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THESIS

**THE GERMAN MILITARY TURNAROUND—REPAIR,
REORGANIZATION, OR REARMAMENT?**

by

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June 2018

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OR REARMAMENT?**

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ABSTRACT

In May 2016, the German government approved an about-face in its military personnel policy by lifting personnel caps. This measure allowed the Bundeswehr to increase its operational power, strengthen its robustness, and establish new capabilities as part of a comprehensive \$150 billion military build-up program—the first since the late Cold War. Germany cut its close ties to Russia and subscribed to the European skepticism about Moscow.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFD	Alternative für Deutschland
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CSU	Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Socialist Union)
CSCU	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EDC	European Defense Community
EFP	Enhanced Forward Presence
EU	European Union
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Forces Command
ISAF	International Security Assistant Force
IT	Information Technology
MAD	Militärischer Abschirmdienst (Military Counter Intelligence Agency)
MOD	Ministry of Defense
NATP	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPP	NATO Defense Planning Process
NVA	Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)
UK	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States
USA	United States of America
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

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I. INTRODUCTION

The parameters of security policy have changed drastically for Germany since 2012 from the blue skies of enduring peace to the dark horizon of crisis. The arc of disorder from Crimea to Syria and Mali, with corresponding mass migration, threats of international terrorism, unconventional and hybrid warfare, and cyber-attacks have thrust themselves on political Berlin. Since the advent of national unity and the Two Plus Four imperative to reduce in force the two German armies in 1989–94, the German military has consistently reduced its personnel over the last 25 years. After the end of the Cold War, national unity and the end of confrontation in central Europe allowed for a sweeping cutback of forces. Thus, a united Germany felt ready for peace dividends and to slash its number of soldiers from around 585,000¹ at the time of the German reunification to 177,000 in 2016.²

In light of the worsening shift in the post-2014 security policy situation, the German military now faces a huge gap between the resulting demands on the armed forces and the resources available. Therefore, in May 2016, the German government approved an about-face in the military personnel policy, lifting personnel caps. This about-face allowed the Bundeswehr, for example, to increase its operational power beyond the expeditionary missions of the so-called deployment phase of the 1990s, to strengthen its robustness, and to establish new capabilities. It is important to view this pivot in light of Germany's historical obligation to ensure peace and security in Europe amid the domestic political environment created by a government of two traditionally competing parties (Social Democrats and Christian Democrats) and tied together by a coalition agreement. As part of a comprehensive €130 billion (\$153 billion) program of military build-up, this turnaround actually has teeth.

¹ Including the *Nationale Volksarmee* (National People's Army) of the former German Democratic Republic.

² Vince Chadwick and Cynthia Kroet, "Germany Plans Military Expansion after Decades of Downsizing," Politico.EU, October 5, 2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/germany-plans-military-expansion-after-decades-of-downsizing-defence-army/>.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

What has been Germany's rationale in the realms of the international system, domestic politics, and the German military as an organization for initiating a military expansion after the European geopolitical upheaval of 2014? The decision to lift personnel caps allowed the Bundeswehr to increase its sustainability, strengthen its robustness, and establish new capabilities. Thereby, Germany significantly changed its foreign and security policies despite being, at least in the minds of some on the left and elsewhere, a (now) reputedly pacifist nation surrounded by friends.

Pointing to Germany's historical obligation to uphold human rights and European security at the same time, what are the detailed political origins of this strategic revolution? Or can it be said to be more of an evolutionary process when viewed against the story of German arms and policy over a longer span of time, especially in the phases of reorganization and transformation of the armed forces since 1989?

This thesis analyzes the main political reasons in their variety and the significant milestones in what has been a confusing process, the results of which have been a turning point in Germany's record in Europe in the 20th and 21st centuries. This study considers such significant factors as domestic limitations and German civil-military relations, with a special focus on the organizational decisions that shaped and are shaping a new Bundeswehr.

B. IMPORTANCE

From a German perspective, the contemporary European security architecture has been crucially determined by two pivotal points in European history. The first is the enduring position of Germany at the center of Europe and how the European and then Atlantic security system has adjusted to this center of gravity in the international system. After two world wars intended to assure Germany a command over the continent and beyond, a defeated Germany was divided under Allied occupation "to prevent Germany

from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world.”³ The Cold War soon led to national division and a new system of bipolar confrontation with each German state armed against the other. It meant two new armies from the wreckage of the defeated Wehrmacht and the integration of the two German states in the respective collective defense systems: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact. The effect of this process on German arms was the military structure of the Cold War, with a high level of armament in central Europe, a burden that was thankfully cast aside after 1990.

The second pivotal point was marked by the end of the Cold War and the consequent reunification of Germany, regaining its sovereignty and finally striving for its rightful peace dividend. The shape and strength of the Bundeswehr was deeply influenced by these forces.

The *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany*⁴ was considered to be a great gift to—and by—the German people sick of defeat in war and the burden of armies in national life. Therefore, by the 1960s, Germany, with its location in the center of Europe, once more came to see itself as a bridge between the West and the East, particularly Russia. It is arguable, however, that the Ukraine crisis in 2014—along with the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the Russian-engineered insurgency in Eastern Ukraine—have led to a fundamental realignment of German security policy, especially with respect to Russia. This realignment not only put an end to the period of a reduced German military and thereby the peace dividend, but also to Germany’s self-imposed restrictions on military commitments and its willingness to finally accept greater responsibility in an “out-of-joint” world.

Identifying the driving factors of military reforms in general and in the aforementioned case of the Bundeswehr in particular is essential to understand the future

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., “Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Occupation Forces (JCS 1067) (April 1945), in *United States Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 2, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2297.

⁴ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany: Moscow, 12 September 1990* (London: HMSO, 1991).

role of the Bundeswehr as political/security/strategic instrument of choice in conflict, crisis, and national as well as collective defense. An understanding of the parameters and political aims of the reform at a national and international level can contribute to reinforce its transatlantic and European allies' trust and confidence in Germany as a reliable partner. An understanding of this process is also essential for an author actively engaged in the further evolution of the German military amid domestic political upheaval and an unsettled international system. As an aspect of U.S. security policy, such a study is also of use to those Americans with an enduring interest in politics in Central Europe given Germany's ever central role in the fate of the continent. An analysis of the redefined Bundeswehr's organization, its objectives, and priorities also helps to predict future developments in European security and defense policy and impacts on its relationship to the NATO alliance and Germany's most crucial ally—the United States.

C. HYPOTHESIS

While reforms of organizations such as armed forces are often triggered by single events with tremendous impact—ahead of looming wars, or after major political changes—the German expansion that was initiated in 2016 clearly eludes a simple, monocausal explanation. The reason behind this assertion is not the absence of a specific trigger event, as this thesis will show by proving that the continued Russian aggression in the Ukraine since early 2014 has led to an unfolding of a third pivotal point in the recent history of contemporary European security architecture. Rather to a greater degree, it was the final push necessary in the realms of international and domestic politics to kick off the process of increasing the number of soldiers instead of reducing it for the first time since the late Cold War. Moreover, this about-face has occurred contrary to party political expectations used to the historical behavior of the German armed forces.

Thus, it seems that a multiplicity of specific factors has made it possible for the highly improbable to become reality—the expansion the German armed forces not only without objection by its European neighbors, but with applause from their fellow NATO partners who now welcome a commanding role for Germany in a Europe struggling to retain its hard-won unity. It required a European crisis to overcome the reluctance of

Germany's neighbors to tolerate a German military expansion—and Putin delivered it in the Crimea.

The crucial part, however, was to overcome the “reform fatigue” of the Bundeswehr itself to transform again after it had suffered from so many reforms and “reforms of reforms” since 1990, and especially since the year 2000.

The German military turnaround in 2016 is neither an empty promise, nor just an adjustment of the 2010 reorientation. Rather, it is a new chapter in German military history, and therefore, its ramifications on international defense and security policy demand further analysis and explanation.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

This study focuses primarily on resources publicly available as well as on the literature by contemporary scholars and media coverage to explain Germany's rationale for initiating a military expansion in 2016.

To provide the theoretical background necessary, it is appropriate to start with an overview on the transformation of military organizations in general based on organizational theory. Then, a brief historic overview is offered on the determinants that have shaped and characterized Germany's role and behavior in terms of defense and security policy since World War II, to understand Germany's historical obligation to ensure peace and security with a military that is uniquely bound to democratic principles. Therefore, this study employs mainly government-produced and -provided historic documents from such figures as John Lewis Gaddis⁵ and Donald Abenheim⁶ as well as from leading actors in the saga (i.e., [retired] General Schönbohm).⁷ Special care is taken

⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Reprint ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

⁶ Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, *Soldiers, War, Knowledge and Citizenship: German-American Essays on Civil-Military Relations* (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2017).

⁷ Jörg Schönbohm, *Two Armies and One Fatherland : The End of the Nationale Volksarmee* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books 1996).

to discuss existing studies from NATO and think tanks like the German Council on Foreign Relations and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

At the very core of this thesis is the case of the “Reorientation of the Bundeswehr.” The examination of this case enables one to determine whether the current pivot to a military expansion is only an adjustment to the previous reform of the Bundeswehr or in fact—as this thesis intends to prove—an evolutionary phase of the prior reform, although it cannot be referred to as such due to domestic constraints from the latest coalition agreement of 2013.⁸ While relevant literature to date is hardly plentiful, an evaluation of the reorientation by Joachim Jens Hesse,⁹ the report of the commission for the future of the Bundeswehr,¹⁰ and the report of the Bundeswehr structure commission¹¹ prove especially valuable in defining organizational principles, characteristics, and cornerstones of military reforms in general and the Bundeswehr’s latest one particularly. Additionally, the publicly available organizational founding documents like the “Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and

⁸ The 2013 coalition agreement committed to leading the successful reorientation of the Bundeswehr; there was no option for readjustments or even a change of course, if required. cf. CDU, CSU, and SPD, “Deutschlands Zukunft Gestalten—Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU Und SPD [Shaping Germany’s Future—Coalition Agreement between CDU, CSU and SPD]” (Union Betriebs-GmbH, December 16, 2013), <https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf>.

⁹ Joachim Jens Hesse, *Die Neuausrichtung Der Bundeswehr: Ansatz, Umsetzung Und Ergebnisse Im Nationalen Und Internationalen Vergleich [The Reorientation of the Bundeswehr. Idea, Implementation and Outcome in a National and International Comparison]* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft MbH & Co, 2015).

¹⁰ Kommission, “Gemeinsame Sicherheit Und Zukunft Der Bundeswehr—Bericht Der Kommission an Die Bundesregierung [Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr—Report of the Commission to the Federal Government]” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung Presse- und Informationsstab Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, May 2000).

¹¹ Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, “Bericht Der Strukturkommission Der Bundeswehr—Vom Einsatz Her Denken, Konzentration, Flexibilität, Effizienz [Report of the Structural Commission—Focus on Operations—Concentration, Flexibility, Efficiency]” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung—Presse- und Informationsstab AB 2, October 2010).

Command and Control Organization in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr (Dresden Decree—cf. appendix)”¹² is evaluated.

Furthermore, because these developments are overshadowed by Germany’s history and the Bundeswehr’s burden of its heritage, a second level of analysis is applied by adding a historical perspective to the argument, where appropriate.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I defines the major research question and provides the context, main hypothesis, and the research design.

Chapter II consists of two parts laying the foundation of this work’s argument. While the first part provides the fundamentals of the transformation of military organizations in general as well as the German case in particular, the second part examines the Bundeswehr’s historic roots in Europe and its heritage to illuminate the constraints under which the Bundeswehr has operated since its very beginning. Moreover, the implications of German unification and the integration of the former National People’s Army are discussed to the extent that they have influenced organizational decisions.

Chapter III sets a clear focus on the so-called Reorientation of 2010 as the most comprehensive German military structural reform since the end of the Cold War by portraying its driving factors, key philosophy, organizational outcomes, and approach to modernizing the forces as well as their administrative body.

Chapter IV concentrates on a “world out of joint” from a German perspective by addressing the crisis of its *Ostpolitik* as a driving factor Germany’s latest reform and military expansion. Chapter IV also discusses Germany’s “special relationship” with Russia, from the beginning of the Cold War to West Germany’s rapprochement, and

¹² Bundesminister der Verteidigung, “Grundsätze Für Die Spitzengliederung, Und Führungsorganisation Im Bundesministerium Der Verteidigung Und Der Bundeswehr (Dresdner Erlass) [Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and Command and Control Organisation in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr (Dresden Decree)]” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, March 21, 2012), <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/11918/a0704bf10c05a278e69de63bd00c49d3/a-04-05-download-dresdner-erlass-data.pdf>.

finally to the post-Cold War era, with Germany becoming a bridge between western Europe and Russia. With Russia's annexation of the Crimea and the Russian-puppeteered insurgency in eastern Ukraine, the tragedy of the failure of Germany's policy of détente had become painfully visible. Therefore, the paradigm shift in German foreign policy is evaluated, and the consequences of this change and NATO's role in that process are addressed.

Moreover, organizational decisions of the Bundeswehr and the curse of a tendency to constantly reform its reforms are debated. In order to determine the scope of the current German military pivot with a new military personnel policy at its very core it must be compared to the so-called Reorientation of the Bundeswehr—its last official reform in 2010.

Chapter V summarizes the findings and identifies implications for Germany's role in shaping the future of the European Union's and transatlantic security architecture. Additionally, the entanglement of Germany's expansion with the question of prospects for a future European Army is addressed.

II. TRANSFORMATION AND THE CASE OF THE BUNDESWEHR

Identifying the driving factors of military reforms in general and the case of the Bundeswehr in particular is essential to understand the future role of the Bundeswehr as a political instrument of choice in conflicts, crises, and contingencies of national as well as collective defense.

Despite often being regarded as a stronghold of conservatism, armed forces throughout history have constantly been reformed, realigned, or reorganized in order to adjust to a changing strategic and operational environment as well as to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. The terms revolution, reform, reorganization, and realignment have often been exchanged for one another as their respective connotations have changed over time. The need for progress, innovation, and adaption, however, have remained constant, at least from the advent of modern armies in the 17th century when the epoch of wars of mercenaries gave way to wars of standing armies up to today.

A. MILITARY CHANGE—A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

With the beginning of the new millennium, the term “military transformation” replaced “revolution in military affairs,” which has been used since the 1980s.¹³ In 2001, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared transformation to be “at the heart” of the “new strategic approach” in order to be “prepared to meet emerging challenges.”¹⁴ This shift in terminology has been adopted by politicians, military professionals, and scholars ever since. And it has gone global: “Transformation” has become a transnational process with almost equivalent trajectories.

¹³ Theo Farrell, Terriff Terry, and Osinga Frans, eds., *A Transformation Gap?: American Innovations and European Military Change* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 2–3.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review,” September 30, 2001, 16, <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>.

1. The Military Organization as Open System

To analyze the transformation processes of military organizations in general, organization theory offers a useful level of abstraction for describing and explaining the related subsystems, their interrelationships, and their response to external influences. William G. Scott and Terence R. Mitchell offer a stunningly parsimonious approach by defining an organization as “a system of coordinated activities of a group of people working cooperatively towards a common goal under authority and leadership.”¹⁵ An entity that features all these attributes therefore can be characterized as an organization, whether it is business, private or public, or an entity created by the government. According to classical organization theories, organizations are all the same—with only minor differences between a restaurant, an automobile factory, or a Department of Defense.¹⁶ Although certainly distinct from each other in size, appearance, and purpose, all these entities can be analyzed according to dimensions of strategy, culture, structure, and their processes. Weber’s classic characteristics of bureaucracy have dominated the organization’s structure as it dominated organizational theory and its image of formal organizations.¹⁷

Military organizations have often been seen and treated as the most formal public organizations, calling for rules and regulations to ensure uniformity in structure and agency. When the world entered the Information age, which led to an evolution of new technologies, organizations as well as organization theorists shifted their focus to the professionalization now needed to perform in these highly specified fields of knowledge. Frederick C. Mosher, who did intensive research on the emerging professionalism in the public sector, identified numerous agencies that had been taken over by this development, as shown in Table 1:

¹⁵ William G. Scott and Terence R. Mitchell, *Organization Theory* (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1976), 29.

¹⁶ Florence Heffron, *Organization Theory & Public Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pearson, 1989), 2–11.

¹⁷ Heffron, 4–6.

Table 1. Professionalization in Public Service¹⁸

Federal	
<i>Professionally dominated agencies</i>	<i>Agents</i>
Military agencies	Military officers
Department of State	Foreign service officers
Public Health Service	Doctors
Bureau of Reclamation	Civil engineers
Geological Survey	Geologists
Department of Justice	Lawyers
Department of Education	Educators
Bureau of Standards	Natural Scientists
State and Local	
<i>Professionally dominated agencies</i>	<i>Agents</i>
Highways	Civil engineers
Welfare agencies	Social workers
Mental hygiene agencies	Psychiatrists
Public health agencies	Doctors
Education and schools	Educators
Higher education institutions	Professors
Attorneys, legal counsel	Lawyers

At first glance, Mosher's list merely suggests, that military organizations have become dominated by professionalism—a statement hardly anyone involved in defense and security policy would ever deny. On second glance, however, one realizes that modern militaries comprise *all* the listed professions in Table 1, since military organizations can best be described as a complex system of systems. Military organizations—as the German Bundeswehr for instance—incorporate different highly specialized branches of services with officers, engineers, doctors, geologists, police officers, aviators, lawyers, and more. An organization like the Bundeswehr nowadays

¹⁸ Adapted from Frederick C. Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 115.

runs its own universities, hospitals, schools, jurisdiction, defense scientific institutes, and—in essence—its own airline, shipping, and transport companies.

While there seem to be as many organization theories out there as there are organizations, *open systems theory* is the most commonly acknowledged one to explain complex (meta-) structures. With a system being “a set of units with relationships among them and the totality of the system [being] greater than the sum of its parts,”¹⁹ open systems theory concentrates on explaining an organization’s relationship with its respective environment and the resulting dynamic interdependencies.

In open systems, the “environment emerges as the crucial variable for organizational survival.”²⁰ What better theory could there be for explaining a military organization, which exists only for the sole purpose to ensure the security and thus the survival of a nation? Furthermore, open systems theory encourages recognition of the small but sometimes decisive differences between all the same organizations, especially when it comes to public versus private and draws attention to the “dichotomy between politics and administration,”²¹ each following different rules and regularities. Since, according to Clausewitz’s famous phrase, “war is the continuation of politics by other means,”²² it seems paramount to discuss in more detail the impact of policy and politics on military organization as an instrument of war.²³

2. Transition in Changing Environments

In a rapidly changing world, nations often feel the increasing need to transform their militaries. While the reasons to transform may differ in their composition and absolute necessity, a few basic patterns can be observed. Essentially, a nation’s military

¹⁹ Heffron, *Organization Theory & Public Organizations*, 8.

²⁰ Heffron, 9.

²¹ Heffron, 12.

²² Edward Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (1995): 14.

²³ In “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Villacres and Bassford note that “this oft-quoted sentence contains two very different messages because of the dual meaning of the German word he [Clausewitz] used: *Politik*. That one word encompasses the two quite different English words policy and politics.”

transformation is triggered either externally by a change in the political or security landscape, or internally by social changes and their possible effects on civil-military relations.

In terms of security policy, the change of perceived or real threats and risks, the behavior of competing states, geo-political shifts, or the interaction within alliances and coalitions can call for structural transformation. On the domestic side, demography, social-cultural transition (e.g., pacifism or post-heroism²⁴), and public attitude toward the use of (military) power influence the decisions shaping a state's armed forces. Each country's individual level of ambition, its military objectives, and self-image as well as the chosen system of military service (conscription versus all volunteer forces) add to the picture.


Although economic aspects such as the budget available, the willingness to invest in military assets and personnel, or the option to focus on public-private partnerships affect the organization of the armed forces as well, these decisions are also part of the political sphere. Thus, it can be concluded that the transformation of military forces is solely rooted in political framework conditions, as far as foreign or domestic policies are concerned. The outcome of the political decisions made will then manifest itself in the organization of military forces in terms of strategy, culture, (top-level) structure, and processes. István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler put it succinctly by stating that “politics becomes a pacemaker for reforms—it and nothing else determines the beat and the speed.”²⁵

Therefore, in this thesis two lenses of foreign and domestic policies as depicted in Figure 1 are applied to the case of the Bundeswehr's latest reforms in order to access their organizational outcome and to serve as a framework for analysis:

²⁴ See Herfried Münkler, “Heroische Und Postheroische Gesellschaften [Heroic and Post-Heroic Societies],” *MERKUR* 61, no. 8/09 (September 2007): 742–52.

²⁵ István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler, eds., *Post-Cold War Defense Reform : Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002), 224.

Figure 1. A Framework for Transition in a Changing Environment²⁶



²⁶ Source: own illustration.

3. Strategic Trends

While politics shape the transformation of military forces, additional factors influence when, how quickly, and to what degree those changes occur. Throughout history military breakthroughs in weapons and organization have been achieved by bringing new technologies to armed forces, which then were able to turn the tables and defeat even far superior forces. Game-changing military technologies, including the invention of chariots, longbows, gunpowder, airplanes, nuclear weapons, and satellites with global positioning systems, have shocked those armies that failed to prove equal to them.²⁷

Today, nations strive to be ahead in military innovation as well as to emulate successful, more developed opponents and their strategies.²⁸ Although the term disruptive technologies is employed in the military realm when talking about technologies that have the potential to drastically enhance or deeply marginalize a nation's military power, it is not isolated to the military sphere. Disruptive technology drives innovation in many areas. Moreover, transformation “anticipates and creates the future and deals with the co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations, *and* technology. Profound change in *any* one of these areas necessitates change in all.”²⁹

With an armada of think tanks, modern militaries compete in analyzing and predicting the future in order to secure their forces any advantage possible and to adjust their organization to future challenges and not the ones of the present or—even worse—the past. The UK 2014 strategic trends study covers disruptive changes ranging from demography, to gender, to corruption, to urbanization—just to mention a few.³⁰ Similar documents from the 2016 Swiss Center for Security Studies add aspects like

²⁷ Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie, *From Crossbow to H-Bomb: The Evolution of the Weapons and Tactics of Warfare*, revised and enlarged ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).

²⁸ Farrell, Terry, and Frans, *A Transformation Gap?*, 7–10.

²⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, Director Force Transformation, *Military Transformation a Strategic Approach* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2003), 8.

³⁰ UK MOD JFC Development, “Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045” (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, June 2014), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/348164/20140821_DCDC_GST_5_Web_Secured.pdf.

irregular migration and a nuclear world lacking arms control to complete the dystopia.³¹ The 2017 United States Army War College’s “Study on the Strategic Landscape 2050” explores scenarios like flooded coastlines and submerged cities, energy blackouts, and self-aware armed robotics.³² Meanwhile, the Bundeswehr Office for Defense Planning in its future topics research series publishes intensively about peak oil³³ and human enhancement.³⁴

The main challenge for every nation remains to filter the different futures described by the various think tanks, and to conclude from them what adjustments need to be made to the military in order to be ready for the challenges in the uncertain future. Any results of the conclusion then need to be translated into consequences for defense planning, some of which are presented in Table 2:

³¹ Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe, and Andreas Wenger, *Strategic Trends 2016 Key Developments in Global Affairs* (ETH Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2016), <https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/ST2016.pdf>.

³² Roman Muzalevsky, *Strategic Landscape 2050—Preparing the US Military for New Era Dynamics* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, September 2017), <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1366.pdf>.

[illegible]

³⁴ Annika Vergin, “Future Topic Human Enhancement—Eine Neue Herausforderung Für Streitkräfte? [A New Challenge for Militaries?]]” (Planungsamt der Bundeswehr, July 2013), http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgaw/start/service/studien/!ut/p/z1/hY_RC4IwEMb_I29qpj46TBNEIqXcXmK4YYZtMpb00B_fROhN-g4-uPvufnBAoQUq2Tz0zAxKstH2hO5vOCqb0os9rykwQkleeX4YHv0cI7jA9d8KtTHaUIKg5gKIZYTbjABqoEC5cDolhVncCGkG671mRmlnUtgMS_LS2ibOwIEgN8XIbtXK_cQZPrQk3AVpgc8L8MFm9v7dsm55GsidST6Kk-qSdTA9s6iqgy4LMCU5cw!!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TIB00AGN2377H3GB5.

Table 2. Consequences for Defense Planning³⁵

<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>
A focus on kinetics	A focus on effects
Twentieth-century processes	Twenty-first century integrated approaches
Static defense, garrison forces	Mobile, expeditionary operations
Under-resourced, standby forces	Fully equipped combat ready units
A battle-ready force (peace)	Battle hardened forces (war)
Large institutional forces (tail)	More powerful operational capabilities (teeth)
Major conventional combat operation	Multiple irregular, asymmetric operations
Separate military service concepts of operation	Joint and combined operations
Forces that need to deconflict	Integrated, interdependent forces
Emphasis on ships, tanks and aircraft	Focus on information, knowledge, and timely, actionable intelligence
Massing forces	Massing effects
Set-piece-maneuver and mass	Agility and precision
Single service acquisition systems	Joint portfolio management
Service ad agency intelligence	Truly Joint Information Operation Centers
Vertical structures and processes (stovepipes)	More transparent, horizontal integration
Moving the user to the data	Moving data to the user
Predetermines force packages	Tailored, flexible forces
Department of Defense solutions	Interagency approaches
Information technology	Cybernetics

The decision to undertake a transformation process affects all dimensions of organization identified before: strategy, culture, structure, and processes. Thus, it is

³⁵ Adapted from Farrell, Terry, and Farrell, *A Transformation Gap?*, 18.

always imperative to consider that “major structural change is one of the most disruptive types of change that organizations experience because it deeply affects the informal organization, the network of interpersonal relationships and communication that members have established over time.”³⁶

B. GERMANY’S HISTORIC BURDEN

To analyze the German military reforms, it is not only imperative to understand the nature of military transformation, but also the evolution of the Bundeswehr from its inception in 1950, since it bears a unique burden in the form of a difficult heritage of Nazi-Germany’s severe crimes against humanity in World War II. Therefore, this section examines the Bundeswehr’s historic roots in Europe as well as the difficult question of political-military balance in Europe to understand the historic constraints under which the Bundeswehr has operated since its inception.

1. The Aftermath of World War II and the Birth of the Bundeswehr

The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps in the accomplishment of this objective are [...] the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, with continuing control over Germany’s capacity to make war.³⁷

At the end of World War II Germany—or what was left of it—lay in ruins. At the so-called zero hour, marking the fall of the Third Reich and the beginning of a new era, Germany not only needed to be reconstructed but also reinvented.³⁸ For the three Western occupation zones that were later merged into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the doctrine of denazification, demilitarization, decartelization, and disarmament

³⁶ Heffron, *Organization Theory & Public Organizations*, 166.

³⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Occupation Forces (JCS 1067) (April 1945),” in *United States Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents*, 2.

³⁸ Stephen Brockmann, *German Literary Culture at the Zero Hour* (Rochester, NY: BOYE6, 2009), 8–24.

can be considered as the very core of the recreation of a now markedly peaceful German people.³⁹

In the years immediately following World War II, security in West Germany was consequently provided by the allied occupation forces only. Even in 1948–49, the writers of a provisional German constitution—the Basic Law—believed that this condition would persist for the foreseeable future.⁴⁰ According to Abenheim, “the spirit and letter of the West German Basic Law was, at the very least, neutral in its provisions for military power in the state, if indeed it was not antimilitary or pacifist in spirit.”⁴¹ He clarifies that Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic’s first chancellor, opposed the idea of creating German armed forces again, but was nevertheless prepared to consider a contingent to an army of a European confederation in the most extreme case.

Abenheim notes that after the Soviets successfully detonated an atomic bomb, conducted the Berlin Blockade, and the war in Korea broke out, Winston Churchill demanded Germany contribute to European defense, being at its eastern flank, particularly. Adenauer complied with the request and thereby shocked his own cabinet, the German people, and the world: “For the third time in a single generation, after the creation of the *Reichswehr* in 1921 and of the *Wehrmacht* in 1935, a new army was to be raised on German soil.”⁴²

The idea of a united European force was soon abandoned, but in 1955, on the 200th birthday of the Prussian military reformer Scharnhorst, the *Bundeswehr*—as a West German national army—was officially established and the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of the NATO alliance. After much trial in the 1960s, the *Bundeswehr*

³⁹ Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 25.

⁴⁰ Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, 41.

⁴¹ Abenheim, 42.

⁴² Abenheim, 43.

reached full strength with up to 495,000⁴³ soldiers to serve as a reliable—if not *the*—backbone of NATO’s European conventional forces throughout the Cold War. In his history on *The Cold War*, Gaddis even judges the Bundeswehr to be “perhaps world’s best army.”⁴⁴ Thus, although being built under the dark shadows of the Third Reich, the Bundeswehr and the West German rearmament helped Germany to regain recognition from its allies, which resulted in a relative normalization of relationships and the relaxation of Allied restraints.⁴⁵

2. Firm Roots in Europe

Although the Bundeswehr was finally founded as one of two German armies in an alliance, an analysis of the events that prevented the creation of a European approach to defense in the early Cold War seems valuable to understand the mechanisms of balance of power in Europe that always played a decisive role in shaping, reforming, and deploying the Bundeswehr.

In the light of the devastation that Germany had brought over the European continent in the second World War, European nations—and France particularly—were reluctant to even think about a German rearmament again and opposed a potential NATO membership.⁴⁶ With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the Cold War becoming hot, France had to accept the need to counterbalance the overwhelming Soviet military forces in Europe.⁴⁷ The demands of the United States for a Germany contributing to Europe’s security could no longer be ignored. Moreover, the idea of granting the West Germans a complete free ride in the military domain was not

⁴³ Statista, “Personalbestand Der Bundeswehr Bis 2016 [Statistics of the Bundeswehr’s Workforce],” Statista, 2017, <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/495515/umfrage/personalbestand-der-bundeswehr/>.

⁴⁴ Gaddis, *The Cold War*, 220.

⁴⁵ David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era*, 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

⁴⁶ Kevin Ruane, *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950-55*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 4.

⁴⁷ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1980), 67–72.

acceptable for France either.⁴⁸ Due to the fear of a German national military revival amid the Korean War, the French Prime Minister Plevin in October 1950 came up with the counter plan of a rearmed Germany within a supranational European Army.⁴⁹

According to Kevin Ruane, it was the French rationale that “under the Plevin Plan, there would be no independent German Army or General Staff for the forces of nationalism to rally around.”⁵⁰ The West German rearmament was the dominant question in European diplomacy in the years to come. With the signing of the Treaty of Paris by six countries on May 27, 1952, the European Defense Community (EDC) was established.⁵¹ Belgian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, and Luxembourgian forces would form a pan-European army. Although the British government chose to not participate in the EDC a close cooperation with the British military and even the guarantee of mutual assistance was agreed and amended as a special protocol to the EDC treaty.⁵²

Obviously, France was the strong man in the EDC. It was determined that the language of the Commissariat, the executive body of the EDC and vested with supervisory power, was to be French.⁵³ Thus, in the wake of the French defeat in Indochina, and tolerated by the UK and the United States, the French National Assembly shockingly put an end to the idea of an integrated European defense force on August 30, 1954, by not ratifying the treaty. French domestic problems as well a changed international situation accounted for the failure. It resulted from France’s fear of losing its national sovereignty, of a rearmed West Germany, the non-participation of the United Kingdom, and being tied too closely to the United States against the Soviet bloc, to

⁴⁸ Large, *Germans to the Front*, 120.

⁴⁹ Ruane, *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community*, 4.

⁵⁰ Ruane, 4.

⁵¹ Ruane, 15.

⁵² U.S. Senate, *European Defense Community Treaty* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2, 1952), 227–28.

⁵³ U.S. Senate, 217.

Stalin's death, as well as the unhappy end of the Vietnam War and onset of conflict in Algeria.⁵⁴

The French refusal to ratify the treaty sent out shockwaves in European diplomatic and political circles and beyond. Only the Soviets were delighted. According to Fursdon, "as the enormity of the destruction of four years' painstaking, sensitive, difficult work and statesmanship penetrated through the numbness of despair, the only question that mattered was what next?"⁵⁵ France, which had been the engine of European integration for the years after World War II, was now discredited and the center of action for European defense had literally overnight changed from Paris to Bonn.⁵⁶

In search of an alternative framework for a German military contribution to Europe's defense against communism, the British took over the initiative by suggesting that the 1948 Brussels Treaty should become that basis.⁵⁷ After being given assurances by Germany, France agreed to the FRG becoming a member of NATO and the establishment of own (national) military forces.⁵⁸

Although the EDC never saw the light of day it has to be considered as a unique milestone of historic importance. Edward Fursdon argues that "its failure had led to the realization of the very event which the EDC had originally been designed to prevent."⁵⁹ It laid the very foundations of Western Europe's defense and security as well as for a European political community and therefore must be regarded as a success. The idea of a European military integration at least has never ceased to exist. In the contemporary debate on the future of the transatlantic security framework and Europe's contribution

⁵⁴ Ruane, *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community*, 89–110; Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*, 266–302.

⁵⁵ Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*, 303.

⁵⁶ Fursdon, 309.

⁵⁷ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 31.

⁵⁸ The FRG accepted various restrictions on conventional weapon systems and bound itself not to produce any kind of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

⁵⁹ Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*, 337.

under the perception of an increased threat from the East it is even more prevalent than ever.

3. The “Other Germany”

In the other Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the *Nationale Volksarmee* (NVA—National People’s Army) was created in 1956 from existing camouflaged military units as a direct answer to the foundation of the Bundeswehr: the NVA immediately became a member of the Warsaw Pact. Essentially formed from a heavily armed and mobile national police force, “even at the height of the Cold War, they were never anything but a reserve to the Operational Maneuver Groups of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany.”⁶⁰ Moreover, Dan Jordan argues, that the NVA suffered from bureaucratic, organizational, and ideologic dysfunctionalities which, by the 1980s, made the NVA a “huge anchor that helped sink the GDR.”⁶¹

Notably, when the Berlin Wall finally came down in 1989, liberating East Germany from dictatorship, neither side of the German Armed Forces—Bundeswehr and NVA—fired a single shot. Moreover, the leadership and ranks of the NVA completely refrained from taking action against demonstrators in Leipzig or Erfurt, for instance, even as the anti-regime demonstrations drew more people to the streets on Monday nights. Not least because of this restraint—in stark contrast to the response to the workers uprising on June 17, 1953, or the Prague Spring of 1968—the reunification of the two Germanies successfully rested on the unification of the two—formerly adversarial—armed forces.

Having been in charge on behalf of the West German Ministry of Defense to take over and integrate the East German forces, the former Bundeswehr-General Jörg Schönbohm in his book *Two Armies and One Fatherland: The End of the Nationale Volksarmee*⁶² analyzes from a commander’s perspective his difficult, sometimes almost incredible, way to a well-recognized success. The German “military unification” and the

⁶⁰ Dan Jordan, “Failure to Command: The Political Underpinnings of the Failure of the Nationale Volksarmee as a Social Institution,” in *Rearming Germany*, ed. James S. Corum (Leiden ; Boston: BRILL, 2011), 255.

⁶¹ Jordan, 256.

⁶² Schönbohm, *Two Armies and One Fatherland : The End of the Nationale Volksarmee*.

integration of the soldiers of the East German National People's Army, according to Schönbohm, "is a credit not only to the Bundeswehr as a whole, but also to those NVA servicemen, who, after the political changeover, felt committed to the common goal of all-German armed forces."⁶³

4. German Reunification and the Military Question

The German reunification clearly was a worrisome and delicate issue for the European and allied countries who suffered from two world wars, as well as the Four Allied Powers, which wielded authority according to their rights and responsibilities in Berlin and Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, "with the wall breached, everything was possible."⁶⁴ Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor, pushed in favor of a reunification and skillfully managed to rally crucial allies. In January 1990, even Gorbachev agreed or at least saw no other choice: "German reunification should be regarded as inevitable."⁶⁵

The question of whether a reunified Germany should remain in the NATO alliance, stay neutral, or even have a dual membership in both military alliances—Warsaw Pact and NATO—still had to be agreed upon in the few months in 1990 when unification became a practical goal of policy. In the end, Gorbachev accepted the American and West German position of a reunited Germany being part of NATO, while the allies would refrain from stationing forces in the integrated military structure in the former GDR/five new state, and thus caused the once unthinkable to happen: "Soviet forces stationed on German territory would withdraw while American forces stationed on German territory would remain."⁶⁶

⁶³ Schönbohm, 207.

⁶⁴ Gaddis, *The Cold War*, 246.

⁶⁵ Gaddis, 250.

⁶⁶ Gaddis, 251.

With the *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany*⁶⁷ (German Treaty) the Four Powers finally set the terms for the unification of Germany by simultaneously ensuring their own—as well as the other European countries’—security interests through disarmament in Central Europe in line with the force cuts that had been enshrined with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The right of self-determination was granted to the German people under mutually agreed terms. With regard to the German military—keeping the name *Bundeswehr* and integrating soldiers and certain units of the former NVA—the German treaty especially demanded a reduction in personnel strength from about 700,000 to 370,000 and banned the deployment of nuclear weapon systems on the territory of the former GDR.⁶⁸

Most importantly, the German Treaty clearly shaped the framework for the use of military force: “acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, are unconstitutional and a punishable offence. [...] Germany will never employ any of its weapons except in accordance with its constitution and the Charter of the United Nations.”⁶⁹ Bearing in mind its responsibility to promote peace imposed by the treaty, Germany not only fully respects that declaration today and assures to continue to do so in the future but chooses to identify itself with it in a way that has truly made it the reason of state. Most notably, nowadays this specific commitment may even lead to the potential situation in which Germany has to deny requests of the former Four Powers to join in military campaigns of coalitions,⁷⁰ when they are not mandated by the United Nations or another system of mutual collective security and/or are not in conformity with the German constitution—the Basic Law.

⁶⁷ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany*.

⁶⁸ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 4–5.

⁶⁹ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 4.

⁷⁰ E.g., the request of the United States concerning the third Gulf War in March 2003.

The German Treaty is accurately described by the statement that “only peace will emanate from German soil.”⁷¹ This idea has not only become the principle of government regarding defense and security policy, but also a widespread attitude among the German society.

⁷¹ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany*, 4.

III. THE REORIENTATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR— A FORESEEABLE FAILURE?

In 2011, in the midst of a severe economic crisis (often referred to as the European sovereign debt crisis), German Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière announced the most comprehensive military reform in post-unification German history.⁷² It aimed at the final step in the process begun in the early 1990s to the cumbersome Bundeswehr into desperately needed expeditionary forces with enhanced capabilities, while significantly reducing defense expenditures by casting off what had come to be seen as wasteful overhead of “legacy Cold War” systems. Additionally, the reform intended to suspend conscription, streamline command structures, professionalize and render highly efficient the management of process, human resources, and defense procurement. In other words, the so-called Reorientation of the Bundeswehr was nothing more and nothing less than an attempt to square the circle. It was a much ballyhooed reform, intended as the last of the reforms that had begun in 1989–1990. In retrospect, it also appears to have been all the more problematic in the wake of the strategic turn that was to unfold 24 months later in Europe.

A. DRIVING FACTORS OF THE REORGANIZATION

Understanding the reorientation is also important in order to determine why the Bundeswehr later in 2016 began to undertake considerable adjustments (the so-called Turnaround), although the Reorientation of 2010/11 still officially represents the current and valid structural layout and conceptional doctrine of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the dvaluation of the reorientation is also intended to provide a starting point for further analysis in Chapter IV on the turnaround of the Bundeswehr, which eventually started to address the shortcomings of the reorientation and—with some controversy—culminated in a reform of the reform.

⁷² See Thomas de Maiziere, “Rede Des Bundesministers Der Verteidigung, Dr. Thomas de Maiziere, Am 18. Mai 2011 in Berlin Zur Neuausrichtung Der Bundeswehr [Speech of Defence Minister, Dr. Thomas de Maiziere, on May 18, 2011 in Berlin Regarding the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr]” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, May 18, 2011), https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/110518_Rede_de_Maiziere.pdf?file=1.

Applying the framework of policy analysis as the sole driver of transformation,⁷³ this chapter examines the following the changes in the environment that led to the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr, from a perspective of foreign as well as domestic policies. On this basis, the organizational consequences for the Bundeswehr—with a special focus on reform fatigue—is discussed.

1. Multinationality—Security Identity or Excuse?

After the end of the Cold War the security situation in Europe had changed drastically for the better and then problems crowded in.⁷⁴ The bipolar world order, when based on nuclear deterrence, provided stability for the continent and the world as a whole, but that changed into a world of alternating multipolarity with new threats and new challenges.⁷⁵ The Merkel cabinet's 2006 White Paper "On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr" listed risks ranging from terrorism to proliferation and military buildup, regional conflicts, illegal arms trade, failed states, organized crime, migration, energy blackouts, epidemics and pandemics.⁷⁶

Germany, now surrounded by friends, needed to rethink its defense posture and adjust it to a new reality not only of relative peace in Europe itself, but of conflicts over the horizon affecting German and European security. The Federal Republic would no longer be the frontline in case of an attack on European NATO forces; that role now belonged to Poland and the Baltics. If it came down to defending the alliance, Germany therefore would need to send out robust, mobile deployment forces, capable of operating with national logistics and support over lines unknown in the Cold War. These troops

⁷³ As presented in Chapter II.A

⁷⁴ Martin van Creveld, *Die Zukunft Des Krieges [The Future of War]* (Hamburg: Murmann Verlag, 2004), 3.

⁷⁵ Jan-Philipp Weisswange, “Die Transformation der Bundeswehr [Transformation of the Bundeswehr],” in *Reform, Reorganisation, Transformation: Zum Wandel in Den Deutschen Streitkräften Von Den Preussischen Heeresreformen Bis Zur Transformation Der Bundeswehr*, ed. Karl-Heinz Lutz, Martin Rink, and Marcus von Salisch (Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2010), 431.

[illegible]

would have to resemble those already deployed in missions abroad—no longer a novelty for the Bundeswehr, which had begun military deployments in the 1990s amid a transformation of security building and anti-terror operations in the alliance and collective security. More than 60 years after the end of World War II, United Germany now openly acknowledged that “German security policy also has to take account of developments in geographically remote regions, insofar as they affect our interests.”⁷⁷

Issuing the new defense policy guidelines (a document subordinate to the White Paper) in 2011, which marked the official start for this reorientation, Germany self-assuredly stated that its “place in the world is characterized above all by our interests as a strong nation in the centre of Europe and by our international responsibility for peace and freedom. [...] As an active member of the international community, Germany pursues its interests and is actively striving for better and safer world.”⁷⁸ Thus, the paradigm shift from defending its own territory to becoming a defender of the liberal world via security building and counterterror deployments was now the officially declared reason of state.

In its comprehensive brochure titled “Reorientation of the Bundeswehr,” which served as a policy statement in adjunct to the aforementioned policy guidelines, the German Ministry of Defense stressed that “multinationality as part of the Bundeswehr’s security identity does not only imply the assumption of international responsibility, but also coordination with partners in terms of future capability development.”⁷⁹ Continuously stressing the need for coordination, pooling, sharing, smart defense, and collaboration among European partner nations in costly armament projects underlined that economic aspects were one of the key—if not decisive—motives of this reorientation while the period of peace in Europe was quietly running out.

⁷⁷ Federal Ministry of Defense, 21.

⁷⁸ Federal Ministry of Defense—The Minister, “Defence Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together,” 3, accessed May 12, 2018, <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/16136/0c1b6d8d0c0e6ba0aed5f0feb0af81d8/g-03-110527-vpr-engl-data.pdf>.

⁷⁹ Federal Ministry of Defense, “The Reorientation Of The Bundeswehr—Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together,” trans. Federal Office of Languages (Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, March 2013), 20.

Germany could count on the willingness of its neighbors to give preference to effectiveness instead of sovereignty, particularly with the debt crisis full in swing. The prospect of considerable savings in their military budgets made the European nations accept so-called multilateralism traps, that is, “being left alone in an operation because a partner withdraws its troops; not being able to engage in an operation, as a partner with important capabilities is not participating; and giving others, who do not make any contributions of their own to security, the opportunity to act as free rider.”⁸⁰

2. Pressure on the Home Front

After reunification, the demands on the German military were continually rising in the wider cosmos with the responsibilities of post-conflict security building and collective security. Yet despite the demands of collective defense after 11 September, the calls at home for harvesting a post-Cold War peace dividend did not stop. And while that discrepancy became increasingly obvious, in 2009 the new government in its 17th Bundestag legislative period ordered the German Minister of Defense to appoint a commission with the task to submit a proposal for a new organizational structure of the Bundeswehr—aimed to shrink and streamline the leadership and administrative structure in favor of boots on the ground.⁸¹ When the report of the so-called Weise-Commission⁸² was published in October 2010, the findings shook the Bundeswehr to its very foundations: it stated an obvious point that many had preferred to ignore, namely, that the German military was a systematically strained organization, suffering from a generic diffusion of responsibility, and incapable of being led, managed, and controlled in a

⁸⁰ Christian Mölling, “Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO. European Defence Needs Political Commitment Rather than Technocratic Solutions,” *SWP Comments*, no. 18 (June 2012): 3.

⁸¹ CDU, CSU, and FDP, “Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU Und FDP 17. Legislaturperiode [Growth, Education, Solidarity. Coalition Agreement between CDU, CSU, and FDP. 17th Legislative Period],” October 26, 2009, 124, http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Ministerium/koalitionsvertrag.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

⁸² Named after the head of the committee, Frank Jürgen Weise, chairman of the Federal Employment Agency and colonel of the reserve forces who was the new broom to enact what was touted as the most far reaching reform of the head and limbs of the Bundeswehr.

target-oriented manner.⁸³ The commission suggested boldly—among other things—to cut the number of posts in the Ministry of Defense in half, to reduce the force strength to no more than 180,000 soldiers (focused on deployment missions at great distance from home), and to suspend compulsory military service. Although in the German political spectrum it was widely agreed that the commission’s proposal went too far to become fully implemented in practice, then German Defense Minister Theo zu Guttenberg (CSU) decided to address the deficits of the Bundeswehr most widely based on the Weise-commission’s report.

In light of the European economic crisis, which emerged in 2010 in parallel to the endeavors of reorganizing the German armed forces, zu Guttenberg furthermore decided to contribute substantial savings at the expense of the military budget. That is, he intended to cut guns in favor of butter as had been the custom from the onset of unification in late 1989 onwards. As the German Finance Minister aimed to find \$102 billion in savings in the years 2011–2014 due to the Euro-crisis, the Defense Minister had to do his part by delivering \$10 billion in savings over the next four years.⁸⁴ Zu Guttenberg, allegedly planning to run for chancellor, accepted that task and promised to deliver the requested amount.

Nevertheless, the options for cutting the military budget were limited because “since the end of the Cold War the Bundeswehr has been in a process of almost constant reform.”⁸⁵ That is to say, a steady process of shrinking budget and force reductions led to a correspondingly shrinking focus on the classic role of armies and air forces in Europe. Defense Minister zu Guttenberg, a young and aspiring shooting star of the conservatives, believed he had found an alternative and shocked his party by openly questioning

⁸³ Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, “Bericht Der Strukturkommission Der Bundeswehr—Vom Einsatz Her Denken, Konzentration, Flexibilität, Effizienz [Report of the Structural Commission—Focus on Operations—Concentration, Flexibility, Efficiency].”

⁸⁴ Judy Dempsey, “A Mission to Modernize Germany’s Armed Forces,” *Atlantic Council* (blog), August 18, 2010, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/a-mission-to-modernize-germany-s-armed-forces>.

⁸⁵ Tom Dyson, “Condemned Forever to Becoming and Never to Being’? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism,” *German Politics* 20, no. 4 (2011): 545, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2011.606315>.

compulsory service. Not only did the Federal Ministry of Defense believe that this reform would allow at least for a part of the much-needed savings, but also zu Guttenberg had a keen instinct for public opinion.⁸⁶ The fairness of the draft in Germany has been questioned for decades, since on a percentage basis fewer young men were being drafted into military service. A rising number of lawsuits therefore sought a final decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the question of whether “conscription is still consistent with Germany’s Basic Law or whether it violates principles of equity by being a form of selective or fictitious conscription.”⁸⁷

The question of abolishing conscription was heavily disputed in the German party spectrum, the society, and even in the military itself. While the majority agreed that conscription helped to link the Bundeswehr to the democratic system, to provide a recruitment base for military professionals, and to strengthen strong civil-military regulations, they acknowledged the resulting inefficiency and incompatibility with operational needs. From 1970 to 2004 the duration of conscription was successively decreased from 18 months to nine at present, as depicted in Table 3.

Table 3. Duration of Military Service⁸⁸

	Military Service (in Months)
July 1962 – December 1972	18
January 1973 – September 1990	15
October 1990 – December 1995	12
January 1996 – June 2000	10
Since January 2002	9

⁸⁶ Dyson, 558.

⁸⁷ Gerhard Kümmel, “An All-Volunteer Force in Disguise—On the Transformation of the Armed Forces in Germany,” in *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*, ed. Curtis Gilroy and Cindy Williams (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 226.

⁸⁸ Adapted from Kümmel, 222.

With only a nine-month service commitment the cost-benefit ratio of training the young recruits was too low, since they could not be deployed in missions abroad or used in special roles that required high skills and additional education. Because the number of conscripts and the length of their service had been reduced so far, Kümmel, a Bundeswehr social scientist, argued that “at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Bundeswehr was, in fact, an all-volunteer force in disguise.”⁸⁹ Zu Guttenberg was aware of that and managed to calm his critics on all sides by using an astonishing argument: He recommended merely suspending conscription. Formally, this was not an outright abolition, although it was no secret that once conscription was suspended, it would be nearly impossible to reinstate.

After zu Guttenberg was forced to resign from office in 2011 due to accusations of plagiarism in his dissertation, Thomas de Maizière, the son of the former Chief of Defense and founder of the Bundeswehr, Ulrich de Maizière, took over as Minister of Defense and finalized the reorganization of the Bundeswehr on the basis of his predecessor’s work.

3. Reform Fatigue—the Curse of the Bundeswehr

We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. Presumably the plans for our employment were being changed.

I was to learn later in life that, perhaps because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.

During our reorganizations, several commanding officers were tried out on us, which added to the discontinuity.⁹⁰

This famous quote by Charlton Ogburn Jr.—often falsely attributed to Gaius Petronius (A.D. 27)—stands for the story of the Bundeswehr in respect to its unique transformation over the last quarter century. During little more than its 60 years of

⁸⁹ Kümmel, 229.

⁹⁰ Charlton Ogburn Jr, “Merrill’s Marauders: The Truth about an Incredible Adventure,” *Harper’s Magazine* 214, no. 1280 (January 1957): 32–33.

transform into the preceding structure (or structures) before starting to reorganize again, the Luftwaffe decided to refrain from designating a target date at all when it wanted air force structure six to be fully implemented.⁹⁴ In fairness, though, the air force did not differ from the army or the other services of the Bundeswehr in this regard.

With the latest big reform of the German forces, the so-called Transformation of the Bundeswehr which started in 2005, defense minister Peter Struck (SPD) and Chief of Staff Wolfgang Schneiderhan announced the final reform for the Bundeswehr: while in the past there were numerous reforms at random intervals, from now on—according to Schneiderhan—the armed forces would change into a status of permanent transformation in order to adjust to changes in the environment.⁹⁵ Aimed at enhancing the Bundeswehr's capabilities for missions abroad, the role of the chief of staff of the Bundeswehr was strengthened while the chiefs of the services were now directly responsible for the operational readiness of their forces.⁹⁶ Moreover, the troops became designated as rapid response forces, stabilization forces, as well as supporting forces in order to prepare them optimally for their respective mission.⁹⁷ The soldiers in the armed forces soon came to discover that this reform meant nothing different but prioritization in times of scarce resources. And prioritization might also be a synonym for a mere administration of deficiencies. Anyone not in the rapid response forces from now on used *transformation* as a swear word only.

⁹⁴ Kommando Luftwaffe, 183.

⁹⁵ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr [Basic Principles of the Conception of the Bundeswehr]" (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Arbeitsbereich Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, August 10, 2004), 14, http://www.rk-marine-kiel.de/files/bundeswehr/informationen/grundzuege_der_konzeption_der_bundeswehr_2004.pdf.

⁹⁶ Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Weisung Zur Inkraftsetzung Der Grundsätze Für Aufgabenzuordnung, Organisation Und Verfahren Im Bereich Der Militärischen Spitzengliederung (Berliner Erlass)." (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, January 21, 2005), 1–2, <https://www.bmvg.de/de/ministerium/geschichte-des-verteidigungsministeriums/erlasse-zur-spitzengliederung>.

⁹⁷ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr [Basic Principles of the Conception of the Bundeswehr]," 25–27.

Soldiers in the Bundeswehr, however, were not only suffering from their military reforms. On top of it all they also had to adapt to reforms of government and society as does each German citizen. These measures ranged from currency reform to spelling reform, educational reform, reform of federalism, health care reform, and social reform. On important issues—tax and pension reforms—Germans, whether in the military or not, were still waiting. It was exactly in that traumatizing situation of reform-fatigue, that defense minister Thomas de Maizière announced the next big reform by saying that the “reorientation far exceeds the scope of any reforms that have taken place in earlier years.”⁹⁸

B. REORIENTATION AS *THE* MAJOR STRUCTURAL REFORM

Since unity in 1990, countless officially ordered reports have stressed the need for reforming the German armed forces: aside from the role of the military in national unity itself in 1990–1995, the most prominent focal points are detailed in the report of the commission for the future of the Bundeswehr⁹⁹ from 2000 and the report of the Bundeswehr structure commission¹⁰⁰ from 2010. The former was written in the wake of national unity and the 1999 NATO strategic concept with its emphasis on post-conflict security, while the 2010 report was an expression of the impact of the September 11 paradigm shift as well as 2008 world depression and the stresses and strains of the Afghan International Security Assistance Force mission as these manifested themselves after 2009. While the 2000 report from the so-called Weizsäcker Commission (led by the former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker) put a clear emphasis on burden

⁹⁸ Federal Ministry of Defense, “The Reorientation of the Bundeswehr—Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together,” 4.

⁹⁹ Kommission, “Gemeinsame Sicherheit Und Zukunft Der Bundeswehr—Bericht Der Kommission an Die Bundesregierung [Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr—Report of the Commission to the Federal Government].”

¹⁰⁰ Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, “Bericht Der Strukturkommission Der Bundeswehr - Vom Einsatz Her Denken, Konzentration, Flexibilität, Effizienz [Report of the Structural Commission - Focus on Operations - Concentration, Flexibility, Efficiency].”

sharing and strengthening collective defense by adhering to conscription, the 2010 report from the so-called Weise Commission (led by the Frank-Jürgen Weise, reservist and chief executive officer of the German employment agency) focused on efficiency, as well as lean- and process management, and proposed suspending conscription. The first reform had a solid military character, not the least because von Weizsäcker as an ex-soldier had an ongoing interest in and sympathy for the spirit of the Bundeswehr as a whole.

The second reform, possessed by the spirit of globalized managerial science in turbo capitalism, was a measure of austerity and efficiency that unfolded as the epoch of peace in Europe was stumbling to an end. The propositions of the Weise Commission were implemented at least to some degree and laid the foundation for one of the most extensive reforms of the Bundeswehr—the so-called Reorientation of the Bundeswehr in 2010.

1. Philosophy and Approaches to Modernization

In the light of the European sovereign debt crisis, the reform approach of the reorientation—started by zu Guttenberg, and continued and implemented by his successor de Maizièrre—unsurprisingly followed a strictly economic logic.¹⁰¹ When Defense Minister de Maizièrre gave the starting signal of his new reform by issuing new defense policy guidelines¹⁰² and holding a speech in Berlin on May 18, 2011, in Berlin, he referred, as so often happens, to Clausewitz in his very first sentence after his salutary address: He pointed out that according to Clausewitz it is advisable to use only those resources and to set only those goals that are needed to achieve the desired political

¹⁰¹ Hesse, *Die Neuausrichtung Der Bundeswehr [The Reorientation of the Bundeswehr]*, 24.

¹⁰² Federal Ministry of Defense – The Minister, “Defence Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together.”

purpose.¹⁰³ Taking a page from programming, planning, and budgeting in its classical form circa 1961, De Maizière argued that the expenditures for personnel were too high with the operating costs too low at the same time. Listening to his speech it was reasonable to doubt that it was a Federal Minister of Defense speaking and not the chief executive officer of a global corporation of the 21st century model. The rationale for the reorientation was clearly derived from fiscal efficiency instead of security policy and strategy in the classical sense.

To cut costs to the desired level, the key element of the reorientation was to transform the Bundeswehr to a much smaller, even more capable military force with its “defence expenditure in keeping with the mission of the Bundeswehr, and a sustainable financial base.”¹⁰⁴ With compulsory military service suspended, every single entity of the Bundeswehr needed to be redesigned to this efficiency on the deployment model. Moreover, de Maizière aimed at “merging functional and organizational expertise on all levels and strengthening mixed civilian-military structures.”¹⁰⁵ Such a move constituted a revolution in the brains of the Bundeswehr and took a meat axe to honored structures of Bonn and Berlin that had a tradition quite their own.

Nonetheless, one would do the reorientation an injustice to characterize it as a cost-cutting program only. In addition to introducing organizational and structural adjustments it was also meant to modernize the cumbersome Bundeswehr and, once again, to implement professional management methods. From one day to another, the soldiers and civilians in the military had to face the implementation of new public management, strategic controlling, management by objectives, process management,

¹⁰³ de Maiziere, “Rede Des Bundesministers Der Verteidigung, Dr. Thomas de Maiziere, Am 18. Mai 2011 in Berlin Zur Neuausrichtung Der Bundeswehr [Speech of Defence Minister, Dr. Thomas de Maiziere, on May 18, 2011 in Berlin Regarding the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr],” 1.

¹⁰⁴ Federal Ministry of Defense, “The Reorientation Of The Bundeswehr - Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together,” 16.

¹⁰⁵ Federal Ministry of Defense, 16.

change management, results-oriented control, cost performance accounting, and continuous improvement programs, to name but a few moments in this whirlwind.¹⁰⁶ The information technology (IT) infrastructure of the Bundeswehr was to be harmonized, administrative workflows optimized, and all provisions and doctrines digitized. In other words, the reorientation availed itself of the treasured “disruption” that in Silicon Valley and elsewhere is held up as the cardinal good of management and corporate public relations, but its impact on an army and its brains, especially on the cusp of another change in the foundations of European security, was something else yet again.

2. Structure, Organization, and Stationing

In 2011, de Maizière announced the *Reorientation* of the Bundeswehr, by—among other things—cutting the strength from 250,000 to 185,000 military personnel, with as many as 170,000 career soldiers and up to 15,000 volunteers.¹⁰⁷ The German compulsory military service was suspended, a new voluntary service was created, and the army reserve concept was revised. The Federal Ministry of Defense was reorganized into nine directorates-general and cut by one third, and the service chiefs of staff were relocated outside the ministry.¹⁰⁸ It was also decided that from now on the chief of defense would be a part of the executive group of the Federal Ministry of Defense and have command responsibility over all soldiers of the Bundeswehr.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, he was assigned to the directorates-general for planning, forces policy, and strategy and operation as depicted in Figure 1.


¹⁰⁶ Gregor Richter, *Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr: Beiträge zur Professionellen Führung und Steuerung [Reorientation of the Bundeswehr: Contributions to Professional Management and Governance]* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), 13–24.

¹⁰⁷ Federal Ministry of Defense, “The Reorientation of The Bundeswehr - Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together,” 16.

¹⁰⁸ Federal Ministry of Defense, 16.

¹⁰⁹ Bundesminister der Verteidigung, “Grundsätze Für Die Spitzengliederung, Und Führungsorganisation Im Bundesministerium Der Verteidigung Und Der Bundeswehr (Dresdner Erlass) [Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and Command and Control Organisation in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr (Dresden Decree)],” 1–3.

Figure 1. Command and Control Structure of the Federal Ministry of Defense¹¹⁰



While the five military major organizational elements Air force, Army, Navy, Joint Medical Service, and Joint Support Service were retained, defense procurement, information technology, and defense planning capabilities each became pooled. This meant tough cuts especially to the traditional military services of the air force, navy, and army: From now on a centralized Bundeswehr Planning Office would be in charge of further technological and doctrine development, and the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support would take over responsibility for the material responsibility of all major weapon systems—at least for all those weapons that were kept in service. The reorientation made no exception to materiel when it came to identify potential for savings. In the case for the army, fatefully enough, this measure implied cutting the number of main battle tanks down to 225 Leopard 2, as

¹¹⁰ Federal Ministry of Defense, “The Reorientation of The Bundeswehr - Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together,” 27.

depicted in Figure 2. The most symbolic weapon system of the army, the core of its identity, a mythos of German engineering, an export hit and backbone of national defense, had been reduced to a homoeopathic dosage. Meanwhile, one has to speculate that curious eyes in the Kremlin must have peered over the horizon as German disarmament coincided with the steady eclipse of U.S. Army ground strength in NATO Europe. From over 3,000 main battle tanks during the Cold War, the German Army was reduced to just a fraction of that in under 25 years. The other services and their major equipment did not fare better. This small(er) numbers of weapon systems was attributed to the fact that de Maizière and his planners—although looking to save every single Euro—were not yet willing to give up any of the Bundeswehr’s existing capabilities. The newly coined mantra was *Breite vor Tiefe* [width over depth] or, in other words, a little bit of everything.

Figure 2. Major Equipment of the Army after Reorientation¹¹¹

	Quantity
 LEOPARD 2 main battle tank	225
 PUMA infantry fighting vehicle	342
 BOXER multirole armoured vehicle	190
 FUCHS armoured transport vehicle	728
 FENNEK reconnaissance vehicle	212
 Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzer	89
 MARS rocket firing system	38
 NH-90 utility helicopter	80
 TIGER support helicopter	40

¹¹¹ Federal Ministry of Defense, 44.


The chiefs of staff of the military services, having been eliminated from the Federal Ministry of Defense and deprived of long-held powers and many of their prestigious weapon systems, were now kept under tight reins by suffocating technocratic management techniques: They were the obvious losers of the new reform.

Along with the organizational and structural adjustments, the stationing of the Bundeswehr needed to be evaluated and synchronized with the cutback of troops and command structures. Officially, the new stationing concept for the Bundeswehr was “based on the principles of functionality, cost-effectiveness, attractiveness and a broad presence throughout Germany.”¹¹² This mouthful could not negate or neutralize the intensely political and freighted nature of military basing, organization custom, and domestic politics. In the course of the reorientation the real assets of the Bundeswehr were transferred to the federal agency for real estate tasks under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Finance. In line with the global capitalist trend of outsourcing and the just-in-time logistics and infrastructure, the Bundeswehr became a tenant in its own former properties. Conflicting interests from various quarters therefore influenced the highly delicate process of adjusting the stationing of the Bundeswehr. As was no surprise, pacifist politicians in rural and structurally weak regions rediscovered their love for the Bundeswehr while those in financially strong areas coveted Bundeswehr real estate, which they could convert into commercial, industrial, or residential zones.

The new stationing concept of de Maizière’s reform led to a reduction from 394 to 264 Bundeswehr bases and facilities in Germany. While the German society appreciated the Bundeswehr’s efforts to contribute to the state budget in difficult times, the consequences of closing infrastructure affected entire areas, reduced the footprint of the Bundeswehr in certain regions and thus, fatefully enough, its connection to the civil society. For some of the economically weaker federal states, as for example Schleswig-Holstein or Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, this policy meant harsh cuts (Figure 3).

¹¹² Federal Ministry of Defense, 16.

Figure 3. Stationing Density throughout Germany



Number of billets per 1,000 of population

C. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE REORIENTATION

So far, only one book has been written and recently published about the reorientation of the Bundeswehr: In *Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr: Ansatz, Umsetzung und Ergebnisse im Nationalen und Internationalen Vergleich*.¹¹³ The author, Joachim Jens Hesse, portrays the reorientation as the most remarkable, significant, and successful approach to reform in German history, leading to a reduction in costs and personnel while enhancing efficiency and effectiveness at the same time.¹¹⁴ Following Hesse's argument, it remains a mystery why the core changes from the reorientation now had to be revoked for the most part and at substantial costs.

¹¹³ Hesse, *Die Neuausrichtung Der Bundeswehr [The Reorientation of the Bundeswehr]*.

¹¹⁴ Hesse, 211–15.

Looking back in history, it seems difficult to understand how a highly complex reorganization and extensive downsizing of personnel, which relied on drastic cutbacks in the number of armed forces and the replacement of compulsory with voluntary military service, was meant to generate \$10 billion in the first four years of its implementation. It is not necessary to have a background in business administration to understand that seed funding is necessary for medium- or long-term savings from major transformation operations. Moreover, to get the expected return on an organizational change, one has to make an investment first, as “planned change to improve organizational performance requires resources.”¹¹⁵

De Maizière soon had to realize that his predecessor’s promised savings of \$10 billion over four years were beyond reach. However, being a skillful negotiator, he managed to get a one-year reprieve from the Federal Finance Minister, whose power over the budget is unlike U.S. practice, as well as the promise, that the costs of the Afghanistan-mission (after all more than \$1 billion per year) would be financed from the defense budget.¹¹⁶ In summary, this step meant that the primary goal of the reorientation, to contribute \$10 billion to the federal budget, had not even been halfway realized. The collateral damage, however, was caused in full since “major structural reorganization takes several years to shake down. In their first year or two, new departments are likely to be less efficient, not more; to display lower morale; not higher; to afford greater opportunities, not smaller, for error, confusion, and scandal.”¹¹⁷

The Bundeswehr’s reform fatigue at the beginning of the reorientation intensified the negative side effects of perpetual change. Two independent surveys commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Defence and the *Deutscher Bundeswehrverband* (Armed Forces Labor Association) revealed surprisingly similar results. The vast majority of

¹¹⁵ Heffron, *Organization Theory & Public Organizations*, 178.

¹¹⁶ Steffen Hebestreit, “Bundeswehrreform: Neue Marschrichtung (Reform of the Bundeswehr: New Direction of March),” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, accessed May 2, 2018, <http://www.fr.de/politik/bundeswehrreform-neue-marschrichtung-a-918462>.

¹¹⁷ Peter Szanton, “So You Want To Reorganize the Government?,” in *Federal Reorganization: What Have We Learned*, ed. Peter Szanton (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1981), 19.

respondents, all soldiers of the Bundeswehr, considered the reform to have failed miserably.¹¹⁸ They felt poorly informed, overwhelmed with additional workload, demotivated, and insufficiently involved. With the suspension of compulsory military service, the Bundeswehr now had to rely on word-of-mouth advertising to recruit new personnel, and the recruitment problems had become more intense.

Surprisingly the up to 15,000 volunteers did not provide relief to the strained personnel situation since it was often not possible to employ them for demanding tasks. In fact, the idea failed because there was simply no way to predict whether a volunteer would be available at the exact time a single soldier was needed. As a consequence, many jobs that have been staffed by conscripts before, as for instance a helmsman on a navy ship, now had to be done by non-commissioned officers. This bottleneck once again contributed to a worsening personnel situation. Harald Kujat, former chief of defense, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and favorite talk show General a.D. therefore spoke of the smallest army with the lowest morale in the history of the Bundeswehr.¹¹⁹

Severe reductions in equipment, major weapon systems, spare parts, and consumable items also impacted the morale of the troops as well as their level of training. Such items were transformed by austerity and force reductions into precious items; the few available operational tanks, rifles, night vision goggles, or protective vests now needed to circulate between different units when those units went either on a mission abroad or a military training area. “Dynamic availability management” was the euphemism that was created for this ignominious procedure that soon became noticeable in civil military relations and in alliance burden sharing.

¹¹⁸ Dan Krause, “Reforming the Reform? The Growing Criticism of the Bundeswehr Realignment,” *RUSI Newsbrief* 32, no. 6 (November 2012): 9–10.

¹¹⁹ Simon Kaminski, “Militärexperte: ‘So geht es nicht weiter mit der Bundeswehr’ [Military Expert: ‘It cannot go on like this with the Bundeswehr’],” *Augsburger Allgemeine*, January 24, 2018, 3, <https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/Militaerexperte-So-geht-es-nicht-weiter-mit-der-Bundeswehr-id43952536.html>.

The new stationing concept of the Bundeswehr added additional hardships to the soldiers and their families. Not only did they have to help transform their respective military entity to new standards, into new structures, and to new courses of procedure, but the majority also had to relocate to new units and thus to new homes in a country where such perpetual relocation is frowned upon. Although the reorientation only cut down the number of soldiers by roughly one third, literally everyone in the Bundeswehr was affected. A look at the plan for the implementation of the air force structure reveals the reason for this unexpected outcome: Every single organizational element of the air force was affected by the reform and had to relocate, disband, change its subordination, reorganize, or even change affiliation of service.¹²⁰

In the new post-Reorientation era a variety of modern management methods competed for supremacy. As Minister de Maizière had structured the new Bundeswehr along technical responsibility and functional competence instead of old-fashioned unity of command hierarchy, ordinary soldiers and superiors often found it difficult to maintain an overview of the command and control organization. Was it the process manager, the technical competency expert, or the good old-fashioned military superior in the higher echelon to whom one turned to with a specific problem? With process management as an organizational second layer over the hierarchic command structure and a virtual matrix organization of functional responsibilities on top, the confusion was made perfect. Additionally, the organizational adjustments between the military services were not synchronized. While the air force disbanded its Force Training Command, which it had considered dispensable, the army created a new Army Force Training Command for itself. Moreover, as the only service in the Bundeswehr, the army created a new Office of Army Development with more than 600 soldiers, predominantly officers. The German Navy now performs the same tasks with only a hand full of officers out of its regular command structure.

¹²⁰ Deutsche Luftwaffe - Inspekteur, "Realisierungsplan Für Die Einnahme Der Luftwaffenstruktur [Plan For the Implementation of the Air Force Structure]" (Deutsche Luftwaffe, June 12, 2012), http://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Realisierungsplanung_Luftwaffe.pdf.

De Maizière was right: his reform was the most ambitious and radical one in the history of the Bundeswehr. It led to overstressed personnel and material, and the level of stress gradually increased until it could no longer be overlooked. The Bundeswehr soon found itself confronting an increasing gap between demands on the one side, and resources available on the other. Since the coalition treaty of the new government of the 18th legislative period clearly forbade a reorientation of the *Reorientation* of the Bundeswehr by committing to adhere to the decisions only just made, the need for an external trigger became obvious. The hopes of politicians with special expertise in military and high-ranking officers rested now on NATO.

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IV. GERMANY'S MILITARY TURNAROUND

The world of 2016 is unsettled. We in Germany and Europe are seeing and feeling the impact of a lack of freedom and of crises and conflicts. We are experiencing that peace and stability are not a matter of course even in Europe. In this changed security situation, the task of the Federal Government is to redefine our country's security policy interests, priorities and objectives and to develop its toolbox responsibly.¹²¹

—Berlin, July 13, 2016, Dr. Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor

In the years since 1990, the reunited Germany never has grown tired of saying that it felt “surrounded by friends.” So what could force a (now) reputedly pacifist nation like Germany to change its foreign and security policies so significantly? Why did it send out such a remarkable signal to its allies, its people, but most especially to its possible adversaries? Why exactly did Germany choose to rethink its role in the defense and security environment?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand Germany's rationale for initiating a military expansion at this exact instant despite its domestic limitations, and the role that NATO played must also be considered. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the two NATO summits in Wales 2014 and Warsaw 2016, which set the stage for Germany's new military expansion. Although the field of NATO allies tends to be well-researched in general, this specific question has not been investigated yet in any detail because of its topicality and the classification period of most of its underlying documents. Thus, the following analysis relies mainly on the primary resources publicly available as well as on the contemporary perceptions of its matter in scholarly research and media coverage.

¹²¹ Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, trans. Federal Office of Languages (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, June 2016), 6.

Based on the critical appraisal of the reorientation, the Bundeswehr's latest reform, this chapter analyzes the reasons for and events that have led to a turning point in recent history. Furthermore, the chapter discussion addresses the question of whether the German military expansion is truly intended to achieve NATO goals with the required new capabilities. Of particular concern here are the questions: what made Germany reorient itself from being a "bridge between Europe and Russia" to national and collective defense against Russia, now clearly a potential adversary, and thereby substantially reshaping its defense and security policy? Which developments contributed to this reorientation of Germany?

A. RATIONALE AND FORCES FOR A HIDDEN REFORM

From a German perspective, the contemporary European security architecture thus far has been defined by two pivotal points in European history: The first was the aftermath of World War II, with Germany divided under allied occupation "to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world."¹²² The second, marked by the end of the Cold War, was the consequent reunification of Germany, which regained its sovereignty and finally pursued its rightful peace dividend.

The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany¹²³ has shaped post-Cold War Europe. Germany, with its location in the center of Europe, liked to see itself as a bridge between the West and the East, particularly Russia. It is arguable, however, that the Ukraine crisis (along with the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the Russian-puppeteered insurgency in eastern Ukraine) had led to a fundamental realignment of German security policy, especially with respect to Russia.

This realignment not only put an end to the period of German military personnel restrictions and the expectation of a peace dividend, but also concluded the German self-

¹²² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Occupation Forces (JCS 1067) (April 1945)," in *United States Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents*, 2.

¹²³ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany*.

imposed restrictions regarding military commitments and willingness to finally accept greater responsibility in an out-of-joint world.

1. A World Out of Joint

Looking at the various European and German white papers, doctrines, and reports dealing with defense and security policy that were issued after the end of the Cold War, one cannot escape the impression that the security situation has changed drastically in recent years, showing a downward trend into chaos. Political and military leaders across these publications are competing in the prefaces to bemoan the constantly deteriorating security situation and to call for a stronger commitment to and acceptance of responsibility. The wide range of crises that must be addressed pertains to interstate conflicts on territory, fragile states, poor governance, climate change, proliferation, migration movements, epidemics and pandemics, the fight against transnational terrorism, natural or man-made disasters, unconventional and hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks, civil wars, and religious conflicts—just to mention a few.

In line with the fundamentally pacifistic attitude or skepticism about military affairs of the German society under which the German military has been operating since its foundation, one cannot deny the Bundeswehr's contribution to peace and stability in its various so called out-of-area missions. Since the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr has taken part in more than 20 constitutionally or parliamentary mandated major operations and a variety of smaller supporting missions with more than 10,000 soldiers on missions abroad at its peak in 2002.¹²⁴

With a Bundeswehr not even half as big as allowed by the German Treaty, the huge gap between the demands on Germany's armed forces and the resources available became obvious even for the uninterested public. While German society according to former Federal President Horst Köhler used to meet the Bundeswehr with "friendly

¹²⁴ Bundeswehr, "Abgeschlossene Einsätze Und Hilfeleistungen [Accomplished Missions and Assistances]," Bundeswehr.de, April 5, 2017, http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/start/abgeschlossene_einsaetze.

disinterest,”¹²⁵ the situation changed after the beginning of the Russian aggression in Ukraine beginning in the end of 2013. German society found itself split on the question of what to think of Russia, Putin, and the armed forces and more behind him.

2. The German “Special Relationship” with Russia

German-Russian relations date back more than 1,000 years, to a time when there were no “Russians” and “Germans” but merchants from East Francia and the Kievan Rus who established first ties by trading goods to their mutual benefit. Since then, Germany and Russia have shared a common history, ranging from cooperation to confrontation. The 1242 Battle on the Ice, when Prince Alexander Nevsky defeated the Teutonic Knights at the Estonian Lake Peipus, shaped German-Russian relations as did the import of German culture initiated by Tsar Peter the Great in the 17th century. Walter Laquer acknowledges the entanglement of both nations, stating that “culturally, the two nations were for many years nearer to each other than to any other country.”¹²⁶

The following section discusses the German “special relationship” to Russia, from the beginning of the Cold War, to West Germany’s Ostpolitik and finally to post-Cold War era, with Germany becoming a bridge between Europe and Russia. It describes a world out of joint, with Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the Russian-puppeteered insurgency in eastern Ukraine, leading to a fundamental paradigm shift in German foreign policy. The tragedy of the failure of Germany’s policy of détente is evaluated, and the consequences of a German policy change are addressed.

¹²⁵ Horst Köhler, “Einsatz Für Freiheit Und Sicherheit - Rede von Bundespräsident Horst Köhler Bei Der Kommandeurtagung Der Bundeswehr Am 10. Oktober 2005 in Bonn. [Dedication for Freedom and Security. Speech of Federal President Horst Köhler at the Commander’s Conference in Bonn, October 10, 2005]” (Bundespräsidialamt, October 10, 2005), 6, http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Horst-Koehler/Reden/2005/10/20051010_Rede_Anlage.pdf;jsessionid=B89D529A090D87FD92FC4C865ADF7785.1_cid387?__blob=publicationFile&v=2

¹²⁶ Walter Laqueur, *Russia and Germany : A Century of Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990), 317.

a. *The Imprint of the Cold War*

Memories of the mutual cruelties of German and Russian soldiers in World War II left deep scars on both sides.¹²⁷ However, it was not only that burden of the past that shaped the Cold War relations between Germany and Russia, but even more the inability of the victors to establish a stable peace in Europe. Because Germany was divided in two under allied occupation following the war, Russian relations with the Germans had to reproduce that dichotomy. While West Germans were portrayed as Nazis, the East Germans in the eyes of the Soviets, were the “good Germans” who welcomed the Soviet occupation troops as their liberators and benefactors.¹²⁸

Persistent underlying fears of Germany that were a legacy of the war spurred the Soviet Union to go to great lengths to keep that memory alive through propaganda.¹²⁹ Since the FRG’s stated aim was to overcome the situation of a divided Germany, Stalin felt threatened by a German revanchism and therefore was eager to contain the situation by maintaining the status quo.¹³⁰ Roland Smith mentions that “You look after your Germans and we’ll look after ours”¹³¹ was a famous remark Western journalists liked to put into Soviet mouths. It was the Soviet version of the Alliance’s purpose “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.”¹³²

With the two blocs formed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both heavily armed with nuclear and conventional weaponry, Germans on both sides realized that their home country would be the battleground of a potential third World War. Moreover, there would be German soldiers on both the opposing sides. Acknowledging that fact, the two Germanies competed with each other on the field of economics and quality of life, rather than provoking military action. While the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan helped to turn

¹²⁷ Angela Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn : Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9.

¹²⁸ Stent, 9.

¹²⁹ Roland Smith, *Soviet Policy Towards West Germany* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), 8–9.

¹³⁰ Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn : Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe*, 6–12.

¹³¹ Smith, *Soviet Policy Towards West Germany*, 11.

¹³² Reported remark by Lord “Pug” Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary-General.

West Germany into an economic miracle, East Germany was transformed into a loyal, dependent Soviet satellite state whose—mediocre at best—economy had to support the Soviet Union.¹³³

With the escalation of the Cold War sparking a series of crises (Suez Crisis, 1956; Berlin Crisis, 1961; Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962; Prague Spring, 1968) Germans on both sides of the wall had nearly given up their hope to ever see a change in this gridlocked situation.

b. German Ostpolitik—Change through Rapprochement

In 1970, at the height of its power and with the Brezhnev Doctrine¹³⁴ being in place, the Soviet Union felt militarily equal to the United States, bursting with self-confidence and eager to embark on a variety of Third World adventures.¹³⁵ With the Soviet satellites under control, Moscow felt ready to adjust its *Westpolitik* while still being the undisputed hegemon in Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, as Angela Stent points out, “the impetus for Soviet-West German détente came from Willy Brandt, the first postwar West German chancellor who was willing to recognize the European status quo.”¹³⁶ As a necessary prerequisite Brandt had to convince Germany’s allies that it would be in their best interest to let him adopt this new course and that this would not affect the German loyalty to the West in any way.¹³⁷ He aimed for a normalization between the two German states without fully recognizing the GDR politically, thereby improving the situation on both sides of the wall. On the other side, the Soviets “hoped that West Germany would finally cease to be a revisionist

¹³³ Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn : Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe*, 13–14.

¹³⁴ The Brezhnev Doctrine was announced November 12, 1968, to retroactively justify the intervention of Soviet troops in the Prague Spring and to prevent similar incidents in the future. According to the doctrine the Soviet Union reserved the exclusive right to decide to intervene in any case of the Eastern Bloc's cohesion being compromised, thereby explicitly limiting the independence of the socialist satellite states.

¹³⁵ Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn : Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe*, 19.

¹³⁶ Stent, 19.

¹³⁷ Helga Haftendorn, *Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 189.

power, and hence would ratify the European status quo, thereby legitimizing their hegemony over Eastern Europe,”¹³⁸ as Stent puts it.

Brandt’s *Wandel durch Annäherung* (change through rapprochement) paved the ground to the Renunciation of Force Treaty between the Soviet Union and West Germany, which was signed on August 12, 1970.¹³⁹ Both states agreed “to respect unconditionally the territorial integrity of all countries in Europe within their present borders” and “to refrain from threat or use of force.”¹⁴⁰ Appended to the treaty was a letter from the German chancellor declaring that “this treaty does not stand in contradiction to the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work toward a state of peace in Europe, in which the German people regain their unity in free self-determination.”¹⁴¹

With the recognition of the status quo, détente and Ostpolitik broadened the spectrum of foreign policy options on both sides. The Soviets established commercial relations with West Germany, trading national resources against industrial technology.¹⁴² With the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE – later OSCE) in 1973 tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be reduced. Therefore, Stent argues “the rise and decline of détente with West Germany created the framework that determined how unification was achieved.”¹⁴³

c. *Postwar Germany as a Bridge between Europe and Russia*

The German reunification, based on the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany,¹⁴⁴ propelled Mikhail Gorbachev to near hero status among German

¹³⁸ Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn : Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe*, 20.

¹³⁹ Stent, 21.

¹⁴⁰ Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany, *Der Vertrag Vom 12. August 1970* [The Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970] (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic, 1970), http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=919.

¹⁴¹ Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany.

¹⁴² Haftendorn, *Coming of Age*, 218.

¹⁴³ Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn : Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe*, 19.

¹⁴⁴ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany*.

people, although it was clearly not his intention in the first place to allow an end to the two-state solution.

In the light of its historical obligation, Germany's self-perception today would be the one of a *Zivilmacht* using soft power as its most cherished tool of foreign policy. In the words of the German Federal Foreign Office, *Annäherung durch Verflechtung* ("rapprochement through economic interlocking")¹⁴⁵ was the new motto for engaging Russia after reunification.¹⁴⁶

Not everyone in Europe felt that comfortable with a reunited Germany. From a Polish perspective, Janusz Stefanowicz argues, "there is an indisputable correlation between the centuries-long division of Europe and the cooperative or rival, benign or malignant, mastery of Germany and Russia in Central Europe, if only they are strong enough to exert their power."¹⁴⁷ Or, as *The Economist* puts it, "When Germany and Russia warm each other, other states start to shiver."¹⁴⁸ Stefanowicz observes and is alarmed by a German deeply rooted *Drang nach Osten* (urge to the east) and the establishment of a special relationship with Russia.¹⁴⁹

On the contrary, more and more Germans consider Germany to be a post-heroic (pacifist) society, committed to values beyond the use of violence and military force.¹⁵⁰ Stressing the old and close relationship to Russia, German commercial, cultural, and political sectors argue in favor of a beneficial strategic partnership with Russia.¹⁵¹ An often observed fraternity among German and Russian political key figures like Helmut Kohl and Boris Yeltsin or Gerhard Schröder and Vladimir Putin underlines the political

¹⁴⁵ An alteration of the legendary motto "change through rapprochement" of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

¹⁴⁶ Constanze Stelzenmüller, "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 2 (2009): 94.

¹⁴⁷ Janusz Stefanowicz, "Central Europe between Germany and Russia," *Security Dialogue* 26, no. 1 (1995): 56, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010695026001006>.

¹⁴⁸ "Europe: Encounter at Stavrapallo," *Economist* 316, no. 7664 (1990): 47.

¹⁴⁹ Stefanowicz, "Central Europe between Germany and Russia," 57.

¹⁵⁰ Münkler, "Heroische Und Postheroische Gesellschaften [Heroic and Post-Heroic Societies]."

¹⁵¹ Steve Wood, "Germany, Russia, Europe: Multilevel Politics and the Divergent Resonance of 'History,'" *International Journal* 72, no. 3 (2017): 341, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017723668>.

elite's attempt to mutually influence favorable policy outcomes.¹⁵² Schröder, for example, who calls Putin a “flawless democrat,” has negotiated the construction of a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea (and became chairman of the supervisory board of the Russian Rosneft oil company in 2017). Chancellor Merkel, Schröder's successor, although not known to be a “bear-hugger” (Russian sympathizer) resisted any attempt from east European countries to revoke her predecessor's decision.¹⁵³ In an interview with the *Wall Street Journal* in 2007 she clearly stated that “the fact remains that we won't be able to manage without Russian gas and oil in Europe, and we don't want to either.”¹⁵⁴ Germany, which by that point had become Russia's largest partner in trade, often called for patience when Russia offended European countries and institutions or started saber-rattling.

Horst Teltschik, former head of the Munich Security Conference, comments that “Putin will not be President forever. In Russia there are also many that think differently, even within his circle, who at this moment are silent because they see no chance to be heard. But that can change; the world does not remain still.”¹⁵⁵

3. Conflict in Crimea—a Pivotal Point in German Foreign and Security Policy

In her 1999 book *Russia And Germany Reborn*, Stent stated that after the reunification of Germany, it would be Russia shaping European history in the next century.¹⁵⁶ She predicted that Russia “will be a constant concern to its neighbors because of its potentially lethal combination of political instability ... and difficulties in adjusting to the loss of empire.”¹⁵⁷ Unfortunately, she ended up being right.

¹⁵² Wood, 338–41.

¹⁵³ Stelzenmüller, “Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe,” 96.

¹⁵⁴ Marcus Walker, “Merkel Energizes Western Links to Russia,” *Wall Street Journal*, 2007, A.3.

¹⁵⁵ Horst Teltschik, “Türen nie zuschlagen [Never Slam Doors],” *Die Politische Meinung* 528 (2014):24–29, quoted in Wood, “Germany, Russia, Europe: Multilevel Politics and the Divergent Resonance of ‘History,’” 348.

¹⁵⁶ Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn : Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe*, ix.

¹⁵⁷ Stent, ix.

When in 2008 troops of Russia and the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia openly engaged with Georgian forces, accusing Georgia of being the aggressor, many German policy makers avoided a clear assignment of blame and called for maintaining the dialogue with Russia instead.¹⁵⁸ This reticence changed as Russian forces continued their advancement into the Georgian heartlands. The Office of the Federal Chancellor unaccustomedly stated that this marked a caesura in Russian-German relations.¹⁵⁹ Nevertheless, in times of crises like these, Germans still preferred to speak with their Russian counterparts to find a solution that would not harm their hard-earned accomplishments.¹⁶⁰ While the Russo-Georgian war—the first European war in the 21st century—was perceived as a defining moment by most of Germany’s allies, it merely downgraded the German-Russian partnership from a strategic one to a “modernization partnership.”¹⁶¹ Chancellor Merkel, unwilling to offend Russia, rejected all calls for imposing sanctions on Russia.

Germany’s attitude toward Russia fundamentally changed when, in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests in Kiev and the collapse of Viktor Yanukovich’s administration, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and turned the Eastern Ukraine into a twilight battlefield. Using soldiers without insignias and an unconstitutional referendum, Russia not only created an area of permanent crisis but also a new and simultaneously old campaign to wage war; nowadays this is often referred to as hybrid warfare, but it is plainly revanchism via military desperados. Russia’s geopolitical moves clearly indicated that it has not yet arrived in the 21st century.¹⁶² Its thinking in spheres of influence, creating a ring of fire around its borders, turned out to be fundamentally incompatible with the European approach to modern security policy.

¹⁵⁸ Stelzenmüller, “Germany’s Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe,” 94.

¹⁵⁹ Stelzenmüller, 94.

¹⁶⁰ Wood, “Germany, Russia, Europe: Multilevel Politics and the Divergent Resonance of ‘History,’” 346.

¹⁶¹ Stelzenmüller, “Germany’s Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe,” 96.

¹⁶² Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, eds., *Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 30.

Russia's aggression in the Ukraine has to be considered as a rejection of the whole post-Cold War security order that it helped to create and defend in the past.¹⁶³ That order was no longer satisfactory to a revanchist Russia, but it was also a manifestation of the Russian addiction to self-justification out a sense of inferiority to the West that has deep roots in an unhappy past.¹⁶⁴ Taking a page from the diplomacy of the epoch after the Russo-Turkish war, where Petersburg felt slighted in the 1880s by Bismarck's Berlin, Russia seemed to have decided that since the West supposedly refused to end the Cold War with Russia, the additional damage to the Russian reputation for invading the Ukraine in the international community seemed an acceptable price to pay for world recognition at the West's expense. His gaining prestige at home, more than compensated Putin for being branded as an outcast by the international community.

Germany, humiliated by having to admit its misjudgment about the prospects of a Russian integration into a peaceful European community, substantially changed its policy. Thomas Forsberg characterized this realignment as a shift from "*Ostpolitik* to *Frostpolitik*."¹⁶⁵ In 2016 Germany consistently initiated a comprehensive €130 billion (\$153 billion) program of military build-up to counter the Russian aggression and to reassure its allies of its rediscovered loyalty.

B. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS

With the publication of its 2016 white paper, the German Government and the Federal Ministry of Defense finally managed to revive the long silent security policy debate. Moreover, this was the first time that a German white paper was formally issued by the federal government and not only the Federal Ministry of Defense. For Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen it was of utmost importance to include and embrace also

¹⁶³ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis : What It Means for the West* (New Haven, 2014), vii.

¹⁶⁴ Wilson, 183.

¹⁶⁵ Tuomas Forsberg, "From Ostpolitik to 'Frostpolitik'? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards Russia," *International Affairs* 92, no. 1 (2016): 21–42, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12505>.

her critics. Therefore, she made sure that the 2016 white paper was “fostered by participation, contributions and critical suggestions from the worlds of politics, science and civil society, as well as from industry, the interested public, and international partners”¹⁶⁶


With an unsettled world in transition, “Germany’s security environment has become even more complex, volatile, dynamic and thus increasingly unpredictable.”¹⁶⁷ German society in the past often tended to ignore issues of foreign and security policy, but rapid globalization soon caused the borders between foreign and security policies to blur steadily and caught the attention of German society. In the media and political spheres the agenda has become dominated in particular by two main topics: the migration crisis and the interpretation of a reinvigorated Russia with its president Putin challenging the liberal world order. Those two issues seem to be closely interlinked in a strange and terrifying manner, mutually reinforcing each other.

At the peak of the migration crisis in 2015 and 2016, with more the one million refugees seeking asylum in Germany (see Figure 4), the question of how to deal with this challenge—especially in the light of Germany’s burdensome history—led to a severe radicalization of the political spectrum at the fringes. Germany’s alt-right party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AFD – Alternative for Germany) unleashed a storm of popular interest and demanded closing the borders, shooting if necessary to defend them, deporting refugees to their home country, and reviving the German culture—whatever that meant. On the other side of the spectrum, the German party *Die Linke* (the left) assumed the opposite standpoint and declared all refugees welcome.

¹⁶⁶ Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, “White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” 17.

¹⁶⁷ Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 29.

Figure 4. Development of the Numbers of Applications for Asylum (1995-2018)¹⁶⁸



Putin and the Russian state-controlled media supported both of these competing parties, invited their leading politicians with private jets to conspiratorial talks in Moscow, and incited hate between the different political tendencies and the German society as a whole.¹⁶⁹ Putin, trying to drive a wedge among German society, the European nations, and Germany's transatlantic partner was alarmingly successful. In a German opinion poll from May 2018, conducted by a publicly-regulated German television station, Putin was considered more than twice as reliable as Germany's

¹⁶⁸ Adapted from Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, "Aktuelle Zahlen Zu Asyls - April 2018 [Latest Figures and Numbers Regarding Asylum Applications - April 2018]" (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, April 2018), 3, <http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/aktuelle-zahlen-zu-asyl-april-2018.html?nn=1694460>.

¹⁶⁹ Peter Pomeranzew, "Internet-Propaganda: Wie Der Kreml Die Deutsche Demokratie Destabilisiert," *DIE WELT*, December 5, 2017, <https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article171289304/Wie-der-Kreml-die-deutsche-Demokratie-destabilisiert.html>.

international partner, the United States (Figure 5).¹⁷⁰ In fact, 82 percent of those polled answered that in their opinion the United States is not a reliable partner anymore. This fundamental change in opinion can attributed to more than the “Trump effect.”

Figure 5. German Opinion Poll: United States No Longer a Reliable Partner¹⁷¹



Harald Kujat, German retired four-star general, former Chief of Defense, and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, now even officially works for the Russian think tank “Dialogue of Civilizations” in the heart of Berlin. The organization is led by Putin’s intimate friend Wladimir Jakunin, who is on the sanctions list for his involvement in the Ukraine crisis.¹⁷² Putin’s information no longer relies solely on his online “troll factories” but has also found its way into the glamorous circles of diplomatic, political, and journalistic society.

¹⁷⁰ ZDF Politbarometer, “Große Mehrheit: USA kein verlässlicher Partner [Overwhelming Majority: USA Not a Reliable Partner Anymore],” Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, May 18, 2018, <https://www.zdf.de/uri/c8ad3bc2-ec4f-4958-93b4-f82d4cd7c5de>.

¹⁷¹ ZDF Politbarometer.

¹⁷² Sabine Adler, “Russischer Think Tank in Berlin - Friedensinstrument oder Propagandawerkzeug? [Russian Think Tank in Berlin - Instrument of Peace or Propaganda?],” Deutschlandfunk Kultur, February 13, 2017, 1, http://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/russischer-think-tank-in-berlin-friedensinstrument-oder.976.de.html?dram:article_id=378839.

The German party *Die Linke* made no secret of its intentions. On November 12, 2015, in a plenary debate on the occasion of the Bundeswehr's 60th anniversary, Wolfgang Gehrcke in his function as foreign policy spokesperson for *Die Linke*, demanded the abolition of the Bundeswehr with reference to the German-Russian relations.¹⁷³ Additionally, he demanded to disband NATO and contribute the budget savings resulting from dismantling both organizations to the arriving refugees.¹⁷⁴ In June 2016 *Die Linke* reinforced its call for the abolition of NATO and proposed instead to establish a new system of collective security in Europe that would include Russia.¹⁷⁵

Meanwhile, the Bundeswehr had rescued more than 20,000 migrants in distress on the Mediterranean Sea, provided more than 51,000 accommodation facilities for refugees, offered reconstruction trainings for Syrian refugees, and in peak times had more than 9,000 soldiers and civilians detailed to work for refugee aid.¹⁷⁶ The German left did not take notice; they were busy saving the world by organizing chains of beacons.

The creeping disintegration of German society did not stop at the barracks gates of the Bundeswehr. Since 2017 the Military Counter Intelligence Agency has started to screen every recruit for extreme left-wing, right-wing, or Islamist tendencies.¹⁷⁷ While the number of suspicions in principle is declining, some cases may give cause for concern. Since 2011, 89 right-wing extremists and 25 Islamists have been convicted. Among them was the case of second lieutenant Franco A., who is accused of having planned an assassination of high ranking politicians responsible for—in his view—the

¹⁷³ Deutscher Bundestag, "Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/136 [German Bundestag, plenary session protocol 18/136]" (Bundesanzeiger Verlag, November 12, 2015), 13237 C, <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/18/18136.pdf>.

¹⁷⁴ Deutscher Bundestag, 13237 D.

¹⁷⁵ Johanna Metz, "Deutscher Bundestag - Linke fordert Abschaffung der Nato [German Bundestags - the Left Demands Abolition of the NATO]," Deutscher Bundestag, June 6, 2016, <https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/201606/-/426400>.

¹⁷⁶ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Arbeitgeber Bundeswehr Im Visier [Employer Bundeswehr in Focus]" (Presse- und Informationsstab, June 2017), 9–13, <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/12488/a030ee76e0fe9be26628593b3866b829/b-06-01-01-download-2-trendwende-personal-data.pdf>.

¹⁷⁷ n-tv Nachrichten, "Bundeswehr beschäftigt weniger Extremisten [Numbers of Extremists in the Bundeswehr Declining]," n-tv.de, May 26, 2018, <https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Bundeswehr-beschaeftigt-weniger-Extremisten-article20451081.html>.

failed refugee policy.¹⁷⁸ He disguised himself successfully for several months as a Syrian refugee before he was unmasked. His case shocked the German public and started a debate about education and tradition in the Bundeswehr, the role and supervision of the Military Counter Intelligence Agency, and a possible failure of the Bundeswehr's concept of citizens in uniform.

C. BACK TO THE ROOTS: TRANSITION STEP BY STEP

Despite the complexity of foreign and domestic issues since the Ukraine conflict and European migration crisis, the German Bundeswehr did not fall into a state of shock. On the contrary, it carried out the needed adjustments in an evolutionary approach, one step by another, resisting the politicians who often regarded major military reforms as simultaneously a panacea for all kinds of deficiencies and a monument to themselves.

1. Masterplan or Management by Crisis?

When Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen took over from her predecessor Thomas de Maizière, she announced the so-called *Agenda Attraktivität* (program to boost the attractiveness of the Bundeswehr) as the first initiative in her new job. It was a wise choice for two reasons. First, she had profound knowledge in that field of expertise from her last position as Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. Second, it was undisputed across the whole political spectrum that the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr had caused a severe personnel problem. The situation at the recruitment front was miserable, the morale down after a series of permanent reforms and reforms of the reforms, equipment was limited and often not available because of missing spare parts and insufficient maintenance capacities. With that situation being no secret to the public and the politicians of all parties, even the opposition parties had to agree, that this was a necessary and highly reasonable step. Since von der Leyen's

¹⁷⁸ Süddeutsche Zeitung, "Anklage gegen Bundeswehroffizier Franco A. erhoben [Charges Pressed against Bundeswehr Second Lieutenant Franco A.]," [sueddeutsche.de](http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/wegen-anschlagsplanung-anklage-gegen-bundeswehroffizier-franco-a-erhoben-1.3789355), December 12, 2017, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/wegen-anschlagsplanung-anklage-gegen-bundeswehroffizier-franco-a-erhoben-1.3789355>.

decision as such did not offer a target for critique, the opposition started to criticize the initiative's implementation before it had even started.¹⁷⁹

Immediately, von der Leyen scored a big coup by engaging Dr. Katrin Suder, a director from McKinsey with a Ph.D. in physics and an expert on public sector practice, as her new state secretary responsible for armaments procurement, information technology, and planning. The Dresden Decree¹⁸⁰ was altered to reflect the changes made in jurisdiction. The goal to radically overhaul the procurement processes, speed up the digitization process, and eliminate the maintenance jam of major weapon systems proved to be too ambitious. Von der Leyen and Suder soon found out that there was a lot of basic work to be done in order to get a well-grounded overview of the thousands of armaments, IT, and procurement programs, and their respective status.¹⁸¹ Military procurement projects are, in fact, “rocket science” and simply do not generate quick success and can hardly be hastened by force.

During von der Leyen's first term the German Bundestag approved procurements projects with a value of more than €32 billion (\$38 billion), compared to €6 billion in the previous term.¹⁸² Furthermore, more than 66 procurement projects with a value of €75 billion (\$88 billion) have been transferred to active risk management.¹⁸³ Even the opposition parties had to admit that Suder's and von der Leyen's endeavors to create

¹⁷⁹ Falk Steiner, “Attraktivität der Bundeswehr - Von der Leyen macht nochmal auf Familie [Attractivity of the Bundeswehr - Von der Leyen Does the Family Thing again],” *Deutschlandfunk*, January 30, 2015, http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/attraktivitaet-der-bundeswehr-von-der-leyen-macht-nochmal.1766.de.html?dram:article_id=310204.

¹⁸⁰ Bundesminister der Verteidigung, “Grundsätze Für Die Spitzengliederung, Und Führungsorganisation Im Bundesministerium Der Verteidigung Und Der Bundeswehr (Dresdner Erlass) [Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and Command and Control Organisation in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr (Dresden Decree)].”

¹⁸¹ Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Rüstung: Der Beschaffungdschungel der Bundeswehr [Armament: The Procurement Jungel of the Bundeswehr],” *Wirtschaftswoche*, June 20, 2017, <https://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/ruestung-der-beschaffungdschungel-der-bundeswehr-/19955316.html>.

¹⁸² Karl-Heinz Kamp, *The NATO Summit in Warsaw Seven Messages to Expect*, Bundesakademie Für Sicherheitspolitik - Security Policy Working Paper (Berlin: BAKS, 2016).

¹⁸³ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Arbeitgeber Bundeswehr Im Visier [Employer Bundeswehr in Focus],” 29.

transparency in the military equipment sector have been exceedingly successful.¹⁸⁴ The tragedy of Defense Minister von der Leyen's tenure is that her efforts for transparency have made the multitude of sins committed against the Bundeswehr even more visible and risk recoiling on her own. Moreover, since armament procurements are often long-term projects that require a substantial effort of planning, the credit for her successfully designed projects will likely be harvested by her successors.

Exposed to risks and challenges from the Ukraine crisis, Russian aggression at NATO's eastern flank, and drastically increasing threats from the cyber realm, von der Leyen took action and started adjustments that later became known as the "turnaround" of the Bundeswehr. On the basis of a security analysis in the 2016 white paper and a deficit analysis of the German armed forces capabilities, von der Leyen ordered an increase in the sustainability of the Bundeswehr by expanding its personnel strength, boosting its robustness and resilience, and establishing missing and new capabilities.¹⁸⁵

While it can be argued that von der Leyen's adjustments of the Bundeswehr with a focus on public image enhancement, armament procurement, and a return to territorial defense with more robust forces was partially triggered by external factors, the actions taken clearly correspond with the actions necessary to repair the damage caused by the reorientation, as outlined in Chapter III.C. Thus, von der Leyen's steps of reforming her predecessor's reform were based on three pillars: image enhancement, equipment, and stopping the sellout of the Bundeswehr. Rather than a master plan, it may more appropriately be called an evolutionary approach of identifying the critical parameters and pulling the decisive levers to get the Bundeswehr back on track. In pursuing her program, von der Leyen could count on the support of Germany's allies and especially NATO.

¹⁸⁴ Deutsche Presse Agentur, "Rüstung."

¹⁸⁵ Ursula von der Leyen, "Tagesbefehl Der Bundesministerin Der Verteidigung Zur Trendwende Personal [Order of the Day of the Federal Defence Minister Regarding the Personnel Turnaround]" (BMVg Berlin, May 10, 2016), https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2016/05/2016-05-10-tagesbefehl.pdf;jsessionid=33D9816696A911077D69F67937AD4FD0.s6t2?__blob=publicationFile&v=1.

2. NATO Summits in Wales 2014 and Warsaw 2016

The external pressure by NATO was not only an important but the decisive factor that put an end to Germany's military restraint and initiated a defense turnaround in 2016. This policy led to Germany's coming of age in terms of security policy and the state's willingness to finally take responsibility in an out-of-joint world.

In September 2014, the NATO member states met at the Wales summit, overshadowed by Russia's ongoing aggression toward Ukraine and just before the completion of NATO's *International Security Assistance Force* mission in Afghanistan. Would the Ukraine crisis revive NATO or rather make the NATO member states focus on national territorial defense, concerned about further resentments toward Russia? While the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) surely was an expected outcome aimed to reinforce NATO's collective defense in the East particularly, the key question was a different one.¹⁸⁶ Taking a page from the burden-sharing regime of the Cold War, would the NATO allies not only have the willingness to commit—again—to increase their defense spending to meet the alliance's 2-percent gross domestic product (GDP) goal, but also act accordingly?

The outcomes of the two NATO summits in Wales and Warsaw were—at least regarding Germany—substantially more significant than they may have appeared at first glance. Germany surprised not only most of its allies,¹⁸⁷ but also its own civil society. At the NATO summit in Wales in 2014, Germany committed itself to take on more responsibility in the world and pledged considerably more funds and resources. Additionally, Germany pushed further to promote its Framework Nation concept in order to become an *Anlehnungspartner*, which has not only been commended by its allies, but “has been even referred to as ‘German self-therapy.’”¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Paul Belkin, *NATO's Wales Summit: Expected Outcomes and Key Challenges*, CRS Report No. R43698 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2014), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43698.pdf>.

¹⁸⁷ Tobias Bunde, “NATO Summit Special Series: Germany,” *Atlantic Council* (blog), accessed May 8, 2017, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-summit-special-series-germany>.

¹⁸⁸ Aylin Matlè and Alessandro Scheffler, “After the Wales Summit: An Assessment of NATO's Strategic Agenda,” *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung - Facts and Findings*, November 2014, 6.

Undoubtedly, the commitments made in Wales were a decisive step in the right direction; however, their effect was limited because they still lacked the proof of actual work. Looking from Wales toward the Warsaw summit, many analysts therefore postulated that NATO should “focus on implementing the deliverables announced at the Wales summit and, in so doing, building the long-term capabilities necessary to make the alliance more agile.”¹⁸⁹ Ahead of the Warsaw summit in 2016, even Germany could no longer avoid acknowledging the consensus among the NATO allies that “Russia has left the European security order that was established after the Cold War and terminated its partnership with NATO.”¹⁹⁰ Germany’s initial intention to act as a link between transatlantic as well as European security interests and Russia was no longer sustainable. The key challenge now was to provide to the East “a different kind of force, one that remains at a heightened state of readiness to be deployed within days, not months.”¹⁹¹

Germany decided to deliver: After an in-depth analysis within the German government, in May 2016, current Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen announced an end to the period of military personnel reductions and restrictions, effective immediately. In a very first step, around 7,000 new military positions were to be established at short notice in accordance with NATO capability planning targets, while the overall need of up to 14,300 soldiers was officially stated.¹⁹² This point in time was not entirely chosen by chance; in fact, it was designed to turn rhetoric into action—just a few weeks before the next NATO summit in Poland.

¹⁸⁹ SWP and Chatham House, “Implementing the NATO Wales Summit: From Strategy to Action (Part II),” in *US Project Meeting Summary* (– Implementing the NATO Wales Summit: From Strategy to Action, Berlin: SWP / The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2015), 4, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150226ImplementingNATOWalesSummitUpdate.pdf.

¹⁹⁰ Kamp, “The NATO Summit in Warsaw Seven Messages to Expect,” 1.

¹⁹¹ Douglas Lute, *From Wales to Warsaw: NATO’s Readiness Action Plan* (Washington, DC: Council of American Ambassadors, Spring 2015), 32, <https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/spring-2015/from-wales-to-warsaw-nato-s-readiness-action-plan>.

¹⁹² Bundesregierung, “Mehr Personal Für Die Bundeswehr [More Personnel for the Bundeswehr],” *Gestiegene Anforderungen [Increased Requirements]*, accessed August 6, 2017, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2016/05/2016-05-10-mehr-personal-fuer-die-bundeswehr.html>.

At the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016 Germany renewed its commitment to NATO with specific promises to provide troops and to take over the lead by serving as a framework nation in the East. Moreover, Germany's contributions would include: the willingness to take over a key role in the new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); to provide troops on a rotational basis to NATO's presence on the eastern flank; to participate regularly at important exercises; and to lead a multinational battalion in Lithuania as part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP).¹⁹³ Thus, following the NATO paradigm shift, Germany has made a considerable about-face from crisis management in out-of-area missions to deterrence and European territorial defense.

3. Contribution to NATO

Given Germany's reticence in defense affairs and the role of war in public memory, its domestic limitations from a rather skeptical society and the present coalition agreement (which clearly forbade a reorganization of the Bundeswehr), the German decision to expand its military cannot only be explained by the level of multi-crises the world continues to face. To a greater degree, the pressure on Germany by its fellow NATO allies helped to initiate more than a military turnaround. It also brought about the understanding that the assured provision of security requires Germany to increase its contribution substantially, to assume more responsibility, and last but not least, to increase spending on defense.

With its second cycle in the new personnel policy, the newly founded personnel committee of the Bundeswehr not only confirmed the chosen path of a military expansion, it pushed it even further. By granting an additional 5,000 soldiers to the different services and increasing the numbers for volunteers and soldiers of the reserve, Germany reinforced its willingness to become a major player in European and

¹⁹³Bunde, "NATO Summit Special Series."

transatlantic security.¹⁹⁴ Moreover, the Bundeswehr personnel committee further aligned the German integrated planning process with the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) and made sure, in particular, to always address the respective target packages set by the NATO capability requirements for Germany. As a result, the Bundeswehr concentrated, for instance, on establishing new cyber capabilities by creating a dedicated cyber service branch, strengthening its resilience, and reinforcing Germany's contributions to the EFP and VJTF.¹⁹⁵

As Germany perpetually faces criticism for not complying with the NATO 2-percent GDP spending goal, the German military expansion serves a welcome side effect. With current spending at not more than 1.19 percent of its GDP, a near-term increase to 2 percent would require an amount of growth in spending that had the potential to severely unbalance the European defense architecture. One must keep in mind the historic relations of Germany to its neighbors as a result of the famed *Deutsche Mittellage*. “The investment of € 130 billion [\$153 billion] over a 15-year period, as requested by the defence minister, is therefore a fairly realistic figure.”¹⁹⁶

4. A Flexible Approach to Personnel Strength

In May 2016, following the decisions made in the Wales summit in 2014 and in preparation for the Warsaw summit in July 2016, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen announced the beginning of a military expansion. The announcement was characterized by a number of distinctive features.¹⁹⁷ She promised to lift the strict personnel caps by implementing an *atmender Personalkörper* (literal translation: breathing body of personnel, meaning a workforce flexible in numbers), capable of flexible adjustment to the respective tasks the Bundeswehr would have to face in the

¹⁹⁴ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Bundeswehr Wächst Weiter Mit Den Aufgaben - Pressemitteilung. [Bundeswehr Continues to Grow According to Its Challenges. Press Release.]” (BMVg Presse- und informationsstab, February 21, 2017), 1–2, <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/10774/9edd4b4da1222872836ec615fe8de927/21-02-17-bundeswehr-waechst-weiter-mit-den-aufgaben-data.pdf>.

¹⁹⁵ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2.


¹⁹⁶ Kamp, “The NATO Summit in Warsaw Seven Messages to Expect,” 3.

¹⁹⁷ Bundesregierung, “Mehr Personal Für Die Bundeswehr [More Personnel for the Bundeswehr].”

given situation. To fulfill the German commitments of the Wales summit, the Bundeswehr would need to increase its number of soldiers by the aforementioned 14,300 by 2023, the German Defense Minister argued. Consequently, she ordered recruiting 7,000 new soldiers immediately.

From now on—as a standing procedure—a personnel committee, led by the two State Secretaries and the Chief of Defense of the Bundeswehr, would determine manpower requirements on an annual basis.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, a planning and prognosis process would be created to justify these demands, even under scrutiny, and adjust the budget planning accordingly.¹⁹⁹ In the second run of the process in 2017, the prognosis was updated again. The new target figure for 2024 was a total of 198,000 soldiers, including reserves, volunteers, and regulars (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Projected Size of the Armed Forces (Target Figures)²⁰⁰



¹⁹⁸ von der Leyen, “Tagesbefehl Der Bundesministerin Der Verteidigung Zur Trendwende Personal [Order of the Day of the Federal Defence Minister Regarding the Personnel Turnaround],” 1.

¹⁹⁹ von der Leyen, 1.

²⁰⁰ Adapted from Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Arbeitgeber Bundeswehr Im Visier [Employer Bundeswehr in Focus],” 25.

To prevent the Bundeswehr's services, commands, and organizational independent units from abusing this new personnel policy simply to fill vacancies and create eagerly longed for posts, a top-down approach with control mechanisms and distinct standards has been enforced. Every additional demand communicated by the armed service, in order to be approved, would require an authorization from the respective service chief of staff. Additionally, it would need to be benchmarked against a set of three guiding principles by contributing to an increase in sustainability, a strengthening of robustness, or the establishment of new capabilities. Last but not least, a cross-check to prevent the creation of any avoidable redundancy with NATO allies must be carried out.

5. Cyber and Other Decisive “Small Things”

In order to move from rhetoric to action, von der Leyen started to put her agenda-policies into practice. In May 2015, severe hacker attacks on the German Bundestag resulted in large-scale data theft and the need to replace the entire Bundestag's IT network. When the attacks were revealed to the public, von der Leyen without hesitation decided to make a major step forward.²⁰¹ Since the Bundeswehr, which was not affected by this particular attack, has to repel more than 4,500 cyberattacks per day, she announced the implementation of a new cyber branch. Its target structure would comprise 14,000 soldiers and civilian experts—a force nearly as big as the German Navy.²⁰² This new military branch would consolidate the Bundeswehr's former scattered competencies in the field of IT and network security, augment new capabilities, and thus

²⁰¹ Deutsche Presse Agentur, “Gesamtes IT-Netz des Bundestages muss ausgetauscht werden [Entire IT Network of the German Bundestag needs to be replaced],” *sueddeutsche.de*, June 14, 2015, sec. politik, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/hackerangriff-auf-den-bundestag-gesamtes-it-netz-des-bundestages-muss-ausgetauscht-werden-1.2519934>.

²⁰² Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Arbeitgeber Bundeswehr Im Visier [Employer Bundeswehr in Focus],” 6.

enable the forces to effectively counter cyberattacks and, if necessary, wage cyber wars.²⁰³

In reaction to the case of army officer Franco A. and other incidents associated with growing right-wing extremism as well as Islamism in the Bundeswehr, von der Leyen in May 2017 decided to change the subordination of the Military Counter Intelligence Agency (MAD—*Militärischer Abschirmdienst*).²⁰⁴ The MAD, formerly an appendix of a lower authority to the German Joint Support Service Command, now became directly subordinated to the Federal Ministry of Defense. Additionally, the *Zentrum Innere Führung* (the German Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre of the Bundeswehr) also became directly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense in order to underline the importance of civic education in fighting extremism and to revive the concept of the citizen in uniform to strengthen the soldier's resilience against harmful influences.²⁰⁵ Along similar lines, the *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr* (Armed Forces Leadership Academy—the Bundeswehr's highest-level educational institution and joint staff college) shared the same fate and demonstrated the willingness of von der Leyen's administration to declare proper education, ethos, and mindset a management issue.

Minister von der Leyen's actions, aimed at improving the political education of the Bundeswehr's soldiers, also raised criticism since she had accused "Germany's armed forces, the Bundeswehr, of having an 'attitude and leadership problem' on German

²⁰³ Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Tagesbefehl: Cyber [Order of the Day: Cyber]" (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, September 2015), http://cir.bundeswehr.de/resource/resource/RXdrN2tBYVgyYVh2QWtpYkZXTnl0VXXZuclJFOWhIbVExT1A5TkhwYlNNZFILcXNITzZhSWdWVnhRcitJQVhJVWx6S3d2WWIxTXRQcllEUnB5K29ib3dmeFo4VTZ5bkswbURFdmE0Z0lRYUk9/20150917_BM_Tagesbefehl%20Cyber.pdf.

²⁰⁴ Deutsche Welle, "MAD gehört nun zum Verteidigungsministerium [Military Counter Intelligence Agency Now Directly Subordinated under the Federal Ministry of Defense]," DW.COM, accessed May 5, 2018, <http://www.dw.com/de/mad-geh%C3%B6rt-nun-zum-verteidigungsministerium/a-39049353>.

²⁰⁵ Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Tagesbefehl der Ministerin zur Streitkräftebasis [Order of the Day of the Federal Defense Minister regarding the Joint Support Service]," BMVg.de, May 30, 2017, <https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/tagesbefehl-der-ministerin-zur-streitkraeftebasis-11322>.

TV”²⁰⁶ in April 2017, after the news of potential misconduct by German soldiers. Although she immediately apologized for her statement and expressed her sincere appreciation for their soldier’s performance, this episode once again showed that the relationship between Minister von der Leyen and her troops was not characterized by deep sympathy, as was the case with one of her predecessors, Peter Struck. Instead, she preferred to rule the Bundeswehr and the Federal Ministry of Defense with an iron grip and concentrated on what she considered her chief task, to reconstitute the Bundeswehr to a state of full operational capability.

Tragically, it turns out that despite all the valid efforts, the military turnaround will take considerably more time than expected; of all things, Germany’s excellent economic situation coupled with the demographic situation and competition for talented people, has hindered the recruitment of additional staff.

²⁰⁶ Deutsche Welle, “German Defense Minister Ursula von Der Leyen at a Crossroads | DW | 19.12.2017,” DW.COM, December 19, 2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/german-defense-minister-ursula-von-der-leyen-at-a-crossroads/a-41866433>.

V. CONCLUSION

The goal of this thesis was not to give a detailed and comprehensive historical overview of Germany and its armed forces, or Russia's grand strategy after World War II, or the Crimean conflict. Instead, it aimed to depict the mechanisms of military transformation, apply them to the German case, and on that basis, tease out the ramifications for the European security architecture from a German perspective.

This final chapter provides a summary to the reader: it addresses questions for further research, draws conclusions from the analysis provided based on the analytical framework provided in Chapter II, and gives a strategic outlook for the possible future development of the German Bundeswehr.

A. SUMMARY

Throughout history armed forces have constantly been reformed, realigned, or reorganized in order to adjust to a changing strategic and operational environment; to improve their effectiveness and efficiency; and to keep up with progress, innovation, and disruptive technologies. Organization theory offers the possibility to approach the analysis of military transformation on the basis of an analytical framework by looking on organizations as open systems. Using that theoretical structure, we can identify policy as the sole driver for military transition, which then manifests in all organizational dimensions (strategy, culture, structure, and processes).

The German Bundeswehr, bearing the unique burden of a difficult heritage of Nazi Germany's severe crimes against humanity, has worked hard to earn respect and renown as a peaceful member within the systems of collective defense committed to defend the liberal world order. Still reluctant to use military force, Germany honors its international commitment that "only peace will emanate from German soil."²⁰⁷

²⁰⁷ Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany*, 4.

With its 2011 military reform, the so-called Reorientation of the Bundeswehr, Germany intended to suspend conscription and streamline command structures, as well as to professionalize and modernize defense procurement and human resource management. In the midst of a severe debt crisis and in a state of reform fatigue, this highly ambitious reform led to a severe overload for the Bundeswehr and its civilian as well as military personnel. In light of the worsening post-2014 security policy situation, the German military faced a huge gap between the resulting demands on the armed forces and the resources available.

From *Ostpolitik* to rapprochement Germany's foreign policy toward Russia became interlocked with its economic policy, which was shaped by a deep sense of mutual understanding of the mistakes made on both sides. Gratefulness for reunification and the sincere belief in Germany's own ability to successfully promote the integration of Russia into the European community made Germany blind to the true face of Russia and deaf to the warnings of its allies, from Eastern Europe particularly.

Because Germany's armed forces were established to counter the Russian aggression in the first place and then constantly reduced after reunification and the end of the Cold War, they can be regarded as an indicator of the Russian threat-level. Following this hypothesis, it can be argued that the perceived Russian threat from a German perspective has significantly increased due to the Ukraine crisis. It has led to the unfolding of a third pivotal point in recent European history and to a reputedly pacifist nation like Germany significantly changing its foreign and security policies.

Germany cut its close ties to Russia and subscribed to the European skepticism toward Moscow. Moreover, the Russian aggression was the final push necessary to kick off the process of increasing the number of German soldiers for the first time since the late Cold War, which was contrary to societal expectations shaped by the historical behavior of the German armed forces. In May 2016, the German government approved an about-face in its military personnel policy, lifting personnel caps and thus allowing the Bundeswehr to increase its operational power and strengthen its robustness, and to establish new capabilities as part of a comprehensive €130 billion (\$153 billion) program of military build-up.

B. QUO VADIS BUNDESWEHR?

It has been proven that an analytical framework based on organization and open systems theory can explain the reasons behind the political fascination with reorganizing. Not only is it difficult to avoid the temptation to use the military for decisive actions, but also for appearances on the political stage. And while it is often very easy to give the correct diagnosis, it is harder to provide the appropriate therapy—particularly when one’s own tenure is limited and the planning for the reform takes half of it.

To understand why the reorientation turned into a disaster it is necessary to take the context of this specific reform into account. It is reasonable to assume that only the brightest minds of the German Federal Ministry of Defense were in charge of planning, implementing, and evaluating the reform. The idea of modernizing and digitizing the cumbersome forces also was as brave as it was right. Nevertheless, the conditions set by the fiscal restraints have drastically overshot the mark, especially since transformation processes usually result in substantial costs in the beginning and achieve their returns only after the implementation and transition phases. In the German case, the political decision of the government—and not only the one of poor Minister de Maizièrre—was the source of all misfortune. On top of it all, the massive reform fatigue in German society and the Bundeswehr contributed to the failure of this overambitious reform.

Who bears the responsibility then? It is the German Bundestag, German politicians, and the German people themselves, who in times of crisis shortsightedly sacrificed the nation’s long-range security in favor of quick money. However, it has to be admitted, this unfortunate line of action was at all times in accordance with the German Basic law, which states that “the Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence. Their numerical strength and general organizational structure must be shown in the budget.”²⁰⁸ Germany’s failure should serve as an example of what not to do for all politicians tempted to reorganize and reduce their militaries for short-term savings or their own political success. As the German case demonstrates, the savings achieved (€4

²⁰⁸ Federal Republic of Germany, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” trans. Christian Tomuschat and David P. Currie, May 23, 1949, Article 87a (1), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf.

to €5 billion, or \$6 billion) did not even come close to the expectations of its creators. The reconstruction of the Bundeswehr on the other side will amount to a sum in three-digit billions—not to mention the loss the Bundeswehr soldiers' trust.

It is arguable whether the planners of the reorganization neglected to properly assess the security policy situation. If they did, they were in good company. After all, Condoleezza Rice's 1997 dictum was still the valid doctrine on both sides of the Atlantic: "Worries may persist that Russia is bent on reconstructing its empire, but there is little concern that it will be a menacing military power on the continent any time soon."²⁰⁹

Although Defense Minister von der Leyen is not exempt from criticism, it is to her credit that she resisted the temptation of leading the Bundeswehr in the next big reform of the reform again. Instead, she chose cautiously to realign the German armed forces exactly at those points that promised to heal the biggest wounds of the reorientation—personnel, public image, defense procurement, sustainability, and robustness. In avoiding large-scale reform, she also escaped the usual stationing debate that pops up with every fundamental military reform. As politicians tend to rediscover their long-lost love for the Bundeswehr when it comes to dismantling the barracks in their own constituency, this process often leads to sub-optimal decisions based on political interests rather than military necessities.

Therefore, it can be argued that von der Leyen's organic, evolutionary approach to military realignment is a favorable one that can indeed serve as a positive example in the transition of military forces. At least, von der Leyen broke the vicious circle of a Bundeswehr "condemned forever to becoming and never to being."²¹⁰ Additionally, while de Maizière's reorganization was widely criticized due to its misguided basic assumption and approach, von der Leyen's turnaround is criticized mostly because its implementation has not been fast enough. Thus, the fundamental difference between these reforms emerges: one being widely opposed, and the other eagerly awaited.

²⁰⁹ Philip D. Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*, Reprint ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 370.

²¹⁰ Dyson, "Condemned Forever to Becoming and Never to Being"? The Weisse Commission and German Military Isomorphism," 545.

From the perspective of foreign and security policies, it is an ironic twist that the Russian aggression in the Ukraine has achieved the exact opposite of its original intention. Instead of driving a wedge between the European allies it revived the spirit of the already written-off EDC and sparked the deepening of the European cooperation in terms of a permanent structured cooperation. Russia's aggression in Ukraine has led to more than the unfolding of a third pivotal point in the recent history of the European security architecture and to a fundamental realignment of Germany's security policy. It can also be seen as a spark to a revitalization of the idea of a European Defense Community and the potential birth of a European army.

As discussed in the preceding chapter, three factors particularly can be identified that led to this turning point in recent history, putting an end to Germany's military restraint and initiating a military turnaround in 2016. These factors are a situation of crises and conflicts in an "out of joint" world, an objectively failed attempt to reorganize the Bundeswehr, and rising external pressure on Germany by its fellow NATO allies. While the reorientation of the Bundeswehr and the constantly deteriorating security situation served as catalysts increasing the gap between demands and resources available, it was NATO's influence—some might even say gentle pressure—that truly paved the way for a German military expansion.

This comprehensive €130 billion (\$153 billion) program of military build-up with a new personnel policy at its very core does not only show characteristics of a repair, reorganization, or rearmament, but it represents the coming of age in terms of security and defense policy. The sheer fact that none of the NATO allied member states objected to this military expansion emphasizes the level of trust that Germany has gained by serving as a reliable, sometimes reluctant, yet always predictable partner. Its willingness to assume reasonable responsibility and therefore to increase its defense capability in close coordination with NATO via the NDPP underlines not only the sincerity of Germany's proceedings but also its reason of state—to refrain from any attempt of independent operations or to unbalance the European (and thus the transatlantic) defense architecture.

The defined goal of preventing any further redundancies between Germany and its neighbors in terms of military capabilities could in fact blaze the trail for a future European Army.²¹¹ Pointing to the history of the creation of the Bundeswehr, as described in Chapter II, this idea is far from absurd, but has to be subject to further in-depth research. In the end, it all comes down to Allison Smale's succinct conclusion that "you know times have changed when the Germans announce they are expanding their army for the first time in 25 years—and no one objects."²¹²

²¹¹ See for instance the German Framework Nation Concept or the initiative to establish a European Air Transport Command.

²¹² Alison Smale, "In a Reversal, Germany's Military Growth Is Met with Western Relief," *New York Times*, June 5, 2016, sec. Europe, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/world/europe/european-union-germany-army.html>.

APPENDIX. THE “DRESDEN DECREE”

Bundesminister der Verteidigung, “Grundsätze für die Spitzengliederung und Führungsorganisation im Bundesministerium der Verteidigung und der Bundeswehr (Dresdner Erlass) [Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and Command and Control Organization in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr (Dresden Decree)].”²¹³

Federal Minister

Dresden, 21. March 2012

Internal distribution list III

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SUBJECT Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and Command and Control Organisation in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr

I hereby issue the following principles for the top-level structure, chain of command, and command and control organisation in the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMoD) and the Bundeswehr with effect from 1 April 2012.

They follow the Blankenese Directive of 21 March 1970 and the Berlin Directive of 21 January 2005.

The new principles take into account that

- the Chief of Defence will become the administrative superior of all military personnel in the Armed Forces and part of the FMoD Executive Group;
- the service chiefs of staff will exercise command and control of their respective military organisational elements from outside the Ministry;
- to ensure greater Bundeswehr-wide task accomplishment, FMoD directorates-general, but also subordinate authorities and agencies, will increasingly be staffed by both military and civilian personnel;
- technical and organisational authority will, where feasible, be merged at all levels.

²¹³ Taken from: Federal Ministry of Defence, “The Reorientation Of The Bundeswehr - Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together,” trans. Federal Office of Languages (Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, March 2013), 135-142

The basic structure of the FMoD announced on 10 October 2011 will thus be augmented by these principles in order to implement the guiding principles of the reorientation such as Bundeswehr-wide task accomplishment, the pooling of responsibility, the reduction of interfaces, and the consolidation of responsibility and authority, starting from the top ministerial level and extending throughout the entire Bundeswehr.

Supplementary arrangements and requirements in the area of responsibility of the FMoD will be tied to these principles.

Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and Command and Control Organisation in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr

FMoD and subordinate agencies

As a supreme federal authority, the FMoD is neither part of the armed forces nor of the Federal Defence Administration. All civilian and military Ministry staff are part of the general administrative chain of command corresponding to the FMoD organisational structure and perform their tasks on the basis of official instructions / directives issued by superior staff members and manage subordinate staff by official instructions / directives regardless of their respective status under public service law. The Federal Minister of Defence or, in his place, the responsible permanent State Secretary, is the sole military superior and disciplinary superior of military personnel within the Ministry.*

Cooperation between the ministerial directorates-general is carried out in accordance with the Common Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries, the Supplementary Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministry of Defence and, where appropriate, the additional stipulations.

The armed forces, the defence administration, the military chaplaincy, and the military justice system are subordinate to the Ministry. The armed forces comprise the major military organisational elements, namely the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Bundeswehr Joint Medical Service, and the Joint Support Service. In addition, there are military agencies directly subordinate to the Ministry. The defence administration comprises the major organisational elements "Personnel", "Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support" and "Infrastructure, Environmental Protection & Services".

* For better readability, only the masculine form will be used.

Notwithstanding specific assignments and the military chain of command, ministerial control of subordinate agencies is exercised by the appropriate organisational elements in the Ministry.

I. FMoD Executive Group

1. The Federal Minister of Defence is the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces in accordance with Article 65a of the German constitution and the head of all major organisational elements within his area of responsibility in accordance with Article 65. He is the highest superior of all military personnel, civil servants and employees of the Bundeswehr.
In addition to the decision-making authority conferred on him by law or by other provisions, the Federal Minister of Defence may make final decisions on the following matters in his area of responsibility:
 - Issues of fundamental or particular political importance;
 - Central issues concerning the organisation and structure of the Bundeswehr;
 - Personnel matters in accordance with the additional stipulations of the Federal Minister of Defence;
 - Bundeswehr operations** outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany
 - i. as part of international alliances/organisations (e.g. NATO, EU, UN),
 - ii. under national command and control, e.g. noncombatant evacuation operations,
 - iii. for humanitarian relief purposes;
 - Standing operational tasks;
 - Humanitarian aid in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in response to natural disasters and serious accidents.
2. Together with the Federal Minister of Defence, the Parliamentary State Secretaries and the State Secretaries form the FMoD Executive Group (Section 6, Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries). As the military advisor to the Federal Government and the most senior military representative of the Bundeswehr, the Chief of Defence is part of the FMoD Executive Group.

** The term "operation" is used here, and in the remainder of this directive, in a military sense, regardless of whether it refers to an **operation in accordance with Article 87a (2) of the German constitution**, the **deployment of armed forces** in accordance with the Parliamentary Participation Act, or the **employment** of armed forces, for example in the scope of mutual administrative assistance. In this context, an operation is whenever the armed forces accomplish a specially ordered task, usually on a temporary basis, which lies outside routine duty, training and exercises, regardless of the legal classification of this operation.

3. The Parliamentary State Secretaries support the Federal Minister of Defence in fulfilling his governmental tasks in accordance with the additional stipulations of the Federal Minister of Defence or decisions taken by the Federal Minister of Defence on a case-by-case basis.

Any necessary preliminary work is conducted by the directorates-general and organisational elements of the Ministry. Parliamentary State Secretaries must reach mutual agreement with the appropriate State Secretary. The responsibility of the State Secretaries is not affected. The Parliamentary State Secretaries deputise for one another.

4. The State Secretaries represent the Minister in their areas of responsibility, which are laid down in the additional stipulations of the Federal Minister of Defence. They must ensure that tasks of the Federal Ministry of Defence are carried out in the most efficient manner possible. As a rule, they have the final decision in administrative and relevant military matters. The State Secretaries deputise for one another.
5. Submissions to the Federal Minister of Defence and to the Parliamentary State Secretaries are made through the appropriate State Secretary. In addition, submissions for the Executive Group must be made to the appropriate State Secretary, if necessary in consultation with the other State Secretary. Official channels are based on the additional stipulations of the Federal Minister of Defence and the FMoD Rules of Procedure.
6. Due to his extensive responsibility for budget matters, the State Secretary responsible for the Directorate-General for Budget must be consulted on all matters pertaining to the Executive Group which will affect the budget.

II. Top-Level Military Structure, Chain of Command, and Command and Control Organisation in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr

1. The Chief of Defence is the highest-ranking service member of the Bundeswehr. He is thus authorised to establish binding principles for all Bundeswehr military personnel, regardless of service affiliation.

He is the most senior military representative of the Bundeswehr and the military advisor to the Federal Government. He is responsible for the overall approach to military defence including planning and development and for the command and control of the Armed Forces. His subordination to the State Secretaries, his authority, and the directorates-general assigned to him are laid down in the

additional stipulations of the Federal Ministry of Defence. In carrying out his responsibilities, the Chief of Defence is also supported by all FMoD directorates-general; this does not result in additional authority and decision-making powers.

2. The Vice Chief of Defence represents the Chief of Defence in his absence. He represents the Chief of Defence in ministerial tasks specified by the Chief of Defence. He is not a ministerial entity in his own right.
3. The Armed Forces are subordinate to the Chief of Defence in every respect. In accordance with Section 1 of the Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations, the Chief of Defence is the immediate superior of all military personnel serving in the Armed Forces and the superior of civilian personnel employed there. In cases where he is designated as the disciplinary superior of military personnel outside the armed forces, he acts as a superior in accordance with Section 3 of the Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations.
4. The service chiefs of staff exercise command and control of their respective major military organisational elements outside the FMoD and, in accordance with Section 1 of the Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations, are the immediate superiors of all military personnel in their major military organisational elements. The heads of the armed forces agencies directly subordinate to the FMoD are the immediate superiors of all military personnel in their respective areas of responsibility.

In addition to his position as the immediate superior of the Joint Medical Service, the Surgeon General, Bundeswehr is at the same time the highest technical superior (Section 2 of the Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations) of all soldiers of the Medical Service in the Bundeswehr. As far as Medical Service matters are concerned, he is authorised to issue binding guidelines for the rest of the Bundeswehr.

5. The Chief of Defence convenes meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Council, which he chairs, to discuss matters of fundamental importance that concern the armed forces as a whole. The Chiefs of Staff Council serves to promote jointness and to prepare decisions by the Chief of Defence. The Chiefs of Staff Council is not vested with decision-making powers.
6. Military personnel employed outside the armed forces, especially in Defence Administration authorities and agencies, are removed from the continuous chain of command in the armed forces.

They are part of the general administrative chain of command in accordance with the organisational structure in question; command and control over them is exercised through official instructions or directions or they themselves exercise command and control in cases where they have a leadership function.

The command authority of the Federal Minister of Defence is not affected by this arrangement. Command and control over these military personnel is exercised by the head of each authority/agency. Their rights and duties as military personnel remain unaffected as does the responsibility for their personnel management. The head of the agency/authority must ensure that administrative matters in connection with military status are attended to. A post for a Representative for Matters Concerning Military Personnel must be established in agencies/authorities to assist agency/authority heads in this respect. The representative is generally the disciplinary superior of military personnel in the agency/authority and acts as a superior in accordance with Section 3 of the Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations. Guidelines for agency/authority heads on exercising this responsibility will be prepared by the FMoD.***

III. Operational command and control

1. The Chief of Defence is responsible for the planning, preparation, execution and assessment of Bundeswehr operations. In addition to his command authority over the armed forces, he exercises command and control of operations through the directorates-general subordinate to him, particularly the Directorate-General for Strategy and Operations and the Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command. In addition, all directors at the FMoD, without prejudice to their authority and responsibility, are instructed to cooperate with the Chief of Defence in respect of specific operations.
2. During ongoing Bundeswehr operations abroad, orders for operational contingents or operational forces are exclusively issued through the operational chain of command (Chief of Defence, Directorate-General for Strategy and Operations, and Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command). Subsection III.1 remains unaffected. The same applies to reporting channels. Functional authority within the FMoD or the subordinate level remains unaffected.

IV. Personnel Management

1. The Director-General for Personnel is responsible for the personnel process in line with a Bundeswehr-wide approach. He is responsible for meeting the personnel requirements of the Bundeswehr and the FMoD. For this purpose, he cooperates closely with the directorates-general in the area of responsibility of the Chief of Defence and with the other directorates-general.

*** Subsection 6 refers exclusively to military personnel employed outside the armed forces but in the area of responsibility of the FMoD. Separate arrangements will apply to military personnel employed in other areas of responsibility or in international organisations.

2. In the scope of their technical authority, the directorates-general in the area of responsibility of the Chief of Defence and the other directorates-general state their requirements to the Directorate-General for Personnel.
3. In addition, the Directorate-General for Personnel is also responsible for social affairs in the Bundeswehr.

V. Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support

1. The Director of Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support has overall responsibility for the procurement and in-service support process and the IT strategy in the Bundeswehr. He is responsible for preparing and developing appropriate procedural regulations. In addition, he is responsible for the principles of procurement and tendering in the Bundeswehr.
2. The Directorate-General for Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support has "material responsibility for operational viability"; by contrast, the Chief of Defence has "in-service and supply responsibility for the maintenance of operational capability and readiness".

VI. Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services

1. The Director of Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services has overall responsibility for Bundeswehr facility management in Germany, abroad and in theatres of operations as well as for all related services. This includes the construction and operation of facilities.

He is responsible for messing and club facilities during routine duty, abroad and in theatres of operations.

2. He is responsible for the performance of statutory protective tasks in areas including environmental protection, nature conservation, occupational safety, fire protection and hazardous materials transportation. He acts as a supervisory authority under public law for the Bundeswehr and the Allied forces stationed in Germany.

I hereby revoke the "Weisung über die Aufgabenverteilung im Bereich der strukturellen und quantitativen Personalplanung" (Directive on the Allocation of Tasks in the Area of Structural and Quantitative Personnel Planning) of 18 December 1970, also known as the Birckholtz Directive, the "Weisung über die Grundsätze für Aufgabenzuordnung,

Organisation und Verfahren im Bereich der militärischen Spitzengliederung" (Directive on the Principles of Task Allocation, Organisation and Procedures for the Top-Level Military Structure) of 21 January 2005, also known as the Berlin Directive, the "Führungsweisung über die Verantwortlichkeiten für Einsätze der Bundeswehr im Ausland sowie Hilfeleistungen der Bundeswehr bei Naturkatastrophen und besonders schweren Unglücksfällen im In- und Ausland sowie bei sonstigen Fällen der Amtshilfe" (Command Directive on Responsibilities with Respect to Bundeswehr Operations Abroad, Relief in Case of Natural Disasters and Serious Accidents in Germany and Abroad, and Other Cases of Mutual Administrative Assistance) of 30 May 2008, and the "Weisung über die Verantwortlichkeiten im Bereich der Leitung" (Directive on Responsibilities within the Executive Group of the Federal Ministry of Defence) of 16 February 2010.



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