



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**CUBAN AND SALVADORAN EXILES: DIFFERENTIAL
COLD WAR-ERA U.S. POLICY IMPACTS ON THEIR
SECOND-GENERATIONS' ASSIMILATION**

by

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June 2018

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2018	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CUBAN AND SALVADORAN EXILES: DIFFERENTIAL COLD WAR-ERA U.S. POLICY IMPACTS ON THEIR SECOND-GENERATIONS' ASSIMILATION			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Amal Nazzall				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) American society conventionally expects immigrants to assimilate, yet contemporary views question whether Latin American immigrants are choosing to conform to this standard. However, this perspective does not account for the structural constraints placed upon immigrants through the influence of U.S. foreign and immigration policy. During the Cold War, two cases—Cuba in the 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s—demonstrated differential U.S. policy responses to sustained, large-scale exile migrations to the United States, particularly to Miami and Los Angeles. In these cases, the U.S. response was to welcome and provide a positive reception to Cubans in Miami, while Salvadorans were excluded and constrained by the negative reception afforded to them as illegal migrants in Los Angeles, with both responses stemming from U.S. foreign policy interests in Latin America. Twenty-five years after the first wave of exiles from each of these countries, both second generations appear to be assimilating in terms of educational attainment, but Salvadoran-Americans lag behind Cuban-Americans in occupational attainment and income levels. These differential outcomes indicate that reception contexts—government responses, economic opportunity, societal attitudes, and presence of ethnic communities—may accelerate or delay exile groups' rates of structural assimilation, with legal status playing a major role in determining whether groups assimilate upward or downward.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS immigration, U.S. foreign policy, assimilation, Cuba, El Salvador, Cold War, American identity, refugee, migration, diaspora, context of reception, Latin America, Western Hemisphere, Central America, Caribbean, exile			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 127	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

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POLICY IMPACTS ON THEIR SECOND-GENERATIONS' ASSIMILATION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(WESTERN HEMISPHERE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

American society conventionally expects immigrants to assimilate, yet contemporary views question whether Latin American immigrants are choosing to conform to this standard. However, this perspective does not account for the structural constraints placed upon immigrants through the influence of U.S. foreign and immigration policy. During the Cold War, two cases—Cuba in the 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s—demonstrated differential U.S. policy responses to sustained, large-scale exile migrations to the United States, particularly to Miami and Los Angeles. In these cases, the U.S. response was to welcome and provide a positive reception to Cubans in Miami, while Salvadorans were excluded and constrained by the negative reception afforded to them as illegal migrants in Los Angeles, with both responses stemming from U.S. foreign policy interests in Latin America. Twenty-five years after the first wave of exiles from each of these countries, both second generations appear to be assimilating in terms of educational attainment, but Salvadoran-Americans lag behind Cuban-Americans in occupational attainment and income levels. These differential outcomes indicate that reception contexts—government responses, economic opportunity, societal attitudes, and presence of ethnic communities—may accelerate or delay exile groups’ rates of structural assimilation, with legal status playing a major role in determining whether groups assimilate upward or downward.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CILS	Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study
CRP	Cuban Refugee Program
DED	Deferred Enforced Departure
EVD	Extended Voluntary Departure
FMLN	Farabundo Martí Liberation Front
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act
NACARA	Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act
TPS	Temporary Protected Status
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am fortunate to have attended the Naval Postgraduate School, and several people have made this educational journey possible. I have to thank my bright and beautiful children who bore the brunt of the late nights and homework weekends and my wonderful and supportive husband who was instrumental in making this work possible. I love you. Additionally, a special thank you is in order for my mom, mother-in-law, and sister, who flew from Florida to California on multiple occasions to help when my husband was deployed. I am eternally grateful to you all!

I would also like to thank the preeminent writing coach, Matt Norton, for his unlimited grammatical insights, good humor, and flexible support to my writing process. Finally, to my advisors, Dr. Tristan J. Mabry and Dr. Christopher Darnton, thank you for your time and guidance, and for allowing me to explore a topic that was of personal significance to me. I am a smarter woman and more capable officer for having been your student.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. IMPORTANCE

The United States has a history of enacting immigration policies as a part of its broader foreign policy efforts.¹ This was evident in the early 1960s when, at the height of the Cold War, foreign policy concerns exerted a major influence over U.S. immigration policy decisions toward Central America and the Caribbean.² President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 Cuban Refugee Program invited Cubans to flee communism and emigrate to the U.S., which, until 2017, granted most Cubans asylum.³ The converse was true for Salvadorans: during its civil war from 1980–1992, the Reagan administration supported the anti-communist junta as a Cold War ally⁴ and, as a result, refused asylum to migrants fleeing widespread state-sponsored violence.⁵ Nonetheless, many fled from El Salvador to the U.S. illegally and lived under a precarious and uncertain legal status⁶ Today, the Cuban and Salvadoran immigrant populations in the U.S. are comparable in size—1.9 million as of 2013—but as a whole, appear to have divergent assimilation patterns in terms of criminality, education rates, occupational attainment, and income.⁷ These two cases point to a link between U.S. policy and immigrant assimilation patterns in the U.S., prompting

¹ Christopher Mitchell, “Preface,” in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), x.

² Christopher Mitchell, “Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico,” in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 6.

³ *Ibid.*, 25, 39; Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Frances Robles, “Obama Ends Exemption for Cubans Who Arrive Without Visas,” *New York Times*, January 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/world/americas/cuba-obama-wet-foot-dry-foot-policy.html?_r=0.

⁴ William Stanley, “El Salvador: State-Building before and after Democratisation, 1980–95,” *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006): 101–102, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/4017662>.

⁵ Susan Bibler Coutin, “Introduction,” *Nations of Emigrants: Shifting Boundaries of Citizenship in El Salvador and the United States* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2007), 6.

⁶ Bibler, “Introduction,” 8–9.

⁷ Gustavo Lopez and Eileen Patten, *The Impact of Slowing Immigration: Foreign-Born Share Falls Among 14 Largest U.S. Hispanic Origin Groups* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2015/09/2015-09-15_hispanic-origin-profiles-summary-report_FINAL.pdf.

the following question: how has U.S. Cold War–era foreign and immigration policy affected the assimilation of Cuban and Salvadoran populations in the U.S.?

Ultimately, this thesis finds that in the context of the Cold War between 1959 and 1980, U.S. foreign policy determined U.S. immigration policy towards Cuba and El Salvador. In turn, the emerging national position vis-à-vis each country shaped the national and enclave cities’—Miami and Los Angeles—context of reception to each immigrant group: the positive context of reception for Cubans led to successful upward structural assimilation in the second-generation adult children of the initial diaspora, and the negative, later passively accepting, context of reception led to partial upward structural assimilation for the Salvadoran population. Within the reception context, both cases demonstrated that the legal status accorded to them were instrumental to their upward structural assimilation: Cubans were given access to permanent residency and citizenship from their arrivals, but Salvadorans were accorded this privilege a few years after their arrival. This difference in legal status affected the rate of structural assimilation for each case and indicates that according legal status to immigrants—whether refugees, exiles, or illegals—may facilitate structural assimilation in the long-term.

Particularly in today’s political and social landscape, this question warrants investigation because immigration policy and assimilation shape American identity. Whether the United States is a “nation of immigrants,” as declared by President John F. Kennedy—echoing President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s sentiments—or a nation *at risk* of immigrants, as feared by Samuel Huntington—echoing modern-day nativists across the country—the process of immigration is undoubtedly essential to the future of American identity.⁸ Throughout America’s immigration history, dating back to the Founding Fathers, society has promoted and expected the assimilation of immigrants into Anglo-American culture.⁹ Without arguing the merits or drawbacks of such an expectation, this thesis begins with an understanding that assimilation is a major concern for the emergent nationalist political movement in American society; thus, it merits analysis as to how best achieve it

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 38–39.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 131–132.

without jeopardizing American values.¹⁰ Contrary to Huntington's polemic assertions about the Hispanic immigrant population, intra-Hispanic variation exists and may be best explained by the influence of structural factors as opposed to cultural ones.

Considering the multitude of factors that affect immigrant assimilation and the emergence of a Hispanic subculture that academics like Huntington contend do not conform to American mainstream culture, two areas emerge for exploration. First, how do the assimilation patterns of intra-Hispanic immigrant groups in the U.S. compare? Second to what extent does U.S. foreign policy in concert with American immigration policy influence assimilation patterns?

With regard to the first question, on Hispanic immigration to the U.S., extensive studies have been conducted on Mexican migration; however, significant and growing immigrant populations from Central America and the Caribbean have also made their way to the U.S. and, by comparison, are less studied.¹¹ Moreover, Mexican migration to the U.S. has slowed continuously since 2007; by 2015, the net migration flow was actually negative.¹² In contrast, immigration from Cuba has increased since the 2014 normalization of relations with the island,¹³ and the immigrant population from Central America has increased consistently for the past few decades, without signs of abatement.¹⁴ The vast differences between the countries and their émigrés demonstrate Hispanic immigration is

¹⁰ Carlos Lozada, "Samuel Huntington, a prophet for the Trump era," *Washington Post*, July 18, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2017/07/18/samuel-huntington-a-prophet-for-the-trump-era/?utm_term=.e516e67b1578.

¹¹ Michael J. White and Colin Johnson, "Perspectives on Migration Theory – Sociology and Political Science," in *International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution*, ed. Michael J. White (New York: Springer, 2016), 71; Donato, et al. "Introduction: Migration in the Americas: Mexico and Latin America in Comparative Context," 6.

¹² Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, *More Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to the US*, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015, <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/11/19/chapter-1-migration-flows-between-the-u-s-and-mexico-have-slowed-and-turned-toward-mexico/>.

¹³ Jens Manuel Krogstad, "Surge in Cuban immigration to U.S. continued through 2016," Pew Research Center, 2017, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/cuban-immigration-to-u-s-surges-as-relations-warm/>.

¹⁴ Gabriel Lesser and Jeanne Batalova, "Central American Immigrants in the United States," Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-immigrants-united-states>.

far from a monolithic movement¹⁵—neither the political context of Mexican immigration nor its assimilation patterns is representative of all Hispanic populations, particularly when migrations are due to political shocks and violence.¹⁶ Insofar as the quantity of immigrants from a particular country affects their assimilation, these diverging immigration rates point to a potential spectrum of assimilation patterns.

As to the second question, scholars like Jorge Dominguez and Christopher Mitchell pioneered the study of U.S. foreign policy’s intersection with immigration policy in the Western Hemisphere, but their focus has been on the interaction of the two for policy formulation.¹⁷ The larger body of immigration policy studies focuses on the flow of migration both from the sending states and to the receiving states, with an emphasis on political economy.¹⁸ This thesis builds upon Dominguez and Mitchell’s explanation of immigration and foreign policy-making and applies this nexus to the incorporation of Hispanic immigrants into receiving societies, specifically the United States.

Additionally, because the U.S. government applies various immigration policies to intra-Hispanic immigrant groups, understanding policy’s effect on U.S. reception to immigrants from particular countries of origin provides nuance to assimilation patterns.¹⁹ To contribute to the body of knowledge on the variety of intra-Hispanic, non-Mexican migration, this research focuses on two Cold War migrations that were prompted by and met with diverging U.S. policy responses: the 1960s Cuban and 1980s Salvadoran diasporas. For Cuban immigrants, U.S. policy granted them virtually automatic legal status and assistance, generating a divergent experience from Salvadorans, who for decades

¹⁵ Katharine M. Donato, et al. “Introduction: Migration in the Americas: Mexico and Latin America in Comparative Context,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 630 (2010): 13–14, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/20743985>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Christopher Mitchell, “Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico,” in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 6–10.

¹⁸ Donato, et al. “Introduction: Migration in the Americas: Mexico and Latin America in Comparative Context,” 12.

¹⁹ Seth J. Schwartz, et al., “Perceived Context of Reception among Recent Hispanic Immigrants: Conceptualization, Instrument Development, and Preliminary Validation,” *Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychology* 20, no. 1 (January 2014): 2, doi:10.1037/a0033391.

experienced “permanent temporariness” in their legal status.²⁰ Because both of these experiences were a consequence of U.S. foreign policy goals affecting immigration policy, the effects of this interaction on assimilation outcomes begs further exploration. Moreover, given the length of time since their arrival, these cases can be assessed in view of their long-term structural assimilation through their second generation.

B. HYPOTHESIS

Given the complexity of migration, it is unlikely that only one aspect of it is responsible for structural assimilation patterns. However, a review of the literature indicates that U.S. policy might play a role in shaping those outcomes with welcoming policies producing positive contexts of reception and unwelcoming policies producing negative contexts of reception. The context of reception is a multi-faceted term for the experience of arriving immigrants, which the literature indicates is a major factor in the assimilation paths of immigrants; I limit the effects of extraneous factors by focusing on the initial exile waves with comparable human capital endowments in two large enclave cities—Miami and Los Angeles. To the extent that U.S. immigration policy affects the context of reception, it may be a principal factor in determining structural assimilation outcomes. Thus, this thesis explores the federal government’s role in the context of reception within: economic conditions, government response, societal attitudes, and the presence of ethnic communities for both case studies.²¹ Accordingly, my hypotheses focus on the role of federal government policy in shaping the context of reception for the initial immigrant arrivals from Cuba and El Salvador and the structural assimilation of their adult second-generation children, about twenty to thirty years after arrival:

Hypothesis: U.S. foreign and immigration policies shape the constraints within the context of reception of the first generation and have corresponding directional implications

²⁰ Cecilia Menjívar, “Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 111, no. 4 (January 2006): 1030, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/195953015/>.

²¹ Nora Hamilton and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City: Guatemalans and Salvadorans in Los Angeles* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001): 12–13.

for the structural assimilation patterns of second-generation adult immigrants—Cubans demonstrating upward and Salvadorans demonstrating downward structural assimilation.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Migration theories explain the dynamics of population movements and contribute to the formulation of immigration policy. The effects of U.S. immigration policy on immigrant groups' adaptation requires understanding the broader phenomenon of international migration—specifically, why people choose to emigrate to their given destinations and how they fare when they choose to stay. Within the broad, interdisciplinary field of international migration, there are two main branches: the study of the determinants that stimulate and inhibit migrations and the study of migrant adaptation in their destinations, usually in the form of assimilation.²² Within both of these branches, the field of international relations explores the role of the state in these phenomena.²³ On a micro level, it seeks to understand how migration affects individual political behavior; on a macro level, how it affects state behavior.²⁴ This literature review provides a survey of the migration theories scholars have proposed to explain the emergence of migration systems from developing states to developed liberal democratic states and the myriad of possible outcomes for immigrants at their destinations.

No single theory provides a comprehensive explanation for the emergence of a migration system, but, taken together, they provide insights into various aspects of its inner workings. The nexus between these varied disciplines is complex but necessary to understanding international migration (see Figure 1).²⁵ Individually, each theory seeks to explain one of the following: the structural forces that promote emigration from a country; the structural forces that stimulate immigration to a country; the individual motivations of

²² White and Johnson, "Perspectives on Migration Theory – Sociology and Political Science," 69.

²³ Ibid., 78.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Sara E. Kimberlin, "Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration," *Journal Of Human Behavior In The Social Environment* 19, no. 6 (September 2009): 766, https://nps.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=tayfranc10.1080/10911350902910922&context=PC&vid=01NPS_INST:01NPS&search_scope=MyInst_and_CI&tab=Everything&lang=en.

international migrants; and the social and economic structures that create a migration system.²⁶ Thus, this literature review is divided into two sections, one on the determinants of migration, the other on migrant adaptation. The first section examines determinant theories—why people choose or are forced to migrate—including neoclassical economics, the new economics of labor migration, segmented labor market theory, world systems theory, the theory of cumulative causation, and forced migration. The second section appraises social science theories of migrant adaptation—how migrants adjust to their new countries—to include acculturation theory, focused on the linear and segmented assimilation models, and the emergent theory of transnationalism.




Figure 1. Conceptualizing Immigration as an Intersection between Human Behavior and the Social Environment.²⁷

²⁶ Douglas S. Massey, *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 281.

²⁷ Source: Kimberlin, “Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration,” 766.

1. Theories on Determinants of Migration

Determinant theories seek to explain why migration systems emerge, both on the macro and micro levels of analysis. The macro-level structural forces that attract migrants to developed countries are central to world systems theory, neoclassical macroeconomics theory, and segmented labor market theory.²⁸ Micro-level theories focus more on individual motivations for immigration, as captured in neoclassical microeconomics theory, new economics of labor migration, and cumulative causation theory.²⁹ Moreover, forced migration theories explore the determinants of migration but within a context of conflict and crisis in origin countries.

Arguably the most expansive of the macro-level determinant theories, Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems theory is a neo-Marxist view of immigration that explains immigration from less developed countries to richer, more industrialized countries as a form of capitalist exploitation by corporations.³⁰ Accordingly, this theory expects migration to be sustained through increasingly global sources of migrants as capitalism penetrates non-capitalist states and creates a "disrupting, dislocating, and disintegrating dynamic" that inspires emigration.³¹ This encourages or forces migration by reducing local job markets and creating labor demands in manufacturing industries in new locations.³² Over time, this theory has come to view migration as a byproduct of globalization, whereby global economic interdependence facilitates the phenomenon of migration.³³

Critics of this theory contend it cannot be tested empirically and relies upon forecasts instead of data and thus is not as useful or valid as economic theories. However,

²⁸ Kimberlin, "Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration," 763.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.; Douglas S. Massey, "Why Does Immigration Occur?" in *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience*, ed. C. H. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind (New York: Russell Sage, 1999): 41.

³¹ Ibid.; Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, "From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration," *Anthropological Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (1995): 48, doi:10.2307/3317464.

³² Massey, "Why Does Immigration Occur?," 41.

³³ Douglas S. Massey et al., "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal," *Population and Development Review* 19, no. 3 (1993): 432, doi:10.2307/2938462.

prolific migration scholar and economic sociologist Douglas Massey contends that the social, economic, political, and cultural changes that world systems theory attributes to the expansion of capitalism are indeed supported by empirical evidence as the origins of migrations.³⁴ He argues that this expansion disrupts local economies in the sending countries, overtakes the existing employment structures, and thus generates a pool of workers in search of new opportunities. In Massey's words, "international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, but from development itself."³⁵ From this perspective, international migration can be understood as not only inevitable, but as an expected consequence of economic growth for developed states, and its worldview on migration is built upon by economic theories of migration.

Another macro-level determinant theory is the neoclassical economics theory of migration, which contends that observable differences in labor demand between states trigger permanent migrations from less developed to more developed economies. Emerging from world systems theory, neoclassical economics theory expects that people displaced by capitalist expansion seek to maximize their odds of employment and increased remuneration in emerging markets, usually by moving from rural to urban areas.³⁶ On an international scale, this usually translates into the movement of people from developing to developed countries; Massey claims that when "researchers have examined the empirical connection between wages in receiving countries and emigration from sending countries, they have found a significant positive correlation."³⁷ This supply-and-demand view of immigration essentially views labor demand in wealthy nations as the drivers of immigration from countries with less developed economies.³⁸

³⁴ Douglas S. Massey, "International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State," *Population and Development Review* 25, no. 2 (1999): 304, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/172427>.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 304.

³⁸ Kimberlin, "Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration," 181–193.

Building upon the globalization dynamic captured in world systems theory and the labor demand from neoclassical macroeconomics, the segmented labor market theory specifically identifies the bifurcation of labor markets as a determinant of migration flows to developed countries. Michael Piore's 1979 theory posits that in post-industrial, wealthy nations, native workers gravitate toward higher-skilled and-paid employment in the primary job sector, which generates a structural demand for people to fill low-pay, low-skill jobs in the secondary job sector.³⁹ As a result of the organic bifurcation of the labor market, employers rely upon immigrants to fill the low-wage jobs and even recruit immigrants for this purpose, generating a migration flow.⁴⁰ Apart from explaining the origins of migration flows, segmented labor market theory posits that, once established, these flows become self-perpetuating systems and provide a continuous flow of immigrants to fill unwanted jobs.⁴¹ Support for Piore's segmentation of the labor market has emerged clearly in multiple studies of developed countries for decades; however, its emphasis on recruiting to promote migrations has received limited empirical support, calling into question the explanatory power of this theory for migration flows.⁴² Additionally, the work of other scholars, such as Alejandro Portes and Robert Bach, identifies a third segment of the labor market, which they dub the "ethnic enclave."⁴³ In this enclave of people from the same origin country, immigrants find employment that yields similar benefits and improvements in capital and human capital as they would if employed in the primary sector, providing an alternative explanation for sustained migration flows to particular enclave cities.

In addition to macro-level causes of migration, determinant theories also include micro-level explanations of migration. These theories for migration, neoclassical

³⁹ Massey, "International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State," 305.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Massey, Douglas S., et al. "An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case," *Population and Development Review* 20, no. 4 (December 1994): 716, doi:10.2307/2137660.

⁴³ Alejandro Portes and Robert L. Bach, *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985): 28 & 248–249.

microeconomics theory applies the notion of rational actors to individual decisions to migrate. This theory uses a market approach for the determinants of migration, whereby individuals migrate to maximize their utility.⁴⁴ Similar to the other economics theories, this theory focuses on the movement of labor in pursuit of higher wages, but it incorporates individuals' cost-benefit analysis into the decision rather than presupposing automatic migration in the face of opportunity in developed countries.

Similarly, the new economics of labor migration theory applies the concept of utility maximization to migration, but at the group level. This theory posits that instead of individual decisions to migrate, households and even communities are the rational actors that decide to undertake migration based on promoting their economic interests and on risk management.⁴⁵ This theory includes the calculations of families in pursuit of increases in income relative to others in the community of origin, not just absolute income. According to Massey, empirical evidence also suggests households struggling with the transformations of early economic development in their origin countries migrate as a way to manage risk and overcome market failures.⁴⁶ Massey also notes migrants and migrant families may move abroad temporarily to earn income and send it back to their country of origin. Thus, this theory incorporates not only the pursuit of capital but also the minimization of risk to the migrant and their family.

Additionally, cumulative causation theory attributes the self-perpetuating character of international migration to the phenomenon's impact on individual motivations and the socioeconomic networks it creates. When migration initially occurs, it causes secondary effects to both the origin country and the destination country.⁴⁷ As economically

⁴⁴ Mimi Kim, "The Political Economy of Immigration and the Emergence of Transnationalism," *Journal of Human Behavior In The Social Environment* 19, no. 6 (September 2009): 679, DOI: 10.1080/10911350902910849.

⁴⁵ Ibid.; Michael J. Greenwood, "Perspectives on Migration Theory – Economics," in *International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution*, ed. Michael J. White, (New York: Springer, 2016): 32.

⁴⁶ Massey, "International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State," 305.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 304–305; Massey et al., "An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case," 733.

successful immigrants earn income, they send remittances back to their original country, which promulgates a sense of relative deprivation in the origin community and inspires others to emigrate.⁴⁸ Moreover, in the destination countries, immigrants create enclave markets tailored to the goods and services of their immigrant community, increasing the demand for low-wage immigrant labor.⁴⁹ These effects are essentially feedback loops that are perpetuated by the networks migrants establish at both the origin and destination and facilitate migration and reduce the risks of others to undertake the same journey.

Lastly, the interdisciplinary sub-field of refugee and forced migrations also provides determinant theories for migration, but within a context of conflict and crisis in origin countries. Originating in the 1980s, in response to global conflicts and increases in asylum-seekers, this approach aims to understand why people flee or stay in a country when faced with political violence.⁵⁰ Under such circumstances, root causes—like oppression and inequality—set conditions for migration, but require the catalyzing effect of a proximate cause, like war, to stimulate a migratory stream.⁵¹ While this may be true, few types of political violence actually provoke large-scale refugee flows.⁵²

Accordingly, theories on forced migrations are complemented by conflict studies. In a review of conflict-driven migration theories, Sarah Lischer identifies political violence as “genocide, politicide [eliminating a group based on political ideology], and civil war,”

⁴⁸ Massey et al., “An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case,” 733.; Alejandro Portes, “Introduction: The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism.” *Global Networks* 1, no.3 (2004):181–193.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona, “Introduction: Refugee and Forced Migration Studies,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2.; Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Conflict and Crisis Induced Displacement,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 319.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Lischer, “Conflict and Crisis Induced Displacement,” 319.

an approach supported by the analysis of Schmeidl, Fein, and Jonassohn.⁵³ Relatedly, in his literature on civil war, Kalyvas separates political violence into conflict and violence to characterize the forced migrations and conditions in an origin country, endeavoring to facilitate tailored political solutions.⁵⁴ Lischer further refines conflicts into civil conflict: persecution, failed state, civil war, and genocide; and international conflict: invasion, border wars, and third party intervention.⁵⁵ Through this disaggregation of the concepts, Lischer seeks to explain how the nature of a conflict affects the forced migration and how they interact with one another.⁵⁶ She notes that the forced movement of people in civil wars may be viewed as a political tool, not necessarily a tragic humanitarian by-product of it.⁵⁷ Additionally, Lischer caveats her work with an important observation: individual decisions to migrate may be influenced by more than just the conflict, since the resulting “economic devastation, epidemics, or environmental destruction” can also “endanger their livelihoods.”⁵⁸ This approach to understanding forced migrations reflects the discipline’s emphasis not only on understanding the phenomena’s causes, but to find political solutions for the conflicts and their subsequent migrations.⁵⁹ Moreover, the interdisciplinary approach necessarily links forced migration flows to the policy decisions of both the countries of origin and host countries.

⁵³ Ibid; Susanne Schmeidl, “Exploring the Causes of Forced Migration: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1971–1990,” *Social Science Quarterly* 78, no.2 (June 1997): 284–308, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=9708316968&site=ehost-live&scope=site.>; Helen Fein, “Accounting for Genocide after 1945: Theories and Some Findings,” *International Journal on Group Rights* 1 (March 1993): 79–106, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24674446>.; Kurt Jonassohn, “Prevention without Prediction,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 7 (March 1993): 1–13, <https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/7.1.1>.

⁵⁴ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁵⁵ Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement,” *Civil Wars* 9, no.2 (June 2009): 145, DOI: 10.1080/13698240701207302.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Lischer, “Conflict and Crisis Induced Displacement,” 320.

⁵⁸ Lischer, “Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement,” 149.

⁵⁹ Lischer, “Conflict and Crisis Induced Displacement,” 325.

2. Theories of Migrant Adaptation

Migrant adaptation theories seek to explain the behavior of immigrants in their destination countries as they develop new identities in response to their new environments. While there are extensive hypotheses, both normative and empirical, as to how this process occurs, this section focuses on the empirical arguments because arguing the merits of assimilation is beyond the scope of this thesis. First, as part of acculturation theory, the models for linear and segmented assimilation are reviewed, followed by the emergent theory of transnationalism.

Acculturation theory, developed by John Berry in 1974, explains changes in immigrants' identity and behavior relative to their new countries on a continuum: assimilation—immigrants over time internalize the new culture; separation—immigrants retain their old culture without adopting a new culture; integration—immigrants retain parts of their old culture and adopt parts of their destination country's culture; and marginalization—individuals discard both the old and new cultures.⁶⁰ Because a large volume of literature concentrates on assimilation and previous studies have explored the assimilation patterns on Cuban and Salvadoran immigrant populations, this review focuses on its two main camps: straight-line assimilation and segmented assimilation.

The most studied aspect of acculturation—assimilation—historically regards migrants who abandon their origin countries' cultures and embrace the culture of their destination country as successful immigrants.⁶¹ In the early twentieth-century U.S., this equated to the linear adoption of Anglo-American culture over time—classical assimilation theory. However, contemporary research now measures assimilation in broader terms:⁶² For example, in 2005, Waters and Jimenez evaluated assimilation across two generations and birth cohorts through immigrants' socioeconomic status, geographic dispersion,

⁶⁰ Kimberlin, "Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration," 764.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 762.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 762; White and Johnson, "Perspectives on Migration Theory – Sociology and Political Science," 77.

language acquisition, and intermarriage.⁶³ They compared immigrants and their children to other Americans according to those categories and found support for the notion that immigrants generally do assimilate in the U.S. Other U.S.-based studies by Alba and Nee and White and Glick found similar support for immigrant assimilation.⁶⁴ Moreover, Alba and Nee developed their new assimilation theory that expands the definition of assimilation beyond just immigrants' actions to include their interaction with the societal structures that surround their daily lives.⁶⁵ Most studies of migrant adaptation conclude that immigrants fare well economically (compared to their economic success in their origin country) and attain social integration in their destination countries over time.⁶⁶ While the generality of assimilation theory is certainly a factor in its durability, it is also its main shortcoming: any evidence showing immigrant adoption of new norms supports it, and evidence showing continued differences counter the theory.⁶⁷

Adding nuance to the existing assimilation theories, Portes and Rumbaut developed the segmented assimilation theory, in which the interaction between immigrant group characteristics and their treatment in the new society generate differences in assimilation across immigrant groups.⁶⁸ This theory, combined with Portes and Zhou's take on the concept, holds that three distinct forms of adaptation manifest in second-generation immigrants as a result of their immigrant group's characteristics: upward assimilation—

⁶³ Mary Waters and Tomas R. Jimenez, "Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges," *Annual Review of Sociology* 31 (August 2005): 108, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100026>.

⁶⁴ Richard D. Alba and Victor Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2003), 36.; Michael J. White and Jennifer E. Glick, *Achieving Anew: How New Immigrants Do in American Schools, Jobs, and Neighborhoods* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009): 184.

⁶⁵ Alba and Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream*, 36.

⁶⁶ White and Glick, *Achieving Anew*, 41; White and Johnson, "Perspectives on Migration Theory—Sociology and Political Science," 76–77.

⁶⁷ Charles Hirschman, "The Educational Enrollment of Immigrant Youth: A Test of the Segmented-Assimilation Hypothesis," *Demography* 38, no. 3 (2001): 318; Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 2nd ed (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970).

⁶⁸ Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).; Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530, no. 1 (November 1993): 96, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1047678>.

growing acculturation and integration into the white middle class; downward assimilation—permanent poverty and assimilation into lower classes; upward assimilation and biculturalism—rapid economic advancement coupled with deliberate preservation of culture, values, and group solidarity.⁶⁹ Ultimately, they determined that when immigrants engage in selective assimilation—not full assimilation—it facilitates their economic success.⁷⁰ Critics of this theory note that it appears to apply exclusively to the U.S. immigrant experience and that segmented assimilation is more the exception than the rule.⁷¹ Nevertheless, some support for this theory emerged in Hirschman’s study of immigrant youth educational attainment and White and Glick’s survey of immigrant assimilation in the U.S., in which segmented assimilation emerged but was not the assimilation pattern of the majority of immigrants.⁷² Nonetheless, segmentation therefore provides viable explanations for assimilation patterns that do not fit the expected linear progression.

While neither segmented nor linear assimilation theory predicts the same outcomes for all immigrant groups, they both recognize the importance of the “context of reception” in those outcomes. In sociology, the context of reception is the term given to “the opportunity structure, degree of openness versus hostility, and acceptance” in the host society.⁷³ It can be positive or negative and can set the trajectory and even admittance of immigrant groups.⁷⁴ For instance, as presented in studies by Portes and Rumbaut and Menjivar, racial and ethnic discrimination, lack of political status, and ill will in the general

⁶⁹ Portes and Zhou, “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants,” 86.; Mary C. Waters, Van C. Tran, Philip Kasinitz, and John H. Mollenkopf, “Segmented Assimilation Revisited: Types of Acculturation and Socioeconomic Mobility in Young Adulthood,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33, no.7 (July 2010): 109, doi: 10.1080/01419871003624076.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ White and Glick, *Achieving Anew*, 184; White and Johnson, “Perspectives on Migration Theory—Sociology and Political Science,” 77; Waters and Jimenez, “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges,” 110.

⁷² Hirschman, “The Educational Enrollment of Immigrant Youth: A Test of the Segmented-Assimilation Hypothesis,” 318; White and Glick, *Achieving Anew*, 39.

⁷³ Schwartz, et al., “Perceived Context of Reception among Recent Hispanic Immigrants: Conceptualization, Instrument Development, and Preliminary Validation,” 2.

⁷⁴ White and Glick, *Achieving Anew*, 38.

public can contribute to a negative context of reception.⁷⁵ The inverse is also possible where immigrants are welcomed and provided with opportunities for employment and legal status, providing a positive context of reception.⁷⁶ Within the context of reception, Kao and Rutherford refine the concept of social capital in immigrant families as related to educational and social involvement in their children's lives, finding differential levels and impacts of social capital between immigrants and native-born Americans.⁷⁷ These studies indicate that institutional factors in the immigrant-receiving societies and the preexisting immigrant communities themselves all contribute to the acculturation models of immigrants and their subsequent generations. Moreover, in understanding the context of reception, different assimilation patterns may become more predictable as continued studies explore specific immigrant groups rather than pan-ethnic groups such as Hispanic or Latino.

The last of the migrant adaptation theories we will discuss is the theory of transnationalism, which explores immigrants' relationship to their old country on a spectrum between disconnection and transnationalism. This emerging approach to immigrant adaptation has developed as a result of globalization facilitating immigrants' links to their homelands.⁷⁸ Rather than viewing adaptation as a one-way phenomenon as acculturation does, transnationalism frames immigrant adaptation as a two-way exchange between the sending and receiving countries.⁷⁹ On the one hand, immigrants may have extensive social, political, economic, cultural, and familial ties to their countries of origin, exhibiting transnationalism; on the other hand, immigrants may also sever all ties to the

⁷⁵ Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America: A Portrait* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 139–141.; Cecilia Menjivar, "Immigrant Kinship Networks and the Impact of the Receiving Context: Salvadorans in San Francisco in the Early 1990s." *Social Problems* 44, no. 1 (February 1997), 106, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096876>.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Grace Kao and Lindsay Taggart Rutherford, "Does Social Capital Still Matter? Immigrant Minority Disadvantage in School-Specific Social Capital and its Effects on Academic Achievement." *Sociological Perspectives* 50, no. 1 (March 2007): 28, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/sop.2007.50.1.27>.

⁷⁸ Kimberlin, "Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration," 769.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 765.

old country, displaying disconnection.⁸⁰ This theory also encompasses the multiple identities immigrants maintain via simultaneous ties to both their countries of origin and destination.⁸¹ Glick, Schiller, Basch, & Szanton-Blanc were the first to link the concept of transnationalism to migration and migrant identity.⁸² They propose that migrants to the U.S. are actually “transmigrants” because they are “immigrants whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state.”⁸³ While there is broad consensus in the field that this phenomenon is not new, it is recognized as a new perspective on immigration.⁸⁴ Moreover, in his summation of empirical studies on transnationalism, Portes concludes that assimilation and transnationalism are not mutually exclusive—they actually occur simultaneously in established immigrants.⁸⁵

The focus of this literature review has been on two aspects of migration studies: the determinants of migration and the adaptation of migrants. Specifically, theories for determinants of migration include economics theories—neoclassical economics, the new economics of labor migration, segmented labor market, world systems, and cumulative causation—provide insights on the wage, labor demand, and inequality factors that promote and sustain migrations and inform the formulation of immigration policy. The reviewed migrant adaptation theories—acculturation and transnationalism—indicate that they are not mutually exclusive processes. However, immigrant adaptation in the U.S. is overwhelmingly studied in terms of assimilation, with robust studies on linear and segmented assimilation in particular. These studies consistently conclude that immigrants generally do assimilate, albeit in different ways across groups.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Kimberlin, “Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration,” 763.

⁸² Kim, “The Political Economy of Immigration and the Emergence of Transnationalism,” 681.

⁸³ Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, “From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (January 1995): 48, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3317464..>

⁸⁴ Alejandro Portes, “Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism,” *International Migration Review* 37, no.3 (Fall 2003): 874, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30037760>

⁸⁵ Ibid., 888.

D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This thesis examines the relationship between the divergent immigration policies applied to 1960s Cuban and 1980s Salvadoran immigrant arrivals to the U.S. and the resulting structural assimilation patterns in their second generations. For this comparative study, I first establish the historical contexts, both for the political shocks and violence that stimulated migration from the countries of origin and in the policy and overall reception in the United States, of first-wave immigrants from Cuba and El Salvador, via a methodical review of the relevant and abundant secondary and historical literature. These cases were selected precisely for their Cold-War context and its enduring legacy: Cubans fled communism and were welcomed in the United States as political refugees because of America's anti-communist stance, whereas that same stance precluded Salvadorans from the designation because they fled a dictatorship that was fighting communist insurrection. In the Cuba case study, the independent variable is a welcoming U.S. policy, whereas in the Salvadoran case study, it is a dissuasive U.S. policy; the dependent variable for both is second-generation structural assimilation.

Within these cases, I focus on the initial cohort of migrants from each country because of previous studies that find similarities between pioneer migrants across Latin America—they tend to be ambitious and risk-tolerant individuals.⁸⁶ Moreover, I conduct a qualitative review of both diasporas' characteristics to establish some parity between them in the pre-migration context. Given some predictable differences between the two countries and their populations' attributes, this review explores intra-group variations to reduce the possibility of those variables (i.e., pre-migration socioeconomic status, educational attainment, pre-established enclaves in the U.S.) as the deciding factors in structural assimilation outcomes.

Lastly, to determine each group's structural assimilation outcomes, I compare data available on these cases from secondary sources that use the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), which surveyed second-generation Americans on delinquency,

⁸⁶ Donato, et al. "Introduction: Migration in the Americas: Mexico and Latin America in Comparative Context," 13.

early child-bearing, education, employment, and income. Using this data, I qualitatively compare assimilation characteristics, in two cities with concentrated diasporas: Miami and Los Angeles and supplement it with prepared datasets on native-born Hispanic groups' educational attainment, occupational attainment and income. To supplement missing data fields or data on particular cohorts both pre and post immigration, I make use of demographic information from the U.S. Census Bureau, think tanks like Migration Policy Institute and Pew Research Center – Hispanic Trends, and the data from the existing academic literature on Cuban and Salvadoran assimilation.

II. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY

The immigration policy set forth by the United States is influenced by a multitude of factors, ranging from the international relations sphere to the bureaucratic processes that implement it. During much of the Cold War, when the international environment constrained foreign policy tools in Latin America, immigration policy became an alternative instrument of power, and, as such, the ideological orientation of a country determined its émigrés' qualification for entry into the United States. Through a welcoming immigration policy toward Cubans, the United States sought to undermine the communist, Soviet-aligned regime in 1960s Cuba and overthrow Castro, granting Cubans asylum from political persecution as a way to demonstrate the superiority of American values to communism. Conversely, in the 1980s, when a communist insurgency threatened to take over El Salvador, the United States buttressed its support of the country's right-wing military junta by promoting a restrictive immigration policy toward Salvadorans. Thus, Salvadorans were not granted asylum from their civil war's widespread human rights abuses because it would have undermined the legitimacy of the Salvadoran junta.

These decisions to grant or deny admission to these forced migrants were set by the Kennedy and Reagan administrations: John F. Kennedy used executive privilege to admit Cubans as refugees, as well as congressional liaison to expand his policy; Ronald Reagan, limited by the 1980 Refugee Act, asserted his power as the executive by abstaining from extending protections to Salvadorans until pressed by political forces. Moreover, as the evolution of immigration laws increasingly restricted executive agency in immigration and refugee admissions, foreign policy's influence over immigration became less overt because it was internalized as standard policy in bureaucracy, as when an administration's national refugee designations affect individual asylum cases en masse. Lastly, as the role of Congress became more prominent, the influence of the administration's foreign policy influences on immigration became the subject of public debate over the contradiction between welcoming immigrants from communist regimes while denying those from embattled friendly countries.

The forthcoming discussion presents these themes first through an overview of U.S. immigration policy development through the 1980s, followed by the specific foreign policy and immigration policy contexts of the two cases, Cuba and El Salvador. The Cuban case shows that U.S. immigration policy was proactively used to support overarching foreign policy goals. In contrast, the Salvadoran case demonstrates how the implementation of U.S. immigration policy corresponded to the existing foreign policy goals. In both cases, U.S. foreign policy in Latin America stimulated large-scale migrations to the United States.

A. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY THROUGH THE 1980s

Until the United States Congress passed the first exclusion law in 1875, the United States did not have and enforce immigration policies. Rather, America embraced almost limitless immigration, in the spirit of George Washington circa 1783: “the bosom of America is open to receive not only the opulent and respectable Stranger, but the oppressed and persecuted of all Nations and Religions; whom we shall welcome to a participation of all our rights and privileges if by decency and propriety of conduct they appear to merit the enjoyment.”⁸⁷ Perhaps the one exception to this trend was the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which allowed the deportation of those deemed dangerous; but it was not enforced and was allowed to expire after two years.⁸⁸ The major shift in American immigration policy occurred in successive waves of increasingly restrictive laws against criminals and prostitutes (1875); those with impaired mental capacity (1882); contract laborers (1885); “epilepsy, vagrancy, polygamy, and radical political beliefs” (1903); and some physical handicaps and unaccompanied minors (1907).⁸⁹ In addition to these restrictions, Congress passed the first racial restriction via the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, when it barred the

⁸⁷ From George Washington to Joshua Holmes, 2 December 1783,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, last modified February 1, 2018, <http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-12127>. [This is an Early Access document from The Papers of George Washington. It is not an authoritative final version.]

⁸⁸ National Research Council Staff, *Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect* (Washington: National Academies Press, 1985), 13, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/reader.action?docID=3377377>.

⁸⁹ Christopher Mitchell, “Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico,” in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 11.

entry of Chinese laborers; more severe restrictions on Chinese immigration continued through 1904.⁹⁰

Limits on immigrants of particular national origins continued in the first part of the twentieth century. An influx of nearly 13 million immigrants from 1900 to 1914 prompted xenophobic public responses and immigration policies, particularly against southern and eastern Europeans, Asians, and Middle-Easterners.⁹¹ This period of restrictions led to the adoption of a national-origins quota system in 1921: between 1921 and 1929, Congress established a quota of immigration visas each year for each sending nation that was proportional to the nationality's presence in the United States in 1920.⁹² However, by 1929, immigration was virtually halted because of the job shortage caused by the Great Depression.⁹³ Notably, immigrants from the Western Hemisphere were not subject to any of these limitations or quotas.⁹⁴

Additionally, the geo-political atmosphere of war affected U.S. immigration policies. During World War II, the United States and Mexico adopted the Bracero Program, which allowed for the open travel of Mexican laborers in response to U.S. shortages. In 1943, when China joined the war effort, the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed. Moreover, after the war, the United States passed the Displaced Persons Act of 1948; this was the country's first refugee legislation and it gave special consideration to individuals persecuted by the Nazis to immigrate and/or become legal residents.⁹⁵ Later, as Cold War tensions rose, changes in immigration policy reflected the ideological battle between

⁹⁰ Migration Policy Institute, "Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790 – Present," March 2013, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/timeline-1790>.

⁹¹ National Research Council Staff, *Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect*, 14; Migration Policy Institute, "Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790 – Present," March 2013.; Mitchell, "Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico," 11.

⁹² National Research Council Staff, *Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect*, 15; Mitchell, "Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico," 11.

⁹³ National Research Council Staff, *Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect*, 15.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ National Research Council Staff, *Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect*, 16.; Migration Policy Institute, "Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790 – Present," March 2013.

communism and capitalism. Domestically, the fear of subversion led to the adoption of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which required aliens to register addresses annually.⁹⁶ At the same time, immigration policy also became more welcoming of immigrants fleeing communism, as with the Refugee Relief Act, which authorized the admission of immigrants escaping Iron Curtain countries.⁹⁷

Changes in American society paved the way for the liberalization of immigration policy in the 1960s. In the context of the Civil Rights Movement, a growing domestic economy, and the responsibility of American global power, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act ended the national-origins quota system.⁹⁸ The new law set immigrant admission on the basis of relationship to a U.S. citizen, resident, or employer.⁹⁹ This law replaced the quotas for individual countries with a cumulative quota for the total number of immigrants accepted each year but placed no admission limits on the members of a U.S. citizen's nuclear family.¹⁰⁰ Still, despite the law's claims of non-discrimination on the basis of sex, nationality, race, or place of residence or birth, it included several exceptions to the rule: an annual cap of 170,000 visas for Eastern Hemisphere countries, allowing up to 20,000 from each country, and the first-ever cap on migration from the Western Hemisphere, set at 120,000.¹⁰¹

Since the 1965 immigration reform, multiple changes have refined immigration laws, particularly those applying to the Western Hemisphere. In 1966, Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act, which allowed Cubans who had been in the United States as refugees to obtain residency.¹⁰² Moreover, by 1976, Congress had extended the 20,000-

⁹⁶ Migration Policy Institute, "Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790 – Present," March 2013.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Mitchell, "Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico," 14.

⁹⁹ Migration Policy Institute, "Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790 – Present," March 2013.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ David S. FitzGerald and David Cook-Martín, "The Geopolitical Origins of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1965," *Migration Information Source*, February 5, 2015, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/geopolitical-origins-us-immigration-act-1965>; Christopher Mitchell, "Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico," 15.

¹⁰² National Research Council Staff, *Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect*, 17.

visa limit per country to the Western Hemisphere, but by 1980 it combined worldwide visa quotas to 270,000 annually.¹⁰³ Subsequently, the Refugee Act of 1980, which allocated 50,000 refugee visas annually, set refugees apart from the broader immigration quota system.¹⁰⁴ The Act removed the ideological and geographic parameters of previous refugees law and defined a refugee as a person outside their country of nationality who is “unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or particular opinion.”¹⁰⁵ Within this definition, differences between refugees and asylees are of particular importance: qualification as a refugee from afar does not guarantee legal admission into the United States, and an asylee is one who requests permission to stay as refugees from *within* the United States; notably, the United States does not establish quotas for asylees, as they are designed to be a flexible tool for Presidents to respond to international crises.¹⁰⁶ Given the enormous response in the Western Hemisphere to the refugee program—triple the annual quota entered the United States from Cuba in 1980—by 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) aimed to reduce illegal immigration by restricting such immigrants’ opportunities for employment and providing a path to legalization after a year.¹⁰⁷ These challenges were further addressed in the 1990 Immigration Act, which increased the number of legal admissions, reducing backlogs of applications and accommodating beneficiaries of the 1986 Act, as well as undocumented Salvadorans in the U.S.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ National Research Council Staff, *Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect*, 17.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Migration Policy Institute, “Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790 – Present,” March 2013.

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Refugees,” last updated October 24, 2017, <https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees>; Lars Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, 202.

¹⁰⁷ Mitchell, “Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico,” 16–17.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 18; Migration Policy Institute, “Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790 – Present,” March 2013.

Despite the successive immigration restrictions set by Congress, U.S. presidents have preferred to maintain flexibility in the process. Presidents Rutherford Hayes, Grover Cleveland, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Harry Truman all attempted to veto the immigration acts passed during their administrations.¹⁰⁹ Their reluctance to codify immigration limitations in law stemmed from their interest in using immigration as a foreign policy tool.¹¹⁰ However, since 1875, when Congress established itself as the primary actor in immigration regulation, presidents who have used immigration in international relations have had to work within and around the existing laws or work with Congress to create new ones.¹¹¹ For instance, since the post-1965 limitations, refugee policy has been an area where foreign policy concerns continue to influence immigration policy because the program is administered by the executive branch, with modest Congressional input.¹¹² Both the growth of presidential power and of U.S. global influence have given the president discretion over issues he deemed to be of national interest.¹¹³

B. CONTEXT: U.S. POLICY FOR CUBAN IMMIGRATION

The aforementioned considerations and dynamics came together in the case of Cuba; at the height of the Cold War in the early 1960s, foreign policy exerted major influence over U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba.¹¹⁴ After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the United States enacted a series of policies and legislation that not only encouraged but also facilitated Cuban immigration. This pattern began with the Eisenhower administration and persisted through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, yielding an almost continuous policy of Cuban exceptionalism for the entirety of the 1960s. The

¹⁰⁹ Mitchell, "Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico," 12.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 13.

¹¹² Lars Schoultz, "Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy," in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 197.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 6.

scope of this immigration posture stems from America's Cold War battles: U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba was a strategic and ideological foreign policy tool against communism and was intended as a temporary measure to undermine communism in the hemisphere.

While U.S.–Cuba confrontation during the Cold War reached an apogee in the 1960s, the countries' tense relationship began in the previous century.¹¹⁵ Before the Cuban revolution, the relationship between the United States and Cuba was driven by intertwined economic interest, U.S. paternalism, and military interventions. However, significant shifts in U.S. foreign policy in the first decades of the twentieth century led to noninterventionist policies in Cuba, which required the United States to expand its foreign policy tools beyond military might to achieve its desired outcomes. Moreover, U.S. treatment of Cuba as a protectorate and its overall approach to the Western Hemisphere as an unrestricted special immigration area made Cuban immigration prior to the Cuban Revolution largely irrelevant to bilateral relations.¹¹⁶

The 1959 Cuban Revolution heralded an uncertain time for U.S.–Cuban relations, eventually resulting in a decades-long adversarial posture. From the start of the revolution, Washington believed Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement was nationalistic, anti-imperialist, and anti-dictatorial, but not communist.¹¹⁷ Nonetheless, the United States was leery of Castro and communicated with embattled dictator Fulgencio Batista in its attempts to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power to a five-man junta; Batista refused the proposal.¹¹⁸ In the months prior to Batista's fall, mounting suspicions that communists had infiltrated Castro's movement led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to express his desire

¹¹⁵ Geoffrey Warner, "Eisenhower and Castro: US–Cuban Relations 1958–60," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 75, no. 4 (1999): 803–17, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626280>.

¹¹⁶ Mitchell, "Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico," 11.

¹¹⁷ Alan McPherson, *A Short History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Hoboken NJ: Wiley, 2016), 152.; Warner, "Eisenhower and Castro: US-Cuban Relations 1958–60," 806.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 808.

for a “third force” beyond Batista or Castro to emerge in Cuba.¹¹⁹ However, a third force never materialized, and as Castro’s movement triumphed, by January of 1959, the United States was left to sort out its position vis-à-vis the new Cuban regime.¹²⁰

Throughout 1959, the United States adopted a “wait and see” approach to Cuba’s new government, eventually adopting a policy aimed at the overthrow of Castro. Cuban actions and U.S. intelligence indicated to American policymakers that Cuba fostered anti-American sentiment and supported revolutions throughout the region—that it tolerated communism in its government and sought to damage American economic interests by establishing a statist economy.¹²¹ Consequently, despite a lack of concrete proof that communists controlled Cuba, in the fall of 1959, President Eisenhower made the “fundamental decision to isolate and destroy the Cuban revolutionary government.”¹²²

By early 1960, Cuba had established economic and military ties to the Soviet Union, prompting the United States to pursue plans for the overthrow of the Castro regime. In March 1960, President Eisenhower approved the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) covert plans for using Cuban exiles in the United States to infiltrate the island and foment a counter-revolution.¹²³ During the remainder of the 1960s, the United States engaged in tit-for-tat exchanges: Cuba undertook agrarian land reforms and nationalized U.S.-owned industries, and the United States responded by eliminating preferences for Cuban sugar imports and prohibiting U.S. exports to the island.¹²⁴ Neither country gained an edge on the other. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, the United States was employing multiple policy tools—covert action, diplomacy, and economic power—in its attempts to isolate and overthrow Cuba.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 809.

¹²⁰ Warner, “Eisenhower and Castro: US-Cuban Relations 1958–60,” 809–811.

¹²¹ Ibid., 813–814.

¹²² Ibid., 803 & 816.

¹²³ Ibid., 816.

¹²⁴ Thomas G. Paterson, “Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Fidel Castro,” in *Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989): 128–129.

President John F. Kennedy not only continued Eisenhower's anti-Castro policies but also intensified them. Shortly before Kennedy assumed the presidency, the United States severed diplomatic ties with Cuba.¹²⁵ Given the elimination of diplomatic tools and the ineffectiveness of economic pressures, Kennedy's administration intensified covert action plans against Castro.¹²⁶ Moreover, Kennedy demonstrated a fixation with "the Cuba problem" early in his Presidency, including concern for the spread of Castro's revolution in Latin America; when presented with the CIA plot for an exile expedition, the plan consumed his attention and he sought to ensure its success and plausible deniability for the United States.¹²⁷ When he launched the doomed Bay of Pigs invasion, in mid-April 1961, the fiasco not only embarrassed the United States but also increased anti-Americanism on the island and further radicalized the Castro regime, creating a fear of future U.S. invasion that pushed them further toward alliance with the Soviet Union for self-preservation.¹²⁸ In May 1961, Castro publicly declared a socialist revolution in Cuba and by late 1961 declared himself a Marxist-Leninist.¹²⁹

The undeterred Kennedy administration intensified its efforts to overthrow and isolate Castro through new covert actions, economic and diplomatic pressures, and anti-Castro propaganda. The CIA recruited Cuban exiles in Miami and enacted Operation Mongoose to sow disorder on the island and innovate assassination plots against Castro, and Kennedy established an embargo on Cuban imports and rallied the Organization of American States to oust Cuba.¹³⁰ These pressures crippled Cuba's economy: debts grew, factories closed, tourism and foreign capital dissipated, and an emigration "brain drain"

¹²⁵ Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Fidel Castro," in *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963*, 129.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 130.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 129 & 137; Edward Gonzalez, "Castro's Revolution, Communist Appeal, and the Soviet Response," *World Politics* 21, no. 1 (October 1968): 67, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009745>.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Fidel Castro," 139.; Gonzalez, "Castro's Revolution, Communist Appeal, and the Soviet Response," 68.

took place, all of which strengthened Cuba's political centralization and its economic ties to the Soviet Union.¹³¹

By 1963, Kennedy realized the hardline approach to Cuba had not been fruitful and decided to pursue a simultaneous, short-lived, and secret effort at rapprochement with Castro. Prior to 1963, rapprochement dialogue with Castro was not a politically viable option, given Kennedy's repeated antagonisms toward Cuba and the domestic support for such a stance.¹³² Instead, dialogue was limited to "specific, narrow issues of mutual interest;"¹³³ these included failed negotiations to release Bay of Pigs prisoners in 1961 and 1962, covert communications via Brazil during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 that were rendered irrelevant when the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from Cuba, and successful prisoner exchange negotiations in late 1962.¹³⁴ These smaller-scale negotiations, coupled with Kennedy's reflection on failures of his Cuba policies and Castro's disillusionment with the Soviet Union during the missile crisis, paved the way for rapprochement dialogue in 1963.¹³⁵ By this time, Castro made it publicly known that he was ready to pursue rapprochement and Kennedy was ready to get passed what his brother called, "the Cuban mess."¹³⁶ Because there was disagreement within the administration, the dialogue was kept a secret to all but the participants, and with the assassination of Kennedy, the immediate possibility of normalized relations disappeared.¹³⁷

In addition to its geopolitical impacts, the 1959 Cuban Revolution marked Cuba's shift from a migrant-receiving to a migrant-sending society.¹³⁸ The 1959 regime change

¹³¹ Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Fidel Castro," 138–139.

¹³² William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 43–47.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 47–58.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 58–62.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 69–74; Robert Kennedy as quoted in LeoGrande and Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba*, 74.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 74–78.

¹³⁸ Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba," in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 33.

in Cuba simultaneously pushed 73,724 objectors out of Cuba, and inspired the return of some 26,000 Cubans living abroad—yielding Cuba a net migration *gain* of 12,345 people.¹³⁹ Only 26,527 Cubans immigrated to the United States, indicating that over 65 percent of Cuban emigrants relocated to countries other than the United States.¹⁴⁰ This data indicates that the revolution alone did not prompt the mass migration of Cubans to the United States, which took place in the 1960s.

Between 1958 and 1970, the nearly 500,000 Cuban migrants to the United States were composed of distinct sub-groups, each of which influenced U.S.–Cuban relations in a different way. The five subgroups generally included the inner-circle of Batista in 1958, the upper-class exodus fleeing property confiscation in 1959, the “brain drain” of professionals and anti-communists in 1960–1961, middle-class technicians and workers in 1962, and the “freedom flight” working-class and the families of prior exiles in 1965.¹⁴¹ Until the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, these Cuban refugees believed their exile would be temporary—that they would return home when the United States overthrew Castro.¹⁴²

Beginning in 1959, the influx of anti-Castro Cubans in the United States engaged in subversive actions against the Cuban regime. In fact, in October 1959, President Eisenhower directed departments and agencies to “stop the activities of counterrevolutionaries working out of Florida”¹⁴³ because the State Department determined that the anti-Castro activities of Cuban exiles were “highly prejudicial to our relations with Cuba.”¹⁴⁴ The CIA later developed a plan to train Cuban exiles for

¹³⁹ Dominguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” 33.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., Susan Jacoby, “The 350,000 Cubans in south Florida make a remarkable success story. Even if Castro fell tomorrow, great numbers would not return,” *New York Times*, September 29, 1974, http://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/29/archives/miami-si-cbua-no-the-350000-cubans-in-south-florida-make-a.html?_r=0.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI*, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), Document 379, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d379>.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., Document 375.

subversion, which President Eisenhower approved in March 1960.¹⁴⁵ Thus, the change in Cuba's regime provoked the initial exodus, and to pursue the President's policy of overthrowing Castro, the CIA capitalized on the ongoing activities of the exile groups.

By 1961, the U.S. realized the potential ideological value of not only the Cuban exiles but of immigration policy as a foreign policy tool against the Castro regime. Within a week of his inauguration, President Kennedy expressed concern for the immense influx of Cuban refugees and the Castro policy of leaving them penniless before departure; his administration established the Cuban Refugee Program to facilitate their settlement in the United States using Mutual Assistance Act funds—a continuation of the Marshall Plan, but to fight communist expansion.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, in a statement to the Soviet government after the 1961 Bay of Pigs embarrassment, Kennedy cited the refugee flow as evidence of “growing resistance to the Castro dictatorship” and of refugees’ hope to “assist their fellow Cubans in the struggle for freedom.”¹⁴⁷ In this statement, Kennedy established the ideological and strategic value of Cuban migration to the broader fight against not just Cuba, but communism.¹⁴⁸ In his view, welcoming Cubans provided a twofold benefit to the United States: it both demonstrated the superiority of American democracy to Soviet communism and provided a strategic tool to overthrow Castro and render the migration a temporary phenomenon.¹⁴⁹

Accordingly, the Kennedy administration “promoted virtually unrestricted migration from Cuba” to delegitimize the Castro regime until the 1962 Cuban missile crisis prompted the blockade of the island and halted commercial flights.¹⁵⁰ After the 1962 crisis, the United States expanded the Cuban embargo to include commercial flights in and out of

¹⁴⁵ Warner, “Eisenhower and Castro: US-Cuban Relations 1958–60,” 816.

¹⁴⁶ Dominguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” 38; John F. Thomas, “Cuban Refugees in the United States,” *The International Migration Review* 1, no. 2 (1967): 47–48, doi:10.2307/3002808.

¹⁴⁷ Dominguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” 38.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.

Cuba as part of its policy to isolate the regime.¹⁵¹ While this policy sacrificed the ideological value of the 1961 migrations, it set the precedent for using the decade's enduring migration streams as leverage in U.S.–Castro relations.

In 1965, after the three-year hiatus in legal migration because of the missile crisis, Castro coerced President Johnson into renewing unrestricted migration from Cuba. Castro perceived the hiatus as a U.S. effort to facilitate an internal uprising by the hundreds of thousands of Cubans who had been approved for visas but could not physically depart the island.¹⁵² Because this population caused turmoil for Castro's regime and the counter-revolution had been defeated, Castro decided to open a port and invite Cuban Americans to pick up their relatives by boat.¹⁵³ Castro's actions were aimed not only at benefitting his domestic politics but also at embarrassing the United States by forcing a change in its migration policy. Undeterred, President Johnson spun the challenge to his favor by appealing to the ideological value of immigration as Kennedy had before him:¹⁵⁴ Johnson publicly declared American "tradition as an asylum for the oppressed is going to be upheld ... [we] will welcome these Cuban people" and commenced an airlift, referred to as "freedom flights," that endured until 1973 and the Nixon Administration.¹⁵⁵ America's ideologically-driven Cuban immigration policy in the 1960s relieved Castro of his unwanted political dissidents and helped to stabilize his regime, working against the U.S. strategic objective of overthrowing the Cuban regime.¹⁵⁶

The fraught U.S.–Cuba relationship of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries unfolded in multiple foreign policy realms: military and paramilitary, economics, overt and covert diplomacy, and immigration. When the 1959 Cuban revolution challenged U.S. capitalist hegemony with a communist threat 90 miles from its coast, the consistent policy

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Dominguez, "Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba," 53.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 41.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 43; John Scanlan and Gilbert Loescher, "U. S. Foreign Policy, 1959–80: Impact on Refugee Flow from Cuba," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 467 (1983): 125, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/1044932>.

¹⁵⁶ Dominguez, "Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba," 44.

of American Presidents for the following decade became the isolation and overthrow of the Castro regime. This contentious relationship created both opportunities and challenges when spontaneous and Castro-induced migrations from the island took place. In both cases, the United States responded by employing immigration policy as part of its broader foreign policy toward Cuba—to win the ideological battle with communism by demonstrating the Cuban people’s preference for democracy and to utilize Cuban exiles for the overthrow of Cuba’s communist regime.

Thus, the United States chose to encourage Cuban migration in the 1960s because it expected the measure would promote its ideological and strategic policies against communism and the Castro regime. Moreover, because policymakers believed the immigration policy would help the United States achieve its policy goals, Cuban migration would be temporary and resolve itself when the refugees returned to Cuba. While the benefit of hindsight reveals the optimism and hubris of such an expectation, for the U.S. administrations of the 1960s, it would be difficult to conceive the scale and duration of the Cuban exodus, much less the longevity of the Castro regime.

Since that time, Cuban migration has continued, yielding over 1 million Cuban immigrants as of 2017.¹⁵⁷ The continuous flow of Cuban migrants is punctuated by three distinct surges: the 1980 Mariel boatlift, the 1994 *balseiros*, and the post-2014 normalization-era exodus. In each of these waves, the bilateral relations of the United States and Cuba have prompted the surge in migration and the policy response within the United States has varied, particularly since the 1980 Refugee Act decoupled ideology from refugee status, turning increasingly restrictionist.

The 1980 Mariel boatlift was prompted by Cuba, echoing the 1965 episode that superseded U.S. immigration policy: Castro opened the Mariel harbor and welcomed Cuban-Americans to pick up their relatives by boat.¹⁵⁸ At the time, Cuba was experiencing a recession and increased political discontent, thus the policy’s intent was to purge the

¹⁵⁷ Jens Manuel Krogstad, “Surge in Cuban Immigration to U.S. Continued through 2016,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2017, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/cuban-immigration-to-u-s-surges-as-relations-warm/>.

¹⁵⁸ Dominguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” 45.

country of what Castro called, “antisocial elements, lumpen and scum.”¹⁵⁹ Indeed, the Mariel boatlift transferred what Dominguez estimates were 8,000 “common criminals” straight from prisons in Cuba to the United States; he also notes that about 45 percent of the 124,769 *marielitos* that arrived in the United States had prison records.¹⁶⁰ In response to Castro, President Jimmy Carter continued the pattern of welcoming the Cubans based on his personal convictions and the dangers of physically interfering with the boatlift, although he acknowledged the “boatlift was contrary to U.S. law and policy.”¹⁶¹ Carter’s position was not domestically popular, even he recognized his decision hurt his reelection campaign, and while the Cubans were admitted into the United States, they were not granted the refugee status and benefits of their predecessors, instead they were deemed “entrants.”¹⁶² During this episode of Cuban migration, it became clear to policy-makers that America’s welcoming immigration policy was beneficial to Castro’s regime, politically damaging domestically, and that the U.S. policy had to reduce the incentives for further migration, leading—for the first time—to a restrictionist policy toward Cubans.¹⁶³

Under Ronald Reagan, migration became the primary concern for relations between Cuba and the United States. In 1981, *marielitos* deemed excludable from admission into the United States were processed for deportation, but Castro refused to accept them; in response, Reagan halted immigrant visa processing until Castro acquiesced, albeit without direct negotiations for the first four years of Reagan’s administration.¹⁶⁴ However, by 1984, Reagan decided to make *marielitos* eligible for the benefits under the Cuban Adjustment of Status Act of 1966, which granted them the benefits they had been denied, and because those benefits were denied to the Haitians who simultaneously arrived under similar circumstances, reinstated the exceptionalism of Cuban immigration policy based

¹⁵⁹ Dominguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” 55; Fidel Castro, as quoted in Dominguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” 57.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* 45.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 46–47.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

on anticommunism.¹⁶⁵ Also in 1984, both countries signed a migration agreement that sought to normalize immigration flows, but Castro unilaterally ended it when the United States began sending radio broadcasts to the island; Reagan responded by preventing both immigrant and non-immigrant travel into the United States—this ultimately resulted in the reinstatement of the agreement in 1987.¹⁶⁶

As a consequence of this upheaval in and slow implementation of this new U.S. policy and domestic Cuban obstacles to emigration, Cuban migration from 1984 to 1989 slowed, yielding about 3,000 Cubans per year in 1988 and 1989.¹⁶⁷ However, by 1989 the rate of tourist visas issued to Cubans was five times higher than the year before and continued to rise in 1990, which combined with the U.S. government decision not to prosecute those who overstayed their visas created an avenue to bypass the official migration agreement between the two countries.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, Cubans were increasingly using makeshift boats (*balsas*) to reach the Florida coast; in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Coast Guard rescued 20 to 60 Cubans a year while they attempted that trip, but by 1991 the number rose to 2,203.¹⁶⁹

These conditions paved the way for the 1994 *balse* crisis, which Castro instigated as a coercive measure against its perceived reluctance of the United States to conduct normal immigration proceedings for Cubans, as agreed upon in 1987.¹⁷⁰ In August 1994 as indications of another Cuban mass migration surfaced—what had been dozens of seafaring Cubans before 1989 became thousands after 1991, and tens of thousands in mid-1994—President Bill Clinton decided and publicly declared U.S. plans to interdict Cubans

¹⁶⁵ Dominguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” 80.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 50–51.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 83.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 84.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; Robert C. Parker, “Did the USCG Use the Lessons Learned from the 1980 Mariel Boatlift from Cuba in Dealing with the Haitian Migration Crisis of 1991–2?” (master’s thesis, Naval War College, 1993), 31, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a264168.pdf>.

¹⁷⁰ Dominguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” 84; Kelly M. Greenhill, “The 1994 Cuban Balse Crisis and Its Historical Antecedents,” in *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 81.

at sea and return them to the U.S. base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba indefinitely.¹⁷¹ While the intent of that policy was certainly to discourage Cubans from making the journey, the numbers indicate neither the policy nor the hazards effectively dissuaded potential *balseros*: in the summer of 1994, interdiction reached a one-month high of 30,900, despite a 75 percent death rate at sea.¹⁷² Castro, displeased with other U.S. actions against Cuba—namely the embargo and Radio Martí—removed obstacles to Cuban emigration by sea in an effort to force dialogue with the United States on these and immigration issues of concern.¹⁷³ Ultimately, bilateral talks yielded an agreement that included provisions for 20,000 Cuban admissions to the United States per year, with no limits on those with U.S. citizen relatives, and issuance of visas for the 4,000-6,000 Cubans on waiting lists, plus a lottery system for future applicants, both of which ended the short-lived possibility for illegal Cuban immigration; additionally, Cuba agreed to crack-down on illegal emigration and accept some repatriations.¹⁷⁴ This agreement would come to be known as the “wet-foot, dry-foot” policy, whereby Cubans interdicted at sea would be returned to Cuba, but those arriving on U.S. soil could remain and apply for asylum. Ultimately, the Clinton-era migration agreements allowed Cubans multiple avenues for legal status in the United States: refugee admissions, family-reunification, visa lotteries, asylum, and eventual permanent residency after one year under the Cuban Adjustment Act.¹⁷⁵ In the late 1990s and into the 2000s, Cuban *balseros* exchanged their makeshift rafts for motorized boats operated by Caribbean migrant smugglers; but when compared to the authorized rates of legal migration the numbers of sea arrivals in the United States remained low.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ Greenhill, “The 1994 Cuban Balseros Crisis and Its Historical Antecedents,” in *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy*, 114.; Holly Ackerman, “The Balsero Phenomenon, 1991–1994,” *Cuban Studies* 26, (January 1996): 174, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24487714>.

¹⁷² Ackerman, “The Balsero Phenomenon, 1991–1994,” 173.

¹⁷³ Greenhill, “The 1994 Cuban Balseros Crisis and Its Historical Antecedents,” 116–117.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 120.

¹⁷⁵ Ted Henken, “Balseros, Boteros, and E I B om bo: Post-1994 Cuban Immigration to the United States and the Persistence of Special Treatment,” *Latino Studies* 3 (2005): 401 & 408, <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.lst.8600159>.

¹⁷⁶ Henken, “Balseros, Boteros, and E I B om bo: Pos t-1994 Cuban Immigration to the United States and the Persistence of Special Treatment,” 404–406.

From 1995 onward, Cuban immigration flow has remained continuous and mostly legal, but in 2014 President Barack Obama's shift toward normalization of relations with Cuba prompted another surge in unauthorized migration. After decades of a continuous policy on Cuba, President Obama reversed the U.S. position incrementally: in December 2014, he announced his initiative to normalize relations with Cuba; in July 2015, he resumed diplomatic ties; in March 2016, he met with Cuban President Raul Castro; and in January 2017, he ended the "wet foot/dry foot" policy declaring, "effective immediately, Cuban nationals who attempt to enter the United States illegally and do not qualify for humanitarian relief will be subject to removal."¹⁷⁷ The initial 2014 announcement provoked a rush of Cuban immigrants—anticipating an end to their exceptional immigration status—to enter the United States: in a quarter-to-quarter comparison, Pew Research indicated the arrival of Cubans doubled from 2014 to 2015, and from 2015 to 2016 the numbers increased by 85 percent.¹⁷⁸ However, this time Cubans added land routes by flying to Ecuador and traversing through Central America to the United States.¹⁷⁹ As a result of this movement, in 2016, Nicaragua shut its borders creating a southbound domino effect of stranded Cubans in Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia, which prompted each country to address the hundreds to thousands of migrants within their borders, namely through deportation back to Cuba.¹⁸⁰ In 2018, new challenges emerged to the standing bilateral migration agreement: cutbacks to U.S. Embassy personnel in Havana have prompted the suspension of visa services in Cuba. Instead, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota took over responsibility for the Cuban visa process, requiring Cubans to travel

¹⁷⁷ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President on Cuban Immigration Policy," <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/12/statement-president-cuban-immigration-policy>.

¹⁷⁸ Krogstad, "Surge in Cuban Immigration to U.S. Continued through 2016," Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2017.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Jim Wyss, "Colombia Denies Airlift for Cuban Migrants, to Begin Deportations," *Miami Herald*, August 3, 2016, <http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/colombia/article93381367.html>.

to Colombia for the prospect of an American visa.¹⁸¹ The most recent developments in United States-Cuban relations officially ended the Cold War-era special status conferred to Cuban migrants, but the future of near-term bilateral relations remains uncertain under President Donald Trump and new Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel.

C. CONTEXT: U.S. POLICY FOR SALVADORAN IMMIGRATION

Near the end of the Cold War, the American experience with communist Cuba heavily influenced U.S. immigration policy toward El Salvador. Here, too, immigration policy was a strategic and foreign policy tool against communism; however, in contrast for its reverse of the Cuban case, the whole-scale *rejection* of refugees and asylees from El Salvador in the early 1980s communicated to the world that the U.S. supported the Salvadoran regime in their war against communist insurgency. While U.S. support for the Salvadoran military junta began under the Carter administration in 1979, the Reagan administration expanded its support to El Salvador's government, fearing the spread of communist revolution in Central America and a subsequent mass migration to the United States. Thus, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans were summarily denied entry and categorized as "economic migrants," with few admitted under the 1980 Refugee Act, resulting in a flow of illegal migration and pattern of precarious legal status for Salvadoran émigrés in the United States.

To understand the connection between these issues requires understanding the relationship between the United States and Central America. The United States has been a dominant influence in Central America for nearly 200 years, and, as in most places in Latin America, it has since then invariably pursued its interests related to national security, domestic politics, and economic development.¹⁸² Prior to the Cold War, this hegemonic relationship sought direct American advantage in commercial interests and stability in Central America, leading to U.S. interventions. During the Cold War, Kennedy's push for

¹⁸¹ Nora Gámez Torres, "U.S. Promise to Issue 20,000 Visas to Cubans is Jeopardized by Cuts at Embassy in Havana," *Miami Herald*, February 9, 2018, <http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article199297749.html>.

¹⁸² Lars Schoultz, "Preface," *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), xv.

development was overcome by anti-communist efforts to stabilize the region through covert action and military aid, particularly in Central America. The United States perceived anti-communism in Central America as its vital interest: as noted by President Reagan in 1983, “the national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put in jeopardy.”¹⁸³ In short, the primary U.S. foreign policy toward El Salvador was the promotion of democracy and ending the communist threat.

These vital U.S. interests were at stake in El Salvador’s 1979 civil war, which remains among the world’s most violent and long-lasting conflicts; it caused countless human rights atrocities from right-wing paramilitaries and leftist guerrillas and displaced hundreds of thousands of people.¹⁸⁴ The insurgency in El Salvador began in the context of 40 years of military rule and a major economic crisis. At the outset, and with the military as El Salvador’s strongest institution, five separate revolutionary groups emerged; fearing a rebellion, junior elements of the military overthrew the government and established a civilian junta.¹⁸⁵ By 1980, political conflict within the junta’s left- and right-wing representatives caused the junta to dissolve, bisecting the country into opposite ends of the political spectrum: the military and oligarchy on the right and the poor and communists on the left.¹⁸⁶ With help from Cuba, leftist guerrillas united to form the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) and received training and assistance from Cuba, Nicaragua, and

¹⁸³ Ronald Reagan, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America,” April 27, 1983, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41245>.

¹⁸⁴ Stephen Macekura, “‘For Fear of Persecution’: Displaced Salvadorans and U.S. Refugee Policy in the 1980s,” *Journal of Policy History* 23, no. 3 (July 2011): 357, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/899274338/>.

¹⁸⁵ Walter Ladwig, “Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency: U.S. Involvement in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1979–92,” *International Security* 41, no. 1 (2016), 110, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/628477>.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 111.

the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁷ In response, the United States sought to support a centrist junta and its economic and security sector reforms.¹⁸⁸

Under the Carter administration, aid and military support for the junta was contingent upon respect for human rights and maintaining a centrist junta, but by 1981 this position became untenable for the United States. With the election of Ronald Reagan in late 1980, Salvadoran leaders changed their calculus: they believed the aid would flow without conditions.¹⁸⁹ Then, in the last days of the Carter administration, the FMLN conducted simultaneous attacks throughout the country in what was dubbed their “final offensive.”¹⁹⁰ The initial success of this offensive prompted Carter to lift human rights conditions from U.S. assistance, a position continued by the Reagan administration, albeit with enhanced aid.¹⁹¹

In providing El Salvador with unconditional and enhanced military aid, the United States facilitated countless human rights abuses against the populace and stimulated sustained emigration. While the Reagan administration did desire a reduction in human rights violations, it attempted to induce rather than coerce compliance.¹⁹² By late 1981, this approach yielded the largest massacre of the war: in El Mozote, American trained forces tortured and killed 767 people, including children, over the course of three days.¹⁹³ The subsequent years of the war pitted the poorly trained Salvadoran conventional military against a flexible guerilla force, with the civilian population caught in between. Military commanders believed that innocent civilians would flee areas of insurgent control, thus

¹⁸⁷ Ladwig, “Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency: U.S. Involvement in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1979–92,” 111.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 119.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 120.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 121.

those that remained merited the violence that befell them.¹⁹⁴ By 1992, about 70–75,000 Salvadorans lost their lives and over one million fled the country.¹⁹⁵

The longevity of El Salvador’s war forced President Reagan to respond simultaneously to the conflict and the ensuing flow of migrants. In a 1983 bid for Congressional support for aid to El Salvador, Reagan remarked, “must we wait while Central Americans are driven from their homes like the...more than a million Cubans who have fled Castro’s Caribbean utopia? Must we, by default, leave the people of El Salvador no choice but to flee their homes, creating another tragic human exodus?”¹⁹⁶ President Reagan’s concerns were aptly placed, whereas the flow of migrants from El Salvador to the United States was largely non-existent in the late 1970s, by 1984, ten percent of El Salvador’s population was living in the United States.¹⁹⁷ However, the President’s words incorrectly predicted the cause of the migration—he suggested that if communism won it would create an exodus, but the exodus was generated by the protracted and indiscriminately violent war his administration was funding.

Despite the clear link between the war and the surge in migration, the Reagan administration made no effort to welcome Salvadorans in the United States—it promoted policies against their admission. Although Salvadorans fled their country as a result of inseparable motivations--war, economic necessity, and personal fears of persecution—they were never deemed a national group eligible for refugee admission.¹⁹⁸ Instead of providing asylum, the Reagan administration argued the solution to the migrant crisis was to pacify El Salvador and declared that the continued provision of military aid was an indication that

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ladwig, “Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency: U.S. Involvement in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1979–92,” 109.; Al Valdez, “The Origins of Southern California Latino Gangs,” in *Maras, Gang Violence and Security in Central America*, ed. Thomas Bruneau, Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 25.

¹⁹⁶ Ronald Reagan, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America,” April 27, 1983, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41245>.

¹⁹⁷ Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 165–168.

¹⁹⁸ Macekura, “‘For Fear of Persecution’: Displaced Salvadorans and U.S. Refugee Policy in the 1980s,” 362–365.

human rights were improving.¹⁹⁹ While those claims are debatable, given the U.S. acknowledgement of and aid to Salvadoran refugees outside the United States and the subjective nature of the asylum assessments, in that political climate, even congressmen had difficulty in finding recourse for Salvadoran asylum opportunities.²⁰⁰

In addition to foreign policy constraints, the Refugee Act of 1980 and the continued flow of Cuban migrants worked in concert against Salvadoran asylum opportunities. Because the 1980 Refugee Act eliminated ideology and particular country designations for refugee status, the law tasked the administration with establishing regional ceilings for admission.²⁰¹ Once those regional ceilings were set, the administration selected groups of “special humanitarian concern” or “national interest” for admission consideration.²⁰² These decisions did not favor Salvadorans, for the aforementioned political reasons, and because most of the 1980s quotas for Latin America were reserved for Cubans, who were designated an eligible “national group;” in 1980, for instance, 95 percent of the 20,000 slots were given to Cubans.²⁰³ While these quotas ebbed and flowed with the bilateral relations of the United States and Cuba, throughout the 1980s Salvadorans were not granted refugee status, with few exceptions: 67 in 1983, 3 in 1985, and 11 in 1989.²⁰⁴ In 1983, the Reagan administration admitted 50 Salvadoran political prisoners and their families following a special request from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).²⁰⁵ The small number admitted the other two years likely reflect similar exceptions.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁹ Macekura, “‘For Fear of Persecution’: Displaced Salvadorans and U.S. Refugee Policy in the 1980s,” 365.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.; Cecilia Menjivar, “The Context of Reception in the United States,” *Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 85.

²⁰¹ Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 196.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid., 197–199.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 200.; U.S. Department of State, “Table XII, Refugees Resettled and Persons Granted Asylum,” *World Refugee Report*, September 1990, <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.10078707205>.

²⁰⁵ Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 198.

²⁰⁶ U.S. Department of State, “Table XII, Refugees Resettled and Persons Granted Asylum: United States,” *World Refugee Report*, September 1990, 91, <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.10078707205>.

Without a clear path to legal entry, Salvadorans resorted to entering the United States illegally. By mid-1985, estimates of Salvadoran migrants living in the United States ranged from 1,054,000 to 1,743,000.²⁰⁷ Within these numbers, the majority is not accounted for in legal migration statistics, which showed negligible immigration before 1979 and amounts to only 34,267 immigrant visas granted to Salvadorans from 1979 to 1985.²⁰⁸ Combined with the low numbers admitted as refugees (70) and asylees (756) from 1983 to 1985, these estimates reflect a considerable flow of illegal immigration during the first half of the Salvadoran civil war.²⁰⁹

Because of U.S. involvement in El Salvador's civil war, Salvadorans who either overstayed non-immigrant visas or entered the country illegally through 1985 had few opportunities to normalize their immigration status. At the time, these Salvadorans could apply to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), known today as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), for asylum; those who applied upon arrival were regarded favorably as "affirmative" applicants and those who applied upon apprehension for illegal entry were deemed "defensive" applicants.²¹⁰ While INS processed their applications, affirmative applicants were normally released on "good faith," whereas defensive applicants were generally detained.²¹¹ Adhering to the 1980 Refugee Act, the INS consulted with the Department of State for advisory opinions on applicant's claims of persecution, and in practice tended to follow those opinions for approval or rejection.²¹² In the case of Salvadorans, applications were overwhelmingly

²⁰⁷ Schoultz, "Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy," 169.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 170.

²⁰⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Table XII, Refugees Resettled and Persons Granted Asylum: United States," *World Refugee Report*, September 1990, 91.; U.S. Department of State, "Table VII.A., Refugees Resettled and Persons Granted Asylum: United States," *World Refugee Report*, September 1985, 118, <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015078359117>.; U.S. Department of State, "Table VII.A., Refugees Resettled and Persons Granted Asylum: United States," *World Refugee Report*, September 1986, 103, <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.10061795613>.

²¹⁰ Schoultz, "Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy," 203.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² *Ibid.*, 204.

rejected—2 percent were approved in 1984 and 2.4 percent in 1985.²¹³ Given the Department of State’s heavy influence on these judgments, foreign policy considerations—foreign aid to the Salvadoran junta contingent upon human rights progress—was arguably the source of these judgments.²¹⁴

Without legal protections nor foreign policy favor in the early 1980s, undocumented Salvadorans were targeted for deportation and inspired the sympathy of a domestic sanctuary movement. In 1980, of the 11,762 Salvadorans apprehended, 75 percent were deported; in 1981, 67 percent of the 15,903 apprehended Salvadorans were deported.²¹⁵ The high numbers of Salvadorans apprehended, coupled with the refusal to allow them out on bond and reports of intimidation practices garnered the attention of the immigration groups and lawyers.²¹⁶ These groups decried unfair treatment of Salvadorans, including specific complaints about their access to information and lawyers.²¹⁷ By 1982, religious organizations took note of the Salvadoran plight and offered them sanctuary from the deportations.²¹⁸ Among those groups, in Arizona, the first church to openly declare its opposition to U.S. policy declared federal treatment of Salvadorans was “illegal and immoral.”²¹⁹ While harboring undocumented immigrants was a crime, the INS had an informal policy of not seeking individuals in places of worship.²²⁰ The movement spread and by 1984, “hundreds of churches, synagogues, ecclesiastical and secular communities ... had declared themselves and their buildings to be sanctuaries.”²²¹ Participants of the

²¹³ Ibid., 205–207.

²¹⁴ Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 207–208.

²¹⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, *Temporary Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens*, 98th Congress 2nd session, 1984, 144, <https://www.loc.gov/law/find/hearings/pdf/00183878839.pdf>.

²¹⁶ Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 192–193.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 208–209.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, *Temporary Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens*, 98th Congress 2nd session, 1984, 145, <https://www.loc.gov/law/find/hearings/pdf/00183878839.pdf>.

²²¹ Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 209.

movement provided Salvadorans with material, spiritual, and legal support to ease their difficulties, but also prompted grassroots political activism on their behalf.²²² At the heart of this movement was the quest for a Salvadoran extended voluntary departure (EVD), a temporary measure granted by the Attorney General to halt apprehensions and deportations of a particular national group, but which did not come to pass in the 1980s.²²³

In the midst of the sanctuary movement, Congress attempted to change deportation practices of Salvadorans, leading to amnesty for some in 1986. In 1983, members of Congress attempted to suspend the deportations of Salvadorans, citing widespread suffering as a result of the ongoing war.²²⁴ In disagreement, the Department of State responded that it would be inappropriate because it would encourage illegal migration, was unnecessary because Salvadorans seek asylum elsewhere in the region, and because it conflicted with the foreign policy of the time.²²⁵ Aside from the charity of the sanctuary movement, Salvadorans were not granted any reprieve of their illegality until 1986. After years of debates, Congress passed the IRCA of 1986, which granted amnesty to some undocumented immigrants—roughly 146,000, all of whom arrived prior to January 1982.²²⁶ After this point, the legal status of Salvadorans has vacillated between temporary measures, but no further amnesty has been granted.

While this helped the initial civil war migrants, it rendered hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans who arrived after this point deportable until 1987. The potential magnitude of the ensuing deportation of Salvadorans was so great that, in April 1987, Salvadoran President Napoleon Duarte requested President Reagan exempt them from the law and deportation; Duarte feared the economic impact of losing \$350 to \$600 million in remittances from those Salvadoran nationals.²²⁷ While the Reagan administration formally

²²² Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 209–210.

²²³ Ibid., 211–215; Menjívar, *Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America*, 85.

²²⁴ Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 215.

²²⁵ Ibid., 215.

²²⁶ Ibid., 216.

²²⁷ Robert Pear, “Duarte Appeals To Reagan To Let Salvadorans Stay,” *New York Times*, 26 April 1987, <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/26/world/durate-appeals-to-reagan-to-let-salvadorans-stay.html>.

rejected Duarte's plea, "deportations of Salvadorans essentially ended" in practice; likely because the United States did not want to take actions counterproductive to its foreign policy aims in El Salvador.²²⁸

By 1990, renewed immigration reform made Salvadorans in the United States the first beneficiaries of a new program called temporary protected status (TPS). Between 1987 and 1990, Salvadorans continued to battle for EVD (known today as deferred enforced departure) opportunities but instead, as a result of sympathetic congressmen's efforts, received a new status known as TPS in 1990, which granted working permits and stopped all deportations of those arriving before September 1990 for eighteen months.²²⁹ Salvadorans were the first group to receive TPS—a congressionally authorized mechanism for providing a "form of humanitarian relief" to migrants from countries "embroiled in violent conflict or suffer[ing] from a natural disaster," who are "unable to return to their home."²³⁰ While TPS can be extended for designated periods of time, it is a temporary status that requires periodic applications to USCIS and political lobbying from beneficiaries to continue.²³¹ The initial TPS for Salvadorans expired in 1992, when the Salvadoran civil war ended, but President George H.W. Bush then authorized the deferred enforced departure (DED), which prevented deportations of 190,000 Salvadorans without the need for their registration and continued to provide the opportunity for work permits with registration.²³² Based on the assertion that a large repatriation would have "serious

²²⁸ Schoultz, "Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy," 216.

²²⁹ Menjívar, *Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America*, 85.; Susan Bibler Coutin, "From Refugees to Immigrants: The Legalization Strategies of Salvadoran Immigrants and Activists," *The International Migration Review* 32, no. 4 (December 1998): 910, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/215279352/>.

²³⁰ Madeline Mesick and Claire Bergeron, "Temporary Protected Status in the United States: A Grant of Humanitarian Relief that is Less than Permanent," *Migration Information Source*, July 2, 2014, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/temporary-protected-status-united-states-grant-humanitarian-relief-less-permanent>.

²³¹ Cecilia Menjívar, "Temporary Protected Status in the United States: The Experiences of Honduran and Salvadoran Immigrants," May 2017, *Center for Migration Research*, https://d3n8a8pro7vhm.cloudfront.net/carecen/pages/1710/attachments/original/1498521692/TPS_Report_FINAL_v5.pdf?1498521692.

²³² Jill H. Wilson, *Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues*, CRS Report No. RS20844 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=805997>, 2–3.

negative effects...on the then evolving situation in El Salvador,” this authorization for DED was repeated by President Clinton in 1993, but finally allowed to expire in December 1994, when “the political and human rights situation in El Salvador...improved significantly.”²³³

The next major change in Salvadoran’s status occurred between 1998 and 2001, when a hurricane and pair of earthquakes devastated El Salvador and prompted the return of DED and prolonged TPS for Salvadorans. While some Salvadorans who arrived prior to 1990 (roughly 129,131) were provided the opportunity to “regularize their status” under the 1997 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), unauthorized Salvadorans continued to arrive in the United States with INS estimates showing 335,000 unauthorized Salvadorans in 1996.²³⁴ Subsequently, from 1998 to 2001, approximately 150,000 Salvadorans who were already in the United States benefitted from two temporary deportation suspensions before receiving TPS designation from President George W. Bush.²³⁵ President Bush’s decision was made in part to Salvadoran President Francisco Flores’ in-person petition for TPS, in which he argued that the remittances of Salvadorans in the United States would help fund the affected families and the national recovery efforts.²³⁶ President Bush explained his rationale declaring the TPS would, “allow them to continue to work here and to remit some of their wages back home to support El Salvador’s recovery efforts.”²³⁷ Since that time, Presidents Bush and Obama consistently renewed the TPS, but under President Donald J. Trump, without plans for an extension the TPS for this group—roughly 262, 528 in 2017—is set to expire on September

²³³ Wilson, *Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues*, CRS Report No. RS20844; Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “Expiration of Deferred Enforced Departure for Nationals of El Salvador,” *Federal Register* 59, no. 233 (December 6, 1994): 94–30088, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1994-12-06/html/94-30088.htm>.

²³⁴ Menjívar, *Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America*, 87.; Sarah Gammage, “El Salvador: Despite End to Civil War, Emigration Continues,” *Migration Information Source*, July 26, 2007, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/el-salvador-despite-end-civil-war-emigration-continues>.

²³⁵ Ibid.; Eric Schmitt, “Salvadorans Illegally in U.S. Are Given Protected Status,” *New York Times*, March 3, 2001. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/03/us/salvadorans-illegally-in-us-are-given-protected-status.html>.

²³⁶ Schmitt, “Salvadorans Illegally in U.S. Are Given Protected Status.”

²³⁷ President George W. Bush, as quoted in Schmitt, “Salvadorans Illegally in U.S. Are Given Protected Status.”

9, 2019.²³⁸ Given the size (approximately 1.9 million in 2013) and long-term presence of Salvadorans in the United States, remittances have become central to El Salvador's economy—amounting to 18.3 percent of its gross domestic product in 2017—and accordingly, to bilateral relations with the United States and domestic politics within El Salvador.²³⁹

Immigration policy toward El Salvador in the 1980s was guided by foreign policy concerns, but also influenced by domestic political actors and the agency this gave to the Salvadoran community. Salvadorans were never granted refugee status as a national group, nor the package of benefits this conferred, because the United States perceived its support for the Salvadoran junta's victory over communists as the solution to their temporary, but substantial migration flow. Moreover, despite indirect U.S. acknowledgement of the Salvadoran migrant's plight, it was also constrained by the large number of Cubans who continued to flee communism and filled the available refugee allocations. Ultimately, because the United States believed its foreign policy goals would solve the Salvadoran immigration problem, the decades-long flow of refugees (in all but name) have yielded a contingent of hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants in precarious legal status in the United States for almost two decades.

²³⁸ Wilson, *Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues*, CRS Report No. RS20844; Miriam Jordan, "Trump Administration Says That Nearly 200,000 Salvadorans Must Leave," *New York Times*, January 8, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/us/salvadorans-tps-end.html>.

²³⁹ Gustavo Lopez and Eileen Patten, *The Impact of Slowing Immigration: Foreign-Born Share Falls Among 14 Largest U.S. Hispanic Origin Groups*, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2015/09/2015-09-15_hispanic-origin-profiles-summary-report_FINAL.pdf; Jesse Acevedo, "What Will Happen to El Salvador When the U.S. Ends the Protected Status of Salvadoran Immigrants?" *Washington Post*, February 22, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/22/salvadorans-will-lose-tps-status-heres-how-this-may-impact-the-countrys-march-elections/?utm_term=.8acfbec084d9; Sarah Gammage, "El Salvador: Despite End to Civil War, Emigration Continues," *Migration Information Source*, July 26, 2007.

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III. CONTEXT OF RECEPTION

The interaction between structural factors in the United States and the characteristics of immigrants entering the country shape the assimilation models of those initial immigrants and their subsequent generations.²⁴⁰ To understand how U.S. policy impacts their assimilation, a key mechanism is the context of reception, which this chapter will explore for the initial waves of migration from Cuba and El Salvador. The context of reception refers to the structural factors in the reception environment that constrain immigrants: 1) government responses; 2) economic conditions; 3) societal attitudes; and 4) the presence of ethnic communities.²⁴¹ These dimensions reflect the economic, social, political, and legal aspects of the reception context and underscore the influence of the federal government's policies—driven by its overarching foreign policy goals—in each area. In the case of Miami-based Cubans, U.S. policy generated a welcoming reception context that facilitated their economic and social integration—albeit with latent racial tensions—and Cubans' creation of an ethnic community with a strong exile identity. Salvadorans in Los Angeles experienced a negative reception: U.S. immigration policy and support for the Salvadoran military junta necessitated the exclusion of Salvadoran refugees, limited their economic opportunities, contributed to negative societal attitudes, and divided the ethnic community, but also sparked some activism in civil society.

This study's emphasis on the reception context does not negate the importance of the interaction between human capital and each of the structural factors. However, because the purpose of this research is to understand how U.S. foreign policy shapes the structural constraints under which an immigrant makes choices about life in the United States, the discussion of American foreign policy's influence on human capital in these countries is not the emphasis of this research. In fact, Portes and Rumbaut, in their fourth edition of

²⁴⁰ Nora Hamilton and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City: Guatemalans and Salvadorans in Los Angeles* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 12–13.

²⁴¹ Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, "Making it America," *Immigrant America: A Portrait*, 4th ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014, 139. Portes excludes this dimension from his 2014 discussion on contexts of reception, however his earlier writings and the literature on Salvadoran and Cuban migrants demonstrates the importance of the general public's attitudes toward them in shaping their reception.

Immigrant America, found that while assimilation stems from the interaction between human capital and reception contexts, immigrants with similar skillsets may be directed toward divergent socioeconomic positions by the receiving environment.²⁴² They add that analyzing the elements of the context of reception “is a way to overcome the limitations of individualistic models of immigrant achievement.”²⁴³

The first element of the reception context, and on which U.S. foreign policy exerts particular influence, is the *government response*. Government responses determine the flow and form of migration, whether authorized or not, and can be understood as: exclusive, passively accepting, or actively encouraging.²⁴⁴ Exclusion can preclude immigration or create illegal migration flows; active encouragement either induces particular migration or assists in resettlement; and passive acceptance exists between the previous two possibilities, where the government is permissive about migration but does not facilitate it.²⁴⁵

Second, *economic conditions* refers to the labor opportunities available to migrants, as constrained and shaped by U.S. policy. This includes regional economic health, existing wage inequalities, and labor demands faced by all residents of an area, but adds the typification—positive, negative, or neutral—of specific immigrant groups.²⁴⁶ Negative typification refers to discrimination that limits immigrants to low-wage labor or confines them to unemployment. Conversely, positive typification can occur in ethnic enclaves with preferential hiring of “their own” or in a broader setting, through stereotypes of a particular group’s disposition to “work hard.”²⁴⁷

Third, the *societal attitudes* toward particular immigrant groups play an important role in the characterization of the reception context and are influenced by U.S. foreign

²⁴² Portes and Ruben Rumbaut, “Making it America,” *Immigrant America*, 138.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 143.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 140.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

policy and immigration considerations.²⁴⁸ This includes the public’s attitudes in the United States as demonstrated in the media, local interactions, and national narratives of particular immigrant groups.²⁴⁹ These attitudes can be classified as positive, negative, mixed, or neutral. They may be consistent or divergent in the national and local environments

Fourth, the local presence of an *ethnic community* that a given immigrant group perceives as similar to themselves is central to their reception context and can be a source of support but can also inhibit assimilation into the mainstream. If there is no pre-existing ethnic community, immigrants rely on their human capital—their existing personal resource endowments—and the other factors of the reception context may play a greater role in their integration.²⁵⁰ When an ethnic community exists, it influences new immigrants’ integration by providing a support network for cultural differences and economic challenges.²⁵¹ However, when the ethnic community is generally working-class, their assistance is generally contingent on new immigrants’ conformity to the community’s economic status.²⁵² On the other hand, when an ethnic community has access to higher paying professions, new immigrants may have more options for employment both within and outside of their community.²⁵³

The following discussion on the context of reception focuses on “the opportunity structure, degree of openness versus hostility, and acceptance”²⁵⁴ experienced by two separate waves of migration: Cubans in Miami and Salvadorans in Los Angeles. The characteristics of the immigrant groups, while not the main focus of this analysis, provide supplemental context for their experience in the United States. Thus, it is necessary to

²⁴⁸ Alejandro Portes and Borocz, Jozsef. “Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation,” *International Migration Review* 23 (October 1, 1989): 618, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/61037326/>.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Portes and Ruben Rumbaut, “Making it America,” *Immigrant America*, 141.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid., 142.

²⁵³ Ibid., 142.

²⁵⁴ Seth J. Schwartz, et al., “Perceived Context of Reception among Recent Hispanic Immigrants: Conceptualization, Instrument Development, and Preliminary Validation,” *Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychology* 20, no. 1 (January 2014): 2, doi:10.1037/a0033391.

survey the demographics, legal status, size, and timing of the first-wave diasporas while also characterizing the context of reception nationally and the local conditions in Miami and Los Angeles at the approximate years of the diasporas' arrival. Moreover, given that early migrants' experiences in the host society are decisive for subsequent migrants' experiences, the lingering legacy of the reception context affects later Cuban and Salvadoran migrants as well.²⁵⁵

A. CUBANS IN 1960s MIAMI

Based on the contextual factors described in the previous chapters, as they relate to the overall reception of the initial wave of Cuban migrants to the United States, this wave of “Golden Exiles” includes those arriving between January 1959 and September 1965. These approximately 304,070 Cubans²⁵⁶ share common structural experiences, as they were “pushed” out of Cuba because of its communist regime and “pulled” to the United States by its welcoming foreign policy, preferential immigration stance, and historical ties between the two nations. Moreover, because initial waves of refugees tend to represent the upper segments of a society, this cohort of Cubans include a disproportionate number of well-educated, upper-class professionals and entrepreneurs, then giving way to a large middle class as early as between 1962 and 1965; they were also mostly white.²⁵⁷ The earliest exiles during this period were tied to the old Batista regime: politicians, high-ranking military officers, and government leaders; they were followed by the upper class who were negatively affected by the socioeconomic changes in Cuba, and later the middle class: artisans, office and factory workers, skilled/semi-skilled workers.²⁵⁸ Among exile arrivals from 1959 to 1962 and 1962 to 1965, the percentage of professional, technical and managerial Cubans dropped from 31 to 18.1 percent, but the number of semi-skilled and unskilled Cubans increased from 8 to 49 percent.²⁵⁹ Politically, this group of exiles was

²⁵⁵ Portes and Ruben Rumbaut, “Making it America,” *Immigrant America*, 138.

²⁵⁶ Sylvia Pedraza-Bailey, “Cuba’s Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration,” *International Migration Review* 19, no. 1 (April 1985): 13 & 35, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1297358035/>.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 13 & 23.

²⁵⁸ María Cristina García, *Havana USA* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 13.

²⁵⁹ Pedraza-Bailey, “Cuba’s Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration,” 13.

also varied, including Batista supporters, former Castro supporters, apathetic Cubans, and anti-communists.²⁶⁰

Thus, the Cuban exiles leading up to the September 1965 Freedom Flights shared a relatively uniform demography that did not represent a full cross-section of Cuban society, but they also shared the experiences of forced departure and a welcoming arrival in the United States. These individuals were inspired to leave Cuba for political, economic, and social reasons that arose from Castro's reformist and repressive communist policies.²⁶¹

While the Cubans in this wave believed their exile would be temporary, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion began to dim their prospects for returning to a democratic Cuba, and they had lost this hope altogether by the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Kennedy–Khrushchev accord included a non-invasion clause.²⁶² Moreover, during this time, Cubans were admitted to the United States as refugees by the thousands, given access to resettlement aid and a path to naturalization that was not offered to other Latin American immigrants. Of this cohort of Cuban exiles, approximately 89,053 were living in Miami by the end of 1965.²⁶³

1. Government Response

In addition to the bilateral politics between Cuba and the United States, as discussed in the previous chapter, that facilitated the Cuban diaspora's arrival in the United States, the federal government complemented its foreign policy decision to welcome Cubans with tangible domestic support. In 1960, President Eisenhower responded to a plea for assistance from concerned civic society in Miami; this led to the creation of the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, using funds from the anti-communism Mutual Security Act,

²⁶⁰ García, *Havana USA*, 13–14

²⁶¹ Pedraza-Bailey, "Cuba's Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration," 13.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, 13 & 35.

²⁶³ U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1970*, 91st edition, Washington, D.C., 1970, 95, <https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1970/compendia/statab/91ed.html>. This number was calculated by subtracting the number of Cuban refugees resettled outside Miami from the total processed at the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami, FL.; García, *Havana USA*, 36–37.

to assist in the resettlement of Cubans.²⁶⁴ While this program responded to domestic political concerns, it also furthered the U.S. foreign policy goal that motivated the admission of Cubans in the first place: undermining the Castro regime. From this program, in 1961, President Kennedy created the Cuban Refugee Program (CRP), which provided an array of assistance to Cubans who registered.²⁶⁵ By 1962, the CRP had been allotted about \$70 million, and in addition to providing Cubans with aid, it also facilitated their resettlement across the United States; however, the majority remained in Miami by choice.²⁶⁶ This program continued the previous administration's policy of welcoming and inviting the arrival of Cuban exiles while also expanding federal support for their transition.

Federal assistance continued through the 1960s, as the United States provided Cuban exiles with numerous supportive programs from the national and local levels of government. The CRP provided Cubans with financial, medical, vocational, educational, job placement, and food aid.²⁶⁷ In addition, the CRP provided funding to the Miami-Dade County school district to facilitate its admission of thousands of Cuban children.²⁶⁸ Moreover, the federal government provided grants for local community groups to help Cuban professionals transfer their skills and education into usable licenses and certificates for employment opportunities, which included the creation of programs for doctor and teacher recertification and assisted with placement into white-collar employment for former professors and lawyers.²⁶⁹ The CRP also undertook nation-wide resettlement initiatives that matched Cubans with jobs and moved them to those locations.²⁷⁰ By 1964,

²⁶⁴ García, *Havana USA*, 20–21.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 22–23.

²⁶⁶ U.S. Congress Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, *Cuban Refugee Problem*, 87th Congress 2nd session, 1962, 305–306, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100679664>.

²⁶⁷ García, *Havana USA*, 22–23.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 22–23.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 46.

²⁷⁰ García, *Havana USA*, 36–37.

as Cubans showed reluctance to move out of Miami, the Johnson administration made the CRP's assistance to individuals contingent upon resettlement.²⁷¹

2. Economic Conditions

Cubans arrived in Miami before it became a center of international business. In 1960, Miami was experiencing an economic recession and a six percent unemployment rate, with a population of approximately 935,000.²⁷² At the time, Miami's economy was largely based on domestic winter tourism, and the city was considered a retirement city.²⁷³ Accordingly, major airlines based their maintenance operations and hubs into Latin America in Miami; approximately 20 percent of the city's labor force was employed in the tourist service sector.²⁷⁴ The next largest sector was small manufacturing, which employed 13 percent of the labor force and experienced slow growth.²⁷⁵ Moreover, Miami's reputation as a "tourist playground" also attracted illicit money, and in the early 1960s, there was a widespread presence of mobsters in Miami Beach.²⁷⁶ While the city relied on its growing seasonal tourism, employment opportunities did not grow in tandem.²⁷⁷

Moreover, while Miami's elites had envisioned the city's internationalization, it was not until a decade after the Cuban exiles arrived that Cuban entrepreneurs made Miami a center of international trade and banking.²⁷⁸ While some Cuban exiles had the means, after settling in, for entrepreneurial endeavors, the majority of them entered into the

²⁷¹ Ibid., 37.

²⁷² Ibid.; U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1970*, 91st edition, Washington, D.C., 1970, 18.

²⁷³ García, *Havana USA*, 20.;

²⁷⁴ Raymond A. Mohl, "Changing Economic Patterns in the Miami Metropolitan Area, 1940–1980," *Tequesta: The Journal of the Historical Association of Southern Florida* 42 (1982): 64, <http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00101446/00042>.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 66.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 69.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 64.

²⁷⁸ Harold M. Rose, "Blacks and Cubans in Metropolitan Miami's Changing Economy," (working paper, *UCLA: Institute for Social Science Research*, 1988), 9, <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5gc241zw>.

existing labor force in tourism, in many cases displacing African-Americans.²⁷⁹ In the subsequent decades, the exile community—taking advantage of the transitional and occupational assistance provided by the CRP—would create an enclave economy that not only transformed Miami but also provided opportunities for economic advancement to subsequent Latin American immigrants.

3. Societal Attitudes

Given the challenging economic conditions in Miami and the robust government support provided to Cubans, societal attitudes toward Cubans were mixed: positive at the national level and supportive yet resentful at the local level. The national narrative about Cubans depicted them as pro-democracy, model immigrants. In his analysis of media publications, Cramer identifies a consistent depiction of Cubans as “good immigrants:” they were white, well-educated, hard-working, and anti-communist.²⁸⁰ These narratives tended to overlook variations in the exile community and lauded their purported monolithic positive attributes. While some of the inspiration for this message came from Cuban exiles’ own identity-creation, Cramer stresses that the information campaign stemmed from the CRP’s proactive public relations effort.²⁸¹ Through depicting Cubans as desirable immigrants, worthy of assistance, the CRP was able to generate support for its resettlement programs, which required volunteer sponsors across the United States.²⁸²

Conversely, at the local level, despite civil society’s mobilization to support Cubans, latent resentment and xenophobia arose. As early as 1961, the stresses created by the influx of Cubans in Miami were high enough to merit the first of two congressional hearings on “Cuban Refugee Problems” (the second was held a year later), in which community leaders and concerned citizens voiced their apprehensions about the size, resettlement and local treatment of Cubans in Miami and requested additional federal

²⁷⁹ Rose, “Blacks and Cubans in Metropolitan Miami’s Changing Economy,” 9.

²⁸⁰ Benjamin W. Cramer, “Normalizing Cuban Refugees,” *Questioning the Cuban Exile model: Race, Gender, and Resettlement, 1959–1979* (El Paso: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2010), 12–15.

²⁸¹ Cramer, “Normalizing Cuban Refugees,” 12–13.

²⁸² *Ibid.*

aid.²⁸³ The testimony of participants in the reception process for Cubans indicated a desire to help the refugees, but the observable disparity between needy Americans and Cubans was clear to Miamians: Cubans received 10 to 20 percent more average monthly financial aid than American citizens on welfare; Cubans received surplus food aid and needy citizens did not; and while Cubans were offered job-training and resettlement opportunities for employment, locals were not afforded such assistance.²⁸⁴ As a result, Miamians expressed their frustration over losing jobs to Cubans who accepted lower wages and the burden of caring for refugees in their city, as evidenced in local newspapers.²⁸⁵ Additionally, Miamians assigned negative stereotypical behavior to Cubans in these outlets including complaints over their loud Spanish, disrespect for the law, and rude driving; locals even posted signs prohibiting the presence of Cubans in housing complexes.²⁸⁶

Moreover, the African-American community in Miami also expressed opposition to Cuban exiles' treatment. At a time when school integration of white and black students was underway, Afro-Cubans attended white schools that were still off-limits to blacks because, although a minority of the exiles were black, Cubans were treated as a monolithic block.²⁸⁷ This situation added another layer of resentment, in addition to the tensions of all Miamians, for the African-American community. Perhaps the best expression of the sentiment came from a minister quoted in the 1961 Senate hearing: "perhaps the American Negro could solve the school integration problem by teaching his children to speak Spanish."²⁸⁸ The minister's view represented a sentiment of indignation among black Miamians, who perceived that immigrants were receiving better treatment and services than American citizens.

²⁸³ U.S. Congress Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, *Cuban Refugee Problems*, 87th Congress 1st session, 1961, 73, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100679664>.

²⁸⁴ García, *Havana USA*, 28-29.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

²⁸⁷ Cramer, "Normalizing Cuban Refugees," 20-21.

²⁸⁸ U.S. Congress Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, *Cuban Refugee Problems*, 87th Congress 1st session, 1961, 73, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100679664>.

4. Presence of Ethnic Communities

This wave of Cubans created the ethnic enclave seen in Miami today, but at the time of their arrival, they relied upon other sources of support. Florida has long-standing Cuban communities dating back to the nineteenth century, but they are located hours away from Miami in Tampa and Key West.²⁸⁹ Nonetheless, by 1959, a generations-old community of approximately 30,000 Cubans resided in Miami, but at that time, African-Americans made up the largest minority, followed by a sizeable Jewish minority.²⁹⁰ While these Cubans were likely assimilated into the mainstream Anglo culture, a small, urban community in the Little Havana section of Miami, which was only four percent “Latin” in 1950, initially welcomed the Cuban exiles.²⁹¹ However, by 1960, Little Havana was not a major reception area for the exiles because housing was not available, and over time, the exiles outgrew this area due to a combination of economic assimilation and zoning laws prohibiting increased population density in this area.²⁹² With the subsequent flows of Cuban exiles, Little Havana became a nearly 100 percent Cuban community by 1974, indicating a trend of displacement and “white-flight” of non-Hispanic Whites that contributed to Miami’s overwhelmingly Hispanic population in subsequent decades.²⁹³

5. Cubans: Conclusion

By the time anticommunist fervor faded in the United States and the Cold War ended, Cubans were embedded in the United States and Miami. Unable to return to Cuba, they played a large role in turning Miami into a thriving city with an international economy. They established an upwardly mobile ethnic enclave that provided a network of support to

²⁸⁹ García, *Havana USA*, 16.

²⁹⁰ García, *Havana USA*, 16.; Morton D. Winsberg, “Housing Segregation of a Predominantly Middle Class Population: Residential Patterns Developed by the Cuban Immigration Into Miami, 1950–74,” *American Journal Of Economics & Sociology* 38, no. 4 (1979): 405, Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed May 17, 2018).

²⁹¹ Winsberg, “Housing Segregation of a Predominantly Middle Class Population: Residential Patterns Developed by the Cuban Immigration Into Miami, 1950–74,” 408.; Rose, “Blacks and Cubans in Metropolitan Miami’s Changing Economy,” 7.

²⁹² Winsberg, “Housing Segregation of a Predominantly Middle Class Population: Residential Patterns Developed by the Cuban Immigration Into Miami, 1950–74,” 408 & 410.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 412–415.

subsequent Cuban immigrants and even other Latin American immigrants. They became naturalized citizens at high rates and created a prominent Cuban-American political force, both as a voting block and in their creation of politicians.²⁹⁴ These accomplishments, which are surveyed in more detail in the next chapter, were made possible by the U.S. government's proactive, multi-faceted support of Cuban exiles, which allowed the transferal of work experience and education into viable professions in the United States; prevented Cubans' downward economic assimilation with an economic safety net; encouraged a positive national identity of the Cuban diaspora; and—despite resettlement efforts—facilitated the development of a vibrant ethnic enclave in Miami.

B. SALVADORANS IN 1980s LOS ANGELES

As evidenced in the previous chapter, Salvadorans were “pushed” out of their homeland as a result of protracted civil war in which the United States supported the right-wing Salvadoran junta. Despite the restrictive U.S. immigration policy, which aligned with the administration's support of the junta, Salvadorans were “pulled” to the United States by pre-existing economic ties, familiarity with the country, and social networks. While some 12,361 Salvadorans entered the United States on immigrant visas between 1979 and 1981, the vast majority of Salvadorans entered or stayed illegally, and few believed they would stay permanently.²⁹⁵ Because neither asylum nor refugee entrance were feasible options for those who could not get an immigrant visa, unauthorized entry became their way to enter the United States. Thus, their journeys less often involved air travel and more often involved a combination of precarious travel modes through Guatemala and Mexico.²⁹⁶ Moreover, because the journey from El Salvador to the United States required access to material and social resources, the immigration patterns of the poorest Salvadorans

²⁹⁴ García, *Havana USA*, 113.

²⁹⁵ Lars Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 171.; Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 154.

²⁹⁶ Cecilia Menjívar, “Salvadorian Migration to the United States in the 1980s,” *International Migration* 32, no. 3 (1994):377, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2435.1994.tb00161.x>.

fleeing the civil war was either rural to urban migration or remained within Central America.²⁹⁷

The experience of the Salvadorans who arrived between 1979 and 1982 has been less liminal than that of subsequent arrivals. In 1986, some undocumented Salvadorans benefitted from the Immigration Reform and Control Act's (IRCA) amnesty clause—but only those 167,952 who arrived before January 1982—leaving an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 Salvadorans vulnerable to deportation across the United States.²⁹⁸ However, prior to the normalization of this early cohort's legal status, they were subjected to high and disproportionate rates of apprehension and removal from the United States.²⁹⁹ Moreover, the IRCA gave illegals one year to apply for legalization and another 18 months for permanent residency, after which citizenship would be an option; simultaneously, the IRCA penalized employers of illegal aliens.³⁰⁰ Thus, these conditions divided the experiences between cohorts in the Salvadoran exile community, where the 1979-1982 unauthorized arrivals experienced less prolonged uncertainty over their legal status than later arrivals.

Beginning in 1979, as Salvadorans fled the nascent civil war in their country of origin and travelled north into the United States, Los Angeles emerged as a major destination.³⁰¹ Whereas in 1970 there were roughly 7,700 foreign-born Salvadorans living in Los Angeles, by 1980, this number had reached 61,600, and by 1990, there were 301,567.³⁰² Based on a RAND study of Los Angeles-based Salvadorans in 1991, of those early 1980s Salvadoran immigrants, approximately two thirds were amnestied by the IRCA

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 378.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 216.; Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 124.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 191–192.

³⁰⁰ Christopher Mitchell, "Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico," in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 17–18.

³⁰¹ Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 1–2.

³⁰² Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 45 & 51.

of 1986.³⁰³ Moreover, because the violence of El Salvador's civil war affected all segments of society, the diaspora included the full spectrum of socioeconomic classes from El Salvador.³⁰⁴ In his survey of legal Central American immigrants in California in 1980, Wallace notes 24 percent of them had at least some college, and of those arriving between 1975 and 1979, about 28 percent were professionals, 46 percent were blue-collar workers, and 24 percent worked in the service industry.³⁰⁵ Subsequent arrivals in the 1980s tended to be undocumented, as a result of the variety of U.S. policies that did not admit them as refugees or asylees, and about 30 percent had not finished high school; still, this cohort included middle-class workers and a small contingent of political activists fleeing repression who would later organize Salvadorans around the Sanctuary movement in Los Angeles.³⁰⁶ While Wallace's sample is not representative of the entire Salvadoran immigrant flow, it supports the theoretical assumption that pioneer migrants tend to differ from subsequent migrants, and it weakens the notion that Salvadorans arrived as a homogenous block of unskilled, uneducated laborers. Moreover, like the Golden Exiles from Cuba, the first wave of Salvadorans was not representative of El Salvador's demographics—it too, reflected a higher level of human capital—which is consistent not only within the grouping of legal Salvadoran immigrants but also of undocumented Salvadorans during this first period.³⁰⁷

³⁰³ Julie DaVanzo, et al. *Surveying Immigrant Communities: Policy Imperatives and Technical Challenges*, Report MR247FF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR247.html, 52.

³⁰⁴ Cecilia Menjivar, "El Salvador," in *New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965*, ed. Mary C. Waters, Reed Ueda, and Helen B. Marrow, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsearch.credoreference.com%2Fcontent%2Fentry%2Fhupnewam%2Fel_salvador%2F0%3FinstitutionId%3D901.

³⁰⁵ Steven P. Wallace, "Central American and Mexican Immigrant Characteristics and Economic Incorporation in California," *The International Migration Review* 20, no. 3 (1986): 663–664, doi:10.2307/2545710.; Prior to 1990, Salvadorans were often aggregated with Guatemalans and Nicaraguans under the term "Central American," not all the sources disaggregate these numbers but Salvadorans generally comprise the majority in this grouping.

³⁰⁶ Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 120 & 222.

³⁰⁷ Wallace, "Central American and Mexican Immigrant Characteristics and Economic Incorporation in California," 663.

1. Government Response

Given the confluence of U.S. foreign policy consideration in the Salvadoran civil war, impacts of continued migration from Cuba and other Central American countries, and the 1980 Refugee Act's redefinition of a refugee, as reviewed in the previous chapter, the government response to Salvadoran migration to the United States began as exclusion. Exclusion turned to passive acceptance because of the Salvadoran government's pleas to maintain remittance flows, but also as a result of the grassroots efforts of civil society, Salvadorans, and the support of Congress. At the national level, President Reagan voiced concerns over Salvadoran migration and indicated a desire to prevent it; this coincided with the challenges of a massive inflow of Cubans during the Mariel crisis of 1980.³⁰⁸ In this context, the de facto U.S. stance was to deny refugee status and the asylum claims of Salvadorans, and to apply increased scrutiny to non-immigrant visas to prevent facilitating unauthorized migration.³⁰⁹

Accordingly, unlike Cubans, Salvadorans were not provided transition support by the U.S. government, leaving a vacuum that was filled by religious and civic organizations throughout the 1980s. From this support, a grassroots movement to protect Salvadorans from deportation during the ongoing civil war in El Salvador emerged. While the IRCA of 1986 afforded the first wave Salvadorans the opportunity for citizenship, its hiring restrictions clause simultaneously endangered the livelihoods of the majority of Salvadorans living in the United States at that time. Moreover, it was not a measure directed at Salvadorans in particular, but rather a broad-based restrictionist response to high rates of immigration that was aimed at dissuading future migrants by penalizing their prospective employers.

³⁰⁸ Ronald Reagan, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America," April 27, 1983, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41245>.; Schoultz, "Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy," in *Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy*, 165–168.

³⁰⁹ Schoultz, "Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy," 174 & 205–207.

2. Economic Conditions

In the early 1980s, when Salvadorans began to arrive in Los Angeles, they encountered a city in transition: economic restructuring and growth, as well as a segmenting labor market. As part of this change, heavy manufacturing jobs moved overseas, while growth in the technological sector created high-paying jobs in electronics and aerospace.³¹⁰ Additionally, the garment and furniture industries, real estate and construction sectors, and a budding foreign trade market also emerged during this time.³¹¹ During much of the 1980s, Los Angeles stood in stark contrast to the rest of the United States, experiencing growth during a time of economic recession.

The restructuring in Los Angeles' economy was met with a simultaneous surge in the city's population, namely from Latin American and Asian immigrant groups, turning the collective population of minorities into the largest population in the city.³¹² In his analysis of occupational change in Los Angeles during this time, Valenzuela finds that the city's economy accommodated those new immigrants with employment in low-paying jobs previously held by whites, while whites shifted to white-collar, higher-pay occupations.³¹³ He notes that the city's economic growth increased its employment rate but summarizes the growing disparity between whites, blacks, and Latinos by adding that "close to 70 percent of the Latino labor force and 45 percent of the African-American labor force were employed in the lower-paid, non-white-collar occupations."³¹⁴

For Salvadorans in particular, these local conditions, coupled with their lack of English and precarious legal status, translated into low-wage employment in janitorial, restaurant, and domestic services, construction, and manufacturing jobs.³¹⁵ This pattern of

³¹⁰ Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 38–39.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

³¹² *Ibid.*

³¹³ Abel Valenzuela, "Industrial and Occupational Change in Los Angeles: The Concentration and Polarization of Minority and White Laborers," *Berkeley Planning Journal* 6, no. 1 (1991): 80–82, <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4216k3jp>.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 82–83.

³¹⁵ Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 39 & 223.

employment would later be sustained by continued Salvadoran migration to the city and the compounding effect of support networks that facilitate new immigrant's job searches. Of note, Menjívar's interviews with Salvadorans reflect a self-identification among these immigrants as "enterprising people" who just needed an opportunity to succeed, a fact she supports with the high rates of employment (over 81 percent) and low rates of public assistance (7.1 percent) among them.³¹⁶ When this self-professed work ethic is combined with the substantial remittances Salvadorans sent to their home country (\$1.3 billion a year in the 1980s),³¹⁷ it indicates Salvadoran economic assimilation may have been limited by their family circumstances, or a long-term desire to return home, as compared to early Cubans in Miami who did not send remittances to Cuba soon after their arrival.

3. Societal Attitudes

Salvadorans began to arrive at a time when national acceptance of immigrants had been exhausted by the surge in worldwide immigration and post-communist refugee flows, leading to a negative societal reception. Locally, they encountered fervent supporters that would prove indispensable to their immigrant community, but at the neighborhood level, they experienced tensions with other minority groups. On the national level, surges in immigration and refugee flows since the 1960s had begun to influence American opinion in the direction of restrictionism.³¹⁸ The results of a national Gallup Poll in 1984 indicated 55 percent of Americans were opposed to the IRCA's amnesty clause, and 75 percent supported penalties against employers of illegal aliens; these results were consistent with a similar poll in 1980.³¹⁹ Moreover, leading up to the arrival of Salvadorans, nearly half

³¹⁶ Cecilia Menjívar, *Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000): 98.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 99.

³¹⁸ Mitchell, "Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico," 16.

³¹⁹ George Gallup Jr., "Gallup Finds Hard-Line Attitude on Illegal Aliens," *Washington Post*, November 22, 1984, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/138075259?accountid=12702>.

the population favored a decrease in immigration, and 79 percent opposed an increase in the level of immigration to the United States.³²⁰

Nonetheless, many Americans—including established immigrants, religious organizations, union leaders, and progressives—were sympathetic toward the Salvadoran diaspora and in vehement disagreement with U.S. national and foreign policy toward them and their country of origin.³²¹ In the early 1980s, this sentiment manifested in a grassroots initiative to provide the would-be refugees with transitional aid and services, including legal advice and information campaigns.³²² This movement also inspired and empowered Salvadoran political activists within the diaspora community to take action for themselves, leading to the growth of numerous political organizations that served to create a sense of community and solidarity among Salvadorans and Central Americans.³²³ Over time, the support turned into a sanctuary movement that lobbied lawmakers for protection from deportation on behalf of Salvadorans.³²⁴ Although this movement gained supporters in Congress, including Senator Edward Kennedy, who advocated for Salvadorans as early as 1981, they did not achieve legislative success until the 1990 approval of Temporary Protected Status for Salvadorans.³²⁵

4. Presence of Ethnic Communities

The early post-civil war Salvadoran immigrants to Los Angeles during this time did not benefit from the solidarity of an existing ethnic community. According to the 1980 census, 84,757 people of self-reported Salvadoran descent lived in California.³²⁶ However, contrary to the experience of Salvadorans in San Francisco, where there was a long history

³²⁰ Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 158–159.

³²¹ Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 120–121.

³²² *Ibid.*

³²³ *Ibid.*, 125–127.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 225–226; Schoultz, “Central America and the Politicization of U.S. Immigration Policy,” 214–215.

³²⁶ U.S. Bureau of Census, “Persons Who Reported at Least One Specific Ancestry Group for Regions, Divisions, and States: 1980,” *Ancestry of the Population by State: 1980 Tables*, <https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/tables/1980/1980-ancestry/tab03.pdf>.

of migration, Los Angeles in the early 1980s was a new destination that would become the largest Salvadoran community outside the country, beginning with this cohort.³²⁷ By 1991, only roughly 26 percent of Salvadorans living in the city had been there for ten years or more.³²⁸ These Salvadorans generally settled into predominantly Spanish-speaking Mexican neighborhoods in Los Angeles' inner city.³²⁹ While in some ways the similarity in language and culture between the two minorities facilitated Salvadorans' transitions, the difficulty of living in poor urban areas proved inescapable for many.³³⁰ By the late 1980s, Salvadorans' now ubiquitous association with gang culture had emerged, due in part to the threat posed by Mexican gangs toward Salvadorans, particularly male youths, in urban Los Angeles.³³¹ Additionally, Salvadorans felt tensions with fellow residents based on perceived arrogance of Mexicans, established immigrants, and other immigrant groups, namely Koreans.³³² Lastly, Salvadorans also faced resentment from African-Americans who accused them of taking their jobs, and in turn they blamed African-Americans for crime and drug problems in the neighborhoods.³³³

Within the Salvadoran cohort, widespread ethnic solidarity was slow to materialize as a result of the legal, economic, and demographic differences between new and established immigrants. Given the reliance of new immigrants on their kin networks, the vast majority of Central Americans lived close to one another, inside the Los Angeles metropolitan area—a necessary but insufficient condition in the formation of a Salvadoran

³²⁷ Menjívar, “El Salvador.”; Menjívar, *Fragmented Ties*, 155-156.

³²⁸ DaVanzo, et al. *Surveying Immigrant Communities: Policy Imperatives and Technical Challenges*, 42.

³²⁹ Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 223.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 223–224.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 186, 223–224; Al Valdez, “The Origins of Southern California Latino Gangs,” in *Maras, Gang Violence and Security in Central America*, ed. Thomas Bruneau, Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 24.

³³² Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 224.

³³³ *Ibid.*

ethnic community.³³⁴ While the 1979 to 1981 wave of Salvadorans responded to its sociopolitical challenges in the United States with political activism, disunity within the broader ethnic group stemmed from the national anti-immigrant rhetoric: pre-established Salvadorans wanted to dissociate from the negative image new arrivals propagated by virtue of being poor and persecuted.³³⁵ Also, at least initially, the negative governmental and economic reception of Salvadorans inhibited the development of social networks within the diaspora because they had little to share with one another.³³⁶ Adding to this segmentation within the community, the IRCA of 1986 made it more difficult for the vast majority of Salvadorans to obtain employment and limited them to low-wage and informal sectors while it afforded earlier arrivals an opportunity for integration.³³⁷ As a consequence of this policy and the pre-existing economic divergence between established Salvadorans and new arrivals, the formation of pan-Salvadoran ethnic solidarity was slow to materialize.

5. Salvadorans: Conclusion

The juxtaposition of national anti-immigration policies and attitudes with the local economic opportunity and activism of sympathetic civil groups marked the early experiences of the early post-Salvadoran civil war exiles in the United States. The U.S. government classification of them as either economic migrants or refugees fleeing persecution made a profound impact on their reception context. Unwilling to return to El Salvador's civil war or the economic conditions in its wake, Salvadorans settled into their community in Los Angeles. They demonstrated the potential agency of immigrant groups in their ability to organize and provide services to their own community but also struggled to develop a thriving ethnic enclave because of the segmentation of their diaspora along

³³⁴ Steven P. Wallace, "Central American and Mexican Immigrant Characteristics and Economic Incorporation in California," *The International Migration Review* 20, no. 3 (Fall 1986): 660, doi:10.2307/2545710.; Salvadorans were often aggregated with Guatemalans and Nicaraguans under the term "Central American," not all the sources disaggregate these numbers but Salvadorans generally comprise the majority in this grouping.

³³⁵ Menjívar, *Fragmented Ties*, 106–107.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, 155–156.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 84.

legal and economic statuses. Their difficulties and successes in assimilation originated in these macro-structural conditions that initially confined them to the lower ends of the socioeconomic ladder; thus, Salvadorans have faced an uphill battle to achieve successful integration in the United States.

C. CONCLUSION

The context of reception plays a paramount role in the assimilation of immigrants, and has a cascading effect from earlier cohorts of a particular immigrant group to the later arrivals. This context is shaped—whether positive or negative—in large part by U.S. foreign policy concerns and the resulting immigration policies toward particular groups: foreign policy influences the immigration status of groups which then has decisive impacts on the group’s ability to integrate economically, the identity ascribed to them at the national and local levels, and the trajectory of their ethnic community. As explained by Portes and Rumbaut, “the fate of these later arrivals depends, to a large extent, on the kinds of community created by their conationals and the access to the resources that this community possesses.”³³⁸ To facilitate the characterization of the two reception contexts described in this chapter, Table 1 summarizes the experiences of the first-wave of Cuban and Salvadoran exiles in their respective local and national environments.

³³⁸ Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, 138.

Table 1. Context of Reception for Cubans Arriving in Miami 1959–1965 and Salvadorans arriving in Los Angeles 1979–1982.³³⁹

		Context of Reception Dimensions			
		Government Response	Economic Conditions	Societal Attitudes	Presence of Ethnic Community
Immigrant Group & Human Capital	Cubans in Miami <i>Skilled, Professional, & Entrepreneurial</i>	Active Encouragement	Slow Economy, High Inequality, Positive Typification	Nationally Positive, Locally Mixed	No
	Salvadorans in Los Angeles <i>Unskilled, Semi-skilled</i>	Exclusion, later Passive Acceptance	Growing Economy, High Inequality, Negative Typification	Nationally Negative, Locally Mixed	No

In the case of Cubans, the welcoming reception context of refugee status and assistance programs helped them to transfer their existing personal assets into employment in all sectors of Miami’s economy, gain access to education, and shaped a positive exile identity, which over time yielded a thriving ethnic community. This Cuban community proved instrumental to the integration of later Cuban refugees, providing them with the benefits of an ethnic enclave that was embedded in the primary economy of Miami. Because Salvadorans shared commonalities with refugees, but lacked the commensurate legal status, they experienced an opposing, negative reception context. Their personal resource endowments (while admittedly less upper-class than Cubans), were not easily transferrable. Their illegal status constrained them to low-wage jobs in Los Angeles, ascribed a negative collective identity to them—which led established Salvadorans to disassociate themselves from the new arrivals. The reception context also generated an ethnic community, divided by cohorts of legality, with few resources to share other than

³³⁹ Created with information from Portes and Rumbaut, 2014; Portes and Borocz, 1989; Cramer 2010; Hamilton and Chinchilla 2010.

political mobilization; these factors all contributed significantly to the Salvadoran ethnic community's notorious ties to gang culture and poverty which perpetuated a negative reception for later Salvadoran immigrants. The following chapter will discuss the long-term effects of these environments on the second-generation of both the Cuban and Salvadoran exiles as seen in their assimilation characteristics.

IV. SECOND-GENERATION STRUCTURAL ASSIMILATION

As shown in previous chapters, U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba and El Salvador significantly influenced U.S. immigration policy toward those countries and contributed to positive and negative aspects of each respective exile group's reception context. This chapter now shows the impact of the structural conditions these immigrant parents faced on the structural assimilation of their children in the United States. An examination of the Cuban and Salvadoran exile communities' second generation—children of immigrants born in the United States—demonstrates that both groups educationally outperformed their local contexts, but that Salvadoran-Americans' employment and remuneration lags behind Cuban-Americans.³⁴⁰ In essence, with this small, but important, differentiation as to what degree, both adult second-generation of the 1959–1965 wave of Cubans immigrants and the 1979–1982 wave of Salvadorans both demonstrate structural assimilation into American society after roughly 25 years in the United States.

While the Cuban second generation's upward assimilation is consistent with the conditions of a positive reception context, the Salvadoran second generation's partial upward assimilation appears contrary to the negative reception context. Given that the amnesty law in 1986 turned Salvadorans' reception context to passively accepting, this may indicate the primacy of legal status above other factors in the reception context with respect to structural assimilation outcomes.

A. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

It is well established in the literature that initial integration experiences affect long-term adaptation patterns of subsequent generations. In their study of immigrant groups across the United States, Portes and Rumbaut found a “durable influence of the first immigrant generation on the successful adaptation of children,” and given immigrants' particular contexts of reception, nationalities “exercise a strong influence on [the second

³⁴⁰ This second generation will also be referred to throughout as U.S.-born, native-born or domestic-born, often in conjunction with hyphenated-American terms: Cuban-Americans and Salvadoran-Americans. This study does not specifically include the “1.5 generation,” those born abroad but raised in the United States, because of the challenge in identifying their parents' arrival cohort.

generation's] educational attainment.”³⁴¹ Moreover, Portes and Rumbaut determine that the adaptation process is cumulative: positive contexts, high socioeconomic status, and social capital lead to positive outcomes, whereas negative contexts, low socioeconomic status, and social capital increase the likelihood of negative outcomes.³⁴² Nonetheless, reception contexts and human capital interact to determine the course of immigrants' and their children's long-term assimilation or ethnic resilience in the face of the dominant culture and social mainstream in the United States.³⁴³ Neither factor is unilaterally predictive of assimilation outcomes, but because of the similarity between the two cohorts studied here, the structural assimilation outcomes can be attributed to the reception context: government responses, economic conditions, societal attitudes, and the presence of ethnic communities.

The adaptation process is overwhelmingly studied in terms of acculturation (losing the old culture) and assimilation (adopting a new culture) using structural indicators to show that immigrants adapt in non-linear and varying ways across groups.³⁴⁴ Because the notion of a single American culture is a relic of times past, immigrants' children can assimilate into any of various segments of American society when they reach adulthood. This differential assimilation can include upward assimilation into the middle-class and higher or downward assimilation into a lower-end socioeconomic position. Second-generation children who demonstrate selective acculturation combine aspects of adaptation to American norms with the retention of their immigrant parents' cultural traditions, including their language.³⁴⁵ This hybrid adaptation may prevent downward assimilation in some immigrant groups by delaying cultural assimilation until, for instance, their parents achieve structural assimilation.³⁴⁶ Conversely, children of immigrants may also

³⁴¹ Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, “Growing Up American,” *Immigrant America: A Portrait*, 4th ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 286.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, 266.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 77–78.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 75.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 282 & 304.

experience dissonant acculturation: they abandon their parent's culture and adopt American norms, but their parents retain the immigrant culture.³⁴⁷ In this case, the cultural cleavage within a family puts the children at-risk of downward assimilation, depending on the contextual factors—particularly the family's socioeconomic status.³⁴⁸

To determine which assimilation patterns the adult children of Cuban and Salvadoran immigrants demonstrate, this research adopts a combination of socioeconomic measures used widely by prolific social scientists.³⁴⁹ These measures include *male incarceration rates and female early childbearing*, *educational attainment*, and *labor market achievement*. *Male incarceration* is linked to limited occupational opportunities for men, and *female early childbearing* is negatively associated with educational attainment for women; as such, this information provides insights into the second generations' educational and occupational achievement.³⁵⁰ *Educational attainment* is a fairly standard metric for socioeconomic integration and is discussed in terms of high school incompleteness, at least some college attendance, and completion of a bachelor's degree or higher. *Labor market achievement* is discussed in terms of occupational distributions, income related to educational and occupational attainment, and poverty levels as defined in the U.S. Census Bureau.³⁵¹ These metrics are presented in comparison on the national level to other Hispanic groups and on the local level to non-Hispanics; in some cases, as available, separate data is presented for male and female achievement.

Whenever possible, the data presented in this chapter includes information reasonably associated with the initial waves of Cuban and Salvadoran immigrants. To achieve this, in line with the U.S. census age categories and Ruben and Rumbaut's definitions of the adult second generation as ages 25 to 39, the information presented covers

³⁴⁷ Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, 282 & 304

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 282 & 304.

³⁴⁹ These dimensions were compiled from studies conducted by Portes and Rumbaut in 2014 and White and Glick in 2009, see the List of References for further details.

³⁵⁰ Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, 279.

³⁵¹ Further details on the poverty calculations of the United States Census Bureau can be found at <https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/guidance/poverty-measures.html>.

Cuban-Americans born no earlier than 1959 and Salvadoran-Americans born no earlier than 1979. Accordingly, Table 2 demonstrates the earliest year in which these groups reach and surpass this definition of adulthood. Additionally, as of 2013, only approximately 30 percent of the Salvadoran second-generation in the United States were older than eighteen.³⁵² In comparison, as of 2016, approximately 74 percent of the Cuban second generation in the United States were over eighteen.³⁵³ Thus, comparisons between these two groups will at times come from U.S. census data from different years to capture this age cohort difference.

Table 2. Approximate Range of Second-Generations Entering Adulthood.

	<i>Earliest Years Born</i>	<i>Earliest Years Turning 25</i>	<i>Earliest Years Turning 39</i>
Second-Generation of First Cuban Exiles	1959–1965	1984–1990	1998–2004
Second-Generation of First Salvadoran Exiles	1979–1982	2004–2007	2018–2021

The results presented here stem primarily from secondary sources: 1) Portes and Rumbaut’s analysis of longitudinal data on the second generation; and 2) Bergad and Klein’s intra-Hispanic data on assimilation factors from 1980 to 2005. These sources are supplemented by local data in the American Community Surveys for Los Angeles County and Miami-Dade County, both areas as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Based on the latter source, Table 3 indicates each ethnic community’s total population size, the size of the naturalized first generation, the size of the second generation, and the total number of adults from 25 to 39 years of age.

³⁵² Migration Policy Institute. “The Salvadoran Diaspora in the United States,” June 2015, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/RAD-ElSalvador.pdf>.

³⁵³ Jeanne Batalova and Jie Zong, “Cuban Immigrants in the United States,” *Migration Information Source*, November 9, 2017, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/cuban-immigrants-united-states>.

Table 3. United States Census Bureau Estimates of Cuban and Salvadoran Population Size, Nativity, and Ages in 2000 and 2010.³⁵⁴

	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>Total Naturalized U.S. Citizens</i>	<i>Total Native U.S. Citizens</i>	<i>Total Population Ages 25–39</i>
Miami-Dade County Cubans in 2000	650,601	303,693	136,137	148,033
Los Angeles County Salvadorans in 2010	368,626	88,780	133,297	96,520

While the ability to sort the data categories to include only second-generation Cuban-Americans and Salvadoran-Americans within particular time frames would undoubtedly provide relevant insights, this research is limited by the difficulty of disaggregating the available statistics. As a result, some of the information presented will include immigrants’ and subsequent generations’ data. Nonetheless, these figures provide powerful insights into each group’s adaptation—they assimilate structurally over time and particularly for Salvadorans, this occurs in spite of policy constraints. While it would be useful to uncover nuances in adaptation between arrival cohorts, the cumulative character of the adaptation process suggests that the shared experience of a particular ethnic community is likely to perpetuate for later immigrants.³⁵⁵

³⁵⁴ Adapted from United States Census Bureau, United States Census 2000 Summary File 2 100% Date and Summary File 4 Sample Data, “Profile of Selected Social Characteristics,” “Age Groups and Sex.”; United States Census Bureau, 2006–2010 American Community Survey, “Sex by Age,” “Citizenship Status in the United States.”

³⁵⁵ Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, 137–138, 286.

B. THE CHILDREN OF THE GOLDEN CUBAN EXILES³⁵⁶

The children of the first post-Castro Cuban exiles in the United States have fared well compared to both white, native-born Americans and other Hispanic immigrants. In Miami, they enjoyed the benefits of bilingual—and for many—private schooling, in an environment where they were sheltered from discrimination and exposure to the challenges of the lower socioeconomic strata of Miami’s society.³⁵⁷ These benefits were accorded to them by their parents, the Cuban exiles, for whom the positive context of reception facilitated their integration into Miami, where they employed their personal talents and capital to create a thriving ethnic enclave that preserved Cuban culture and displaced non-Hispanic whites as the power center of the city. First-generation Cuban-Americans became mayors, large-scale entrepreneurs, small-business owners, and the clear demographic and cultural majority in many part of Miami-Dade County.³⁵⁸

As early as 1990, when the second generation of the Golden Cuban Exiles were entering adulthood, their measures of educational attainment exceeded the local averages and set them up for the upward socioeconomic movement seen in their occupational statuses. While the achievements of the broader Cuban enclave in Miami are part of the story, the discussion of Cuban achievements below belongs to a small subset of the Cuban exile community: by 1990, only four percent of Cuban adults were U.S.-born; this increased to seven percent in 2000, and 12 percent in 2005.³⁵⁹ This particular second-generation put their human and social capital endowments to use and avoided the pitfalls of downward assimilation, in part by retaining a strong sense of Cuban identity—the Spanish language, Cuban nationalism, social customs, and above all pride in the exiles’

³⁵⁶ “Golden Exiles” is a name commonly given to the first wave of Cuban exiles; it is seen often in the literature on the Cuban diaspora and is meant to convey the high levels of human capital this group transferred to the United States.

³⁵⁷ Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, 254.; María Cristina García, *Havana USA* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 89–94.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 86–88.

³⁵⁹ Laird W. Bergad and Herbert S. Klein, *Hispanics in the United States: A Demographic, Social, and Economic History, 1980–2005* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), loc. 3700 of 7289, Kindle.

cubanidad (Cubanness)—while gradually adopting a more American way of life than their parents.³⁶⁰

1. Male Incarceration Rates and Female Early Childbearing

Inasmuch as incarceration rates and early childbearing have a negative effect on educational attainment and income, they can be important indicators of immigrant adaptation. While U.S.-born Cuban-Americans' incarceration rates are higher than White Americans', early childbearing rates are below white and Black Americans averages. According to the 2000 U.S. census, the incarceration rate of U.S.-born Cubans between 25 and 39 years of age was 4.20 percent.³⁶¹ While these figures are above the incarceration rates of white Americans (1.71 percent), and the U.S. child of immigrant average (3.5 percent), they are well below the 11.61% rate for Black Americans.³⁶² Among U.S.-born Cuban women, 1.8 percent of those aged 15 to 19 and 11.4 percent of women 20 to 24 had at least one child by the year 2000.³⁶³ These rates are slightly lower than the White American rate of 1.9 percent for women 15 to 19 years old and 15.6 percent for women 20 to 24 years old.³⁶⁴ These rates are also much lower than Black Americans' rates of 4.5 percent and 22.5 percent, respectively. Given these comparatively low rates among the Cuban second-generation, neither incarceration nor early childbearing appear to have significantly hindered this Cuban cohort's educational attainment.

2. Educational Attainment

As the earliest of the second-generation Cuban-Americans entered adulthood, they demonstrated a pattern of increased educational attainment over time and achieved well above the local average for Miami. Of U.S.-born Cubans over 25 years old, in 1990, 18

³⁶⁰ García, *Havana USA*, 90–99.

³⁶¹ Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, 289. Many sources combine statistics for Central Americans, this source did not disaggregate Salvadoran and Guatemalan incarcerations rates.

³⁶² *Ibid.*

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 289. Many sources combine statistics for Central Americans, this source did not disaggregate Salvadoran and Guatemalan female fertility rates.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

percent had not completed high school a figure that had dropped to 14 percent by 2000.³⁶⁵ Moreover, in 1990, 59 percent of adult U.S.-born Cubans had completed at least some college, and by 2000, this number had increased to 67 percent.³⁶⁶ Also in 1990, 26 percent of domestic-born Cubans had earned a bachelor’s degree or higher; by 2000, this rate had increased to 34 percent.³⁶⁷ By comparison, the 2000 Census for Miami-Dade County reported a total high school incompleteness rate of 32.1 percent for adults 25 and over, and 45.5 percent who completed at least some college.³⁶⁸ Table 4 summarizes this stark contrast between the educational attainment of U.S.-born Cubans (who were mostly concentrated in Miami) and the Miami-Dade County average.

Table 4. Comparison between U.S.-Born Cuban Educational Attainment and Miami-Dade County Average in 2000.³⁶⁹

<i>Educational Attainment</i>	<i>Total Population Ages ≥25 in 2000</i>	
	U.S.-Born Cubans (National)	Miami-Dade County Average
High School Incomplete	14%	32.1%
Some College or Higher	67%	45.5%
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher	34%	21.7%

While the data presented shows a pattern of high educational attainment among the early second-generation Cuban-Americans, it is a pattern that continues among later arrivals as well. The cross-generational comparisons of Bergad and Klein indicate that, while the arrival of later Cubans slowed the total percentage of educational achievement among Cubans (in 2005, the high school incompleteness rate was 8 percent for domestic-

³⁶⁵ Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 3515 and 3540, Kindle.

³⁶⁶ Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 3540.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ United States Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, Summary File 3 Sample Data, “Profile of Selected Social Characteristics,” Miami-Dade County, Florida, <https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml>.

³⁶⁹ Adapted from Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 3540 and United States Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, Summary File 3 Sample Data, “Profile of Selected Social Characteristics,” Miami-Dade County, Florida, <https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml>.

born Cubans versus 30 percent for the foreign-born), both domestic and foreign-born Cubans demonstrated continued increases in educational achievement from 1980 to 2005.³⁷⁰ Bergad and Klein's evidence of continued high educational attainment among Cubans supports the cumulative characterization of ethnic communities' adaptation patterns, as shaped by the interaction between their human capital endowment and reception context.³⁷¹

3. Labor Market Achievement

Reflecting their high educational attainment, U.S.-born Cuban-Americans average slightly higher rates of white-collar employment than other groups, with some variance between male and female rates. In 2005, domestic-born Cuban men over 16 years of age were employed in the following sectors: 33.6 percent management, professional, and related occupations; 17.7 percent service occupations; 24.9 percent sales and office occupations; 0.4 percent in farming, fishing, and forestry; 12.6 percent construction, extraction, and maintenance; and 10.5 percent production, transportation, and material moving.³⁷² The occupations of domestic-born Cuban women were 38.7 percent management, professional, and related occupations; 16.4% service occupations; 41.6% sales and office occupations; 0.2 percent in farming, fishing, and forestry; 0.8 percent construction, extraction, and maintenance; and 2.3 percent production, transportation, and material moving.³⁷³ Second-generation Cubans were employed in the upper-echelon occupations at slightly higher rates than their non-Hispanic white counterparts. Moreover, fewer Cuban women than white women were employed in the lower-end occupations, but more Cuban men were employed in the service sector than white men. Table 5 summarizes the comparisons between the total populations, as discussed above.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., loc. 3682.

³⁷¹ Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, 137–138, 286.

³⁷² Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 4350.

³⁷³ Ibid., loc. 4351.

Table 5. Comparison between U.S.-born Cubans and Non-Hispanic White Occupational Representation.³⁷⁴

<i>Occupational Category</i>	<i>Total Population Ages ≥16 in 2005</i>	
	U.S.-Born Cuban	Non-Hispanic White
Management and Professionals	36.2%	35.4%
Sales and Office	33.3%	27.4%
Service	17.1%	14.9%
Construction, Extraction, and Maintenance	6.6%	9.6%

Despite their higher-status occupations, this same grouping of the Cuban second-generation earned less median income than non-Hispanic whites, with the exception of Cuban professional women, who earned more than their Anglo counterparts. Domestic-born Cuban-American men earned an upper-end median income of \$52,971 for managerial and professional employment and a lower-end median income of \$18,540 for service occupations.³⁷⁵ In comparison, non-Hispanic white men earned \$8,149 more as managers and professionals, and \$1,935 more in the service sector.³⁷⁶ Native-born Cuban-American women earned \$40,747 and \$9,983 in those same occupations, respectively, with non-Hispanic white women earning \$4,686 less than professional Cuban women and \$407 more than those in service occupations.³⁷⁷

In terms of socioeconomic opportunity and poverty, Cuban-Americans also fare well. By 2005, Cubans were the most highly remunerated Hispanic immigrant group as compared to educational attainment: Cubans with a four-year college degree or better earned an average income of \$60,482; the next-best group was Puerto Ricans, earning \$8,532 less for the same level of education.³⁷⁸ Turning to poverty levels in 1990, the rate was 11.3 percent among Cubans 15-44 years of age.³⁷⁹ This rate was the lowest among

³⁷⁴ Adapted from Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 4301 and 4350.

³⁷⁵ Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 4372.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, loc. 4326.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, loc. 4374.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, loc. 3548.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, loc. 3051.

Hispanic nationalities, with the highest rate being 28.4 percent among Dominicans.³⁸⁰ However, this rate was almost three percentage points higher than the non-Hispanic white poverty rate for the same age group, which was 8.6 percent.³⁸¹ Given the inclusion of first-generation Cubans in the poverty calculations, it is possible and reasonable to assume that this metric would be lower if it were specific to the second generation.

4. Conclusion on the Second-Generation Cubans

U.S.-born Cubans perform highly on all measures of structural assimilation, particularly in their local context of Miami. Given the local environment in which this cohort of Cuban-Americans was raised, their outcomes lend support to the concept of selective acculturation—Cuban immigrant parents, improved the economic context of Miami with their economic assimilation but did not acculturate. Instead, they turned Miami into a vibrant ethnic enclave, which their children have since used as springboards in their own socioeconomic paths.

Ultimately, this cohort of Cubans demonstrates high educational attainment and socioeconomic integration into the middle-class and higher. As compared to other Hispanic groups and non-Hispanic whites, they tend to be employed in white-collar professions, but earn less than non-Hispanic whites in the same sector. The notable exception to this is among the white-collar second-generation Cuban women, who earned more than white women. This information supports the notion that Cubans have fared well in the United States, and that they have done so at rates higher than other Hispanic immigrant groups.

C. THE CHILDREN OF THE WOULD-BE SALVADORAN REFUGEES

The majority of the second-generation Salvadorans, whose parents arrived before 1982, have achieved socioeconomic assimilation in the United States. Despite their parent's challenging reception contexts—unauthorized entry, negative public perceptions, underemployment, lack of financial assistance—many young Salvadoran-Americans have earned college degrees and entered the middle-class and beyond. The statistics below,

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Ibid., loc. 3020.

while not the most impressive of second-generation immigrants, Hispanic or otherwise, demonstrate Salvadoran-Americans are not a poor, uneducated mass. In fact, they achieved this at a time when the major concentration of Salvadorans (those arriving in the 1980s) lived in the inner city and East Los Angeles, where 1990s gang and drug activity were intertwined parts of their environmental upbringing.³⁸²

That said, while over time Salvadoran immigrants established a robust civil society full of social, political, and religious organizations in Los Angeles, they did not foster a strong sense of Salvadoran identity in the community.³⁸³ Instead Salvadoran youths, due to the preponderance of Mexicans in the city and their parent's reluctance to revisit their difficult pasts in El Salvador, identified with a Latino identity.³⁸⁴ In comparison to second-generation Cuban's strong sense of identity, second-generation Salvadorans may not have had the sheltering effect of ethnic pride and identity. What they did have was a first generation which was largely hard working, and who invested time and resources into obtaining legal status for themselves (and in effect keeping the family intact), and improving their working and living conditions incrementally.³⁸⁵ Accordingly, the Salvadoran ethnic community in Los Angeles was slow to materialize, but undoubtedly benefited from the upward socioeconomic mobility of some of their second-generation members.³⁸⁶

On a methodological note, because Salvadorans arrived in the United States en masse twenty years after Cubans, their second generation is younger. Thus, the data in this section begins in the year 2000; in some discussions, same-year comparisons with Cubans are provided with the caveat that time is essential to adaptation, and later dates of arrival and birth are clearly constraints on educational and occupational achievement.

³⁸² Nora Hamilton and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City: Guatemalans and Salvadorans in Los Angeles* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 42, &153.

³⁸³ Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 46.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 178

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 188.

1. Male Incarceration Rates and Female Early Childbearing

Inasmuch as incarceration rates and early childbearing have a negative effect on educational attainment and income earnings, U.S. Salvadoran rates are somewhat above white Americans but well below the highest rates. According to the 2000 U.S. census, the incarceration rate of U.S.-born Salvadorans between 25 and 39 years of age was 3.04 percent.³⁸⁷ While these figures are above the incarceration rates of white Americans (1.71 percent), they are well below the 11.61 percent rate for Black Americans.³⁸⁸ Three percent of U.S.-born Salvadoran women ages 15 to 19 and 16.5 percent of U.S.-born Salvadoran women 20 to 24 had at least one child by the year 2000.³⁸⁹ These rates are slightly higher than the White American rate of 1.9 percent for women 15 to 19 and 15.6 percent for women 20 to 24.³⁹⁰ Conversely, these rates are much lower than Black Americans' rates of 4.5 percent and 22.5 percent, respectively. These rates do not appear to have significantly hindered this Salvadoran cohort's educational attainment.

2. Educational Attainment

Second-generation Salvadorans attained better-than-average educational levels than the average of their enclave city, Los Angeles. Among Salvadoran adults over 25 and born in the United States, 28 percent had not completed high school in the year 2000, and 18 percent in the year 2005.³⁹¹ Of this same cohort, 53 percent completed at least some college by 2000, which increased to 64 percent by 2005.³⁹² By comparison, the census for Los Angeles County in 2005 reported a total high school incompleteness rate of 25.6 percent

³⁸⁷ Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, 289. Many sources combine statistics for Central Americans, this source did not disaggregate Salvadoran and Guatemalan incarceration rates.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, 289. Many sources combine statistics for Central Americans, this source did not disaggregate Salvadoran and Guatemalan female fertility rates.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 3540.

³⁹² Ibid.

for adults 25 and over, while 52.5 percent completed at least some college.³⁹³ Moreover, by 2005, 27 percent of these Salvadoran-Americans had completed a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared to 18.1 percent of Los Angeles County. Second-generation Salvadorans also outperformed second-generation Mexicans in both 2000 and 2005, when 39 and 45 percent of Mexicans had at least some college, and only 11 and 15 percent had completed a bachelor’s degree or higher.³⁹⁴ Table 6 depicts the difference between the U.S.-born Salvadorans’ educational attainment rate (who were mostly concentrated in Los Angeles County) and the Los Angeles County averages. The cross-generational comparisons of Bergad and Klein indicate that, while the arrival of later Salvadoran immigrants slowed the total percentage of educational achievement among Salvadorans (in 2005, the high school incompleteness rate was 18 percent for domestic-born Salvadorans versus 55 percent for the foreign-born), both domestic and foreign-born Salvadorans demonstrated continued increases in educational achievement from 2000 to 2005.³⁹⁵

Table 6. Comparison between U.S.-Born Salvadoran Educational Attainment and Los Angeles County Average in 2005.³⁹⁶

<i>Educational Attainment</i>	<i>Total Population Ages ≥25 in 2005</i>	
	U.S.-Born Salvadoran (National)	Los Angeles County Average
High School Incomplete	18%	25.6%
At Least Some College	64%	52.5%
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher	27%	18.1%

³⁹³ United States Census Bureau, “Educational Attainment and Employment Status By Language Spoken at Home for the Population 25 Years and Over,” 2005 American Community Survey, Los Angeles County, California, <https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml>.

³⁹⁴ Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 3540

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, loc. 3541.

³⁹⁶ Adapted from Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 3540 and United States Census Bureau, “Educational Attainment and Employment Status By Language Spoken at Home for the Population 25 Years and Over,” 2005 American Community Survey, Los Angeles County, California, <https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml>.

Similar to the early Cuban second-generation, the disparity between the domestic and foreign-born Salvadoran-Americans is reflected in the high school incompleteness statistics for 2005: 18 percent for the domestic-born and 55 percent for the foreign-born.³⁹⁷ This indicates that commonly seen aggregate figures likely distort the educational attainment of native-born Salvadoran-Americans by skewing them downward.

3. Labor Market Achievement

Despite the similarities in educational achievement among this cohort to U.S.-born Cuban-Americans, occupational distributions in 2005 demonstrate that U.S.-born Salvadoran-Americans lag behind both Cubans and non-Hispanic whites in high-end occupations but outpace the employment rates of both in lower-paid office jobs. In 2005, the occupations of domestic-born Salvadoran men over 16 years of age included 18.4 percent management, professional, and related occupations; 24.8 percent service occupations; 23.9 percent sales and office occupations; 0.8 percent in farming, fishing, and forestry; 13.2 percent construction, extraction, and maintenance; and 18.6 percent production, transportation, and material moving.³⁹⁸ The occupational distribution of domestic-born Salvadoran women included 23.3 percent management, professional, and related occupations; 23.6 percent service occupations; 47.7 percent sales and office occupations; and 5.4% production, transportation, and material moving.³⁹⁹ Table 7 summarizes this distribution of occupations in a total population comparison between native-born Salvadorans and non-Hispanic whites. The results may reflect the youth of Salvadoran adults, who may not have had the time to complete their professional schooling by 2005 or who have not yet advanced to managerial positions.

³⁹⁷ Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 3540.

³⁹⁸ Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 4350.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, loc. 4351.

Table 7. Comparison between U.S.-born Salvadorans and Non-Hispanic White Occupational Representation.⁴⁰⁰

<i>Occupational Category</i>	<i>Total Population Ages ≥16 in 2005</i>	
	U.S.-Born Salvadoran	Non-Hispanic White
Management and Professionals	20.9%	35.4%
Sales and Office	35.8%	27.4%
Service	24.2%	14.9%
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry	0.4%	0.6%
Construction, Extraction, and Maintenance	4.25%	9.6%

In measures of socioeconomic opportunity, Salvadorans show greater differences with Cubans and non-Hispanic white Americans. In 2005, a Salvadoran with a bachelor’s degree or higher earned an average income of \$40,851, nearly \$20,000 less than their Cuban counterparts; in fact, out of the nine Hispanic nationalities measured by Bergad and Klein, Salvadorans ranked eighth, with Hondurans earning \$5,570 less.⁴⁰¹ In an interesting comparison, Salvadorans ranked second for remuneration among those who did not complete high school, earning \$17,030 as compared to Cubans, who earned \$14,246 for the same work.⁴⁰² Shifting to poverty rates, in 2005, 15.2 percent of Salvadoran 15-44 year-olds lived in poverty, as compared to 24.1 percent among Dominicans on the high end and 10.1 percent among Peruvians at the low end.⁴⁰³ Young Salvadoran adults’ poverty rate was higher than non-Hispanic whites, who had a 9.4 percent poverty rates among the same age group.⁴⁰⁴ Here again, the inability to disaggregate inter-generational data may be a factor in the higher than White American poverty rate.

⁴⁰⁰ Adapted from Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 4301 and 4350.

⁴⁰¹ Bergad and Klein, *Hispanics in the United States*, loc. 3548.; The other Hispanic groups studied were Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Colombians, Ecuadorians, Hondurans, and Peruvians. Within these groups, Hondurans make better comparisons for Salvadorans than South Americans, given the differential levels of unauthorized migration from these regions, which drastically alter their reception contexts.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, loc. 3051.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, loc. 3020.

4. Conclusion on Salvadorans

Surprisingly, this cohort of second-generation Salvadorans achieved better socioeconomic integration than is expected when looking across all Salvadoran immigrant statistics and the challenging Los Angeles environment of their youths. Nonetheless, this cohort of Salvadorans achieved rates of educational attainment beyond their local peers. Notably, the Los Angeles rates are likely lowered by the prevalence of Mexican-Americans who tend to have lower educational attainment. Additionally, despite their contextually above-average educational levels, Salvadorans are not well represented in white-collar occupations.

In fact, when they do enter this occupational level, they are not as well compensated as their Hispanic and non-Hispanic white peers. College-educated Salvadorans under-earn non-Hispanic White Americans and most other Hispanic groups with college degrees, but Salvadoran high school drop-outs earn more than most other Hispanics without a high school diploma. This comparison may be indicative of discriminatory practices against Salvadoran-Americans in white-collar employment and/or a product of the Los Angeles economy, in which Salvadorans have historically been over represented in low wage, labor-intensive jobs.⁴⁰⁵

D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Throughout their first 25 years of living in the United States, the initial waves of both Cuban and Salvadoran immigrants established ethnic communities in which their children were raised. For these Cubans, their dominance and stability in Miami created a second-generation with a strong sense of Cuban-American identity, high educational attainment, and employment opportunities that generally prepared them for upward socioeconomic assimilation. For these Salvadorans, the slow onset of community and Hispanic identity in Los Angeles did not significantly detract from their educational attainment, but failed to create high wage employment opportunities, which perhaps diminished the degree of their somewhat upward socioeconomic assimilation. For ease of

⁴⁰⁵ Hamilton and Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City*, 76–77.

comparison between the two cohorts, Table 8 lists their respective representation in adaptation metrics.

Table 8. Side-by-Side Comparison of Select Adaptation Metrics as Percentages of Total Population in Respective Age Groupings and Years.⁴⁰⁶

<i>Adaptation Metric</i>	<i>U.S.-Born Cuban-Americans</i>	<i>U.S.-Born Salvadoran-Americans</i>
Male Incarceration Rate Ages 25-39 in 2000	4.2%	3.04%
Female Early Childbearing Rate Ages 15-19 in 2000	1.8%	3%
Female Early Childbearing Rate Ages 20-24 in 2000	11.4%	16.5%
High School Incomplete Ages ≥ 25 in 2000/2005	14%	18%
At Least Some College Ages ≥ 25 in 2000/2005	67%	64%
Bachelor's Degree or Higher ≥ 25 in 2000/2005	34%	27%
Management and Professionals Ages ≥ 16 in 2005	36.2%	20.9%
Sales and Office Occupations Ages ≥ 16 in 2005	33.3%	35.8%
Service Occupations Ages ≥ 16 in 2005	17.1%	24.2%
Construction, Extraction, and Maintenance Occupations Ages ≥ 16 in 2005	6.6%	4.25%

Using Portes and Rumbaut's description of the adaptation process, this cohort of Cubans enjoyed the benefits of positive contexts, high and middle socioeconomic status, and abundant social capital as compared to the Salvadoran cohort which experienced negative, and later passively accepting contexts, low and middle socioeconomic status, and moderate social capital. Accordingly, Cuban-Americans consistently rank above other

⁴⁰⁶ Adapted from: Laird W. Bergad and Herbert S. Klein, *Hispanics in the United States: A Demographic, Social, and Economic History, 1980–2005* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Hispanic groups and near non-Hispanic White Americans in the structural measures discussed above, demonstrated a positive structural assimilation outcome. On the other hand, the Salvadoran cohort, while not as high achieving as Cubans, performs higher than local average on educational attainment and their labor statistics demonstrate some upward occupational mobility with a positive, but partial structural assimilation outcome.

While the results for Salvadorans may appear to negate the effects of the reception context, it is important to note that the cohort's legal status—an important element of the reception context—was less liminal than that of subsequent arrivals. The Salvadoran first generation was able to apply for legalization as early as 1986, meaning their second generation did not face the destabilizing uncertainty of their family's situation for the majority of their upbringing. It is possible that while the context of reception for these Salvadoran immigrants was negative at the time of their arrival, as it turned to passive acceptance with the 1986 amnesty, where previously there were constraints, their shift in legal status created opportunities for their children's educational advancement. Legal status may therefore have an overpowering effect on structural assimilation over other aspects of the reception context.

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V. CONCLUSION

American society expects immigrants to assimilate, yet contemporary views question whether Latin American immigrants are choosing to conform to this standard. However, this perspective does not account for the structural constraints placed upon immigrants through the influence of U.S. foreign and immigration policy. During the Cold War, two cases—Cuba in the 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s—demonstrated differential U.S. policy responses and sustained, large-scale exile migrations to the United States, particularly to Miami and Los Angeles. In these cases, the U.S. response was to welcome and provide a positive reception to Cubans in Miami, while Salvadorans were excluded and constrained to the negative reception accorded to them as illegal migrants in Los Angeles—both responses stemming from U.S. foreign policy interests in Latin America. In light of this discrepancy, this thesis has asked the following question: How has the United States' Cold War-era foreign and immigration policy affected the assimilation of Cuban and Salvadoran populations in the U.S.?

In response to this question, this research put forth the following hypothesis: U.S. foreign and immigration policies shape the constraints within the context of reception of the first generation and have corresponding directional implications for the structural assimilation patterns of second-generation adult immigrants; Cubans would therefore demonstrate upward structural assimilation, while Salvadorans would demonstrate downward structural assimilation. This hypothesis was partially supported by the evidence presented in the previous chapters: First, foreign and immigration policy did contribute to the structural assimilation patterns of both the Cuban and Salvadoran cases through the reception contexts detailed in chapter three. However, because both cases' second generations appear to be assimilating, the directionality of their assimilation did not diverge as expected.

Given that these receptions were influenced in multiple dimensions by immigration policy and Cold War foreign policy concerns, these policies affected the rate of assimilation of the ethnic populations in the United States, hastening the structural assimilation of Cubans but delaying the process of structural assimilation for Salvadorans.

This outcome may be explained by the shift in legal status for the Salvadoran cohort in 1986, indicating that legal status in the United States may be the critical factor within the reception context for determining structural assimilation. Further intra-Salvadoran and intra-Cuban cohort comparisons of structural assimilation outcomes may lend further support to this observation. Alternatively, these somewhat differential long-term outcomes may also indicate that U.S. policy toward exile groups affects their rate of structural assimilation rather than their directionality. Further research specifically on these case's rates of structural assimilation may provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between U.S. policy and structural assimilation.

What is clear is that U.S. foreign policy toward a country can influence its immigration policy toward that country's people. In the case of Cuba in the 1960s, U.S. foreign policy toward the adversarial Castro regime in Cuba generated a welcoming immigration policy for Cuban exiles. Conversely, in the case of El Salvador in the 1980s, the U.S. foreign policy of cooperation with the military junta in El Salvador necessitated a restrictive immigration policy toward Salvadoran exiles. In both cases, the interplay between internal push factors within the countries of origin and the pull factors in the United States resulted in the large-scale and long-duration migration of hundreds of thousands of Cubans and Salvadorans into the United States. Through geographic proximity and the self-reinforcing nature of migration flows, Cubans settled en masse in Miami, Florida beginning in the 1960s, and Salvadoran settled en masse in Los Angeles beginning in the 1980s.

Each of these first-wave exile groups experienced a particular context of reception, shaped by the national and local government and economic, societal, and ethnic community-level conditions. As U.S. foreign policy influenced the exiles' immigration status, it began a cascade of effects, from the decisive impact on the group's initial ability to integrate economically to the identity ascribed to them at the national and local levels, down to the trajectory of their ethnic community. Within the reception context, Cubans experienced a consistently positive government response, whereas the reception for this cohort of Salvadoran exiles changed after a few years of their arrival, from negative to

passively accepting because of the amnesty clause in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.

In the case of Miami-based Cubans, U.S. policy generated a consistently welcoming reception context that facilitated their economic and social integration—albeit with latent racial tensions—and Cubans’ creation of an ethnic community with a strong exile identity. Salvadorans in Los Angeles experienced a negative and later passively accepting reception: U.S. immigration policy and support for the Salvadoran military junta necessitated the exclusion of Salvadoran refugees, limited their economic opportunities, contributed to negative societal attitudes, and divided the ethnic community, but also sparked some activism in civil society. In both cases, the reception context created a particular opportunity structure for the immigrants’ socioeconomic integration: early Cuban exiles became an economic tour de force and powerful ethnic enclave in Miami; early Salvadoran exiles dominated labor-intensive low-wage jobs and established one of many ethnic communities in Los Angeles.

Raised in this milieu, the second generations of these Cuban and Salvadoran immigrant cohorts have demonstrated somewhat different patterns of structural assimilation in the first 25 years following their parents’ arrivals. By the year 1990, the earliest adults of the Cuban second generation were largely well educated, well employed, and well compensated and showed indications of continued progress along these lines in 2000 and 2005. For the early second-generation Salvadoran adults, metrics from the year 2005 also reflect a well-educated cohort, but one still under-employed and under-compensated in higher-status occupations.

While these outcomes do not align with all parts of the hypothesis, they do lend support to Alba and Nee’s theory of new assimilation, demonstrating that, over time, the second generation assimilates, but to different degrees across groups. I contend that this difference is determined by immigrants’ legal status. For second-generation Cubans, the positive context of reception experienced by their parents aided their structural assimilation by facilitating their selective acculturation in Miami. Their parents’ eased resettlement in the United States—particularly their government-sponsored ability to transfer skills and experience into middle-class and higher occupations—and development of a powerful

ethnic enclave all provided resources that benefitted the Cuban second generation. As a consequence, U.S.-born Cuban Americans adopted a dual American and Cuban identity, which allowed them to bridge the cultural gap between the society their parents originated from and the society they lived in. Moreover, the Miami enclave provided them educational and employment opportunities absent the discrimination many other immigrants find inescapable. This environment was made possible for them by the Cuban first generation, which was aided by welcoming immigration policies that supported broader American foreign policy goals.

The negative, and later passively accepting, context of reception experienced by native Salvadoran-Americans' parents limited the second generation's structural assimilation by constraining the employment opportunities available to them in Los Angeles. Though the early years of their parents' experience in the United States were complicated by their largely undocumented legal status, after 1986, legal residency became an option for this cohort, which contributed in part to their children's relatively high educational attainment. Still, they faced negative typification in the labor force and low-income surroundings, from which the second generation emerged to find a place in the middle class. Moreover, their parents were armed with human capital from El Salvador that was not readily translated into socioeconomic progress but that could have contributed to the second generation's high educational attainment. As a community, Salvadorans in Los Angeles were slow to unite economically, directing their resources to their broader efforts to obtain legal or protected status and labor rights. Moreover, because the second generation outgrew the occupational opportunities within the Salvadoran ethnic enclave, their underemployment and under-compensation may also, at least in part, be a product of discriminatory practices by non-Salvadoran employers.

This study's focus on specific cohorts within the two cases allowed the results to illustrate the contours of two particular immigrant and ethnic groups in the United States. Because the results for Salvadoran assimilation differed from the more common characterization of the group as low achieving and its association with gangs, it reveals differential levels of assimilation within the population of Salvadoran exiles and immigrants. Moreover, throughout this research there were indications that these Cuban

assimilation patterns may also be different from those of later arrivals. Further research on immigrant groups with sustained migration flows should take these variances into account so as not to conflate later arrivals' statistics with those of their cohort. While this study was limited in the capacity to collect and analyze pure census data, future studies may be able to better isolate particular cohorts' data if these methods are available to them.

Expanding these findings to later cohorts and taking changes in immigration policy as demarcation points, Cubans arriving after 2017 and Salvadorans arriving after 1982 are unlikely achieve upward structural assimilation without amnesty. Pre-1982 Salvadoran unauthorized arrivals were given a path to permanent residency in 1986, which I contend facilitated their upward structural assimilation in spite of other challenging factors in their reception context, but post-1982 unauthorized arrivals remain in liminal legal status, continuously dependent on temporary protected status to remain in the country. Similarly, in the case of Cubans, the 2017 end of preferential asylum ended the consistently available path to residency for the exiles and marked a similar dividing point within the Cuban community because new arrivals are now subject to deportation. Given the inherent challenges to unauthorized migrants' educational and employment opportunities, without amnesty, these later arrivals are expected to underperform their predecessors in their ethnic communities.

In addition, because the influence of foreign policy in immigration policy is most visible in forced migrations, case studies on this type of migration from regions beyond Latin America can provide additional insight into the effect of policy on assimilation patterns. Moreover, statistics on the various metrics of structural assimilation collected from now to the future may enable longitudinal analyses on particular cohorts and determine with more precision the rates of assimilation as they relate to the relevant policy decisions. Perhaps most importantly, additional studies can contest or confirm the relationship between U.S. policy and structural assimilation, as found in this thesis.

Lastly, contrary to the belief of nativists that immigrants become an underclass in American society, this study demonstrates that even an ethnic group—Salvadorans—popularly associated with negative socioeconomic and criminal attributes makes socioeconomic advances across generations under the right legal conditions. Such

outcomes indicate that U.S. immigration policy has a causal effect on assimilation. While it is possible Salvadoran achievement would be higher if their reception had been more uniformly favorable, the evidence of educational advancement and economic advancement beyond the low-wage labor of the cohort's first generation indicates that the impact of legal status may be the strongest predictor of structural assimilation outcomes. This relation is also consistent with the positive outcomes in Cuban structural assimilation. Thus, to the extent that legal status is a predictor of structural assimilation, policymakers can encourage upward assimilation by shifting away from temporary legal status and toward permanent residency through amnesty for unauthorized immigrant communities while enforcing existing laws on immigrant admission.

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