opérations extérieures*, briefing, Lyon, France: Trinôme académique d’Amiens, January 27, 2015.

²⁷⁵ Duboulet, 2015.

²⁷⁶ French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, para. 335.

coordination center may also be set up in theater to act as an interface between the French military and civilian actors—whether the local population or NGOs.²⁷⁷

In other cases, cooperation is more ad hoc. For instance, representatives of France and the United States have made efforts on the ground to coordinate the activities of the U.S. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, which builds African capacity for peacekeeping operations, and the French Reinforcement of African Capacity to Maintain Peace (RECAMP, later EURORECAMP) program, which has a broader capacity-building mandate. French forces based in Africa are in contact with the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program to ensure a more coherent action between France and the United States.²⁷⁸

Implications for the United States

Strengths and Weaknesses of the French Model; Unique Aspects of the Model

Although some specific initiatives, such as the regionally oriented national schools, offer interesting models about how to regionalize security cooperation and give partner nations ownership, the general approach adopted by France to coordinate civil-military action in stabilization missions is largely informal and, hence, difficult to replicate in other countries. Several points stand out in particular:

- The French model of civil-military coordination for stabilization missions is largely ad hoc. Departments do work together, but this is done largely informally. When a more formal structure is established (for instance, the Afghanistan-Pakistan cell), it is on an ad hoc basis also. To a large extent, this model works because of the overall limited number of actors involved and might not be applicable to a larger bureaucracy, such as the United States.
- In spite of talks about the need to embrace a comprehensive approach, the French approach is characterized by limited ambitions and a large dose of realism about what can effectively be achieved. Although the French doctrine on civil-military cooperation underlines that a partnership with civilian actors engaged in similar activities is desirable, it also notes that such partnership should be undertaken “to the extent possible” and that “coordination” should be preferred to “collaboration” in the event that the military and civilian actors disagree on the objectives to be pursued.²⁷⁹
- Formal coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the public-aid agency AFD is still in its infancy. In this regard, the French model is very far behind the United Kingdom’s, which has tried to create a fully integrated approach among its Ministry

²⁷⁷ French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, para. 350–352.

²⁷⁸ McNerney et al., 2016, p. 137.

²⁷⁹ French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, para. 230.

of Defence, the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Department for International Development (DfID), as described later in this appendix.

Can These Capabilities Support U.S. Stabilization Efforts and, If So, on What Scale and How Reliably?

The decision to deploy French forces abroad used to be a prerogative of the president and did not require prior consultation or vote of the parliament. A 2008 constitutional reform changed this situation, with a parliamentary vote required to extend any foreign deployment beyond four months. In practice, however, not all French deployments since 2008 were submitted to a parliamentary vote—in Mali, for instance, Operation Serval was submitted to a vote, but Operation Barkhane was not, possibly because the latter was largely a reorganization of French forces already deployed on the continent in separate operations.²⁸⁰ The three operations that the French conducted jointly with the United States—in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq and Syria—were submitted to a vote by the Parliament, and it is likely that similar future operations would require an authorization as well.²⁸¹

The case of Afghanistan shows that self-imposed constraints on civil-military action in nonpermissive environments (also known as *national caveats*) for France's stability missions might be subject to change. One study noted that France's risk aversion in Afghanistan prior to 2007 was replaced by more risk-taking behavior, likely reflecting the personal preferences of two different presidents. This suggests that the United States' ability to count on French participation in stabilization without caveats might be highly dependent on the civilian power at the time, specifically on the president.²⁸²

Finally, France's ability to contribute substantially to stabilization operations might be constrained by the new security demands on its territory, following the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks in Paris and Nice. The deployment of soldiers in France for monitoring and surveillance purposes (Operation Sentinelle) has stretched thin French forces that were already heavily committed in outside theaters.²⁸³

²⁸⁰ Jacques Gautier, Daniel Reiner, Jean-Marie Bockel, Jeanny Lorgeoux, Cédric Perrin, and Gilbert Roger, *Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées sur le bilan des opérations extérieures*, No. 794, Paris: French Senate, July 13, 2016a, pp. 237–242.

²⁸¹ Gautier et al., 2016a, pp. 241–242.

²⁸² Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2011, pp. 78–79.

²⁸³ Phone interview with French defense official, October 14, 2016.

Germany

Background

Stabilization represents a core competence of the German armed forces. For historical reasons, the combat role of the German Army (the Bundeswehr) has been tightly limited by the basic law, with a focus placed instead on self-defense at home and, since a 1994 ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, on collective security and stabilization abroad. As Germany's Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier noted in July 2016, "[A]bove all, Germans share a deeply held, historically rooted conviction that their country should use its political energy and resources to strengthen the rule of law in international affairs. . . . Whenever possible, we choose *Recht* (law) over *Macht* (power)."²⁸⁴ Until 2014, foreign deployments of German armed forces were systematically serving United Nations; European Union; NATO; and, in one instance, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mandates.²⁸⁵

Germany's most significant involvement in stabilization tasks in recent years has been in Afghanistan. By 2009, Germany was providing the third-largest troop contribution, with close to 5,000 soldiers.²⁸⁶ In addition to military support capabilities—such as information; surveillance; target acquisition; and reconnaissance assets, intratheater air-lift capabilities, and field hospitals—Germany has also played a role in more-specific stabilization missions through its two PRTs and several operational mentoring and liaison teams.²⁸⁷ German PRTs in Afghanistan were particularly civilian-heavy and focused mainly on long-term projects.²⁸⁸ Germany also took the lead in the training of the Afghan police through the German Police Project Office, which, from 2002 onward, involved close interagency cooperation between the ministries of defense, development, foreign office, and interior.²⁸⁹

The willingness to contribute to deployments around the world is increasing among German leaders and political elites. In 2011, the German Ministry of Defence published the Defense Policy Guidelines, which planned to increase the numbers of troops deployable for overseas

²⁸⁴ Frank-Walter Steinmeier, "Germany's New Global Role: Berlin Steps Up," *Foreign Affairs*, July–August 2016, p. 110.

²⁸⁵ Germany's involvement in Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq was placed under a mandate from the Bundestag. Stefani Weiss, "Germany's Security Policy: From Territorial Defense to Defending the Liberal World Order?" *Newpolitik*, Bertelsmann Foundation, October 2016, Table 1, pp. 6–7.

²⁸⁶ Ryszarda Formuszewicz and Marcin Terlikowski, *Willing and (Un)able. New Defense Policy Guidelines and Reorientation of the Bundeswehr*, Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, July 2011.

²⁸⁷ NATO, "Commitment to Operations and Missions: Germany," April 2, 2009.

²⁸⁸ French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, Annex E, p. 56.

²⁸⁹ The German Police Project Office became the German Police Project Team in 2007, when EUPOL Afghanistan took over the lead for police training. Markus Feilke, "German Experience in Police Building in Afghanistan," paper presented at the GRIPS State-Building Workshop 2010: Organizing Police Forces in Post-Conflict Peace-Support Operations, Tokyo, January 27–28, 2010, p. 1.

operations to approximately 10,000,²⁹⁰ up from 7,000.²⁹¹ In November 2015, Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen announced an expansion of Germany's military involvement in the United Nations mission in Mali—a mission that still operates in a largely nonpermissive environment.²⁹² The Ministry of Defence followed, in July 2016, with a white paper advocating for an increasing role of Germany in the leadership (including the military leadership) of United Nations mission, and called German armed forces to be ready to intervene, when needed, in contexts of “robust peace enforcement”²⁹³—a euphemism for combat role.²⁹⁴ The 2016 white paper also emphasized the importance of stabilization missions, noting that “Germany must participate in the prevention and stabilisation of crises and conflicts as well as in post-crisis and post-conflict management, depending on the extent to which it is affected and its available options”²⁹⁵ and that “Germany will respond with strategic perseverance to the enormous challenges associated with the long-term stabilisation of fragile, failing and failed states. Civilian and military instruments complement one another in [Germany's] comprehensive approach.”²⁹⁶

Germany is giving itself the means to reach these objectives. In 2016, von der Leyen announced an increase in the size of the Bundeswehr, with an additional 14,300 troops planned over seven years—a first since the country's reunification in 1991.²⁹⁷ The recently established Cyber Command, the Medical Service, the German Navy, the German Air Force, and the Special Forces are expected to benefit the most from this personnel increase.²⁹⁸ Germany's defense budget was also increased by 14 percent, to reach 39.2 billion euros (close to \$43 billion) by 2020.²⁹⁹ Although the additional troops are not specifically earmarked for stabilization, von der Leyen mentioned “the indispensable contribution of the Bundeswehr to international conflict prevention and crisis management” and that expectations and demands in this realm are likely to grow in the future.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁰ German Federal Ministry of Defence, “Defence Policy Guidelines,” May 27, 2011, p. 11.

²⁹¹ Sebastian Fischer, “De Maizièr schrumpft die Armee,” *Spiegel Online*, May 18, 2011.

²⁹² “Germany Discusses Sending Bundeswehr Troops to Mali,” *Deutsche Welle*, November 23, 2015.

²⁹³ German Federal Ministry of Defence, *2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, Berlin, July 2016, p. 51.

²⁹⁴ To underline how quickly this change has been taking place, it is worth remembering that, in May 2010, German President Horst Köhler faced public criticism after stating that the use of the military was acceptable to “protect [German] interests such as ensuring free-trade routes or preventing regional instabilities” and eventually resigned. Borzou Daraghi, “German Questions Involvement in Afghanistan,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 2010.

²⁹⁵ German Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 50.

²⁹⁶ German Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 60.

²⁹⁷ “German Military Gets a Personnel Boost,” *Deutsche Welle*, May 10, 2016.

²⁹⁸ German Association of the Bundeswehr, “Ministerin informiert zur ‘Trendwende Personal,’” September 23, 2016.

²⁹⁹ “German Military Gets a Personnel Boost,” 2016.

³⁰⁰ German Federal Ministry of Defence, “Trendwende Personal: Tagesbefehl der Ministerin,” May 10, 2016.

Yet Germany's ability to adopt a more extensive stabilization agenda is constrained by the fact that the use of the Bundeswehr for any purpose other than self-defense remains controversial in a country where antimilitarist movements remain strong. A January 2014 poll showed that 61 percent of respondents rejected von der Leyen's announcement that she would increase German troop deployments abroad.³⁰¹

Primary Military and Civilian Organizations Tasked with Stabilization Activities

The 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines provide updated guidance for the Bundeswehr and mentions contributing "to stability and partnership at an international level" as a Bundeswehr mission. Conflict prevention, crisis management, humanitarian assistance, and cooperation with partner nations are all mentioned among the Bundeswehr's tasks.³⁰² Restrictions placed by the German government on the Bundeswehr's combat role have resulted in almost all of its missions abroad focusing on nonlethal tasks, such as training and mentoring; logistical, medical, and technical support; observation; or rescue.³⁰³

Germany's stabilization efforts can also rely on the Center for Civil-Military Cooperation of the Bundeswehr (Zentrum Zivil-Militärische Zusammenarbeit der Bundeswehr). Following Germany's involvement in the NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the realization that soldiers were often incapable of coordinating their action with the civilian organizations on the ground, a civil-military coordination battalion was first established in 2003. In 2006, this unit became a civil-military coordination center, with the added role of providing advice to the military regarding cooperation with civilian organizations during stabilization missions. In 2013, the civil-military coordination center was upgraded to its current form and now also provides research and analysis to the Bundeswehr on foreign and domestic contingencies. The center also serves as a platform for civil-military, multinational, and joint training and exercises. As of 2016, the center had 300 military and civilian staff, of which two-thirds were deployed to national and multinational missions, from NATO's Kosovo Force to the European Forces Republic Central Africa mission.³⁰⁴ A 2016 defense white paper promised an additional capability of deployable experts by announcing the creation of "teams of civilian experts which can be deployed to crisis areas at an early stage and at short notice, thus increasing

³⁰¹ Infratest Dimap, "Bundeswehr: Mehrheit lehnt Ausweitung der Auslandseinsätze ab," survey, January 2014. Popular support for NATO has also been declining, and, in 2015, a majority of Germans were reluctant to intervene unless another member of the alliance were to find itself under attack. Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, "NATO Public Opinion: Wary of Russia, Leery of Action on Ukraine," Pew Research Center, June 10, 2015.

³⁰² German Federal Ministry of Defence, 2011.

³⁰³ Weiss, 2016, p. 5.

³⁰⁴ German Joint Support Service, "Über uns," webpage, Zentrum Zivil-Militärische Zusammenarbeit der Bundeswehr, last updated June 3, 2016.

... ability to respond to and de-escalate crises” to increase civilian capabilities in support of the military.³⁰⁵

On the civilian side, the Foreign Office has, as of March 2015, the Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilization and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, with responsibility over humanitarian assistance, crisis prevention, stabilization, and postconflict peace building.³⁰⁶ This directorate also oversees recruitment and training of civilian personnel for international peace operations through the Center for International Peace Operations. The center is a platform that recruits and trains civilian experts willing to join stabilization operations.³⁰⁷

Other key civilian actors, within the federal government, take part in stabilization tasks. The Ministry of Interior also plays a role in exporting police training.³⁰⁸ The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ) focuses on development projects, while humanitarian assistance falls under the purview of the Foreign Office.³⁰⁹ This division of labor has not been fully institutionalized, however, and has not fully resolved the competition between the two ministries.³¹⁰ Both the Foreign Office and the BMZ routinely commission the German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) or private organizations to design and implement in-country projects.

GIZ is a government-controlled development agency that plays a major role in reconstruction efforts. In Afghanistan, for instance, GIZ employed 100 German staff and 1,400 local staff.³¹¹ GIZ receives commissions from the Ministry of Defence, as well as from the Foreign Office and BMZ and foreign countries and international organizations, such as the World Bank.

The Agency for Technical Relief (Technisches Hilfswerk, THW), which falls under the Ministry of Interior, is another public institution with competence on stabilization issues. Its main particularity is that 99 percent of its staff is made of volunteers who become operational when their competences are needed.³¹² For instance, THW volunteers work with the armed forces inside Germany to provide disaster relief in the event of a flood. THW volunteers can deploy internationally, on behalf of the Ministry of Interior and on the request of the Foreign

³⁰⁵ German Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 61; RAND’s translation.

³⁰⁶ German Federal Foreign Office, “Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilization and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” webpage, July 5, 2015.

³⁰⁷ Center for International Peace Operations, “What We Do,” webpage, undated.

³⁰⁸ Cécile Wendling, *The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective*, Paris: Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire, Cahier de l’IRSEM No. 6, November 2010, p. 77.

³⁰⁹ Previously, both ministries had been covering all issues.

³¹⁰ EntwicklungspolitikOnline, “AA und BMZ verteilen Zuständigkeiten neu,” webpage, November 11, 2011.

³¹¹ GIZ, “Afghanistan,” undated.

³¹² THW, “What We Do,” webpage, undated.

Office. In the Kurdistan region of Iraq, for instance, THW has been involved since 2013 in building sanitation systems in refugee camps near the border with Syria.³¹³

KfW, the German development bank, also plays a role in Germany's stabilization efforts abroad by funding infrastructure, education, and other projects in fragile or conflict countries on behalf of the BMZ. For instance, between 2012 and 2015, this bank provided 520 million euros for projects related to the Syrian crisis.³¹⁴

Coordination Mechanisms and Models

Interagency Relations

The German Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence work together through the Enable and Enhance Initiative. This initiative, which had a 100 million-euro budget in 2016, funds common projects elaborated by both ministries, focusing on empowering regional actors to provide stability, in countries ranging from Tunisia and Mali to Nigeria and Iraq.³¹⁵ These projects (e.g., training, education, provision of equipment) are then implemented through the NATO Defense Capacity Building Initiative, as well as a similar mechanism from the European Union.³¹⁶ Although the Enable and Enhance Initiative represents a step forward in terms of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office working together, it still lacks input from a number of other actors involved in sustainable crisis prevention, such as the Ministry of Interior or the BMZ.³¹⁷

Another modality of interagency coordination is the creation of ad hoc positions for specific crises. For instance, in Afghanistan, an ambassador-at-large for police reform chosen by the Foreign Office oversaw the coordination between the efforts of THW, the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) Center, the German Embassy in Kabul, and the Company for Technical Cooperation (now part of GIZ).³¹⁸ Similarly, a special representative of the federal government for the Middle East Stability Partnership was appointed to implement the pledges made by Germany at a multinational pledging conference in February 2016. This special representative is in charge of coordinating the measures—from humanitarian aid to military and civil stabilization measures and development cooperation—taken by all relevant ministries.³¹⁹ Some of Germany's

³¹³ THW, "Emergency Accommodation and 'WASH': Humanitarian Assistance from the THW," webpage, August 19, 2016.

³¹⁴ KfW, *Annual Report*, Frankfurt, 2015.

³¹⁵ Jana Puglierin, *Germany's Enable & Enhance Initiative: What Is It About?* Berlin: Federal Academy for Security Policy, 2016, p. 1; Majid Satar, "Kosten der Ertüchtigung: Deutschland zahlt 100 Millionen Euro an Krisenstaaten," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 20, 2016.

³¹⁶ Puglierin, 2016, p. 2; German Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 65.

³¹⁷ Tobias Lindner, "Haushalt 2016—Einzelplan Verteidigung," November 25, 2015.

³¹⁸ Feilke, 2010, p. 11.

³¹⁹ German Federal Foreign Office, "Special Representative of the Federal Government for the Middle East Stability Partnership," webpage, undated.

aid for Syria is also channeled through the multidonor Syria Recovery Trust Fund.³²⁰ KfW acts as trustee for this fund, which serves to provide essential services to the population and implement projects in other areas, such as rule of law, transportation, and housing.³²¹

Overall, the German model is not as integrated as the British model (see below),³²² and cross-department coordination is seldom institutionalized. Improving interministerial coordination was a focal point of a German policy review launched in 2014. As a direct result of this review, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilization and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, which has the ability to liaise with other parts of the German government as well as external actors, such as NGOs.³²³ Although this new structure may help Germany achieve a more integrated approach to stabilization, it is too early to tell whether it has achieved its intended purpose.

In theater, the German model remains largely stovepiped. Civilians and military officers in the German PRT in Afghanistan depended on different chains of command—a specificity of the German model. The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinate deployed activities from Berlin rather than directly in theater.³²⁴

Relations with External Actors in Charge of Stabilization

Germany regularly contributes military and civilian personnel to operations and missions led by NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. Until 2014, all of the Bundeswehr's deployments had been for an international organization.³²⁵ In Mali, for instance, Germany contributed stabilization capabilities in a number of ways. Key contributions included Bundeswehr troops in the United Nations stabilization and European Union training missions in Mali, which involved support to defense institution-building; up to ten police personnel provided by the Ministry of Interior to the civilian European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali, which trains and advises the police, National Guard, and the National Gendarmerie;³²⁶ and BMZ-led humanitarian and development aid projects, particularly on food security and refugees.³²⁷

³²⁰ Syria Recovery Trust Fund, "Overview," webpage, undated.

³²¹ Syria Recovery Trust Fund, undated.

³²² French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, Annex E, p. 56.

³²³ Josef Janning, "Germany's Foreign Ministry Reinvents Itself," European Council on Foreign Relations, March 18, 2015.

³²⁴ Wendling, 2010, p. 77; French Ministry of Defense, 2012a, Annex E, p. 56.

³²⁵ Weiss, 2016, pp. 6–7.

³²⁶ Michael Hanisch, *A New Quality of Engagement: Germany's Extended Military Operation in North Mali*, Berlin: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, 2015, p. 2.

³²⁷ Federal Ministry of Development, "Mali: Situation and Cooperation," webpage, undated.

Implications for the United States

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Model; Unique Aspects of the Model

1. Germany, as a federal state, must coordinate stabilization capabilities and missions not only between departments but also between the national and regional levels.³²⁸ This is particularly relevant for police training, which is placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. Germany's efforts to coordinate these two levels might be of interest to the United States, which also has to rely on states for its National Guard contributions to international policing missions.
2. In other regards, Germany's model is possibly the least applicable to the United States, because of its very limited focus on combat operations—which would likely make up a large part of stabilization missions for the United States.

Can These Capabilities Support U.S. Stabilization Efforts and, If So, on What Scale and How Reliably?

Germany's recent decisions to increase its defense budget and boost the number of deployable soldiers suggest that the country might be a more active actor in international stabilization mission in the future. A 2016 white paper also emphasized Germany's role within NATO and mentions first Germany's "partnership of values and security with the United States" in its list of "enduring features of [its] bilateral and multilateral relations."³²⁹ Finally, Germany's involvement in Iraq under Operation Inherent Resolve, since 2014, represents the first time Germany has taken part in an operation that has no mandate from an international organization.³³⁰ Germany has served as co-chair of the Counter-ISIS Working Group on Stabilization and has donated significant funding to reconciliation and other nonmilitary stabilization programs in Iraq.

Yet there are three important limiting factors to how extensive Germany's role can be in stabilization missions, possibly limiting its ability to undertake such missions alongside the United States:

1. Germany's willingness to play a major role in military missions remains overall limited. In the words of Germany's foreign minister, "Germany will continue to frame its international posture primarily in civilian and diplomatic terms and will resort to military engagement only after weighing every risk and every possible alternative."³³¹
2. Any deployment must be authorized by a parliamentary vote, which may constrain Germany's military action. One analyst notes that "German allies in NATO and the EU

³²⁸ Wendling, 2010, p. 77.

³²⁹ German Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 80.

³³⁰ Weiss, 2016, p. 9.

³³¹ Steinmeier, 2016, p. 110.

continue to look skeptically on this parliamentary reservation, questioning whether Germany could be relied on as a partner when it comes to questions of war and peace that would require quick decision-making.”³³²

3. Germany has, in the past, put substantial caveats on its rules of engagement. For instance, the necessity to be able to bring any wounded soldier to a medical facility within an hour limited Germany’s ability to support coalition operations in Afghanistan and may do so again in future operations.³³³

United Kingdom

Background

The United Kingdom defines *stabilization* as “one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability.”³³⁴ Although the French doctrine sees stabilization as an intermediary phase between intervention and stability, the United Kingdom considers stabilization to be part of a “persistent engagement” (thus, transcending the concept of phases) supporting the achievement of a particular political objective.³³⁵

The United Kingdom adopted early on an integrated approach to stabilization, with close coordination of action between the FCO, the Ministry of Defence, and DfID. This approach calls for an integration of the military, political, social, and development dimensions of interventions.³³⁶ The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 emphasizes this cross-government approach in its “tackling conflict and building stability overseas” section, noting that its “approach requires a consolidated, whole-of-government effort, using [its] diplomatic, development, defence and law enforcement capabilities, as well as drawing on external expertise.”³³⁷

³³² Weiss, 2016, p. 4.

³³³ Hanisch, 2015, p. 4.

³³⁴ Stabilisation Unit, 2014, p. 1.

³³⁵ Interview with UK defense official, October 5, 2016. On “persistent engagement,” see, for instance, Peter Wall, “Defence Engagement: The British Army’s Role in Building Security and Stability Overseas,” transcript, London: Chatham House, March 12, 2014.

³³⁶ On the UK definition of “comprehensive approach,” see, for instance, UK Parliament, *The Comprehensive Approach: The Point of War Is Not Just to Win but to Make a Better Peace*, London: House of Commons, Defense Committee, March 18, 2010.

³³⁷ UK Government, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*, London, November 2015, para. 5.119, p. 64.

Primary Military and Civilian Organizations Tasked with Stabilization Activities

In an effort to consolidate stabilization capabilities within a single military organization, the United Kingdom created, in 2014, the Security Assistance Group, which became the 77th Brigade a year later. The 77th is home to the Army's CA, psychological operations, and information capabilities. The purpose of the 77th Brigade is to fulfill stabilization missions, but also to respond to new types of warfare, including information warfare.³³⁸

The 77th Brigade brings together staff from the UK Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force and includes 42 percent of reservists,³³⁹ including specialist reservists—i.e., civilians with very specific skills that may include, for instance, professionals with knowledge of politics, finance, commerce, or counter Corruption.³⁴⁰ The decision to resort to such atypical recruits came from a realization that some of the skills that the UK Army needs for stabilization missions are unlikely to be found in the military, whether in its active or its reserve component.³⁴¹ The creation of this brigade is also in line with the strategy outlined in the Army 2020 Plan set out in 2013, which aims to maximize “capability by fully integrating Regular and Reserve soldiers, civilians and contractors as part of a whole force. The Reserves will be used routinely, rather than in extreme circumstances, for defined tasks and capabilities including providing troops for enduring stabilization operations and Defense Engagement overseas.”³⁴²

The 77th Brigade has close relations with other units that have capabilities likely to be deployed in a stabilization mission, such as the 170 Engineer Group, which specializes in reconstruction. A liaison officer with the 170 Engineer Group sits with the 77th. Yet the 77th also has its own engineering capability, through the Engineer and Logistics Staff Corps, which the UK Army describes as a “specialist Army Reserve unit providing engineering, logistics and communication consultancy to both the [Ministry of Defence] and across government agencies.”³⁴³

With regard to building partner capacity, the United Kingdom relies on various structures to coordinate military assistance, including British Peace Support Teams in East Africa and South Africa, a British Army Training Unit in Kenya, and an International Military Advisory & Training Team in Sierra Leone.³⁴⁴ Since 2015, the United Kingdom has also deployed forces in Nigeria to assist Nigerian forces in building their capabilities to fight Boko Haram.³⁴⁵

³³⁸ Jonathan Beale, “Army Sets Up New Brigade ‘For Information Age,’” *BBC*, January 31, 2015.

³³⁹ Beale, 2015.

³⁴⁰ Interview with UK defense official, October 5, 2016.

³⁴¹ Interview with UK defense official, October 5, 2016.

³⁴² UK Army, *Transforming the British Army: An Update*, London, July 2013.

³⁴³ UK Army, “77th Brigade,” webpage, undated-a.

³⁴⁴ UK Army, “The British Army in Africa,” webpage, undated-b.

³⁴⁵ UK Ministry of Defence, “UK Team Deploys to Train Nigerian Forces Fighting Boko Haram,” January 13, 2016.

Stabilization missions, however, remain under the leadership of civilians.³⁴⁶ More specifically, as an official document noted, “Even when there are military-led and implemented tasks in stabilization (e.g., carrying out patrols to bolster local security), their application should occur in the context of an operationally civilian-led, politically engaged, stabilization approach.”³⁴⁷ In the case of the United Kingdom’s response to the 2014–2015 Ebola pandemic in West Africa, for instance, the military staff deployed,³⁴⁸ and it was put under the leadership of DfID.³⁴⁹

The most prominent civilian actor in charge of stabilization is the Stabilisation Unit, which defines itself as “a cross-government unit supporting UK government efforts to tackle instability overseas.”³⁵⁰ Created in 2004 under the name Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (and renamed Stabilisation Unit in 2007),³⁵¹ the unit’s main mission is to manage and train a pool of civilian and military experts who can be quickly deployed to fragile or conflict states in support of UK or multilateral operations and at the request of the departments. Civilian advisers within the Stabilisation Unit form the Civilian Stabilisation Group, which is divided in three categories: Deployable Civilian Experts for noncivil servants; Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre for civil servants; and a pool of serving UK police officers.³⁵² The Stabilisation Unit also collects and disseminates best practices on stabilization.³⁵³ One UK defense official described the 77th Brigade as a “tactical delivery partner for the [Stabilisation Unit].”³⁵⁴ Within the Stabilisation Unit, the National School of Government International focuses more specifically on governance and institution building by deploying advisers to foreign ministries.³⁵⁵

³⁴⁶ Stabilisation Unit, 2014, p. 5.

³⁴⁷ Stabilisation Unit, 2014, p. 5.

³⁴⁸ The United Kingdom’s contribution to this effort comprised 750 personnel in charge of providing transport support to the medical teams on the ground, running a training facility for health care workers, and providing aid to the government of Sierra Leone. Prime Minister’s Office, “COBR Meeting on Ebola: 8 October 2014,” press release, October 8, 2014.

³⁴⁹ Interview with UK defense official, October 5, 2016.

³⁵⁰ UK Government, “Stabilisation Unit: About Us,” webpage, undated-a.

³⁵¹ Stuart Gordon, “The United Kingdom’s Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: The Impact on Humanitarian Actors,” *Disasters*, Vol. 34, No. S3, 2010, p. S369.

³⁵² UK Government, “Working for SU,” webpage, undated-b.

³⁵³ UK Government, undated-a.

³⁵⁴ Interview with UK defense official, October 5, 2016.

³⁵⁵ UK Government, undated-a.

Coordination Mechanisms and Models

Interagency Relations

The whole-of-government approach adopted by the United Kingdom applies to all aspects of stabilization missions, including the initial determination of “whether stabilization should be part of the UK’s approach to a particular situation of violent conflict”—an assessment made by the National Security Council, the FCO, the Ministry of Defence, and DfID.³⁵⁶ The National Security Council establishes country and regional strategies, which guide the work of the different departments.³⁵⁷ Regional boards in charge of implementing these strategies are chaired by FCO senior officials but also include officials from other departments.

In theater, an example of military and civilians working together is the PRT that the United Kingdom led in Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province) in Afghanistan. The UK military provided support to the civilian personnel involved in the PRT, and those civilians were coordinating their action with DfID programs at the national level to ensure consistency of effort.³⁵⁸

An important incentive for military and civilians to work together is through funding sources. The Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement (CSSF) replaced, in 2015, the Conflict Pool, which was hailed as the “first such dedicated instrument for conflict prevention to be created internationally.”³⁵⁹ The CSSF pursues the same objective as the Conflict Pool did, which is to promote stability in fragile and conflict-affected states. Yet the CSSF is wider in reach: Placed under the National Security Council, it funds interministerial strategies that involve the FCO, Ministry of Defence, DfID, Home Office, and Justice Department. The CSSF funds projects covering a broad range of projects pertaining to “conflict reduction and development assistance as well as tackling threats to UK interests.”³⁶⁰ A July 2016 statement before the UK Parliament mentions, as recent uses of the CSSF, “supporting peace processes including that in Colombia, tackling organized crime in the Caribbean, helping Ukraine to build its resilience to withstand external threats, funding a doubling of British UN peacekeepers.”³⁶¹ The CSSF is also the source of funding for the United Kingdom’s involvement in peacekeeping operations.³⁶² A substantial source of funding, the CSSF was established at 1 billion pounds in 2015–2016 (\$1.2 billion),

³⁵⁶ Stabilisation Unit, 2014, pp. 3–4.

³⁵⁷ UK Parliament, “Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement, Financial Year 2015–16: Written Statement by Mr. Oliver Letwin, HCWS392,” March 12, 2015.

³⁵⁸ Stabilisation Unit, 2014, p. 9.

³⁵⁹ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, *Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool*, Report 12, London, July 2012, para. 2.4, p. 5.

³⁶⁰ UK Parliament, 2015.

³⁶¹ UK Parliament, “Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015/16 and Settlement for 2016/17: Written Statement by Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen, HLWS119,” July 21, 2016.

³⁶² UK Parliament, 2015.

with a planned increase to more than 1.3 billion pounds (\$1.6 billion) per year by 2019–2020.³⁶³ In comparison, the Conflict Pool had a budget of 256 million pounds (\$312 millions) in 2011–2012.³⁶⁴ The CSSF funds priority projects that involve more than one department. For instance, it can fund deployments of the 77th Brigade (Ministry of Defence) requested by an ambassador (FCO).³⁶⁵

It remains to be seen whether the Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement can overcome some of the difficulties experienced by its predecessor. A 2012 independent evaluation mandated by the United Kingdom to assess the impact of the Conflict Pool found: “There has been a tendency for the three departments to divide the resources between them, rather than work alongside each other. We saw few examples of activities that were genuinely multidisciplinary in nature.” In addition, the report noted, “Each department brings its own mandate and interests to the table. Decision-making is by consensus and tends to be slow and painstaking. The task of administering funds tri-departmentally is so challenging that those charged with the management of the Conflict Pool have tended to shy away from the harder strategic issues.”³⁶⁶ This suggests that, even with appropriate structures and incentives, an effective whole-of-government approach remains difficult to implement.³⁶⁷

Relations with External Actors in Charge of Stabilization

Although the United Kingdom can undertake stabilization missions on its own—Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone in 2000 is one example—there is also an understanding that, “increasingly, [the UK government] seeks to work in partnership with its allies and with multilateral organizations. Stabilization approaches which are based on broad international ownership benefit from greater acceptance and coherence, as well as being able to draw on a greater range of resources and expertise.”³⁶⁸ Although cross-government integration is going reasonably well, integrating efforts with external partners—whether the United Nations or NGOs—has proven more difficult.³⁶⁹ A document by the Stabilisation Unit acknowledged that, because of the inherent political nature of stabilization—any stabilization activity presupposes a judgment on what political system should be encouraged and sustained—international agreement on these issues can at times be difficult to reach.³⁷⁰

³⁶³ UK Government, 2015, para. 5.118, p. 64.

³⁶⁴ Mark Tran, “UK Fund to Prevent Global Conflict Fails to Make Major Impact,” *Guardian*, July 13, 2012.

³⁶⁵ Interview with UK defense official, October 5, 2016.

³⁶⁶ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2012, para. 2.6, pp. 5–6.

³⁶⁷ For a critique of the division of labor among the Ministry of Defence, FCO, and Department for International Development in Helmand Province (Afghanistan), see Gordon, 2010, p. S373.

³⁶⁸ Stabilisation Unit, 2014, p. 4.

³⁶⁹ Interview with UK defense official, October 5, 2016.

³⁷⁰ Stabilisation Unit, 2014, p. 4.

Implications for the United States

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Model; Unique Aspects of the Model

1. The UK model is the most integrated of all, with the Stabilisation Unit spanning several departments and providing some unity of action for the UK government in stabilization missions.
2. A key feature of the UK model is the common pool of funding, which forces departments to work together if they want to use the Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement. As noted, this does not necessarily create perfect coordination (particularly on complex issues), but, at the very least, it provides a strong incentive for departments to engage in a dialogue.
3. The 77th Brigade's use of the "special reserves" system allows it to engage the expertise of individuals who would have otherwise never been recruited by the UK Army. This supposes creating specific modalities of recruitment for these individuals and managing relations between the "regular" and the "special" reserves—two populations with largely different cultures and approaches of the military.³⁷¹

Can These Capabilities Support U.S. Stabilization Efforts and, If So, on What Scale and How Reliably?

In the past, the United Kingdom has been keen to support U.S.-led efforts at stabilization, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. It remains to be seen how the ongoing restructuration and downsizing of the UK Army will affect (if at all) the United Kingdom's propensity to intervene in stabilization missions. So far, the concentration of capabilities in the 77th Brigade and an increased pool of funding for stabilization missions suggest that the United Kingdom intends to maintain its ability to undertake this type of operations.

One important constraint to the United Kingdom's participation in stabilization operations, however, is the necessity for the prime minister to secure a parliamentary vote authorizing overseas military action. The August 2013 narrow rejection (285 to 272 votes) by the House of Commons of Prime Minister David Cameron's motion to allow UK participation in U.S.-led strikes in Syria, for instance, shows that, in some instances, the United Kingdom will not be able to support U.S. interventions, even when the political leadership is in favor of such support.³⁷²

³⁷¹ Interview with United Kingdom defense official, October 5, 2016.

³⁷² "Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action," *BBC*, August 30, 2013.

Bibliography

AFD—See Agence Française de Développement.

Agence Française de Développement, “Historique et statuts,” webpage, July 2016.

Airault, Pascal, “Militaires et spécialistes français du développement cherchent comment travailler ensemble en Afrique,” *L’Opinion*, October 9, 2016.

Allansson, Marie, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér, “Organized Violence, 1989–2016,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2017.

Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011.

Army Regulation 350-50, *Combat Training Center Program*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 3, 2013.

Ashley, Nicholas, “Civil Affairs Support to Decisive Action: Challenges and Opportunities,” Civil Affairs Association, June 7, 2016. As of October 22, 2016:
<http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/single-post/2016/06/07/Civil-Affairs-Support-to-Decisive-Action-Challenges-and-Opportunities>

Atos Consulting and Technology Services, *Evaluation of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan: Phase V Report*, April 17, 2012.

Beale, Jonathan, “Army Sets Up New Brigade ‘For Information Age,’” *BBC*, January 31, 2015.

Bensahel, Nora, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson, *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-852-OSD, 2009. As of February 15, 2018:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG852.html>

Binnendijk, Hans, and Patrick M. Cronin, *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009.

Binnendijk, Hans, and Stuart E. Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004.

Brook, Tom Vanden, “Army Kills Controversial Social Science Program,” *USA Today*, June 29, 2015.

Center for Army Lessons Learned, *The Brigade Engineer Battalion: A Leader’s Guide*, Leavenworth, Kan., June 2015.

- , *Decisive Action Training Environment at the JRTC*, Vol. 18: *Whole of Government, Interagency, and Engagement*, Leavenworth, Kan., August 2016a.
- , *Decisive Action Training Environment at the JMRC*, Vol. 3: *Multinational Interoperability*, Leavenworth, Kan., September 2016b.
- Center for International Peace Operations, “What We Do,” webpage, undated. As of November 15, 2016:
<http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/about-zif/what-we-do.html>
- Center for Law and Military Operations, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, *Rule of Law Handbook*, Charlottesville, Va., 2011.
- Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, *Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan*, New York: Vintage Books, 2012.
- Crane, Keith, Olga Oliker, Nora Bensahel, Derek Eaton, S. Jamie Gayton, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Jeffrey Martini, John L. Nasir, Sandra Reyna, Michelle Parker, Jerry Sollinger, and Kayla M. Williams, *Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-633-A, 2009. As of February 26, 2018:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR633.html
- Cronk, Terri Moon, “Hospital Ship USNS Comfort to Anchor in Haiti at 2015 Mission’s End,” U.S. Department of Defense, September 10, 2015. As of October 25, 2016:
<http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/616820/hospital-ship-usns-comfort-to-anchor-in-haiti-at-2015-missions-end>
- Cyrus, Stephen, “The Major Crimes Task Force-Afghanistan: A Case Study and Examination of Implications for Future FBI Capacity Building Programs,” *Homeland Security Affairs Journal*, December 2014. As of March 1, 2018:
<https://www.hsaj.org/articles/3345>
- Daniels, Matt, “Navy Disestablishes MCAST,” U.S. Department of the Navy, May 16, 2014. As of October 25, 2016:
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=81067
- Daraghi, Borzou, “German Questions Involvement in Afghanistan,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 2010.
- Davidson, Janine, *Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011.
- Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, *Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2014*, Newport, R.I., undated. As of November 1, 2016:
<https://globalnetplatform.org/system/files/517/DIILS%20FY2014%20Report.pdf>

- Defense Manpower Data Center, “Active Duty Military Strength by Service (Updated Monthly),” webpage, undated. As of August 24, 2016:
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Information Paper: Programs Directorate; Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief & Mine Action Division,” July 2012. As of November 4, 2016:
<http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/ohdaca.pdf>
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/FY 2009 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2007.
- , *Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., May 2009.
- , *Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2010.
- , *Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2011.
- , *Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2012.
- , *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., April 2013.
- , *Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., March 2014.
- , *Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Estimates*, Washington, D.C., February 2015.
- Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005.
- Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, August 28, 2014.
- Department of Defense Directive 5205.82, *Defense Institution Building*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 27, 2016.
- Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009.
- Department of Defense Instruction 6000.16, *Military Health Support for Stability Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 17, 2010.
- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, “Afghanistan,” webpage, undated. As of November 16, 2016:
<https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/358.html>
- Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-557-SRF, 2007. As of February 15, 2018:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557.html>

DoD—See U.S. Department of Defense.

DoDI—See Department of Defense Instruction.

Donigan, Jonathan M., “Intelligence and the Integrated Training Exercise,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 2015. As of October 22, 2016:
<https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2015/08/intelligence-and-integrated-training-exercise#>

DoS—See U.S. Department of State.

Duboulet, Olivier, *Les actions civilo-militaires et la prise en compte de l’environnement humain dans les opérations extérieures*, briefing, Lyon, France: Trinôme académique d’Amiens, January 27, 2015. As of November 16, 2016:
http://www.ac-amiens.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/ACADEMIE/Partenariats/TRINOME/SEMINAIRE2015/Presentation_intervention_Lieutenant-colonel_Olivier_Duboulet.pdf

Egel, Daniel, and Peter Glick, *Assessing the Stabilizing Effects of Development Programming: A Review of USAID’s Evaluation Efforts in Afghanistan*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, WR-1106-MSI, 2016. As of February 22, 2018:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1106.html

Egel, Daniel, Charles P. Ries, Ben Connable, Todd C. Helmus, Eric Robinson, Isaac Baruffi, Melissa A. Bradley, Kurt Card, Kathleen Loa, Sean Mann, Fernando Sedano, Stephan B. Seabrook, and Robert Stewart, *Investing in the Fight: Assessing the Use of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1508-OSD, 2016. As of February 15, 2018:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1508.html

EntwicklungspolitikOnline, “AA und BMZ verteilen Zuständigkeiten neu,” webpage, November 11, 2011. As of November 16, 2016:
http://www.epo.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7828:aa-und-bmz-verteilen-zustaendigkeiten-neu&catid=13&Itemid=55

European Commission, “Central African Republic: EU Launches Its First Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development,” press release, July 14, 2014. As of November 16, 2016:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-829_en.htm

Faram, Mark D., “2015 Outlook: Master-at-Arms Ranks to Grow,” *Navy Times*, December 27, 2014. As of October 25, 2016:
<https://www.navytimes.com/story/military/careers/2014/12/27/ma-navy-ranks-carriers-security-detachments/20768589/>

Federal Ministry of Development, “Mali: Situation and Cooperation,” webpage, undated. As of November 16, 2016:

http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/subsahara/mali/zusammenarbeit/index.html

Feilke, Markus, “German Experience in Police Building in Afghanistan,” paper presented at the GRIPS State-Building Workshop 2010: Organizing Police Forces in Post-Conflict Peace-Support Operations, Tokyo, January 27–28, 2010. As of November 16, 2016:

<http://www.grips.ac.jp/r-center/wp-content/uploads/10-02.pdf>

de Félignon, Amaury, *Caveats to Civilian Aid Programs in Counterinsurgency: The French Experience in Afghanistan*, Paris: French Institute of International Relations, Focus Stratégique No. 24, December 2010. As of November 16, 2016:

<https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/enotes/focus-strategie/caveats-civilian-aid-programs-counterinsurgency-french>

Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2008.

Field Manual 3-07, *Stability*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2014.

Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 2013.

Finnegan, Conor, “Trump Proposes Deep Cuts in State Budget,” *abcnews.go.com*, February 12, 2018. As of March 7, 2018:

<http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-proposes-deep-cuts-state-department-budget/story?id=53031980>

Fischer, Sebastian, “De Maizière schrumpft die Armee,” *Spiegel Online*, May 18, 2011. As of November 16, 2016:

<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehrreform-de-maiziere-schrumpft-die-armee-a-763273.html>

Fitzgerald, David, *Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2013.

Flynn, Michael T., Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, January 2010.

Formuszewicz, Ryszarda, and Marcin Terlikowski, *Willing and (Un)able. New Defense Policy Guidelines and Reorientation of the Bundeswehr*, Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, July 2011.

- French Army, *Gagner la bataille, conduire à la paix: Les forces terrestres dans les conflits aujourd'hui et demain*, Paris: Centre de doctrine d'emploi des forces, FT 01, January 2007.
- French Ministry of Defense, *Contribution des forces armées à la Stabilisation*, Paris: Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations, February 2, 2010.
- , *Coopération civilo-militaire*, Paris: Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations, July 17, 2012a.
- , “Le Centre interarmées des actions sur l'environnement,” webpage, August 29, 2012b. As of November 16, 2016:
<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/interarmees/le-centre-interarmees-des-actions-sur-l-environnement/le-centre-interarmees-des-actions-sur-l-environnement>
- , *French White Paper on Defense and National Security*, Paris, 2013.
- , *Dossier de presse: Opération Barkhane*, Paris, July 2016.
- French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Stabiliser les pays en sortie de crise,” October 2016. As of November 16, 2016:
<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/le-ministere-et-son-reseau/centre-de-crise-et-de-soutien/stabiliser-les-pays-en-sortie-de-crise/>
- Galula, David, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958*, 2nd ed., Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-478-1-ARPA/RC, 2006. As of February 15, 2018:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG478-1.html>
- Gates, Robert M., *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.
- Gautier, Jacques, Daniel Reiner, Jean-Marie Bockel, Jeanny Lorgeoux, Cédric Perrin, and Gilbert Roger, *Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées sur le bilan des opérations extérieures*, No. 794, Paris: French Senate, July 13, 2016a. As of November 16, 2016:
<https://www.senat.fr/rap/r15-794/r15-7941.pdf>
- , *Interventions extérieures de la France: Renforcer l'efficacité militaire par une approche globale coordonnée*, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Armed Forces Commission, French Senate, July 17, 2016b.
- German Association of the Bundeswehr, “Ministerin informiert zur ‘Trendwende Personal,’” September 23, 2016.
- German Federal Foreign Office, “Special Representative of the Federal Government for the Middle East Stability Partnership,” webpage, undated.

- , “Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilization and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” webpage, July 5, 2015. As of November 16, 2016:
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/AAmt/Abteilungen/S_node.html
- German Federal Ministry of Defence, *2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, Berlin, July 2016.
- , “Defence Policy Guidelines,” May 27, 2011.
- , “Trendwende Personal: Tagesbefehl der Ministerin,” May 10, 2016.
- German Joint Support Service, “Über uns,” Zentrum Zivil-Militärische Zusammenarbeit der Bundeswehr, webpage, last updated June 3, 2016. As of November 16, 2016:
http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/kdoskb!/ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK94uyk-OyUfL2S1KKixNK0dL2q1LySoqrcKqBcaWpSalFpXrF-QbajIgAX-LqR
- “German Military Gets a Personnel Boost,” *Deutsche Welle*, May 10, 2016.
- “Germany Discusses Sending Bundeswehr Troops to Mali,” *Deutsche Welle*, November 23, 2015.
- GIZ—See Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2002.
- Gordon, Stuart, “The United Kingdom’s Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: The Impact on Humanitarian Actors,” *Disasters*, Vol. 34, S3, 2010.
- Gott, Kendall, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946–1953*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, 2005.
- Gunderson, Jon, and Melanne A. Civic, eds., *Unity of Mission: Civilian-Military Teams in War and Peace*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 2016.
- Hagel, Chuck, “Memorandum: Designation of United States Army as Joint Proponent for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations,” U.S. Department of Defense, June 11, 2013.
- Hammes, T. X., “Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, eds., *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War*, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, September 2015.
- Hanisch, Michael, *A New Quality of Engagement: Germany’s Extended Military Operation in North Mali*, Berlin: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, 2015.

- Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, *The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century*, Washington, D.C., September 2016.
- Heyres, Wernher C., *Seabees: National Instrument of Power Projection*, Quantico, Va.: U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, May 6, 2013.
- Hicks, Kathleen H., and Christine E. Wormuth, *The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2009.
- Holshek, Christopher, ed., *PKSOI Paper, Vol. 3: 2016–2017 Civil Affairs Issue Papers: Leveraging Civil Affairs*, Carlisle, Pa.: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2017.
- Hooker, Richard D., and Joseph J. Collins, eds., *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War*, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015.
- Hughes, Michelle, and Michael Miklaucic, *Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and Transition*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2016.
- Independent Commission for Aid Impact, *Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool*, London, July 2012.
- Infratest Dimap, “Bundeswehr: Mehrheit lehnt Ausweitung der Auslandseinsätze ab,” survey, January 2014. As of November 16, 2016:
<http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/umfragen/aktuell/bundeswehr-mehrheit-lehnt-ausweitung-der-auslandseinsaetze-ab/>
- Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, *CIMIC Capabilities*, Brussels, July 2013.
- “Iraq Crisis: US Says Mount Sinjar Evacuation Unlikely,” *BBC*, August 14, 2014.
- Janning, Josef, “Germany’s Foreign Ministry Reinvents Itself,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 18, 2015.
- Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, *Decade of War, Vol. 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, Suffolk, Va., 2012.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army War College, and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media*, Unified Action Handbook Series Book Two, February 19, 2016.
- Joint Publication 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2, 2016.
- Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 3, 2016.

- Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 22, 2013.
- Joint Publication 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 6, 2016.
- Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 11, 2013.
- Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011.
- JP—See Joint Publication.
- Judson, Jen, “Army Chief Taking Hard Look at Building Advise-and-Assist Brigades,” *Defense News*, January 21, 2016. As of October 24, 2016:
<http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/army/2016/01/21/army-chief-taking-hard-look-building-advise-and-assist-brigades/79116554/>
- Kelly, Terrence K., Ellen E. Tunstall, Thomas S. Szayna, and Deanna Weber Prine, *Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-580-RC, 2008. As of February 16, 2018:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG580.html>
- Kerr, Alexandra, and Michael Miklaucic, eds., *Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense Institution Building*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2017.
- KfW, *Annual Report*, Frankfurt, 2015.
- Klein, Ellen, “Bridging the Potomac: How a Rule of Law Field Force Strikes Balance Between Security and Development Operations,” *Small Wars Journal*, March 25, 2013.
- Ladwig, Walter, *The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Lamb, Christopher J., James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies, and Theodore T. Pikulsky, “The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 70, 2013, pp. 21–29.
- Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, *Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Report to the U.S. Congress*, Washington, D.C., 2017.
- Lindner, Tobias, “Haushalt 2016—Einzelplan Verteidigung,” November 25, 2015. As of November 16, 2016:
<https://www.gruene-bundestag.de/parlament/bundestagsreden/2015/november/tobias-lindner-haushalt-2016-einzelplan-verteidigung.html>

- Long, Austin, *The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Culture in the US and UK*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2016.
- Lopez, C. Todd, “Army Training for DATE with Hybrid Threats,” U.S. Army, November 14, 2012. As of October 22, 2016:
<https://www.army.mil/article/91010>
- Malkasian, Carter, *War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Mansoor, Peter R., *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*, New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013.
- Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command Integrated Training Exercise Order*, Twentynine Palms, Calif., Combat Center Order 35000.14A, April 9, 2015.
- Marine Corps Training and Education Command, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Plan, Enclosure 1: MAGTF Training Program Overview*, Training and Education Command Order 3502.2, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va., February 26, 2013.
- Markel, M. Wade, Bryan W. Hallmark, Peter Schirmer, Louay Constant, Jaime L. Hastings, Henry A. Leonard, Kristin Leuschner, Lauren A. Mayer, Caolionn O'Connell, Christina Panis, Jose Rodriguez, Lisa Saum-Manning, and Jonathan Welch, *A Preliminary Assessment of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) Concept's Implications for Army Personnel Management*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1065-A, 2015. As of February 16, 2018:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1065.html
- Marquis, Jefferson P., Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Justin Beck, Derek Eaton, Scott Hiromoto, David R. Howell, Janet Lewis, Charlotte Lynch, Michael J. Neumann, and Cathryn Quantic Thurston, *Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-942-A, 2010. As of February 16, 2018:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG942.html>
- Martin, Joseph M., “NTC: The Army’s Training Oasis in the Mojave,” *ARMY Magazine*, November 12, 2015.
- Maulny, Jean-Pierre, Sylvie Matelly, and Fabio Liberti, *Les perspectives de cooperation (nationale, européenne) et d’interarmisation de l’outil de defense: quels partages capacitaires possibles et quelles conséquences pour l’Armée de terre?* Paris: Institut de Relations Internationales et de Stratégie, March 2007. As of November 16, 2016:
http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2007_cooperation.pdf

- McFate, Sean, “Lessons Learned from Liberia: Security Sector Reform in a Failed State,” *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 153, No. 1, 2008, pp. 62–66.
- McNerney, Michael J., Stuart Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, David Stebbins, Renanah Miles, Angela O'Mahony, Chaoling Feng, and Tim Oliver, *Defense Institution Building in Africa: An Assessment*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1232-OSD, 2016. As of February 16, 2018:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1232.html
- Melander, Erik, Therese Pettersson, and Lotta Themner, “Organized Violence, 1989–2015,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2016, pp. 727–742.
- Merchet, Jean-Dominique, “Propagande sur le web: l’armée tâtonne,” *L’Opinion*, February 5, 2015. As of November 16, 2016:
<http://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/propagande-web-l-armee-tatonne-21073>
- Miklaucic, Michael, ed., *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Complex Operations, 2009.
- Moyar, Mark, *Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police*, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.: Joint Special Operations University, October 2014.
- Muller, Christopher W., *USMILGP Colombia: Transforming Security Cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism*, thesis, Monterrey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2006.
- Naland, John K., *Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011.
- National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States, January 28, 2016*, Arlington, Va., January 28, 2016.
- National Security Presidential Directive 24, “The Iraq Post War Planning Office,” Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 20 2003.
- National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 11, 2004.
- National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 7, 2005.
- NATO—See North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Commitment to Operations and Missions: Germany,” April 2, 2009. As of November 16, 2016:
<http://www.nato.int/issues/commitment/docs/090402-germany.pdf>
- Nowowiejski, Dean A., “Regaining the Edge in Combined Arms,” *ARMY Magazine*, March 2013.

- Olson, Wyatt, “USNS Mercy Set to Lead Pacific’s Largest Disaster-Relief Preparation,” *Stars and Stripes*, May 16, 2016. As of October 25, 2016:
<http://www.stripes.com/news/usns-mercy-set-to-lead-pacific-s-largest-disaster-relief-preparation-mission-1.410032>
- Parker, Ned, “Torture by Iraqi Militias: The Report Washington Did Not Want You to See,” Reuters, December 14, 2015.
- Parks, Rachel, “Civil Affairs Brigade Activates at Fort Hood,” U.S. Army, September 22, 2011. As of December 6, 2016:
https://www.army.mil/article/66011/Civil_Affairs_brigade_activates_at_Fort_Hood
- Perito, Robert, *Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009.
- Peters, Heidi M., Moshe Schwartz, and Lawrence Kapp, *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007–2016*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2016.
- Prime Minister’s Office, “COBR Meeting on Ebola: 8 October 2014,” press release, October 8, 2014. As of November 16, 2016:
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cobr-meeting-on-ebola-8-october-2014>
- Public Law 114-328, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Sec. 333, Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity, December 23, 2016.
- Puglierin, Jana, *Germany’s Enable & Enhance Initiative: What Is It About?* Berlin: Federal Academy for Security Policy, 2016. As of November 16, 2016:
https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2016_01.pdf
- Reinert, Patrick J., and John F. Hussey, “The Military’s Role in Rule of Law,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 77, 2015, pp. 120–127.
- Robinson, Linda, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1236-OSD, 2016. As of February 23, 2018:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1236.html
- Robinson, Linda, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwille, and Raphael S. Cohen, *Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-816-A, 2014. As of February 16, 2018:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR816.html
- Saideman, Stephen M., and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2011, pp. 67–84.

- Satar, Majid, “Kosten der Ertüchtigung: Deutschland zahlt 100 Millionen Euro an Krisenstaaten,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 20, 2016.
- Schadlow, Nadia, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017.
- Scheffer, David, “The Security Council and International Law on Military Occupations,” in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum eds., *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- SIGAR— See Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
- SIGIR—See Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
- Simmons, Katie, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “NATO Public Opinion: Wary of Russia, Leery of Action on Ukraine,” Pew Research Center, June 10, 2015.
- Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*, Arlington, Va., September 2017.
- Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “All Reports,” webpage, undated. As of February 26, 2018:
<https://www.sigar.mil/allreports>
- , *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, Washington, D.C., 2009.
- , *Long-Standing Weaknesses in Department of State’s Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program*, Washington, D.C., January 25, 2010.
- , *Learning from Iraq: Final Report of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction*, Washington, D.C., March 2013.
- Stabilisation Unit, *The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation (2014)*, London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, and Department for International Development, May 2014.
- Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, “Germany’s New Global Role: Berlin Steps Up,” *Foreign Affairs*, July–August 2016.
- “Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action,” *BBC*, August 30, 2013.
- Syria Recovery Trust Fund, “Overview,” webpage, undated. As of November 16, 2016:
http://www.srtfund.org/articles/1_overview

- Szayna, Thomas S., Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-646-A, 2007. As of February 16, 2018:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG646.html>
- Technisches Hilfswerk, “What We Do,” webpage, undated. As of November 16, 2016:
https://www.thw.de/EN/THW/Overview/overview_node.html
- , “Emergency Accommodation and ‘WASH’: Humanitarian Assistance from the THW,” webpage, August 19, 2016. As of November 16, 2016:
https://www.thw.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/EN/Meldungen/international/2016/08/meldung_003_welttag_humanitaere_hilfe.html
- THW—See Technisches Hilfswerk.
- Torreon, Barbara Salazar, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2017*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 12, 2017.
- Tran, Mark, “UK Fund to Prevent Global Conflict Fails to Make Major Impact,” *Guardian*, July 13, 2012.
- Tucker, Patrick, “How McMaster Could Change the Way the US Goes to War,” *Defense One*, February 20, 2017.
- Tyson, Ann Scott, and Spencer S. Hsu, “U.S. Military Dispatches Aircraft Carrier, Other Assets to Haiti,” *Washington Post*, January 13, 2010.
- UK Army, “77th Brigade,” webpage, undated-a. As of November 16, 2016:
<http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/39492.aspx>
- , “The British Army in Africa,” webpage, undated-b. As of November 16, 2016:
<http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx>
- , *Transforming the British Army: An Update*, London, July 2013.
- UK Government, “Stabilisation Unit: About Us,” webpage, undated-a. As of November 16, 2016:
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about>
- , “Working for SU,” webpage, undated-b. As of November 16, 2016:
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about/recruitment>
- , *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*, London, November 2015.

- UK Ministry of Defence, “UK Team Deploys to Train Nigerian Forces Fighting Boko Haram,” January 13, 2016. As of November 16, 2016:
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-team-deploys-to-train-nigerian-forces-fighting-boko-haram>
- UK Parliament, *The Comprehensive Approach: The Point of War Is Not Just to Win but to Make a Better Peace*, London: House of Commons, Defense Committee, March 18, 2010.
- , “Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement, Financial Year 2015–16: Written Statement by Mr. Oliver Letwin, HCWS392,” March 12, 2015. As of November 16, 2016:
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2015-03-12/HCWS392/>
- , “Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015/16 and Settlement for 2016/17: Written Statement by Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen, HLWS119,” July 21, 2016. As of November 16, 2016:
<https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Lords/2016-07-21/HLWS119/>
- United Nations Development Programme in Iraq, *Funding Facility for Stabilization: 2017 Q3 Report*, 2017.
- U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance Fact Sheet,” undated. As of November 16, 2016:
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/OFDA_Fact_Sheet.pdf
- , *USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense*, Washington, D.C., June 2015.
- , “Foreign Aid Explorer,” last updated December 12, 2017. As of March 1, 2018:
<https://explorer.usaid.gov/query>
- , “Organization,” webpage, last updated February 16, 2018. As of February 22, 2018:
<https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization>
- U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Transition Initiatives, “Criteria for Engagement: USAID/OTI’s Engagement Criteria,” webpage, last updated June 22, 2017. As of February 27, 2018:
<https://www.usaid.gov/political-transition-initiatives/criteria-for-engagement>
- U.S. Army, Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) historical database, accessed October 12, 2016.
- U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, *Training for Decisive Action: Collected Insights from Commanders and Leaders on their Experience and the National Training Center*, Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014.

- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Building Strong: Serving the Nation and Armed Forces*, 2010.
- , *Overseas Contingency Operations Playbook*, Leavenworth, Kan.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2015.
- U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, FMSWeb, website, data pulled on October 10, 2016. As of February 22, 2018:
<https://fmsweb.fms.army.mil/unprotected/splash/>
- U.S. Army G-1, “End Strength Increase,” webpage, March 20, 2017. As of March 7, 2018:
<https://www.army.mil/standto/2017-03-20>
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept, Win in a Complex World, 2020–2040*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Fort Eustis, Va., October 14, 2014.
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Combat Studies Institute, *Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives*, proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2006 Military History Symposium, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
- U.S. Code, Title 22, Section 2420, Police Training Prohibition, January 7, 2011.
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Demographics 2009: Profile of the Military Community*, Washington, D.C., 2009.
- , *Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Defense*, Washington, D.C., January 2012.
- , *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, D.C., 2014.
- U.S. Department of Defense, Inspector General, *Summary of Lessons Learned—DOD IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, Assist and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan*, Washington, D.C., DOD IG 2015-093, March 31, 2015.
- U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, *Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, Washington, D.C., 2015.
- U.S. Department of Justice, “About the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training,” webpage, last updated May 26, 2015. As of March 1, 2018:
<https://www.justice.gov/criminal-opdat/worldwide-activities-and-programs-alternate>
- , “Our Programs,” webpage, last updated January 23, 2018. As of March 1, 2018:
<https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap/our-programs>
- U.S. Department of State, “About PRM,” webpage, undated-a. As of November 4, 2016:
<http://www.state.gov/j/prm/about/index.htm>

- , “Plans and Policy Division,” undated-b. As of December 5, 2016:
<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/ppd/>
- , “Resources,” webpage, undated-c. As of December 12, 2016:
<http://www.state.gov/j/cso/resources/>
- , *Foreign Affairs Manual*, Washington, D.C., 2013.
- , *Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2017*, Washington, D.C., February 9, 2016a. As of November 4, 2016:
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252179.pdf>
- , “Department of State Organization Chart: November 2016,” webpage, November 2016b. As of March 7, 2018:
<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99484.htm>
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix*, Washington, D.C., April 1, 2005. As of November 16, 2016:
<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm>
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, *Inspection of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations*, Washington, D.C., March 2014.
- U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, Washington, D.C., 2010.
- U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, Washington, D.C., 2013.
- U.S. Department of the Army, G-35, DAMO-SSO, *Army Stability Operations Self Assessment: Report on Implementation of DoDI 3000.05*, Washington, D.C., March 2011.
- U.S. Department of the Army and Provost Marshal General, *2025 Military Police Force Strategic Plan*, Washington, D.C., June 23, 2016.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation*, Washington, D.C., March 2009.
- U.S. Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Washington D.C., 2009.
- U.S. Navy, Military Sealift Command, “USNS Comfort (T-A H 20) Hospital Ship,” fact sheet, undated.

- Wall, Peter, “Defence Engagement: The British Army’s Role in Building Security and Stability Overseas,” transcript, London: Chatham House, March 12, 2014. As of November 16, 2016: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140312Defence%20Engagement.pdf
- Waller, Stephen, Jose Fonseca, Joseph Anderson, James Fike, and Sean Murphy, “What Every Airman Needs to Know About Medical Stability Operations,” *Air & Space Power Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1, January–February 2012.
- Watts, Stephen, J. Michael Polich, and Derek Eaton, “Rapid Regeneration of Irregular Warfare Capacity,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 78, July 2015.
- Weiss, Stefani, “Germany’s Security Policy: From Territorial Defense to Defending the Liberal World Order?” *Newpolitik*, Bertelsmann Foundation, October 2016.
- Welch, James, and Adam Stoddard, “Fixing Intelligence II: Why Army Intelligence Should Look Beyond the Enemy,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, January–March 2014.
- Wendling, Cécile, *The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective*, Paris: Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire, Cahier de l’IRSEM No. 6, November 2010.
- Wright, Donald P., and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003–January 2005*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008.
- Yacoubian, Mona, *Lessons Learned for Stabilization in Syria*, Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, June 2014.
- Yates, Lawrence A., *The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.
- Zakem, Vera, and Emily Mushen, *Charting the Course for Civil Affairs in the New Normal*, Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 2015.

The pendulum regarding the level of U.S. military participation in stabilization efforts has swung dramatically since 2001, from a low level of preparation and participation in the early days of the Afghanistan and Iraq operations in 2003, to widespread stabilization activities costing billions of dollars in the ensuing years, to significantly scaled-back forces and resources devoted to stabilization in recent years. To remedy the initial lack of preparation, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued a directive with guidance on stabilization requirements in 2005 and then updated it with more expansive requirements in 2009. This report supports DoD efforts to update this guidance by assessing the accumulated experience of the past 17 years and evaluating the appropriate roles for the U.S. military and its ability to execute them in conjunction with interagency and other key partners.

Without stabilization, successful warfighting often does not produce desired political outcomes. Yet warfighters are not the most capable actors for many stabilization tasks. Therefore, the authors recommend shifting DoD guidance on stabilization away from requiring high levels of proficiency in a large number of tasks to emphasizing three key roles for DoD: prioritizing security tasks; providing support to other actors performing stability functions; and performing crosscutting informational, planning, coordination, and physical support roles.



NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

www.rand.org

\$37.00

ISBN-10 1-9774-0046-9
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-0046-8

