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THESIS

**NON-MEMBER STATE PARTICIPATION IN NATO
MARITIME OPERATIONS: BENEFITS IN
BURDEN-SHARING**

by

Kenneth J. Wenzel

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

David S. Yost
Robert L. Simeral

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OPERATIONS: BENEFITS IN BURDEN-SHARING**

Kenneth J. Wenzel
Lieutenant, United States Navy
BS, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2012

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June 2018**

Approved by: David S. Yost
Advisor

Robert L. Simeral
Second Reader

Mohammed M. Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Since the early 1990s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has increasingly welcomed the participation of non-member states in its operations and activities. This thesis examines two NATO maritime operations: Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), conducted from 2001 to 2016, and Operation Ocean Shield (OOS), conducted from 2009 to 2016. In each of these operations, NATO benefited from the participation of non-members, notably in information sharing. OAE and OOS provided opportunities for non-members to gain valuable insight into how NATO and its Allies operate individually and together in multilateral missions. NATO and its partners thereby gained the potential for more extensive and higher-quality participation in the future. Moreover, NATO obtained an outside perspective on its operations and practical support in the allocation of responsibilities undertaken by NATO Allies and non-NATO partners. The participation of non-NATO partners benefited both the Alliance and the non-member operational partners.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMC	Allied Maritime Command
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces
CTF	Combined Task Force
EU	European Union
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Council
IFOR	Implementation Force
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plan
IRTC	Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAE	Operation Active Endeavour
OOS	Operation Ocean Shield
OSG	Operation Sea Guardian
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHADE	Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
SNMG	Standing NATO Maritime Group
STROG	Strait of Gibraltar
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

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I. INTRODUCTION

In September 2001, following the terrorist attacks in the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), one of the Alliance's several responses to counter-terrorism. Shortly after OAE's creation, NATO accepted assistance from countries that were not part of the Alliance, although the Alliance had done this with comparatively few operations in the past and those cases involved ground forces in the Balkans. In August 2009, in response to a United Nations (UN) call to curb piracy and protect aid efforts in Somalia, NATO began Operation Ocean Shield. Unlike OAE, OOS included non-member participation from its start. Both operations represented a shift in NATO policy toward the inclusion of non-members. However, did the addition of these countries provide a benefit to the operation or NATO?

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

What impact has the participation of non-member states had on maritime operations conducted by NATO since September 2001? The goal of the two major NATO maritime operations that were conducted since the September 2001 attacks in the United States was to help curb terrorism as well as piracy. Other recent operations in the area, including Italy's *Mare Nostrum*, have pursued similar goals of fighting terrorism and aiding war torn neighbors while assisting endangered migrants. This thesis analyzes NATO's OAE and OOS separately and evaluates the lessons learned for future operations.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Despite the efforts of the United States, its allies, and security partners to curb terrorism and piracy, both remain a danger to most of the globe. NATO has played a major role in counter-terror and counter-piracy operations in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Contributions to these NATO-led operations by non-NATO states reinforced OAE and OOS for 15 years (2001-2016) and 7 years (2009-2016), respectively. This building upon success may signify a trend in NATO to include more non-member states.

The first maritime example of non-member participation was OAE, through which NATO paved the way for the cooperation of maritime forces in an international framework by creating partnerships with non-NATO countries. This is due in part to the possible global impact of terrorism and the possibility of its spread. As a result, NATO was able to draw on the support of not only of its members but also of other countries that have an interest in countering these threats.

The second example, OOS, followed a similar pattern. Although initially established as a NATO operation, it too increased its capacity by allowing non-members to participate because of the global concern over piracy in the region and the possibility that it too could spread. In the OOS case, NATO acted at an even earlier point in the process to welcome non-member support in the operation.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Three major categories of literature exist for each operation, OAE and OOS. The first consists of the information published by NATO concerning the specifics of the operations—their dates, participants, and accomplishments—to describe the origins and transformations of each operation. The second category features NATO Defense College papers that analyze the operations. The third category contains scholarly works from outside NATO. Most of these works focus on the contributions of a single country to a NATO operation and provide an in-depth analysis of that participation.

An extensive analysis of the literature mentioning OAE and OOS typically notes the origins and sometimes provides statistics about the operations or information on the participants. The scholarly works generally focus on one or two of the main participating countries at the time; however, there is a lack of works that cover the other countries that participated. For OAE, the research focuses on the improving ties between NATO and Russia but fails to analyze the contributions by Georgia, Israel, Morocco, New Zealand, and Ukraine. For OOS, the published research focuses on the inclusion of forces from Japan as well as NATO developing ties to China but fails to analyze the contributions by Australia, Colombia, New Zealand, and Ukraine.

One of the most helpful starting points for basic information on OAE was NATO's website. It offers information on the purposes and participants, but does little more than list the information with little to no analysis. OAE was one of NATO's responses to the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Its primary objective was to prevent terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, and as such, it fell under the NATO Joint Force Command located in Naples, Italy.¹ The Mediterranean is a critical area to protect due to the extensive flow of merchant traffic through its narrow seas.² In order to monitor maritime movements and deter terrorism in the Mediterranean, OAE relied on the vast number of merchant vessels in the area to report suspicious activities and employed naval assets for conducting presence and surveillance missions. The operation specifically targeted the movements of weapons associated with terrorism.

The NATO Defense College, the second source of information advantageous for this thesis, provides analysis and research from NATO's perspective. Two schools of thought have come out of this research. The first, described by Claudia Bernasconi, is that OAE succeeded because it involved cooperation with partners outside the NATO framework. This first school of thought holds that future operations should continue to welcome the contributions of non-members.³ The second school of thought, described by Pierre Razoux, contends that the inclusion of non-member states through multiple frameworks has been taxing and difficult because of the "different contents and format, which does not facilitate coordination." As a result, this school's view on cooperation is cautious at best.⁴

The third category of literature for OAE comprises the scholarly articles, which have generally served two purposes.⁵ The first was to discuss the increase in NATO-Russia

¹ "Operation Active Endeavour," NATO, October 27, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm.

² Ibid.

³ Claudia Bernasconi, "NATO's Fight Against Terrorism: Where Do We Stand?," *NATO Research Paper* 66 (April 2011): X.

⁴ Pierre Razoux, "The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue at a Crossroads," *NATO Research Paper* 35 (April 2008): 2.

⁵ These articles are listed in the List of References.

cooperation in the post-Cold War era and even more so in the post-September 2001 era. The second purpose was to examine the origins of OAE and to discuss its success as a result of outside partners—specifically, those in the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Partnership for Peace, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. However, these articles fail to offer information regarding the inclusion of Georgia, Israel, Morocco, New Zealand, and Ukraine in OAE. According to Isaac Kfir, OAE “provides a good example of how an operation can evolve from a traditional security operation to a mechanism that provides protection and as a tool to improve relations between the NATO members and the other countries, emphasizing once again, NATO’s commitment to develop and build partnerships.”⁶ The success of OAE’s inclusion of non-members resulted in their inclusion in future maritime operations.

Like the information for OAE, one of the most useful sources for basic information on OOS was NATO’s website. As with OAE, however, the website does little more than list the information with minimal analysis. OOS was a NATO operation for seven years (2009-2016). It was established to counter and deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa, and in the Indian Ocean.⁷ In contrast with OAE, which involved only NATO allies at the beginning, OOS was “designed to not only promote naval security but also forge ties with out-of-area states such as New Zealand, Australia and Japan.”⁸ NATO partnered with the European Union (EU) and the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces in Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, allowing the organizations along with 30 states operating in the area to coordinate their efforts. Notable countries involved in these meetings were China, India, Japan, and Russia.⁹ This inclusion indicates NATO

⁶ Isaac Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift: Searching for a Traditional Security-Human Security Nexus,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 36, no. 2 (July 8, 2015): 235, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2015.1061766>.

⁷ “Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived),” NATO, December 19, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm.

⁸ Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift,” 235.

⁹ James M. Bridger, “Safe Seas at What Price? The Costs, Benefits and Future of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield,” *NATO Research Paper* 95 (2013): 6.

allies decided to build upon their success with OAE by making OOS a “capacity-building programme” and including states such as Australia, New Zealand, and Ukraine.¹⁰

The NATO Defense College, once again the second source of information useful for this thesis, provides analysis and research from NATO’s perspective. However, only one study of OOS has been published by the NATO Defense College, and it concluded that OOS has achieved “an unparalleled level of international cooperation.”¹¹ This indicates that NATO’s decision to continue its trend of including non-members in operations was positive and fruitful.

The third category of literature for OOS consists of scholarly articles, which have had two main purposes. The first has been to provide general information on the origins, participants, and mission accomplishments. The second purpose has been to clarify the level of integration and success of particular states or international organizations acting in cooperation with NATO, particularly Japan, China, and the United Nations (UN).

Japan’s contributions in particular benefitted the operation. Alessio Patalano notes that “both actors [Japan and NATO] need to face the possibility of having to deter both Russia and China from taking steps against the established maritime order.”¹² Therefore, Japan’s contributions not only benefitted the operation, but also signified a trend toward improved cooperation with Japanese forces for the possibility of joint action to deal with future security challenges.

NATO’s move toward including non-members in its operations has been clearly evident in these two maritime operations. OAE did not initially involve partners, but their inclusion in the later phases of activity benefitted the operation. Building on this success, OOS welcomed the contributions of partners from an early phase, and succeeded in reducing piracy. NATO crisis management in the future will likely continue this trend and not only include but rely on non-member participation.

¹⁰ Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift,” 236.

¹¹ Bridger, “Safe Seas at What Price?,” 6.

¹² Alessio Patalano, “‘Natural Partners’ in Challenging Waters?,” *The RUSI Journal* 161, no. 3 (June 22, 2016): 44, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1193356>.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

In addition to reducing terrorist activity through the Mediterranean, OAE succeeded in geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and organizations. This thesis examines to what extent OAE enhanced intelligence sharing and co-operation with countries willing to provide assistance. Doing so may have enabled these countries to sever links in the networks of terrorists and traffickers and provided assistance to countries in need with the forces at their disposal.

Similarly, this thesis assesses the hypothesis that in addition to reducing piracy activity in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, OOS (following the example of OAE) succeeded in geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and organizations. This thesis investigates to what extent the inclusion of non-members in OOS was advantageous for mission accomplishment.

There are two extreme possibilities about the effectiveness of including non-members in NATO's maritime operations. The first possibility is that it was a resounding success in that non-members were able to integrate fully, and their support was vital to the success of the operation. The second is that the inclusion of non-members was detrimental to the operation and that it floundered as a result. Intermediate possibilities are also conceivable. For example, the participation of non-members might have been of minimal importance with little effect on the success or failure of the operation.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research for this thesis utilized three main sources of information. The first focused on NATO's website for specifics on operation origins, activities, transitions, and participants. The second included NATO Defense College studies for analyses from within NATO. The final source comprised scholarly works which typically focused on the involvement of a single country in an operation. This thesis focuses in particular on the participation of countries outside NATO.

This thesis explores the success of both OAE and then OOS by considering the roles of the individual participants. To do this, it examines the origin of each operation. Second, it evaluates the transformations throughout each operation's duration. Finally, this

thesis introduces the participants, specifying the part that each played, and investigates to what extent their inclusion led to each operation's success.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is organized in five chapters. Following Chapter I, Chapter II focuses on NATO, providing a background on its origins and purposes. Chapters III and IV each examine one of NATO's maritime operations: OAE and OOS, respectively. Each chapter will analyze the origins of the operation, any transformations during its activity, and the contributions of the participants with due attention to the activities of non-members. Chapter V, the conclusion, compares the findings about OAE and OOS and determines to what extent—and in what ways—the inclusion of non-member states in these NATO operations was advantageous. The conclusion focuses on lessons learned and makes recommendations for future operations.

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II. NATO'S CHANGING SECURITY ROLES AND COOPERATIVE PARTNERS

A. INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a multinational organization made up of 29 countries. To support unity in the alliance, NATO has a set of shared values that each member nation has agreed upon, including individual liberties, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Generally, the Allies rely on democratic values but have the strength of military force, if necessary, to protect their freedom and safety. In order to do this, NATO undertakes a number of missions supported by its members for the benefit of one and all. At its outset, NATO was focused on the collective defense of its members as well as cultivating dialogue with possible enemies, and later added the goals of crisis management and cooperative security.¹³

Isaac Kfir, Director, National Security Program, and Head, Counter-terrorism Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, has suggested that NATO is in a paradigm shift into its third distinct identity. Its first identity entailed its initial formation as a defensive security alliance. Second, it shifted following the Cold War by accepting additional responsibilities in peacekeeping and crisis management. Finally, according to Kfir, the post-11 September 2001 NATO, its current form, is struggling to settle on an identity.¹⁴ The Allies themselves hold that they are simultaneously pursuing three core tasks—collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Following their actions in Kosovo conflict in 1999 and more specifically following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the NATO Allies have been shifting their attention toward the inclusion of non-members in their operations.¹⁵ This is especially important because, with the increase of non-traditional security threats, as with state actor threats, “NATO’s security

¹³ David S. Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 1.

¹⁴ Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift,” 1.

¹⁵ David S. Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept,” *International Affairs* 86, no. 2 (2010): 489.

may thus be affected by threats stemming from beyond the territory of its member states.”¹⁶ NATO has employed several methods to counter such threats since its beginning. However, the range and extent of these threats may be changing.

As noted earlier, some observers maintain that NATO is in a paradigm shift into its third distinct identity. It first entailed its formation as a defensive security alliance. Second, while remaining an alliance for collective defense, NATO began to undertake non-Article 5 crisis management operations and cooperative security activities in 1991. These new core tasks, especially since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, have involved increased attention to the inclusion of non-member partners.¹⁷ This is especially important because of the increase in non-traditional security threats. Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga, a Policy Advisor on Foreign and Security Policy at the European Parliament, notes four main ways that the threats to NATO have changed since the Cold War; they have become (a) “more pernicious and complex,” (b) “interconnected and mutually reinforcing,” and (c) “less predictable,” and (d) they “transcend geography” in relation to the Alliance’s traditional Article 6 stipulations.¹⁸

One way that NATO is countering non-traditional security threats is through its “global partners” initiative. “Global Partners” are countries outside NATO’s regional partnerships that wish to participate in NATO-led operations or cooperate in other ways. NATO’s website states that “the emergence of global threats requires the cooperation of a wider range of countries to successfully tackle challenges such as terrorism, proliferation, piracy or cyber attacks.”¹⁹ Improved relations with non-members through cooperative frameworks can be to the benefit of NATO, whether they be in the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Partnership for Peace, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, or the new Global Partners.

¹⁶ Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga, “Emerging Security Challenges: A Glue for NATO and Partners?,” *NATO Research Paper* 85 (November 2012): 2.

¹⁷ Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept,” 489.

¹⁸ Zyga, “Emerging Security Challenges,” 2.

¹⁹ “Relations with Partners across the Globe,” NATO, May 19, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49188.htm.

Improved relations with non-members through cooperative frameworks can be to the benefit of NATO allies, as outlined in NATO's 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration:

We remain committed to further developing political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners. In doing so, we will carry forward the important achievements of NATO's partnerships policy and continue to respect the specificity of our existing multilateral partnerships... NATO's relationships with other partners across the globe are expanding and deepening, reflecting common goals in the area of security. NATO's Partnership mechanisms have evolved substantially over the past 20 years and they, like NATO itself, would benefit from a focused reform effort to make our dialogue and cooperation more meaningful, and to enhance the strategic orientation of our cooperation through a better assessment of the cooperation activities conducted with partners.²⁰

As a result of the successful inclusion of non-members in its operations, NATO outlined its drive to include more partners in its 2010 Strategic Concept. Specifically, to “enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together—across and beyond existing frameworks.”²¹ To date several operations have benefited from such participation, including the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), and Operation Ocean Shield (OOS).

Having discussed the origins and purposes of NATO, this chapter will explore the transformations of NATO and analyze its current state. It will focus on NATO's shift toward the inclusion of non-member states in its non-Article 5 operations. NATO was initially designed as an alliance based on pledges of collective defense. However, since its inception the global situation has changed quite drastically. With major changes in the geopolitical realm, NATO too has changed. This chapter examines how NATO has changed since 1949 along with the catalysts for its changes. Finally, this chapter analyzes

²⁰ “Lisbon Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon,” NATO, November 20, 2010, paragraph 25–26, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm.

²¹ *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (NATO Summit in Lisbon: NATO, November 20, 2010), 26, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

NATO in its current form, with particular attention to non-member participation in NATO-led operations, as well as what impact (if any) these non-members have had on NATO policy. This chapter hypothesizes that by providing assistance and benefit to NATO operations non-member participants are driving NATO to open its future non-Article 5 operations to more contributors.

B. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION: TRANSFORMATIONS

NATO has employed several methods to counter threats from beyond the borders of the Allies, including by undertaking operations to directly counter those threats. David Yost states that “the allies have retained the traditional purposes of the alliance and have taken on additional roles.”²² Since the end of the Cold War the purposes have included security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management, and partnership. The shift in recent times has steered the alliance to a more global focus. “This is not an alliance focused on Europe or the Euro-Atlantic area; nor is it a global alliance because it remains Atlantic and invokes global threats and issues in relation to its own security; it is rather an Atlantic Alliance focused on the globe.”²³ Increasing the purview of the Alliance to a global scale involves the addition of new partners that may not share the same values as NATO.

Following its actions in the Kosovo conflict and more specifically following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO has been shifting its attention toward the inclusion of non-members in its operations.²⁴ Specifically, the Alliance has included “Global Partners” from outside NATO’s regional partnership frameworks in order to counter these new or changing threats. Because these nations are not members of the alliance, they are not required to share the same values as the alliance; they simply share a desire to exchange views and contribute to a specific NATO activity. Magnus Petersson, an associate professor for defence and security policy at Stockholm and Oslo Universities, states that

²² Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept.”

²³ Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, “Introduction: Taking Stock of NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” in *NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment*, ed. Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, DIIS Report 2 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011), 8.

²⁴ Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept,” 489.

“NATO has conducted a number of ‘out of area’ operations after the Cold War... especially the operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan, to a large extent have shaped the development of NATO over the last 20 years.”²⁵ In order to carry out these operations NATO has relied on a number of partnership programs to tailor participation of non-members to their interests or regional concerns.

C. NON-MEMBER PARTICIPATION

According to Benjamin Schreer, when NATO began its enemy and its goals were clear: “to deter and, if necessary, to defeat an existential threat posed by forces of the Warsaw Pact. After the collapse of the former enemy, NATO adapted its strategic focus and became increasingly engaged in crisis management operations which, while certainly important, were not existential to its member states. Moreover, the alliance significantly expanded its membership from 16 at the end of the Cold War to 28 members in 2009.”²⁶ Since June 2017, NATO has had 29 members. The Alliance has an indefinite number of current or future partners for crisis management operations.

Schreer has also observed that “the advent of crisis management operations beyond the Euro-Atlantic area has led many allies to carefully limit their contributions to these missions. In their view, even a failure of operations such as in Afghanistan will not mean the end of NATO as a military alliance.”²⁷ This seems to be a reasonable assessment since none of these operations is geared against an existential threat to the Alliance, specifically one that could trigger an Article 5 response. As a result of the limited threat it is reasonable for some NATO members to decide that it is not in their best interest to become involved in these operations. However, non-Article 5 operations, such as ISAF, OAE, and OOS, offer excellent venues for non-members to participate and gain valuable insights into how

²⁵ Magnus Petersson, “The Forgotten Dimension? NATO and the Security of the Member States,” in *Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi*, ed. Håkan Edstöm and Dennis Gyllensporre, New Security Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 126.

²⁶ Benjamin Schreer, “The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy in Afghanistan,” in *Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi*, ed. Håkan Edstöm and Dennis Gyllensporre, New Security Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 141.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 142.

NATO and its members operate. This experience could make it possible for these nations to cooperate more effectively with NATO, or each other, in the future.

Launched in December 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) represents NATO's first partnership programme after the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace (PfP). When the MD was founded, it was specifically designed due to concerns over "security and stability" in the Mediterranean region.²⁸ There are currently seven countries participating in the MD: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Each primarily participates in a one-on-one relationship with NATO with the goal of stimulating "political dialogue and practical cooperation."²⁹

Established in January 1994, the PfP was designed to increase individual country relations with NATO, allowing access to all aspects of the Alliance's activity. Currently there are 21 countries participating. Altogether 34 countries have participated; 13 have joined NATO, and 3 are currently in a Membership Action Plan (MAP).³⁰ Those countries formerly in the PfP and currently in NATO are: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Countries that are still in the PfP include: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In 2011 the program was expanded to allow access to PfP activities and exercises by other partners with NATO as well.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched in 2004, is specially geared toward countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).³¹ There are currently four countries participating in the ICI: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

²⁸ "NATO Mediterranean Dialogue," NATO, February 12, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_60021.htm?

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ "Partnership for Peace Program," NATO, June 7, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm#.

³¹ "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI): Reaching out to the Broader Middle East," NATO, November 18, 2011, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_58787.htm?

Oman and Saudi Arabia have been observers. The intent of the ICI is to focus on regional issues such as terrorism as well as weapons of mass destruction. As with the other geographical partnership frameworks, the ICI is intended to be a venue for dialogue and cooperation, specifically focusing on the concerns of the Alliance and its partners.

Building on previous partnership programs, NATO launched an initiative that began in 1999 with its Membership Action Plan (MAP). Taking advantage of the lessons from the membership accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999, the Alliance via MAP helped Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join NATO in 2004. They were followed by Albania and Croatia in 2009 and by Montenegro in 2017.³² There are currently 2 countries with a MAP, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYROM. These countries are receiving tailored advice as they aspire to join NATO. However, not every country that participates in NATO-led operations can aspire (or has the desire) to join the alliance.

Because not every country has the ability to join NATO, owing to geographical or political or other reasons, NATO began developing Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) in 2002. Similar to the MAP in some ways, an IPAP allows for bilateral assistance focused on the individual partner country in one or more of six categories: “political and security issues; defence, security and military issues; public information; science and environment; civil emergency planning; and administrative, protective security and resource issues.”³³ There are currently five countries with an IPAP: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Georgia and Montenegro withdrew while pursuing full NATO Membership, which Montenegro attained in 2017.

One of NATO’s most recent initiatives is its Partners Across the Globe. “Global Partners” are countries that fall outside NATO’s regional partnership frameworks but have a desire to participate in NATO-led operations and partnership activities.³⁴ In the early

³² “Individual Partnership Action Plans,” NATO, June 9, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49290.htm.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ NATO, “Relations with Partners across the Globe.”

1990s, especially after the formation of the MD and PfP, it became apparent to NATO that the inclusion of partners from outside the Alliance could provide critical support to its operations. Steps taken at the 2006 Riga Summit and the 2008 Bucharest Summit finally resulted in a more clearly defined goal of global partners at the 2010 Lisbon summit.³⁵ There are currently nine countries that are included in NATO's Global Partners initiative: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and South Korea (ROK). Creating new partnerships and expanding the scope of existing relationships with partners have the potential to benefit NATO and its partners.

Stephan Frühling, a lecturer in the Strategic Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, and Benjamin Scheer, the Deputy Director of the Aspen Institute Germany, suggest four steps for NATO to progress with partnerships. First, the Allies could pursue a more intense focus on European partners, specifically those in the EU that are not part of NATO. Second, the Allies could maintain relations with Russia, as well as bilateral and multilateral relations with countries on NATO's eastern border. Third, Frühling and Schreer hold that the MD and the ICI should be clearer with their goals in order to manage expectations on both sides. Finally, Frühling and Schreer propose that NATO's global partners include regional security organizations and not just countries.³⁶ NATO has certainly changed since the end of the Cold War. However, maintaining its status as a defensive alliance while building on vital partnerships has kept it relevant.

D. CONCLUSION

The Alliance is no longer just a Cold War defensive alliance, nor did it ever become simply a peacekeeping organization. This chapter shows that NATO is also engaged in partnership activities in support of cooperative security and crisis management. As stated previously, the 2010 Lisbon Summit acknowledged the successes of NATO's partnerships, and the Allies revised NATO's Strategic Concept to bolster relations with partners.³⁷

³⁵ NATO, "Lisbon Summit Declaration," paragraph 25–26.

³⁶ Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer, "Creating the Next Generation of NATO Partnerships," *The RUSI Journal* 155, no. 1 (March 10, 2010): 56–57.

³⁷ NATO, "Lisbon Summit Declaration," paragraph 25–26.

Capitalizing on this shift, the call to increase partnership activities and operations derived in part from recent NATO-led operations such as ISAF and OOS. The integration of partners in these operations and others demonstrates the Alliance's ability not only to work with partner forces but also to integrate them at the operational level as well. For some partner countries, this has involved little more than a few liaison missions concerning how to integrate their forces with NATO in the future, while for others it has meant thousands of troops, several ships, or financial support. Following its actions in the Kosovo conflict and more specifically following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO has been shifting its attention toward the inclusion of non-members in its operations.³⁸ Recent operations have demonstrated steps forward in the development and the inclusion of partners, and have indicated a trend toward including these forces in earlier stages of planning and preparation than in the past.

Since June 2017 NATO has had 29 members. The Allies were, at NATO's founding, dedicated to collective defense. In more recent times, with the expansion of the Alliance, as well as the rise of global threats, the Allies have been able to work with a variable number of current or future partners in crisis management operations. As a result of limited the stakes in certain contingencies it is reasonable for some NATO members to decide that it is not in their interest to become involved in these operations. Some Allies chose, for example, not to take part in the 2011 intervention in Libya. However, operations such as ISAF, OAE, and OOS have offered excellent venues for non-members to participate and gain valuable insights into how NATO and its members operate. Such participation makes it possible for these nations to cooperate with NATO more successfully in similar or more complex operations and activities in the future.

³⁸ Yost, "NATO's Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept," 489.

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III. NATO'S OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR

A. INTRODUCTION

The NATO treaty is comprised of fourteen articles that each of the members has agreed to abide by. Article 5 is the keystone for the protection of NATO's members. Specifically, that an attack on one of the members would be considered "an attack against them all." The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 prompted the NATO Allies to invoke their Article 5 obligations for the first and only time to date.

Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) was one of NATO's responses to the 11 September terrorist attacks against the United States. Its primary objective was to prevent terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, and as such, it fell under Joint Force Command located in Naples, Italy.³⁹ The Mediterranean is a critical area to protect due to the flow of merchant traffic through such a narrow area of water.⁴⁰ In order to monitor and deter terrorism in the Mediterranean, OAE relied on the vast amount of merchant traffic to report suspicious activity, and naval assets for conducting presence and surveillance operations. The operation specifically targeted the movements of weapons associated with terrorism.

In addition to the triumphs against terrorism, OAE was successful as a result of its geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and organizations. This chapter explores that success by reflecting on the role of the individual participants in OAE. To do this, it examines the origin of OAE. Then, it evaluates the transformations that OAE underwent over 15 years. Finally, this chapter introduces the participants, reflecting on the importance that each played in OAE in order to determine whether their participation benefitted the operation.

³⁹ NATO, "Operation Active Endeavour."

⁴⁰ "Alliance Maritime Strategy," NATO, June 17, 2011, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm.

B. OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR: ORIGINS

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September on the United States, at the request of the United States, NATO invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty. Article 5 calls for the collective defense of allies of the treaty, implying that an attack on one ally is an attack on all.⁴¹ As such, each member is asked to respond as it sees fit, individually or with the rest of NATO. To this day, this remains the only time that NATO has invoked the Article 5 collective defense pledge; as a result of Article 5, NATO implemented eight measures. Those eight measures were stated by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, to the press:

- enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
- take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
- Backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
- provide blanket overflight clearance for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
- provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism, including for refueling, in accordance with national procedures.

The North Atlantic Council also agreed:

⁴¹ "The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO, March 21, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

- that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and
- that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning force to support operations against terrorism.⁴²

The eight measures implemented by NATO paved the way for all future operations with allies and also with non-NATO entities. For the Allies, the measures directed assistance to those suffering terrorism as well as providing security for those fighting it. With applications to multiple operations, including OAE, the measures called for use of airspace, ports and airfields in the fight against terrorism. Finally, the Allies deployed the Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean, and this deployment within 20 days would come to be known as OAE. Since that time, with OAE's success and persistence it became the longest lasting NATO naval operation.

The mission of OAE was to deter, defend against, and disrupt terrorism to protect the shipping traffic in the Mediterranean through the use of NATO ships.⁴³ The Standing Naval Forces in the Mediterranean were deployed on 6 October, 2001, and on 26 October, 2001 the deployment officially became OAE.⁴⁴ The primary contributors of forces initially were Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey because of their proximity to the Eastern Mediterranean, their membership in NATO, and their reliance on trade through the area.⁴⁵ To accomplish the tasks of OAE, NATO relied on the navies of its members as well as the dense merchant traffic in the area to patrol and report any suspicious activity. Once such activity was reported, the surface forces that carried out the mission of OAE were

⁴² "NATO Speeches," NATO, October 4, 2001, <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm>.

⁴³ NATO, "Operation Active Endeavour."

⁴⁴ "NATO Expeditionary Operations: The Way Forward," *Military Technology* 33, no. 4, (April, 2009), 44.

⁴⁵ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 54

responsible for “locating, tracking, reporting, and boarding selected vessels.”⁴⁶ OAE was successful in completing its tasks as set out by NATO.

OAE rallied together eleven NATO members (Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the UK, and the United States), two countries from the Mediterranean Dialogue (Israel and Morocco), three countries from the Partnership for Peace (Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia), and New Zealand. These countries made it possible for OAE to, in the first three years, conduct surveillance on 41,000 vessels, board 47 vessels, and escort 414 ships through the Straits of Gibraltar (STROG);⁴⁷ and by December 2008, to hail 100,000 merchants and board 148 of those.⁴⁸ During the period from 2012 to 2016 the number of boardings was as follows: 1 in 2012, 1 in 2013, 5 in 2014, 3 in 2015, and 1 in 2016. During the period from 2014 to 2016 the number of vessels hailed was as follows: 3,571 in 2014, 5,940 in 2015, and 3,135 in 2016.⁴⁹ This demonstrates a continuing trend toward utilization of counter-terror surveillance networks rather than direct contact. Additionally, OAE provided assistance to countries in need despite not falling under the purview of the operation. In particular, OAE assisted the Greek law enforcement authorities with motor vessel *Crystal* in March 2006, a vessel which was carrying 126 potential illegal immigrants bound for Greece. Although migrant issues did not fall under the purview of the operation, the availability of a military vessel that was able to render aid proved vital for those onboard the *Crystal*.⁵⁰

OAE was not the only operation that was dedicated to defending against terrorism in the maritime environment. Adjacent to the Mediterranean is Operation Black Sea Harmony, another multinational operation. Initiated by Turkey, it has received support

⁴⁶ “NATO Expeditionary Operations,” 44.

⁴⁷ Michael C. Mays, “Identifying New Trends within an Old relationship” (Master’s Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2013), 32.

⁴⁸ “NATO Expeditionary Operations,” 44.

⁴⁹ The author thanks the Allied Maritime Command (AMC) at Northwood, England, for this information, which the AMC provided in June 2017 with the caveat that it may be incomplete. The data furnished by AMC did not cover vessel hailings in 2012 and 2013.

⁵⁰ “Active Endeavour Assists Greece in Illegal Immigration Operation,” *NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace*, no. 1 (2006): 155.

from other littoral Black Sea states.⁵¹ However, efforts to extend OAE into the Black Sea were halted by Russia and Turkey because of the operation already taking place. South of the Suez Canal and shortly after the launch of OAE, Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 was reestablished to carry out a similar mission, encompassing the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman.⁵² CTF 150 operates under Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a naval partnership between 31 nations with five tasks: “defeating terrorism, preventing piracy, encouraging regional cooperation, and promoting a safe maritime environment.”⁵³ These similar operations and OAE mutually benefitted from each other, by covering neighboring regions and by demonstrating their utility.

C. OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR: TRANSFORMATIONS

OAE was vital geographically because “90% of the world’s commerce is seaborne and 75% of that trade passes through a few, vulnerable, canals and international straits.”⁵⁴ At its inception, OAE sought to provide protection for one of those international straits—the Suez Canal. Because of the location of the Suez Canal in the Eastern Mediterranean, its vital trade importance, and the proximity to the flow of terrorism there was a significant possibility of a terrorist attack in the area. In February 2003, OAE was expanded to include the STROG, to protect some 3,000 merchant ships that travel the straits daily.⁵⁵ The primary purpose of the expansion was to provide safety for non-military vessels while transiting. Terrorist attacks in either the STROG or the Suez Canal area have the potential for significant global social, economic, and military impacts.

In 2006 NATO expanded OAE politically, by inviting countries outside the NATO framework, to build an interoperable force by offering training for those willing.

⁵¹ “US Black Sea Strategy Emerges, But May Lack Pentagon Focus,” *Jane’s* by IHS Markit, February 14, 2007, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1156345>.

⁵² Jason R. Haen, “Leveraging Global Maritime Partnerships to Increase Global Security in the Maritime Domain” (master’s thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, 2008), 31.

⁵³ “About CMF,” CMF, accessed March 14, 2017, <https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/>.

⁵⁴ NATO, “Alliance Maritime Strategy.”

⁵⁵ Haen, “Leveraging Global Maritime Partnerships to Increase Global Security in the Maritime Domain,” 31.

Specifically targeted were non-NATO countries willing to aid in the counter-terrorism efforts. By including these countries the Allies not only gained additional forces to share the burden of the mission but also to provide and share valuable intelligence data. As Bailey points out, “a war against terrorists, or against state regimes with actual or possible WMD [weapons of mass destruction] capabilities, relies heavily on precise intelligence, highly trained and professional personnel, advanced technology and modern, integrated platforms.”⁵⁶ The process of receiving this aid from non-NATO countries began with an exchange of letters detailing their intent to join followed by a number of training evolutions to ensure proficiency. The training was gladly provided by NATO because the process ensured security throughout Europe and across the globe. As a result OAE was able to build geopolitical relationships, even outside NATO.

In January 2010, OAE underwent another change, this time operationally, shifting “from a platform-based to a network-based operation” focusing on intelligence sharing between its participants.⁵⁷ Due to budget restrictions and the geographical expansion of OAE, it became impossible to cover the entire maritime area with a naval force. As a result, the new OAE focused on building a network of nations, making the operation more cost-effective. A result of the change was that the allies could rely less on having forces deployed in the Mediterranean. Therefore, OAE shifted to the use of surge forces that may have already been in the area for other purposes. Moreover, OAE headquarters shifted from Naples to Maritime Command Headquarters, Northwood, England, in February 2013.⁵⁸ Because it was now an intelligence operation there was no longer a need for a naval commander in the Mediterranean.

Finally, NATO ended OAE in 2016 in order to strengthen relations with the EU through the sharing of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance air and naval assets.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Nathaniel A. Bailey, “NATO and the War on Terrorism: Objectives and Obstacles” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004.), 39.

⁵⁷ NATO, “Operation Active Endeavour.”

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Matthew L. R. Fillmore, “Italy, the European Union, and Mediterranean Migrants: Opportunity from Crisis?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 26.

The end of OAE saw the beginning of Operation Sea Guardian (OSG), a similar operation with a greater scope and scale. Despite the change, the mission of OAE remained part of OSG's mandate: to identify and disrupt terrorism operations in the Mediterranean. According to NATO's website, "Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, if so decided by the North Atlantic Council. It is currently performing three tasks in the Mediterranean Sea: maritime situational awareness, counter-terrorism at sea and support to capacity-building."⁶⁰ Because OAE had evolved to an intelligence-based operation, logic indicates it became an operation of greater scale. These intelligence-based actions were successful, as demonstrated by the number of participants that aided OAE.

D. WHO'S WHO?

Participating in OAE were NATO allies Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the United States, all of which provide forces to Standing Naval Force Mediterranean on a rotating basis.⁶¹ Denmark, Germany, Norway and Spain donated forces specifically for STROG escorts.⁶² Estonia also participated in OAE by providing naval personnel. More significant, however, are the non-NATO contributors, including members of the Mediterranean Dialogue: Israel and Morocco. The Partnership for Peace contributors have included Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. Additionally, New Zealand provided a vessel in April - May 2015.⁶³ Some countries that sought to aid in OAE were also aspiring to become NATO members, like Georgia and Ukraine, while some simply hoped to develop closer ties to NATO, like Russia.

The Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum that was created in 1994 by NATO to reinforce "security and stability in the Mediterranean... It has deepened mutual understanding between NATO member countries and their Mediterranean partners."⁶⁴

⁶⁰ NATO, "Operation Active Endeavour."

⁶¹ "NATO Ships Will Visit Casablanca, Morocco." *M2 Presswire*, Oct 14, 2003.

⁶² NATO, "Operation Active Endeavour."

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Razoux, "The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue at a Crossroads," 2.

Following an exchange of letters in 2006, Israel supported OAE by having a liaison stationed permanently at OAE headquarters in Naples. Israel did not provide any ships, despite numerous negotiations that occurred until May 2010, when Turkey vetoed Israel's participation. Turkey's actions were a result of the Gaza flotilla incident, in which Israeli naval commandos killed eight Turkish citizens while in combat.⁶⁵ For Morocco, an exchange of letters occurred in 2008 concerning its intent to contribute to OAE. Like Israel, Morocco had not provided any ships to support OAE. However, Morocco hosted ships from the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean in Casablanca, particularly in 2004, when four ships were in port.⁶⁶ This type of evolution is vital because it results in a dialogue and continued mutual understanding between countries that at times have been antagonistic.

As noted previously, participants in the Partnership for Peace also rendered aid to OAE. According to NATO's website, the Partnership for Peace is intended to create an opportunity for individual countries to open a dialogue and engage in cooperation with NATO.⁶⁷ The addition of Partnership for Peace nations to OAE was considered an achievement because of the interoperability and capability building with those nations.⁶⁸ Georgia, like Israel and Morocco, exchanged letters with NATO in 2008, established a Tactical Memorandum of understanding in 2010, and sent a liaison representative but did not provide any forces to OAE.⁶⁹

According to David S. Yost, "Ukraine has participated more extensively in NATO-led operations than any other partner country."⁷⁰ One of the driving factors for Ukraine's heavy involvement was to participate in international cooperation efforts to further the goal of European integration. Ukraine provided: The *URS Ternopil* from 25 May to 2 July, 2007, the *URS Lutsk* from 24 November to 11 December, 2007, the *URS Sagaidachnyi* from 30

⁶⁵ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 106.

⁶⁶ "NATO Ships Will Visit Casablanca, Morocco."

⁶⁷ "Partnership for Peace Programme," NATO, April 7, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm.

⁶⁸ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 204.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 228.

May to 2 August, 2008, the *URS Ternopil* for the second time from 18 November to 3 December, 2008, the *URS Ternopil* for the third time from 22 October to 23 November, 2009, and *URS Ternopil* for the fourth time from 10 November to 17 December, 2010.⁷¹

Russia provided the *RFS Pitliviy* from 9 to 25 September, 2006, and also the *RFS Ladny* from 3 to 25 September, 2007. Both of Russia's deployments were short. However, the fact that they deployed for OAE at all indicated an improvement in NATO-Russia relations. However, Russia's participation ended with the Georgia crisis.⁷² The inclusion of forces from countries outside NATO demonstrates OAE's success in its goal to enhance cooperation.

E. CONCLUSION

Born out of NATO's Article 5 response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, this protracted NATO mission could be called a success. Over its 15 years, OAE expanded its scope; first in its geographic coverage, reaching to the STROG and including the entire Mediterranean as a result; and second geopolitically, by accepting aid from countries outside NATO. These expansions showed a continued interest in using the maritime environment to fight terrorism, as well as interest in partnering with NATO. Altogether OAE rallied together eleven NATO members, two countries from the Mediterranean Dialogue, three countries from the Partnership for Peace, and New Zealand. This cooperation represents one of the closest and most successful interactions with countries outside the alliance for its time. Clear interest in continuing this type of operation is evident because one of the key components of OSG is continuing the mission of OAE.

Despite the fact that OAE was only one of the eight measures in NATO's response to 11 September, it was also successful in accomplishing three other missions as well. It did this by enhancing intelligence sharing and co-operation with countries willing to provide assistance; by aiding countries subjected to terrorism, severing links in the flow of

⁷¹ "Ukrainian Ship Ternopil to Join Operation Active Endeavour," *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, February 2007, 162.

⁷² "Russian Federation Ship Pitliviy Continues Preparations to Join NATO Operation Active Endeavour," *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, February 2006, 157.

terrorist networks and providing assistance to countries in need with the forces at their disposal; and by the cooperation of the Allies and partner countries with an interest in the mission providing ports and airfields to support the shared objectives.

Taking the maritime environment away from terrorists has proven to be a vital element in the fight against terrorism. However, the fight continues, and NATO is expanding to a more extensive range of operations; OSG will need to be NATO's new instrument in the efforts. As new challenges emerge on the terrorism front, the example of the transformations that OAE underwent and its recent evolution to OSG can be used as a guide to effectively counter-terrorism not only in the Mediterranean but around the globe. OAE has demonstrated NATO's ability to provide a venue for political dialogue and as well as a framework for increasing awareness of—and countering—emerging threats. Calling on the strength of its Allies as well as willing partners has granted NATO unparalleled experience in the field of counter-terrorism as well as cooperation, an objective that can be expected to continue in the future.

IV. NATO'S OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD

A. INTRODUCTION

As a result of the successful inclusion of non-members in its operations NATO outlined its drive to include more partners in its 2010 Strategic Concept.⁷³ To date several operations have benefited from such participation, including the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the International Security Assistance Force, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), and Operation Ocean Shield (OOS). This chapter will focus on OOS, the most recent of these operations.

OOS received the support of countries outside NATO's regional partnership frameworks, including Australia, Colombia, Japan, and New Zealand. For seven years (17 August, 2009—15 December, 2016) OOS was a NATO-led operation established to counter and deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa, and in the Indian Ocean.⁷⁴ This chapter will discuss three major aspects of this operation. First, the chapter will clarify the origins of OOS and explain why the UN was calling for action against piracy in the region. Second, this chapter will analyze how the operation changed over the course of its seven years, shifting from an operation actively countering piracy to one that provided assistance to other countries developing their own counter-piracy capabilities.⁷⁵ Finally, this chapter will examine the participants in OOS, paying particular attention to states outside NATO and what they provided to the operation. This chapter proposes that, in addition to its triumphs against piracy, OOS succeeded in geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and organizations. Further, OOS represents a new trend for NATO's inclusion of non-member states in its operations, and this chapter recommends their addition at the earliest possible stage.

⁷³ NATO, "Lisbon Summit Declaration," paragraph 25-26.

⁷⁴ NATO, "Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived)," December 19, 2016.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

B. OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD: ORIGINS

Following in the footsteps of two previous NATO counter-piracy operations—Operation Allied Provider (2008) and Operation Allied Protector (2009)—NATO established OOS in response to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions calling for maritime counter-piracy action off the horn of Africa. Following UNSC Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1844, 1846, and 1851 (2008), NATO implemented Operation Allied Provider. It furnished naval escorts for World Food Programme vessels and deterred piracy by patrolling the waters near Somalia. From October to December 2008 ships from three NATO members—Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom—carried out Operation Allied Provider.⁷⁶ Later NATO began Operation Allied Protector to deter, defend against, and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, acting on previous UNSC resolutions. From March to August 2009, ships from nine NATO members—Canada, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States—carried out Operation Allied Protector.⁷⁷

The goal of OOS, unlike the two preceding missions, included the objective of integration of non-member states. According to Isaac Kfir, OOS was “designed to not only promote naval security but also forge ties with out-of-area states such as New Zealand, Australia and Japan.”⁷⁸ It did so under the auspices of the previously listed United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and also UNSCRs 1897 (2009); 1918 and 1950 (2010); 1976, 2015 and 2020 (2011). NATO partnered together with the European Union (EU)⁷⁹ and the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces⁸⁰ in Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, allowing the organizations along with 30 states operating in the area to coordinate their efforts. These meetings involved Australia,

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift,” 235.

⁷⁹ EU Operation Atalanta began on December 8, 2008. “EU Naval Operation against Piracy (EUNAVFOR Somalia - Operation ATALANTA),” EU Council Secretariat, February 2010, www.consilium.europa.eu/csdp.

⁸⁰ Combined Task Force 151 was established in January 2009 “CTF 151: Counter-Piracy,” Combined Maritime Forces, September 16, 2017, <https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/>.

Bahrain, China, Egypt, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Korea, Ukraine, and Yemen, among others.

Rather than participating in the efforts organized by NATO, the EU, or the United States, some countries conducted national efforts. Instead of providing forces to one of the operations already in place, China, India, Iran, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the Gulf States, among others, sent their own forces to conduct counter-piracy operations.⁸¹ Some nations, including China, did not utilize the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), but instead established a route in the vicinity—China’s was just 5 nautical miles north of it—requiring at least some level of coordination with SHADE. Some other nations, particularly those that did not participate in the SHADE meetings, did not utilize a defined area of operations for their counter-piracy operations, specifically Iran.

Due to the large amount of area to cover, about 2 million square miles, OOS required a significant naval presence; as a result, cooperation became a vital aspect of OOS. David Yost quotes Andrew Shapiro’s statement in 2011: “On any given day up to 30 vessels from as many as 20 nations are engaged in counter-piracy operations in the region.”⁸² Those forces come from NATO, the EU, CTF-151, as well as national efforts. OOS, in particular, “has been conducted by three to six ships from the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, plus maritime patrol aircraft.”⁸³ Together, NATO, the EU, and the United States Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) established a 480 nautical mile IRTC for shipping traffic to utilize while transiting the Gulf of Aden.⁸⁴ There were, however, only two states from outside the Alliance that provided ships for the Standing NATO

⁸¹ Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 167.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Miwa Hirono and Manshu Xu, “China’s Military Operations Other than War,” *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 6 (December 24, 2013): 77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.869726>.

Maritime Group⁸⁵ for OOS, Ukraine and New Zealand. From the start of the operation, these forces conducted escorts as well as defended against pirate attacks. However, OOS was not a static operation. Because of the change in pirate activity it changed its goals over the course of its seven years of operation.

C. OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD: TRANSFORMATIONS

At its outset, NATO directed OOS to concentrate on counter-piracy efforts in the maritime environment. UNSCR 2020 in 2011 renewed previous resolutions calling for counter piracy operations off the Horn of Africa as follows:

*Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and through seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use.*⁸⁶

Because of the success of the operation and because of the continued OOS presence in the area, piracy off the Horn of Africa declined. Following this decrease, and also due to changes in tactics by the pirates, the NATO allies transformed OOS, targeting logistics and support for piracy.⁸⁷

The first major transformation shifted OOS from aiding pirated ships and providing escorts to targeting logistics and support for the pirates. In order to do this NATO forces sought to disable pirate vessels and to attach tracking beacons to mother ships while

⁸⁵ “SNMGs are multinational, integrated maritime forces made up of vessels from various Allied countries. Their composition varies and usually comprises between six and ten ships. These vessels (including their helicopters) are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from participating in exercises to actually intervening in operational missions. These groups provide NATO with a continuous maritime capability for operations and other activities in peacetime and in periods of crisis and conflict. They also help to establish Alliance presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct routine diplomatic visits to different countries, support transformation and provide a variety of maritime military capabilities to ongoing missions.” “Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived).”

⁸⁶ “UNSC Resolution 2020,” United Nations Security Council, November 22, 2011, [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2020%20\(2011\)%20](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2020%20(2011)%20).

⁸⁷ NATO, “Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived),” December 19, 2016.

“allowing the use of force to disable or destroy suspected pirate or armed robber vessels.”⁸⁸ By doing this OOS was able to further reduce the amount of piracy in the area. (See Table 1). Because of the trackers, the Allies were able to predict and prevent pirate attacks much more easily. Pervaiz Asghar, a Maritime Researcher at the National Centre for Maritime Policy Research in the National Defence College Islamabad, summarizes the changes in pirate activity:

During the period 2005 to 2012, piracy off Somalia posed the predominant threat to world shipping. What started off as a local endeavor to curb the rampant poaching and dumping of toxic waste in lawless Somali waters grew into a fullblown piratical enterprise. Incidents of piracy rose seven fold to 35 in 2005, prior to declining briefly the next year, and then from 31 pirate attacks in 2007, the problem literally exploded in 2008, when fabulous sums of money were raked in as ransom for captured vessels, cargo and crew. In 2010 alone, pirates seized close to 50 vessels, taking nearly 1200 seamen as hostages. And from this peak, piracy dwindled gradually in 2011 and more rapidly in the next year. In figurative terms, successful seizures went down from 49 in 2010 to 28 in 2011 and only 13 in 2012.⁸⁹

NATO noted in 2014 that, epitomizing this decrease, “since May 2012, not a single ship has been captured.”⁹⁰ However, piracy is still a threat, as it could occur at any time. In fact, more recently, there appears to be a trend indicating that piracy may be back on the rise; although, “the number of pirate attacks in the past five years has been negligible.”⁹¹

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Perviaz Asghar, “Safeguarding Vital Links in Sea Trade,” *Defence Journal* 20, no. 4 (2016): 2.

⁹⁰ “Fact Sheet—Operation Ocean Shield” (NATO, November 2014), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/141202a-Factsheet-OceanShield-en.pdf.

⁹¹ Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Piracy Back on the Rise off Somalia, U.S. Military Says,” *Washington Post*, April 23, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/04/23/u-s-monitoring-spike-in-pirate-attacks-off-horn-of-africa-officials-say/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e85183175ad5.

Table 1. Pirate Attacks 2008–2014 (as of October)⁹²

Pirate Attacks 2008 – 2014 (as of October)

Location	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Somali Basin	8 hijacks	26 hijacks	26 hijacks	4 hijacks	2 hijacks	0 hijacks	0 hijacks
	11 attacks	58 attacks	68 attacks	52 attacks	5 attacks	5 attacks	0 attacks
	N/A	15 disruptions	88 disruptions	52 disruptions	16 disruptions	6 disruptions	0 disruptions
Gulf of Aden	33 hijacks	18 hijacks	12 hijacks	1 hijacks	0 hijacks	0 hijacks	0 hijacks
	42 attacks	67 attacks	33 attacks	29 attacks	7 attacks	1 attack	0 attacks
	N/A	47 disruptions	56 disruptions	21 disruptions	7 disruptions	2 disruptions	0 disruptions
Arabian Sea	N/A	1 hijacks	7 hijacks	19 hijacks	5 hijacks	0 hijacks	0 hijacks
	N/A	5 attacks	31 attacks	48 attacks	10 attacks	0 attacks	1 attacks
	N/A	N/A	3 disruptions	23 disruptions	14 disruptions	0 disruptions	0 disruptions
Total		45 hijacks	45 hijacks	24 hijacks	7 hijacks	0 hijacks	0 hijacks
		130 attacks	132 attacks	129 attacks	22 attacks	6 attacks	1 attacks
		62 disruptions	147 disruptions	96 disruptions	37 disruptions	8 disruptions	0 disruptions

Legend:

Hijack: Pirates are able to take control of a vessel

Attack: Pirates try to take over a ship but do not succeed.

Disruption: International military action causes the pirates to abort an attack.

Pirated vessels: As at 11 November 2014, pirates are holding an estimated of 30 hostages.

Due to the nature of piracy, an activity that virtually anyone could carry out, the second major change to OOS broadened its scope even further. This modification for OOS offered, “within means and capabilities to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy.”⁹³ This addition to OOS allowed NATO to provide training and also coordinate efforts with the nations attending SHADE meetings. Doing so increased the counter-piracy effectiveness of the other countries and also helped to increase the ability of countries in the region to prevent piracy. Because of the lack of pirate activity and the bolstering of the ability of countries in the region to defend against it, NATO ended OOS in December 2016. In the words of the NATO website, “While the operation officially concludes today, NATO will continue to keep a close eye on the situation in the region and stands ready to restart our patrols should they be needed.”⁹⁴ It is important that, though piracy may no longer be a major threat, NATO stands ready to respond in the event of a resurgence.

⁹² “Fact Sheet - Operation Ocean Shield.”

⁹³ NATO, “Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived),” December 19, 2016.

⁹⁴ “NATO Concludes Successful Counter-Piracy Mission,” NATO, December 15, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/en/natohq/news_139420.htm.

D. WHO'S WHO?

NATO members that participated in OSS include Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The states that participated in OOS from outside NATO included Australia, Colombia, Japan, New Zealand, and Ukraine.⁹⁵ Only two of these were integrated in the Standing NATO Maritime Group for deployments: New Zealand and Ukraine. Additionally, NATO units worked closely with other international operations that were occurring at the same time; the European Union was conducting Operation Atalanta, and the United States led Combined Task Force 151.

Alessio Patalano, a Reader in War Studies in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, specializing in Japanese naval history, analyses Japan's contributions and determines that NATO is a "Natural Partner" for Japan. Patalano describes NATO's relationship with Japan in three phases. First, during the Cold War both were concerned about the Soviet Union. Second, there followed a period of increasing political dialogue until the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001. Finally, they shifted to focus on global security issues; however, this interaction did not begin until 2009.⁹⁶ Japan initially deployed two P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and two destroyers in July 2009 for OOS—but these assets were not integrated into the Standing NATO Maritime Group. From there Japan's involvement increased, and "by 2014 Japanese air patrols covered 60 per cent of all surveillance flights in the Gulf of Aden."⁹⁷ Patalano notes the vital importance of not only maintaining, but also increasing relations between Japan and NATO, because "both actors need to face the possibility of having to deter both Russia and China from taking steps against the established maritime order."⁹⁸ Increasing activities in cooperation with Japan seems to be a wise decision for NATO; integrating forces for not only counter-piracy

⁹⁵ NATO, "Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived)," December 19, 2016.

⁹⁶ Patalano, "'Natural Partners' in Challenging Waters?," 43.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

operations but also for a number of other maritime purposes is beneficial, considering the uncertainties presented by Russia and China.

Two other countries that provided forces to counter-piracy operations but did not integrate with NATO except for attending SHADE meetings were Russia and China. According to Patalano, “Until 2013, Russia too interacted with NATO naval forces for the benefit of the anti-piracy effort.”⁹⁹ After 2013, Russia withdrew from NATO’s counter-piracy as well as other efforts as the Russians turned their focus and became revanchist. China’s efforts against piracy began in December 2008 by deploying two warships, one support ship, and two helicopters.¹⁰⁰ China’s continued attendance at SHADE meetings demonstrated its continued interest in cooperation with forces. According to Miwa Hirono, Associate Professor in Chinese studies at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, and Manshu Xu, Captain and Associate Professor at the Research Center for Crisis Management at the National Defence University in China, “Co-operation in counter-piracy operations can be further strengthened by, for example, the sharing of scarce force enablers, such as tankers and medical ships.”¹⁰¹ Improving the relationship between NATO and China may prove to be vital, and an important step for the future, especially when taking into account Russia’s decreased interest in co-operation with NATO.

Two countries provided ships to the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) for deployments, New Zealand and Ukraine. From June until December 2013, Ukraine provided a frigate, *UPS Hetman Sagaidachny* to SNMG1 and from January until June 2014 New Zealand provided a frigate, *HMNZS Te Mana* to SNMG2.¹⁰² These deployments represented continued interest and an improved level of integration for both countries because both participated in OAE but did not integrate into the SNMG structure at the time.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 47.

¹⁰⁰ Hirono and Xu, “China’s Military Operations Other than War,” 77.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 79.

¹⁰² NATO, “Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived),” December 19, 2016.

This integration of forces reflects a continued trend for NATO to increase its cooperation with non-members, specifically with Global Partner New Zealand.¹⁰³

Unfortunately, due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Alliance is likely to see a step backwards in the contributions from Ukraine to NATO-led operations in the future. Of the 21 countries in NATO's Partnership for Peace, Ukraine is the only one to have integrated forces for OOS.¹⁰⁴ Russia also provided forces but they were not integrated in the SNMG structure. NATO remains hopeful for a positive solution, as indicated by the trust funds established by NATO allies at the 2014 Wales summit to aid Ukraine in developing and sustaining its capabilities.¹⁰⁵

E. CONCLUSION

As evidenced by the decrease in piracy activity and the Alliance's ability to conclude OOS, this thesis considers OOS to have been a success. In Resolution 2020 in 2011 the UNSC unanimously commended

the efforts of the EU operation Atalanta, North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations Allied Protector and Ocean Shield, Combined Maritime Forces' Combined Task Force 151, and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with the TFG [Transitional Federal Government of Somalia] and each other, to suppress piracy and to protect vulnerable ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the efforts of individual countries, including China, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, which have deployed ships and/or aircraft in the region.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ "Following the [2010] Lisbon Summit, NATO revised its partnership policy in April 2011 to better engage with partners. Global partners now have access to the full range of activities NATO offers to all partners; each has developed an Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme, choosing the areas where they wish to engage with NATO in a spirit of mutual benefit and reciprocity." NATO, "Relations with Partners across the Globe."

¹⁰⁴ "The Partnership for Peace was established in 1994 to enable participants to develop an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation, and the level and pace of progress." "Partnership for Peace Program."

¹⁰⁵ "Relations with Ukraine," NATO, July 11, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations Security Council, "UNSC Resolution 2020."

For NATO, along with the EU and CTF 151, to have the support of the UNSC indicates a positive result. NATO's website quotes Alliance spokesperson Oana Lungescu as follows: "Operation Ocean Shield has been a great success—making an essential contribution to combatting piracy in the seas off Somalia and therefore keeping one of the world's most important waterways safe and secure."¹⁰⁷ However, this thesis, after having analyzed the origins and transformations of OOS as well as the participants, concludes that it succeeded in geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries as well.

The support received by NATO from partners integrated well and benefited the operation. As evidenced by the establishment and success of SHADE, OOS signals a landmark in NATO's transition to its new paradigm. The alliance is no longer just a Cold War defensive alliance, nor simply a peacekeeping organization. This thesis shows that NATO is also engaged in partnership activities in support of cooperative security and crisis management. The 2010 Lisbon Summit acknowledged the success of OOS by revising NATO's Strategic Concept to bolster relations with partners:

We remain committed to further developing political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners. In doing so, we will carry forward the important achievements of NATO's partnerships policy and continue to respect the specificity of our existing multilateral partnerships... NATO's relationships with other partners across the globe are expanding and deepening, reflecting common goals in the area of security. NATO's Partnership mechanisms have evolved substantially over the past 20 years and they, like NATO itself, would benefit from a focused reform effort to make our dialogue and cooperation more meaningful, and to enhance the strategic orientation of our cooperation through a better assessment of the cooperation activities conducted with partners.¹⁰⁸

Capitalizing on this shift, the call to increase partnership activities and operations was immediately applied to OOS, demonstrating the Alliance's ability not only to work with partner forces—in particular Ukraine and New Zealand—but also to integrate them into SNMG deployments. Following its actions in the Kosovo conflict and more

¹⁰⁷ NATO, "NATO Concludes Successful Counter-Piracy Mission."

¹⁰⁸ NATO, "Lisbon Summit Declaration," paragraph 25-26.

specifically following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO has been shifting its attention toward the inclusion of non-members in its operations.¹⁰⁹ OOS demonstrated a step forward in the development and the inclusion of partners and indicated a trend toward including these forces in earlier stages of planning and operations than in the past.

¹⁰⁹ Yost, "NATO's Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept," 489.

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V. CONCLUSION

Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO launched its first maritime Article 5 operation, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE). The goal of this operation was to help deter, disrupt, and defend against terrorist activity. OAE began on 4 October 2001 and was the first NATO maritime operation to include non-member participation, following in the footsteps of noteworthy operations before it—the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The second maritime operation to include non-members, Operation Ocean Shield (OOS), was established in 2009 to deter and disrupt piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa, and in the Indian Ocean. This operation represented a continuing trend for NATO to not only include non-member participants, but to include them at an earlier point and to integrate them completely into the force.

The inclusion of non-members in NATO maritime operations could lead to two basic outcomes. The first possibility is that of resounding success, in that non-members might integrate fully, and their support could be vital to the success of the operation. The second possibility is that the inclusion of non-members could be detrimental to the operation and it might flounder as a result. Intermediate possibilities are also conceivable. For example, the participation of some non-members might have been of minimal importance with little effect on the success or failure of the operation. This thesis investigated to what extent the inclusion of non-members contributed to the success of OAE and OOS. Further, it suggested that the implications of their inclusion should be considered by NATO planners at the earliest possible opportunity.

This thesis examined to what extent Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) enhanced intelligence sharing and co-operation with countries willing to provide assistance. It determined that intelligence sharing and cooperation may have enabled these countries to sever links in the flow of terrorists and illicit supporting networks of traffickers, and may have provided assistance to countries in need with the forces at OAE's disposal. In addition to reducing terrorist activity throughout the Mediterranean, OAE succeeded in geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and

organizations. OAE marked the first NATO maritime operation to include non-member participation.

This thesis also investigated to what extent the inclusion of non-members in OOS was advantageous for mission accomplishment. It determined that in addition to reducing piracy activity in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, OOS was (like OAE) successful in geopolitical relationship-building between NATO members and non-NATO countries and organizations. This operation specifically benefited from the inclusion of non-members during the planning phases. Going beyond OAE, OOS incorporated those non-NATO forces into a Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG), a first in NATO history.

A. SIGNIFICANCE

Despite the efforts of the United States, its allies, and security partners to curb terrorism and piracy, both dangers remain. NATO has played a major role in counter-terror and counter-piracy operations in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Contributions to these NATO-led operations by non-NATO states reinforced OAE for 15 years (2001-2016) and OOS for 7 years (2009-2016).

Through OAE NATO paved the way for cooperation of maritime forces in an international framework by creating partnerships with non-members. This is due in part to the possible global impact of terrorism. As a result, NATO was able to draw on the support not only of its members but also of partner countries that have a common interest in countering these threats. OOS followed a similar pattern. Although initially established as a NATO operation, it too increased its capacity by allowing non-members to participate because of the global concern over piracy in the region and the possibility that it—like terrorism—could spread.

As a result of the successful inclusion of non-members in its operations NATO outlined its drive to include more partners in its 2010 Strategic Concept. Specifically, the Allies pledged to “enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and

partners together—across and beyond existing frameworks.”¹¹⁰ To date several operations have benefited from such participation, including IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, OAE, and OOS to name a few.

OAE was one of NATO’s responses to the 11 September terrorist attacks against the United States. Its primary objective was to prevent terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, and as such, it fell under Joint Force Command located in Naples, Italy.¹¹¹ The Mediterranean is a critical area to protect due to the immense flow of merchant traffic through such a narrow area of water.¹¹² In order to monitor activities and deter terrorism in the Mediterranean, OAE relied on the vast amount of merchant traffic to report suspicious activity, and OAE employed naval assets to conduct presence and surveillance operations. OAE specifically targeted the movements of weapons associated with terrorism.

Over its 15 years, OAE expanded its scope; first in its geographic coverage, reaching to the Strait of Gibraltar (STROG) and including the entire Mediterranean as a result; and second geopolitically, by accepting aid from partner countries outside NATO. These expansions show a continued interest in using the maritime environment to fight terrorism, as well as an interest in benefiting from the contributions of non-members partnering with NATO. Altogether OAE rallied together eleven NATO members, two countries from the Mediterranean Dialogue, three countries from the Partnership for Peace, and New Zealand.¹¹³ This cooperation represents some of the closest and most successful ties with partner countries outside the Alliance. Clear interest in continuing this type of operation is evident because one of the key purposes of Operation Sea Guardian—the operation taking OAE’s place—is continuing the OAE mission.

¹¹⁰ *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.*

¹¹¹ NATO, “Operation Active Endeavour.”

¹¹² NATO, “Alliance Maritime Strategy.”

¹¹³ The countries concerned are listed in Chapter III.

Despite the fact that OAE was only one of the eight measures in NATO's response to 9/11, it was also successful in meeting three other tasks as well: (a) enhancing intelligence sharing and co-operation with countries willing to provide assistance; (b) aiding countries subjected to terrorism by severing links in the terrorist and trafficking networks and providing assistance to countries in need; and (c) promoting cooperation by NATO Allies and partner countries with an interest in the mission and a willingness to provide ports, airfields, ships, aircraft, and other assets.

Taking the maritime environment away from terrorists may prove to be a vital element in the fight against terrorism. However, the fight continues and NATO is expanding to a more extensive field of operations against terrorism, piracy, and other crimes. OSG will become one of NATO's new instruments in the efforts. As new challenges emerge on the terrorism front, the example of the transformations OAE underwent and its recent evolution to OSG can be used as a guide to effectively counter-terrorism not only in the Mediterranean but around the globe.

Following in the footsteps of two previous NATO counter-piracy operations—Operation Allied Provider (2008) and Operation Allied Protector (2009)—NATO established OOS on 17 August 2009 in response to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions calling for maritime counter-piracy action off the horn of Africa. Following UNSC Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), and 1851 (2008), NATO implemented Operation Allied Provider. It furnished naval escorts for World Food Program vessels and deterred piracy by patrolling the waters near Somalia. From October to December 2008 ships from three NATO members—Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom—carried out Operation Allied Provider.¹¹⁴ From March to August 2009 NATO conducted Operation Allied Protector to deter, defend against, and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, acting on previous UNSC resolutions. Ships from nine NATO members—Canada, Greece, Italy,

¹¹⁴ NATO, "Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived)," December 19, 2016.

Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States—carried out Operation Allied Protector.¹¹⁵

OOS, unlike the two preceding missions, included the participation of non-member states. According to Isaac Kfir of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, OOS was “designed to not only promote naval security but also forge ties with out-of-area states such as New Zealand, Australia and Japan.”¹¹⁶ OOS did so under the auspices of the previously listed United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and also UNSCRs 1897 (2009); 1918 (2010) and 1950 (2010); 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011) and 2020 (2011). NATO partnered together with the European Union (EU)¹¹⁷ and the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces¹¹⁸ in Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, allowing these organizations and 30 states operating in the area to coordinate their efforts. These meetings involved Australia, Bahrain, China, Egypt, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Korea, Ukraine, and Yemen, among others.¹¹⁹

Capitalizing on NATO’s shift toward including partners, the call to increase partnership activities and operations was immediately applied to OOS, demonstrating the Alliance’s ability not only to work with partner forces—in particular Ukraine and New Zealand—but also to integrate them into SNMG deployments. Following its actions in the Kosovo conflict and more specifically following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO has been shifting its attention toward the inclusion of non-members in its operations.¹²⁰ OOS demonstrated a step forward in the inclusion of partners and indicated a trend toward including these forces in earlier stages of planning and action than in the past.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Kfir, “NATO’s Paradigm Shift,” 235.

¹¹⁷ “Fact Sheet - EU Naval Operation against Piracy (EUNAVFOR Somalia - Operation ATALANTA).”

¹¹⁸ Combined Task Force 151 was established in January 2009. “CTF 151: Counter-Piracy.”

¹¹⁹ “Fact Sheet - Counter-Piracy: Operation Ocean Shield” (NATO, January 2010), 2.

¹²⁰ Yost, “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept,” 1.

Since June 2017 NATO has had 29 members. The Allies were, at NATO's founding in 1949, dedicated to collective defense. Since the 1990s, with the expansion of the Alliance, as well as the rise of global threats, the Allies have been able to work with a variable number of current or future partners in cooperative security activities and crisis management operations. As a result of the limited stakes in certain contingencies (notably non-Article 5 cases), it is reasonable for some NATO members to decide that it is not in their interest to become involved in these operations. Some Allies chose, for example, not to take part in the 2011 intervention in Libya. However, operations such as ISAF, OAE, and OOS have offered excellent venues for non-members to participate in support of international security and gain valuable insights into how NATO and its members operate. Such participation makes it possible for these nations to cooperate with NATO more successfully in similar or more complex operations and activities in the future.

Integrating forces is beneficial not only for counter-terror or counter-piracy operations but also for a number of other maritime purposes. This is of particular importance given today's situation with the uncertainties presented by Russia, China and other potential adversaries. Geoffrey Till, a British naval historian and Professor of Maritime Studies in the Defence Studies Department of King's College London, states that "NATO provides the most sophisticated examples of maritime coalition operations with standing forces such as those in the Atlantic and Mediterranean... highlighting force unity and developing friendships between ships and bonds between nations."¹²¹ Integrating the forces of Allies and partners under NATO auspices presents an early and often valuable opportunity for forces to practice together. This allows them to learn how Allies and partners operate, and this in turn enables them to conduct joint operations more smoothly and effectively in the future.

¹²¹ Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 245.

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