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**MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE FUTURE
OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN AFRICA**

by

Richard T. Wilkerson

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Cristiana Matei
Jessica R. Piombo

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RELATIONS IN AFRICA**

Richard T. Wilkerson
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps
BS, University of Tennessee Knoxville, 1999

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June 2018**

Approved by: Cristiana Matei
Advisor

Jessica R. Piombo
Second Reader

Mohammed M. Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Transnational crime, violent extremism, insecurity, and instability are common challenges that negatively impact U.S. interests in Africa, including democracy promotion, development, trade, peace, and security. Professional African militaries are one potential solution to these challenges. Toward this end, U.S. military training and professional education has increased in Africa since 2002. Building professional militaries can improve security but also presents a moral dilemma. African regimes are often criticized for poor governance—including patrimonial, kleptocratic, and authoritarian rule—and African armies are often political in nature. In this regard, this thesis investigated whether U.S. training and professional education encourages democratic civil-military relations or simply provides rulers with more lethal militaries. From a comparison of four case studies, the effects of U.S. security assistance to El Salvador and Colombia during the 1980s and 1990s were compared to the political and military environments of modern Cameroon and Senegal to determine potential outcomes of current and future training and professional education programs there. Results show likely increases in soldiering skills but indeterminate effects on the professionalism required for transition to democratic civil-military relations. This transition is more probable when both the partner state's regime and military are reform-minded, and reforms are implemented throughout the defense sector.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
AU	African Union
CAMF	Central African Multinational Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COLAR	Colombian Armed Forces
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
ESAF	El Salvador Armed Forces or
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
GDP	gross domestic product
IMET	International Military Education and Training program
MARFORAFRICOM	Marine Corps Forces, Africa
NCO	noncommissioned officer
SANDF	South African National Defense Force
SOA	U.S. Army School of the Americas
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
VEO	violent extremist organization
UN	United Nations
UNC	Union National Camerounien party

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

In November 2010, Cote d'Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo lost re-election in what was considered a "relatively free and fair" democratic process.¹ The military disregarded its duty to support the constitution, came out of its barracks, helped Gbagbo flee international authorities, and attacked his opponents in an attempt to overturn the election results.² Thousands died between the announcement of Gbagbo's electoral loss and his arrest in April 2011. The military had been a critical client in Gbagbo's patrimonial network during his ten-year rule and this likely prompted them to back him instead of observing the rule of law.

The Cote d'Ivoire case is a good example of undemocratic civil-military relations. Regrettably, the Cote d'Ivoire case is not unique in Africa. State use of militaries and security forces to repress political activities and other civil liberties occurs frequently in African states such as Cameroon and Zimbabwe. African militaries also attempt coups, as they did in Niger in 2010, Burkina Faso in 2014, and Burundi in 2015.³ It is likely that better-trained, professional militaries, which accept the civilian supremacy of the armed forces, would improve contemporary African civil-military relations (understood as a trinity of civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency), which will ultimately result in better governance, improved legitimacy, political liberalization, and limit the misuse or misbehavior of African armed forces.⁴ Unfortunately, it is also possible that militaries in

¹ "Freedom in the World 2011: Cote d'Ivoire Report," Freedom House.
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/c-te-divoire>. Viewed 31 August 2017.

² Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, "Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions," *Africa Security Brief*, No.17 (January 2012), 4.

³ Jonathan Powell, Trace Lasley and Rebecca Shiel, "Combating Coups d'Etats in Africa 1950–2014," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 51, No. 4 (2016), 500.

⁴ Florina Cristiana Matei, "A new conceptualization of civil-military relations," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 35.

Africa will continue to impair democracy and governance since civilian authority over the military “remains a missing piece of Africa’s democratic transition puzzle.”⁵

This thesis researches the current roles militaries perform in African politics and their relationship with the requirements for democratic civil-military relations.⁶ Specifically, it addresses how externally trained and educated militaries influence the democratization of civil-military relations in Africa. It also analyzes whether or not military professionalism alone is sufficient to ensure the armed forces’ political neutrality and further democratization of civil-military relations in Africa.

The overall purpose of this investigation is to gain a better understanding for how the U.S. Department of Defense foreign military training and professional education programs could improve or impair the democratization of civil-military relations in transitioning democracies and illiberal democracies in Africa. Military training and professional education programs improve a military’s lethality, efficiency, and effectiveness, and are intended to modify behaviors and improve decision making in scenarios encountered across the range of military operations. These programs are crucial in regions like Africa where the DoD seeks to gain partners to achieve strategic objectives such as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.

This investigation is relevant to the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAFRICOM). The genesis of this particular research lies in the MARFORAFRICOM Commander’s desire to develop a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps in both Senegal and Cameroon. The intent of these programs is “to increase familiarity of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) amongst like-minded forces on the continent.”⁷ The program’s concept is based on a Commander, U.S. Marine

⁵ Hounnikpo, “Africa’s Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions,” 3.

⁶ The model of democratic civil–military relations used in this thesis is the model presented by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*. This model consists of democratic civilian control and measures the effectiveness and efficiency of the security institutions. This thesis will use a minimalist definition of democracy, describing states that hold national elections as democratic. This will facilitate the analysis of Cameroon.

⁷ Major General Niel E. Nelson, quoted in an email from Major Temitope Songonuga, U.S. Marine Corps, dated 25 May 2017.

Corps Forces, Europe, model currently implemented with partnering amphibious forces. The Commander, MARFORAFRICOM, wants to determine if a similar effort is worth pursuing with African partner states and to what extent. A successfully implemented program would likely be expanded to other countries that have the political will to develop their NCO corps. Other DoD service and functional components have similar programs currently in operation or planning stages.

The training and professional education of African militaries may simply be an attempt by the DoD to use African troops to subsidize U.S. strategic lines of effort. As the DoD budget is more constrained and the threat of violent extremist organizations grows in Africa, improving African militaries' capacities to address these threats can relieve the burden on the U.S. soldier and potentially the U.S. taxpayer. However, training African militaries could have different effects on civil-military relations depending on the regime type. Professionalized militaries in consolidating democracies like Senegal are more likely to submit to increased civilian control, observe the rule of law, play a minimal role in politics, and become a symbol of national pride. Will professionalized militaries in illiberal democracies like Cameroon seek the same?⁸ That is the hope.

Just as they may be a boon, professionalized militaries may also turn out to be a bane. The fear is Paul Biya, Cameroon's president since 1982, could instead get a U.S.-trained security force that is more effective at being used for repression and political policing. In this scenario, rather than reforming, the military would continue to be used by political elites for extrajudicial detention and torture of Cameroonians suspected of having ties to Boko Haram, the opposition party, or the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community.⁹ Another fear is a U.S.-trained military fails to de-politicize and uses its improved lethality, tactical and operational efficiency to return an electorally deposed leader to power in the vein of the 2010 incident in Cote d'Ivoire. Of course, there is also the possibility that a professional army will step into politics in a state that is democratically

⁸ "Freedom in the World 2017," Freedom House, data pull on 9 May 2017. www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.

⁹ Alioune Tine, *Cameroon's Secret Torture Chambers: Human Rights Violations and War Crimes in the Fight against Boko Haram*, (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2017), 6.

regressing and change the government with the consent of the people.¹⁰ Professionalizing militaries in African states is not a one size fits all proposition and presents the DoD with a moral dilemma.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Civil-military relations are “the relations of the armed forces, the state, and the rest of society.”¹¹ The fundamental aspects of civil-military relations are these: the military’s formal structure within the government; the military’s formal and informal roles and their influence on politics and society; and the compatibility of the “nature of ideologies of military and non-military groups.”¹² This review surveys a cross-section of scholarly literature to parse these concepts and discern potential effects of externally driven military training and professional education programs on civil-military affairs. The literature review identifies the framework for examining the research question based in the trinity of democratic civil-military relations: control, effectiveness, and efficiency.

1. The Military as a Profession

In order to understand military professionalism as a variable of democratic civil military relations, professionalism should be divided into two models. The first —referred to here as the soldier-state model— is a social science concept of military professionalism that evolves from Samuel P. Huntington and focuses on the military’s relationship and responsibilities to the state. The second —referred to here as the soldiering skills model— is a military science concept that focuses on the soldier’s relationship to the military profession. Both are important measures of determining military professionalism and are of the same genesis, but may not be equally related in their impacts on civil-military relations.

¹⁰ Powell et al., 500.

¹¹ Narcis Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, translated by Peter Bush, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.

¹² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1972), VIII.

Huntington describes a profession as having “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.”¹³ Expertise is achieved through education and experience. Responsibility is the belief in achieving expertise and exercising it when required by society. Corporateness encompasses an understanding that the organization is bigger than the self, and accomplishing the organization’s roles and missions supersedes one’s personal agenda. Huntington claims the military is a “peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics.”¹⁴ The “management of violence” is the critical skill that separates the military officer from the rest of society, and the officer must direct, operate, plan for, and control his organization in the application of violence.¹⁵ Harold Lasswell agrees with the critical skill of being “specialists on violence,” as does Morris Janowitz in saying professional officers are charged with “directing the application of violence under certain prescribed conditions.”¹⁶

The key characteristic of the soldier-state model is derived from Huntington’s argument the soldier has a social responsibility to be an expert who practices his profession for the benefit of society, obligated by oaths or statements of societal relation, and functioning under high ethical standards.¹⁷ The professional soldier executes his roles and missions because it is expected of him and he is the only one who can. Huntington claims military officers are professional only if they are loyal to the military ideals—their duty to serve and protect the state- and a “loyalty to the idea of professional competence,” duties he believed were permanent.¹⁸

Thomas Bruneau and others disagree with Huntington’s idea that military professionalism is static in its reliance on loyalty to military ideals.¹⁹ While “social

¹³ Huntington, 8–10.

¹⁴ Huntington, 7.

¹⁵ Huntington, 11.

¹⁶ Timothy Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe,” *International Affairs* 82, No. 6 (Nov. 2006), 1060.

¹⁷ Huntington, 9–10.

¹⁸ Huntington, 74.

¹⁹ Bruneau, “Impediments to the accurate conceptualization of civil-military relations,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 16–17.

responsibility, corporateness, and honor-related pride to serve one's nation" are important, the soldier-state model is fluid.²⁰ Jose A. Olmeda says Huntington fails to acknowledge that the ethos of public service, skill structure, and internal cohesion is part of military professionalism.²¹ Serra argues the military must be willing to change with government and societal changes, and that military values do not have to be, and perhaps should not be, completely isolated and external to societal values.²² Militaries that hold permanent values dear are susceptible to associating military values as higher than societal values and becoming the guardians of those higher values. Serra continues the military must share values and principles that are part of the democratic process and those held by civil-society: de-politicizing the military, protecting human rights, and religious tolerance.²³ Donald Abenheim suggests the rule of law and civil-society norms must inform military behavior, training, and operations.²⁴ Because Huntington identifies the state and its citizens as the client of the military, Shemella suggests the armed forces should help build "a sense of national identity" and should be more connected to the citizen, instead of isolated as Huntington suggests.²⁵ Finally, while citizens and the military both need to understand the military is not the nation, Ronald Krebs believes the military should demonstrate the character of the nation.²⁶

The soldiering skills model is professionalism defined by mastering the art and science of war —warfighting—technical expertise, and general military conduct.²⁷ The soldiering skills model, like the soldier-state model, shares a Huntingtonian genesis, but it

²⁰ Joseph Soeters and Audrey Van Ouytsel, "The Challenge of Diffusing Military Professionalism in Africa," *Armed Forces & Society* 40, No. 2 (2014), 254.

²¹ Olmeda, 63.

²² Serra, 54, 57–58.

²³ Serra, 75.

²⁴ Donald Abenheim, *Soldier and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment*, (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2007) 192.

²⁵ Paul Shemella, "The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces," in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006), 128.

²⁶ Ronald R. Krebs, *Fighting For Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 10.

²⁷ Soeters and Van Auytsel, 254.

can exist without the soldier-state model. It is in the soldiering skills that militaries remain isolated from society. This is an important distinction in this thesis considering DoD-led training curriculum focus considerably more on soldiering skills.

S.E. Finer states that militaries are hierarchical and highly stratified, with clearly defined relationships of subordination and separation between grades and ranks.²⁸ This structure depersonalizes authority and places it squarely with the rank and not the individual. Where Huntington says the role of the officer is a profession and the role of enlisted is a vocation, Kenneth Estes disagrees saying the modern military is considered a profession of arms wherein both officer and enlisted perform roles in making their units effective and prepared to perform roles and missions.²⁹ Continuous professional military education, training, and certification are critical in maintaining a high proficiency in soldiering skills. The profession of arms creates a moral and ethical imperative in the soldier to “focus on generating expert knowledge and the ability... to apply that expertise to new situations,” just as a doctor or lawyer would, according to Don Snider.³⁰

Excellence in the soldiering skills model facilitates accomplishment of the military’s roles and missions. Shemella defines roles as having a general and long-term purpose, while missions are specific tasks shaped by time-sensitive events requiring a military response.³¹ Both roles and missions inform how armed forces are structured, equipped, and trained; the responsibilities of the professional soldier. Today’s military missions encompass more than just national security, and conventional war may be least likely of six military functions to be performed today according to Matei.³² Militaries perform at least six primary roles and they are wars, internal wars, terrorism, crime, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations. Edmunds points out that militaries have

²⁸ S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, (London: Pall Mall Press Limited, 1962), 7.

²⁹ Kenneth W. Estes, *Handbook for Marine NCOs*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 34–35.

³⁰ Don M. Snider, “The U.S. Army as Profession,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, Second Edition, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews, (Boston: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2005), 12–13.

³¹ Shemella 138.

³² Matei 26, 28.

more often been used to provide primarily internal security since the end of World War II.³³ These missions most often do not include the application of violence, but do include construction, humanitarian assistance, and so on.

Mathurin Hounnikpo identifies Africa as a region where internal security outweighs external security. The lack of interstate conflict in Africa deflects emphasis from national security concerns and armies are used primarily for internal order.³⁴ Dustin Sharp agrees, claiming internal threats are much higher in Africa than international threats, and they include poverty, inequality, violent crime, disease, famine, youth-demographic, etcetera.³⁵ Counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and illegal immigration have become higher priority national security issues and increasingly involve military participation. Shemella expresses concern that these once infrequent missions are now so commonplace that states must decide if these have become military roles that will require changes to structure, training, and equipment.³⁶ Continuous training and professional education is paramount because Abenheim says policing, state-building, and counterinsurgency—the roles African militaries are most likely to perform—often require soldiers to rely less on technology and more on their professionalism, education, and skill.³⁷

2. Democratic Civil-Military Relations

The majority of works have civilian control of the military as the core characteristic of democratic civil-military relations. A sensible structure when the assumption is that militaries capable of defending a state are capable of controlling the state.³⁸ Control implies a degree of power, which Huntington defines as “the capacity to control the behavior of

³³ Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For,” 1060.

³⁴ Hounnikpo, “Civil Military Relations in Africa,” in *Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa*, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2016), 60.

³⁵ Dustin Sharp, “Accountability: A Critical Link in the Security-Development Nexus,” in *The U.S. Military in Africa: Enhancing Security and Development?*, ed. Jessica Piombo, (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2015), 66.

³⁶ Shemella, 133.

³⁷ Abenheim, 225.

³⁸ Matei, 30.

other people.”³⁹ This definition of power is critical to Huntington’s primary focus, the military officer’s role in relation to the state and statesman.⁴⁰ The soldier recognizes the state as the highest political authority of society. He sees security as a political objective and war serves the political objective.⁴¹ Claude E. Welch largely agrees that “civilian control exist [*sic*] if the officer corps has internalized the value of civilian supremacy as part of its ethical makeup.”⁴² That ethical decision, Huntington argues, is the officers’ identity as a military professional; an expert in military affairs who abstains from politics.⁴³

Finer disagrees with Huntington’s assertion that civilian control is the result of the military’s apolitical professionalism. The military is a political force with superior organization and armament.⁴⁴ The military’s strength rests within its warfighting skills, so subordination to civilian authority is therefore not natural. Finer states the military can choose to subordinate itself, act against its government, or refuse to follow the state’s orders.⁴⁵ However, most militaries recognize their inability to manage both a complex state administration and national security.⁴⁶ Furthermore, advanced societies consider rule by force as illegitimate. Finer argues the decision to subordinate itself to civilian authority is pragmatic, and thus civilian control of the military is the rule and not the exception.

Brian M. Linn agrees, saying the concept of professionalism changes over time so Huntington’s apolitical professionalism is “not a solid basis on which to build an argument about democratic civilian control.”⁴⁷ Welch concurs and claims that “all armed forces

³⁹ Huntington, 86.

⁴⁰ Huntington, 3.

⁴¹ Huntington, 65.

⁴² Jose A. Olmeda, “Escape from Huntington’s labyrinth: Civil-military relations and comparative politics,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 64.

⁴³ Huntington, 70–71.

⁴⁴ Finer, 5.

⁴⁵ Finer, 23.

⁴⁶ Finer, 14.

⁴⁷ Brian M. Linn, quoted in Bruneau, “Impediments to the accurate conceptualization of civil-military relations,” 17.

participate in politics in various fashions.”⁴⁸ Today’s soldiers live in a mass politics environment, according to Abenheim, implying that soldiers participate in politics at least on a personal level.⁴⁹ Alfred Stepan sees the politicization of the military contributing to “military-political managerialism and role expansion.”⁵⁰ However, the degree of political participation is key to achieving democratic civil-military relations. So is the civilian authority’s approach to getting the military’s support.

Serra attests there is no clear theory of military transition to democratic civilian control and demonstrates that similar states take different paths to military transition with different results.⁵¹ Edmunds believes weak and fragmented states prove most challenging in achieving democratic civilian control of the armed forces because legitimacy is already low and there may be no guarantee the military will act in the interests of the state or its people.⁵² In this context, scholars equate democratization of civil-military relations with reducing military prerogatives after transition to democracy. Alfred Stepan for one identifies 11 prerogatives that once minimized would pave the way toward democratic civilian control.⁵³ These military prerogatives concern the constitutionally sanctioned role of the military; the relationship to the chief executive; the coordination of the defense sector; military participation in the cabinet; the legislature’s role in the military; the role of civil servants and political appointees; intelligence collection roles; roles in policing; promotions; the role in state enterprises; and the role in the legal system. Edmunds claims militaries may resist new roles or reductions in power and privilege, and regimes may politicize militaries to bully opposition.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ Huntington, 95; Claude E. Welch, quoted by Olmeda, 64.

⁴⁹ Abenheim, 14.

⁵⁰ Alfred Stepan, quoted by Bruneau, “Impediments to the accurate conceptualization of civil-military relations,” 17.

⁵¹ Serra, 39.

⁵² Timothy Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 52–53.

⁵³ Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 93.

⁵⁴ Timothy Edmunds, 52–53.

Serra notes democratization of civil-military relations can be achieved via specific military reforms. He opines that “military reform is a process driving and guiding the military to shift gradually to positions of greater democratic normalcy and to fit coherently into the new democratic state,” specifically in regard to shifting autonomy to match the rule of law.⁵⁵ Political change—or perhaps consistency in some regards—must precede military changes and be moving in the same direction.⁵⁶ Sharp identifies that some regimes may fear that enforcing accountability or pushing military reforms may imperil their regime.⁵⁷ Therefore, Larry Diamond concludes democracy must be legitimate and serve the state triad “of institutions-civil society-military.”⁵⁸ The military is more likely to intervene or attempt to resist transition and stay outside the scope of civilian control if democracy fails to work, does not solve societal problems, or loses its legitimacy.

Democratic civilian control is a choice and results in a contract between the military and civilian authority that should create a symbiotic relationship. According to Serra, political parties must refrain from politicizing the military or its leaders to maintain the military’s vital political neutrality.⁵⁹ This neutrality, according to Huntington, obligates the statesman, who in a democratic system cannot be the military professional, to accept the judgments of the military profession even if he does not have to follow the advice they provide.⁶⁰ The military must represent military security in state activities and keep political leaders abreast of states of readiness, requirements, and relative combat power. When the relationship is working well, Serra claims it allows militaries to maintain some autonomy over internal functions and remain separate from society but the state must determine the roles of the military and how the military will manage its missions, structure, training, and equipping.⁶¹ Eliot Cohen concurs, arguing the best civilian leaders do not allow the military

⁵⁵ Serra, 43–44.

⁵⁶ Serra, 64.

⁵⁷ Sharp, 67.

⁵⁸ Larry Diamond, quoted in Serra, 43.

⁵⁹ Serra, 41.

⁶⁰ Huntington, 71–72.

⁶¹ Serra, 43.

to overwhelm politics in war and that they “combine strategic vision with tactical flexibility” and understand the need to shape the strategic battle space for future tactical and operational success, which the generals will determine and execute.⁶²

Under democratic civilian control the “executive defines military policy” through elected and ministerial authority.⁶³ Tension remains between the two over categories of military semi-autonomy and how the military lobbies the executive and legislative to achieve and “defend the corporate interests of the military.”⁶⁴ However, Serra further explains that a transitioned and democratic military is subordinate to civil authorities, respects the rule of law and the law of the land, and is loyal to the state institutions.⁶⁵ Sharp agrees, saying the “rule of law is... essential to ensure transparency, accountability, and control of security forces.”⁶⁶ Hounnikpo explains it alternatively saying militaries should serve the constitution or law, not concepts of nation or state.⁶⁷ This supports the soldier-state model of professionalism discussed above.

Florina Cristiana Matei suggests too much literature and policy focuses on strengthening civilian control instead of other aspects of civil-military relations.⁶⁸ Therefore, she introduces a new paradigm of civil-military relations that argues civilian authorities should also strive to build and manage effective and efficient militaries. Matei submits that more emphasis should be placed on effective civilian control that can place strategic planning and oversight in the hands of civilian personnel while facilitating the military’s focus on training for missions.⁶⁹ Thomas Bruneau agrees, but adds that while the effectiveness of civilian control is important, so is military effectiveness.⁷⁰ Overall effectiveness of civil-military relations in this construct attempts to measure how well

⁶² Olmeda, 65.

⁶³ Serra, 45.

⁶⁴ Serra, 46.

⁶⁵ Serra, 49.

⁶⁶ Sharp, 73.

⁶⁷ Hounnikpo, “Civil Military Relations in Africa,” 76.

⁶⁸ Matei, 29.

⁶⁹ Matei, 33.

⁷⁰ Bruneau, 17.

prepared the military is to execute the six functions of wars, internal wars, terrorism, crime, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations. Measuring effectiveness in war is easy, according to Matei.⁷¹ Effectiveness in the other roles is difficult because it can be hard to prove a negative; there is no clear means to discern if an event did not occur because security was effective or because the perpetrators chose not to attack for other reasons, such as a lack of funding or manpower.

Measuring efficiency is also an aspect of the new civil-military relations paradigm. Paul Shemella concludes all states want to be *peacekeepers* but want the flexibility to move toward *warfighters*.⁷² This implies that militaries train and equip for roles they may never perform. The type and duration of military roles has an impact on society, especially on economies. Shemella states frequently changing military roles requires expensive retraining and equipment acquisition, and may reduce security in the long run.⁷³ The military will be inefficient unless roles and missions are determined by the civilian authority and remain stable.⁷⁴ Waste and duplication of effort must be eliminated to achieve greater efficiencies. Shemella further argues democratic states conduct strategic planning through debate between branches horizontally and agencies vertically.⁷⁵

Tom Bruneau believes the degree to which militaries are effectively and efficiently prepared to achieve roles and missions is more important than basic civil control, and measuring all three shows the achievement of democratic civil-military relations.⁷⁶ This is extremely difficult in the contemporary security environment because the roles and missions have expanded beyond external security. The literature indicates that civil-military relations is most complete when civilian control of the military ensures effective

⁷¹ Matei, 31–32.

⁷² Shemella, 127.

⁷³ Shemella, 128.

⁷⁴ Shemella, 132–133.

⁷⁵ Shemella, 131.

⁷⁶ Olmeda, 66.

and efficient accomplishment of a variety of military roles and missions; what Bruneau calls the trinity of civil-military relations.⁷⁷

3. The Impact of Training and Education Programs on Military Professionalism

Joseph Soeters and Audrey Van Ouytsel point out that Western states have long sought to professionalize developing state militaries to share the international security burden.⁷⁸ They show that many recipient state officers attend military academies and military professional education residence programs in Western states, and then return to their home states. France, in particular, offers academy positions to officers from more than twenty African states. Training also frequently occurs in the donor state. Both overseas and at home training, say Soeters and Van Ouytsel, includes primarily soldiering skills with some emphasis on social responsibility and corporateness.⁷⁹

Despite this training and education, Soeters and Van Ouytsel claim the transfer of professional skills often does not occur because different states have varying regard for different professional skills.⁸⁰ Edmunds suggests another reason, saying that building and adapting military roles in “recipient” states has been informed by the “donor” “states” experience in the post-Cold War environment, wherein they attempting to create carbon copy militaries with little understanding of the recipient state’s context.⁸¹

Soeters and Van Ouytsel offer the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Benin as two different examples of the failure to sustain transfer of training and professional education. Officers and cadets from both states attend or have attended academies in Belgium. Cadets from Democratic Republic of the Congo typically do not transfer skills from the military academy in Belgium because they desert the army shortly after their

⁷⁷ Bruneau, “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited,” *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* 19, No. 1 (2005), 123.

⁷⁸ Joseph Soeters and Audrey Van Ouytsel, “The Challenge of Diffusing Military Professionalism in Africa,” *Armed Forces & Society* 40, No. 2 (2014), 252–253.

⁷⁹ Soeters and Van Ouytsel, 254.

⁸⁰ Soeters and Van Ouytsel, 254.

⁸¹ Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For?” 1065.

return to the DRC.⁸² Benin cadets remain in their army after completing the military academy in Belgium, so it would be presumed the transfer of training and professional education would take hold. However, Soeters and Van Ouytsel show that senior and seasoned leaders of the Benin military are unlikely to listen to or accept the professionalism and training reforms suggested by the young officers trained in Belgium. The patrimonial character of their system and hierarchy makes new methods seem threatening to their leadership status in the organization. Young Beninese officers become frustrated over time and set aside what they learned, resulting in an externally trained army that sees no improvement in either model of professionalism.⁸³

Krebs raises additional concerns for the military's ability to implement and sustain training and professional education. He says that militaries are a reflection of the society as a whole and the problems within the society, such as ethnic or political cleavages, can be drawn into the military.⁸⁴ While the contemporary U.S. military is an example of how state demographics, at least in the shape of leadership roles, do not mirror societal demographics, this may not be so in Africa and other developing states. Krebs argues soldiers bring with them preconceived beliefs and character traits, some of which are bad, and that military training and education cannot eliminate or replace them all.⁸⁵ Mamadou Diouma Bah adds the military can almost serve as an ethnic identity on its own, created by military elites to serve the purpose of achieving roles and missions.⁸⁶ Finer seemingly agrees, saying the barracks mentality can "inspire contempt for one's own nationals—the 'civies', 'les pekins', 'les bourgeois',—and so forth."⁸⁷ Can professionalism transcend preexisting ethnic cleavages and is it strong enough to prevent the establishment of "an exclusionist mentality" that creates animosity toward certain groups or political leaders?

⁸² Soeters and Van Auytsel, 255–256.

⁸³ Soeters and Van Auytsel, 259

⁸⁴ Krebs, 5.

⁸⁵ Krebs, 8–9.

⁸⁶ Mamadou Diouma Bah, "The Military and Politics in Guinea: An Instrumental Explanation of Political Stability," *Armed Force & Society* 41, No. 1 (2015), 71–72.

⁸⁷ Finer, 9.

Krebs, Bah, and Finer contend the military man not serve as an all-transforming experience and potentially unable to positively reinforce training and professional education efforts.⁸⁸

4. Professionalism and Military Intervention in Politics

Professional and transformed militaries must be able “to master the problems of war and peace” according to Abenheim.⁸⁹ However, in line with Finer’s theory, Houngnikpo says military professionalism has not stopped militaries from intervening in politics or attempting coups, especially if they believe the current regime impairs the national security.⁹⁰ He says there are two reasons for the military to intervene: (1) motives to intervene must outweigh motives for not intervening; (2) army must be willing to act.⁹¹ Weak or ineffective civilian political institutions are most vulnerable, especially in states where democratic civil-military transition is incomplete or immature.⁹² Edmunds concurs, offering there may be no guarantee in weak states that the military will act in the interests of the state or its people.⁹³ Houngnikpo claims that interventions and coups are the result of protracted state failures and often combined with militaries that believe it is “the soldier’s destiny to be the savior of his country.”⁹⁴ Fortunately, Jonathan Powell suggests coups have decreased since the end of the Cold War.⁹⁵ This is likely because coup-plotters are rational actors who weigh costs and benefits of conducting a coup, which could range from exile to imprisonment or execution.⁹⁶

The transfer or presence of either professionalism model is not a clear indicator that a military will intervene politically or maintain its neutrality. Bruneau says that professional officers in Latin America have often pushed back on civilian control because

⁸⁸ Krebs, 8–9.

⁸⁹ Abenheim, 227.

⁹⁰ Houngnikpo, “Civil Military Relations in Africa,” 76.

⁹¹ Houngnikpo, “Civil Military Relations in Africa,” 75.

⁹² Houngnikpo, “Civil Military Relations in Africa,” 77.

⁹³ Timothy Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 53.

⁹⁴ Houngnikpo, “Civil Military Relations in Africa,” 74 and 76.

⁹⁵ Powell et al., 2.

⁹⁶ Powell et al., 3.

of their concerns the civilian authorities know too little about military roles, missions, and needs.⁹⁷ Zoltan Barany recalls that Chile's armed forces had been trained and educated by the British navy, U.S. Air Force, and the Prussian Army before they overturned the civilian government in 1973.⁹⁸ On the other hand, Jessica Piombo details the post-apartheid democratic transition of the South African Defence Force to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The SANDF did not always agree with the decisions of the civilian authority, but "most officers firmly believe[d] that the military profession must and should be subordinate to civilian leadership," and maintained their political neutrality.⁹⁹ Saidou Norou Tall adds that Senegal lacks the capacity [as of 2008] to adequately train and educate its soldiers, relying on France, Germany and the United States to provide equipment and training.¹⁰⁰ It is unlikely the Senegalese military has been able to sustain either professional model; yet, Tall says they have not conducted a coup or otherwise intervened in politics.¹⁰¹ The literature indicates mixed results on professionalism as a variable that prevents the military from intervening in politics.

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Existing scholarship explains military professionalism, defines democratic civil-military relations, demonstrates how training and professional education sometimes fails to transfer to recipient states, and shows that professional militaries do occasionally intervene in politics. However, the literature neither adequately address if militaries decide to transition to democratic civilian control because of learning new behaviors nor how those behaviors are learned. The DoD regularly trains foreign militaries across the globe, including specific training and professional education programs, and has done so through

⁹⁷ Bruneau, "The Hedgehog and the Fox," 112.

⁹⁸ Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 143–145.

⁹⁹ Jessica Piombo, "Civil-military relations in an emerging democracy: South Africa," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (New York: Routledge, 2013.), 263.

¹⁰⁰ Saidou Norou Tall, "Senegal," in *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa*, ed. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye, and Funmi Olonisakin, (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008) 277–278.

¹⁰¹ Tall, 275.

theater security cooperation for decades. This thesis will attempt to determine if these programs can improve military professionalism in a way that results in transitions to democratic civil-military relations. Additional research has the potential to provide frameworks to improve future training and professional education programs.

This thesis presumes that any military undertaking an externally driven training and professional education program will achieve short-term increases in soldiering skills professionalism. However, sustaining change will require iterative training and professional education with donor state forces or the establishment of homegrown training and professional education programs or institutions. This thesis also presumes the training and professional education of African militaries is part of broader democratization and development programs that have been key aspects of U.S. foreign policy for decades. In this context, the key is Finer's concept that the military will not intervene in politics only if the military believes explicitly in the principle of civilian supremacy—that the military works for the government in power and not the state.¹⁰² These programs are likely to have a limited positive effect on civil-military relations if they are not part of this comprehensive framework. Therefore, training and professional education for African militaries has four possible effects on civil-military relations.

The first hypothesis is that professional education and training will result in increased military effectiveness but decreased civilian control. This result could occur because donor states “may emphasize military effectiveness at the cost of promoting civilian control of the armed forces” in order to achieve donor state security objectives in the recipient state, such as counter-terrorism.¹⁰³ Training and equipping recipient militaries is easier and more measurable than professional education.¹⁰⁴

The second hypothesis is that professional education and training will result in increased military effectiveness and increased civilian control. This could result when training and professional education emphasize soldiering skills along with the rule of law,

¹⁰² Finer, 25.

¹⁰³ Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,” *Democratization* 13, No. 5 (December 2006), 788.

¹⁰⁴ Timothy Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 54

the benefits of civilian control, and the need for political neutrality in the armed forces. This could also be more likely to occur in consolidated democracies where militaries are more comfortable with civilian control because they have experienced at least two consecutive peaceful transitions from incumbent to challenger.¹⁰⁵ The more advanced the democratic consolidation, the less likely military intervention will occur. The military can not only remain in barracks, but can also grow more comfortable ceding certain decisions to the civilian authorities while the military focuses on internal structure, professional education, and training to achieve its assigned roles and missions.

The third hypothesis is that professional education and training will result in decreased military effectiveness and increased civilian control. This result is possible in consolidating democracies, such as Argentina, which transitioned to democracy in 1982, where despite foreign education and training, aimed at promoting both democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the armed forces, the democratic civilian authorities have intentionally repressed and humiliated the military for misdeeds during the previous regime.¹⁰⁶

The fourth hypothesis is that professional education and training will result in decreased military effectiveness and decreased civilian control. This could occur in democracies with weak, corrupt, and/or neopatrimonial systems that erode both the military's and the civilian authority's professionalism. This could also be possible in countries with where democracy regresses.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis will provide a comparative study of the current military roles and status of civil-military relations in Senegal and Cameroon. Primary and secondary sources will be used to conduct qualitative research on empirical evidence. These states provide a

¹⁰⁵ Ken Opalo, "African Elections: Two Divergent Trends," *Journal of Democracy* 23, No. 3 (2012), 90. Note: Democratic consolidation is defined by Samuel P. Huntington as a state seeing turnover occur at least twice between incumbents and challengers in a given period of time.

¹⁰⁶ Barany, 149–153; Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Asserting Civilian Control: Argentina," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 151, 153–154.

relevant comparison because of their different regime types and because MARFORAFRICOM has chosen them to implement its training and professional education program. Both states also have similarities besides their littoral orientation. Both have French colonial ties. Both states' economies are based on commodities exports.¹⁰⁷ Both states are also under increasing pressure from piracy and violent extremist groups, although Cameroon's experience with the latter is more violent and occurs within the state instead as well as in peripheral states. Understanding their political and military history since independence compared to their contemporary state composition will give insight to how the training and professional education programs and any other security sector reforms will be accepted.

This thesis will also use two case studies to assess the potential impacts of externally driven military training and professional education on Senegal and Cameroon. Colombia and El Salvador are analyzed due to their commonalities with Africa generally, and Cameroon and Senegal specifically. The DoD initiated training and professional education programs with Colombia and El Salvador in the 1980s and 1990s during the height of their respective insurgencies. Colombia experienced increased professionalism and democratization of civil-military affairs. El Salvador's experience, on the other hand, was negative, with the military becoming more political and more indiscriminate in its use of violence.

The first similarity involves the nature of their national security challenges. Very little interstate conflict or dispute exists in both Latin America and Africa that would require large, well-equipped militaries, and therefore the militaries in these regions are not built for long-term expeditionary operations and conflict. Latin America has experienced only two interstate wars since 1945.¹⁰⁸ Africa has also experienced only two interstate wars

¹⁰⁷ Cameroon and Senegal export data, The Observatory of Economic Complexity, viewed <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/>. Senegal's leading exports are gold and refined petroleum. Cameroon's leading exports are crude petroleum and cocoa beans.

¹⁰⁸ Tassio Franchi, Eduardo Xavier Ferreira Glaser Migon, and Roberto Xavier Jimenez Villarreal, "Taxonomy of interstate conflicts: is South America a peaceful region?," in *Brazilian Political Science Review* 11, No. 2 (2017), 14. Note: Franchi, et al., define war using the Correlates of War model requiring more than 1000 battle deaths per year of the conflict. The conflicts referenced are the Falklands War of 1982 and the 1995 Cenepa War between Ecuador and Peru.

since the first wave of African independence in 1957.¹⁰⁹ These states are much more likely to view international mitigation as the best resource for interstate conflict resolution and seek to cooperate on common security concerns through bilateral or multilateral exercises and operations.¹¹⁰ Most Latin American states are satisfied with their territorial boundaries and do not seek expansion. In comparison, African states agreed in the 1960s to keep the territorial boundaries developed during colonialism and the result has been very little change in the decades since.¹¹¹ The four states also have similar defense budgets based on gross domestic product (GDP). Colombia and El Salvador spend 3.4 and 0.9 percent of GDP, respectively, while Cameroon and Senegal spend 1.2 percent and 1.7 percent of GDP.¹¹²

A second similarity between Latin America and Africa is instability. Weak governance capacity and weak institutions drive instability in Latin America, and this has also plagued Africa.¹¹³ The military is often seen as one of the more developed, bureaucratic, and administratively adept government agencies and, therefore, professionalizing the military is often seen as a means of improving governance. Porous borders, ungoverned spaces, and crime are historical concerns in Latin America and fueled the rise of leftist insurgencies during the second half of the 20th Century that resulted in significant U.S. military aid.¹¹⁴ Political instability, porous borders, and ungoverned spaces

¹⁰⁹ Monty G. Marshall, *Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946–2004 A Macro-Comparative Perspective*, (London: Ministry of Defense Department for International Development, September 2006), 6. Note: The wars referenced are the 1978–1979 Ugandan-Tanzanian war and the 1998–2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war.

¹¹⁰ Marcella, 166.

¹¹¹ Changes in the African map have occurred, such as the partitions of Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as Sudan and South Sudan.

¹¹² The World Bank, *Data: Military expenditure (% of GDP)*, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2018). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbap. Viewed 21 April 2018.

¹¹³ Marcella, 167–168.

¹¹⁴ Note: These issues specific to Colombia and El Salvador will be discussed in detail in Chapter III of this thesis.

in Africa facilitate the proliferation of violent extremist organizations and since 2001, has resulted in increased U.S. military aid.¹¹⁵

A final similarity between Latin America and Africa arises from their political economies. All four economies are primary products based, largely consisting of mineral or agricultural exports.¹¹⁶ The lack of external security threats has also meant that economic security may be a more important political issue than traditional security issues for Latin American countries.¹¹⁷ This holds true for Africa as well, where many economies are growing but have not transformed into developed and industrialized economies.¹¹⁸ The common belief that security and stability is required for economic development drives the internal security focus of both regions.

The similarities in their security challenges and political economy present Colombia and El Salvador as appropriate case studies to determine how military training and professional education can impact civil military relations in Cameroon and Senegal. The case studies will analyze how DoD implemented the programs in Colombia and El Salvador and determine whether the programs were integrated into holistic reforms. The results will be informative for implementing the training and professional education programs in Senegal and Cameroon.

¹¹⁵ Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa* CRS Report RL34003, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 22 July 2011), Summary and 19.

¹¹⁶ The Observatory of Economy Complexity. <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/slv/>. <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/col/>. <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/cmr/>. <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/sen/>. Note: El Salvador does have a developed textiles industry.

¹¹⁷ Arie M. Kacowicz and David R. Mares, "Security Studies and Security in Latin America: The First 200 Years," in *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security*, ed. David R. Mares and Arie M. Kacowicz, (London: Routledge, 2015), 19.

¹¹⁸ Lindsay Whitfield, Ole Therkildsen, Lars Buur, and Anne Mette Kjaer, "The Puzzle of Limited Economic Transformation in Africa," in *The Politics of African Industrial Policy*, ed. Lindsay Whitfield, Ole Therkildsen, Lars Buur, and Anne Mette Kjaer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the subject, providing a foundation for understanding the research problem. The literature review provides scholarly context for democratic transitions in contemporary civil-military relations and outlines the civil-military relations framework I intend to use in the research. Chapter II explains security cooperation programs—the primary methods the United States uses to train and educate foreign militaries—and security sector reform, as well as outlines current U.S. strategy toward Africa. Chapter III will provide case studies of DoD training and professional education programs in Colombia and El Salvador during the 1980s and 1990s. The outcomes and context of these programs will provide insight for the analysis of MARFORAFRICOM's programs. Chapter IV provides a comparison of the political environment, military roles, and status of civil-military relations in Senegal and Cameroon. A historical analysis will detail each state's post-independence evolution in these topic areas and provide a baseline for understanding how training and professional education programs may impact their civil-military relations. Chapter V will describe and analyze the training and professional education programs intended for Senegal and Cameroon. The chapter will also analyze other U.S. government development programs in each state and how they are integrated with the professionalization program. Finally, this chapter will assess the training and professional education program's prospects for success in each state, and test the hypotheses. The conclusion will identify potential trap-falls and provide recommendations to address concerns.

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II. SECURITY COOPERATION, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, AND THE U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD AFRICA

Understanding how U.S. military training and professional education can increase foreign military professionalism and has the potential to influence civil-military relations requires knowledge of the reasons the United States seeks to train foreign forces and the programs it uses. The United States cannot achieve its strategic security objectives alone; therefore, it seeks partners with the common security interests of improving regional security, developing professional militaries, defeating terrorism, and addressing other transnational threats.¹¹⁹ These partners work in conjunction with the United States in some cases and may serve as proxies in others.

The 2017 United States National Security Strategy posits that U.S. power is magnified through its allies and partners who must “shoulder a fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect against common threats.”¹²⁰ Training foreign forces seeks to increase foreign military capabilities and improve interoperability with U.S. forces and agencies across the range of security operations. Professional education for foreign forces seeks to build their capacity to operate independently and further develop their own forces, while promoting an American image of military professionalism that includes a focus on military ethos, respect for human rights, and subordination to civilian authority. Both training and education professionalize the militaries, but the former is more associated with the soldiering skills model of professionalism while the latter is associated with the soldier-state model.

This Chapter discusses security cooperation as the primary means of training and educating foreign militaries, as well as the more holistic concept of security sector reform. Also discussed is the United States’ military strategy for Africa and why professionalizing partner militaries nests within the greater national security. The objectives, constraints,

¹¹⁹ Michael J. McNerney et al., *SMART Security Cooperation Objective: Improving DoD Planning Guidance*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), xi.

¹²⁰ Donald J. Trump III, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2017), 4.

restraints, and potential outcomes are detailed below to better understand the case studies presented in the following chapters and the final analysis of how U.S. military training and professional education impact the democratization of civil-military relations in Africa.

A. RATIONALE AND METHOD: SECURITY COOPERATION

The United States has been educating and training foreign militaries through a set of activities that are known as security cooperation in order to meet U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.¹²¹ Security cooperation developed during the Cold War as a U.S. strategic perception that securing partners advances trade and limits new military competition.¹²² Security cooperation includes “all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”¹²³ Most developing states do not have the internal capacity to professionalize their militaries and enhancing partner capability and capacity through training and professional education helps to maintain security and influences adversaries and non-partners alike.¹²⁴ Regional stability is a key national security objective of the United States, because it is believed to inhibit terrorism and reduce the need for future U.S. military intervention.¹²⁵ Therefore, creating effective and efficient security forces is a step in achieving stability.¹²⁶ Additional reasons why the United States is conducting security cooperation include

¹²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3–20 Security Cooperation*, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), I-1. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “History of Security Assistance and Security Cooperation: Security Assistance and Foreign Policy,” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2016), A2-1 and A2-4. Training and equipping foreign militaries has occurred during different periods in U.S. history as determined necessary by the president and the Congress. However, only since the 1940s has it been a steady state aspect of U.S. foreign policy.

¹²² Reveron, 31.

¹²³ Randal M. Walsh, “Security Cooperation: A New Functional Command,” in *Joint Forces Quarterly* 64, No. 59 (1st Quarter, January 2012), (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009), 54.

¹²⁴ Derek S. Reveron, *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 111, 46.

¹²⁵ Reveron, 170.

¹²⁶ Reveron, 102.

concern for the welfare of allies, U.S. political concerns such as fostering diplomatic relations, and the desire to relieve human suffering.¹²⁷ Regional military balances of power favorable to the United States is also a justification for security cooperation, as are creating security arrangements that facilitate access to partner states, advancing mutual defense, and preventing conflict and crisis.¹²⁸ Security cooperation seeks to prevent fragile states from turning into regional crises, through providing the training, education, and equipment to help states resolve their own problems.¹²⁹

Currently, the United States conducts some degree of security cooperation in more than 150 countries. This seeks to build foreign military capabilities and capacity. A capability is “‘the ability to generate a desired effect’ in a military operation, under a set of conditions, and to a specific standard.”¹³⁰ Capacity is the ability for foreign forces to respond to crises over a range of operations without the assistance of the United States and achieve interoperability with international security structures.¹³¹ The United States Federal Code (Title 10) also identifies military-to-military contacts and cooperation as opportunities to encourage democratic ideals within foreign forces.¹³² The U.S. military has a respected reputation globally and because foreign militaries are often the best developed and most respected bureaucracies in their state, this gives the militaries an advantage over other agencies to achieve democratic reform.¹³³ A belief also exists within U.S. political leadership that American military training can encourage indigenous militaries to conform to the U.S. military’s morality standards.¹³⁴ Each leads to an

¹²⁷ Reveron, 101.

¹²⁸ Reveron, 105.

¹²⁹ Reveron, 38.

¹³⁰ Scott Jasper, “The Capabilities-based Approach,” in *Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security*, ed. Scott Jasper, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2009), 7.

¹³¹ Jasper, 6.

¹³² Reveron, 104.

¹³³ Reveron, 41. Note: This also reflects the United States’ belief in democratic peace theory in that democracies rarely go to war with other democracies and, therefore, promote security and stability. Bruce Russett, “The Fact of Democratic Peace,” in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 58–81.

¹³⁴ Eric R. Rittinger, “Arming the Other: American Small Wars, Local Proxies, and the Social Construction of the Principal-Agent Problem,” *International Studies Quarterly* 61 (2017), 405–406.

increased imperative for security cooperation and there are many aspects of security cooperation used to achieve these ends.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is one of the most commonly used aspects of security cooperation and the primary tool for training and educating foreign forces. Created as part of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, IMET, which is funded by the Department of State, is used to increase understanding and interoperability, build self-reliance in foreign forces, and gain more oversight of human rights.¹³⁵ The IMET allows the United States to operate military schools abroad and facilitates attendance by foreign troops at military schools in the United States.¹³⁶ Examples of these institutions are the Naval Postgraduate School, the Marshall Center, the National Defense Universities, the U.S. service War Colleges, the Marine Corps' The Basic School, and the Army's Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. The IMET program allows foreign soldiers to come to the United States and encourages interpersonal relationships with U.S. troops that, through exposure to American military professionalism and cultural norms, hence, encourages respect for human rights. For example, at least 15 percent of Army War College classes each year are foreign students.¹³⁷ In addition to attendance at formal schools, the IMET also provides shorter duration defense management, law enforcement, civil-military relations, and military justice courses for foreign forces in the United States and abroad.¹³⁸ The personal relationships built between U.S. and foreign troops is hard to measure, but may be the most important aspect.¹³⁹ A former commander of the U.S. European Command, General Bantz Craddock, says IMET is the best security cooperation tool because of its low cost but high return due to relationship-building and technical training it provides. Other programs also facilitate security cooperation goals.

¹³⁵ Reveron, 109; U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations 1976 quoted in Rittinger, "Arming the Other," 404.

¹³⁶ Reveron, 109–110.

¹³⁷ Reveron, 110.

¹³⁸ Ploch, 23–24.

¹³⁹ Reveron, 110.

Security cooperation is not an available option for all states and the programs have many constraints and restraints to ensure the programs do not achieve negative results such as fraud, waste, and abuse, or result in partner militaries committing human rights abuses. The U.S. Congress began regulating security cooperation in 1961 as part of the Foreign Assistance Act. The law has been updated several times since and the 1973 revision made military assistance contingent on human rights protections and created the DoS Office of Human Rights to assist in oversight.¹⁴⁰ Substantiated and consistent gross violations of international law on human rights should prevent U.S. military aid.

The most stringent oversight tool is the 1997 Leahy Law that amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Created largely in response to the human rights violations during the Salvadoran civil war during the 1980s and in Colombia during the 1990s, the Leahy Law increased conditionality for assistance down to the unit level.¹⁴¹ Units with as few as one individual implicated in human rights abuses could be black listed for military assistance. The Leahy Law also specifically identified torture, enforced disappearance, political rape, and extrajudicial killing as trip lines to prevent military assistance.¹⁴² The law reflects an awareness that socialization does not always lead to reform and acknowledges that training human rights abusers —past, present, or future— implies U.S. guilt by association.¹⁴³ The law seeks accountability for human rights abusers and provides oversight of the security cooperation programs that trained them. Therefore, the Leahy Law also made conditional assistance more proactive by requiring that all foreign units and personnel be vetted before participating in any security cooperation program. Military assistance can be resumed if the Secretary of State determines the partner state has made serious attempts to prevent future abuses and has sought to hold abusers accountable.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Eric R. Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” (master’s thesis, Syracuse University, 2008), 165–166.

¹⁴¹ Rittinger, “Putting the Moral in ‘Moral Hazard,’” 201.

¹⁴² Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, *Leahy Fact Sheet*, (Washington, DC: DoS, 9 March 2018). <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2018/279141.htm>.

¹⁴³ Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 159.

¹⁴⁴ DoS, *Leahy Fact Sheet*.

However, conditionality is also at the discretion of the president and the national security team and can be waived if aid is deemed an emergency; although what determines an emergency has not been codified.¹⁴⁵ Another restraint is that all military activities with a partner state are supposed to be approved by and coordinated through the U.S. ambassador.¹⁴⁶

Security cooperation can have both positive and negative outcomes, even when operating within the existing oversight. The most measurable positive effect can be the increase in soldering skills that results in increased effectiveness in the application of the art and science of war. New tactics and equipment, as well as improved decision making can lead to increased tactical efficiency, wherein militaries can achieve operational success while expending less blood and treasure. Foreign militaries can also see improvement in professional attitudes toward the state, the rule of law, and an acceptance of the supremacy of civil authority. However, security cooperation can become associated with human rights violations and military coups, as happened in El Salvador and Colombia in the former and in Thailand in the latter. Recipient states can also sometimes mistakenly see security cooperation as being equal to mutual security agreements, leading them to be either aggressive toward other states or more intense in their response due to a misperception the United States will come to their aid.¹⁴⁷ Partner states may also see security cooperation as a form of patron-client relationship, like those developed in much of the world during the Cold War. Positive outcomes are more likely if security cooperation is nested within security sector reform.

B. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Security cooperation is a combination of training, equipping, and professional education for foreign militaries, but on its own is not security sector reform.¹⁴⁸ Achieving long-term capabilities, interoperability, and capacity, however, is more likely when

¹⁴⁵ Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 167.

¹⁴⁶ Reveron, 104.

¹⁴⁷ Reveron, 177–178.

¹⁴⁸ Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 54.

security institutions and governance functions are well-developed.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, security cooperation programs should not be executed in a vacuum and should be a subset of an overarching security sector reform program.¹⁵⁰ The DoS defines security sector reform as “reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law.”¹⁵¹ It also improves efficiency in the security sector, improves accountability, and is an essential ingredient for stability.¹⁵² The security sector or security system implies all of the organizations that contribute to security: military, police, intelligence, justice, and potentially some civil-service organizations.¹⁵³ Civil society organizations—think tanks, public policy organizations, university, non-governmental organizations, and media—can be included in security sector reform activities and consultation.¹⁵⁴ The security sector can also include presidential guards, civil defense forces, and militias.¹⁵⁵ Security sector reform recognizes the explicit link between well-developed, functioning security institutions and good governance.¹⁵⁶ Both are also viewed as complementary and reinforcing. The rule of law and transparent, responsive, and accountable governance is required for security sector reform to be effective and lasting.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, the environments and state/regime types are major considerations for security sector reform and how it should be planned and implemented.¹⁵⁸

¹⁴⁹ DoS and DoD, *Security Sector Reform*, 1.

¹⁵⁰ Andrea M. Walther-Puri, Ch 5 “Security Sector Assistance in Africa, but Where is the Reform?,” in *The U.S. Military in Africa: Enhancing Security and Development?*, ed. Jessica Piombo, (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2015), 97.

¹⁵¹ DoS and DoD, *Security Sector Reform*, 1.

¹⁵² Jean-Jacques de Dardel, “Preface: Self-Assessment and Security Sector Reform,” in *Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe Self-Assessment Studies: Regional Perspectives*, ed. Eden Cole, Timothy Donais and Philipp H. Fluri, (Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004), 9.

¹⁵³ Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 50.

¹⁵⁴ DoS and DoD, *Security Sector Reform*, 4.

¹⁵⁵ DoS and DoD, *Security Sector Reform*, 3.

¹⁵⁶ Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 51.

¹⁵⁷ DoS and DoD, *Security Sector Reform*, 4.

¹⁵⁸ Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 52.

Weak security and governance institutions in several African states has led to failures in both public and citizen security. “Public security is the ability of a government to maintain civil order necessary for the execution of basic functions such as commerce, transportation, and communication.”¹⁵⁹ “Citizen security [is]... the capacity of individuals and groups to exercise the political, economic, civil, and human rights that make them citizens.”¹⁶⁰ Insecurity has given rise to violent extremist organizations and organized crime. Professionalism programs for Africa’s militaries could improve security sector reform by developing partner nation defense institutions and by building interoperability and capacity.¹⁶¹ These militaries will inevitably sharpen their skills, lethality, and perhaps increase their professionalism, but will be challenged to achieve greater impact on governance, security, and democratization without significant training and education focused on the institutions within and having authority over the security sector.¹⁶²

Security sector reform uses several concepts and activities to teach interagency cooperation, values, and principles to build state capacity to conduct whole of government operations.¹⁶³ Restructuring the armed forces to reflect their roles and missions is one concept.¹⁶⁴ An example may be teaching budget management to defense ministries to gain accountability of security force budgets, make them more efficient and relative to roles and missions, and decrease corruption.¹⁶⁵ Other examples would be working with legislatures to build committees that provide oversight of security forces and the strengthening of the judiciary, both military and civilian, to improve its political impartiality and capacity to maintain accountability of the security sector and other aspects of the government.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁹ Shemella 139.

¹⁶⁰ Shemella 139.

¹⁶¹ Walther-Puri 95.

¹⁶² Abenheim 225.

¹⁶³ Walther-Puri, 95.

¹⁶⁴ Chris Smith, “Security-Sector Reform: Development Breakthrough or Institutional Engineering,” in *Conflict, Security and Development* 1, No. 1 (2006), 10.

¹⁶⁵ Smith, 14.

¹⁶⁶ Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Post-Conflict Societies and the Military: Challenges and Problems of Security Sector Reform,” in *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 7–8.

Security sector reform must be holistic to achieve democratization of civil-military relations. Focusing on the rule of law is required to establish control, accountability, and transparency of security forces.¹⁶⁷ U.S. participation in security sector reform could be in the form of exercises and training that must focus on the range of human and state security threats and causes, to include accountability and impunity.¹⁶⁸ Accountability is an important public good and security sector reform should encourage the development of civil-society to participate in holding the security sector accountable directly, and also indirectly by establishing interest groups that promote accountability and assist civilians who have been victims.¹⁶⁹ Holistic security sector reform has the potential to establish effective civil control, build a professional military capable of performing the six roles and serving as a “school for the nation,” and creating a legitimate military upon which civil-society can build its national identity.

C. U.S. STRATEGY, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFRICA

The national security strategy for Africa seeks to create and support relationships that counter terrorist threats in Africa and threats to U.S. interests in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East.¹⁷⁰ Strategic success has been identified by the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) as states that provide their own security and contribute to regional security, can mitigate violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and have democratic civil-military relations.¹⁷¹ Increased economic development and democracy are also measures of success.¹⁷² Security cooperation is seen by AFRICOM as inadequate to achieving persistent stability without creating security institutions that are capable and sustainable.

¹⁶⁷ Sharp 73.

¹⁶⁸ Sharp 76.

¹⁶⁹ Sharp 78.

¹⁷⁰ James N. Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, January 2018), 10.

¹⁷¹ Reveron, 175.

¹⁷² Thomas D. Waldhauser, *U.S. Africa Command 2017 Posture Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee*, (Stuttgart, Germany: U.S. Africa Command, March 2017), 5.

Since African insecurity is due to a lack of effective governance and not necessarily due to a lack of military professionalism and training, it cannot be solved by more military training and equipment alone.¹⁷³ Therefore, AFRICOM seeks to build “professional, legitimate defense institutions... that prioritizes the security of the population over the security of the regime.”¹⁷⁴ Improving African security forces and governments to resist VEOs and other destabilizing threats is a key component to achieving AFRICOM’s mission and U.S. national security interests.¹⁷⁵

Four defense-oriented goals provided by African states have been identified and incorporated within AFRICOM’s strategy.¹⁷⁶ The first is professional and capable militaries that are accountable for their actions. The second is security institutions that are professional and legitimate with the capacity to support and sustain the military. The third is a credible deterrence against internal and external threats. The fourth is the desire and capacity to support regional and international peacekeeping operations. A fifth could also be to train African militaries to a capacity to train other African units.¹⁷⁷ Pursuing these goals directly supports U.S. strategic objectives and will serve as a reinforcing function for building regional stability.

D. CONCLUSION

This thesis focuses primarily on military training and professional education because they are easier to measure in the short-term through exercises and operations compared to civil-military relations, respect for human rights, and other security missions which can often only be measured in the long-term by seeing how well commerce occurs and through observing governance.¹⁷⁸ Training and professional education are also the

¹⁷³ Marks, “Why USAFRICOM?” 148.

¹⁷⁴ Waldhauser, 4.

¹⁷⁵ Brian J. Dunn, “The AFRICOM Queen,” in *Military Review* (May-June 2016), 52.

¹⁷⁶ William E. Ward, *U.S. Africa Command 2010 Posture Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee*, (Stuttgart, Germany: U.S. Africa Command, March 2010), 11.

¹⁷⁷ Ploch, 24.

¹⁷⁸ Reveron, 175.

most common security operations conducted. However, failing to understand how training and professional education fit into the larger security cooperation and security sector reform concepts has the potential to achieve marginal results at best and negative results, such as increased violence and human rights violations, at worst. Security cooperation and security sector reform activities must meet U.S. strategic objectives, one of which is building foreign partner capacity to conduct mutually benefiting security operations independently of the United States.¹⁷⁹ These activities should also be complimentary to other U.S. government activities.¹⁸⁰ Military professionalization programs that are not integrated with other sector reforms have resulted in negative results in some cases.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, the experience of counterinsurgencies and counterterrorism in the 21st Century—the primary contemporary U.S. military operation—has proven that increased lethality alone is not sufficient to solve security problems¹⁸²

Security cooperation and security sector reform must also be based on the local political and geographical context in order to be successful.¹⁸³ American civil-military relations, developed and codified over more than 200 years of trial and error, may not work in African states who became independent only in the second half of the 20th Century.¹⁸⁴ It is unlikely that a lack of civilian control of the military is the primary obstacle to achieving democratic civil-military relations in Africa. So the question is this: Can U.S. led military training and professional education have a positive impact on democratizing civil-military relations? The remaining chapters will attempt to answer this question.

¹⁷⁹ Trump, 11.

¹⁸⁰ Reveron, *Exporting Security*, 43.

¹⁸¹ Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 51.

¹⁸² Reveron, *Exporting Security*, 102.

¹⁸³ Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 48.

¹⁸⁴ Thomas Bruneau, “Challenges in Building Partner Capacity: Civil-Military Relations in the United States and New Democracies,” in *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, No. 3 (2015), 440.

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III. CASE STUDY: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. MILITARY TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION IN COLOMBIA AND EL SALVADOR

United States led military training and professional education programs for foreign militaries improve their effectiveness in conducting self-defense and coalition operations, and the programs seek to integrate views on security challenges and “encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.”¹⁸⁵ Success in these areas increases the likelihood of successful combined operations –where the U.S. military works in concert with partner militaries on specific missions. It also better prepares partner militaries to operate unilaterally on security challenges that meet U.S. strategic objectives. This Chapter reviews Colombia’s and El Salvador’s experiences with U.S. military training and education from the 1970s through the 1990s, in an attempt to identify potential impacts of the U.S. training on soldiering skills, military professionalism, and civil-military relations. The training sought to professionalize the Colombian and Salvadoran armies and increase their combat effectiveness.¹⁸⁶ Both militaries improved soldiering skills. Both became more effective at locating and attacking their enemies. However, both became notorious for their human rights abuses, largely due to the institutionalization of violence at varying levels of both states. Furthermore, each achieved a different outcome in regards to professionalism and the evolution of civil-military relations. This Chapter will detail the training the United States provided to the armed forces of both nations during that time and attempt to explain the different outcomes. A future chapter will use this analysis to inform potential outcomes of U.S. training in Cameroon and Senegal.

¹⁸⁵ Derek S. Revert, *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 104–105.

¹⁸⁶ Michael McClintock, “US Military Assistance to El Salvador: From Indirect To Direct Intervention,” in *Race and Class* XXVI, No. 3 (1985), 63.

A. BACKGROUND ON THE VIOLENCE AND THE ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA

El Salvador and Colombia both experienced internal security crises in the 1980s and 1990s that required extensive attempts by their armed forces to quell them and drew military aid and training from the United States. This section will explain the roles, missions, and capabilities of the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) and the Colombian Armed Forces (COLAR) during this period. It will also demonstrate that the ESAF and COLAR grew increasingly violent toward non-combatants as the crises intensified and attempt to explain why. This will provide the military strategy background for why the United States chose to train both militaries.

Both the ESAF and the COLAR were designed for different strategic purposes—the ESAF to protect the landed elite and the COLAR to protect against external threats—but have historically been tasked to perform internal security roles and missions that specifically focused on domestic counterinsurgency. The ESAF was not designed to defend El Salvador from external threats.¹⁸⁷ It was initially designed to conduct local security for wealthy landowners who also comprised the ruling elite. This created a patrimonial relationship that resulted in elite support and funding for the ESAF who, in turn, were extremely loyal to the elite and saw regime protection as its primary role. The elite used the ESAF to harshly repress leftist politicians, Jesuit priests, and civilians who protested El Salvador's corruption and economic and political inequality starting in the late 1970s. By 1980, the ESAF's primary role was to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the *Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front* (FMLN) when it launched a civil war over ideology and economic inequality against the ruling elite.¹⁸⁸

The COLAR's training and equipping has historically been focused on territorial defense.¹⁸⁹ However, considering external threats have remained minimal compared to

¹⁸⁷ Julie Mazzei, *Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America* (Raleigh, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 147.

¹⁸⁸ Zoltan Barany, "After Civil War: Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, and Lebanon," *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*, (Princeton, NJ: The Princeton University Press, 2012), 80.

¹⁸⁹ Bruneau, "Colombia: Conflict and Civil-Military Relations," 4.

multiple insurgencies and the rise of organized crime and narco-terrorism after 1960, the COLAR has been used to defeat domestic security threats to Colombia's conservative government.¹⁹⁰ To achieve this the COLAR was granted policing powers when the National Police were placed under the control of the Ministry of Defense by Decree no. 1705 of 1960.¹⁹¹ Put another way, the Colombian armed forces, with its official police powers, are "oriented towards functions related to the control of internal public order."¹⁹² Therefore, the primary roles and missions the COLAR has been charged with and performed since the 1960s have been counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counter-organized crime, and counterterrorism.¹⁹³

The period encompassed in the case study was extremely violent in El Salvador and Colombia. Both armies increased their violence against insurgents, but violence also significantly increased against noncombatants. The Salvadoran civil war was an incredibly violent period and created a myth amongst U.S. observers that El Salvador was historically violent and backwards compared to the United States.¹⁹⁴ Violence was considered a Salvadoran cultural norm. In this connection, American politicians and policy bureaucrats deemed Salvadorans as "an inherently violent society," thereby differentiating Salvadoran troops from U.S. soldierly values and the U.S. Department of State (DoS) in 1982 believed that El Salvador could only achieve gradual improvement in curtailing its level of violence if it received U.S. military support. Violence had been a part of Salvadoran history, but it was overemphasized by U.S. officials considering there had been little political violence between the 1930s and the early 1970s.¹⁹⁵ By 1980, however, violence had been institutionalized within the ESAF.

¹⁹⁰ Carlos F. Castillo, "Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and Civilian Control Mechanisms in Colombia: 1991–2016," in *Georgetown Security Studies Review* 6, Issue 1 (December 2017), 107.

¹⁹¹ Velasquez, 130–133.

¹⁹² Velasquez, 130.

¹⁹³ Castillo, 107.

¹⁹⁴ Rittinger, "Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy," 168–171.

¹⁹⁵ Lauria-Santiago, 91.

By the middle of the civil war, the CIA assessed that the Salvadoran citizen equally feared the FMLN insurgents-and the ESAF.¹⁹⁶ More than 10,000 civilians were killed by the ESAF in 1980.¹⁹⁷ Salvadoran National Guard troops were also accused of the rape and murder of three U.S. nuns and a laywoman in 1980.¹⁹⁸ A 1982 DoS report detailed extrajudicial killings of insurgent prisoners. The ESAF also worked with paramilitary death squads to locate and kill insurgents, often through torturing and then murdering civilians who were used as information sources.¹⁹⁹ One incident is particularly unsettling and indicates the many means in which the ESAF incorporated violence.

Thirty heavily armed men wearing army combat vests, but masked with hoods lettered 'death squad', came to my village and seized and killed a number of peasants. They went then to the neighboring village of Santa Helena, seized Robilia Hernandez, aged 21, raped and then decapitated her. Her relatives buried her head: the rest of her body was burned by her murderers. The head had been left in front of her relatives' house. The members of the 'death squad' were evacuated that day by a Salvadoran army helicopter.²⁰⁰

The death squads were ultraviolent and information received from Salvadoran military defector interviews suggests the death squads consisted of far more ESAF troops than non-military personnel and included high-ranking officers.²⁰¹

Colombia was consistently one of the most dangerous countries in the world during the 1980s and 1990s. It had one of the highest homicide rates in the 1980s and the leading cause of death for Colombians in 1986 was homicide.²⁰² Colombia's increasing internal insecurity due to multiple active revolutionary, terrorist, and paramilitary groups led the

¹⁹⁶ Rittinger, "Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy," 169.

¹⁹⁷ McClintock, 75.

¹⁹⁸ Rittinger, "Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy," 172.

¹⁹⁹ Rittinger, "Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy," 175.

²⁰⁰ Amnesty International report *Political killings by governments* (1983) quoted in McClintock, 63.

²⁰¹ Mazzei, 159.

²⁰² David Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 252.

state to delegate policing of social protests and other public safety functions to the armed forces throughout the 1980s, to include military justice over civilians.²⁰³ The military established counter-guerrilla forces that conducted “civil-military activities and psychological actions aimed at the civilian population” amounting to selective repression in areas of guerrilla activity.²⁰⁴ Counter-guerrilla operations included food control and the creation of informant networks. Colombia also conducted a “para-institutional strategy” that used terror and paternalism to separate guerrillas from local populations.²⁰⁵ This indicates the COLAR viewed repression and violence against civilians as a justifiable method of accomplishing their counterinsurgency mission.

El Salvador’s and Colombia’s ability to counter their respective leftist insurgency was in doubt and increasingly alarmed U.S. leaders who feared communist movements in Latin America. The Carter administration saw the potential collapse and replacement of El Salvador’s civil-military government with a left-wing, socialist, or communist government as a threat to the U.S. and the region.²⁰⁶ The ESAF in 1979 were poorly trained and poorly led, and the U.S. DoD “had little confidence” in their capacity or capabilities.²⁰⁷ The DoD assessed the ESAF needed “a dramatic transformation” in order to successfully meet the FMLN threat and therefore created a training and aid program and lobbied for presidential and congressional support to implement them.²⁰⁸

The many insurgent and organized crime groups operating within Colombia in the 1980s grew increasingly successful at attacking the

²⁰³ Velasquez, 133–134. Note: These were the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), M-19, the Castroite ELN (National Liberation Army), and the EPL (Popular Liberation Party), as well as narcotics cartels. Bushnell, 254–256.

²⁰⁴ Velasquez, 134. Civil-military activities in this regard refer to military operations toward civilian populations. Specifically, the COLAR were conducting operations that were intended to encourage rural civilian populations not to support guerrilla elements. Instead of positive actions like improving quality of life, these actions sought to coerce civilian support of government activities.

²⁰⁵ Velasquez, 134.

²⁰⁶ McClintock, 66.

²⁰⁷ Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 168.

²⁰⁸ Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 169.

COLAR and the government.²⁰⁹ Key events included attacks on military bases in Bogota, seizure of the Dominican Embassy in 1980 and capture of 14 ambassadors, and the 1985 attack on the *Palacio de Justicia* that killed several Supreme Court justices.²¹⁰ These events and others led Colombian and U.S. officials to believe that major military reform, aid, and training was necessary in order for the COLAR to defeat insurgent forces.²¹¹

B. U.S.-LED MILITARY TRAINING, PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, AND AID IN COLOMBIA AND EL SALVADOR BETWEEN 1975 AND 2005

Neither the ESAF nor the COLAR were prepared to achieve victory in their security crises and this, along with an ideological strategic posture, led the United States to provide military aid and training to both. Colombian security forces have received U.S. military aid since the 1960s and the United States also started training Salvadoran troops, mostly the national guard and police, and providing other military aid in the mid-1960s.²¹² The United States-led training and military aid through the 1970s resulted in improvements in capabilities and capacity for both states, and in the case of El Salvador, included developing intelligence services and special forces.²¹³ However, the training and aid significantly increased beginning in 1981 as the security crises in El Salvador and Colombia began to be seen through a Cold War lens.

This section will briefly explain how the U.S. military strategy for El Salvador and Colombia was nested within the overall U.S. national strategic policy as it related to the Cold War. It will also detail the military training, professional education, and aid that the United States provided to the ESAF and COLAR, setting the conditions for the next section describing the effects on each military.

²⁰⁹ Bushnell, 254–256. These were the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), M-19, the Castroite ELN (National Liberation Army), and the EPL (Popular Liberation Party), as well as narcotics cartels.

²¹⁰ Bushnell, 253–254.

²¹¹ Velasquez, 139.

²¹² Dugas, 240; Mazzei, 146.

²¹³ Mazzei, 146–147.

The violence of the 1970s and 1980s in El Salvador and Colombia was tied to leftist insurgencies and placed into the overall context of the Cold War, resulting in U.S. military aid as an aspect of a strategic policy to stop the global spread of communism.²¹⁴ El Salvador was seen as part of the wave of communist movements through Central America, and its close proximity to the United States—only a 1,000-mile plane ride to Houston, Texas—gave it a high priority for U.S. leadership. Thus, the Salvadoran civil war became a Cold War proxy fight when the United States funded the ESAF and the FMLN forces received funding from the USSR and Cuba [until approximately 1989].²¹⁵ In Colombia, the merger of the Clandestine Colombian Communist Party and disparate leftist peasant groups into the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) in 1964 signaled a formal socialist movement within the country that drew support from Cuba and the Soviet Union and represented an existential threat to Colombia’s conservative ruling elite, who sought U.S. support to combat it.²¹⁶

Concerns over encroaching communist and socialist elements resulted in increasing military aid and training for the ESAF and COLAR, especially when enemy forces surged operations, such as the FMLN offensive of January 1980. Aid and training for the ESAF under U.S. President Jimmy Carter consisted of six personnel and were limited to non-lethal training, including riot control, and the equipment provided to El Salvador ranged from bullet-proof vests to command and control helicopters.²¹⁷ Beginning with the Ronald Reagan administration however, the 1981 military aid budget rose from a projected \$5 million, including nearly \$500,000 for the International Military Education and Training Program to train Salvadoran officers in U.S. military doctrine and tactics for international security, to more than \$49 million.²¹⁸ The United States went from tepid support to fully funding El Salvador’s civil war one year into the Reagan administration, spending at least

²¹⁴ Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 167.

²¹⁵ Barany, 81.

²¹⁶ Castillo, 106.

²¹⁷ McClintock, 63–65.

²¹⁸ McClintock, 65.

\$1 billion in military aid to El Salvador between 1980 and 1990.²¹⁹ More than \$85 million had been allocated to train the ESAF in 1991 as the civil war was ending. Colombia experienced similar upticks in military aid, especially with the implementation of Plan Colombia during the Clinton Administration, which provided more than \$1 billion for security assistance and development aid tied to counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations.²²⁰

1. Soldiering Skills Training

While U.S. training and military aid for the ESAF promoted reform, its ultimate goal was training the Salvadoran army to defeat the growing insurgency.²²¹ Trainers would focus mostly on operational and tactical level planning, infantry training, combat logistics and communications, reconnaissance and counterinsurgency operations, and fixed-wing aircraft pilot training.²²² An early aspect of training and aiding the ESAF was to build its intelligence capability. The U.S. personnel who helped El Salvador establish their intelligence organization in the 1970s had been members of the Phoenix Program used by the United States during Vietnam.²²³ The Phoenix Program used torture and assassination to achieve tactical objectives such as intelligence on the North Vietnamese Army and its guerrilla component, the Vietcong. The result was a Salvadoran intelligence agency that believed similar tactics could achieve success.

United States Special Forces were training Salvadorans by 1981, and this training included counterinsurgency tactics, patrolling, shooting, soldiering skills, and infantry tactics.²²⁴ More than 1,000 Salvadoran troops first received training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 1982. The DoD also set up training areas in Honduras and trained Salvadorans in the Panama Canal training areas. An average of 37 U.S. military trainers per month

²¹⁹ McCarthy, A13. Barany, 82; Nelson-Pallmeyer, 57

²²⁰ Bruneau, "Colombia: Conflict and Civil-Military Relations," 3.

²²¹ McClintock, 63.

²²² Drischler, 1–2.

²²³ Menjivar and Rodriguez, 13.

²²⁴ McClintock, 68–69.

served in El Salvador between November 1982 and September 1983.²²⁵ By 1983, nearly all Salvadoran officers and half the regular forces had been trained by the United States. The United States also began training paramilitary Civil Defense forces in August 1983 to supplement ESAF operations.²²⁶

The United States provided similar training to Colombia in the 1980s, but by the 1990s also modernized Colombian military installations and provided surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft as well as crew training.²²⁷ United States military aid also helped Colombia purchase U.S. Blackhawk and Russian MI-17 helicopters and field Mobile Brigades, an Anti-Narcotics Brigade, the Mountain Battalion and the Marine Riverine Infantry Brigade. The United States also helped Colombia create a Rapid Deployment Force.²²⁸ Each of these organizations required training in U.S. tactics and operations that matched the mission sets of these types of units. The United States also provided counternarcotics aid in the form of military equipment and training.

Many Salvadoran and Colombian junior enlisted troops were trained in their home states, but most officers and senior noncommissioned officers were trained at the U.S. Army operated School of the Americas (SOA) campuses in Panama and Fort Benning, Georgia. More Salvadorans trained at the SOA than troops from any Latin American state during the 1980s, with more than 1100 Salvadoran officers and enlisted training there between 1989 and 1990 alone.²²⁹ However, Colombia has the most SOA graduates over the duration of the school's existence.²³⁰ The School of the Americas was designed to teach

²²⁵ Note: The report does not indicate the length of deployment for these members, but it is presumed they were deployed for at least six months at a time. One trainer was wounded by enemy fire during this period and one trainer was killed by presumed insurgent assassination. Alvin Paul Drischler, *Senate Report on U.S. Military Trainers in El Salvador: November 1982 to September 1983*, (Washington, D.C.: Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 8 November 1983), 1–2.

²²⁶ McClintock, 73.

²²⁷ Velasquez, 140.

²²⁸ Velasquez, 141.

²²⁹ McCarthy, A13.

²³⁰ Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 142. Nelson-Pallmeyer, 7. Note: The School of the Americas changed its name to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) in 2000. Nelson-Pallmeyer, VIII.

Latin American militaries the U.S. way of war, a mixture of tactical proficiency ethics, and liberalism. The SOA's soldiering skills training focused on weapons employment, including the infantry assault rifle, grenade launcher, light and heavy machine-guns, and mortars, and also included infantry squad through company level combined arms tactics.²³¹ Communications, call-for-fire, patrolling, and land navigation training was also prominent.

The SOA taught intelligence collection and analysis, psychological operations, interrogation, commando tactics, and sniper techniques.²³² Many Salvadorans who trained at the SOA indicated in later interviews they were trained in torture techniques for interrogations such as electric shock. Intelligence training before 1996 advocated harsh tactics including the use of fear, extortion, the use of truth serum, and even suggested that execution could be useful in recruiting informants and controlling sources.²³³ This led to the School of the America's intelligence training manuals being commonly referred to as the "Torture Manuals."²³⁴

One anecdote from an intelligence trainer at the SOA recalled a Salvadoran student explaining to the class how well it worked to blindfold detainees, fly them in helicopters to disorient them, and then push them out of the helicopter when just a few feet off the ground.²³⁵ While the Salvadoran claimed this practice would lead to actionable intelligence, the SOA instructors found it difficult to emphasize that the U.S. military no longer used those techniques and that SOA trainees should not use them either. These same manuals are also alleged to have recommended targeting insurgent family members as a counterintelligence tactic to gain leverage on informants.²³⁶ Many Colombian officers were SOA during the time the "Torture Manuals" were part of the curriculum and more than 150 Colombian SOA graduates have been linked to human rights abuses."²³⁷

²³¹ Gill, 106.

²³² Menjivar and Rodriguez, 19.

²³³ Gill, 49.

²³⁴ Gill, 49.

²³⁵ Gill, 50.

²³⁶ Nelson-Pallmeyer, 37.

²³⁷ HRW, 1996, 93. Leech, quoted in Dugas, 240.

2. Professional Education

Several U.S. officials believed that training alongside U.S. troops would socialize Salvadoran and Colombian troops to American standards military professionalism.²³⁸ These troops would understand military discipline, the rules of war, the militaries relationship to a democratic civilian authority, and the importance of human rights. A National Security Council memorandum in February 1983 reported its strategy for El Salvador would “Emphasize importance of fostering, through training, improvement in ESAF professionalism, to include teaching the relevance of respect for laws and the populace; the importance of civic action; and the necessity of a comprehensive campaign to provide that security essential for political and economic progress.”²³⁹ Training in El Salvador needed to include a focus on liberalizing the illiberal and civilizing the uncivilized in order to sway the ESAF from human rights abuses.²⁴⁰

Attendance at the SOA served as the optimal opportunity to socialize trainees, teach them the rules of war, and create a preference for human rights through a type of osmosis.²⁴¹ Simply put, it was believed trainees would come to exhibit the best characteristics of U.S. troops —professionalism, protectors of human rights and the rule of law— through daily interaction with the SOA’s U.S. instructors. The SOA was designed to teach ethics and liberalism in addition to doctrine and tactics as mentioned above. The SOA emphasized human rights training and respect for both the rule of law and the law of war very early in its existence. General Wallace Nutting, commander of U.S. Southern Command, in October 1980 stressed that SOA training sought “to enhance technical and professional skills... including a course titled ‘Human rights aspects in internal defense and development.’”²⁴² Two years later, Colonel Nicholas Andreacchio of the SOA claimed that

²³⁸ McClintock, quoted in Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 180.

²³⁹ Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 181–182.

²⁴⁰ Rittinger, “Arming the Other,” 404.

²⁴¹ Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 180–181.

²⁴² McClintock, 70.

every training course contained “some sort of human rights training.”²⁴³ The school attempted to “describe military training as an exercise in democracy, engagement, and the promotion of human rights.”²⁴⁴ Much of the human rights training emphasized the intelligence value of civilians and stressed that killing them did not serve the objective. However, most of the SOA training focused on soldiering skills and, at times, this training counteracted concerns for human rights.

Training covered civil-military operations as well, emphasizing that the proper military role was in support of civilian authority and civil defense during counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations.²⁴⁵ Much of the civil-military operations training focused on humanitarian assistance activities that would provide quality of life improvements to achieve civil society support for military operations against insurgents. However, the professional education provided included heavy doses of anticommunism, which stressed that communists could not be trusted.²⁴⁶ Professional education also promoted corporateness, was security-oriented, and promoted professional secrecy and served to reinforce themes already inherent in the ESAF and facilitated state-led repression and violence.²⁴⁷ It could be argued the same themes were present within the COLAR as well.

C. THE EFFECTS OF U.S. TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION ON SOLDIERING SKILLS, MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA

The United States provided extensive military aid to the ESAF and COLAR that included training and professionalism and took place both in the United States and in their respective countries. This section will explain that both militaries achieved improvements in soldiering skills that made them more effective in the use of force. However, improvements in military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations were

²⁴³ McClintock, 70.

²⁴⁴ Gill, 45.

²⁴⁵ Gill, 45–46.

²⁴⁶ Gill, 108.

²⁴⁷ Lauria-Santiago, 89.

eventually achieved in both militaries but not as a direct result of U.S. military training and education.

The U.S. training and military aid provided to the ESAF increased their soldiering skills and made them more lethal, but evidence suggests their respect for human rights decreased. Civilian casualties significantly increased after U.S. aid and training increased in 1980.²⁴⁸ When asked about U.S. trained Salvadoran troops, the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENESTRAS) Union President Gerardo Diaz said:

It isn't true, that the soldiers trained in the U.S. go back to El Salvador and respect human rights. They come back and become a gang of Salvadoran Noriegas . . . We have seen, year after year, U.S. aid used against our people. That puts us in a position we don't want to be in: protesting against U.S. citizens. It's painful for me to think that so few of them are aware of how much destruction has occurred in El Salvador because of the money they send and soldiers they train.²⁴⁹

The Truth Commission established at the end of the Salvadoran civil war to investigate civil and human rights abuses and to identify and purge from the government the perpetrators indicated that 95 percent of violence against noncombatants committed during the war was committed by the ESAF.²⁵⁰ The Truth Commission also determined “more than two-thirds of the more than sixty officers cited for the worst atrocities in El Salvador’s brutal civil war are alumni of the School of the Americas.”²⁵¹ Benjamin Schwarz determined that many of the murders in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly the murders of Jesuit priests, were committed by U.S. trained officers and enlisted, alleging their abuses are among the most atrocious.²⁵² Educating troops on human rights seems to have been ignored because, like other U.S. supported reforms in El

²⁴⁸ McClintock, 69.

²⁴⁹ Colman McCarthy, “U.S. pays for training El Salvador military” *Edmonton Journal*, 2 Feb 1990. A13.

²⁵⁰ Barany, 80, 83.

²⁵¹ Nelson-Pallmeyer, 27.

²⁵² Schwarz quoted in Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 185.

Salvador, it seems to have resulted in more violence.²⁵³ As the civil war was ending, the ESAF air force bombed neighborhoods with no known combatants and destroyed an estimated 30,000 homes.²⁵⁴

The COLAR's soldiering skills improved with increases in U.S. military training and combat deaths rose more than 60 percent from 1997 to 2001.²⁵⁵ However, civilian deaths attributed to the COLAR also increased. Units conducting counterterrorism and counternarcotics were indiscriminate in killing and sometimes killed civilians, claiming later they were insurgents or narcoterrorists.²⁵⁶ The U.S. DoS 2002 report on Colombia acknowledges the COLAR's "serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings" that are rarely brought to justice.²⁵⁷ The report also outlines military support and cooperation with paramilitary groups engaged in human rights abuses.

Professionalism and respect for security under the rule of law has improved at the highest levels of the COLAR but frontline troops and even some regimental and regional leadership have continued to violate human rights through their cooperation with paramilitaries. This has been an attempt to hide human rights abuses similar tactic to the ESAF's use of death squads. The COLAR in some cases assisted paramilitary operations actively, but most often passively through roadblocks, disposal of corpses, or by informing paramilitaries of planned COLAR attacks.²⁵⁸ The government reported in 2001 that the Calima Front in Cali was established and supported by officers in the COLAR Army Third Brigade, perhaps even by the brigade commander who was eventually arrested by the Attorney General's Office. Colombian "security agents have engaged in illegal and abusive counterinsurgency and counternarcotics tactics, including torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and the creation and support of illegal paramilitary units."²⁵⁹ The

²⁵³ Note: the United States pushed for agrarian land reforms in El Salvador, but this resulted in a doubling down by elites and increased violence (Lauria-Santiago, 103).

²⁵⁴ McCarthy, A13.

²⁵⁵ Dugas, 228–230.

²⁵⁶ Dugas, 235–236.

²⁵⁷ Dugas, 244.

²⁵⁸ Mazzei, 110–111.

²⁵⁹ Dugas, 233.

military is also alleged to have cordoned off the village of Chengue on 17 January 2001 and even conducted a mock battle with guerrillas to facilitate the massacre of villagers by the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).²⁶⁰

Cooperation and support between the COLAR and the paramilitaries was incredibly deadly for combatants and civilians at the end of the 20th Century despite U.S. training and education and reforms the U.S. helped Colombia implement. This is likely due to a systemic belief that the strategic objective is the elimination of guerrillas and terrorists and that paramilitaries are partners in that strategy even if they kill civilians.²⁶¹ Military officials and some in government believed the paramilitary groups were legitimate partners in securing the state because they not threaten to overthrow the state, unlike the insurgencies and the civilians that are likely supporting them. While the ultra violence was abhorrent, their objectives were the same. A former Colombian peace envoy once noted, “For our military, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”²⁶²

D. ANALYSIS

The U.S. military training and professional education provided to the ESAF and the COLAR failed to directly improve military professionalism. However, both states did eventually achieve more professional militaries and greater democratic civil-military relations through different methods and in different timeframes. This section argues that institutionalized violence prevented U.S. military professionalism from taking hold and that types of regimes and international pressure are significant determinants for reforming militaries.

Evidence indicates human rights abuses and violence were institutionalized in both El Salvador and Colombia and prevented improvements in military professionalism despite the professional education provided by the United States. Both states used or empowered the military to protect the regime and political elite. Both states gave soldiers significant policing and judicial powers and protected them from prosecution. Both states also used

²⁶⁰ Dugas, 227.

²⁶¹ Mazzei, 117.

²⁶² Mazzei, 117.

combat effectiveness as measures of success and as prerequisites for troops to receive training in the United States. All of these characteristics promoted violence and undermined the rule of law and human rights focus of U.S. professional education programs.

The Salvadoran elite believed in the 1980s that the deaths of thousands was necessary to defeat the FMLN and stabilize the country, referring to it as “the necessary massacre.”²⁶³ The result was state-sanctioned murder, executed by the ESAF, whose priority was to support the elite class. The regime facilitated prosecution of the war by passing laws such as Code 50 that granted the ESAF and intelligence agencies authorities to selectively target suspected insurgents and collaborators and detain them indefinitely and without oversight.²⁶⁴ Many were tortured and disappeared. Jose Alberto Madrano—head of the National Guard, ANSESAL (*Agencia Nactional de Servicios Especiales*, or Salvadoran National Security Agency) and the Democratic Nationalist Organization—scoffed at the U.S. Eighth Special Forces Group counterinsurgency emphasis on winning hearts and minds and civic action, saying, “In this revolutionary war, the enemy comes from our people. . . . They don’t have the rights of Geneva. They are traitors to our country. What can the troops do? When they find them, they kill them.”²⁶⁵ Medrano and other military leaders accepted that only the elimination of subversive groups would be successful.²⁶⁶ When the Salvadoran government was pressured by the Reagan administration to improve its human rights record the government in El Salvador promoted clandestine death squad operations to achieve its ends.²⁶⁷ The death squads provided an opportunity to clandestinely use U.S. trained ESAF troops to prosecute the Salvadoran government’s annihilation strategy and attempt to avoid scrutiny over human rights abuses.

²⁶³ Lauria-Santiago, 92.

²⁶⁴ Menjivar and Rodriguez, 21.

²⁶⁵ Mazzei, 148.

²⁶⁶ Nairn, quoted in Mazzei, 148.

²⁶⁷ Lauria-Santiago, 99.

Colombia's democracy has largely been dominated by a narrow band of ruling elites who have shaped military doctrine to secure their access to power.²⁶⁸ The military has been directed to combat all internal threats and has been granted broad control over strategy and operations against insurgents.²⁶⁹ The COLAR had operated under an attitude in the 1980s that victory should be achieved at any cost and the state attempted to reform this attitude, but the "due obedience" immunity clause within the 1991 constitution protected junior officers and enlisted from prosecution civilians were killed while they were following orders or were in the act of engaging insurgents.²⁷⁰ The Constitutional Court did rule in 1997 "that human rights violations such as forcible disappearance, torture, murder, and rape could not be considered 'acts of service' and should, therefore, be tried in the civilian justice system."²⁷¹ Evidence suggests the COLAR became more reliant on paramilitaries to conduct counterinsurgency when the state attempted military reforms or the United States demanded accountability.²⁷²

Combat effectiveness was seen as the primary measure of merit and performance in El Salvador and Colombia for selection to the SOA or other training in the United States.²⁷³ Combat effectiveness was related to enemy body counts. Since attendance at a military school in the United States was seen as a chance at social mobility, a chance to get promoted, and an opportunity to gain access within the native military and government, this policy contributed to more violence. Salvadoran and Colombian troops conducted counterinsurgent operations that took no prisoners or would cover-up civilian casualties by planting weapons on them to disguise them as guerrillas in order to be considered for attendance.²⁷⁴

²⁶⁸ Castillo, 106.

²⁶⁹ Velasquez, 138.

²⁷⁰ Dugas, 236.

²⁷¹ Sent. C-358 de, 1997, quoted in Dugas, 236.

²⁷² Dugas, 239.

²⁷³ Gill, 158.

²⁷⁴ Gill, 92 and 159.

Regime types can promote or obstruct the improvement of military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations. What distinguishes Colombia from El Salvador in this study is the more democratic nature of the state during the focus period, the long-standing tradition of civilian control of the COLAR, and the state's long-term attempts to reform the COLAR and professionalize it while attempting to defeat several insurgencies. El Salvador was a military dominated autocracy prior to and during the civil war that systematically used violence against the FMLN and civilians in its attempts to secure victory. Democratic military reform did not fit within that strategic viewpoint. After nearly two decades of civil war, El Salvador transitioned to democracy in 1992 and military reforms began.²⁷⁵

Colombia has been a democracy since 1958.²⁷⁶ Civilian control of the military has had a strong tradition in Colombia even if it has been fluid and ineffective through much of its modern history.²⁷⁷ However, civilian control of the COLAR has not always been democratic, complete, or endogenously promoted. The COLAR has openly resisted reform at times and the civilian authority has granted the COLAR significant autonomy during other times. The *Lleras Doctrine* of 1958 attempted to depoliticize the military and give it autonomy over its structure, equipment, discipline, training, and the conduct of security and defense.²⁷⁸ Reform programs have consistently included structural reorganization, specialization, and attempts to enforce the rule of law and an appreciation of human rights. Civilian authority determines security policy per law, but the COLAR has largely been given autonomy to conduct security.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵ Rene Santamaria Varela, David G. Browning, Markus Schultze-Kraft, and Philip F. Flemion, "El Salvador," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, (London: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 10 January 2018), <https://www.britannica.com/place/El-Salvador>, viewed 15 January 2018. Mazzei, 130.

²⁷⁶ Thomas C. Bruneau, "Colombia: Conflict and Civil-Military Relations," *Strategic Insights* 2, Issue 3 (March 2003), 4.

²⁷⁷ Castillo, 102.

²⁷⁸ Alejo Vargas Velasquez, "The Profile of the Colombian Armed Forces: A Result of the Struggle against Guerrillas, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism," in *Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, ed. David R. Mares and Rafael Martínez, (Eastbourne, United Kingdom: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 132–133.

²⁷⁹ Bruneau, "Colombia: Conflict and Civil-Military Relations," 4.

The increasing violence and effectiveness of insurgent and terrorist groups within Colombia during the early 1980s convinced the United States and the Colombian government that reforming the COLAR was necessary in order to secure the state. In this context, the Belisario Betancur administration (1982-1986), with U.S. assistance, attempted security reforms, political reforms, and peace negotiations but the military actively resisted them.²⁸⁰ Betancur also directed a reorganization of the COLAR in 1984 and 1985 with a special emphasis on civil-military actions and the creation of the Elite Anti-Guerrilla Force, using professional soldiers.²⁸¹

The 1991 constitution democratized civilian control of the COLAR. It established the President as the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” and made the COLAR commanders subordinate.²⁸² Article 216 codified the Military Forces and National Police as the state security forces and directed that all citizens be required to serve if directed. This was an apparent attempt to build a social contract wherein the COLAR would have a responsibility to protect Colombians and the citizens were responsible for protecting Colombia. The constitution also directed that professional training and education for the COLAR and national police be institutionalized and consistent with a democratic state. The first civilian Defense Minister was appointed in 1992 and civilians actively took more control of setting security policy.

President Andres Pastrana Arango (1998-2002) wanted to promote human rights and establish a legal framework, rules of law, within which the armed forces would operate against the insurgents.²⁸³ Pastrana, with the help of the United States, restructured troop training and promotion programs and developed the “Statute of the Professional Soldier” to define “the legal status of military personnel.”²⁸⁴ The COLAR professionalized recruiting and officer selection, tripling the number of professional soldiers between 1998 and 2002. The COLAR added *regulares* in the same period - “conscripts completing

²⁸⁰ Dugas, 233–234.

²⁸¹ Velasquez, 136.

²⁸² Velasquez, 137.

²⁸³ Velasquez, 140.

²⁸⁴ Velasquez, 141.

military service of 18 months to two years.”²⁸⁵ The military budget and aid increased under the Pastrana regime and the number of combat soldiers doubled between 1998 and 2002.²⁸⁶

With the support of the United States under the framework of Plan Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe Velez continued military reforms when he took office in 2002 but extended reforms to other government agencies as well. The Uribe administration sought significant military and police reforms, to include changes to military conscription, intelligence, and civilian cooperation.²⁸⁷ Uribe created the first national security strategy to defeat terrorist logistics and financial systems. He established the Democratic Defense and Security Policy between 2002 and 2010 identifying “(a) the protection of the rights of all citizens, (b) the protection of democratic values, pluralism and democratic institutions, and (c) the solidarity and cooperation of the entire community” as “the pillars of Democratic Security.”²⁸⁸ The military passively resisted Uribe’s civil-military relations related reforms initially, but U.S. assistance helped mitigate this resistance.²⁸⁹

Uribe worked with the United States to create more specialized Mobile Brigades than had been established during the Pastrana regime.²⁹⁰ Uribe further reduced the number of conscripted soldiers, consolidating the previous administration’s gains in increasing the professionalism of troops. He created the “peasant soldier” program where conscripted troops were garrisoned in their home areas to use them as area experts. The Uribe administration also integrated human and technical intelligence with operations planning, new tactics, better training, and new equipment to generate more efficient operations that resulted in higher attrition of the FARC and other insurgent forces. A democratic regime focused on achieving a professionalized military was the key difference to Colombia achieving moderate reforms while continuing to fight its insurgencies. Continued reform increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the COLAR but deficiencies remained in their

²⁸⁵ Velasquez, 141.

²⁸⁶ Velasquez, 141–142.

²⁸⁷ Bruneau, “Colombia: Conflict and Civil-Military Relations,” 4.

²⁸⁸ Velasquez, 142.

²⁸⁹ Bruneau, “Colombia: Conflict and Civil-Military Relations,” 5.

²⁹⁰ Velasquez, 144–146.

professionalism. Another key difference was how subsequent Colombian presidents took these actions in concert with U.S. assistance and with the understanding that the failure to reform could result in losing U.S. military and financial support.

External political and economic pressure may be required in addition to U.S. military training and professional education to achieve improvements in military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations regardless of the regime type. External pressure was essential to generating El Salvador's reforms. External pressure served as an oversight tool to encourage Colombia to continue reforms.

By the mid-1980s the U.S. Congress was increasingly aware of and appalled by human rights abuses allegedly committed by U.S. trained Salvadoran troops. The Congress mandated biannual certification that the Salvadoran military was actively working to prevent and curtail human rights violations and a failure to prove such proof would result in the loss of funding and training.²⁹¹ Even though the Reagan administration continued to approve emergency funding for military training of Salvadoran troops, threats of losing U.S. support, international scrutiny, the dogged staying power of the FMLN guerrillas, and the political exhaustion caused by more than a decade of civil war led to change in El Salvador. Alfredo Cristiani, a leftist, was elected president in 1989 and pledged to demobilize the FMLN and decrease the army's political powers.²⁹²

President Cristiani promoted "the demilitarization of politics."²⁹³ This attempt to democratize civil-military relations through the agreement and new constitution achieved only modest results. However, civilian control of the ESAF was established when the president was designated by the constitution as the commander-in-chief and the National Security Council was created.²⁹⁴ The president appoints a military officer as defense minister and the joint chiefs of staff have a say in who the defense minister will be, but all

²⁹¹ Rittinger, "Arming the Other," 404.

²⁹² Barany, 81–82.

²⁹³ Barany, 83.

²⁹⁴ Barany, 95

defense ministers have been active duty military officers.²⁹⁵ Active duty officers are prohibited from being political candidates or serving elected office. The constitution also provides the Legislative Assembly some oversight of defense issues, but no significant defense budgetary controls. The potential loss of U.S. funding was a factor in getting the ESAF leadership to go along with Cristiani's negotiations and reforms.

Plan Colombia not only increased U.S. military training and aid, it increased critical assessment of the COLAR's effectiveness. The United States demanded the major military reforms beginning in the 1990s because of human rights violations and tactical assessments saying the COLAR could not defeat the insurgents without major military reform.²⁹⁶ Reports from various agencies such as the United Nations during the 2000s increased the calls for reform by showing systemic failure in Colombia's guarantee of protection and failures to hold violators accountable.²⁹⁷ The COLAR disbanded the 20th Intelligence Brigade for its violations under pressure from the United States and the United States ended support to the Air Combat Command No. 1 in 2003 because it failed to investigate a 1998 civilian casualty incident.²⁹⁸ The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also collaborated with Colombia to establish a nationwide mass violence or human rights early warning system and created a human rights victim assistance program managed by the Ministry of the Interior's General Office for Human Rights. Colombia's promotion of military professionalism and democratic civil-military is unlikely to have achieved these moderate successes without pressure and assistance from the United States.

E. CONCLUSION

The human rights abuses committed by Colombian and Salvadoran forces trained by the U.S. military during the 1980s and 1990s and the challenges in increasing military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations in both countries provide a detailed case study for military planners and politicians seeking to train foreign forces. The training

²⁹⁵ Barany, 95–96.

²⁹⁶ Velasquez, 139.

²⁹⁷ Dugas, 245. Mazzei, 115.

²⁹⁸ Dugas, 245.

provided was primarily focused on soldierly skills, but professional education that focused on ethics and human rights was incorporated as well. These troops were taught the most effective and efficient tactics for conventional war as well as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Yet they were also instructed in the rule of law and the Geneva Conventions. So *why did U.S. trained Salvadoran and Colombian soldiers abuse human rights; why did it take so long to reform and professionalize their militaries, and improve democratic civil-military relations?*

The ESAF and COLAR institutionalized violence and their governments either encouraged it or condoned it. The U.S. standard of military professionalism and its approach to the conduct of war did not mesh with how Salvadoran and Colombian troops viewed their conflicts or their relationship to their states. For example, one former COLAR commander complained that American military doctrine did not apply to their intrastate war, saying, “We were using American doctrine, where we conceptualized the continuum as ‘war’ and ‘other than war.’ This was absolutely incorrect. There is only war, with the enemy fielding different mixes of the elements of war.”²⁹⁹ The insurgencies in both states were viewed as struggles for existence. Soldiers feared the lost opportunity of social mobility if they reduced the violence and lowered body counts. From these perspectives, it is unlikely that any amount of human rights training would be institutionalized without home state support. As one SOA spokesman said in 1990, “We place serious emphasis on human rights. It’s beyond our control what happens when the Salvadorans go back to their country . . . it’s probably inevitable that some of the people we’ve trained here behave in less than desirable ways.”³⁰⁰

The absence of a democratic regime that wanted to reform its military prevented professionalization and democratic civil-military relations in El Salvador before the end of the civil war in 1992. The resolution of the conflict in El Salvador and the effects of consolidating democracy have resulted in reforms. Colombia’s democratic presidents sought reform at the encouragement and with the assistance of the United States but were

²⁹⁹ General Carlos Ospina, former Commander of the Colombian Army, quoted in Marcella, 166.

³⁰⁰ McCarthy, A13.

often opposed by the military who feared reforms would limit opportunities for social mobility or were pressured to give the military more autonomy when insurgent groups went on the offensive or achieved tactical successes.

The U.S. military aid policies toward El Salvador and Colombia were also hypocritical in the sense that they promoted democratic civil-military relations and military professionalism but multiple presidential administrations frequently failed to monitor human rights violations and implement congressional mandates that prohibited funding them. There was a significant imbalance between the funding provided for military aid and the funding provided for oversight.³⁰¹ The Congress mandated that groups found to violate human rights would be prohibited from receiving military aid, yet administrations from Reagan to George W. Bush skirted this mandate by linking the events in El Salvador and Colombia with the Cold War and War on Terror, respectively, declaring them emergency military crises. Leftist and terrorist groups in El Salvador and Colombia were identified as part of a greater existential threat to U.S. security and the ends —protecting the United States— nearly always justified the means. Not holding accountable units accused of human rights violations reinforced their actions and aligned tactical actions to strategic interests to create a mindset of victory at any cost. Also, U.S. policy makers could claim that disengagement from El Salvador and Colombia would remove any leverage the U.S. had to push reforms to professionalize the military and democratize civil-military relations.³⁰² The United States provided billions of dollars in military aid that included equipment and training even when evidence of human rights abuses by these militaries was too numerous to deny. However, implementing increased conditionality for aid eventually coerced both El Salvador and Colombia to reform.

Improved military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations eventually occurred in both El Salvador and Colombia. Both have codified democratic civilian control of the military in their constitutions. The ESAF has also experienced an evolution in its roles and missions. While the roles and missions during the late 20th

³⁰¹ Dugas, 239–240.

³⁰² Rittinger, “Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy,” 195.

Century were focused on internal security, the ESAF's post-conflict mission has been more focused on external security including participation in a number of international coalitions in Libya, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti and the Sudan.³⁰³ This shows a maturation in both the professionalism of the ESAF and the civilian authority's understanding of the appropriate use of the ESAF.

Colombia increased the size of the COLAR, its capabilities, and its capacity for expanded operations through U.S. assistance.³⁰⁴ The COLAR reformed doctrine, leadership, equipment, and strategy. The Ministry of Defense also widely introduced human rights and international humanitarian law education.³⁰⁵ The COLAR's roles and missions have not evolved much from internal security but this could change if the 2016 peace achieved with the FARC can last. Professionalism and democratic civil-military relations in Colombia is moving in a positive direction due to a long-term holistic view toward reform.

Using El Salvador and Colombia as a case study shows that U.S. military training and professional education alone is limited in its ability to achieve comprehensive improvements in military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations in partner states. Other factors are required. The receiving states regime must want reform and be able to implement it, even though that desire may be inspired by U.S. assistance. The training and professional education should be applied across the foreign government bureaucracy as well as the military. And finally, the United States must make military aid conditional on respecting human rights and enforce it.

³⁰³ Barany, 83, 94.

³⁰⁴ Marcella, 169.

³⁰⁵ Dugas, 238.

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IV. CASE STUDY: CAMEROON AND SENEGAL

While military training and professional education programs seek to achieve the same objectives in Africa as in Latin America –improved military effectiveness, interoperability, increased capacity, and democracy promotion—planners should understand modern Africa’s political and military history in relation to its present context to best develop working solutions. African colonies were codified in the late 19th Century and Sudan was the first to be granted independence in 1956, unlike Latin America, which was formally colonized beginning in the 15th Century and achieved independence through revolution in the early 19th Century.³⁰⁶ The short timeframe of formal colonial administration opened Africa to the global economy, but failed to fully establish modern state structures.³⁰⁷ Newly independent rulers inherited state institutions designed for indirect rule that relied on patrimonial systems to govern or deliver public goods, and alienated the populations furthest from the state capital.³⁰⁸

The particular type of colonialism and the mostly peaceful decolonization in Africa meant the continent skipped the Western state-building process, meaning many of the bureaucracies needed to manage the state were underdeveloped.³⁰⁹ The Organization of African Unity in 1963 resolved that each African state recognize the others’ borders and demanded “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.”³¹⁰ Therefore, states did not require their militaries to participate in the state building process as described by Tilly, and they do not

³⁰⁶ Note: Sudan received its independence from Britain in 1956. BBC. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/14chapter1.shtml>. Peru and Bolivia were the last continental states to gain independence in Latin America in 1826. However, Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean did not achieve independence from Spain until the Spanish-American War in 1898. Roger A. Kittleson, David Bushnell, *Encyclopedia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Latin-America/The-independence-of-Latin-America>. Both accessed 8 May 2018.

³⁰⁷ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 97.

³⁰⁸ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 18.

³⁰⁹ Olaf Bachmann, “Civil–Military Relations in Francophone Africa and the Consequences of a Mistaken Analysis,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, No. 3 (2014), 610.

³¹⁰ Herbst, 104.

require the same level of civilian support because social contracts created by the use of citizen-soldiers were not part of the state building process.³¹¹ If war makes states, African states have largely been built on peace.³¹²

On the other hand, the Cold War also affected Africa differently than it did in Latin America and its influence, like that of colonization, also contributed to stunted African state-building and democratization.³¹³ The Soviet and Chinese supported insurgencies in Latin America occurred in established states more than 100 years removed from their colonial masters. By contrast, the Cold War spanned the first and second waves of African independence. The activities by Cold War agents in Africa –Soviet and Chinese support to leftist insurgencies and U.S. support to anti-communist regimes, often with little concern about their interest in democracy—interfered with an endogenous state-building process.³¹⁴

The history of colonialism, the Cold War, indirect rule, and personalized rule in modern Africa created a collective political culture of neopatrimonialism where the military was comfortable as a political actor.³¹⁵ Military interventions have been a regular occurrence and range from regime protection to coups d'état, especially in Western and Central Africa where both Cameroon and Senegal are located. The result is a continent where state structures and economies are underdeveloped, states struggle to maintain a monopoly of force over their territories, and instability and insecurity are significant threats. Western and Central Africa, where Cameroon and Senegal are located, are unstable and have experienced most of the UN Peace Support Operations since 2004.³¹⁶

This chapter will analyze and compare the post-independence political histories of Cameroon and Senegal, as well as their militaries, including their roles and missions, and

³¹¹ Bachmann, 607.

³¹² Herbst, 98.

³¹³ Martin Rupiya, "Sub-Saharan Africa: Decolonization to Multiparty Democracy and the Challenges of Transforming Military Institutions," in *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, ed. Dennis C. Blair, (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2013), 193.

³¹⁴ Rupiya, 193.

³¹⁵ Bachmann, 607.

³¹⁶ Bachmann, 608.

the status of their civil-military relations. It will also detail current security threats for both countries and any training and professional education programs conducted with the United States up to the present. This will frame the final chapter's assessment of the potential impacts future U.S. training and professional education programs will have on these and other African states.

A. BACKGROUND ON CAMEROON AND SENEGAL

This section reviews the post-independence history of Cameroon and Senegal to provide the political and social context within which their armed forces operate and will provide a framework for understanding the roles and missions their armed forces perform.

Cameroon and Senegal gained their independence during the first wave of African decolonization in the early 1960s. Both had been French colonies, although the northwestern region of Cameroon was once part of the British colony of Nigeria. Both adopted single-party dominated governments post-independence that used cooptation and patrimonialism to function. The 1990s democratization wave inspired liberalization movements in both Senegal and Cameroon, but achieved different outcomes.³¹⁷ Senegal has liberalized and become a multiparty democracy, while liberalization attempts in Cameroon have largely failed.³¹⁸ Both economies are primary products-based, and Cameroon has been an oil exporter since the late 1970s.³¹⁹ Both state economies are developing but small, with Cameroon ranked as the world's 95th largest economy by gross domestic product and Senegal ranked as the 116th.³²⁰

Modern Cameroon was created when French Cameroon gained its independence in 1960 followed by the merger with British Cameroon upon its independence in 1961. The colony of Kamerun was partitioned by France and Britain after Germany's defeat in WWI,

³¹⁷ Kristen A. Harkness, "Military Loyalty and the Failure of Democratization in Africa: How Ethnic Armies Shape the Capacity of Presidents to Defy Term Limits," *Democratization* 24, No. 5 (2017), 810.

³¹⁸ Harkness, 806.

³¹⁹ Harkness, 806.

³²⁰ World Bank, *World Development Indicators database*, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 17 April 2018). <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>. Accessed 10 May 2018.

with what is now called the Anglophone region becoming part of British Cameroon.³²¹ Cameroon is ethnically heterogeneous but has two distinct colonially imposed linguistic groups speaking English and French.³²² Anglophones make up 20 percent of Cameroon's population.³²³ While Cameroon's independence was gained without revolution, its modern creation was not without violence. The *Union des Populations du Cameroun*, an independence group with communist political tendencies that did not receive funding or arms from the Eastern Block, fought against French colonial forces from 1948 through independence.³²⁴ Cameroon became a federated republic with a multiparty system in 1961 with Amadou Ahidjo as president.³²⁵ Due to the ongoing insurgency by UPC, President Ahidjo legislated a one-party system in 1966, under the *Union National Camerounien* (UNC) party, believing that this was the only way to create national unity. Ahidjo worked to fracture the UPC and Anglophone political party alliances and bring them into the UNC fold.³²⁶ Those parties that did not join UNC were kept out of government when the multiparty federation was dissolved in 1972 (creating a unitary system). The current Anglophone separatist movement is a result of the failure of the 1972 decision to build the national unity that Ahidjo desired.

Paul Biya assumed the presidency in 1982 when Ahidjo resigned due to poor health.³²⁷ Biya spent the early years of his presidency appointing co-ethnics and regional leaders to ministerial, legislative, and state-owned businesses based on personal loyalty. Liberalization movements during the 1990s resulted in a multiparty election and established presidential term limits, but opposition parties failed to win the presidency in 1992. Biya's response was to introduce and receive approval of an amendment to the 1996

³²¹ Sarah Graveline, "Cameroon: Anglophone Protests Highlight Historical Grievances," *Africa Watch*, 14 (2017), 2.

³²² Peter Ateh-Afac Fossungu, *Understanding Confusion in Africa: The Politics of Multiculturalism and Nation-building in Cameroon*, (Bamenda, Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2013), xi.

³²³ Graveline, 2.

³²⁴ Elizabeth Rechniewski, "A Small War in Cameroon," *Small Wars Journal*, Accessed 3 June 2018, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-small-war-in-cameroon>.

³²⁵ Fossungu, 114.

³²⁶ Fossungu, 130.

³²⁷ Harkness, 811–812.

constitution that identifies the president as “the symbol of national unity,”³²⁸ thereby implying that opposition to the president is opposition to national unity. Single-party dominance along with co-ethnic parliamentarians and judges also facilitated Biya’s removal of constitutional term limits in 2008 and the reversal of the 1990s liberal reforms.³²⁹ This democratic regression resulted in mass protests that were violently repressed by the co-ethnic military. Biya won his sixth term in 2011 with 78 percent of the vote.³³⁰ Biya is planning to run for another term as president in 2018.³³¹

Cameroon’s political system has been designated a hybrid regime or a competitive authoritarian regime.³³² These are described as democracies that allow elections and other democratic governance protocols, but manipulate them and restrict freedom while segregating or repressing some groups. Mass protest and liberalization movements are significant actions for achieving democratic reforms if the military does not support the ruler.³³³ Herein may lie one key factor in Cameroon’s inability to achieve liberal democracy. Biya, like his predecessor, has been successful in factionalizing the military and political elites.³³⁴ This is a common outcome in hybrid regimes. Biya’s has ample support in the government and does not have to rely on democratic support because the military, legislature, and judiciary are filled with co-ethnics or political partisans. Oil rents may also allow Cameroon to rely less on democratic institutions because oil rents allow rulers to depend less on foreign aid and state taxes and this can reduce their respect for the rule of law and the need to develop a social contract with its citizens.³³⁵

³²⁸ Fossungu, 134.

³²⁹ Harkness, 806 and 812.

³³⁰ Harkness, 813.

³³¹ Graveline, 3.

³³² Wolfgang Merkel, “Return of the Dictatorships? New Democracies, However, Fragile, Can Defend Themselves from Autocracy,” *Internationale Politik – Global Edition* 11 (2010), 3. Scholars identify competitive authoritarian or hybrid regimes in various ways: demi-democracies, semi-democracies, illiberal democracies, etc.

³³³ Harkness, 809.

³³⁴ Merkel, 4.

³³⁵ Harkness, 807–808.

Senegal also gained its independence from France in 1960. Senegal has been mostly peaceful since independence except for the insurgency in the Casamance region that began in 1982.³³⁶ The Senegalese favor debate and consensus, even in politics, and the civil society is strong, including the National Association of Traditional Communicators that promotes peace among Senegalese. This helps explain the absence of significant religious conflicts in a population that is 90 percent Muslim and which had a Christian serve as the first president. Senegal's human rights and freedom of the press ratings are also some of the highest in the region.³³⁷ This has been achieved despite single party rule for much of Senegal's post-independence history.

Leopold Sedar Senghor was the first president of Senegal from 1960 until 1981 when his handpicked successor, Abdou Diouf, assumed the office. Diouf was elected to two five-year terms until 1993, when he reformed the constitution to allow a seven-year presidential term.³³⁸ Senegal allowed limited regional self-governance after independence, which established some democratic institutions early on prior to 2000; however, single-party rulers in Senegal stacked co-ethnics in cabinet and judiciary positions and used agricultural subsidies to build loyal voter blocks throughout the state.³³⁹ Co-ethnic stacking and co-optation of local authorities resulted in voter fraud and election violence during the 1980s and 1990s.³⁴⁰ Economic crises in the 1980s restricted political patronage and opposition movements developed that eventually degraded the Socialist Party's grip on power.³⁴¹ The first free *and* fair democratic transition transpired when Diouf's challenger,

³³⁶ Biram Diop, "Civil-Military Relations in Senegal," in *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, ed. Dennis C. Blair, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 236–237.

³³⁷ Alexis Arieff, *Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 2013), 6.

³³⁸ *Africa Focus Bulletin*, "Senegal: Election Briefing," (21 May 1998).
<http://www.africafocus.org/docs98/sen9805.php>

³³⁹ Harkness, 807 and 810.

³⁴⁰ Arieff, 2.

³⁴¹ Harkness, 810.

Parti Democratique Senegalais candidate Abdoulaye Wade, won the 1999 election and assumed the presidency in 2000.³⁴²

Despite the democratic election in 1999, concerns about democratic regression began early in Wade's first term.³⁴³ Wade tried throughout his presidency to concentrate power and succeeded in placing loyalists and relatives in the judiciary and ministerial jobs.³⁴⁴ The DoS believed governance and transparency regressed under Wade.³⁴⁵ A DoS report published in 2012 alleges deficiencies in the independence of the judiciary and suggests increases occurred in security force abuses of human rights, including physical abuse and torture, gender harassment, and violence toward the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender community.³⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch also reported violations by the police. Wade also stacked co-ethnics in the judiciary and successfully lobbied the legislature to change the constitution to allow a third term.³⁴⁷ However, when political protest erupted during the elections over diverging interpretations of the constitution, the military refused to intervene at the behest of Wade and he lost the election to opposition leader Macky Sall.³⁴⁸

The 2012 election served as the third peaceful transition of power in Senegal since 1981 and the second democratic transition in a row, qualifying Senegal as a consolidated democracy.³⁴⁹ In addition to democratic presidential elections, Senegal boasts a multi-party, popularly elected National Assembly and normally achieves more than 50 percent voter turnout in elections.³⁵⁰ President Sall seems intent on further consolidating

³⁴² Arieff, 3.

³⁴³ Arieff, 2–3.

³⁴⁴ Harkness, 810.

³⁴⁵ Arieff, 9.

³⁴⁶ Arieff, 6–7.

³⁴⁷ Harkness, 807.

³⁴⁸ Diop, 237.

³⁴⁹ Arieff, Summary. The three transitions of power are Senghor from 1962–1981, Diouf from 1981–2000, Wade from 2000–2012, and Sall from 2012–present. Definition of consolidated democracy by Samuel P. Huntington in Opolo, 90.

³⁵⁰ Arieff, 3.

democracy and has abolished the Senate, which Wade had created and in which 65 percent of senators were appointed by the president.³⁵¹ Sall has also pledged support to a constitutional amendment for presidential term limits of two five-year terms and has regularly ordered investigations into political corruption.

Both Cameroon and Senegal began as one-party states, but only Senegal transitioned to a consolidated democracy. In fact, Senegal is one of only a handful of African states that have achieved multiple peaceful democratic transitions.³⁵² While Senegal has flirted with democratic backsliding since 2000, it shows signs of continuing its democratic consolidation. Meanwhile, Cameroon has held multi-party elections, but remains under the single-party rule of Paul Biya.³⁵³ Furthermore, unlike Senegalese ruling parties, in Cameroon, Biya has used co-optation to cement competitive authoritarianism.³⁵⁴ The next section will review how the political and social context of Cameroon and Senegal impacts the roles and missions of their respective armed forces.

B. THE ARMED FORCES OF CAMEROON AND SENEGAL

The structure, roles, and missions of African militaries, like many African political institutions, often transferred directly from the colonial experience. Some newly independent armies consisted of soldiers from the former colonial master and other foreigners.³⁵⁵ In many cases, colonial militaries were designed to protect the state from the people instead of being tasked to protect African citizens.³⁵⁶ The AU agreement to keep colonial borders prevented interstate wars and land grabs, and, therefore, helped sustain military roles and missions that often focused on dynamics internal to the new states: indirect, personal rule through coercive force.

³⁵¹ Arieff, 4.

³⁵² Rupiya, 188.

³⁵³ Harkness, 810.

³⁵⁴ For a definition of competitive authoritarianism, see Levitsky and Way....

³⁵⁵ Bachmann, 611.

³⁵⁶ Emile Ouedraogo, *Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa*, (Washington, D.C.: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 2014), 1.

The Cameroon and Senegalese armed forces share many similarities despite the differences regime type. They are similar in size. Cameroon has 14,400 active duty military for population of almost 25 million, or one soldier for every 1600 people.³⁵⁷ Senegal has 13,600 active duty military for population of 14.6 million, or one soldier for every 1073 people.³⁵⁸ Both militaries are all-volunteer forces.³⁵⁹ Both are members of regional security cooperatives. Cameroon participates in the Multinational Joint Task Force countering Boko Haram, is a partner with the Central African Multinational Force (CAMF), and has sent experts to participate in the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.³⁶⁰ Senegal is an active member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and has participated in multiple UN and African Union missions.³⁶¹

Both militaries are tasked with external security. Cameroon's focus is along the Bakassi Peninsula, the Central African Republic border, and the Chadian border.³⁶² Senegal's external security focus is on its borders with the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali.³⁶³ Both armed forces are tasked with counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and countertrafficking missions. Cameroon is also tasked to perform antipoaching missions in its northeastern region.³⁶⁴ Both states have small navies. Cameroon's naval mission is to serve as a riverine and coastal patrol force with the additional mission of protecting

³⁵⁷ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2018: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*, (Washington, D.C.: 2018), 481. Note: Janes has a far higher estimate of 60,000 military. I cannot find a reason for this significant difference. "Cameroon: Armed Forces," Jane's by IHS Markit, 21 November 2017. <https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/senes100-wafr>.

³⁵⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 481.

³⁵⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook – Senegal*, (Langley, VA: Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html>. Viewed 9 May 2018. Janes, "Cameroon Armed Forces," 4.

³⁶⁰ "Cameroon: Armed Forces." The Multi-National Joint Taskforce consists of forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. The CAMF is comprised of troops from Gabon, Chad, Cameroon, and Congo-Brazzaville.

³⁶¹ Diop, 236.

³⁶² "Cameroon: Armed Forces."

³⁶³ "Senegal: Armed Forces," Jane's by IHS Markit, 21 July 2017, <https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/senes100-wafr>.

³⁶⁴ "Cameroon: Armed Forces"

offshore oil rigs.³⁶⁵ The Senegalese Navy performs coast guard functions, fights maritime pollution, and enforces maritime environmental regulations.³⁶⁶

There are also several key differences between the two militaries. While Cameroon and Senegal have an army, air force, navy, and gendarmerie, Cameroon's armed forces include specialized Rapid Intervention Battalions, a Presidential Guard, and Firefighters.³⁶⁷ The Senegalese military works on national development projects, including building roads and bridges.³⁶⁸ The army has been tasked at times to help get crops to market, which required building or improving roads, drilling wells, building wharves and airfields.³⁶⁹ The Senegalese military also builds firebreaks, fights fires, and conducts reforestation programs.³⁷⁰ Senegal also tasks its military to provide medical services to the civilian population and Senegalese military hospitals and clinics provide 80 percent of the medical care in the country.³⁷¹

Another key difference is in the demographics of the military. Many African states maintain militaries built around a core ethnic or tribal group.³⁷² Evidence suggests the Cameroon armed forces are largely co-ethnics of President Biya.³⁷³ However, there is also evidence that careful consideration is made to co-opt troops from different ethnicities and regions through key military leadership appointments.³⁷⁴ On the contrary, Senegalese law allows all ethnicities and religions to join the military and the military is fully desegregated down to the unit level.³⁷⁵

³⁶⁵ "Cameroon: Armed Forces."

³⁶⁶ Diop, 242.

³⁶⁷ "Cameroon: Armed Forces."

³⁶⁸ Blair, 18.

³⁶⁹ Diop, 240.

³⁷⁰ Diop, 242.

³⁷¹ Diop, 240.

³⁷² Ouedraogo, 16.

³⁷³ Harkness, 811.

³⁷⁴ "Cameroon: Armed Forces."

³⁷⁵ Blair, 20.

A significant divergence occurs in how Cameroon's and Senegal's militaries are tasked to conduct internal security. Both have gendarmerie forces that provide policing and internal security functions. Cameroon's military, however, is regularly used to repress civilian protest of the government as a form of maintaining public safety. The result is often violent, as it was during the youth protests of 2008, and implies the function of internal security is primarily regime security.³⁷⁶ Senegal's armed forces are used to supplement the gendarmerie and local police during crises of public safety but they are not ordered to repress peaceful civilian protest. As mentioned previously, the Senegalese military chose not to help Wade remain in office when he lost the 2012 election.

The Cameroon and Senegalese armed forces are both assessed to be professional in soldering skills. Both have codified joint and combined arms doctrine and regularly execute them in exercises and operations.³⁷⁷ Senegal developed doctrine, administration, and military judicial regulations not long after independence, which promoted professionalism.³⁷⁸ Cameroon operates specialized forces, such as the Rapid Intervention Battalions that have shown some success against paramilitary units and provide a flexible combined arms reaction force capacity.³⁷⁹ Senegal's armed forces have earned a reputation as a highly educated and skilled military with specialized training and are regularly asked by the UN and AU to participate in peacekeeping and other operations.³⁸⁰ In fact, Senegal has participated in more than 20 missions globally and deployed more than 33,000 troops.³⁸¹ Cameroon's participation in CAMF is notable, but it has not provided any significant elements to international peacekeeping, even if that is an objective for the state.³⁸²

³⁷⁶ Julius A. Amin, "Understanding the Protest of February 2008 in Cameroon," *Africa Today* 58, No. 4 (Summer 2012), 26.

³⁷⁷ "Cameroon: Armed Forces;" "Senegal: Armed Forces."

³⁷⁸ Diop, 246.

³⁷⁹ Helmoed Heitman, "Optimizing Africa's Security Force Structures," *Africa Security Brief* No. 13, (May 2011), 14.

³⁸⁰ Diop, 238 and 249.

³⁸¹ Diop, 249.

³⁸² "Cameroon: Armed Forces."

Assessing the soldier-state professionalism of the Cameroon and Senegalese armed forces is more challenging. Both states recognize the importance of education generally and military professional education specifically. Cameroon requires a high school diploma for enlistment.³⁸³ Cameroon also requires all of its officers to complete the Joint Forces Military Academy.³⁸⁴ Enlistment requirements are difficult to ascertain, but the Senegalese military has always sought well-educated recruits that represent Senegalese society.³⁸⁵ Senegal also operates a military school, *Ecole Militaire of Saint Louis*, and also has university level programs at the *Ecole Polytechnique de Thies* and the *Ecole de Sante Militaire de Dakar*.³⁸⁶ The former trains civilian engineers as well as military engineers. Additionally, Senegal officer and noncommissioned officer schools require competitive entrance exams.³⁸⁷ Senegal also has a strong military administration that includes annual performance evaluations, rigid and independent promotion nominations processes.³⁸⁸ Recruiting better educated soldiers and competitive selection for military schools gives the impression that the Senegalese military is considered a profession instead of an occupation, and specifically that it is not perceived as an “employer of last resort.”³⁸⁹ The same could be inferred for Cameroon. However, there are indicators that the militaries are not equal in their levels of soldier-state professionalism.

Indicators of a divergence in soldier-state professionalism in Cameroon and Senegal can be found using three measures of effectiveness: leadership participation with peacekeeping operations, levels of corruption, and shirking. Senegal officers have served as UN peacekeeping mission force commanders on numerous occasions.³⁹⁰ While Cameroon has provided subject matter experts to international missions, there is no

³⁸³ Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook – Cameroon*, (Langley, VA: Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cm.html>. Viewed 9 May 2018.

³⁸⁴ “Cameroon: Armed Forces.”

³⁸⁵ Diop, 247.

³⁸⁶ Diop, 243.

³⁸⁷ Diop, 247.

³⁸⁸ Diop, 253.

³⁸⁹ Diop, 247.

³⁹⁰ Diop, 250.

evidence Cameroon officers have been assigned to leadership roles in international missions. This discrepancy may be the result of the significant oversight and scrutiny peacekeeping missions receive, particularly their focus on enforcing the international law of war, and concerns the UN and AU may have regarding the Cameroonian government's use of the military to repress civilian protest. A cursory review of mass media reports since the October 2017 declaration of an independence by Anglophone separatists shows military repression of civic protest is increasing in both frequency and violence. Corruption is also a significant concern in Cameroon but less so in Senegal. Emile Ouedraogo measures corruption in Defense Sector Financial and Administrative Affairs and finds that Cameroon scores a 0 (low transparency) in all but five categories, and those score no higher than a 2 out of 4.³⁹¹ For example, Cameroon's Defense Minister was charged in 2010 with embezzling operations and acquisitions funds from the military between 2004 and 2009.³⁹² Ouedraogo does not grade Senegal, but Transparency International grades both, ranking Cameroon as the 153rd most corrupt state in the world and Senegal the 66th.³⁹³ Therefore, it can be inferred that Senegal's armed forces are considerably less corrupt than Cameroon's, especially considering Sall's anti-corruption investigations. Finally, Cameroon soldiers have allegedly shirked their duties during the recent Anglophone crisis when some soldiers were reported to be among the refugees fleeing to Nigeria.³⁹⁴

Cameroon and Senegal appear to have mostly effective militaries. Their militaries also appear to be professional based on the soldierly skills model. However, the roles and missions of the militaries diverge in that, although Cameroon is fighting violent extremist organizations and separatist insurgents, a frequent application of the Cameroon armed forces' internal security role is to repress political opponents and civil protest. On the other hand, Senegal uses the armed forces to supplement policing but does not direct them against political opponents or repress civil protest. The different applications for internal

³⁹¹ Ouedraogo, 24. Table 2 "Anti-Corruption Scores for Select Categories of Defense Sector Financial and Administrative Affairs."

³⁹² Ouedraogo, 25.

³⁹³ "Corruption Perceptions Index 2017," Transparency International, 21 February 2018, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017#table.

³⁹⁴ "Legacy of history drives Cameroon's rift," 2.

security appears to be result of their different political systems. Cameroon is most concerned about regime security while Senegal is concerned with providing security as a public good. Soldier-state professionalism also appears to be different in both states and may also be a result of different political context. The next section explores the current state of civil-military relations in both states.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CAMEROON AND SENEGAL

The history of colonialism, indirect rule, coercive force, and patrimonialism has created a collective political culture that makes the transition to democratic civil military relations challenging for African states.³⁹⁵ Many African militaries remained influenced by former colonial powers after independence and it impaired democratic transition.³⁹⁶ Armies were often built around tribal affiliation, especially those tribes with warrior cultures.³⁹⁷ The transition to democratic civil-military relations in francophone Africa, specifically, has been difficult because personal loyalty to the president has been a driving force within the political culture.³⁹⁸ Therefore, most African militaries have been politically involved in their state at some point regardless of their path to independence.³⁹⁹ Cameroon's civil-military relations follows this logic while Senegal's does not.

Both states have strong civilian control of the military. Cameroon's president has direct control over the armed forces and the Presidential Guard and Rapid Intervention Battalion are subordinate only to President Biya.⁴⁰⁰ However, Cameroon's civilian control does not include the parliament, which has no military oversight roles.⁴⁰¹ Senegal has a mature and broad civilian management structure with considerable oversight.⁴⁰² The

³⁹⁵ Bachmann, 615–616.

³⁹⁶ Rupiya, 190.

³⁹⁷ Bachmann, 612.

³⁹⁸ Bachmann, 607.

³⁹⁹ Blair, 44.

⁴⁰⁰ "Cameroon: Armed Forces." Richard J. Pera, "Ambazonian Separatists Fight on in Cameroon: No Peace in Sight," *Africa Watch* 18 (2018), 5.

⁴⁰¹ "Cameroon: Armed Forces."

⁴⁰² Ouedraogo, 26.

Senegalese president is the commander in chief.⁴⁰³ The Senegalese parliament passes laws regarding the military and approves its budget. The Senegalese Ministry of the Armed Forces is the civilian bureaucracy that supervises the military and is advised by the chief of defense staff and gendarmerie commander. The Ministry also sets roles, missions, and strategy with advice from military staff and civilian advisors.

Coups are relatively rare in both countries, and those that have occurred, have not succeeded. This fact on its own establishes Cameroon and Senegal as anomalies in Western and Central Africa, two of the most coup-prone regions in the world. Cameroon had failed coups in 1983 and 1984.⁴⁰⁴ Cameroon's first president had appointed northern co-ethnics (Muslim Fulani and Peuhl) to the military, parliament, judiciary, and ministries. When Biya took over in 1982, he did the same, which required a shift to his co-ethnics from his home territory in the south (Christian Bulu).⁴⁰⁵ The army attempted the coups when Biya announced intentions to appoint co-ethnics, but the coups failed and northerners were purged. Senegal has also not experienced a successful coup since independence.⁴⁰⁶ Senegal's first Prime Minister Mamadou Dia had been planning a military coup to overthrow President Senghor in 1962, but his plan was discovered and he was arrested before it could be conducted.

Strong civilian control and the absence of coups do not mean both militaries are apolitical. Cameroon's military has intervened on behalf of the president during mass protests as mentioned above and has been ordered to deploy to opposition strongholds throughout the country during presidential elections.⁴⁰⁷ This is likely because co-ethnic and co-opted militaries tend to be loyal to the president.⁴⁰⁸ Initially, the Senegalese military assumed an apolitical posture, and soldiers were not allowed to vote until 2007.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰³ Diop, 246.

⁴⁰⁴ Ouedraogo, 8.

⁴⁰⁵ Harkness, 812.

⁴⁰⁶ Ouedraogo, 6.

⁴⁰⁷ "Cameroon: Armed Forces."

⁴⁰⁸ Ouedraogo, 17.

⁴⁰⁹ Diop, 238.

However, the military has been diverse since Senegal's first president, Leopold Senghor, promoted ethnic diversity and Senegalese nationalism, and the military has been more loyal to the rule of law than to political patrons.⁴¹⁰ There have been political tensions and periods of democratic regression in Senegal since independence, but the military has never intervened via a coup.⁴¹¹ The Senegalese military has defected from the ruler in cases where ruler decisions run counter to the constitution.⁴¹² The 2012 election is a good example of the Senegalese military's allegiance to democratic principles vice showing a penchant for supporting the personal rule of a sitting president. On the contrary, the Cameroon military has supported the president when he has attempted to change the constitution. Therefore, the type of civilian control is different and results in the Cameroon military's political orientation while the Senegalese military remains apolitical.

Another significant difference between civil-military relations in Cameroon and Senegal is the relationship between the military and society. Significant tension and mistrust exists in the former and not the latter. Cameroon's principle of *popular defense*, wherein all citizens are expected to come to the nation's defense, should help build a sense of nationalism and camaraderie with the military but it does not.⁴¹³ This is likely caused by the frequent use of the military to quell liberal reforms. Widespread civil resistance occurred after the end of the Cold War seeking democratic transition, particularly multiparty elections, but Biya used the co-ethnic military to repress demonstrators and intimidate opposition politicians.⁴¹⁴ The military and police are also alleged to have killed more than 100 civilians during the February 2008 youth protests. Amnesty International claims Cameroon has committed significant human rights violations, "including with arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, enforced disappearances, torture and deaths in custody," under the guise of its operations against Boko Haram.⁴¹⁵ They documented at

⁴¹⁰ Harkness, 811.

⁴¹¹ Ouedraogo, 6.

⁴¹² Harkness, 810.

⁴¹³ "Cameroon: Armed Forces."

⁴¹⁴ Harkness, 812–813.

⁴¹⁵ Alioune Tine, *Cameroon's Secret Torture Chambers: Human Rights Violations and War Crimes in the Fight against Boko Haram*, (London: Amnesty International, 2017), 6.

least 101 individual cases of human rights violations, some of which resulted in torture and murder by the Cameroon security forces, including regular army, police, and Rapid Intervention Battalion.⁴¹⁶ All documented victims, some of whom were women and children, were accused of supporting Boko Haram but little evidence was provided to justify the claims. These incidents show a distinct fissure between the average Cameroon citizen and the military.

Senegal's military, unlike Cameroon's, is well respected by Senegalese society. This is largely due to programs developed by the government to integrate the military into state and nation building projects. President Senghor wanted to build a Senegalese state and his second chief of defense, General Diallo, wanted to develop Senegalese infrastructure.⁴¹⁷ They both felt the military could build roads, bridges, and other projects. The program, called *Armee-Nation*, builds a strong bond between the military and society in Senegal.⁴¹⁸ The *Armee-Nation* concept mobilizes the military to work on urgent development needs neither the public nor private sector can fulfil and the military's role can be complimentary to public and private roles.⁴¹⁹ It provides avenues for civil-military interaction and collaboration that serves as a *school for the nation*.

Other programs also promote goodwill between the Senegalese military and civilians. The use of military physicians in rural areas has improved quality of life and raised the reputation of the military among civilians.⁴²⁰ A Senegalese military officer is director of the National Civic Service.⁴²¹ This youth-focused program teaches young men and women democratic values and the importance of nation building through work programs with government ministries, schools, nongovernmental organizations, and

⁴¹⁶ Tine, 6.

⁴¹⁷ Diop, 238.

⁴¹⁸ Ouedraogo, 33.

⁴¹⁹ Diop, 240.

⁴²⁰ Diop, 239.

⁴²¹ Diop, 244–245.

schools.⁴²² Additionally, the Senegalese army has weekly radio broadcasts and three publications that provide outreach and public relations. The Senegalese media are also invited to a military media boot camp program and the media host programs for the military, resulting in a favorable and respectful working relationship. Finally, Senegalese military bases are open to the public, including the use of military facilities for public social events. All of these initiatives build a strong bond between the Senegalese military and society but Cameroon appears to have no similar programs to achieve the same result.

The current status of civil-military relations in Cameroon and Senegal are considerably different. While both have strong civilian control of the military, only Senegal's civil-military relations can be qualified as democratic. Cameroon's armed forces are political and partisan, regularly intervening on behalf of the president against his opponents and to quell civil protest. Senegal's military has purposefully stayed out of politics. The Cameroon armed forces have been accused of human rights violations throughout Biya's presidency resulting in a significant fissure between the military and society, whereas, the Senegalese military has been used to promote economic development, human development, and Senegalese nationalism to achieve a positive relationship with society. The nature of each state's politics is the likely cause of this divergence in civil-military relations.

D. CONCLUSION

Cameroon and Senegal both face several security concerns that drive U.S. interest in training and educating their militaries in order to achieve stability within the region. Organized crime, smuggling, and violent extremist activity in Mali are a security concern for Senegal's eastern territory.⁴²³ Regional democratic regression, such as in Mali, is another threat to Senegal.⁴²⁴ The 36-year-old insurgency in Casamance has improved in the last decade but remains Senegal's greatest internal security challenge and a manpower

⁴²² "Senegal Youth Civic Participation Overview," Innovations in Civic Participation, accessed 4 June 2018, <http://www.icicp.org/resource-library/icp-publications/global-youth-service-database/africa-2/west-sub-saharan-africa/senegal/>.

⁴²³ Arieff, 2.

⁴²⁴ Arieff, Summary.

burden.⁴²⁵ Also, significant drug and human trafficking through Senegal is estimated at eight times higher than GDP. Similarly, Cameroon is stressed by security risks on four fronts. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta insurgents operate in the Bakassi Peninsula.⁴²⁶ Boko Haram has killed at least 1,500 Cameroon civilians and caused more than 223,000 refugees to flee northern Cameroon since 2014.⁴²⁷ The Anglophone separatist movement declared the Republic of Ambazonia on 1 October 2017 and has since been fighting a small-scale guerrilla campaign against Cameroon security forces, raided government positions, and the violence has caused more than 20,000 refugees to flee to Nigeria.⁴²⁸ Crime and violence also continue to plague Cameroon's border with Central African Republic. Any of these security concerns could jeopardize either state's stability.

Effectiveness and soldiering skills professionalism make the Cameroon and Senegalese militaries well-qualified prospects for U.S. military training and professional education in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives in the region. But how will these U.S. programs impact their civil-military relations? Can U.S. training and professional education encourage democratization of Cameroon's civil-military relations or just provide President Biya with more lethal forces that can intervene on his behalf? Can U.S. training and professional education deepen Senegal's democratic civil-military relations or prevent democratic regression? The next chapter will review previous military training and professional education programs both states have conducted with the United States and analyze current and future programs to answer these questions and provide a general assessment for potential impacts on African civil-military relations.

⁴²⁵ Arieff, 5–6.

⁴²⁶ Heitman, 2.

⁴²⁷ Tine, 6–9.

⁴²⁸ Pera, 4–5.

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V. ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS

Cameroon and Senegal conduct counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and maritime security operations that align with U.S. national strategic objectives in Africa and U.S. security cooperation and security assistance programs there. Cameroon received \$4.7 million in U.S. military training and assistance in 2016 for equipment, training, and professional education, including funds for 47 students attending resident professional education programs in the United States and other locations. Funding in 2017 was \$1.1 million.⁴²⁹ Senegal received \$3.3 million in 2016, including funds for 63 students in resident programs. That amount dropped to just under \$1 million in 2017.⁴³⁰ The DoS highlighted “military professionalism, maritime and transnational threats, border security and transnational threats, adherence to norms of human rights, and civilian control of the military” as the primary objectives for Cameroon’s assistance programs.⁴³¹ Senegal’s program highlights consisted of “military professionalism, peacekeeping, border security and transnational threats, adherence to norms of human rights, civilian control of military, maritime security and transnational threats.”⁴³²

This chapter outlines the military training and professional education the United States currently conducts with Cameroon and Senegal. It defines the Marine Corps’ concept of a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps and discusses the likely means through which MARFORAFRICOM will incorporate these concepts into future training for Cameroon and Senegal. Finally, it will assess the training and professional education program’s prospects for success in each state, determine the validity of the hypotheses presented in the Chapter I and analyze those findings, and identify potential trap-falls and implications for the rest of Africa.

⁴²⁹ Department of Defense and Department of State, *Foreign Military Training Report Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017 Joint Report to Congress Volume I*, (Washington, D.C.: Departments of Defense and States, April 2017), III-I-2 and 3.

⁴³⁰ *Foreign Military Training Report Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017*, III-I-13, 14.

⁴³¹ *Foreign Military Training Report Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017*, II-I-3.

⁴³² *Foreign Military Training Report Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017*, III-I-13.

A. U.S. MILITARY TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN CAMEROON AND SENEGAL

Training and professional education programs in Cameroon and Senegal seek to build their tactical and technical capabilities, improve their interoperability with U.S. forces and other security partners, and enhance their capacity to conduct operations independently in order to counter narcotics and human trafficking, violent extremist organizations, and piracy, while fostering stability, good governance, and economic development. These programs range from multilateral exercises to small-group senior leader engagements and resident education programs in the United States and other locations. United States military services typically conduct these programs with similarly designed military and security forces in partner states. Marine Corps training programs are typically designed to increase interoperability and build capabilities and capacity with partner state amphibious forces or naval infantry.

Military training, including multilateral exercises, focus on the soldiering skills model of professionalism. Multilateral exercises often cover a broad scope of soldiering skills including command and control of large and small units, platoon-level fire and maneuver, and individual combat skills. Smaller, bilateral exercises and engagements tend to focus on individual, team, and platoon tactics, techniques, and procedures. Professional education will focus on the soldier-state model of professionalism, although many of its elements—leadership, ethics, and decisiveness—also impact the soldiering skills model. Some programs combine the soldiering skills and soldier-state models into medium-term and long-term residential education curriculum. Regional Centers, the U.S. Service Academies, The Basic School, and graduate education programs are examples that focus heavily on both the soldiering skills and soldier-state models.

1. Military Training: The Soldiering Skills Model

Cameroon and Senegal participate in several regional, multilateral, and bilateral exercises and engagements managed by the United States. Some exercises and engagements are one-time events. Others feed into exercise cycles that seek to achieve

incremental improvements each year. The following provide examples of each going back to 2011.

African Partnership Station 2011 partnered Senegalese Marine Commandos with U.S. Marines to learn movement to contact techniques.⁴³³ African Partnership Station serves as an ideas and tactics, techniques, and procedures exchange between the U.S. military and the Senegalese armed forces.⁴³⁴ Some of the Senegalese NCOs were experienced in the techniques and served as instructors.⁴³⁵ A Senegalese Staff Sergeant served as a chief instructor of the training.⁴³⁶ The Senegalese also taught the Marines Senegalese techniques for fighting in their environment as well as survival skills.

Cameroon Naval Commandos in March 2015 trained with U.S. Marines on small-boat operations, search and seizure techniques, basic infantry skills, and marksmanship.⁴³⁷ The engagement included classroom instruction, weapons safety, and live-fire training. The previous year, the Marines exercised with the Cameroon Naval Commando Company to teach small-boat operations, marksmanship, patrolling, and NCO leadership.⁴³⁸ These training events sought to build the Naval Commandos' capability and capacity to secure Cameroon's maritime border through riverine operations and patrolling. Riverine operations training focused on safe weapons use from boats to help them maximize firepower. Infantry tactics and NCO leadership were also significant aspects of the training, as were counter-narcotics and human trafficking. The NCO leadership training focused on teaching the NCOs how to conduct and teach the training during future iterations.⁴³⁹ The

⁴³³ Grady Fontana, "Marines, Senegalese Commandos Test Immediate Action Skills during APS-11," (Stuttgart, Germany: Marine Corps Forces, Africa, 28 April 2011), 1. <http://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/8260/marines-senegalese-commandos-test-immediate-action>. Viewed 6 May 2018.

⁴³⁴ Fontana, 2.

⁴³⁵ Fontana, 1.

⁴³⁶ Fontana 2.

⁴³⁷ Steve Cushman, "NATO Marine Forces work with West African partners," (Stuttgart, Germany: Marine Corps Forces, Europe, 4 May 2015), 1. <http://www.marforeur.marines.mil/News/>. 14 January 2018.

⁴³⁸ Shawn Valosin, "Riverine tactics deter illicit activity on Cameroon waterways," (Stuttgart, Germany: Marine Corps Forces, Africa, 16 October 2014), 1. <http://www.marforeur.marines.mil/News/>. Viewed 14 January 2018.

⁴³⁹ Valosin, 2.

final training event evaluated the Cameroon commandos on insertion, extraction, boat formations, and shore-based patrolling.

In 2016, the Marines trained officers and noncommissioned officers from the Senegal *Compagnie Fusilier de Marine Commando*. The focus was on combat firing techniques that included weapons live-fire ranges and culminated with a platoon attack.⁴⁴⁰ The training served as a train-the-trainer event, wherein the Senegalese leaders are expected to train their units in the future. Another training goal was to build relationships between U.S. Marines and Senegalese troops to enhance their ability to operate together in the future.

The Marines also conducted a theater security cooperation exercise on peacekeeping in 2017 that sought to improve Senegalese capacity for deployment throughout the continent to perform UN peacekeeping missions.⁴⁴¹ The peacekeeping training included counter improvised explosive device training, urban combat training, convoy operations, patrolling, and small and medium weapons training. Senegalese proficiency was assessed during a culminating event.

Cameroon and Senegal participated in Exercise Obangame Express 2018 to enhance capabilities and interoperability in maritime security and safety in the Gulf of Guinea.⁴⁴² The strategic objective of Obangame Express is to improve law enforcement capacity and build the planning and execution capabilities and interoperability of the African maritime law enforcement partnership within the Gulf of Guinea.⁴⁴³ Obangame Express was also “designed to improve regional cooperation, maritime domain awareness, information-sharing practices, and tactical interdiction expertise to enhance the collective

⁴⁴⁰ Eric Abrams, “Senegal, U.S. build partnership through advanced training,” (Camp Lejeune, NC: II Marine Expeditionary Force, 30 June 2016), 1. <http://www.marforeur.marines.mil/News/>. 14 January 2018.

⁴⁴¹ Samuel Guerra, “Road to peace: Senegalese, U.S. Marines Strengthen Peacekeeping Abilities in Africa,” (Stuttgart, Germany: Marine Corps Forces, Africa, 23 June 2017), 1. <http://www.marforeur.marines.mil/News/>. Viewed 14 January 2018.

⁴⁴² Dino Teppara, “Successful Obangame Express 2018 Concludes,” (Naples, Italy: U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, 2 April 2018), 1. http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=104929. Viewed 5 May 2018.

⁴⁴³ Anonymous, “Press Release: Obangame Express,” (Stuttgart, Germany: United States Africa Command, undated webpage), 1. <http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/obangame-express>. Viewed 6 May 2018.

capabilities of Gulf of Guinea and West African nations to counter sea-based illicit activity.”⁴⁴⁴ The event included a U.S. Navy-Marine Corps led tabletop exercise to enhance interagency communication and coordination between African partners and the United States.⁴⁴⁵ Vessel boarding techniques, medical response and evacuation, communications, search and rescue, and information management were unit level skillsets that were also rehearsed during Obangame Express.

Another major annual exercise is Flintlock. It involves more than 30 militaries and seeks to develop relationships, build interoperability between African, European and United States forces, and improve skills.⁴⁴⁶ Flintlock helps to serve as a culminating exercise that assesses skills rehearsed in numerous exercises and engagements conducted throughout the year.⁴⁴⁷ Senegal hosted Flintlock 2016. In that exercise, the Senegalese Army, with the help of the U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa, planned and executed combined-joint logistics for five different geographic locations, including mess halls, with organic resources.⁴⁴⁸ Each example above demonstrates the primacy of soldiering skills during exercises.

2. Professional Education: The Soldier-State Model

Professional education focuses on the soldier-state model of professionalism even if many of the skillsets it develops are applicable to soldiering skills. Many of the regional multilateral exercises noted above incorporate senior or key leader engagements to provide professional education. These engagements can include senior officers and/or senior enlisted personnel. The formats typically include classroom instruction, guided discussion, and focus groups on ethics, decision-making, leadership, and governance. These topics

⁴⁴⁴ “Press Release: Obangame Express,” 1.

⁴⁴⁵ Anonymous, “Press Release: Exercise Obangame Express 2018 Starts,” (Naples, Italy: U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, 30 March 2018). 1.
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1480881/exercise-obangame-express-2018-starts/>. Viewed 6 May 2018.

⁴⁴⁶ Janice Burton, “Africa, It’s All Relative,” *Special Warfare* 30, Issue 1 (January-March 2017), 18.

⁴⁴⁷ Burton, 20.

⁴⁴⁸ Michael A. Sabb, “The Last Tactical 11 Million Miles,” *Special Warfare* 30, Issue 1 (January-March 2017), 26.

may be scenario driven. Professional education can be provided by U.S. military personnel but is often supplemented by civilian and contracted instructors from organizations such as the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military Relations. Professional education also includes resident attendance at courses in the United States and other allied nations funded through the IMET program.

Specific fiscal year 2016 professional education programs in Cameroon included counterterrorism executive seminars, the legal aspects of counterterrorism, and human rights.⁴⁴⁹ Cameroon troops attended courses and seminars in the United States and elsewhere on how to reintegrate ex-combatants, Security Risks of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Civilian Police Training, Gender Protection, and Protection of Civilians. Cameroon officers also attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College preparatory course, the U.S. Army Basic Infantry Officer Course, the U.S. Army Maneuver Captains Career Course, the Naval Staff College, and Professional Military Education Preparatory School.

Specific fiscal year 2016 professional education programs in Senegal included Civil-Military Response to Terrorism and Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief.⁴⁵⁰ Senegalese officers attended the U.S. Army Armor Basic Officer, the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officers Course, International Fellows Orientation, International Officers School, the Naval Command College, and the Naval Staff College. Senegal also sends some officers to the Marine Corps' The Basic School.⁴⁵¹ Each of these programs contain dozens of hours of instruction to enhance the overall professionalism of the individual soldier.

3. Professionalizing the NCO Corps: A Combination of the Two Models

The professionalization of Cameroonian and Senegalese NCO corps was a specific objective of MARFORAFRICOM and the genesis of this thesis. To achieve this

⁴⁴⁹ *Foreign Military Training Report Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017*, IV-I-9 and 10.

⁴⁵⁰ *Foreign Military Training Report Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017*, IV-I-57 through 60.

⁴⁵¹ Fontana, 1; A Senegalese officer was a member of my training platoon at The Basic School in 2001.

MARFORAFRICOM will develop a curriculum and incorporate it into exercises and engagements. They may also use the IMET program to send NCOs to resident enlisted courses in the United States. The range of topics will vary, but primary instruction will consist of applicable warfighting functions and leadership. Programs will include a one-year training cycle broken into two to three modules. Each module will contain programs of instruction lasting two to three weeks each. Below is a description of the Marine Corps' concept of a professional NCO corps.

The U.S. Marine Corps views the NCO corps as its foundation for excellent performance of roles and missions and this belief is the impetus for replicating this concept within partner state militaries.⁴⁵² Noncommissioned officers provide the order and discipline of a unit and this has been a hallmark of Western military professionalism since at least the 18th Century.⁴⁵³ They are leaders, and professionalized military organizations have advancement mechanisms based on merit and evaluation of professional and technical performance that shape those leaders as they progress through the ranks.⁴⁵⁴ The result is an NCO who bridges the gap between officers and junior enlisted, maintains discipline, and operates in the absence of clear orders.

Noncommissioned officers feel duty bound to perform all of their roles and missions to the best of their ability, and to inspire their subordinates to do the same.⁴⁵⁵ They are responsible for following and issuing *appropriate* orders, which are orders that are not only commensurate with the capabilities and skills of their organization, but are also legal, moral, and correct for the situation. They should have superior knowledge and technical experience compared to their subordinates.⁴⁵⁶ Noncommissioned officers, as the bridge between officers and junior enlisted, are responsible for training and educating their

⁴⁵² Kenneth W. Estes, *Handbook for Marine NCOs, Fourth Edition*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 5.

⁴⁵³ Estes, 2.

⁴⁵⁴ Estes, 3.

⁴⁵⁵ Estes, 5.

⁴⁵⁶ Estes, 6.

subordinates in order to prepare them to effectively and efficiently execute their roles and missions.⁴⁵⁷

Noncommissioned officers must have the capacity to act independently, based on an understanding of their officer's intent and based on their own personal knowledge, proficiency, and understanding of the situation.⁴⁵⁸ The NCO must demonstrate knowledge, initiative, and decisiveness in order to execute a fundamental aspect of Marine Corps leadership, the mission-type order or mission tactics. This is the process of "assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must be accomplished." In mission tactics, the subordinate leader, in this case the NCO, determines the best way to execute the task.⁴⁵⁹ This requires the NCO to use their imagination to achieve their missions and objectives. This encourages adaptation and innovation and NCOs must know their officers and other leaders well enough to anticipate their decisions and have their units ready to execute their roles and missions.⁴⁶⁰

Professional NCOs are ambassadors and representatives of their organizations and their countries.⁴⁶¹ Their appearance and conduct should not only reflect the values of their organization, but also the values of their state. They are always on duty in this regard, maintaining their personal discipline and professionalism as well as that of their units.⁴⁶²

Professional NCOs communicate clearly and effectively, especially by making sure their subordinates understand what they are to accomplish and the reasons or intent behind commands and orders.⁴⁶³ Professional NCOs lead their subordinates fairly and consistently. Finally, NCOs are leaders and supervisors of junior enlisted troops and advisors to officers on enlisted matters.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁵⁷ Estes, 34.

⁴⁵⁸ United States Marine Corps, *MCDP-1 Warfighting*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 78.

⁴⁵⁹ USMC, *MCDP-1*, 87.

⁴⁶⁰ Estes, 55–56.

⁴⁶¹ Estes, 54.

⁴⁶² Estes, 55.

⁴⁶³ Estes, 60.

⁴⁶⁴ Estes, 62.

Professional education for NCOs focuses on the Marine Corps' 14 leadership traits: judgment, justice, discipline, integrity, decisiveness, tact, initiative, enthusiasm, bearing, unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and endurance. While all of these are important, the NCO will work to achieve mastery of judgement, justice, integrity, decisiveness, initiative, unselfishness, knowledge, and endurance. Senior leader seminars would seek to develop NCOs who understand commander's intent and "execute disciplined initiative" within that intent.⁴⁶⁵

The Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course-Africa (MIBOC-A) and the Military Intelligence Non-Commissioned Officer Course-Africa (MINOC-A) is a current program that seeks to build trust and communication between officers and NCOs of Cameroon, Chad, Tunisia, Senegal, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso through intelligence gathering, analysis, and planning exercises.⁴⁶⁶ The intelligence basic course training uses planning scenarios and divided students into integrated officer and NCO teams, some of which were led by NCOs. A Senegalese lieutenant attending the course admitted they normally do not incorporate their NCOs into planning and independent leadership.⁴⁶⁷ The result was a greater appreciation of the NCOs' abilities to complete their tasks on their own initiative. The exercise improved trust and communication between officers and NCOs attending the course.

Professionalizing African NCO corps complements the strategic objective to increase capacity to operate independently and improve interoperability with global and regional partners. The decentralized leadership the U.S. Marines want to impress upon African militaries requires officers and NCOs to trust and communicate with one another.⁴⁶⁸ Trust between officers and their NCOs and subordinates is much rarer in Africa

⁴⁶⁵ Garamone, 3.

⁴⁶⁶ Story, 1.

⁴⁶⁷ Story, 2.

⁴⁶⁸ Courtesy Story, "Finding the ties that bind: Breaking the cycle in West Africa," (Stuttgart, Germany: Marine Corps Forces, Africa, 8 October 2014), 1.
<https://www.marforeur.marines.mil/News/News-Article-Display/Article/521129/finding-the-ties-that-bind-breaking-the-cycle-in-west-africa/>.

than in Western militaries.⁴⁶⁹ If NCOs are to become trusted advisors to commanders on enlisted matters and the health and proficiency of their units, then professional education specific to that end must be included in security cooperation.⁴⁷⁰

B. ANALYSIS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES

The case studies on El Salvador and Colombia provide a good reference for analyzing how U.S. military training and professional education can effect civil-military relations in Cameroon and Senegal. This section will summarize and compare the cases to Cameroon and Senegal. It will also test the hypotheses and discuss the findings.

Both the ESAF and COLAR primarily received military training with some professional education. Thousands of officers and enlisted trained at U.S. military bases and attended the School of the Americas. United States troops also trained with the ESAF and COLAR in their home countries and provided assistance during combat operations. Professional education included leadership training, ethics, human rights, and the rule of law. Cameroon and Senegal are receiving assistance that in many ways is similar to that provided to El Salvador and Colombia and how that assistance effected the latter informs how it could affect the former.

El Salvador and Colombia achieved different levels of democratic civil-military relations after receiving U.S. military training and professional education. This was largely due to several factors effecting each state at the time of receiving assistance. These factors are the regime type, the type and level of civilian control of the military, institutionalized violence, the level of military professionalism, and the perceived nature of security threats. El Salvador's state regime was an illiberal democracy that was ran by the military at times while Colombia's rulers had been democratically elected since 1958. El Salvador had tight control of the military, which followed orders to attack not only insurgents but also peasants and Jesuit leadership. Colombia had control of the military, but its effectiveness

⁴⁶⁹ Story, 1; Dwyer, 6.

⁴⁷⁰ Jim Garamone, "Combatant Command Enlisted Leaders Discuss Operations, NCO Empowerment," (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense News, 29 November 2017), 4. <https://www.defense.gov/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=753&Article=1382579>. Viewed 12 March 2018.

vacillated from strong to weak depending on how the military reacted to reforms and based on the battlefield success of Colombia's disparate insurgencies at the time of those reforms. Violence was institutionalized from the Salvadoran regime through the lowest ranks of the ESAF and culminated in the creation of the Death Squads. The Colombian regime attempted military reforms over time that attempted to limit collateral damage and human rights violations, but the COLAR supported paramilitary groups that committed human rights violations. Both the ESAF and the COLAR were perceived as a means for social mobility instead of professional institutions that served the state and its citizens. Both also perceived their respective insurgencies as existential threats that justified the brutal methods they used to counter them. Ultimately, however, oversight mechanisms enforced by the U.S. Congress—including withholding funding of U.S. security assistance programs based on human rights violations—played a significant role in El Salvador and Colombia eventually achieving democratic civil-military relations. It forced reforms in the former and facilitated them in the latter.

The factors that impacted the success of military training and professional education programs in El Salvador and Colombia can also be assessed in Cameroon and Senegal. Cameroon is an illiberal democracy, but not a military-based regime, and Senegal is a consolidated democracy. Both have strong civilian control of the military. However, Cameroon's president uses the military to repress political opposition and violently suppress civilian protest. Senegal's military has overtly refused to intervene in politics and accepts the supremacy of civilian control. Evidence suggests that neither state has institutionalized violence; however, Amnesty International's reporting of Cameroon's human rights violations surrounding their fight against Boko Haram is disturbing. While there are hundreds of reports of torture and allegations of state-sponsored murder in Cameroon, it is not comparable to the tens of thousands of disappearances and murders that occurred in El Salvador and Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s. Both the Cameroon and Senegalese armed forces are considered professional, especially in the soldiering skills model, but the Senegalese have also demonstrated soldier-state professionalism in their refusal to support President Wade's attempt to unconstitutionally retain control in 2012 and their refusal to violently suppress civilian protests. Both militaries are also all volunteer

forces with strict recruitment policies and no evidence suggests they are considered primarily as a means of social mobility. Finally, neither state seems to view their security threats as existential, although the Boko Haram and Anglophone crises have potential to be viewed that way by Cameroon, and Senegal considered the Casamance insurgency as an existential threat during the 1990s.

Initial research determined the available scholarly literature did not adequately address if externally provided training and education encouraged military transitions to democratic civilian control. This generated four possible effects on civil-military relations in Africa. Each hypothesis is tested by comparing and contrasting the above case studies. The findings follow.

- 1. Professional Education and Training Will Result in Increased Military Effectiveness but Decreased Civilian Control**

This outcome is unlikely in Cameroon and Senegal. The case studies discussed in this thesis show that militaries receiving U.S. military training and professional education achieve short-term increases in soldiering skills professionalism. Tactics, techniques, and procedures improve, and it is reasonable to expect some increase in capabilities and the capacity to conduct operations independently. This most likely also causes a measurable uptick in lethality. Effectiveness is therefore increased if actions on the enemy are the primary measure of effectiveness.

Transitioned militaries show strong soldier-state professionalism. They respect the rule of law, subscribe to the supremacy of civilian control, and are apolitical. The case studies show little improvement in soldier-state professionalism in the ESAF and the COLAR. Evidence shows the professional education provided to the ESAF and the COLAR included respect for the rule of law, human rights, and the supremacy of civilian control. Salvadoran and Colombian troops trained and worked closely with U.S. troops in the United States and in their home states. Yet socialization with U.S. soldiers and professional education failed to transfer the norms of American military professionalism – the soldier-state model—to the ESAF and the COLAR and these ideals were not institutionalized. The transition to democratic civil-military relations was largely

politically driven and not the result of U.S. military training and professional education. This does not imply that no Salvadoran and Colombian soldiers were socialized to the ideals of soldier-state professionalism, but evidence indicates that socialization did not become systematic within the military institution until the state regimes forced military reforms.

Cameroon and Senegal will likely achieve increased military effectiveness in soldiering skills through military training and professional education. Senegal is likely to achieve higher soldier-state effectiveness due to the current state of their democratic civil-military relations. Many soldier-state ideals are institutionalized, so socialization with U.S. soldiers would reinforce these norms. This would equate to fewer human rights violations in Casamance as well as increased institutionalization of the supremacy of civilian control under the rule of law. Cameroon could also see improvements in soldier-state professionalism but that increase would likely be significantly constrained due to the partisan nature of the Cameroon armed forces.

Decreased civilian control is unlikely in both Cameroon and Senegal except under extreme situations. Cameroon soldiers who internalize respect for the rule of law and human rights could choose to shirk their duties when ordered to oppress political opponents and suppress civil protest. Shirking would constitute a loss of civilian control, although it is unlikely to be widespread. Senegal could experience decreased civilian control if significant democratic regression occurs and the military chooses to intervene, but the 2012 case where the military chose not to help Wade retain office indicates the form of democratic regress would have to be more extreme than mere constitutional amendment. Therefore, Senegal's history of nonintervention makes this very unlikely, whereas shirking in Cameroon is slightly more likely as evidenced by limited media reports that Cameroon troops are fleeing with refugees to Nigeria. Civilian control of the military did decrease in Colombia at times during the period under review but not due to the training and professional education they received. Decreased civilian control occurred primarily when insurgents saw increased battlefield successes and the COLAR resisted reforms instituted by the state—most commonly reforms associated with human rights—in attempts to regain the advantage against the enemy. El Salvador's civilian control of the armed forces was

heavily influenced by the military leadership, and therefore technically decreased. However, the decrease in civilian control was not due to the U.S. assistance the ESAF received.

Military training and professional education is unlikely to cause an increase in military effectiveness *and* a decrease in civilian control in Africa. Militaries in consolidated democracies will likely achieve an increase in military effectiveness that includes both increases in soldiering skills and soldier-state professionalism. Militaries in illiberal democracies will likely achieve only modest increases in military effectiveness because increases in soldier-state professionalism will be limited. It is very unlikely that civilian control will decrease in either type of regime but it is not removed as a possibility. Militaries in either regime could mutiny or, in extreme cases, overthrow rulers based on an internalization of soldier-state model concepts that interpreted illiberal rule or democratic backsliding as a threat to the national interest or constitutional norms. However, the mood and opportunity to mutiny or conduct a coup must be present and the risk of failure low. This would decrease civilian control but also demonstrate deficient soldier-state professionalism due to the disrespect for the supremacy of civilian control.

2. Professional Education and Training Will Result in Increased Military Effectiveness and Increased Civilian Control

This outcome is possible for Cameroon and probable for Senegal. Both militaries are likely to achieve measurable increases in effectiveness. Cameroon has strong, but undemocratic civilian control, that is likely to continue due to increasing security threats by Boko Haram in the north and Anglophone separatists in the west, as noted in the previous chapter. It is possible that increased soldier-state professionalism provides avenues for the Cameroon armed forces to seek reform in the security sector that include increased oversight by the legislature to decrease corruption, but it is unlikely to achieve increased democratic civilian control while President Biya remains in office. Senegal, on the other hand, currently has democratic civil-military relations and U.S. military training and professional education is likely to deepen the military's respect for the supremacy of civilian control. Democratically transitioned militaries protest through resignation, not through intervention, and this is the most likely outcome for Senegal unless the state

undergoes significant democratic regression that triggers a *savior of the state* type of response.⁴⁷¹ Therefore, the likely impact in Africa is that illiberal democracies with strong civilian control and consolidated democracies both achieve increased military effectiveness and increased civilian control.

3. Professional Education and Training Will Result in Decreased Military Effectiveness and Increased Civilian Control

This result is unlikely in the cases of Cameroon and Senegal but could result in other African states. Increased military effectiveness should be measured by improvements in both soldering skills *and* soldier-state professionalism. The El Salvador and Colombia case studies demonstrate that U.S. military training and professional education can achieve improvements in soldiering skills and fail to achieve measurable improvements in soldier-state professionalism. Restated, militaries may become more effective in achieving assigned missions, but this can coincide with an increase in human rights violations, partisanship, or political intervention. Decreased military effectiveness could also result if the training received was incompatible with the roles and missions assigned to the military. This could occur if U.S. military interests do not align with partner state military interests, yet the partner state accepts U.S. military aid regardless.

Increased civilian control can be achieved even with decreased military effectiveness. However, this would not be directly caused by the military training and professional education. Increased civilian control can result in decreased military effectiveness if the civilian authority neuters the military through budget reductions or other punitive administrative controls, or if the partner state accepts military training and professional education but does not staff the bureaucracies that support the military.⁴⁷² Yet, these outcomes of increased civilian control and decreased military effectiveness are not directly related to the assistance received.

⁴⁷¹ Blair, 22.

⁴⁷² Barany; Bachmann, 620.

4. Professional Education and Training Will Result in Decreased Military Effectiveness and Decreased Civilian Control

This outcome is unlikely in Cameroon and Senegal, but may be possible in African states with weak civilian control of the military that struggle to fund and equip their militaries and pay their soldiers. These internal factors could prevent positive outcomes of U.S. military training and professional education. Some militaries receive erratic pay and junior enlisted seek supplemental income, some of which may be achieved through illegal activity.⁴⁷³ This form of shirking distracts or removes the soldier from the military's roles and missions and decreases its effectiveness. In extreme cases, this may result in mutiny or political intervention that limits or eliminates civilian control. Like the previous hypotheses, this outcome is more related to internal state factors than the training and education received.

C. CONCLUSION

The potential effects of U.S. led military training and professional education on democratization of African civil-military relations is mixed and depends on several factors. These factors are regime type, the type and level of civilian control of the military, institutionalized violence, the level of military professionalism, and the perceived nature of security threats. It can lead to increased effectiveness and increased civilian control of the military, but this does not necessarily lead to democratic civil-military relations. Each of the factors above can influence the outcomes. In the case of Cameroon, it is very likely its armed forces will achieve increased soldiering skills and may even internalize some soldier-state professionalism, but the partisan and co-ethnic nature of the military, the nature of President Biya's 34 year illiberal democratic rule, and the dual security threats of Anglophone separatist actions, and Boko Haram, are likely to prevent a transition to democratic civil-military relations. Biya cannot live forever, however, so there is potential that U.S. military training and professional education prepares the Cameroon armed forces for a democratic transition upon his death if his successor insists on reforms, the military has accepted the norms of rule of law, and reduced its prerogatives for partisanship. On the

⁴⁷³ Dwyer, 32.

contrary, U.S. military training and professional education will likely deepen democratic civil-military relations in the case of Senegal. It is also likely that democratic civil-military relations can become so deeply engrained in the Senegalese armed forces' psyche that it can survive future attempts at democratic regress.

However, sustaining positive change will require iterative training and professional education with donor state forces or the establishment of homegrown training and professional education programs or institutions in Cameroon and Senegal or any African state in which it takes place. This requires a state apparatus that is capable of supporting it, otherwise military training and professional education will just become another form of aid on which the partner state will become dependent. The conclusion will determine if the research questions were answered and provide recommendations to address concerns.

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VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis questioned if U.S. military training and professional education provided to African militaries could impair or improve democratic civil-military relations in Africa. The research demonstrates the characteristics of the partner state regime and military have a large influence on the outcome that may outweigh the impacts of the assistance they receive. Military and professional education programs can achieve measurable improvements in military effectiveness and civilian control of the military but are unlikely to result in democratic civil-military relations in all states.

Through the case studies of the U.S. military training and professional education provided to El Salvador and Colombia during their counterinsurgencies of the 1980s and 1990s, we discovered that military effectiveness increases if measured primarily through lethality or combat effectiveness. The ESAF and the COLAR became more effective in their ability to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. However, both militaries also increased human rights violations. Also, neither state experienced greater civilian control as a direct result of the training and education. Military reforms and democratic civil-military relations were achieved in El Salvador only after the United States threatened to cut off military aid. Colombia achieved it through a combination of endogenous government reforms and conditional U.S. aid. So far, Senegal has sustained a high level of military professionalism and democratic civil-military relations after years of receiving U.S. military aid. In comparison, Cameroon has also received many years of U.S. military assistance but human rights violations by the armed forces have reportedly increased as terrorism and insurgency have increased. Therefore, these facts demonstrate the unlikelihood that U.S. military training and professional education on its own can achieve democratic civil-military relations in a partner state.

Consolidated democracies with apolitical, ethnically heterogeneous militaries whose soldiers believe the military is a profession are most likely to achieve increased democratic civil-military relations while receiving only U.S. military training and professional education. This is representative of Senegal. Colombia was a consolidated democracy, but its military, while multi-ethnic, was less professional at the time it received assistance.

Illiberal democracies, like Cameroon, with strong, but undemocratic civilian control of the military and partisan, co-ethnic militaries are less likely to achieve democratic civil-military relations through U.S. assistance that only includes military training and professional education. Military-dominated regimes like El Salvador in the 1980s are unlikely to achieve democratic civil-military relations through U.S. military training and professional education. Therein lies the challenge in Africa, including Cameroon, which is more representative of the continent's states than Senegal. Can the United States achieve its national strategic objectives in Africa through primarily providing military training and professional education to African states?

The moral dilemma

Achieving only an increase in military effectiveness along the soldiering skills model of professionalism might be acceptable if the United States is only concerned with defeating or mitigating the security threats of violent extremist organizations, piracy, narcotics trafficking, and human trafficking. Combat effective African militaries could successfully neutralize these threats with U.S. assistance, effectively preventing the ability of these threats to negatively impact the U.S. homeland or U.S. commercial interests in Africa. But this was part of the failure of security cooperation and security assistance in El Salvador and Colombia. Security assistance through 1991 served to support proxy wars against communism.⁴⁷⁴ Cold War rhetoric identified communism as an existential threat to the United States and its allies. This promoted the idea that the ends—defeating the socialists at all costs—justified the means. Dangers seemed to emerge everywhere for the United States during the Cold War, blurring the lines between war and peace and requiring the creation and training of larger professional militaries, for which the United States was willing to fund and equip.⁴⁷⁵ Plan Colombia served a similar role in the war on drugs. A similar result has occurred since the 11 September 2001 attacks and Africa has the potential to become a proxy battlefield in the War on Terror.

⁴⁷⁴ Rittinger, "Risks of Outsourcing Security: Foreign Security Forces in United States National Security Policy," 167.

⁴⁷⁵ Gill, 91.

African military success against these security threats will be a pyrrhic victory for the United States and its African partners if it comes at the cost of increased human rights violations and poor governance. Political rhetoric promoting the War on Terror is very similar to the rhetoric of the Cold War: terrorism represents an existential threat to freedom and the American way of life. An “any means necessary” approach to security threats has a pragmatic appeal, but it can lead to morally questionable outcomes if the United States chooses to accept stable authoritarianism as an acceptable counter to security threats in Africa.⁴⁷⁶ The United States is conducting training and operations throughout much of Africa to combat these threats and spending considerable amounts of money. Military aid to defeat terrorism and narcotics far exceeds the aid provided to promote human rights.⁴⁷⁷ The potential exists for some states to see counter-terrorism and other military operations as avenues to receiving increased U.S. aid that promotes regime security. Africa Command’s strategic objectives are to deepen democracy, increase military respect for the rule of law, and instill military professionalism because for decades the United States has seen these as keys to achieving security and stability. If the United States wants to achieve security and stability in Africa, U.S. engagement must involve more than security cooperation and security assistance.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

Military training and professional education must be part of a greater security sector reform and democracy promotion program that incorporates multiple U.S. government agencies and nongovernmental agencies and targets the partner state’s whole of government. The strategy should incorporate civil society, engagement, partnership, and outreach.⁴⁷⁸ Security sector reform programs must be developed with an understanding of the partner state’s political, military, social, and historical context. Therefore, no two African programs are likely to be identical and some are likely to be more difficult to develop and require diplomatic finesse to incorporate.

⁴⁷⁶ Nelson-Pallmeyer, 18–19.

⁴⁷⁷ Dugas, 246.

⁴⁷⁸ Crawford and Zwicker, 158

Partner state oversight mechanisms --checks and balances-- and accountability for military and political leaders are required and should be a top priority.⁴⁷⁹ This requires significant coordination from the DoS, DoD, and legislative think tanks to develop academic programs that can be tailored to each partner state and executed within the constraints of their politics system. Programs would include legislative armed services committees, budgeting, diplomacy, and national strategy development.

Military reforms that include merit-based promotion, ethnically diverse recruitment, and professionalism are needed in Africa.⁴⁸⁰ Roles and missions must be defined, as well as military's responsibility to the state and citizens, and emphasis on respecting the rule of law and constitutionalism.⁴⁸¹ In order to achieve military reforms, defense ministries must also be reformed and professionalized. They must have the technical skills to manage the military.

The United States must also provide adequate oversight of these programs to ensure their legitimacy and success. Measures of military effectiveness need to be established for each partner state along the lines of both soldiering skill and soldier-state professionalism. These could identify shirking duties in combat, coups, human rights abuses, mutiny, looting, corruption, and crime as examples of unprofessionalism.⁴⁸² Strict adherence to the Leahy amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act must occur. States, units, and personnel accused of human rights violations and corruption should be removed from assistance programs for the minimum durations required by U.S. statute and until designated authorities determine they are compliant. The Congress should further constrain the Executive Branch's power to override the Leahy Act through designation as a national security crisis, as happened on multiple occasions in the years of support to El Salvador and Colombia. Human rights violations by Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram reflect those of El Salvador against the FMLN or Colombia against the FARC, albeit on a smaller scale.

⁴⁷⁹ Ouedraogo, 2.

⁴⁸⁰ Harkness, 813.

⁴⁸¹ Ouedraogo, 2.

⁴⁸² Ouedraogo, 1.

Context driven programs developed for each partner state will take time and drive up costs initially due to a likely need for additional manpower requirements in the agencies charged with creating the programs. However, this will eventually balance out because some states will need fewer aspects of security sector reforms than others. Senegal, for example, is likely to deepen its democratic civil-military relations through military training and professional education alone. While Cameroon's program may require more aspects of security sector reform, the United States may be heavily constrained in implementing it due to Cameroon's politics, thereby reducing execution costs. Partner state context and U.S. national interest will drive development and implementation.

B. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

The scholarship on African civil-military relations appears to be limited to those states with significant coup histories. Research should be expanded to include those states that have stable civil-military relations, like Senegal and Cameroon, to better understand why their civil-military relations are stable, if not always democratic. The fact that both Cameroon and Senegal were former French colonies but developed different regime types and civil-military relations suggests another avenue of research: does the colonial master impact state regime and type of civil-military relations after independence and why? Scholarship also seems to be limited on the specific effects of U.S. military training on African militaries. El Salvador and Colombia were picked as case studies because of their notoriety. Volumes of material exists detailing the types of U.S. military training and professional education provided to both states and the outcomes. More research into the effects on Africa should occur, including how training and education impacts African military effectiveness against VEOs.

C. TIME WILL TELL

Professionalizing militaries in African states is not a one size fits all proposition. Training and professional education is likely to achieve both professionalization and democratic civil-military relations only under the right circumstances. It is important to remember that Western powers had just transitioned to the modern definition of democratic

civilian control around the time of African decolonization.⁴⁸³ This slow transition by Western states should help manage expectations for African states who came to independence via disparate methods and only within the last 60 years. African states receiving U.S. assistance today will not transition tomorrow. It may take decades to see the wholesale positive transition to democratic civil-military relations in Africa, especially if U.S. assistance focuses primarily on military training and professional education.

⁴⁸³ Bachmann, 611.

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