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**INNERE FÜHRUNG IN PRACTICE:
THE EDEN-PRINCIPLE**

by

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INNERE FÜHRUNG IN PRACTICE: THE EDEN-PRINCIPLE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis reflects the ongoing debate on Innere Führung and questions whether the principle is outdated, or how it is still of value for the Bundeswehr and Germany. After pointing out factors of internal instability for Germany and its society, vulnerable elements and threats to the core values of German citizenship are explained. The thesis further makes obvious how a strong level of resilience is necessary by presenting the fact of hybrid war threats, especially Russian information operations. Psychology serves as a means to explain why and how such methods of persuasion can be used in general. In order to develop and maintain a strong level of resilience against current internal and external threats, the thesis presents a way out of this dilemma by simplifying core elements of Innere Führung through the EDEN-Principle. This principle focuses on the development, practical implementation, and maintenance of democratic norms and an ethos of the soldier, based on the core values of citizenship.

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of these words that are way more than mere terms out of context. In great gratitude and in love, thank you for everything, Dad!



Family crest of the family Würger.

I. INTRODUCTION

Innere Führung, the leadership principle of the German armed forces, the *Bundeswehr*, faces a challenge of practical implementation in the transitions of society and arms of the 21st century. Especially after the end on conscription in 2011, civil-military relations seem to need an improvement in key aspects of the military, politics, and German society. Core values of citizenship and soldiering must be further developed, maintained, and transported within the model of the citizen in uniform despite enduring skepticism in society about soldiers in general and those in the military who want to embrace a simplistic cult of the warrior.

In the first chapter, this thesis gives a brief overview on the internal development within the *Bundeswehr*, including current challenges of missions abroad, the ongoing debate on *Innere Führung*, and core values of citizenship in the self-perception of the soldier and German society. The *Bundeswehr*'s demand for more public acceptance, role models, and challenges regarding the development from a military focused on forward defense and a garrison role in the past (a so-called training army) into a force on perpetual deployment often far from Germany (a so-called Deployed Army) are significant challenging factors that will be covered as well. Focusing on internal aspects, issues of mass migration, deployments abroad, and the political support for the *Bundeswehr* will be discussed in the final part of this chapter.

The second chapter points out further external challenges for Germany, including hybrid warfare, Russian psychological warfare and information operations, and the external influence on the domestic political development under aspects that pose a threat to a democratic country. Such threats as Russian information operations and hybrid/subterfuge/covert operations challenges will be analyzed in detail. This chapter points out and explain specific factors of vulnerability in order to prove the necessity for Germany—especially the *Bundeswehr*—to develop a strong level of resilience. An examination of the field of psychology will help to understand how methods of persuasion, like information operations, work. Isolating the weak points and vulnerabilities will open the opportunity to work specifically on improvement in these areas.

In the third chapter, this thesis raises the main argument that the *Innere Führung* needs practical improvement but is still helpful and adaptable to utilize the model of the citizen in uniform for the development and maintenance of core values of citizenship. The new developed EDEN-Principle is a possibility to translate main messages and elements of the *Innere Führung* into four practically adaptable fields that can continuously strengthen the vulnerable areas of German society and the *Bundeswehr* that were emphasized in the former chapter.

By developing the ethos of the soldier and maintaining the practical outcome of *Innere Führung*, the EDEN-Principle can produce the positive and desired side effect of a strong level of resilience. A strong level of resilience against a variety of negative, anti-democratic influences, such as Russian information operations, radical political parties, extremist movements, or terrorism is a vital factor of a country's defense capability and internal stability.¹ If a radicalization of the armed forces can generally be avoided, e.g., through strong civil-military bonds, a democratic ethos, and ethical core values of citizenship, the resilience against such destructive influences will persist.

¹ Jamie Shea, "Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence," NATO Review, 2016.

Also see: Uwe Hartmann, ed., *NATO's Adaptation* (Miles-Verlag, 2017), and Michael Hanisch, "What Is Resilience? Ambiguities of a Key Term," *Bundesakademie Für Sicherheitspolitik*, Security Policy Working Paper, no. 19 (2016): 4.

II. *INNERE FÜHRUNG*: AN OPEN DEBATE ON SOLDIERS AND CITIZENSHIP

“In any given moment we have two options: To step forward into growth or to step backward into safety.”

—U.S.-American Psychologist Abraham Maslow, 1908–1970

The ongoing debate on *Innere Führung*² and, therefore, also the core principle of German citizenship is a debate on values and self-perception of German state and society as well. The citizen in uniform is a not only a valuable principle of soldiering linked to citizenship and democratic norms, but it also reflects German society itself that aspires to limit the power of the state to do harm to the same citizens, whether it is in the barracks or on a battlefield or in parliament. To go with Maslow’s introductory quote, the option Germany chooses will significantly influence the future of Germany; to distinguish which direction is forward and which one might rather be backward-oriented will be evaluated in this thesis as well. Which way Germany chooses, will not only influence the German future, but it will also have an impact on how German society will be seen from its neighbor countries in future.

The first chapter gives an overview of the ongoing debate on *Innere Führung* in Germany, specifically the period after the end of conscription in 2011. The self-perception of the soldier and the wish for role models will be addressed, as well as the possible change and development in the core principle of German citizenship. Following this introductory part of the thesis, the first chapter ends up by addressing aspects of vulnerability regarding migration, deployments abroad, and the political support for the German armed forces.

² Armed Forces Staff Branch Fü S I 4, “Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1. *Innere Führung* (Leadership Development and Civic Education)” (Federal Minister of Defence, 2008).

A. THE ISSUE WITH THE SELF-PERCEPTION AND POSITIVE ROLE MODELS

With a view to the challenge posed to western democracies on a broad front, this thesis states that a destabilization of the democratically rooted basis of the *Bundeswehr* would be equivalent to the failure of democracy in Germany, especially in association with the country's history from 1819 until 1945. This development would most likely cause an alarming security risk for other member countries of the European Union or NATO and possibly lead to a domino effect of social and political instability.

When it comes to the question whether the *Bundeswehr* has a lack of tradition and ethos or an issue with the soldiers' self-perception and the wish for heroic role models in practice, one could argue rather for the latter. Often, it seems to be easier to follow a practical example or a heroic role model than theoretical and broad principles. Apart from the *Wehrmacht* in the Nazi regime and the *Nationale Volksarmee* (National People's Army) in the former German Democratic Republic, Germany has a variety of memorable, positive, and ethically rooted traditions today. As the 2018 German "*Traditionserlass*" (Tradition Decree) points out, especially the resistance against the Hitler regime, but also the founding elements of the *Bundeswehr* and brave soldiers in current missions are worthy of remembering and preserving as the historical ideals of the German soldier.³ However, the implementation of these ideals and the political support of the German soldiers in practice seem to be in need of improvement.

Actually, *Innere Führung* as a core principle of democratically-based leadership culture sets the main focus on integration of the soldier into constitutional principles, ethics, martial tradition, and a positive self-perception for the soldier in a democracy as an important part of the German state and society and the core principle of citizenship. The *Bundeswehr* is under development and internal reorganization. Apart from the multitude of deployments abroad, the *Bundeswehr* has faced a current challenge in stability and self-perception, especially since the end of conscription in 2011. As many current *Bundeswehr*

³ "Die Tradition Der Bundeswehr. Richtlinien Zum Traditionsverständnis Und Zur Traditionspflege (Tradition in the Bundeswehr. Guidelines for Understanding and Maintaining Tradition)" (Ministry of Defense, 2018).

missions are opposed by the majority of German society and the end of conscription caused a gap in civil-military exchange—compared to the former constant exchange through conscription—the military self-perception of citizenship as part of German society could also be challenged in a consequence. The *Wehrbeauftragter des Deutschen Bundestages* (Parliamentary Commissioner of the Armed Forces of the German Bundestag) stated in his latest evaluation that the *Bundeswehr* is “*derzeit nicht einsetzbar*” (not operational at the moment).⁴ This lack of readiness is an obvious factor of instability in European security that might also lead to a lack of security not only for the *Bundeswehr* but also for the Germany as a whole in the end.

In addition, the self-perception of the German soldier is being transformed in the wake of the changing face of conflict and the upheaval in society. The deployments abroad (e.g., in Afghanistan), have led to discussions about the image and perception of the soldier, starting among a group of young Army officers and officer candidates of combat troops.⁵ While the principle of leadership, the German *Innere Führung*, focuses on a democratic basis and roots in ethical and humanitarian core ideas, the wish for the image of a warrior rather than a citizen in uniform has steadily grown among young men and women who serve alongside others in ISAF and elsewhere.⁶ The widespread public appreciation of the soldier in other countries, especially in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, partially leads to dissatisfaction among German military personnel about public scorn and lack of popular affection. Added to this are public doubts about strategy, which is a problem of identification with the purpose of missions such as that in Afghanistan for German soldiers. The lack of public appreciation of both the soldiers and the missions itself by German politics leads to tensions between the military and German politics as an

⁴ DIE WELT, “Anhaltende Pannen: Wehrbeauftragter Hält Bundeswehr Für „derzeit Nicht Einsetzbar“ [Persistent Breakdowns: Armed Forces Commissioner Considers Bundeswehr ‘Currently Not Usable’],” *DIE WELT*, January 20, 2018, <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article172662371/Anhaltende-Pannen-Wehrbeauftragter-haelt-Bundeswehr-fuer-derzeit-nicht-einsetzbar.html>.

⁵ Marcel Bohnert and Lukas J. Reitstetter, eds., *Armee im Aufbruch. [Army Awakening]* (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2014).

⁶ Anja Dr. Seiffert, “Aus Der Empirischen Feldforschung-Wofür Riskieren Soldaten Ihr Leben? [From Empirical Field Research-What Do Soldiers Risk Their Lives For?],” in *Schützen, Retten, Kämpfen. Dienen Für Deutschland [Protect, Rescue, Fight. Serving for Germany]* (Norderstedt, Germany: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2016), 213–25.

outcome. In this context, the former Minister of Defense, Thomas de Maiziere (with a page taken from his father's book of Prussian virtues), demanded from the soldiers in an official interview not to beg for recognition.⁷ A statement that caused a significant debate and a perception of a lack of appreciation for the military in the aftermath.

Although the current German Minister of Defense, Ursula von der Leyen, implemented a new Tradition Decree in March 2018,⁸ the German soldiers' desire for specific role models and appreciation persists. The new Tradition Decree offers perhaps an incomplete answer to this desire for such a specific guidance and rightly opens up a variety of broad opportunities for interpretation and individual decisions. This fact can be an opportunity but also creates the risk for wrong or even no guidance at all in the end. Such a partly perceived lack of guidance and orientation for subordinate leaders is difficult to overcome. Such a situation can open a path for radical movements to influence and manipulate individuals of the Armed Forces.

As long as such terms as citizen in uniform or the specific role of citizenship and civil-military relations for the *Bundeswehr* and German society are not clarified and persistently explained, these factors of insecurity will remain unchanged. The case of Franco Albrecht⁹ in early 2017 made clear that the misbehavior of even one individual can unsettle the social structure and the German public's trust in the *Bundeswehr*. In cases like this, the current fragility of mutual trust becomes obvious.

⁷ "Thomas de Maizière im Gespräch: „Giert nicht nach Anerkennung!“ - Inland - FAZ [Thomas de Maiziere in conversation: 'Do not crave for recognition!']," *FAZ*, sec. Politik, accessed May 24, 2018, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/thomas-de-maiziere-im-gespraech-giert-nicht-nach-erkennung-12092201.html>.

⁸ "Die Tradition Der Bundeswehr. Richtlinien Zum Traditionsverständnis Und Zur Traditionspflege (Tradition in the Bundeswehr. Guidelines for Understanding and Maintaining Tradition)."

⁹ "Terrorverdächtiger Soldat: Franco A. fiel früh als rechtsextrem auf," *Die Zeit*, April 29, 2017, sec. Gesellschaft, <http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-04/terrorverdaechtiger-soldat-bundeswehr-rechtsextreme-thesen-masterarbeit>.

Note: the young *Bundeswehr* officer, Franco A., was initially charged with being a terrorist in a non-transparent story that ended in the headlines and pivoted on an imitation machine pistol and steel helmet as symbols of a Nazi cult in the *Bundeswehr*.

B. THE GERMAN DEBATE ON INNERE FÜHRUNG

In the generation since the end of the Cold War, the self-image of German society and politics grew indifferent to the former ideals of martial virtue, and with the end of conscription in 2010/11 generally lost interest in the fate of military reality that the soldiers had to cope with every day. In order to counteract this trend, this student's thesis advisor in California, USA, Colonel Dr. Uwe Hartmann during his assignment as the Commander/Military Dean of the Students' Regiment at the University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg from 2010–2014 implemented a curriculum that was designed not only to familiarize young officers and officer candidates with the concept of *Innere Führung* but also to contribute to its further adaptation to changes in security policies and domestic politics. Encouraged by these discussions and following an example of others a half century ago in the turmoil of the 1960s (another *Aufbruch*), a group of students built a working group with the purpose to create a dialogue with society about the meaning of soldiering today. The result of this process was the publication of the book *Armee im Aufbruch* (Army Awakening) in 2014,¹⁰ a collection of statements and reports by young German officers of combat forces. Their very critical assessments indicated the starting point for an internal and public discussion on the German military, the society and the *Bundeswehr's* self-conception within the principle of *Innere Führung*. The sentiment of a crisis of personal identity, or better, an ethos as either a warrior or a soldier—i.e., the citizen in uniform—is mirrored in these articles; for example by Lieutenant Jan-Philipp Birkhoff in his essay about the role of the military leader in the Professor Herfried Muenkler's "postheroic"¹¹ society that seems to have overcome heroism as a virtue.¹² The claim for an ethos, more likely to aim for the picture of a warrior, stands at the end of this discussion and points towards the need, or even reality, of a special role of the soldier within the society.

¹⁰ Marcel Bohnert and Lukas J. Reitstetter, eds., *Armee im Aufbruch. [Army on Departure]* (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2014).

¹¹ Note: The term "postheroic" was initially shaped by US scholar Edward Luttwak and later adapted by the German political scholar Herfried Münkler..

¹² Bohnert and Reitstetter, *Armee im Aufbruch. [Army Awakening]*, 105–28.

Once the Crimean crisis hit soon followed by the refugee crisis in the years 2014–2015 the hitherto silent question about the purpose of the military and the possible gap between social-political theory and military reality underwent a big bang in what is now an ongoing public, scholarly, and inner-military discussion. This debate concerns the fate of the citizen in a professional *Bundeswehr* without conscription as a time of significant change in politics and society that go far beyond the ranks of soldiers and also challenge the general principle of citizenship.

If, as it new/old critics assert that *Innere Führung* has become outdated, or even completely irrelevant, the self-conception of the *Staatsbürger in Uniform* (citizen in uniform) would be rendered obsolete as well. This development would mean a real threat to civil-military relations and the embedding of the *Bundeswehr* in society within the ethos of a democratic-political basis—the core principle of German citizenship.

The debate that began after the abandonment of conscription in 2012 took on new force in early 2017 with the case of the young *Bundeswehr* officer, Franco Albrecht (the so-called Franco A.), who was initially charged with being a terrorist in an odd story that exploded in the headlines and then pivoted on an illegal old French pistol, an imitation machine pistol and steel helmet as symbols of a Nazi or *Wehrmacht* cult in the *Bundeswehr*. After a series of high-level, expert seminars, in mid-November 2017, the German Minister of Defense, Ursula von der Leyen, published the first public draft for a new tradition decree for the German Armed Forces, the document that focuses on German military tradition—in the current *Bundeswehr* after 1955 on a democratic basis—and declares once again as done in previous decades that the *Wehrmacht* and the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) former *Nationale Volksarmee* (National People’s Army) as being no valid source of tradition for today’s military. The ongoing public, political and scholarly discussion on the implementation of the principle of *Innere Führung*, the soldier’s place and role in the society, as well as the contents and contours of a valid tradition, are once more in the headlines, a place these themes occupied in various episodes from the moment the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) decided to acquire armed forces in the years after 1949.

Carolyn Halladay and Donald Abenheim point out that “*Innere Führung* is not outdated” and that “this [the German] society has the most to gain from ‘rediscovering’

Innere Führung—and the most to lose from failing to understand its enduring relevance to Germany, both today and tomorrow.”¹³ It serves as an advocate for the ethos of the soldier in a sense of the *Innere Führung*, rather than pointing out a need for the warrior ethos—away from the society-embedded military—in comparison.

Uwe Hartmann’s argument for the principle of *Innere Führung* on the one side creates an understanding for its core meaning and possible advantages, but on the other side he questions the political and social frame, in which the German soldiers have to act and do their duty. Here, the *Bundeswehr*’s development from a deterrence-oriented *Ausbildungsarmee* (Training Army) in the classical epoch of the Cold War toward a post-1990 *Einsatzarmee* (Deployment Army) and the importance of a necessary change in leadership culture is the most significant aspect of circumstances.¹⁴ As is the case with those NATO armies that abandoned conscription beginning in the 1960s, Hartmann points out the possibility of an increasing gap between society and the *Bundeswehr*, which would become a major issue for German society, the core principle of citizenship, and its civil-military relations.¹⁵

Theology professor Christian Walther states that a conflict between the necessity of military duty in missions and the support for such missions by German society can be observed.¹⁶ Walther criticizes the lack of support by German society for politics and military and demands the development toward a more supportive civil society in Germany. Heiko Biehl on the other hand argues for the importance of mechanisms of integration into the society—especially after the end of conscription—which should be mainly developed

¹³ Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, *Soldiers, War, Knowledge and Citizenship: German-American Essays on Civil-Military Relations* (Norderstedt, Germany: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2017), 40, 41.

¹⁴ Uwe Hartmann, *Innere Führung* (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2007), 148ff.

Note: The term Army serves as a historically grown *pars pro toto* in this context and stands for the whole *Bundeswehr*.

¹⁵ Hartmann, IV.1.

¹⁶ Christian Walther, “Was bewegt Soldaten? Zu Fragen soldatischer Mentalität [What moves soldiers? On questions of a soldierly mentality],” in *Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2010 [yearbook Innere Führung 2010]* (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2010), 51–61.

by the *Bundeswehr*.¹⁷ Furthermore, Hartmann points out that a discourse about the *Innere Führung* in the context of hybrid war issues seems necessary. Hartmann shows how the circumstances of modern war scenarios—that is, the hybrid threats and conventional war in parallel—give proof for the still present significance of *Innere Führung* in a recourse for the current requirements of the *Bundeswehr*.¹⁸ The ongoing discourse clearly shows the ambiguous and complex nature of the understanding of *Innere Führung* and the current development of the core principle of citizenship in the view of German society.

If *Innere Führung* failed in Germany, the democratic fundamentals of the country might have to be questioned as well by those who watch closely the character of nationalism in Germany and the revival of groups devoted to a violent understanding of what they today call “German identity,” but which is surely a well-known variant of integral nationalism. In addition to this challenge of a blood and soil nationalism and soldiers, the gap between military and society would be obviously proven. Such a development could underscore a process well visible, say, in the United States, with a military caste as “a state within the state” again.¹⁹

C. MIGRATION, DEPLOYMENTS ABROAD, AND THE POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED FORCES

A variety of factors currently lead to an increase in the problematic morale and discipline as well as operational effectiveness within the German Armed Forces. Apart from the already mentioned lack of personnel and the scarcity and neglect of operational military materiel—although a positive development in core missions such as in Afghanistan and Mali can be pointed out—the understanding and acceptance of the

¹⁷ Uwe Hartmann, Claus von Rosen, and Christian Walther, eds., *Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2012* [*yearbook Innere Führung 2012*] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2012).

¹⁸ Uwe Hartmann, ed., “Innere Führung und hybride Kriegsführung-Zur Bedeutung des Kriegsbildes für die Weiterentwicklung der Führungsphilosophie für die Bundeswehr [Innere Führung und hybrid warfare-On the significance of the war image for the further development of leadership philosophy for the Bundeswehr],” in *Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2016* [*yearbook Innere Führung 2016*] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2016), 137ff.

¹⁹ Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, “Soldier and Politics in the United States: The Effects of the long War,” in *Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2009* [*yearbook Innere Führung 2009*] (Berlin: BoD, 2009), 117–25.

political purpose of missions (e.g., in Afghanistan), are significantly low.²⁰ The majority of the German people does not know a lot about the missions in which the *Bundeswehr* is deployed. In the year 2017, only 18 percent of the German people felt well informed about the *Bundeswehr*'s missions in general; most Germans preferred non-military missions or missions of humanitarian support as a major focus instead.²¹ If German society's lack of knowledge about the *Bundeswehr*'s missions is directly related to the lack of acceptance of missions abroad cannot be verified on this point.

A common criticism is rooted in the lack of official political support for the *Bundeswehr* and the lack of meaningful public discussions on roles and missions of the *Bundeswehr* in general.²² Although the German people do not feel well informed about the *Bundeswehr* and the Armed Forces are not a popular topic in German politics, the standing of the *Bundeswehr* enjoys more respect in the perception of the German people than in the darker times of the cold war, for instance.²³ The misperception of a significant number of German soldiers, especially officers, might therefore be rooted in the lack of public appearances and a desire for the kind of at times overwrought display of civil military affection as found in the U.S. or the UK, or, say, in Poland or Russia.

The increased African and Middle Eastern migration toward Europe has led Germany to a social and political crisis since 2015. At the end of the year 2016, Germany registered an official number of 1.6 million refugees, which amounts to an increase of 113 percent compared to the year 2014 in official numbers.²⁴ This new social situation and the

²⁰ Marcel Bohnert, *Innere Führung Auf Dem Prüfstand. Lehren Aus Dem Afghanistan-Einsatz Der Bundeswehr [Innere Führung on the Test Rig. Lessons Learned from the Afghanistan Mission of the Bundeswehr]* (Hamburg: DeutscherVeteranenVerlag, 2017), 60ff.

²¹ Markus Steinbrecher, Heiko Biehl, and Chariklia Rothbart, "Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2017 [security- and defense-policy poll in the Federal Republic of Germany. 2017]," n.d., 6ff.

²² Bohnert, *Innere Führung Auf Dem Prüfstand. Lehren Aus Dem Afghanistan-Einsatz Der Bundeswehr [Innere Führung on the Test Rig. Lessons Learned from the Afghanistan Mission of the Bundeswehr]*, 59ff.

²³ Steinbrecher, Biehl, and Rothbart, "Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2017 [security- and defense-policy poll in the Federal Republic of Germany. 2017]," 37ff.

²⁴ Statistisches Bundesamt, "Destatis. Statistisches Bundesamt. Pressemitteilung Nr. 387 [Destatis. Federal Statistical Office. Press Handout No. 387]," February 2, 2017.

challenge to cope with such a huge number of mostly young, male, and unemployed refugees opened the opportunity of creating and manipulating a feeling of fear within the German population.²⁵ The rise of the right-wing political party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD, Alternative for Germany) as well as the FPÖ. *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Free Party of Austria), in Austria was a major outcome of a populist right-wing movement that could be observed in several regions of Europe at that time.²⁶

In addition, the fear of terrorist attacks in Europe grew significantly higher with every attack on European soil from 2015 onwards.²⁷ The populist right-wing movements misused this fear in building up the perception of a connection between the refugees and potential terrorists, as well as the fear of Germany losing its own culture and traditions. Although the general connection between migration and terrorism can be seen as unjustified, the numbers of Muslim refugees in Europe encouraged this perception of fear. In 2017, the Pew Research Center published a related study, including a projection of possible growth of the Muslim population in Europe.²⁸ In the three pictured scenarios (see figures 1 and 2), increases of the Muslim population in Europe are visualized, while the third scenario (the high migration scenario) could even strengthen the arguments and populist tactics of radical right-wing groups in Europe.

Although the mentioned aspects are just a selection of major fields of vulnerability in German society, the general presence of such factors becomes visible. What affects German society, also affects the German military, the *Bundeswehr*, and the core values of citizenship, as a switch to the political extreme would also affect the democratic values of

²⁵ Ruth Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 1 edition (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015).

²⁶ John Abromeit et al., eds., *Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas: History and Recent Tendencies* (London Oxford New York New Delhi Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017).

And:

Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, *Far-Right Politics in Europe*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2017).

²⁷“Chronologie: Attacken Auf Europas Metropolen [Chronology: Attacks on European Metropolises],” *Spiegel Online*, June 4, 2017, sec. Politik, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/terrorismus-in-europa-eine-chronologie-a-1150645.html>.

²⁸ Pew Research Center, “Europe’s Growing Muslim Population” (Pew Research Center, Washington, DC, USA, 2017).

a country. The next question must be how external and internal negative influences of all kind can use such vulnerabilities for their purpose at all and how a defense against such influences can be build up. A focus on the *Bundeswehr*—as a significant part of Germany—and the citizen in uniform within the principle of *Innere Führung* will help achieving this goal in the final part of this thesis.




Figure 1. Muslim future migration under three different scenarios in Europe.²⁹

²⁹ Pew Research Center, 5.



REGION	Projected size of Muslim population in 2050 under HIGH migration scenario	% of population that is Muslim
REGION	75,550,000	14.0%
Germany	17,490,000	19.7
United Kingdom	13,480,000	17.2
France	13,210,000	18.0
Italy	8,250,000	14.1
Sweden	4,450,000	30.6
Spain	2,810,000	7.2
Netherlands	2,790,000	15.2

Figure 2. High migration scenario of Muslim immigration in Europe until 2050.³⁰

³⁰ Pew Research Center, 10.

D. CONCLUSION

Summarizing the different political, social, and military aspects of political and social upheaval and the weakening of democratic norms of citizenship, Germany faces a period of development and social change that contributes to the increasing instability of domestic politics in Germany while the international system is also in uproar. Since the German *Bundeswehr* has been highly integrated in the German society due to its core principle of citizenship and the former institution of conscription, these factors of instability have already had an impact on the political attitude, morale, discipline and service of military personnel. How the *Bundeswehr* can build up its own resilience through a strong and democratically based citizenship and a better implementation of the *Innere Führung* in practice and how a *Bundeswehr* with a solid esprit de corps in a vigilant democracy can contribute to enhancing the level of resilience for state and society will be focus of the following chapters.

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III. THE THREAT OF HYBRID WARFARE

Information wants to be free.

—Stewart Brand

American Writer and Futurist (1984)

In an increasingly interconnected, highly developing, and media-focused world, ideas that might have been science fiction a few years ago have become reality amid the shocks and upheavals of the 21st century. The Internet connects the world and opens up a new range of channels in media, radio, and television broadcasting as well. The distinction among those who are too indifferent to the duties of citizenship and too suffused of the putative pleasures of consumption and pleasure cannot distinguish quickly enough between fiction and reality—or better true or false—became a matter of complex evaluation and a requirement of a significant amount of knowledge. How and in what kind of purpose this modern information flow is manipulated and by whom and what possible threats emerge out of these circumstances will be focus of this part of the thesis.

The second chapter points out the threat that especially Russian hybrid warfare—that is, psychological warfare, subterfuge, covert operations, and coercive diplomacy—creates not only for Germany but also for the European Union and NATO as an alliance. The specific German role in this context and the necessity for creating a strong “resilience” is part of this consideration. The term resilience as a key term of this thesis is ambiguous in its meanings and will be explained in context. Leading toward the final chapter, this part of the thesis raises the attempt to explain why an improvement is important in aspects of practice. To understand the basics and the heritage of this thought, a deep analysis, including aspects of human psychology, is at the core of this chapter.

Today, NATO faces a threat that existed in a forgotten period of the cold war but the context of such aggression today requires a different answer than in former times.

Especially after the Russian annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in 2014,³¹ the hybrid threat of psychological warfare/information operations that Russia created has become starkly visible because the western powers neglected such a threat in an overemphasis on "Islamic fundamentalism" as the dominant form of conflict in the 21st century.³²

As a side effect of globalization, political, technical, economic, social, and information networks increased in almost the same manner, as the coherent future and current threats accumulated.³³ As a consequence, NATO has to deal with the growing action of the Kremlin's information operations. Reacting to or preventing such hybrid threats is not possible in the conventional way of traditional warfare. For instance, this phenomenon suddenly appeared in the heart of Berlin, with the supposed rape case of the girl "Lisa" in Germany, January 2016, when a false story was spread that a Volga Russian girl had been sexually assaulted by a refugee, a tactic targeted at the not inconsiderable emigrant German Russian community (i.e., ethnic Germans born on the territory of the ex USSR). The case illustrates not only that Russia is successfully using information operations to create political confusion and destabilize the European Union, but also how important a security and defense response to such threats has become currently.³⁴ In the further course of this chapter, this example will be considered in detail.

At the very beginning, this chapter points out selected examples of Russian information operations in the European Union (EU), especially in Germany. The second section deals with the aspects of resilience, the special example of Finland, and why it is of such significance and importance to analyze Finland's best practices. This chapter's examination of psychology helps to further understanding of the effects of information operations.

³¹ Stefan Meister and Jana Puglierin, "Perception and Exploitation: Russia's Non-Military Influence in Europe," DGAPkompakt, no.10 (October 2015): 1.

³² Note: Russia, the Kremlin or Moscow is in this paper related to the Russian government and the legacy of the current president Vladimir Putin, not to the Russian people in general.

³³ Shea, "Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence," 1-2.

³⁴ Stefan Meister, "The 'Lisa Case': Germany as a Target of Russian Disinformation," NATO Review, 2016, 3.

What this all amounts to in the final conclusion is that the growing threat of Russian information operations not only has the ability to destabilize the EU, but also creates an evolving threat for NATO. The possibilities and ways in which NATO can react to such a threat and, ideally, prevent its impact on the organization itself, its politics, and the people of the Western countries³⁵ constitute one of NATO's most challenging future tasks, highly dependent on each member country's development of resilience.³⁶ Germany as one of those member countries has to play its own role and find ways for future improvement and a better practical approach. This chapter focuses on the necessity of such a development and improvement, leading to the last chapter, which presents a concrete practical approach to implement a strong resilience based on democratic norms and core values of German citizenship.

A. RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE/ INFORMATION OPERATIONS

As long ago as the year 2012, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin,³⁷ announced in his programmatic article "Russia and the Changing World"³⁸ that he was willing to use information tools and other forms of intervention to achieve his foreign policy goals by naming those means soft powers. Today, it is obvious that he was already talking about what has become widely known as hybrid warfare and his planned use of information operations and spread of false or deceptive information in the upcoming Crimean crisis within Ukraine.³⁹ Not just since the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula has the Kremlin under Putin's rule focused on the centralization and stabilization of Russian power.⁴⁰ For

³⁵ Note: this paper defines the Western countries as the European democratic NATO-countries sharing the same values, as well as the United States of America.

³⁶ Shea, "Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence," 1–2.

³⁷ Note: Wladimir Wladimirowitsch Putin (Russian president 2000-2008, 2012-today) in the following named in the short form due to aspects of better readability.

³⁸ "Vladimir Putin: 'Russia and the Changing World' | Global Research - Centre for Research on Globalization," February 27, 2012, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/vladimir-putin-russia-and-the-changing-world/5477500>.

³⁹ Soldatov/Borogan, *Red Web by Soldatov/Borogan*, edition (PublicAffairs, 2015), 275ff.

⁴⁰ Thomas Gomart, *Russian Civil-Military Relations : Putin's Legacy* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 71f.

this aim, Putin particularly used the Internet and developed a network of disinformation,⁴¹ but also political alliances with (or support for) far right and far left, anti-EU parties (Figure 3) as well as pro-Russian organizations in Europe.⁴² The latter aspect poses a significant threat to Germany as the political spectrum is in a process of change and a variety of radical new offers for the individual go along with this.



Figure 3. Pro-Kremlin political parties in Europe.⁴³

⁴¹ Soldatov/Borogan;, *Red Web by Soldatov/Borogan*, 223ff.

⁴² Alina Polyakova, Atlantic Council of the United States., and Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, “The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,” 2016, 3–4, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/The_Kremlins_Trojan_Horses_web_1118.pdf.

⁴³ Polyakova, Atlantic Council of the United States., and Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, 5.; “note: * signifies that individuals associated with the party take a pro-Russian stance rather than the party itself.”

In the years since 2012, Moscow has strengthened its efforts on its information operations, particularly in Germany, as Putin identified German Chancellor Angela Merkel's leading role after the Crimean crisis and her ambitions to implement EU sanctions on Russia as a threat to the accomplishment of Russian power objectives and his own aims.⁴⁴ The conflation of fact and fiction as well as the disinformation and unsettling presentation of various so-called facts and a plurality of views⁴⁵ became visible without limitation in the 2016 German case of "Lisa,"⁴⁶ when the Kremlin demanded action by the German government. In this case, a girl named Lisa was supposedly raped by an immigrant, but the German government could not react or protect its citizens, as the Russian government's representative stated on TV. Finally, this case was exposed as an example of Moscow's fake news for the purpose of undermining the German people's trust in their government. The Russian aim of exerting a destabilizing influence in the EU has been shown not only in the Kremlin's efforts to develop its influence in the Western countries via the media, e.g., the news agency "*RIA Novosti*," the radio programme "Voice of Russia," and the TV channel "*RT Deutsch*,"⁴⁷ but also its developing participation in the "German-Russian-Forum" and the "*Petersburg Dialog*," both pro-Russian networks.⁴⁸ Furthermore, Putin has targeted the significant Russian-born German population (Figure 4) to strengthen the power and influence of anti-NATO and anti-EU political parties, such as the German far right "*Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany)*" and the far left "*Die LINKE (The LEFT)*."⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Polyakova, Atlantic Council of the United States., and Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, 12.

⁴⁵ "Pomerantsev and Weiss - How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture an.Pdf," accessed August 28, 2017, http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Menace_of_Unreality_Final.pdf.

⁴⁶ Meister, "The 'Lisa Case': Germany as a Target of Russian Disinformation."

⁴⁷ Meister, 2.

⁴⁸ Polyakova, Atlantic Council of the United States., and Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, "The Kremlin's Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom," 13.


⁴⁹ Henry Meyer, "Putin Has a Really Big Trojan Horse in Germany," *Bloomberg.Com*, May 2, 2017. And Meister, "The 'Lisa Case': Germany as a Target of Russian Disinformation," 2–3.

Geographical Distribution of Russian Germans in Germany

2.4 million Russians of German origin emigrated to Germany between 1950-2010

Percentage of the 2.4 million
Russian Germans in each region

0% 25%



Source: Museum of Russian-German Cultural History, Detmold

Bloomberg

Figure 4. Geographical distribution of Russian Germans in Germany (1950–2010).⁵⁰

Putin's information operations are nothing new, but use modern means for old Russian political procedures, such as "*kompromat*." The Russian word *kompromat* has no direct English translations, it rather has the meaning of compromising a political opponent by denouncing, exposing, gathering, or even fabricating harmful information, documents, pictures, or revelations.⁵¹ Seen in an international sphere, Putin seems to simply follow old Russian traditions of power politics in a modern world.

In a broader sense, this is not only a challenge for Germany, but for the EU and NATO as a whole. Putin is threatening the Western countries' liberal order, their values,

⁵⁰ Meyer, "Putin Has a Really Big Trojan Horse in Germany," 7.

⁵¹ Alena V. Ledeneva, *How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business*, 1 edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 58ff.

the alliance's virtues of openness, plurality, and dialogue by turning them into vulnerabilities and exploiting them.⁵² The threat for all Western countries remains current as the Kremlin's action can be seen as an "unvirtuous circle...[that] can either begin with Russian political or economic penetration and from there expand and evolve, in some instances leading to 'state capture'."⁵³ The Crimean crisis is a perfect example of the actuality and significance of the Russian information operations threat to the EU and, in particular, Germany. How and in what way Germany can deal with this threat and what kind of practical improvements are necessary to gain a future resilience will be pointed out in the following.

B. RESILIENCE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TODAY

Resilience against information operations is not only one of NATO's primary aims, but also a highly important task for each single Western country.⁵⁴ Especially for Germany, the importance of resilience has a specific significance in the concept of the citizen. Anti-democratic movements and a development against democratic norms and values pose a threat to this core element of German society and civil-military relations in addition. This thought will be picked up again in the final chapter in order to present a practical approach to develop this kind of resilience in further detail.

The concept of resilience is used in many different fields, such as ecology, social sciences, and engineering, but relates always to the Latin word "resilire," which means "to spring back" or "to rebound."⁵⁵ In a general way, this term describes the ability to resist or surpass negative outer influences and circumstances;⁵⁶ circumstances, such as Russian information operations, aiming for a directed destabilization of political opponents, either

⁵² "Strange Bedfellows: Putin and Europe's Far Right," *World Affairs Journal*, accessed August 28, 2017, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/strange-bedfellows-putin-and-europe%E2%80%99s-far-right>.

⁵³ "Conley et Al. - 2016 - The Kremlin Playbook Understanding Russian Influe.Pdf," 12, accessed August 28, 2017, http://www.csd.bg/fileadmin/user_upload/160928_Conley_KremlinPlaybook_Web.pdf.

⁵⁴ Shea, "Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence."

⁵⁵ "Resilience | Define Resilience at Dictionary.Com," accessed September 5, 2017, <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resilience>.

⁵⁶ Hanisch, "What Is Resilience? Ambiguities of a Key Term," 1–2.

like single Western countries like Germany or the whole organization of NATO. Consequently, it is of vital interest for both single Western countries and NATO as an organization to build and strengthen their ability to resist—to show resilience—against the hybrid threats of Russian information operations in order to protect their own system and their ability to act.

The example of Finland shows that resilience against Russian information operations is not only possible, but also has been done for many years.⁵⁷ NATO can only act as an organization in its own structures and is dependent on the growing resilience of its single member countries like Germany. Therefore, every single NATO member country has to develop an essential strategy to face the threat of Russian information operations by the means of a strong resilience.

1. Exempla Gratia: Finland

Finland's successful strategy of resilience can serve as an efficient object lesson for every Western country. The political scientist and associate editor of the magazine *Foreign Policy* (online version) Reid Standish shows in one of his articles how Finland was and still is able to resist Russian information operations and build up its own concept of resilience.⁵⁸ Finland maintains a lively heritage of the citizen in uniform and the memory of the military resistance to Soviet aggression in 1939 is a key part of the self-image of the Finnish armed forces, to say nothing of service at arms against the Russians over a significant part of national history. The ideal of total defense, the dominant concept of national security in Scandinavia, celebrates citizenship on a model of armed neutrality and the role of each citizen as an irregular soldier to defy an occupier.

Like many other countries, Finland has been attacked by Russian information operations since Moscow's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Standish describes the means of Russian information operations not only as Russian-based fake news and conspiracy theories, but also as the Russian attempt to focus the media on actually

⁵⁷ Reid Standish, "Why Is Finland Able to Fend Off Putin's Information War?," *Foreign Policy*, March 1, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/01/why-is-finland-able-to-fend-off-putins-information-war/>.

⁵⁸ Standish.

existing problems and difficulties that Finland has. It becomes clear that building up a strong concept of resilience is the responsibility of every single country, first and foremost.⁵⁹ Finland's example, which Standish describes, is quite useful, because it seems to be transferable to every other Western country as well.

The most convincing aspect of Standish's article relates to a statement by Jed Williams, director of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Center for Global Engagement at Harvard, who argues: "The best way to respond is less by correcting the information, and more about having your own positive narrative and sticking to it."⁶⁰ Hired by the Finnish government, Williams helped the Finns develop a "public diplomacy program," which started to face the Russian information operations threat in two steps, Standish summarizes. According to Standish, the first step is officially acknowledging the threat as a fact, followed by the second step of establishing a strong education system that leads to an understanding and recognition of Russian information operations by the critical thinking skills (that is to say, the virtues of citizenship) of, in this example, the Finnish population.

To sum it up, both steps seem to be of vital importance, the official acknowledgement of the threat by the government and the following specific education of the population in order to build up resilience (i.e., the enabling of the population to resist Russian information operations). Main aspects and core elements of Finland's solution can be adapted for Germany and be included in already existing own concepts in the end. Especially the aspect of education and political responsibility as features also of *Innere Führung* will be discussed in the last chapter of this thesis.

Therefore, the example of Finland shows how adopting the Finnish concept of resilience in security and citizenship could work for other Western countries, such as the Germany as a target of Russian subterfuge. Even though it is not necessary to adopt the full Finnish concept one-to-one, core elements that proved successful in practice can be a valuable factor to borrow. Furthermore, a concept of resilience is not only necessary for every country that Russia attacks with hybrid means, but is also feasible, with manageable

⁵⁹ Also see: Shea, "Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence," 3.

⁶⁰ Standish, "Why Is Finland Able to Fend Off Putin's Information War?," 1.

efforts of time and money. Germany started to focus on the Russian threat after officially acknowledging it in the Lisa case, and learned its lesson by building up a better education of the population, based on a strong German media network, as well as a stable democratic party environment.⁶¹ It is still not realistic to analyze this as well-established or perfect resilience, such as in the example of Finland. But it shows developments in the right direction and as well the necessity as the possibility for the Western countries to resist Russian information operations in general.

2. Examination: Psychology of Information Operations

After the significance of a strong resilience, especially under current political circumstances, has been previously discussed, it is important to understand how and why negative influences can have an impact on the individual at all. Only when the source of individual vulnerability and the reason for it can be pointed out, a solution in form of individual resilience can successfully be created. How to influence people's opinions and their attitudes as a consequence is one aspect of social psychology. Although, this excursus does not attempt to discuss every possible psychological aspect of Russian information operation's effects in detail, it can show and analyze aspects of the psychological field of "persuasion"⁶² generally. Persuasion does not automatically mean manipulation, but is rather an objective term with a very broad definition, which gets its positive or negative direction by the user, or better, influencer and the way persuasion is used.⁶³ Defining persuasion is, generally speaking, a difficult task, because there is no such thing as an absolute, sharp-edged distinction between those actions that could be described as persuasion and those which could not;⁶⁴ or even where positive aspects start and maleficent

⁶¹ "Russian Hackers Can't Beat German Democracy," *Foreign Policy* (blog), n.d., <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/03/russian-hackers-cant-beat-german-democracy-putin-merkel/>.

⁶² Def.: "the process by which a person's attitudes or behavior are, without duress, influenced by communications from other people":

"Persuasion | Psychology | Britannica.Com," accessed September 5, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/persuasion-psychology>.

⁶³ Nick Kolenda, *Methods of Persuasion: How to Use Psychology to Influence Human Behavior* (Kolenda Entertainment, LLC, 2013), 2–3.

⁶⁴ Daniel J. O'Keefe, *Persuasion: Theory and Research*, 2nd edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2002), 1–2.

aspects of persuasion, such as lying or deception by manipulation, end. Nevertheless, a common definition of persuasion, by Herbert Simons, describes the term broadly as “human communication designed to influence others by modifying their beliefs, values, or attitudes.”⁶⁵

Influencing people’s opinions and gaining their support is one of the main means to influence foreign policy.⁶⁶ As the example of Germany’s Lisa case has already shown, the emotional impact of Russian information operations can have a big influence on people’s behavior and beliefs, even more than real physical or financial injury.⁶⁷ Especially, persuasive language,⁶⁸ as well as focusing people’s fears via repetitive rhetoric⁶⁹ by Russian officials against European governments, demonstrates how Russia uses propaganda methods to create an enemy-picture,⁷⁰ exploiting the tactics of persuasion in the worst way. The Kremlin has utilized such persuasive tactics, making them a maleficent means of manipulation, in order to weaken peoples’ trust in their government. Again, this is not a new idea, but the simple use of psychology, as Harvard University professor Roger Brown’s “Flashbulb Memory Theory” of the late 1970s shows by highlighting the importance of peoples’ emotions to create vivid memories of a highly emotional situation’s circumstances and feelings, but few actual facts concerning the outcome of the situation in the end.⁷¹ Following this academic approach, the outcome of

⁶⁵ *Persuasion: Understanding, Practice and Analysis (Addison-Wesley Series in Speech Communication)* by Simons Herbert W. (1976-12-01) Hardcover, n.d., 21.

⁶⁶ Yoel Cohen, *MEDIA DIPLOMACY: The Foreign Office in the Mass Communications Age*. (London, Great Britain: FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED, 1986), 83.

⁶⁷ Yvonne de Kort et al., eds., *Persuasive Technology: Second International Conference on Persuasive Technology, PERSUASIVE 2007, Palo Alto, CA, USA, April 26-27, 2007. ... Papers*, 2007 edition (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 50–51.

⁶⁸ Charles K. West, *The Social and Psychological Distortion of Information* (Chicago: Burnham Inc Pub, 1981), 72–73.

⁶⁹ Ruth Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 1 edition (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015), 130.

⁷⁰ Also see: John Abromeit et al., eds., *Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas: History and Recent Tendencies* (London Oxford New York New Delhi Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), xiv–xv.

⁷¹ Stephen Worchel and Wayne Shebilske, *Psychology: Principles and Applications*, Subsequent (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Pearson, 1995), 203.

And

the Lisa case in Germany is not so important in people's memories as a consequence of this; people's behavior and beliefs, like the first emotional impression of the violent rape of a young girl and the failure of the German government to protect her stayed primary, even though this was proven wrong and a Russian information operation in the end.

The impact of Russian information operations on people's beliefs and trust can lead to a long-term change in their values and behavior. The principle of the "Social Identity Theory" makes clear that—even out of those influenced memories and persuasive beliefs—new social identities as an individual's self-conception, being a member of a group or society, can change fundamentally.⁷² This can lead to a mistrust of one's own government, based on the manipulation of Russian information operations through persuasive tactics, which weaken people's support for the government and strengthen anti-governmental parties or movements as an outcome. The German examples of the Russian-supported far right party "*Alternative für Deutschland*" (Alternative for Germany) and the far left party "*Die LINKE*" (The LEFT) perfectly serve as a proof for such a development.

"In real life, as well as in experiments, people can come to believe things that never really happened," concludes the distinguished professor of psychology Elizabeth Loftus in her long-term memory studies.⁷³ This is a perfect core statement referring to the aim of Russian information operations as well. As it is not necessary to find and show facts to convince or persuade somebody—provided morality or ethics do not matter—the manipulation of significant parts of a country's population is not only possible but done daily in foreign policy in the Kremlin's hybrid war.

This vulnerability to negative influences, including a possible change of beliefs and attitude toward the own government or even democratic norms, can develop a real threat for a country like Germany. A development toward a lack of trust regarding German democratic norms, democratic core values, or a citizenship that is rooted in these basic

Susan Nolen-Hoeksema et al., *Atkinson & Hilgard's Introduction to Psychology*, 15 edition (Andover: Wadsworth Pub Co, 2009), 291–93.

⁷² Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 2–3.

⁷³ Elizabeth F. Loftus, *Eyewitness Testimony*, 2 New edition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), 62.

assumptions, can cause an issue of destabilization, especially for the military and in civil-military relations. Developing and maintaining a strong resilience over these negative factors and persuasive influences (e.g., Russian information operations), must, therefore, be a major aim as an outcome. Consequently, the following last chapter of the thesis focuses on a practical approach to provide a way to develop, improve, and maintain democratic norms, resilience, and strong civil-military relations in the *Bundeswehr* and in Germany via the EDEN-Principle.

C. CONCLUSION

Russian information operations are not only a challenge for Germany but also for the EU's and NATO's peace and security. This chapter revealed the significant responsibilities of every single NATO member country, especially Germany, in order to develop its own resilience and to strengthen the alliance, as well as to build the ability to face this threat of information operations. The research also uncovered the fact that Russia is not inventing or even using new methods, tactics, or techniques, but is recycling old Russian political traditions, such as *kompromat*. Russia also uses simple theories of social psychology in practical adaptation, propaganda, and simplified persuasion to manipulate foreign public opinion. Understanding and acknowledging these means is the first step on the path of successful future improvement and of increasing the own resilience. Germany has to develop, maintain and improve the practical aspects of its resilience in future. Predicting possible further developments of hybrid war will remain a challenge to react to and protect against Russian information operations. NATO in general and the Western countries specifically must develop their resilient abilities perpetually. A strong German resilience will not only strengthen the *Bundeswehr* and German society from within, but it will also provide a significant factor of stability for the EU and NATO in the end.

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IV. THE EDEN-PRINCIPLE: INNERE FÜHRUNG IN PRACTICE

I cannot teach anybody anything. I can only make them think.

—Greek Philosopher Socrates (470–399 BC)

A solid and strong self-perception of citizenship and the soldier with roots in democratic values leads to an equally strong and stable level of resilience against insidious threats of all kinds to morale and operational effectiveness. The German Armed Force’s principle of leadership, *Innere Führung*, provides an ideal and practice of a democratically-based military, humanistic focused core values, and strong democratic civil-military relations.⁷⁴ Yet, the practical implementation of this principle in the life of the soldier and in the affairs of government faces the challenge of chronic misunderstandings by those who falsely claim that effective constitutions, rule of law, command and obedience based on checks and balances and a role for parliament in peace and war are, somehow, an abstraction. Today, the internal stability of the German Armed Forces, the *Bundeswehr*, may well be in decline or not, as the ethos of the soldier is changing and the gap between the military and society seems to have widened since the end of conscription in the year 2011. Hybrid attacks and extremist terrorism as well as geopolitical upheaval aim to destabilize Germany—and other European countries—including the armed forces. And yet, NATO missions with participation of the *Bundeswehr*, like the current “Enhanced Forward Present (EFP)” mission in the front state NATO allies on the Russian border, are still as unpopular in German society as the ISAF mission.⁷⁵ The discrepancy between actual reality and perceived threats becomes clear in reference to German society yet again. This chapter focuses on how democratic self-perception—or ethos—can be achieved and maintained and in what way German politics, society, and the *Bundeswehr* can work

⁷⁴ Armed Forces Staff Branch Fü S I 4, “Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1. Innere Führung (Leadership Development and Civic Education).”

⁷⁵ Heiko Biehl, Chariklia Rothbart, and Markus Steinbrecher, “Cold War Revisited? Die deutsche Bevölkerung und die Renaissance der Bündnisverteidigung [German Society and the Renaissance of collective Defense],” in *Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2017* [yearbook *Innere Führung 2017*] (Miles-Verlag, 2017), 137–51.

against a possibly increasing gap in civil-military relations that enables the opponents of the basic constitutional order in the FRG to advance their aggressive goals.

First, this chapter points out the role of the German Armed Forces in a democratic society and the impact that armed forces can have in a negative or positive way. In the second part, the “EDEN-Principle”⁷⁶ will be explained as possible means to strengthen Germany’s resilience from within the Armed Forces. In a four-step-approach, the principle explains the core elements of a successful implementation of *Innere Führung* in practice. Finally, this chapter attempts to transform the theoretical approach into a selection of practical improvements in the field of the *Bundeswehr*, German society, and German politics.

A. THE ARMED FORCES AS A CORE FACTOR OF STABILITY

Obedience and disobedience are a significant factor when it comes to the evaluation of armed forces in a democracy. In the case of the *Bundeswehr*, the historical background of perverted command and obedience under national socialism in the *Wehrmacht* comes to mind. Not only was this blind obedience a core element of the totalitarian Nazi system; it was also the crucial factor hindering any democratic development or humanitarian values. Actually, the totalitarian, anti-democratic rise of Nazi Germany led to the “vanguard of Nazism—an alliance whose appalling results have cast a shadow over Germany’s military tradition that reaches to the present.”⁷⁷ The negative impact that the failure of the armed forces can have on a country, therefore, becomes perfectly clear in the German case.

Although the armed forces can be a foundation element of totalitarian or anti-democratic systems, they can also be crucial to defend democracy or help to transform a country into a democracy.⁷⁸ Especially after World War II, West Germany had to face the

⁷⁶ Note: The EDEN-Principle will be explained in further detail. The abbreviation stands for E (=Education), D (=Democracy), E (=Ethos), and N (=Norms), also see figure 5.

⁷⁷ Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), 16.

⁷⁸ Gerhard Kümmel, “The Winds of Change: The Transition from Armed Forces for Peace to New Missions for the Bundeswehr and Its Impact on Civil–military Relations,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 2 (June 1, 2003): 7, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390412331302955>.

challenges of a transformation into a successful democracy, while East Germany was accorded a new form of totalitarianism on the Soviet model. Overcoming the former perception of blind obedience as a military virtue was one of the challenges for the new *Bundeswehr* developed after 1955. While the establishment of West-German Armed Forces was immediately a subject of intense controversy in the young West Germany, the “ideal of the *Staatsbürger in Uniform* (citizen in uniform) became the catch phrase of reform and a subject of much controversy and misunderstanding.”⁷⁹ This core element of the *Innere Führung*, the soldier who is not only a citizen but also part of civil society, raised the value of the individual and the importance of strong and healthy civil-military relations in a democracy from the beginning.⁸⁰ In fact, it was a difficult-to-understand process for those skeptical about any soldiers at all or among those who still thought the *Wehrmacht* to have been a pretty good army, with no faults at all. This skepticism was even stronger in a West-German society that did not want to establish anything related to the military or armed forces ever again.⁸¹ The latter attitude became perhaps the chief lesson of the war in the self-image of West Germany and United Germany.

Distinguishing between aspects of moral—right or wrong—and the necessity to disobey in extreme situations of command and combat is a very complex and multilayered task which is every more alien to those with no military experience. Borrowing a metaphor from the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen, a guide dog for blind people faces its most difficult task when trained to disobey.⁸² Even if this metaphor pictures the complex task of learning to decide whether it is the situation to obey or disobey for a dog—based on a right-or-wrong spectrum—the complexity is the same for human beings, just at a higher level of evaluation and decision process.

Morality, experience, and ethics cannot be easily learned or taught. Especially for military personnel, the variety of different and complex situations to make a decision

⁷⁹ Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 81.

⁸⁰ Frank Nägler, *Der Gewollte Soldat Und Sein Wandel [the desired soldier and his change]* (München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2010), 60–61.

⁸¹ Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 3-4, 12f.

⁸² Roger Cohen, “Opinion | In Trump World, the Need for Disobedience,” *The New York Times*, sec. Opinion, accessed April 6, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/opinion/trump-disobedience.html>.

between ethically right or wrong (e.g., in a mission abroad), can be overwhelming. The regulation *Innere Führung* gives a variety of well-developed and universal principles but does not give many direct instructions for their practical implementation. A strong self-perception and roots in a democratic society are as important for the German soldier as is the understanding of ethical norms. Because of that, an applicable, as simple as possible, and coherent principle has to be developed in order to help the soldier in implementing the sublime theoretical approach of *Innere Führung* and the resilient ethos of the soldier in practice.

B. THE EDEN-PRINCIPLE

The EDEN-Principle represents an attempt to develop a practice-focused approach that promotes an appropriate self-perception, based on democratic values of citizenship, and that is adaptable for all military levels, society, and political needs at the same time. Following the idea of a simple and applicable approach that focuses on main aspects, such as education (E), democratic self-perception (D), a well-balanced and modern ethos of the soldier (E),⁸³ and strong, stable norms (N) as an outcome, the EDEN-Principle leads to an auspicious possibility of a strong future level of resilience for the *Bundeswehr* and German society as a whole (compare figures 5 and 6).

The EDEN-Principle points out a 4-step-approach to develop a resilient and strong self-perception of the German soldier that leads to common democratic norms and shared values as the final outcome. Furthermore, the EDEN-Principle is intended to help military leaders, regular soldiers, German society, and political leaders to understand and maintain the transparent, practically-oriented, and democratic ethos of the soldier. As the *Bundeswehr* mirrors a heterogenic part of German society, the EDEN-Principle is rooted

⁸³ Note: the term „Ethos“ (Ancient Greek: ἦθος, literally: custom, morals, character) is used to characterize a generally strong and positive self-perception as a norm, instead of the term “identity”. The term “identity” has, especially in Germany, a historically-based, negative connotation. Currently, it is strongly related to the radical right “Identitarian Movement” in Europe and, therefore, should be avoided in a democratic context, first and foremost in the *Bundeswehr*.

Also see: “Ethos | Define Ethos at Dictionary.Com,” accessed May 24, 2018, <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ethos>.

And: “How ‘Identitarian’ Politics Is Changing Europe,” *The Economist*, March 28, 2018, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/03/28/how-identitarian-politics-is-changing-europe>.

in the rationale of a very broad pick up point for the single citizen and also a goal-driven outcome of common norms and values in the end. Hereby, the EDEN-Principle can develop democratic norms, maintain them, and also lead toward a common basic understanding and shared values of democratically-based norms. The final outcome of the EDEN-Principle is the practical reflection of the *Innere Führung* through the ethos of the soldier.

The first and most important step of the EDEN-Principle is the establishment of a common, broad, and distinguished education to include the core values of citizenship. Especially, the history of Germany, Europe and the German Armed Forces has to be a main focus of this section. Only understanding and knowing about a country's own history enables a citizen to evaluate and classify historic and current circumstances, draw conclusions from it, and learn for future improvement. The German school system has a well-developed curriculum of history lessons, which also focuses on German history and the Nazi regime in World War II. The perception of the relevancy of history and the interest in it are significantly high among students.⁸⁴

The knowledge about the concentration camp *Auschwitz-Birkenau* is—with above 86 percent—well marked in German society, while only 46 percent of younger students between 14–16 years of age know about it in general.⁸⁵ As a result, the specific knowledge about German history can be evaluated as a declining aspect in the same manner as the individual connection to historic events and the personal dismay of the *Nazi* regime fades away in the perception of especially younger students. Still, the general interest in history is a vital advantage that can be utilized in order to further develop not only a common knowledge but also an understanding of the core values of citizenship, even after school. In the *Bundeswehr*, the key factor of this approach is a profound and comprehensive education in history and politics from the beginning on.⁸⁶

Building on the first element of a well-developed education, the value of the German democracy, especially within the *Bundeswehr* in its early history in the 1950s and

⁸⁴ forsa Politik- und Sozialforschung GmbH, “Forsa Befragung Zum Thema Geschichtsunterricht. 2017 [Forsa Poll on History Lessons. 2017]” (Körber Stiftung, September 5, 2017).

⁸⁵ forsa Politik- und Sozialforschung GmbH, 15.

⁸⁶ Hartmann, *Innere Führung*, 59ff.

1960s, can be pointed out and understood in detail.⁸⁷ In relation to the German democratic development, democracy becomes clearly visible as a significant and valuable achievement when contrasted to the record of government and state in previous epochs. The *Bundeswehr* is part of this development and a vital element of the Federal Republic of Germany. Rooted in the Basic Law and under executive and parliamentary control,⁸⁸ that is, it is not a thing in itself or a state within a state, the *Bundeswehr* embodies German way of democracy and the rule of law versus some cult of warriors and gunmen for hire. If this connection can be explained in a proper way and the value of its role within the Armed Forces is understood, the strengthening factor of pride and belief in the mission and the importance of the *Bundeswehr* as part of German democracy becomes concrete.⁸⁹ A soldier convinced of his own relevance in the everyday and also higher aspects of service, the importance for the German democracy, and the value of the *Bundeswehr* within the German state and society as well as the in the international system, will be more resilient against radical and anti-democratic influences in general. This goal was a core and original one of *Innere Führung* in the 1950s, just as the Prussian reformers wanted a soldier who had rights as well as duties, so that he would serve and fight in an effective manner and not break and run in the thick of battle.

The ethos of the soldier can be progressively built up on the basis of the first two steps. *Innere Führung* envisions this core competency as the element of character or personality formation.⁹⁰ Such an idea is based in Clausewitz, but also in a canon of German military writing of great lineage.⁹¹ The outcome of this positive and democratically-based ethos of the soldier must be the direct focus of the practical approach. Especially in this third step of the EDEN-Principle, an ongoing and permanently reviewed, practically

⁸⁷ Also see: Abenheim and Halladay, *Soldiers, War, Knowledge and Citizenship: German-American Essays on Civil-Military Relations*, 55.

⁸⁸ “Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany” (Deutscher Bundestag, as of: December 2014), Art. 87a.

⁸⁹ Also see: Hartmann, *Innere Führung*, 27–28.

⁹⁰ Armed Forces Staff Branch Fü S I 4, “Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1. Innere Führung (Leadership Development and Civic Education),” 28, no.508.

⁹¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (United States: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012).

oriented training, role plays, or even community events have to be implemented.⁹² Not only the democratic understanding of the role of the *Bundeswehr* in practice is part of this ethos development and maintenance, but also the aspect of civil-military relations and the internal, social stability of the German Armed Forces. A strong bond to the society, or better, the self-perception as an important part of the democratic society, and an ethically-based, wealthy “band of brothers” are vital aspects of a stable, strong and resilient ethos of the soldier in the end.⁹³ This is nothing that would exclude each other. Furthermore, it is the aim to reach both in the perfect outcome of a democratic self-perception; this is the core element of the ethos of the soldier.

Furthermore, in detail the ethos of the soldier is based on an individual self-perception. The attitude toward others depends on the attitude toward oneself. The self-perception therefore influences the evaluation of others and the possibility of a development of common norms. In other words, “how students view themselves influences their views of others.”⁹⁴ First and foremost, not only the individual student but also the individual soldier must develop his personal ethics in order to develop common and shared norms.⁹⁵ The deeper self-perception of being a part of the society, without a special role in it, and the understanding of a leadership principle of leading through conviction and trust, not just simple orders, must be the aim for an individual ethos at first.⁹⁶ The fact that the soldier in German society—and the *Bundeswehr* in general—is highly valued, can help in this process.

⁹² Note: see chapter 3.1 for practical details and further recommendations.

⁹³ H. Karst, *Das Bild Des Soldaten: Versuch Eines Umrisses [the Picture of the Soldier: A Sketch]* (Harald Boldt, 1969), 349.

⁹⁴ Mary F. Howard-Hamilton, Vasti Torres, and Diane L. Cooper, *Identity Development of Diverse Populations: Implications for Teaching and Administration in Higher Education: ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report*, 1 edition (Jossey-Bass, 2003), 29(6).

paraphrased in: Kathy L. Guthrie et al., *Cultivating Leader Identity and Capacity in Students from Diverse Backgrounds: ASHE Higher Education Report*, 39:4, 1 edition (Jossey-Bass, 2013), 90.

⁹⁵ Christian Walther, *Im Auftrag Für Freiheit Und Frieden. Versuch Einer Ethik Für Soldaten Der Bundeswehr [On Behalf of Freedom and Peace. An Attempt of Ethics for Soldiers of the Bundeswehr]* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2006), 52f.

⁹⁶ Walther, 68ff.

Against the common perception that most German citizens do not hold the *Bundeswehr* in high regard, the “Center for Military History and Social Science in the *Bundeswehr*” (*Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften in der Bundeswehr*) proved that, in contrast to the late cold war epoch, 80 percent of German society has a very positive attitude toward the *Bundeswehr* and think that the Armed Forces are important for Germany.⁹⁷ However, since 2011 and the end of conscription, the German people’s trust in the *Bundeswehr* has declined from 53 to 45 percent, which is the lowest level since the end of the draft.⁹⁸ Public confidence in the operational capability of the *Bundeswehr* is significantly poor at 20–30 percent.⁹⁹ This fact means that parts of German society values the *Bundeswehr* with its soldiers very well and considers them important, but has a lack of confidence when it comes to operational readiness and a general trust in the ability to fulfill the mission of the Armed Forces. This differentiation embodies a vital aspect for the individual to understand the role of the *Bundeswehr* as part of German society and the civilian appreciation that is not necessarily connected to politically ordered missions or structural and internal weaknesses in general.¹⁰⁰

As a final outcome, shared norms can be drawn from the progressively repeated and developed first three steps. The knowledge about the country’s own history and especially Germany’s democratic development, the understanding of the *Bundeswehr*’s own important role as part of the democratic society, and the practically implemented and permanently maintained development of the ethos of the soldier will lead to persistent, stable, democratically-based norms for every individual in German society, civilian or military. Such ethical norms can not only provide a stable level of resilience despite

⁹⁷ Steinbrecher, Biehl, and Rothbart, “Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2017 [security- and defense-policy poll in the Federal Republic of Germany. 2017],” 37ff: Abb.6.2 u. 6.3.

⁹⁸ Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, “SICHERHEITSREPORT 2018. Ergebnisse Einer Repräsentativen Bevölkerungsumfrage [Security Report 2018. Results of a Representative Population Survey]” (Allensbach, 2018), 14.

⁹⁹ Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 13.

Note: the discrepancy/range in the percentage is related to a differentiation between Eastern Germany (30%) and Western Germany (20%).

¹⁰⁰ Heiko Biehl in: Hartmann, Rosen, and Walther, *Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2012 [yearbook Innere Führung 2012]*, 61.

challenges such as missions abroad, internal structural changes, or negative, radical influences, but they can also prove vital for a strong basis of resilience in the end.¹⁰¹

All the steps of the EDEN-Principle are interconnected and permanently revisited in a repeatedly evaluated process. Especially, steps 1 and 2 (E-D) as well as steps 3 and 4 (E-N) have a high proportion of overlapping elements and interconnect with each other (see Figure 5). This flexible and actively developing character is a strong aspect of the EDEN-Principle. It is not a static construct but rather an adaptable and modern approach that has roots in core values and shared norms of democracy.




Figure 5. The EDEN-Principle: A 4-step approach.

¹⁰¹ Hartmann, *Innere Führung*, 25f.

C. RESILIENCE THROUGH A STRONG SELF-PERCEPTION AND AN ADVANCED PRACTICAL APPROACH

By developing the ethos of the soldier and maintaining the practical outcome of *Innere Führung*, the EDEN-Principle can produce the positive and desired side effect of a strong level of resilience. A strong level of resilience against a variety of negative, anti-democratic influences, such as Russian information operations, radical political parties, extremist movements, or terrorism is a vital factor of a country's defense capability and internal stability.¹⁰² If a radicalization of the armed forces can generally be avoided, e.g., through strong civil-military bonds, a democratic ethos, and ethical core values of citizenship, the resilience against such destructive influences will persist.

The practical adaptation of these core ideas of the EDEN-Principle is an enduring and recurring task for various echelons of command. With every new generation of soldiers, the four-step-approach starts from the beginning. Even though older and experienced soldiers can pass on and share their experiences and the developed norms, i.e., the ethos of the soldier, a permanent process of revision and control will remain necessary in order to ensure the connection to reality and stay up-to-date referring to practical relevance and ongoing missions of the *Bundeswehr*.¹⁰³

The connection between politics, civil society, and the *Bundeswehr*—or civil-military relations—is the focus for an improvement in practice.¹⁰⁴ Those three fields of German society have developed a variety of different stable and well-functioning elements of positive civil-military relations over many years. The following chapter attempts to point out a selection of fields for practical improvement with this principle in mind. (See Figure 6 for a summary overview.) The *Bundeswehr*, German society, and German politics might still need a multitude of theoretically possible enhancements. Nevertheless, the emphasis is on practical possibilities within the EDEN-Principle that can be directly addressed in the following sections.

¹⁰² Jamie Shea, "Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence," NATO Review, 2016.

¹⁰³ Hartmann, *Innere Führung*, 86ff.

¹⁰⁴ Hartmann, 120ff.

1. The Bundeswehr

The *Bundeswehr* enjoys solid political and history education, but the leadership and subordinates have to focus on its practical relevancy of it. Referring to the *Innere Führung*, a broad and innovative, even creative approach can help to include political topics in everyday military life.¹⁰⁵ This means in particular that the relevancy of current political circumstances and situations can be put into the context of history by the military leaders and also in everyday conversation. To do so effectively, they must be well educated. And committed to a task that demands special energy and skill. A further positive aspect of the focus on present-day relevancy is that this kind of conversation is not only limited to the internal life of the *Bundeswehr*, but it can spread out into many spheres of civil-military relations.

In the context of this practical focus, a visit by troops and commands to civilian entities of government, society, education, culture and history can be an additional asset to get into touch with civilian contact points, to share opinions, to benefit from the exchange, and to strengthen the understanding of historical knowledge.¹⁰⁶ Certainly, such visits already take place within the *Bundeswehr*, but a refocusing on the connection between history and topics that are perceived by every citizen today could further improve this already well-developed standard. Not just teaching knowledge but connecting the dots between now and then is the key to an individual experience and a possible change of individual perception. Open discussions (e.g., on specific military history topics), in a museum, a cenotaph, or at memorials, can be a helpful possibility to picture this practical context to the present.

The development and maintenance of tradition is another vital aspect in the field of education and democracy. The revised and 2018 edition of the “German Armed Forces

¹⁰⁵ Hartmann, 61.

¹⁰⁶ Hans-Joachim Reeb, ed., “Politische Bildung in der Sicherheitsgesellschaft. Kritisches oder gemeinsames Verständnis von Bildungsinstitutionen und Bundeswehr? [Political education in the security society. Critical or common understanding of educational institutions and the Bundeswehr?],” in *Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2016 [yearbook Innere Führung 2016]* (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2016), 127f.

Tradition Decree” [*Traditionserlass*”]¹⁰⁷ is a promising step in the direction of a healthy and democratic understanding of the military’s tradition. It does not exclude certain parts of the German history, especially referring to Nazi Germany and the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), but it focusses on developing and creating a tradition worth preserving that is meaningful for the *Bundeswehr* itself. In the context of these fields (i.e., the military and civil resistance against the Nazi Regime and any other anti-democratic elements in German and European history), there are wide and open fields to develop a modern and creative understanding of history and maintain the country’s own democratic tradition.

All history must be generally covered in education and understood in context, but the emphasis rightly should fall on that which can be accepted as worthy of being part of the tradition for democratically-based and modern armed forces like the *Bundeswehr* in general. The “Center for Military History and Social Science in the *Bundeswehr*” (*Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften in der Bundeswehr*) can provide help for military leaders in this approach as well as military schools and museums can do with their personnel. Furthermore, the “*Zentrum Innere Führung*” [Centre for *Innere Führung*] provides a software drive that is accessible for military personnel of all ranks in order to gain information, prepare presentations on political and historical topics, and to find various multimedia material for educational purposes.¹⁰⁸

The step from the educational first two fields of the EDEN-Principle into the last two fields of ethics and norms must focus on the ethos of the soldier, but also on positive civil-military relations in the German democracy. The individual self-perception of the soldier as an important part of German society is vital in the first step toward the ethos of

¹⁰⁷“Die Tradition Der Bundeswehr. Richtlinien Zum Traditionsverständnis Und Zur Traditionspflege (Tradition in the Bundeswehr. Guidelines for Understanding and Maintaining Tradition).”

¹⁰⁸ Note: This software drive can easily be added for every person in the Bundeswehr who possesses a military laptop (or has access to it). A simple email toward the *Zentrum Innere Führung*, asking for the access to this software drive, is the only requirement to get access to all the constantly updated content in German and also partly in English language.

the soldier and a significant factor of attractivity.¹⁰⁹ Overcoming the misperception that the soldier is not valued within German society must be a focus of this approach, despite all the challenges connected with this task. Although there is not yet a drastically growing gap between the *Bundeswehr* and society, the perception of such a gap especially in those who are combat veterans and otherwise is a reality. Therefore, the gap between perception and reality must be overcome by concerned soldier and civilians on a broad axis, as was done in the early years of the FRG and the *Bundeswehr*.

Only an open and regular exchange between the *Bundeswehr* and German society can provide and maintain healthy civil-military relations in the future.¹¹⁰ This kind of dialog must not only be open, but also transparent in order to gain a better understanding and to work against the perceived “*freundliches Desinteresse*” (“friendly lack of interest”)¹¹¹ of German society toward the *Bundeswehr*. This open and transparent dialog, can only be reached when the *Bundeswehr* can give up the current “traffic light policy”¹¹² that leads to a downplaying or even ignorance of mistakes and grievances within the military.¹¹³ Finally, an open dialog on the basis of a transparent military error culture between the *Bundeswehr* and German society can lead to an honest exchange that results in a better mutual understanding and a real self-perception beyond mere beliefs or opinions.

On the basis of a strong, reality-bound, and healthy self-perception of citizenship and soldiering, as had, say, in Switzerland or Finland or in the UK, the ethos of the individual soldier can be further developed by a practically-focused training in order to solidify democratic and ethical values. Not only the exchange with German society in

¹⁰⁹ Heiko Biehl, “Aus den Augen, aus dem Sinn? Überlegungen zur gesellschaftlichen Integration der Bundeswehr nach der Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht [Out of sight, out of mind? Reflections on the social integration of the Bundeswehr after the suspension of compulsory military service],” in *Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2012* [yearbook *Innere Führung 2012*] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2012), 60.

¹¹⁰ Uwe Hartmann, *Der Gute Soldat* [*The good Soldier*] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2018), 157.

¹¹¹ Former German Federal President Horst Köhler in: Hartmann, *Innere Führung*, 134.

¹¹² Note: The colloquially used “Ampelpolitik” [“traffic light policy”] is utilized within the German military to describe the process of reported grievances that turn from “red” [= poor] over “yellow” [=medium level] into “green” [very good] on their way through the several hierarchical levels from bottom to top. That means, the real condition or the real report can be rephrased and watered-down until it loses its actual negative content and finally turns into a positive outcome.

¹¹³ Klaus Beckmann, *Treue.Bürgermut.Ungehorsam.* [*loyalty. civil courage. disobedience*] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2015), 75ff.

community events or in an open dialog is a way to reach this aim, but also a military-focused, mission-based approach can do so. In order to simplify such ethical values and transform them into a generally trainable concept for every individual soldier, a simple test that the soldier can do individually in every situation must be provided.

The KEC-Test—“*Koblenzer Entscheidungs-Check*” (“Koblenz decision-making check”)—exactly provides a form of self-test for the individual soldier that not only helps to find the ethically right solution but also gives some general advice to stay within democratic norms.¹¹⁴ This practice test was developed by Anthony M. Pagano,¹¹⁵ but was adapted and is permanently evaluated and updated by the *Zentrum Innere Führung* (Centre for *Innere Führung*) today. The KEC-Test provides test criteria for individual action and behavior in five single steps. After the question if an action is legitimate, the individual soldier has to answer the question if the action would cause discontent in public opinion. In a third step, the soldier must answer if the action would be ethical and a good narrative for the family afterwards. The fourth step asks the religiously-based question—as a golden rule in general—if the action can be seen as something that one would wish to experience as well.¹¹⁶ The fifth and final question aims for the “*kategorischer Imperativ*” (“categorical imperative”), based on the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, which postulates to act justly under the maxim of action that one would be willing to generalize.¹¹⁷ If the soldier would have to answer “no” to only one of these five questions, the individual outcome and advice would obviously be to find another solution or to avoid the planned action or behavior. The KEC-Test can be seen as a simplified ethical compass for the individual

¹¹⁴ Thomas R. Elßner, “Praxisorientierte Ethikausbildung in Den Deutschen Streitkräften [Practice-Oriented Ethical Education in the Armed Forces],” in *Entscheiden.Führen.Verantworten. Soldatsein Im 21. Jahrhundert [Decide. Lead. Answer. Being a Soldier in the 21. Century]* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2011), 86ff.

¹¹⁵ Anthony Pagano, “Criteria for Ethical Decision Making in Managerial Situations,” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, UIC College of Business Administration research paper, 10, no. 05 (August 1, 1987): 20.

¹¹⁶ Note: „Alles, was Ihr also von anderen erwartet, das tut auch ihnen: Das ist das Gesetz und die Propheten.“ [All those things, then, which you would have men do to you, even so do you to them: because this is the law and the prophets.] (Holy Bible: Mt 7,12).

¹¹⁷ „Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die Du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde.“ [„Only act according to the maxim by which you can at the same time want it to become a universal law.“] Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in: Elßner, “Praxisorientierte Ethikausbildung in Den Deutschen Streitkräften [Practice-Oriented Ethical Education in the Armed Forces],” 89.

soldier. Only permanently repeated training and practice, e.g., on drill grounds and in role plays, can establish a generally desired ethical behavior of every soldier as an outcome. In sum, it can lead to individual ethical certainty for general action and behavior that is rooted in democratic values.

The German soldier should not develop a self-perception of a military superman outside of society but as an important part within it. Here, the EDEN-Principle must constantly be used to work on a democratically-based self-perception and the development of an ethos that roots in the core values of citizenship. Pride and military ethos anchored in constitutional values and discipline at the core of the soldierly profession can and must be a healthy element of this. The establishment of a new “warrior cult” or the Spartan special role above society, a development with a lousy past that is being revived quite widely in this world in the face of terrorism and irregular warfare¹¹⁸ A rejection of society or the denial of the checks and balances of German political structure would be equal to an increasing gap in civil-military relations and, therefore, cannot be the aim of a democratic country in general.¹¹⁹ A soldier needs the pride and the backing of the *Bundeswehr*’s core mission, but it must be rooted in the purpose of defending democracy and serving German society as “a good soldier,” not in standing apart or even above it.¹²⁰ This syndrome that arose in the dynastic order reached its awful climax in the *Wehrmacht* in national socialism or in the *Waffen SS*. The soldier’s mission remains special and will always be thus. This is part of the purpose of a soldier’s duty, including the real possibility of war, combat, the uncertainties and sacrifice of service, which include fighting, and dying.¹²¹ Nevertheless, this part of a soldier’s duty can and may lead to a healthy form of pride in the *Bundeswehr*’s purpose and the individual’s special abilities, but it must not lead to the establishment of an anti-democratic ethos apart from German society. The Franco A. case showed the potential, however slight in the biography of this unfortunate officer, also at a time of

¹¹⁸ Beckmann, *Treue.Bürgermut.Ungehorsam. [loyalty. civil courage. disobedience]*, 57ff, 82ff.

¹¹⁹ Uwe Hartmann, *Der Gute Soldat [The Good Soldier]* (Miles-Verlag, 2018), 160.

¹²⁰ Hartmann, 159.

¹²¹ Hartmann, *Innere Führung*, 173ff.

renationalization in Germany and Europe where militarism is once more a feature of the contemporary political world.

The *Innere Führung* is an important basis for the ethos of the soldier, although it might not be perceived as such by many soldiers. Only half of the German soldiers have a broad knowledge about the regulation *Innere Führung* and just 14.2 percent dealt intensively with it or have deep and detailed knowledge about it.¹²² Nevertheless, especially referring to the associative understanding of ratings,¹²³ common associations and a well-developed understanding of the values of *Innere Führung* can be observed.¹²⁴ *Innere Führung* can, therefore, be evaluated as a quite well-developed standard within the *Bundeswehr*, although these standards are not necessarily related to the regulation *Innere Führung* for every individual in general.

As some soldiers have already lived their military life in the purest values of *Innere Führung*,¹²⁵ it becomes obvious that the mere fact of giving those values a name is incidental. The vital aspect in it, indeed, is the function of the *Innere Führung* to act as the democratic frame of (and the military anchor in) the German Basic Law¹²⁶ and democracy.¹²⁷ The significance of the regulation becomes clear as the basis for democratic values within the *Bundeswehr* when one keeps in mind the continuity of challenges faced by soldiers and government in the facets of service in peace and war as well as the threats this study has attempted to analyze. A positive understanding and perception of the *Innere Führung* and its advantages are necessary for the individual to understand the connection

¹²² Angelika Dörfler-Dierken and Robert Kramer, *Innere Führung in Zahlen. Streitkräftebefragung 2013 [Innere Führung in numbers. Armed Forces poll 2013]* (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2014), 19–20.

¹²³ Note: lowest ranks in the military, esp. US Navy, [German: *Mannschaftsdienstgrade*].

¹²⁴ Dörfler-Dierken and Kramer, *Innere Führung in Zahlen. Streitkräftebefragung 2013 [Innere Führung in numbers. Armed Forces poll 2013]*, 24ff.

¹²⁵ Viktor Toyka, *Dienst in Zeiten des Wandels: Erinnerungen aus 40 Jahren Dienst als Marineoffizier 1966-2006 [Service in the Times of Change: Memories over 40 years of Service as a Navy Officer 1966-2006]*, 1st ed. (S.l.: Miles-Verlag, 2017).

¹²⁶ “Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.”

¹²⁷ Hans-Christian Beck, “Warum benötigt die Bundeswehr eine Führungskultur und ein soldatisches Leitbild? [Why does the Bundeswehr need a leadership culture and a soldier’s role model?],” in *Schützen, Retten, Kämpfen – Dienen für Deutschland [Protect, Rescue, Fight - Serving for Germany]*, 1st ed. (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2016), 31–33.

between *Innere Führung*, the German Basic Law and democratic values as the ethos of the soldier, to say nothing of fighting power in combat.

After the development and the ongoing maintenance of ethical values, the outcome of the EDEN-Principle ideally should foster strong and resilient democratic norms. An individual self-perception within the ethos of the soldier as part of German society is the last step in this practical approach. Although this aim can be reached at some point, a permanent and repeatedly occurring reflection and evaluation must be ensured. The FMO Concept—“*Führungsbegleitung in militärischen Organisationen*” (“leadership mentoring in military organizations”)—is a current German example for such an evaluation process.¹²⁸ Herein, the status quo in the military community can be evaluated, feedback can be provided, and a better outcome in practice can be achieved, based on democratic values and ethical norms of the *Innere Führung*.¹²⁹ This complex multiple-step-process can help to reflect the outcome of the EDEN-Principle on a constantly recurring basis and can ensure a real feedback without any effects of organizational blindness.

2. German Society

The term civil-military relations has many sides. It depends on the collaboration and active exchange between government, society and the armed forces. After the suspension of conscription in 2011, reservists became even more important for this civil-military exchange,¹³⁰ but they cannot compensate for the total number of former conscripts. The lack of exchange and common topics between society and the *Bundeswehr* coincided with an epochal change in German politics and society; that is, the effects of the world depression, the geopolitical upheaval around and in Europe, and the revival of radical right wing politics in a country that had long eschewed this phenomenon. This process opened

¹²⁸ Martin Scherm and Stefan Scherer, “Führungsbegleitung in Den Streitkräften - Konzept Und Wirkung [Leadership Mentoring in the Armed Forces - Concept and Effect],” in *Entscheiden.Führen.Verantworten. Soldatsein Im 21. Jahrhundert [Decide. Lead. Answer. Being a Soldier in the 21. Century]* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2011), 110ff.

¹²⁹ Walter Sauer, “Führungsbegleitung in militärischen Organisationen - Der freiwillige Weg zu höherer Führungskompetenz? [leadership mentoring in military organisations - the voluntary path toward higher leadership competence?],” in *Schützen, Retten, Kämpfen – Dienen für Deutschland [Protect, Rescue, Fight - Serving for Germany]*, 1st ed. (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2016), 165ff.

¹³⁰ Hartmann, *Innere Führung*, 37.

the field for radical influences and the misperception of a growing civil-military gap instead of noticing the actually healthy democratic civil-military relations in practice.¹³¹

Therefore, German society in its variety must also focus on a healthy self-perception and an openness toward political, security-, or military-related topics in order to be aware of the realities of power and the best means to assure peace and security in a time of growing extremes. This active way of participation and discourse in every topic of German politics has to be based on the free will and demand for transparency by German society. The fact of the end or suspension of conscription in Germany may not lead to a public self-perception of a loss of responsibility by the citizen for his or her defense.¹³² Because of this fact, the responsibility for security issues cannot be generally delegated to the *Bundeswehr* alone, but must be understood as a common task for all parts of German state and society. German society must develop a healthy self-perception of the will to defense as a feature of citizenship as part of the security environment. This fact includes the public responsibility for an overall resilience and the acceptance of the society's own role regarding security and defense issues. As a consequence, a participation on and interest in security issues can not only be the task of the *Bundeswehr* or internal German politics, but it must also be a responsibility for all German citizens.¹³³ Paraphrasing the Prussian reformers, in 1964 the former German brigadier-general Heinrich Karst (one of the authors of *Innere Führung* wrote: “*Der Geist der Armee [hängt] zum beachtlichen Teil... von Geist und Verteidigungswillen des Volkes [ab]*” (“The spirit of the army depends to a considerable extent on the spirit and the will to defense of the people”).¹³⁴ In the end, security and defense are an inseparable task for democratic civil-military relations and

¹³¹ “Erwartungen Der Zivilgesellschaft an Eine Militärische Führungsphilosophie Im 21. Jahrhundert [Civil Society's Expectations to a Military Leadership Philosophy in the 21. Century],” in *Entscheiden.Führen.Verantworten. Soldatsein Im 21. Jahrhundert [Decide. Lead. Answer. Being a Soldier in the 21. Century]* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2011), 182f.

¹³² Angelika Dörfler-Dierken, ed., “Innere Führung - Innere Lage [Innere Führung - Inner Situation],” in *Am Puls der Bundeswehr: Militärsoziologie in Deutschland zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik, Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft [at the heart of the Bundeswehr: military sociology in Germany between science, politics, Bundeswehr, and society]*, 1. Aufl. 2016 ed. edition (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2015), 269.

¹³³ Hartmann, *Innere Führung*, 125.

¹³⁴ Karst, *Das Bild Des Soldaten*, 57.

cannot be outsourced to a military elite in a professional army that seals itself off from society, or a society that turns it back on the needs of such soldiers within a democracy.

Especially the media as part of society play an important role in the common perception. Military and security topics are not very popular in Germany, which is also a challenge for the state financed German media coverage. Security policy and defense issues are generally avoided as a “*Igitt-Thema*” (“repulsive topic”), which means that German media, intentionally or unintentionally, have created an unwelcome setting for military content as an outcome.¹³⁵ Improved, transparent, and, as much as possible, objective media coverage must be encouraged in order to achieve an enhanced knowledge flow on military topics and the *Bundeswehr* in general, especially in areas in which the *Bundeswehr* has no obvious military biases.¹³⁶

Finally, a way to improve democratic civil-military relations can be pointed out in the field of opportunities to give insights into the civil sector for soldiers.¹³⁷ This does not have to be just an obligation for German society, but it can be an opportunity to directly focus on regular soldiers who have benefited from military training, education, and leadership experience. After their time of service, the regular soldiers have to find their way back into the job market outside the *Bundeswehr*, and exactly this significant group of veterans can also be attractive for employers in the civil job market. Healthy and well-developed civil-military relations are, therefore, always dependent on the observer’s point of view and can create opportunities apart from a democratic system, a strong level of resilience, and shared norms.

¹³⁵ Christian Thiels, “Krieg Zur Primetime. Führen Im Medienzeitalter [War at Prime Time. Command in the Media Age],” in *Entscheiden - Führen - Verantworten. Soldatsein im 21. Jahrhundert [Decide. Lead. Answer. Being a Soldier in the 21th Century]* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2011), 201.

¹³⁶ Heiko Dr. Biehl, “Bundeswehr im Urteil der Bürger - Das Integrationsgebot der Inneren Führung auf dem Prüfstand [Bundeswehr in the judgment of the citizens - The integration requirement of the Innere Führung on the test bench],” in *Schützen, Retten, Kämpfen – Dienen für Deutschland [Protect, Rescue, Fight - Serving for Germany]*, 1st ed. (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2016), 241ff.

¹³⁷ Biehl, “Aus den Augen, aus dem Sinn? Überlegungen zur gesellschaftlichen Integration der Bundeswehr nach der Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht [Out of sight, out of mind? Reflections on the social integration of the Bundeswehr after the suspension of compulsory military service],” 66f.

3. German Politics

German politics must take open responsibility for the constitutional “*Primat der Politik*” (Primacy of Policy and Politics).¹³⁸ Working together with the military leadership, German politics (i.e., the *Bundestag* [the parliament]), must focus on its leading role and create, as is practically possible, clear guidance and backing for the soldiers entrusted to the parliament.¹³⁹ German politics have a direct responsibility for the *Bundeswehr* and the political decisions for all military action.¹⁴⁰ This constitutional responsibility can only be borne by German politics in a pluralistic and at time confused exchange with the *Bundeswehr* and German society. Not only the development and maintenance of *Innere Führung* must be part of this but also the transparent and open political dialogue on military decisions, political aims, and missions abroad must be faced in a public manner despite the demagoguery of the present and all its confusion.¹⁴¹

It is the task of German politics to avoid the tendency to allow military affairs to degrade to a “Toxic Topic” in order to maintain an objective and wide information distribution for German society. Not only the political rhetoric comes into count for this but also the way in which military topics are covered in public, either subjective or objective. Toxic leadership, the opposite of good leadership, can be destructive for every organization and creates significant issues, especially for the inner military structure of the *Bundeswehr*.¹⁴² By forcing the *Bundeswehr* into becoming a fringe phenomenon for

¹³⁸ Wolfgang Schneiderhahn, “Verantwortung für die Innere Führung in Zeiten der Umbrüche - eine gemeinsame Aufgabe der politischen Leitung und der militärischen Führung [Responsibility for Innere Führung in times of upheaval - a common task of political direction and military leadership],” in *Schützen, Retten, Kämpfen – Dienen für Deutschland [Protect, Rescue, Fight - Serving for Germany]*, 1st ed. (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2016), 267–68.

¹³⁹ Hans-Christian Beck and Christian Singer (Hrsg.), “Die Fragen an Die Konzeption Innere Führung Im 21. Jahrhundert - Gibt Es Antworten? [Questions to the Conception Innere Führung in the 21st Century - Are There Answers?],” in *Entscheiden.Führen.Verantworten. Soldatsein Im 21. Jahrhundert [Decide. Lead. Answer. Being a Soldier in the 21. Century]* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2011), 189–91.

¹⁴⁰ Wolfgang Hellmich, “Die Verantwortung des Parlaments für die Bundeswehr [The parliament’s responsibility for the Bundeswehr],” in *Schützen, Retten, Kämpfen – Dienen für Deutschland [Protect, Rescue, Fight - Serving for Germany]*, 1st ed. (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2016), 249f.

¹⁴¹ Beckmann, *Treue.Bürgermut.Ungehorsam. [loyalty. civil courage. disobedience]*, 47–48.

¹⁴² Reinhold Janke, “Toxic leaders - auch in der Bundeswehr? [Toxic leaders - also in the Bundeswehr?],” in *Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2017 [yearbook Innere Führung 2017]* (Miles-Verlag, 2017), 190ff.

society or part of a “Toxic Topic,” German politics would equal the picture of a toxic leader referring to their political role. The German Minister of Defense, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, focused on the humanistic aspect of altruism in the *Innere Führung* when she stated: “*Wer Menschen führen will, muss Menschen mögen*” (“If you want to lead people, you have to like people”).¹⁴³ This is perfect advice: to take responsibility and care of the entrusted personnel for every single part of German society, especially German politics.

Finally, German politics do not generally have to focus on an increase of financial support for the *Bundeswehr*; the amount of financial support, however, must be better addressed to the political will and strategic aims. The operational and personnel capability of the *Bundeswehr* is vital for the very survival and the military value of German politics, but since the advent of the peace dividend and national unity a quarter century ago, defense affairs and resources have been constrained to the breaking point.¹⁴⁴ The German Parliamentary Commissioner of the Armed Forces, Hans-Peter Bartels, recently confirmed in an official statement that he considers the *Bundeswehr* “*derzeit nicht einsetzbar*” (“currently not usable”).¹⁴⁵ In this context, a gap between the political will or aims and the will to invest the necessary money to achieve those aims becomes visible. That means that a possible discrepancy between the political will—and also international responsibility—to take part in a variety of missions abroad must be covered by the appropriate financial support in order to maintain military material, ensure supplies and endurance, and take care of the personnel.

¹⁴³ Ursula Dr. von der Leyen, “Vorwort der Bundesministerin der Verteidigung: Schützen, Retten, Kämpfen - Dienen für Deutschland [Preface by the German Minister of Defence: Protect, Rescue, Fight - Serving for Germany],” in *Schützen, Retten, Kämpfen – Dienen für Deutschland [Protect, Rescue, Fight - Serving for Germany]*, 1st ed. (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2016), 16.

Note: original quote in: Armed Forces Staff Branch Fü S I 4, “Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1. Innere Führung (Leadership Development and Civic Education),” 607.

¹⁴⁴ Hellmich, “Die Verantwortung des Parlaments für die Bundeswehr [The parliament’s responsibility for the Bundeswehr],” 256.

¹⁴⁵ WELT, “Anhaltende Pannen.”

The EDEN-Principle

Bundeswehr	German Society	German Politics
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on Practice (political/history ducation) • Focus on civ-mil Relations (open and transparent Dialog) • Focus on a reality-based Self-Perception within Society • no special Role out of/apart from Society but a special Part within it • healthy Ethos of the Soldier • Training and Practice through KEC-Test • Norm Evaluation through FMO Concept 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Openness toward political and security/military Topics or Issues • Focus on civ-mil Relations (open and transparent Dialog; Opportunity Job Market) as Part of German Democracy • Focus on a reality-based Self-Perception as Part of the Security Responsibility • transparent and objective Media Coverage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsibility within the "Primat der Politik" ("Primacy of Politics") • Avoidance of creating a "Toxic Topic" or the Bundeswehr as a fringe Phenomenon within German Society • open and transparent Communication and Distribution of military Topics and Issues • Financial Support related to the political Will

Figure 6. The EDEN-Principle—A practical approach for the *Bundeswehr*, German society, and German politics.

D. CONCLUSION

The EDEN-Principle is a chance to transform the *Innere Führung* into practice and, therefore, strengthen German resilience from within the *Bundeswehr*. Although the focus of this principle is obviously on the German Armed Forces, a positive and strengthening influence on German society becomes clearly visible for future development. In real practice, the differences between the military and society can be shown less than in the self-perception of individuals. Therefore, the focus must be on a change of individual self-perception in order to create the ethos of the soldier as a strong and resilient reflection of the *Innere Führung* and the value of democratic norms in practice.

The development and maintenance of shared norms of citizenship as an outcome of a democratic *Bundeswehr* within German society constitute the core value of the EDEN-Principle. The perceived growing gap between the *Bundeswehr* and German society can be reduced through a change of perception and knowledge of facts instead of mere emotions, misperceptions, or beliefs. Especially, the aspects of the EDEN-Principle that focus on stronger civil-military relations and better communication among the three fields of politics, *Bundeswehr*, and society can lead to a stable democratic self-perception and a reliable level of resilience in the end.

The nature of the EDEN-Principle reflects a permanent and ongoing process of revision and self-evaluation in order to stay focused on current realities instead of sticking to knowledge or perceptions that are already overcome. In this way, a strong level of resilience can be maintained over the generations through shared norms of democratically based civil-military relations as well as the values of a democratic Germany in general. The EDEN-Principle provides a simple and practice-focused way to implement the *Innere Führung*, develop and maintain democratic norms and, therefore, create an overall resilience for German society as a whole.

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V. CONCLUSION

Since the Russian decision to redraw the map of Europe as part of a general onset of a new era of geopolitics, the fate of the German military in the practice of German government and European security has reemerged as a theme in the headlines of the years 2016–2018. The morale and discipline of army is always as central to its mission as are its weapons and equipment. This thesis has chosen to analyze the imponderables of command, morale, discipline and constitutions when seen through the lens of the battle field. These battlefields are many and one does not match the other. The result of these issues and factors leads to the topic of this thesis, an analysis of means and principles to enliven the command practice of the German military in the wake of two decades of deployment far from home, the impact of terror and irregular warfare, and now the prospect of large scale aggression or highly aggressive subterfuge and coercion to overturn the post 1990 order. These factors lead to a term in German that cannot be translated into English, but which stands at the center of where all these issues meet. That is, the idea and practice of *Innere Führung*.

The first chapter of this thesis had shown that the ongoing debate on *Innere Führung* is a reflection of the search for a role model and still a factor of insecurity in German self-perception of citizenship. A variety of factors, such as the mass migration toward Europe, lead to additional internal factors of instability for Germany and its society. Therefore, the current level of vulnerability could initially be pointed out for German society in this thesis

The second chapter focused on external threats and destabilizing factors, such as hybrid threats and Russian information operations. The thesis had shown the importance of a development of a strong level of resilience and explained the psychological elements that stand behind the attempts of persuasion. As an outcome, the threat that NATO and the EU are currently facing highly affects Germany in an internal level as well. The *Bundeswehr* as a significant part of Germany has to build up and maintain a strong level of resilience in consequence.

In order to reach this aim, the final chapter presented the newly invented EDEN-Principle as a way out of this dilemma. In order to simplify the already existing *Innere Führung* and its principle of the citizen in uniform as a role model, the EDEN-Principle focuses on the development and maintenance of the ethos of the soldier—based on democratic norms of citizenship— to ensure a strong level of resilience. In addition to a mere theory, the EDEN-Principle focuses on a practical implementation of these values, not only in the field of German military but also for German society and German politics.

Finally, *Innere Führung* as a role model—including the citizen in uniform—is still a valuable and important factor to develop and maintain strong civil-military relations that can persist negative external influences through a strong level of resilience. Nevertheless, a practical improvement has proven as necessary in this thesis. Not only German society in general but also the *Bundeswehr* in specific have to face current external challenges of hybrid threats, especially Russian information operations, and internal social aspects of migration that can lead to a utilization of perceived fears and sorrows to develop radical political influences on a domestic level. Pointing out, analyzing, and understanding those influences and the own vulnerabilities opened the door for future improvement.

The EDEN-Principle can provide a way of practical transformation of the *Innere Führung* to implement core values of citizenship as an outcome. Although the necessity for improvement in mostly practical aspects became obvious in this thesis, simple adaptations can lead to a promising and strong result of citizenship in the end. The EDEN-Principle serves as a simplified role model for the practical implementation of *Innere Führung*.

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