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THESIS

**LEARNING FROM U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM
EXPERIENCE IN THE SAHEL: A SPRINGBOARD FOR
THE SAHEL G5 ORGANIZATION**

by

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September 2018

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SAHEL: A SPRINGBOARD FOR THE SAHEL G5 ORGANIZATION**

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ABSTRACT

The thesis aims to assess the United States' antiterrorism strategy in the Sahel to help the Sahel G5 (SG5) organization succeed in its goal of eradicating terrorism. Analyzing the successes and failures of the strategy, including its governance, security, economic development, and educational aspects, confirms the necessity of a comprehensive approach to effectively face the terrorism threat in that region. This thesis addresses critical issues in the framework of the international community to enhance the SG5's chances of success. Even though funding issues are a major concern, strategic cooperation with regional power Algeria will greatly enhance the SG5's chances of success. Furthermore, this thesis recommends working toward improving professional security apparatuses and increasing economic development, education, and literacy rates, factors that could bolster resistance to terrorist groups' recruitment.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

4D	Defeat, Deny, Diminish, and Defend
AFRICOM	Africa Command
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AO	area of operation
AQMI	Al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamic (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb)
AU	African Union
BH	Boko Haram
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRG	Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
ETIA	Echelon Tactique Inter Armes (Combined Tactical Group)
EU	European Union
FAMA	Forces Armees Maliennes (Malian Armed Forces)
FBI	Federal Bureau for Investigation
FC	Force Conjointe (Joint Force)
FIS	Front Islamic du Salut (Islamic Front of Salvation)
FLM	Front de Liberation du Macina (Macina Liberation Front)
G5	Group of Five
GPS	Global Position System
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HQ	headquarters
IDP	internal displaced person
IED	improvised explosive device
IICEM	integrated initiatives for economic growth in Mali
ISGS	Islamic State in Greater Sahara
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training
JF	joint force
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MNLA	Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad (National Movement for Liberation of Azawad)
MUJAO	Mouvement pour l’Unité et le Jihad en Afrique Occidentale (Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa)
NGO	non-government organization
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
PAJE	Projet d’Appui aux Jeunes Entrepreneurs (Support to Youth Entrepreneurs Project)
PIP	priority investment program
PSI	Pan Sahel Initiative
RCP	Regiment des Commandos Parachutists (Airborne Battalion)
RISE	resilience in the Sahel enhanced
SF	special forces
SG5	Sahel Group of Five
SG5JF	Sahel Group of Five Joint Force
SG5PC	Sahel Group of Five Police Component
TSCP	Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership
TSCTP	Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
US-SF	United States Special Forces
WB	World Bank

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I. INTRODUCTION

The intensity of how a group perceives its adversary and the strategies that it believes are required to redress the grievances against it, will affect the types of tactics and weaponry it will employ in the warfare against its stronger adversary.

—Dr. Joshua Sinai,¹
author and scholar on terrorism

The Sahel Group of Five (G5) is a regional organization created on February 17, 2014, by five Sahelian countries (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad).² This organization aims to fight terrorism by means of both economic development and military/security policies.³ Even though these countries are some of the economically poorest in the world, they decided to put together their meager resources to face their most urgent threats.⁴ Having understood that it is a matter of the states' survival, and individuals and communities' freedom, the Sahel G5 countries started to collectively plan strong actions against the terrorism phenomenon. Additionally, each one of the countries faces internal political challenges as well as social instability. In order to achieve its goal, the Sahel G5 organization has created a Joint Force of 5,000 soldiers.⁵ On September 9, 2017, the Malian Head of State Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, presiding over the organization at that time, inaugurated the Joint Force Headquarters in Sevare (Mali).⁶

¹ Joshua Sinai, "A Conceptual Framework for Resolving Terrorism's Root Causes," in *Root Causes of Terrorism*, ed. T. Bjørge. (London: Routledge, 2005), p217

² "Convention Portant Creation du G5 Sahel," [Sahel G5 Convention], Sahel G5, accessed December 10, 2017, <http://www.g5sahel.org/images/convention.pdf>.

³ Ibid., Title II, Art. 4 and 5.

⁴ United Nation Development Program, *Human Development Report* (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2016), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf.

⁵ Nathalie Guibert, "La Force du G5 Sahel se met Progressivement en Place," [The G5 Sahel Force is gradually taking place] *Le Monde Afrique*, September 11, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/09/11/la-force-du-g5-sahel-se-met-progressivement-en-place_5183870_3212.html.

⁶ Ibid.

In addition to the security response, the Sahel G5 organization launched the “Alliance pour le Sahel.” According to the French Foreign Affairs Department, that alliance gathers the Sahel G5 countries and four international partners (the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)), to finance more than 400 projects in the Sahel.⁷ Five sectors are targeted (Youth Employment, Education, and Training; Energy and Climate; Governance; Agriculture, Rurality, and Food; Decentralization and Basic Social Services), and the funds needed for the programs totals about 6.5 billion Euro.⁸ Importantly, the nonmilitary wing of the Sahel G5’s strategy comprehensively fits with the security measures, which is performed by the SG5 Joint Force. Indeed, as mentioned by Dr. Ashley N. Bybee, a research staff member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses, “unemployment, illiteracy, poor governance, and other underlying conditions have structural roots that cannot be overcome with a military approach alone.”⁹ More interestingly, in the United States, the approach combining security and non-security measures seems to have been understood early among scholars. In 2004, Princeton N. Lyman and Stephen Morrison proposed that, “Rather than concentrate solely on shutting down existing al Qaeda cells, it [the United States] must also deal with the continent’s fundamental problems—economic distress, ethnic and religious fissures, fragile governance, weak democracy, and rampant human rights abuses—that create an environment in which terrorists thrive.”¹⁰ To sum up, the choice of building a counterterrorism strategy through the Joint Force and the Alliance for the Sahel seems sound since it represents a comprehensive approach, which relies not only on security measures but also on governance and economic policies. That strategy goes beyond the Sahel G5

⁷ “La Force Conjointe G5 Sahel et l’Alliance Sahel,” [The Sahel G5 Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance] French Embassy, last updated March 2018, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/defense-et-securite/crises-et-conflits/la-force-conjointe-g5-sahel-et-l-alliance-sahel/>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ashley N. Bybee, “The Alliance for the Sahel—An Essential Accompaniment to the G5 Sahel Joint Force,” *Africa Watch* 18 (February 22, 2018), file:///C:/Users/elise/Desktop/Proper%20Thesis/Jessica_Doc/Africawatch-February-22-2018-vol18.pdf.

¹⁰ Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 1 (January - February 2004): 76.

countries' engagement, and inspires the attention and support of the entire international community.

Since its creation, the Sahel G5 organization has faced many questions about its finances and operational readiness.¹¹ Indeed, while it represents a real ray of hope for the Sahelian communities and governments, lack of funding and substantive operational capacity (military readiness and professionalism) of its troops provide huge challenges.¹² Another concern raised by many other observers centers on how it will operate among the other international forces (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and Operation Barkhane) and the national armed forces.¹³ These issues reflect the International Crisis Group's concerns.¹⁴ That non-governmental organization claimed: "[The Sahel G5 Joint Force] raises numerous unanswered questions

¹¹ Nicolas Desgrais, "La Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) Ou l'émergence d'une Architecture de Défense Collective Propre au Sahel," [Sahel G5 Joint Force (FC-G5S) Or the emergence of a Sahel-specific Collective Defense Architecture, Center for Strategic Training and Research] (2017), accessed March 20, 2018, https://www.csfrs.fr/sites/default/files/nicolas_desgrais_v2.pdf.

Hugo Sada, "Quel avenir pour le G5," [What future for the G5, *Foundation for Strategic Research*], (March 2017), accessed February 18, 2018, <https://www.frstrategie.org/web/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/7.pdf>.

Laurent Lagneau, "La Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel va Accentuer ses Efforts mais les Doutes sur ses Capacités Subsistent," [Sahel G5 Joint Force to Accelerate Efforts but Doubts about Its Abilities] *Zone Militaire*, December 13, 2017, <http://www.opex360.com/2017/12/13/la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-va-accentuer-ses-efforts-mais-les-doutes-sur-ses-capacites-subsistent/>.

Fréjus Quenum, "G5 Sahel Joint Force: Wind?" *D.W-Made for Minds*, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://www.dw.com/fr/force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-du-vent/av-39166119>.

¹² Karolina Gasinska and Elias Bohman, *Joint Force of the Group of Five: A Review of Multiple Challenges*, Report No. FOI-R-4548-SE (December 2017), http://www.academia.edu/36363504/Joint_Force_of_the_Group_of_Five_A_review_of_multiple_challenges.

Jean-Pierre Stroobants, "Le Financement de la Force G5 Sahel Assuré, mais pour un an Seulement," [G5 Sahel Assured Force Financing, but for one year only] *Le Monde Afrique*, February 23, 2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/02/23/sahel-macron-affirme-la-determination-entiere-des-dirigeants-europeens_5261613_3212.html.

¹³ Christophe Châtelot, "Le G5 Sahel, une Force Antiterroriste Balbutiante," [The G5 Sahel, a Stunting Anti-Terror Force], *Le Monde Afrique*, July 1, 2017, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/07/01/le-g5-sahel-une-force-antiterroriste-balbutiante_5154373_3212.html.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group, *Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force*, Report No. 258/AFRICA, December 12, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making>.

about its funding, operational capacity, the political cooperation between its five members, and its place in the Sahel—a region crowded by sometimes-competing military and diplomatic initiatives.”¹⁵ Nonetheless, the terrorist threat is a daily reality for the local populations as well as to the governments, so without being quickly addressed, terrorism can propagate and add to the disorder that characterizes the international environment in terms of security.¹⁶ Then, in turn, terrorism will endanger weak countries. For that reason, preventing this infernal cycle remains paramount. In other words, it is necessary to disconnect and dismantle the network on which terrorism, as a global threat, relies and develops. Therefore, keeping ready to address the issues raised is very important and will facilitate the Sahel G5’s success.

A. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTION

Combating the terrorism phenomenon in the Sahel region requires a common engagement beyond the Sahel G5 organization, which is primarily a group of weak and poor countries. Any country or organization, working alone, cannot overcome the terrorism phenomenon. The case study of these five Sahelian countries engaged in a specific way of facing terrorism is particularly relevant. Therefore, the thesis aims to answer a specific two-fold question. Learning from the United States’ counterterrorism experience in the Sahel, what are the challenges for the individual states themselves and for those Sahel G5 states as a group in combating a transnational terrorist threat? In addition, what is the prognosis for their future success?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The explorations, which are conducted in response to the research question stated previously, holds its significance in the fact that a group of five weak countries made the decision to overcome the terrorism phenomenon. Considering the shaping dynamics

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ I assume that the current international relations trend does not help as it should to address the terrorist threat. The main actors do not have a common point of view on how to combat terrorism. The emblematic example is the case of ISIS, where Russia and Western countries have totally opposing ideas. Also, in the Sahel, while the local governments see some insurgent groups as terrorists, France (as the main actor) sees them as reliable partners.

(social, political, economic) of the Sahel region over the past two decades, the Sahel G5 countries' standing up against terrorism seems innovative. Yet, beyond the political willingness their leaders shown, understanding the root causes and choosing the right approaches to deal with terrorism will play a key role in the success of their counterterrorism policy. Therefore, learning lessons from the successes and the failures of other countries' prior efforts would be a good starting point.

C. METHODOLOGY

The thesis does not aim to compare the U.S. counterterrorism strategy with that of Sahel G5. Rather, the aim is to learn from the U.S. experience. For the purpose of understanding and combating the terrorism phenomenon in the Sahel region, it will be meaningful to learn from the United States' Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), specifically in the Sahel region. Despite its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power, the United States has suffered deeply from terrorist attacks. That has led this country to make and adapt counterterrorism policies continuously, and implement strategies not only in their homeland but very often far away from home, where the threats usually originate and develop.

Some of the United States' most memorable achievements against terrorism are the short time frame it took to overthrow the Taliban regime in Kabul (Afghanistan) and its long range and successful hunt of Osama Bin Laden. First, on October 7, 2011, the United States launched the military operation "Enduring Freedom" in response to the 9/11 attacks and the refusal of Taliban's regime to stop harboring Al-Qaeda and hand over its leader Osama Bin Laden.¹⁷ That complex and multidimensional operation, gathered intelligence services, conventional and special operations forces, as well as a variety of allies, including Afghan political and armed opponents.¹⁸ In less than two months, the coalition led by the United States defeated the Taliban, who have taken refuge either in the mountainous

¹⁷ CNN, "Operation Enduring Freedom Fast Facts," CNN Library, October 5, 2016, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/28/world/operation-enduring-freedom-fast-facts/index.html>.

¹⁸ Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, *War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress*, CRS Report No. R40156 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 3, 20019), 8, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40156.pdf>.

regions or in neighboring countries. Second, following up with its decision to neutralize Al-Qaeda's leaders, the United States stepped up its search for Bin Laden. Almost ten years after the 9/11 attack, the United States found and killed the man who allegedly was behind that attack.¹⁹ Obviously, the events of 9/11 caused such physical and emotional harm to the United States that the world's strongest power would never let the guilty go unpunished.²⁰ Therefore, defeating the Taliban and hunting down Bin Laden were great achievements, as witnessed by President Barack Obama in his speech of May 1, 2011.²¹ Even though the achievements do not mean the United States' GWOT is a full success, they represent evidence of a particular knowledge in combating terrorism.

Although the United States seemed to have neglected the African field in combating terrorism, specifically the Sahel region, the various counterterrorism and violent counter extremism programs the United States implemented later contributed to strengthening its experience. Indeed, Dr. Greg Mills has acknowledged American inattentiveness to Africa extends from 2004.²² He has argued: "as international attention in the war on terrorism continues to focus primarily on the Middle East, it is easy to forget that Al Qaeda's most extreme terrorist attacks prior to September 11 were the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi."²³ Interestingly, in the following years the United States reinforced its security cooperation in Africa, a continent, which according to Paul D. Williams, is far ahead the rest of the world in terms of state failure, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, adverse regime changes, genocides, and

¹⁹ John Rollins, *Osama bin Laden's Death: Implications and Considerations*, CRS Report No. R41809 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 5, 2011), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41809.pdf>.

²⁰ "President Bush's speech from the Oval Office on the night of September 11, 2001," You Tube, Video 4:24, posted by the Fearless Conservative, January 6, 2011, accessed March 10, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uY1aSV36qlk>.

²¹ "President Obama Announces Osama Bin Laden Killed," NBC News Special Report, Video, 3:37, May 1, 2011, <https://www.nbcnews.com/video/may-1-2011-president-obama-announces-bin-laden-s-death-677792323587>.

²² Greg Mills, "Africa's New Strategic Significance," *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 157, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/173615>.

²³ Ibid.

politicides.²⁴ In sum, the African ungoverned areas represented a growing concern to the U.S. policy makers.

In response to the incubating threats or erupting crises, the United States has engaged in the Sahel, supporting the African countries. While some of these initiatives are mostly military oriented like the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), some others are more open to states' comprehensive capability building, like the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).²⁵ More globally, the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) include humanitarian and resilience building aspects in addition to some of the previously mentioned assignments.²⁶ Interestingly, each of the Sahel G5 countries is closely working with the United States either individually or as part of a collective program. That shows how significantly the United States is engaged in combating terrorism in the Sahel. Nevertheless, as Andre Le Sage remarks, the American policy makers have to conduct a meticulous assessment of the complexity of the Sahelian environment coupled with the evolving nature of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) in order to make an appropriate decision.²⁷ To sum up, the United States' engagement in the Middle East, the programs implemented in the Sahel, and the assessment processes, have contributed to strengthen the understanding of the terrorism phenomenon.

The global war the United States plans and conducts draws many inputs from services involved in the physical fighting as well as from the ones in charge of analyzing the terrorism phenomenon. For example, the 9/11 Commission's Report clearly

²⁴ Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 15–20.

²⁵ Stephen Ellis, "Briefing: The Pan-Sahel Initiative," *African Affairs*, 103/412 (2004): 459, DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adh067.

Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, "Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy across Africa's Sahel Region," Rand Corporation, Testimony (Before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs United States Senate November 17, 2009), 7, accessed February 25, 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT335.pdf.

²⁶ Sean McFate, "U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?" Army University Press, February 28, 2008, http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20080228_art005.pdf.

²⁷ Andre Le Sage, "The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," *Strategic Forum*, no. 268, (July 2011): 1–2, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-268.pdf>.

demonstrated that the terrorist organizations had reached critical capabilities while showing an incredible ability to attain both very sensitive and protected targets.²⁸ In its report, the commission observed, “We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined and lethal.”²⁹ Furthermore, the same commission, when investigating, asked some counterterrorism experts, if they were terrorist group leaders, where they would implant their bases. Many times, the answers given were West Africa (specifically, Mali and Nigeria).³⁰ The United States’ dynamic of investigating events, hearing from experts, and updating data contributes to enlighten the policy makers in particular and to demystify the terrorism phenomenon in general.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of counterterrorism in general has generated many policy recommendations.³¹ Scholars may not agree on a single definition of terrorism, but they do believe that it is one of the most challenging threats of the 21st century.³² Even though terrorism is not the exclusive privilege of Muslim extremists, the case studied here explores Islamist terrorism in the Sahel. Addressing this threat, scholars have recommended many strategies, which sometimes conflict but hold the potential to complement one another.³³ While some researchers think that terrorism should be preemptively addressed, some others emphasize direct actions in response to terrorist attacks.³⁴ In any case, spotting and dealing with the terrorism drivers, as early as possible, could be a major step in the process of framing a global approach, which also should include effective measures in case

²⁸ U.S. Congress, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” xvi, accessed February 12, 2018, <https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>.

²⁹ Ibid., Preface, xvi.

³⁰ Ibid., 366.

³¹ Todd Sandler; “Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Overview,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 67, no. 1, (January 2015): 1–20, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpu039>.

³² Miryam Lindberg, “Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,” *Análisis*, no. 7561, (February 20, 2010), http://www.gees.org/files/article/20022010093237_Analisis-07561.pdf.

³³ Jeremy Keenan, *The Dying Sahara, U.S. Imperialism and Terror in Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 14–29.

³⁴ Sanaa Khan and Mieke Eoyang, *The Plan to Combat Terrorism*, Third Way, accessed May 28, 2018, <https://www.thirdway.org/report/the-plan-to-combat-terrorism>.

terrorism breaks out.³⁵ In other words, the preventive measures in peacetime seem as important as physical and intellectual measures taken in response to terrorist groups' violent actions. Consequently, this literature review is categorized into four approaches. The governance approach, the security approach, the economic approach, and the educational approach come together and form a comprehensive strategy.³⁶

1. Governance Approach

Many researchers mention the ineffectiveness of state governance as contributing to terrorist organizations' birth and growth.³⁷ According to Dr. Jessica Piombo, Sub-Saharan Africa's lack of development and good governance is a source of conflicts and insecurity.³⁸ In the same vein, the safe havens used by terrorist organizations reflect either the failure of a state's governance or its collusion with the terrorist groups.³⁹ Edward Newman, a British scholar, asserts, "State failure or poor governance may be greater threats, as terrorist organizations exploit the absence of order and regulation, even without the support of governments."⁴⁰ Giving shelter to terrorist organizations in remote areas or in cities, or being unable to control its own territory while terrorist groups dwell there, contributes to creating and maintaining safe havens for them. For example, Lyman and Morrison point out the case of the Sudanese government that, according to them, had given shelter and protection to Osama Bin Laden from 1991 to 1996.⁴¹ Furthermore, citing the case of Nigeria, Lyman and Morrison mention that the rising crimes and increasing

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ronald Crelinsten, "Perspectives on Counterterrorism: From Stovepipes to a Comprehensive Approach," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 1 (February 2014): 2, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180128/332-2270-6-PBFull.pdf>.

³⁷ Jessica Piombo, "Addressing Security Threats in Africa" in *The U.S. military in Africa: Enhancing Security and Development?* First Forum Press (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2015), 1.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Edward Newman, "Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 4 (2007): 463, DOI: 10.1080/09546550701590636.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, "The Terrorist Threat in Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2004): 77.

instability made the extremist leader's message more credible to local people.⁴² These authors add that the political leaders from the north, not happy about losing influence because of the democratization and the new government's anticorruption measures, shifted their position in manipulating the local populations. They installed Islamic law (Shari'a) in response to the rampant crimes.⁴³ People accepted and appreciated it because of the unjust and ineffective governance they had been experiencing.⁴⁴ To sum up the scholars, ineffective governance, which included official connections with terrorist organizations, lack of justice, lack of human rights, or lack of democracy, could significantly contribute to the birth or rise of terrorism.

2. Security Approach

According to some well-known scholars, even though military and security measures are insufficient in combating terrorism, they play a key role in the comprehensive approach necessary to win the war on terrorism.⁴⁵ According to Sanaa Khan and Mieke Eoyang, "Jointly, over 15,000 airstrikes have been conducted in Iraq and Syria. Over 30,000 ISIS targets have been damaged or destroyed, including oil infrastructure, combat positions, and tanks," and that did not solve the terrorism problem there, as it was supposed to do.⁴⁶ They think that the security measures should be only part of a more comprehensive approach.⁴⁷

According to Charles Rault, a scholar who has studied the French counterterrorism approach, the security approach should include security cooperation aspects as well as military operation and intelligence aspects.⁴⁸ To Rault, the security cooperation itself might

⁴² Ibid., 79.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Sanaa Khan and Mieke Eoyang, "The Plan to Combat Terrorism," Third Way, accessed May 28, 2018, <https://www.thirdway.org/report/the-plan-to-combat-terrorism>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Charles Rault, "The French Approach to Counterterrorism," *Combating Terrorism Center* 3, no. 1 (January 2010), accessed May 20, 2018, <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-french-approach-to-counterterrorism/>.

rely on both training and intelligence sharing with partners and allies.⁴⁹ Sharing the same perspective, Simon J. Powelson, an American officer, who closely participated in Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) training in combating terrorism, thinks that the security cooperation should be as long lasting as possible since definitively defeating terrorism might be a very long-range engagement.⁵⁰ In his Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis, Powelson declares that “episodic engagement by itself does not build real or lasting capability and capacity.”⁵¹ After having investigated the reasons why the Malian Armed Forces, the U.S. Special Operations Forces (US-SOF) trainees, were defeated by the terrorist groups, Powelson came up with the conclusion that “enduring engagement is of enduring value; episodic engagement, on its own, is not.”⁵² The same idea flows from some others’ analyses, like that of Le Sage, who advocates for “a long-term commitment to modernizing law enforcement, civilian intelligence and border security agencies.”⁵³

To some researchers, military campaigns targeting combat units as well as infrastructure (specifically, training centers, and logistic and communication means) represent the most effective way to defeat terrorism.⁵⁴ Joseph Guido advocates for offensive and coercing military operations against terrorist bases.⁵⁵ Based on his own field experiences in the Sahel region and his study of U.S. counterterrorism experience, Guido concludes that, “Denying terrorists’ sanctuary has become a pillar of U.S. defense strategy since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks.”⁵⁶

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Simon J. Powelson, “Enduring engagement yes, episodic engagement no: lessons for SOF from Mali,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School-2013), p.56.
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38996/13Dec_Powelson_Simon.pdf;sequence=3.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., Abstract.

⁵³ Andre Le Sage, “Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement,” *Strategic Forum*, no. 255 (May 2010): 1, URL???

⁵⁴ Joseph Guido, “Terrorist Sanctuary in The Sahara: A Case Study,” *Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press* (November 2017), accessed May 20, 2018,
<https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1370.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

In terms of security and intelligence measures, another thought flows from the American 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which describes a 4D strategy (Defeat, Deny, Diminish and Defend).⁵⁷ The Defeat section mentions: “The best way to defeat terrorism is to isolate and localize its activities and then destroy it through intensive, sustained action.”⁵⁸ The same document gives credit to intelligence as a key factor in that strategy.⁵⁹ Talking about the need of identifying, locating, and destroying terrorists and terrorist organizations, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism paraphrases an adage that says, “Know your enemy [as] one of the most acceptable maxims in warfare.”⁶⁰ The strategy envisages strengthening intelligence capabilities at the states, federal and international levels.⁶¹ Then, it foresees a major step, which is to “use every tool available to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy their [terrorist organizations’] capacity to conduct acts of terror.”⁶² Following up, the strategy specifies, “The final element of the Defeat goal is an aggressive, offensive strategy to eliminate capabilities that allow terrorists to exist and operate.”⁶³ The strategy further states that terrorists’ “sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances should be targeted.”⁶⁴

Many scholars for many reasons have criticized the effectiveness of the security approach to fighting terrorism.⁶⁵ The analysts’ opinions about the security approach vary from accepting it as just a part of a comprehensive strategy to totally rejecting it.⁶⁶ To

⁵⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” 2003, accessed February 10, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 16.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 17.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ David Sedney, “America’s Counterterrorism Policy Is Failing,” *Time*, January 21, 2015, <http://time.com/3676321/americas-counter-terrorism-policy-is-failing/>.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Daniel Byman, a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and Professor and Senior Associate Dean at Georgetown University, even though the military option can garner positive results, it should be carefully used.⁶⁷ According to him, “Targeted killings are also an appropriate use of military force, though they should be used sparingly.”⁶⁸ Moreover, Byman, asserts, “Limited military strikes usually fail and often backfire.”⁶⁹ Therefore, another concern about military operations is the anti-Western feeling they create.⁷⁰ In turn, that anger strengthens the terrorists’ propaganda and could even compromise the other positive efforts made in combating the phenomenon.⁷¹

3. Economic Approach

Some scholars, like David Sterman, argue that poverty and low economic resilience play a fundamental role in the rise of terrorism.⁷² Simon Cottee, trying to explain “What motivates terrorists,” came up with the conclusion that the economic alternative offered by terrorist groups is so attractive—contrasting with the inefficiency of the state policy—that in certain regions desperate people do not resist terrorists’ offers.⁷³ Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet suggest that extreme poverty feeds conflicts.⁷⁴ According to Brainard and

⁶⁷ D. Byman, “Fighting the War on Terrorism: A Better Approach,” *How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security*. (Cambridge, MA: Tobin Project, 2006), 70.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Daniel Benjamin, “Strategic Counterterrorism,” *Foreign Policy*, Policy Paper No. 7 (October 2008), accessed May 18, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10_terrorism_benjamin.pdf.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² David Sterman, “Don’t Dismiss Poverty’s Role in Terrorism Yet,” *Time*, February 4, 2015, <http://time.com/3694305/poverty-terrorism/>.

Alan, B Krueger and Malečková Jitka, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4, (2003): 119–144, DOI: 10.1257/089533003772034925.

⁷³ Simon Cottee, “What Motivates Terrorists?” *Atlantic*, June 9, 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/terrorism-isis-motive/395351/>.

Sadhana Pittala, “Why Do People Join Terrorist Groups?” *Medium*, December 27, 2018, <https://medium.com/@sadhanapittala/why-do-people-join-terrorist-groups-b176431eda84>.

⁷⁴ Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet, *Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 1

Chollet's study, the lack of essential needs in addition to insecurity's pressure makes people more vulnerable to terrorists' appeal.⁷⁵ The same conditions contribute in turning local people against the authorities they blame for being unable to provide basic needs or to protect them.

The snaky issue of which one (poverty or conflict) feeds the other is discussed by James A. Piazza, who concludes that the question would always remain as a matter of debate among scholars.⁷⁶ Danielle Beswick and Paul Jackson analyze the link between security and development through academic theory, field research, and policy developments and find that security and development reinforce each other.⁷⁷ In their conclusion, Beswick and Jackson stress that unemployment is an important driver to terrorism.⁷⁸ According to them, after getting their diplomas, many young people stay in the streets doing nothing, without any employment opportunity.⁷⁹ Hence, living miserably and lacking credible alternatives from the government, they become prime targets for terrorist recruiters and are likely to answer positively.⁸⁰

Supporting the view that youth unemployment plays a key role in the terrorism issue, Clint Watts, an antiterrorism expert and former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), observes, "The educated recruit ... cannot find gainful employment locally (high unemployment) nor campaign for greater economic and social access (lower political rights). Surrounded by other underemployed recruits (high youth population) and

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ James A. Piazza, "Poverty and Terrorism: A Hypothesis in Search of Evidence," in *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses*, ed. Stuart Gottlieb (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2009), 38–51.

⁷⁷ Danielle Beswick and Paul Jackson, *Conflict Security and Development An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

⁷⁸ Kartika Bhatia Hafez Ghanem, "How Do Education and Unemployment Affect Support for Violent Extremism? Evidence from Eight Arab Countries," *Global Economy & Development*, Working Paper No. 102 (March 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/global_20170322_violent-extremism.pdf.

Gertrude Adwoa Offeibea Ansaaku, "Youth Unemployment and the Fight against Terrorism in West Africa," World Policy, August 15, 2017, <https://worldpolicy.org/2017/08/15/youth-unemployment-and-the-fight-against-terrorism-in-west-africa/>.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

former foreign fighters, the recruit sees jihad as not just a potential option but also his only purpose.”⁸¹ Clint’s assertion shows how risky it is to the unemployed youth living in poor and terrorism-influenced environments.⁸² More interestingly, a study by Raoul Caruso and Eveline Gavrilova on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shown that “there is a positive association between the growth rate of youth unemployment and Palestinian brutality; there is a positive association between the growth rate of unemployment and the number of incidents.”⁸³ Corroborating all of the preceding findings, Gertrude Adwoa Offeibea Ansaaku, an African antiterrorism expert, declares, “Without jobs, violent extremist organizations can be an attractive source of income, and countries that fail to create employment opportunities for young people witness more incidents perpetrated by these groups.”⁸⁴

4. Educational Approach

According to some scholars, the lack of education is an important contributor to terrorism’s growth.⁸⁵ To Claude Berrebi, the reason why in certain areas (countries), people are attracted by terrorism has something to do with their lack of education, and that can be a religious extremism driver since less educated people tend to respond to the terrorists’ propaganda positively.⁸⁶ Sharing the same point of view, Lesly Anne Warner, a foreign affairs analyst with solid expertise on African countries, argues that: “Drivers of violent extremism in the region are not sole-source; they include youth frustration over insufficient

⁸¹ Clint Watts, “Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut,” *Small Wars Journal* (Blog), 2009, accessed February 15, 2018, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/247-watts.pdf>.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Raoul Caruso and Eveline Gavrilova, “Youth Unemployment, Terrorism and Political Violence, Evidence from the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict,” *IDEAS*, 2012, accessed February 10, 2018, <https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/pepspp/v18y2012i2n2.html>.

⁸⁴ Gertrude Adwoa Offeibea Ansaaku, “Youth Unemployment and the Fight against Terrorism in West Africa,” *World Policy*, August 15, 2017, <https://worldpolicy.org/2017/08/15/youth-unemployment-and-the-fight-against-terrorism-in-west-africa/>.

⁸⁵ Claude Berrebi, *Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians* 13, no. 1, article 2 (2007), RAND Corporation, accessed May 10, 2018, <http://public-policy.huji.ac.il/.upload/segel/ClaudeBerrebi/EvidenceAbouttheLinkBetweenEducation.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

educational or vocational opportunities.”⁸⁷ In the same vein, Amritha Venkatraman stresses that terrorists’ propaganda is always built on a tendentious interpretation of the Quran, the Muslims’ Holy Scriptures.⁸⁸

Donald Holbrook argues that, lacking sufficient contextual knowledge and skills, some religious leaders, even some simple believers, fall into a rigorist interpretation of the Islamic scriptures, which justifies the “duty to kill” non-Muslims or non-believers.⁸⁹ Supporting Holbrook’s point of view, Qasim Rashid thinks that the terrorists’ biased interpretation of the Holy Scriptures is either guided by the clear willingness to manipulate people or flows from a proselytizing sincere heart, but very limited knowledge.⁹⁰ That way of wrongly interpreting the Quran is denounced by Shawki Allam, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, who declares, “They take the Quranic verses and the Prophet’s words out of context and imbue them with savage meanings.”⁹¹ According to Alan Travis, a *Britain Home Affairs* editor, who accessed the restricted 2008 United Kingdom’s MI5 briefing report on radicalization, “Far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism ... lack religious literacy and could be regarded as religious novices.”⁹² John L. Esposito, who participated in the studies on radicalization, terrorism, and global suicide

⁸⁷ Lesley Anne Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership Building Partner, Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” *Strategic Studies CNA*, CRM-2014-U-007203-Final (March 2014), accessed February 12, 2018, <https://lesleyannewarner.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/tsctp-building-partner-capacity-to-counter-terrorism-and-violent-extremism2.pdf>.

⁸⁸ Amritha Venkatraman, “Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2007): 229–248, DOI: 10.1080/10576100600781612.

⁸⁹ Donald Holbrook, “Using the Qur’an to Justify Terrorist Violence: Analysing Selective Application of the Qur’an in English-Language Militant Islamist Discourse,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no. 3 (2010), <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/104/html>.

⁹⁰ Qasim Rashid, “Anyone Who Says the Quran Advocates Terrorism Obviously Hasn’t Read Its Lessons on Violence,” *Independent*, April 10, 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/islam-muslim-terrorism-islamist-extremism-quran-teaching-violence-meaning-prophet-muhammed-a7676246.html>.

⁹¹ Shawki Allam, “Terrorists and Their Quranic Delusions,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 9, 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/terrorists-and-their-quranic-delusions-1428620268>.

⁹² Alan Travis, “MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain,” *Guardian*, August 20, 2008, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1>.

bombings in Europe that found low educational level is an important factor in the radicalization of European Muslim youth, confirms that assertion.⁹³

E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION

In fighting terrorism, the countries of G5 Sahel face myriad problems; some are structural while the most visible are functional. The dream of building an embedded, safe, and developed space is hampered by several structural challenges. One can cite the ethnic disparity, the fate of minorities, the social segmentation of Sahelian societies, the structure of the central power as well as those of local powers, the countries' dimensions, the climate affecting populations' resilience, etc. Another range of challenges is related to the weakness of the system implemented by the central powers as well as the local powers. In fact, the chosen ways to deal with the insecurity and the poverty have proved very inefficient. The last one, but not the least, is the functioning of the international system and other world organizations, which seem to stifle weak states, thus narrowing their chance of emergence. Nevertheless, the suggested challenges, instead of discouraging Sahelian governments, should be taken as a springboard to reach the goals.

To effectively deal with the terrorism phenomenon in the Sahel, a comprehensive strategy that includes governance measures, security measures, economic measures, and educational measures should be implemented. These four approaches tied to each other, sometimes overlapping one another, must be taken as the four pillars of a single strategy to successfully overcome terrorism in the Sahel G5's space. While the governance approach enhances the rule of law, and faces the ungoverned spaces and local communities' inclusion issue, the security approach combines a range of intelligence and military actions against terrorist targets. The educational approach seeks to increase the schooling rate and reduce illiteracy whereas the economic approach aims to fight poverty and unemployment in addition to enhancing local communities' resilience. In sum, identifying and dealing with terrorism drivers, and physically combating it by coercive

⁹³ John L. Esposito, "Islam and Political Violence," *Religions* (2015): 6, 1067–1081, doi:10.3390/rel6031067.

actions, should be parts of a comprehensive strategy that holds the potential to entirely address the problematic nature of terrorism.⁹⁴

F. HYPOTHESIS

Learning from U.S. military engagement in Africa since 2002 while thinking of the best way of making the Sahel G5 organization successful, one can hypothesize that if the Sahel G5 organization raises its local populations' education level in addition to offering economic opportunities, it will reduce the terrorism phenomenon. Enhancing governance and making security forces more professional (well trained and adequately equipped) will contribute to a long lasting peace and development in the Sahel G5's space.

Following this first thesis chapter, which has presented the literature review, the second chapter assesses the effectiveness of the United States' counterterrorism experience in the Sahel, in terms of both successes and failures. The third chapter investigates the Sahel G5 organization's concept of combating terrorism, which also relies on governance and security measures as well as economic and educational measures. After mentioning the main terrorist groups operating in the Sahel G5's space, the last chapter discusses the SG5's prognosis for success.

⁹⁴ Ronald Crelinsten, "Perspectives on Counterterrorism: From Stovepipes to a Comprehensive Approach," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 1 (February 2014): 2, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180128/332-2270-6-PBFull.pdf>.

II. SAHEL: U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM ASSESSMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the previous chapter, the United States of America has earned substantial experience through operations, training, and studies related to counterterrorism. It has exerted great efforts in combating terrorism in its homeland as well as abroad in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.⁹⁵ According to the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, from 2002 to 2017, the United States spent \$2.8 trillion on counterterrorism.⁹⁶ That indicates a yearly average of almost \$190 billion, which is higher than the 2017 combined defense expenditures of Russia, India, and South Korea.⁹⁷ The United States engagement to fight terrorism has led it to invest significantly in preventing as well as combating the phenomenon.⁹⁸ As part of this effort, the country has increased its security cooperation all over the world.⁹⁹ That engagement has allowed the United States to capitalize on very broad experience and to strengthen its counterterrorism strategy.

Building upon the United States' resolution to fight terrorism, the 9/11 attacks hardened a war-oriented mindset among American leaders, who started paying much more attention to Africa.¹⁰⁰ President George W. Bush's speech following the attack was clear

⁹⁵ Thomas H. Kean, Cheryl Benard, Joseph Braude, Tarek Elgawhary, John Gannon, Husain Haqqani, Bernard Haykel, Charles Hill Jenkins, Nibras Kazimi, Christopher Kojm, Kristin Lord, Blaise Misztal, Nicholas Danforth, Jessica Michek, and Samuel Tadros, "Defeating Terrorists, Not Terrorism: Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism Policy from 9/11 to ISIS," Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2017, <https://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/BPC-National-Security-Defeating-Terrorist-Not-Terrorism.pdf>.

⁹⁶ Amy Belasco, Mackenzie Eaglen, Luke Hartig, Tina Jonas, Mike McCord, and John Mueller, "Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America while Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability," Stimson, May 2018, 5, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf.

⁹⁷ Aaron Mehta, "Here's How Much the U.S. Has Spent Fighting Terrorism since 9/11," Defense News, May 2016, <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/05/16/heres-how-much-the-us-has-spent-fighting-terrorism-since-911/>.

⁹⁸ Susan B. Epstein and Liana W. Rosen, *U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends*, CRS Report No. R45091 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 1, 2018), 2, <https://fas.org/srg/crs/natsec/R45091.pdf>.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Richard Dowden, "The West and East Approach to Africa after 9/11," *RUSI*, September 2, 2011, accessed May 5, 2018, <https://rusi.org/commentary/west-and-east-approach-africa-after-911>.

in terms of determination: “I’ve directed the full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”¹⁰¹ Following up with its resolution of eradicating terrorism, the United States did pay more and more attention to the growing ungoverned spaces in Africa.¹⁰² Subsequently, the United States deployed a significant number of troops in Africa.¹⁰³ Practically, worldwide deployment of U.S. Special Operations rose from 1% in 2006 in Africa to 10% in 2014.¹⁰⁴

Despite the controversial aspect of U.S. counterterrorism, African leaders have opened up to it.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, the American counterterrorism ideology implemented through a brutal and offensive strategy was widely criticized.¹⁰⁶ The most virulent critiques came from non-governmental organizations (NGO) that pointed to the United States’ human rights violations and the civilian casualties.¹⁰⁷ According to Human Rights Watch, “The United States has refused to recognize the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to any of the Afghan war or al-Qaeda detainees held at Guantánamo or elsewhere, including captured members of the Taliban armed forces, although it has insisted that it treats them

¹⁰¹ CNN “The Text of President Bush’s Address Tuesday Night, after Terrorist Attacks on New York and Washington,” September 11, 2001, accessed March 10, 2018, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/>.

¹⁰² Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore W. Karasik, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kevin A. O’Brien, and John E. Peters, “The Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks,” RAND Corporation (Project Air Force, 2007), accessed May 10, 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdf.

¹⁰³ Pan Sahel Initiative (2002), Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership (2005), AFRICOM (2008).

¹⁰⁴ Government Accountability Office (GAO), Special Operations Forces: Opportunities Exist to Improve Transparency of Funding and Assess Potential to Lessen Some Deployments, Report No. GAO-15-57 (Washington, DC: GAO, July 2015), Put page number here (but don’t use p. or pp.—just the number).

¹⁰⁵ Brian Michael Jenkins, “President Obama’s Controversial Legacy as Counterterrorism-in-Chief,” RAND Corporation, August 2, 2016, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/08/president-obamas-controversial-legacy-as-counterterrorism.html>.

¹⁰⁶ Eben Kaplan, “Examining Counterterrorism Culture,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 6, 2006, accessed March 15, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/background/examining-counterterrorism-culture>.

¹⁰⁷ Elizabeth A. Bloodgood and Joannie Tremblay-Boire, “NGO Responses to Counterterrorism Regulations After September 11th,” *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 12, no. 4 (November 2010), accessed January 11, 2018, http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol12iss4/special_1.htm.

humanely.”¹⁰⁸ Despite this controversy, investing hope in U.S. expertise and its commitment to eradicate terrorism everywhere in the world, most African leaders saw the United States’ support as at least a short-term solution to the pressing threats. These threats target poverty, low level of education, ineffective governance, and military weakness.¹⁰⁹ Interestingly, the American counterterrorism package considers all of the aforementioned factors.¹¹⁰ Seemingly, African leaders did not acknowledge NGOs’ criticism of the United States because of the urgency of the threats they face. Currently, the United States has implemented many antiterrorism programs in Africa, introducing a set of educational, economic, governance and security measures.¹¹¹

This chapter aims to assess the United States’ counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel region through the prism of economic, educational, governance, and security measures. Therefore, the ways the United States responded to the drivers are investigated as well as how it addressed the physical consequences. For that purpose, the thesis focuses on the impact of three main initiatives: The Pan Sahel Initiative, the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, and the African Command. In sum, this chapter capitalizes on data from U.S. government official documents and reports, as well as independent studies and scholars’ analyses.

B. GOVERNANCE MEASURES

Knowing that ineffective governance can be a driver of violent extremism and terrorism, the United States pays close attention to its partners’ governance.¹¹² In the Sahel countries, despite the commitment of political leaders to democratic rule, many weaknesses

¹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch, “Briefing Paper for the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,” March 25, 2003, 23, accessed March 10, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ Christina Boutros, “Top Challenges Facing Africa Today,” *Global Young Voices*, accessed June 2, 2018, <https://www.globalyoungvoices.com/fast-news-blog/2016/5/5/top-challenges-facing-africa-today>.

¹¹⁰ “Programs and Initiatives,” U.S. Department of State, accessed June 10, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSCTP>.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Richard Downie, “Collective Insecurity in the Sahel: Fighting Terror with Good Governance,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 16, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2015): 70–78, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43773669?newaccount=true&read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

have shown up and contributed to unhappiness and revolts.¹¹³ Indeed, as long as people suffer from injustice, the tendency to defy the authorities hatches and grows.¹¹⁴ At a certain level, this condition transforms into an active confrontation, which leads opponents to embrace radical ways of solving their problems.¹¹⁵ More dangerously, the feeling of injustice among youth can drive them to join criminal and terrorist organizations.¹¹⁶ According to the USAID, “Countries that have ineffective government institutions, rampant corruption and weak rule of law have a 30% to-45% higher risk of civil war and higher risk of extreme criminal violence than other developing countries.”¹¹⁷ This section assesses the United States’ achievements in terms of governance support in the Sahel countries, in direct or indirect responses to the terrorism threat.

Knowing that each of the Sahel G5 countries has a history of ineffective democracy characterized by human rights violations, unfair elections, corruption, unequal distribution of growth’s fruits, and minority issues, the United States has encouraged and supported for effective governance as well as greater social justice.¹¹⁸ Effective governance is essential to social cohesion since it lessens the trend of protests, and allows the full participation of everybody into public life.¹¹⁹ Willing to contribute to that objective, USAID launched an ambitious program from 2016 to 2021, with a budget of \$13 million, which includes the Sahel G5 countries.¹²⁰ Providing tools to counter violent extremism, the program aims to strengthen the civil societies, allowing them to play their role in democratic debates, in

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Mireille Affa’a Mindzie, “Building Peace and Development in the Sahel: Enhancing the Political Participation of Women and Youth,” International Peace Institute, January 2015, <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/IPI-Rpt-Building-Peace.pdf>.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ USAID Home page, “Democracy Human Rights and Governance,” accessed March 7, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/democracy>.

¹¹⁸ International Peace Institute, “Threats to Peace and Security in the Sahel: Responding to the Crisis in Mali,” December 2012, accessed April 5, 2018, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156614/ipi_e_pub_threats_to_peace_in_sahel.pdf.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ USAID Home page, “Partnership for Peace, Strengthening West African Capacity to Counter Violent Extremism,” accessed March 10, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/factsheets/partnerships-peace>.

addition to the other goals.¹²¹ In Mali, USAID implemented a wide program focused on human rights and rule of law as key factors of social justice in any democracy. According to USAID, whenever a country works to consolidate its democracy and governance, the country advances its citizens' freedom, dignity, and development.¹²² The USAID Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) program covering 2015–2016 and funded with \$ 750,000 was conducted with Freedom House and the American Bar Association.¹²³

USAID has contributed to strengthening the other Sahel G5 countries' governance in many ways. In Niger, USAID has focused on some key sectors involving the government, the extractive industry, the National Assembly, communities, and the civil society.¹²⁴ The program has contributed to capacity building in favor of the National Assembly and civil society in terms of overseeing government activities.¹²⁵ In Chad, USAID is closely involved in building peaceful communication and interaction among the components of society, providing trainings and workshops to prepare both the administrators and the local populations to stand against violent extremism and terrorism.¹²⁶ Also, USAID encourages the rule of law while promoting the emergence of a strong civil society.¹²⁷ More precisely, its work focuses on youth and on weak and marginalized populations, encourages peace messages, legal moneymaking opportunities, and good governance.¹²⁸ USAID's aim has always been to create a collaborative framework including all of the society's components. Targeting vulnerable communities

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² USAID Mali Fact Sheet, "Human Rights Strengthening Advocacy," accessed March 10, 2018, <https://scms.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20Mali%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Human%20Rights%20Strengthening%20Advocacy%20-%20Final.pdf>.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ USAID, "Niger: Democracy, Human Rights and Governance," accessed March 11, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/niger/democracy-human-rights-and-governance>.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ USAID, "Chad: Working in Crises and Conflict," accessed March 7, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/chad/our-work>.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

in northern Mali, USAID, through the Peace, Democracy, and Governance Office, funded \$21.9 million to address violent extremism.¹²⁹ The program trained traditional, religious, and elected leaders across ethnic communities in 200 villages in conflict resolution, while more than 20 inter-ethnic women's peace committees facilitated intercommunity dialogue and provided psychological support, and more than 100 women and youth worked as local conflict mediators.¹³⁰ In addition, engaging at-risk youth ages 15 to 29, the program supported the creation of 100 inter-ethnic sports clubs.¹³¹ According to USAID, "The community level conflict mediation groups successfully mediated 31 conflicts in the targeted areas."¹³² Finally, USAID's programs have contributed to drying up the violent extremists' and terrorist organization's sources of recruitment.

C. SECURITY MEASURES

In terms of security measures in fighting terrorism in the Sahel G5, the United States implemented a variety of strategies from intelligence sharing to physical engagements.¹³³ By not taking the lead on the ground as a reflection of its official stance, the United States implemented a spectrum of strategies, composed of training and equipping local forces in addition to "coaching" sometimes in real operations.¹³⁴ Acknowledging the U.S. engagement in the Sahel G5 area, however, one can legitimately question why terrorist groups are proliferating? What is the outcome of two decades of U.S. engagement? Why could the Sahelian governments not capitalize on the U.S. aid? This section assesses how the United States implemented strategies in fighting terrorism in

¹²⁹ USAID, "USAID Mali Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)," May 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID_PDG_-_Countering_Violent_Extremism_Program_Overview_-_May_18.pdf.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Lawrence Cline, "Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 10 (2007): 889–899, DOI: 10.1080/10576100701559032.

¹³⁴ Wesley Morgan and Bryan Bender, "America's Shadow War in Africa," *Politico*, October 12, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/12/niger-shadow-war-africa-243695>.

the Sahel G5 area. It will consider the PSI achievements as well as those of TSCTP and AFRICOM.

Aiming to build Sahelian security forces' capacities, the United States has launched different antiterrorism programs with training and equipment. To enhance capabilities, the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) brought both U.S. and African combat units for common trainings while the Flintlock exercises annually gather African troops.¹³⁵ In addition, under TSCTP's umbrella, individual countries have benefited from training and equipment. For example in Mali, the US-SOF trained the ETIAs (Echelon Tactiques Inter Armes) and the 33rd Regiment des Commando Parachutistes (Airborne Battalion or RCP).¹³⁶ Powelson recognizes that, for unknown reasons, the trained units have not been equipped as promised by the United States.¹³⁷ Yet, from 2005 to 2012, the units were deployed for combating terrorist groups in the desert. Unfortunately, the U.S. trainees could not durably face their enemies mostly due to logistical issues. Also, the 1,000 men (ETIA plus RCP), who were fighting terrorism in an area bigger than the size of Texas would have had difficulty succeeding, while the enemy benefited from local complicities. In sum, PSI did not reach its goals.

The United States has implemented a progressive strategy, from PSI to TSCTP and AFRICOM, to help Sahelian countries take control of their ungoverned areas as well as the porous borders (potential safe havens for the returning fighters from Afghanistan or the jihadist from Algeria).¹³⁸ Launched in 2002, the PSI aimed to help Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad to protect their borders.¹³⁹ Based upon military-to-military cooperation, PSI helped in the sharing of intelligence and in small combat unit training, as well as allowing

¹³⁵ Nick Turse, "Mission Impossible: Keeping Track of U.S. Special Ops in Africa," Bill Moyers, September 2016, <https://billmoyers.com/story/mission-impossible/>.

¹³⁶ Simon J. Powelson, "Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No: Lessons for SOF from Mali," (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 17–30, 32–46, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38996/13Dec_Powelson_Simon.pdf;sequence=3.

¹³⁷ Ibid. 43–44.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Stephen Ellis, "Briefing: The PAN-Sahel Initiative," *African Affairs* 103, no. 412 (July 2004):459–464, DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adh067.

better cooperation among the countries.¹⁴⁰ PSI trained light infantry units in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad, focusing on elementary skills (marksmanship, planning, communications, GPS, and patrolling).¹⁴¹ Nonetheless, today the reality is that AQMI and its affiliated groups have defeated Malian security forces. In addition, the northern part of Mauritania and Burkina Faso and Niger, in addition to southern Chad, are still suffering from a much bigger terrorist threat than in 2002. After the PSI was judged successful by American policy makers, the TSCTP was established in 2005 with a broader scope and much more funding.¹⁴² Interestingly, USAID was deeply involved in addition to the Department of Defense, but the Department of State also became involved during the TSCTP.¹⁴³ The TSCTP implementation shows a strategic shifting in terms of approach since USAID, a nonmilitary agency, received the largest portion of the budget.¹⁴⁴ The funding allowed the United States to train and equip more combat units, specifically light infantry units, like ETIAs in Mali.¹⁴⁵ In 2008, the United States established AFRICOM with many more responsibilities.¹⁴⁶ Specifically, it included humanitarian operations in addition to its normal geographical combat command tasks.¹⁴⁷ In sum, the U.S. support to Sahelian countries was not only military oriented but also state capacity building in terms of development and regional cooperation.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, *Mali's Next Battle: Improving Counterterrorism Capabilities* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1241.html.

¹⁴² Lesley Warner, "Nine Questions about the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership You Were Too Embarrassed to Ask," War on the Rocks, April 8, 2014, accessed June 10, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2014/04/nine-questions-about-the-trans-sahara-counter-terrorism-partnership-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/>.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming*, (Washington, DC: USAID, Bureau for Africa (USAID/AFR), 2009), 52.

¹⁴⁵ ETIA Echelon Tactic Inter Armes is a small and light infantry unit of about 140 soldiers. Four of them were created with the support of the United States from 2006 to 2008.

¹⁴⁶ Stephanie Hanson, "U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)," Council on Foreign Relations, May 2, 2017, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-africa-command-africom>.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

The concept of training and equipping infantry units was appreciated by the African partners, but many factors jeopardized, if not destroyed, the United States security measures in fighting terrorism in the Sahel. First, the width of the Sahelian desert, in addition to the enduring sanctuaries of terrorist groups, represented some important challenges that eroded the U.S. engagement outcomes. In terms of logistical support, most of the Sahel G5 countries are unable to effectively support a long-term operation. Another factor, which accelerated the situation's worsening crisis, was the collapse of the Libyan government in 2011.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, the huge quantity of weapons stored in Libya landed in the hands of rebel groups and terrorist organizations.¹⁴⁹ In sum, even though the U.S. efforts to build effective defense tools in the Sahel G5 brought hope, its speed has not allowed local forces to mature while the threats were developing and propagating even faster. In addition, the inability of the Sahel G5 leaders to keep the trained units together contributed to destroying their operational capacity. Finally, the United States seems to have relied much too heavily on its Sahelian partners without taking into account the rapid change in the security situation and the slow adaptability of their political and military leadership.

D. ECONOMIC MEASURES

In fighting terrorism, economic measures mostly aim to strengthen communities' resilience to hinder terrorists' recruitment.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, the conducive conditions are

¹⁴⁸ Ricardo René Larémont, "After the Fall of Qaddafi: Political, Economic, and Security Consequences for Libya, Mali, Niger, and Algeria," *International Journal of Security and Development*, accessed July 6, 2018, <https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.bq/>.

Morten Bøås, "The Libyan Crisis - Implications for Stabilization Efforts in the Sahel and Northern Mali," *The Broker* (Blog), March 3, 2015, accessed Jun 25, 2018, <http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Sahel-Watch-a-living-analysis-of-the-conflict-in-Mali/The-Libyan-crisis-Implications-for-stabilization-efforts-in-the-Sahel-and-Northern-Mali>.

Princy Marin George, "The Libyan Crisis and the Western Sahel: Emerging Security Issues," Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, August 14, 2012, accessed June 28, 2018, https://idsa.in/backgrounders/TheLibyanCrisisandWestAfricanSahel_140812.

¹⁴⁹ Conflict Armament Research, "Investigating Cross-Border Weapon Transfers in The Sahel," November 2016, <http://www.conflictarm.com/reports/investigating-cross-border-weapon-transfers-in-the-sahel/>.

¹⁵⁰ United Nations Office of Counterterrorism, "Pillar I: Measures to Address Conditions Conducive to the Spread of Terrorism," UN website, accessed June 3, 2018, <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/pillar-i-measures-address-conditions-conducive-spread-terrorism>.

important to address as President Obama mentioned in 2005: “Ideologies are not defeated with guns, they’re defeated by better ideas—a more attractive and compelling vision.... Poverty does not cause terrorism. But as we’ve seen across ... Africa, when people, especially young people, are impoverished and hopeless and feel humiliated by injustice and corruption, that can fuel resentments that terrorists exploit.”¹⁵¹ The president then emphasized the role of viable development, which creates opportunity and self-esteem for youth.¹⁵² Interestingly, the U.S. policy makers understood early the importance of economic development and political measures to combat terrorism.¹⁵³ Consequently, the nonmilitary aspects of the U.S.–Sahel countries’ cooperation are coming to the forefront. Therefore, the economic support of Sahelian countries dealing with terrorism was implemented as part of a comprehensive approach as mentioned in the 2003 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.¹⁵⁴

This section talks about the United States’ achievements in terms of economic support benefiting Sahelian countries that face terrorism threats. Each one of the Sahel G5 countries has been part of the three initiatives mentioned previously in addition to its own bilateral cooperation with the United States. Therefore, the section considers the main economic policies implemented by the United States through its agencies in the Sahel.

The United States researched and found that unemployment and poverty are some terrorism drivers in the Sahel and subsequently invested funds to address these conditions.¹⁵⁵ Indeed, for the TSCTP, USAID ordered two studies in 2005 to find how development assistance could be most effective in terms of sustainable peace and stability

¹⁵¹ White House, “Remarks by President Obama at the Leaders’ Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism,” released September 29, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/29/remarks-president-obama-leaders-summit-countering-isil-and-violent>.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Transcript of Senate Hearing examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy across Africa’s Sahel Region. “Statement of Earl Gast, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development,” November 17, 2009, 12, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56320/html/CHRG-111shrg56320.htm>.

¹⁵⁴ CIA, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” 2003, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf.

¹⁵⁵ Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* (Washington, DC: USAID, February 2009), 8–11, 19–21, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadt978.pdf.

in Africa (north and west).¹⁵⁶ According to Earl Gast, the first study aggregated and supplemented the real situation, while the second one focused on how to address the findings.¹⁵⁷ Interestingly, the former found that the unmet needs, in terms of economic conditions, are an important driver of violent extremism, including terrorism.¹⁵⁸ More precisely, it discovered that people, mostly young men and women, who suffer from poor economic conditions, tend to slide into violent extremism. That tendency is explained by the fact that terrorist organizations offer economic answers (jobs, food, medical care, and other services like socio-economical guarantees) to these people.¹⁵⁹ Lianne Kennedy Boudali from the Combating Terrorism Center notes that the money allocated to TSCP is roughly \$100 million per year, while International Crisis Group specified that an important part of this funding is development oriented.¹⁶⁰

After having established that being more resilient to hunger and creating more job opportunities can reduce the terrorist groups' influence in many areas, the United States Government concocted various plans to address these causes.¹⁶¹ For example, USAID helped “the Nigerien government and local actors create new economic conditions

¹⁵⁶ Transcript of Senate Hearing examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy across Africa's Sahel Region. “Statement of Earl Gast, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development,” November 17, 2009, 12.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2009), 14–16, <http://www.dmeforpeace.org/peaceexchange/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Development-Assistance-and-Counter-Extremism-A-Programming-Guide-2009-pdf.pdf>.

¹⁵⁹ Gertrude Adwoa Offeibea Ansaaku, “Youth Unemployment and the Fight against Terrorism in West Africa,” *World Policy*, August 15, 2017, <https://worldpolicy.org/2017/08/15/youth-unemployment-and-the-fight-against-terrorism-in-west-africa/>.

¹⁶⁰ Lilianne Kennedy Boudali, *The Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, April 2007), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a466542.pdf>.

International Crisis Group, “Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?” *Africa Report No. 92*, March 31, 2005, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/islamist-terrorism-sahel-fact-or-fiction>.

¹⁶¹ Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” April 18, 2002, accessed July 2, 2018, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.18.1349&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

Lawrence Cline, “Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 10 (2007): 895–896, DOI: 10.1080/10576100701559032.

opportunities in favor of youth for it can resist to extremist, and contribute to the country's stability."¹⁶² Also, the USAID program Resilience in the Sahel Enhanced (RISE) facilitated access to credit and more economic openings for local populations, in addition to aiding natural resource and soil management and animal husbandry. Also, USAID participates in improving the "competitiveness and inclusiveness of three pro-poor value chains: cowpea, small ruminants and poultry, while strengthening the organizational capacities of farmer groups."¹⁶³ In its 2016 Report, USAID mentions that RISE has benefited almost 2 million persons in Niger and Burkina Faso.¹⁶⁴ The report claims, "As a result of investments to expand economic opportunities, nearly 250,000 farmers are now applying new technologies and management practices, well over 1,000 small and medium sized enterprises have accessed \$6.3 million in loans, and more than 1,300 savings groups have accumulated \$772,000 in capital for investment."¹⁶⁵ The RISE program is implemented in Mali as it has been in Niger."¹⁶⁶ In terms of economic development, the United States' policy in fighting terrorism in the Sahel has contributed to making youth more resistant to terrorist groups' appeal. Therefore, it is assumed that without the USAID's achievements in building resilience among vulnerable populations, both the gap left by the governments and the terrorist groups' pressure would push many people to join terrorist organizations.

Another economic response to terrorism threats the United States has implemented in the Sahel has focused on professional training, youth entrepreneurship, and agriculture productivity.¹⁶⁷ In Mali, the PAJE-Nieta, a local NGO, USAID Out-of-school Youth Project sponsored trained 10,951 rural youth from 2010 to 2015, and made them either

¹⁶² USAID Fact Sheet: Agriculture and Food Security in Niger, "Working in Crises and Conflict," accessed June 2, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/niger/working-crises-and-conflict>.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ "Resilience at USAID, 2016 Progress Report," USAID, 14, accessed June 2, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/082816_Resilience_FinalB.PDF.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ "Resilience at USAID, 2016 Progress Report," USAID, 16, accessed June 2, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/082816_Resilience_FinalB.PDF.

¹⁶⁷ U.S. Department of State, "Programs and Initiatives," web page, accessed June 10, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/>.

self-employers or more competitive for jobs.¹⁶⁸ According to USAID, “8,077 youth launched a microenterprise as self-employed, 82% of trained youth who received kits were still self-employed up to 24 months after the close of the youth development cycle, 70% of youth who launched microenterprises between 2011 and 2013 were still operating their businesses as of November 2015.”¹⁶⁹ In the same vein, the following graphic (Figure 1) shows the change in terms of agricultural production under the Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali (IICEM), a USAID funded program, from 2009 to 2012.¹⁷⁰ The 2011–2012 decrease resulted from the country’s major security and political crises.¹⁷¹ On March 22, 2012, the democratically elected president was overthrown by a military coup d’état.¹⁷² Subsequently, two third of the country was invaded by terrorist and separatist groups.¹⁷³ Despite new elections in 2013 that brought an elected president, the government still does not control an important part of the country, where populations continue to lack many services compared to the other regions. As revealed by USAID in the following graphic, its program Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali has fueled significant increases in agricultural production for the small farmers.¹⁷⁴ Obviously, to a farmer, having an agricultural production increase means a great change in terms of financial wellness. Even though other programs not part of TSCTP have contributed to these achievements in addition to the country’s own efforts, one can assume that the transition from PSI, which was an almost pure military activity, to TSCP represents a great improvement in terms of a comprehensive approach in fighting terrorism.

¹⁶⁸ “Positive Youth: Development In Mali: Better Educated, Economically Productive and Civically Engaged Rural Youth,” USAID, accessed June 25, 2018, <http://idd.edc.org/sites/idd.edc.org/files/Mali%20Out%20of%20School%20Project%20Summary.pdf>.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ “USAID/MALI: Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali (IICEM), Performance Evaluation,” USAID, October 2013, accessed June 28, 2018, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacy107.pdf.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Adam Nossiter, “Soldiers Overthrow Mali Government in Setback for Democracy in Africa,” *New York Times*, March 22, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html>.

¹⁷³ Afua Hirsch, “Islamist Rebels Vow Assault on Malian Capital if International Forces Attack,” *Guardian*, October 29, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/29/mali-africa>.

¹⁷⁴ “USAID/MALI: Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali (IICEM), Performance Evaluation,” USAID, October 2013, accessed June 28, 2018, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacy107.pdf.




Figure 1. USAID, Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali (IICEM) performance evaluation (May 28–August 21, 2013).¹⁷⁵

To sum up, the United States’ assistance toward Sahel G5 countries did contribute to better development conditions.¹⁷⁶ In 2014, the United States spent almost \$280 million (see Figure 2) to support Sahelian countries mostly in the domain of agriculture and food security.¹⁷⁷ The following graphic highlights these efforts.¹⁷⁸ Also, the 2012 U.S. Sahel Joint Planning Cell aimed to reduce poverty and hunger among economically weak groups by 20% and to increase income from livestock breeding by 50%.¹⁷⁹ Although it is difficult to declare that American programs directly contributed to fighting terrorism, it is

¹⁷⁵ “USAID/MALI: Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali (IICEM), Performance Evaluation,” USAID, October 2013, accessed June 28, 2018, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacy107.pdf.

¹⁷⁶ “The Sahel,” USAID, 2014, accessed June 28, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/sahel>.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ “Sahel Joint Planning Cell Strategic Plan: Reducing Risk, Building Resilience, and Facilitating Inclusive Economic Growth,” USAID, 2012, accessed June 29, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Sahel%20JPC%20Strategy%20Summary_28%20June%202013.pdf.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

observable that people and communities that benefited from the USAID programs had their lives positively changed.¹⁸⁰




Figure 2. USAID: Sahel.¹⁸¹

E. EDUCATION MEASURES

Since many scholars and U.S. agencies have established the link between lack of education and violent extremism, including terrorism in Africa, the United States implemented programs to encourage African countries to face the problem. In addition, the African Union (AU) during its meeting at Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on January 27, 2018,

¹⁸⁰ “USAID/MALI: Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali (IICEM), Performance Evaluation,” USAID, October 2013, accessed June 28, 2018, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacy107.pdf.

¹⁸¹ Source: “The Sahel,” USAID, 2014, accessed June 28, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/sahel>.

highlighted the place of education in combating terrorism.¹⁸² Knowing that Africa holds one of the lowest literacy rates in the world, the African Union aimed to improve the schooling rate as well as educating the religious leaders so they can play a positive role in fighting radicalization.¹⁸³ Therefore, the United States' efforts to address the education issues in the Sahel met the communities' and governments' expectations.

The Sahel G5 countries' low level of literacy as well as their weak schooling rate contrasts with their high fertility rate.¹⁸⁴ This birth performance reveals a strong challenge to these poor countries and must be addressed in terms of education to reduce the potential youth exposure to terrorist appeals. For example, Niger has the highest birth rate in the world while 70% of its population is illiterate and almost half of the female primary school students do not reach the sixth grade.¹⁸⁵ If nothing is done to manage the growing population's needs, especially the youth, through education, the chance exists that they will boost terrorist groups.

This section assesses the U.S. achievements in terms of developing education and literacy in the Sahel G5 countries. This assessment does not focus on a precise time period since the aim is to find out how USAID and its connected agencies have improved the literacy level, and then how that contribution has helped to enlighten people who might be exposed to terrorism propaganda. In other words, the section enumerates only the current

¹⁸² African Union, "Briefing Note on a Comprehensive Approach to Combat the Transnational Threat of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa," Peace and Security Council, 749th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 27, 2018), accessed June 3, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/psc-749-rpt-summit-terrorism-27-jan-2018_0.pdf.

¹⁸³ Africa-America Institute, *State of Education in Africa Report 2015* (New York: Africa-America Institute, 2015), 6–15, <http://www.aaionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AAI-SOE-report-2015-final.pdf>.

African Union, "Briefing Note on a Comprehensive Approach to Combat the Transnational Threat of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa," Peace and Security Council, 749th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 27, 2018), accessed June 3, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/psc-749-rpt-summit-terrorism-27-jan-2018_0.pdf.

¹⁸⁴ "Sahel Region," World Health Organization, October 2006, accessed June 5, 2018, http://www.who.int/hac/donorinfo/callsformobilisation/Sahel_advocacy_Oct06.pdf.

¹⁸⁵ "Niger: Education Fact Sheet," USAID, accessed March 6, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Niger_Fact_Sheet-Education-EN.pdf.

"Sahel Region," World Health Organization, October 2006, accessed June 5, 2018, http://www.who.int/hac/donorinfo/callsformobilisation/Sahel_advocacy_Oct06.pdf.

achievements in each country in terms of USAID's impact on the national education system.

USAID developed an education strategy for 2011–2015 that aimed to improve the education level throughout the world.¹⁸⁶ This strategy, the third goal of which was to “increase equitable access to education in crisis and conflict environments for 15 million learners by 2015,” recognized the link among education, economic growth, and democratic governance.¹⁸⁷ That conviction drove USAID to implement many programs in favor of Sahel G5 countries.

In Mali, USAID helped to achieve some spectacular results.¹⁸⁸ These results include training teachers in more than 2,000 schools, reinforcing the school administration method by helping establish more than 500 parent-teacher associations and almost ten local NGOs, and reaching about 4,000 out-of-school jobless youth, males as well as females.¹⁸⁹ Impressively, the impact was concrete and very interesting. According to USAID, “The proportion of illiterate youth tested participating in USAID's Youth Project dropped from 79% (male: 85%; female: 71%) at baseline to 48% (male: 59%; female: 36%) at midline, while the proportion of semi-literate youth rose from 21% (male: 15%; female: 29%) to 52% (male: 41%; female: 64%) in that same timeframe.”¹⁹⁰ More interestingly, USAID has launched a project, Equitable Access to Education for Children in Areas of Insecurity, covering 2015 to 2017 with a budget of \$4.9 million, targeting areas of insecurity where schools were closed due to terrorist threats (Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Taoudenni, Gao, Menaka, and Kidal regions).¹⁹¹ The project aimed to achieve the following results: facilitating access of 100,000 girls and boys in the most conflict-affected communities,

¹⁸⁶ “USAID Education Strategy Progress Report 2011–2015,” USAID, accessed June 4, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/2011-2015_ProgressReport_r13_Final_WEB.pdf.

¹⁸⁷ “Education through Learning,” USAID Education Strategy, February 2011, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacq946.pdf.

¹⁸⁸ “USAID: Mali Education,” USAID, accessed March 2, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/mali/education>.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

identify and train 2,000 teachers to implement an accelerated learning curriculum and psychosocial response, enrollment of 15,000 children in the accelerated learning program.¹⁹² In addition, the project aimed to increase the capacities of the education system at all levels, which would help to plan and implement an education contingency plan in case of emergency.¹⁹³ In 2013, through the civil society, a contingency plan was implemented in the north of Mali when the government workers withdrew due to a terrorist group invasion.

Even though the increase in both school enrollment and literacy rates in Mali coincides with the United States' firm engagement in these domains, it is important to know that the Malian government itself has developed its own national policy for education in addition to getting support from other non-American partners (UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP, World Bank (WB), African Union, and European Union).¹⁹⁴ Table 1 reveals the significant changes in terms of schooling rate from 2000/2001 to 2013/2014, which has increased by more than ten points.¹⁹⁵ The government recognized the great contribution from foreign partners, including the United States, even though it does not specify the amount of money contributed by each one of the partners. Tellingly, considering the data given by USAID in the previous paragraph, it is clear that it has lifted the Malian schooling rate as well as the literacy rate, as shown in Figure 3.¹⁹⁶ The graphic demonstrates the increase in the literacy rate among Malian populations according to their ages.¹⁹⁷ Since most of the U.S. programs against terrorism in Africa started after 2000, coinciding with

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ministry of National Education, *Rapport D'évaluation Nationale de L'Education pour Tous (EPT) 2015* [Report on National Education for the 2015] (November 2014), accessed July 10, 2018, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002310/231079f.pdf>.

¹⁹⁵ Adama Diallo and Oumar Cisse, "4ème Recensement General de la Population et de L'habitat du Mali (RGPH-2009), Scolarisation, Instruction et Alphabétisation au Mali," [4th General Census of Population and Housing in Mali (RGPH-2009), Schooling, Education and Literacy in Mali] (Bamako: Economic Ministry for Finance and Budget, National Institute of Statistics, Central Bureau of Census, 2012), 6, accessed June 10, 2018, http://www.instat-mali.org/contenu/rgph/raedu09_rgph.pdf.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ "Mali, Education and Literacy," UNESCO, accessed July 12, 2018, <http://uis.unesco.org/country/ML>.

the very notable changes shown in Figure 3, one can argue the undeniable role played by these programs in the increase of both schooling and literacy rates.

Table 1. Mali's schooling rate evolution 2000–2001 to 2013–2014.¹⁹⁸

School Years	Boys	Girls	National Schooling Rate
2000-2001	72.5%	50.0%	61.0%
2001-2002	75.3%	53.7%	64.3%
2002-2003	77.9%	56.4%	67.0%
2003-2004	81.3%	59.9%	70.5%
2004-2005	85.0%	63.4%	74.0%
2005-2006	85.1%	65.1%	75.0%
2006-2007	87.5%	68.0%	77.6%
2007-2008	89.5%	70.7%	80.0%
2008-2009	91.2%	73.0%	82.0%
2009-2010	87.4%	71.8%	79.5%
2010-2011	89.1%	74.0%	81.5%
2011-2012	75.7%	76.5%	76.1%
2012-2013	69.8%	72.1%	71.0%
2013-2014	76.4%	64.0	70.1%

¹⁹⁸ Adapted from Adama Diallo, Oumar Cisse, “4ème Recensement General de la Population et de L’habitat du Mali (RGPH-2009), Scolarisation, Instruction et Alphanetisation au Mali,” [4th General Census of Population and Housing in Mali (RGPH-2009), Schooling, Education and Literacy in Mali] (Bamako: Economic Ministry for Finance and Budget, National Institute of Statistics, Central Bureau of Census, 2012), 6, accessed June 10, 2018, http://www.instat-mali.org/contenu/rgph/raedu09_rgph.pdf.




Figure 3. Source: The evolution of literacy rate among population aged 15 years and older, from 1975 to 2015.¹⁹⁹

The Government of Niger signed a ten-year partnership with USAID in 2013, which started in 2014 to address the 70% illiteracy rate.²⁰⁰ In Niger, the USAID education program focused on increasing the schooling rate as well as lowering illiteracy. It has also helped in enhancing education quality in addition to encouraging civil society to accept oversight of the school domain.²⁰¹ USAID contributes to building good communication

¹⁹⁹ Source: “Mali, Education, and Literacy,” UNESCO, accessed July 12, 2018, <http://uis.unesco.org/country/ML>.

²⁰⁰ “Niger: Education Fact Sheet,” USAID, accessed March 6, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Niger_Fact_Sheet-Education-EN.pdf.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

among school actors in Niger.²⁰² The change observed in schooling rate in Niger from 2012 to 2016 is a positive sign.²⁰³ According to the Niger government’s data, as shown in Table 2, a constant evolution can be seen in terms of schooling, among both male and female students.²⁰⁴

Table 2. Niger’s schooling rate evolution 2012–2016.²⁰⁵

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Annual Growth Rate’s Average
Boys	255,423	271,444	279,785	301,883	289,774	3.2%
Girls	219,743	266,224	230,422	252,157	242,046	2.4%
Total	475,166	497,668	510,207	554,040	531,820	2.9%

In general, the description of the USAID education strategy and achievements in Niger and Mali is quite like what it has done in the other Sahel G5 countries (Chad, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso). In addition, its education strategy is tied to many other strategies for the same goal: to contribute to youth employment, increase economic resilience, contribute to social cohesion, or participate into the decision-making process. For example, the Republic of Mauritania “is contending with high youth unemployment (48.9% for men and 40.7% for women), high poverty (42%) and a relative lack of formal education.”²⁰⁶

To sum up, although it is difficult to measure the United States programs’ impact within the education and literacy domain in the Sahel G5 countries, it is possible to argue that all these supports have contributed to erode the terrorists’ ability to recruit. The

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ “Statistiques de L’éducation de Base et Alphabétisation Annuaire 2015–2016,” [Statistics of Elementary Education and Literacy Year 2015–2016] Niger, accessed July 12, 2018, http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaire_Statistiques/men/Annuaire_2015_2016.pdf.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Adapted from “Statistiques de L’éducation de Base et Alphabétisation Annuaire 2015–2016,” [Statistics of Elementary Education and Literacy Year 2015–2016] Niger, accessed July 12, 2018, http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaire_Statistiques/men/Annuaire_2015_2016.pdf.

²⁰⁶ “Mauritania,” USAID, accessed March 3, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/mauritania>.

programs forcibly prepared people to understand the hidden and dangerous face of the terrorist propaganda. The programs provided to people the means of resisting obscurantists' appeals and make people ready to connect with knowledge. Therefore, they can be part of a passive or active resistance network, standing against the terrorism phenomenon in the Sahel.

F. CONCLUSION

The U.S. counterterrorism experience in the Sahel G5 countries provides many lessons in terms of a strategy to defeat terrorism. The understanding that terrorism could not be won without a global approach supported it. That approach included strategies dealing with root-causes of the terrorism threat as well as its consequences. In the light of the four-pronged U.S. strategic approach (education, economic development, governance and security), the possible defeat of the terrorist organization in the Sahel is questionable even though the United States' approach has achieved some appreciable results. Obviously, as proven by the satisfactory rise of schooling and literacy rates in the Sahel G5 countries, the educational measures deserve credit, as does the economic data. Nevertheless, while it is impossible to quantify the governance measures' impact, the security measures have proven to be a clear failure. Despite the fact that PSI was designed to prevent or eliminate terrorists' sanctuaries in the Sahel Sahara region, most of the Sahelian countries have become sanctuaries to terrorist groups.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, a larger U.S. engagement against terrorism in the Sahel G5 area, through TSCTP and AFRICOM, is insufficient as witnessed by the spreading of terrorist groups and the gravity of the threats they continue to impose on the populations.²⁰⁸ The U.S. trained units were unable to stand against terrorist groups, as demonstrated in Mali in 2012. New terrorist groups are proliferating and endangering peace, security, and economic development in Sahel G5's space. More and more light weapons are circulating out of states' control. Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and other armed

²⁰⁷ Craig S. Smithmay, "U.S. Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorists," *New York Times*, November 5, 2004, accessed July 30, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/11/world/us-training-african-forces-to-uproot-terrorists.html>.

²⁰⁸ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Violent Extremism in the Sahel," CSIS, accessed June 6, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/projects/militancy-and-arc-instability/militancy-and-arc-2>.

groups spread and defy the governments. Therefore, despite the nearly 20-year U.S. counterterrorism engagements in the Sahel, the Sahel G5 leaders have failed to stem the spread of terrorism in their countries.²⁰⁹ In conclusion, the Sahel G5's space is less safe than 20 years ago. Ultimately, the United States counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel can be qualified as unsuccessful since from the early 2000 to 2018 the security situation has worsened. That failure does not count for only the United States but also for its Sahelian partners that appear unable to capitalize on the support.

²⁰⁹ United Nations, ““Time Running out” to Stop Terrorism’s Spread across the Sahel,” UN News, August 15, 2017, <https://news.un.org/en/audio/2017/08/631982>.

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III. THE SAHEL G5 CONCEPT

A. INTRODUCTION

The Sahel G5 organization has drawn the attention of many scholars because of the originality of its concept, which recommends allying security and development to overcome terrorism in the Sahel region.²¹⁰ That approach has fascinated many specialists, who have welcomed it since it represents a clearly stated political vision from a specific region that shares the same historical and cultural similarities and deals with the same challenges.²¹¹ While this original concept appeared as a potentially adequate response to actual terrorism threats, lack of development, including illiteracy and low education levels, together with an ineffective security apparatus, the concept has yet to address all the main issues.²¹² Additionally, some researchers are doubtful about the Sahel G5's ability to achieve its goals because of its lack of funding and the low level of its defense institutions that need not only equipment but also more time to professionalize. Meanwhile, the threats are exponentially growing.²¹³

The SG5 countries were ready to contribute financially to the organization's needs; however, they did call for funding from international partners since it was clear that, alone,

²¹⁰ "Presentation," G5S webpage, September 29, 2015, <http://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/qui-sommes-nous/le-g5-sahel>.

Abdelhak Bassou, "State, Borders and Territory in the Sahel: The Case of the G5 Sahel," Policy Brief PB-17/33, October 2017, 3–5, <http://www.ocppc.ma/publications/state-borders-and-territory-sahel-case-g5-sahel>.

²¹¹ Nicolas Desgrais, *La Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) Ou l'émergence d'une architecture de défense collective proper au Sahel*, [Sahel G5 Joint Force (FC-G5S) Or the emergence of a proper collective defense architecture in the Sahel] (Paris: Centre Supérieur de la Formation et de la Recherche Stratégiques, December 2017), https://www.csfrs.fr/sites/default/files/nicolas_desgrais_v2.pdf.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Graciana del Castillo, "Can the G5 Force Work Counterterrorism Magic in Africa's Sahel Region?," Pass Blue, July 15, 2017, <http://www.passblue.com/2017/06/15/operation-barkhane/>.

International Crisis Group, *Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force* (Report No. 258 / AFRICA, December 12, 2017), CSIS, accessed June 6, 2018, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/258-force-du-g5-sahel-trouver-sa-place-dans-lembouteillage-securitaire>.

they would not be able to support the cost over a long period.²¹⁴ Therefore, they established a very close cooperation with the European Union (EU) countries and other international organizations.²¹⁵ The EU has always taken the lead, diplomatically as well as in fundraising, in favor of the SG5.²¹⁶ In July 2017, aware of the economic weakness of the new organization, France and Germany launched the “Alliance pour le Sahel” (Sahel Alliance).²¹⁷ That alliance aims to mobilize donors in favor of the SG5.²¹⁸ The Sahel Alliance’s domain of action is education and training, agriculture, governance and justice, and climate deregulation issues.²¹⁹ Besides the Sahel Alliance, the EU supports the SG5 in specific areas, including political dialogue, development and humanitarian support, and security.²²⁰ The SG5 leaders conceived the “Strategie pour le Developpement et la Securite des Pays du G5 Sahel” (Sahel G5 Countries’ Development and Security Strategy).²²¹ The strategy highlights the context, states a vision, and explains the course of action.²²² In sum, both the EU and the Sahel Alliance contribute to the SG5 strategy’s achievement.

Implementing its member countries’ development and security strategies, the SG5 organization has conceived the “Programme d’Investissement Prioritaire” (Priority Investment Program) to immediately address the most urgent needs of security and

²¹⁴ Jennifer G. Cooke, Boris Toucas, “Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?” CSIS, November 15, 2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security>.

²¹⁵ “The European Union’s Partnership with the G5 Sahel Countries,” EU web page, February 20, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-942_en.htm.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ “Berlin et Paris lancent l’Alliance pour le Sahel,” Reuters, July 13, 2017, <https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=https://fr.reuters.com/article/topNews/idFRKBN19Y1PV-OFRTTP&prev=search>.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ “The European Union’s Partnership with the G5 Sahel Countries,” EU web page, February 20, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-942_en.htm.

²²¹ “Strategie pour le Developpement et la Securite des Pays du G5 Sahel,” [Strategy for Development and Security of Sahel G5 Countries] SG5 web page, accessed May 5, 2018, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/SDS_G5S_VF.pdf.

²²² Ibid.

development.²²³ To that end, the meeting gathering SG5 participants with international donors held in July 2014 in Niamey (Niger) decided upon an ambitious Priority Investment Program (PIP), estimated around \$14.8 billion.²²⁴ This program aimed to boost development, governance, security, and economic resilience in addition to tackle the infrastructure issue.²²⁵ The PIP's first phase (2018–2020) should allow a better road network, a better access to education, stronger security forces and desire for economic growth.²²⁶

For the purpose of this thesis, assessment of the achievements of the SG5 in its brief four-year existence seems to be less interesting than studying its concept, strategy, and course of actions. Nevertheless, questioning its concept and looking at the chances of success is helpful. Therefore, this chapter explains the SG5's organization and functioning. Then, the chapter examines the Sahelian organization strategy in terms of security and defense, governance, infrastructure, and resilience as described in its Convention of Creation.²²⁷

Finally, the chapter attempts to identify the organization's chances of success. The four areas mentioned earlier mirror the quaternary structure of education, economic development, governance, and security, by which this thesis is structured.

²²³ “Berlin et Paris lancent l’Alliance pour le Sahel,” [Berlin and Paris launch the Sahel alliance] Reuters, July 13, 2017, <https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=https://fr.reuters.com/article/topNews/idFRKBN19Y1PV-OFRTTP&prev=search>.

²²⁴ “Sahel G5 Meeting Brings Together Governments and Donors to Accelerate Regional Development,” World Bank, July 14, 2014, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/14/sahel-g5-meeting-brings-together-governments-and-donors-to-accelerate-regional-development>.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ “Programme D’investissements Prioritaires (PIP/G5 Sahel) Première Phase: 2018–2020 Présentation du Portefeuille Actualisé des Projets,” [Priority Investment Program (PIP / G5 Sahel) First Phase: 2018–2020, Updated Projects Portfolio] Sahel G5 web page, accessed May 5, 2018, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

²²⁷ “Convention de Creation du G5 Sahel, Art 5,” Sahel G5 web page, accessed July 10, 2018, <http://www.g5sahel.org/images/convention.pdf>.

B. THE SG5 ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING

The SG5 can be described as a regional security architecture that relies on the capacity building of its members (states and communities) for collectively conquering terrorism.²²⁸

The purpose of the G5 Sahel is: (i) to guarantee conditions of development and security in the member countries; (ii) to provide a strategic framework for intervention to improve the living conditions of the population; (iii) to combine development and security, supported by democracy and good governance, in a framework of mutually beneficial regional and international cooperation and (iv) to promote inclusive and sustainable regional development.²²⁹

To implement its policy, the Sahel G5 organization is structured into five organs: the Heads of State's Conference, the Ministers' Council, the Permanent Secretariat, the Defense and Security Committee, and the National Coordinating Committees.²³⁰ Established in Nouakchott (Mauritania), the Headquarters gathers official representatives of each country. The Heads of States' Conference is the supreme governing body.²³¹ That structure sets the organization's strategic and political orientations and ordinarily meets once a year.²³² Ordinarily meeting twice a year, the Ministers' Council, composed of the five ministers in charge of development, is the statutory organ for implementing the organization's political vision.²³³ Even though each one of the structures plays an important role in the organization's functional system, the Permanent Secretariat that coordinates the four domains of expertise (Defense and Security, Governance, Infrastructures, Resilience)

²²⁸ Nicolas Desgrais, *La Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) Ou l'émergence d'une architecture de défense collective propre au Sahel* [Sahel G5 Joint Force (FC-G5S) Or the emergence of a proper collective defense architecture in the Sahel] (Paris: Centre Supérieur de la Formation et de la Recherche Stratégiques, December 2017, 4, accessed June 1, 2018, https://www.csfrs.fr/sites/default/files/nicolas_desgrais_v2.pdf).

²²⁹ "Convention de Creation du G5 Sahel, Art 4," Sahel G5 web page, accessed July 10, 2018, <http://www.g5sahel.org/images/convention.pdf>.

²³⁰ Ibid., Art. 6.

²³¹ Ibid., Art. 7.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid., Art. 8.

is the organization's linchpin.²³⁴ A group of counselors (Legal Advisor, Programming and Evaluation, Communication and Public Affairs, Administrative and Financial Affairs) strengthens the Headquarters' frame. Under the Ministers' Council authority, the Permanent Secretariat is in charge of administrative, logistical, and financial matters.²³⁵ The Defense and Security Committee is composed of the five General Chiefs of Staff, who are assisted by experts for the purpose of managing and supervising the security and defense issues.²³⁶ The National Coordinating Committees are miniaturized replicas of the Permanent Secretariat in each country. Under the control of the Minister in Charge of Development, they group experts working on specific thematic issues in the frame of the Sahel G5 policy at the national levels.²³⁷ The graphic in Figure 4 shows the organizational structure.

²³⁴ Ibid., Art. 10, 11, 12.

²³⁵ Batina Moulaye Zeidane, "Du Cadre Institutionnel et du Fonctionnement du G5 Sahel," [Institutionnal Framework of Sahel G5] *Revue Semestrielle d'Information du G5 Sahel*, no. 1, (June 2016): 6, <http://www.g5sahel.org/media/mag/Revue01.pdf>.

²³⁶ "Convention de Creation du G5 Sahel, Art 13," Sahel G5 web page, accessed July 10, 2018, <http://www.g5sahel.org/images/convention.pdf>.

²³⁷ Ibid. Art 14.




Figure 4. The Sahel G5 organizational chart constructed according to the Sahel G5’s webpage information.²³⁸

C. THE SAHEL G5’S STRATEGY

The Sahel G5 Convention of Creation’s fifth article specifies the organization’s lines of strategy: “Strengthening peace and security in the G5 Sahel area; developing transport, hydraulic, energy and telecommunication infrastructures; creating better governance conditions; strengthening populations’ resilience capacity, ensuring sustainable food security, human development and pastoralism.”²³⁹ Although the education aspect has not been given a specific strategy, it is included in the governance and the resilience and human development strategies. In February 2018, the Sahel G5 organization

²³⁸ Source: Sahel G5 web page, published November 5, 2015, accessed July 10, 2018, <http://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/documentations/organigramme>.

²³⁹ “Convention de Creation du G5 Sahel, Art 5,” Sahel G5 web page, accessed July 10, 2018, <http://www.g5sahel.org/images/convention.pdf>.

launched its PIP's first phase (2018–2020).²⁴⁰ Table 3 summarizes 60 projects estimated at \$7,232.47 million with less than third funded in February 2018.²⁴¹ Afterwards, aiming to help operationalizing the Sahel Joint Force, some partners like France and Germany together contributed \$21.7 million while some others have pledged (Saudi Arabia \$100 million, the United Arab Emirates \$30 million, and the United States \$60 million).²⁴² The whole Sahel G5 PIP portfolio is composed of six Defense and Security projects, five Governance projects, 45 Infrastructures projects, and four Resilience and Human Development projects.²⁴³

Table 3. G5 Sahel PIP portfolio (February 2018).²⁴⁴

Projects' orientation	Number of projects	Cost \$ million	Funding available \$ million	Missing (gap) \$ million	Percentage of gap
Defense and Security	06	544.53	0	544.53	100%
Governance	05	104.27	0	104.27	100%
Infrastructures	45	6,426.88	2,262.71	4,164.17	65%
Resilience and Human Development	04	162.78	0	162.78	100%
Total	60	7,238.47	2,262.71	4,975.76	68.74%

²⁴⁰ “Programme D’investissements Prioritaires (PIP/G5 Sahel) Première Phase: 2018–2020 Présentation du Portefeuille Actualisé des Projets,” [Priority Investment Program (PIP / G5 Sahel) First Phase: 2018–2020 Updated Portfolio of the Projects] Sahel G5 web page, February 2018, 2, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Benjamin Nickels, Jean-Baptiste Matton, and Alix Boucher, “The G5 Sahel Joint Force Gains Traction,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 9, 2018, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/g5-sahel-joint-force-gains-traction/>.

²⁴³ Adapted from “Programme D’investissements Prioritaires (PIP/G5 Sahel) Première Phase: 2018–2020 Présentation du Portefeuille Actualisé des Projets,” [Priority Investment Program (PIP / G5 Sahel) First Phase: 2018–2020 Updated Portfolio of the Projects] Sahel G5 web page, February 2018, 2, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

²⁴⁴ Created by the author according to Sahel G5’s website information.

1. Security and Defense

The Sahel G5 Security and Defense strategy has focused on a set of six projects to respond to the urgent needs of security and development, and make the organization more dynamic since peace and security represent the communities' highest expectations.²⁴⁵ In the frame of the PIP, the creation of both the Sahelian Center for Threat Analysis and Early Warning, and the War College and Police Academy will contribute to the security forces' capacity building.²⁴⁶ The Defense and Security Strategy aims to reinforce the public and civil security in addition to enhance the intelligence sharing.²⁴⁷ A coherent implementation of that strategy will contribute to the achievement of the Sahel G5's vision of building a safe and developed region in which states are democratically ruled and citizens are educated. Yet, the achievement of that strategy requires both the Sahel G5 Joint Force (SG5JF) and the Sahel G5 Police component (SG5PC) to reach full operational capacity. In addition to its mission of advising the JF commander, the Sahel G5 Police Component will be composed of investigative units in the security apparatus and the criminal justice system.²⁴⁸ The Security and Defense projects are estimated at €470 million.²⁴⁹

Tackling the terrorism phenomenon and the other transnational threats, the Sahel G5 organization created its military Joint Force on July 2, 2017, while the process of its

²⁴⁵ "Programme D'investissements Prioritaires (PIP/G5 Sahel) Première Phase: 2018–2020 Présentation du Portefeuille Actualisé des Projets," [Priority Investment Program (PIP / G5 Sahel) First Phase: 2018–2020 Updated Portfolio of the Projects] Sahel G5 web page, February 2018, 3, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ "Opérationnalisation de la composante police de la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel," [Operationalization of the police component of Sahel G5 Joint Force] Sahel G5 web page, April 30, 2018, <http://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/8-nos-activit%C3%A9s/1310-operationnalisation-de-la-composante-police-de-la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel>.

²⁴⁹ "Programme D'investissements Prioritaires (PIP/G5 Sahel) Première Phase: 2018–2020 Présentation du Portefeuille Actualisé des Projets," [Priority Investment Program (PIP / G5 Sahel) First Phase: 2018–2020 Updated Portfolio of the Projects] Sahel G5 web page, February 2018, 2, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

Police Component creation is not yet completed.²⁵⁰ The Sahel JC was declared ready and launched on July 2, 2018, to patrol the countries' borders, ungoverned areas, and havens for many terrorist groups.²⁵¹ That force of 5,000 men has been assigned the mission of fighting terrorism, organized trans-border crimes, and human trafficking in an area bigger than 5,000 square kilometers, inhabited by more than 70 million people.²⁵² Even though the JF supports the National Defense Forces, its focused Area of Operation (AO) composed of three sectors (almost 6,000 kilometers by 100 kilometers) seems too much to master by the JF.²⁵³ Each sector stretches 50 kilometers over each side of the border; thus, it covers all of the borderlines separating two or three neighboring countries. The Western Sector is the AO of two battalions (Mali and Mauritania), the Central Sector is the AO of three battalions (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) while the Eastern Sector is the AO of two battalions (Niger and Chad).²⁵⁴ In case of legal issues, to fulfill the need for investigation, the Sahel G5 organization has reinforced the battalions with small police or gendarmerie

²⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, "Force du G5 Sahel: Trouver sa place dans l'embouteillage sécuritaire, Report No. 258 December 12, 2017)," [G5 Sahel Force: Finding its place in a security traffic jams, Report No. 258 December 12, 2017] accessed July 14, 2018, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/258-force-du-g5-sahel-trouver-sa-place-dans-l-embouteillage-securitaire>.

G5 Sahel, "Recommendations De L'atelier Sur L'opérationnalisation De La Composante Police De La Force Conjointe Du G5 Sahel," [Workshop Recommendations on the operationalization of the Sahel G5 Joint Force Police Component] Niamey (Niger), April 12, 2018, https://www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrica/Recommandations_Atelier_de_Niamey_REV.pdf.

²⁵¹ French Embassy, "Le G5 Sahel: Une décision politique avant tout africaine," [The G5 Sahel: an African political decision] accessed July 15, 2018, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-et-rangere-de-la-france/defense-et-securite/crises-et-conflits/la-force-conjointe-g5-sahel-et-l-alliance-sahel/>.

"Briefing Security Council on Joint Force for Sahel, Secretary-General Urges Innovative International Actions to Keep Region from 'Sinking into Chaos,'" United Nations, December 30, 2017, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13046.doc.htm>.

²⁵² French Embassy, "Le G5 Sahel: Une décision politique avant tout africaine," [The G5 Sahel: an African political decision] accessed July 15, 2018, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-et-rangere-de-la-france/defense-et-securite/crises-et-conflits/la-force-conjointe-g5-sahel-et-l-alliance-sahel/>. "Strategie pour le Developpement et la Securite des Pays du G5 Sahel," [Strategy for Development and Security of Sahel G5 Countries] SG5 web page, accessed May 5, 2018, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/SDS_G5S_VF.pdf.

²⁵³ French Embassy, "Le G5 Sahel: Une décision politique avant tout africaine," [The G5 Sahel: an African political decision] accessed July 15, 2018, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-et-rangere-de-la-france/defense-et-securite/crises-et-conflits/la-force-conjointe-g5-sahel-et-l-alliance-sahel/>.

²⁵⁴ Concept d'Operation du G5 Sahel.

units on the ground. Table 4 presents the JF’s details while Figure 5 shows the battalions’ AO.²⁵⁵

Table 4. The Joint Force details table.²⁵⁶

Countries	Mauritania	Mali	Burkina Faso	Niger	Chad	HQ & log	Total
Military	550	1100	550	1100	550	450	5000
Police	100	200	100	200	100		
Total	650	1300	650	1300	650	450	

²⁵⁵ Karolina Gasinska and Elias Bohman, “Joint Force of the Group of Five: A Review of Multiple Challenges” (Report No. 4548—SE, 2017), FOI, accessed July 10, 2018, http://www.academia.edu/36363504/Joint_Force_of_the_Group_of_Five_A_review_of_multiple_challenges.

²⁵⁶ Adapted from Karolina Gasinska and Elias Bohman, “Joint Force of the Group of Five: A Review of Multiple Challenges” (Report No. 4548—SE, 2017), FOI, accessed July 10, 2018, http://www.academia.edu/36363504/Joint_Force_of_the_Group_of_Five_A_review_of_multiple_challenges.




Figure 5. Sahel G5 JF deployment. Source: FOI.²⁵⁷

2. Governance

The Sahel G5 organization has indicated the governance challenge as a key issue, which should be addressed through an effective judiciary system and the rule of law, a good decentralization, and the fighting of radicalization and violent extremism.²⁵⁸ Mamadou Samake, the Sahel G5's expert in charge of governance, has mentioned disregard for the constitution (changing the number of presidential mandates, coups d'Etat), women and youth, and minorities' participation in decision-making processes, the unachieved decentralization processes, in addition to corruption as major challenges to

²⁵⁷ Source: Karolina Gasinska and Elias Bohman, "Joint Force of the Group of Five: A Review of Multiple Challenges" (Report No. 4548—SE, 2017), FOI, accessed July 10, 2018, http://www.academia.edu/36363504/Joint_Force_of_the_Group_of_Five_A_review_of_multiple_challenges

²⁵⁸ Mamadou Samake, "G5 Sahel: Axe Gouvernance," *Revue Semestrielle d'Information du G5 Sahel*, No. 1 (June 2016), <http://www.g5sahel.org/media/mag/Revue01.pdf>.

quickly overcome.²⁵⁹ In response to the previously mentioned issues, the organization wants to consolidate the electoral processes in the five countries by strengthening the rule of law and encouraging states to effectively implement decentralization.²⁶⁰ The expert also added the importance of standing against radicalization by enhancing education and literacy.²⁶¹ The organization highly recommended to train and to equip the law enforcers (police, judges) as a springboard for good governance.²⁶² Consequently, that process will contribute to the professionalization of the judiciary system as well as to allow more people to feel themselves as part of the state.²⁶³ Obviously, that feeling could contribute to greater political stability and social wellness.

Besides the measures mentioned earlier, the Sahel G5 organization has determined a set of prioritized actions to promote good governance.²⁶⁴ The Sahel G5 has recommended the creation of a biometric electoral file for elections' transparency and preventing conflict and post-electoral disputes in addition to enhance states officials' capacity in terms of providing citizen needs.²⁶⁵ The Sahel G5 has also encouraged the creation of more positive social communication in terms of political and religious dialogue among all components of society.²⁶⁶

Thoroughly addressing the governance issues, the organization planned five projects, estimated together at €90 million.²⁶⁷ First, human rights promotion and protection

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ "Strategie pour le Developpement et la Securite des Pays du G5 Sahel," [Strategy for Development and Security of Sahel G5 Countries] SG5 web page, September 2016, 9, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/SDS_G5S_VF.pdf.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ "Programme D'investissements Prioritaires (PIP/G5 Sahel) Première Phase: 2018–2020 Présentation du Portefeuille Actualisé des Projets," [Priority Investment Program (PIP / G5 Sahel) First Phase: 2018–2020 Updated Projects Portfolio] Sahel G5 web page, February 2018, 2, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

shows up as an important factor to peace and social cohesion in the Sahel region.²⁶⁸ The Sahel G5 plans to organize informational sessions in addition to facilitating access to justice for all the citizens, as well as strengthening the parliamentary oversight of the executive branch's activities. Secondly, peace consolidation and conflict prevention are necessary for sustainable development.²⁶⁹ The organization aims to reinforce the culture of peace among communities, especially youth. It also foresees a setting of traditional mechanisms of conflict mediation through local leaders' councils (chiefs of villages or tribes, civil society actors, NGOs), who are continuously in touch with locals. Thirdly, the G5S sees youth empowerment in the areas affected by conflicts and high migration zones as a condition of social stability and economic development.²⁷⁰ The project dedicated for that sector aims to facilitate jobs and loans to youth so they can be economically independent and more resistant to terrorist groups' appeals. While the fourth project is dedicated to the conception of a comprehensive strategy addressing the youth among the five countries, its implementation represents a whole project.²⁷¹ The youth face myriad difficulties including, but not limited to, illiteracy, rapid population growth, unemployment, poverty, climate change effects, AIDS, alcoholism and drug abuse, and lack of education.²⁷² The organization has recognized youth deserve more attention from leaders since they represent the strategy's spearhead. Hence, the organization wants to address the aforementioned challenges by facilitating access to education and health care, offering more jobs, and promoting positive communication focused on sensitizing youth about the role they should play for the success of the organization. In sum, the five projects will contribute to make governance more effective in the Sahel G5 space.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 3.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² "G5 Sahel: La Jeunesse Au Cœur D'une Strategie Integree," Sahel SG5 web page, published April 27, 2017, <http://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/13-actualite-des-pays-g5/576-g5-sahel-la-jeunesse-au-coeur-d-une-strategie-integree>.

3. Infrastructure

According to the Sahel G5 organization's strategy for development and security, both will depend on the infrastructure's quality and quantity in terms of roads, energy, hydraulics, and telecommunications.²⁷³ In its PIP, the Sahel G5 has listed 45 projects estimated at €5,547.2 million.²⁷⁴ The aim of these projects is to connect people and cities, and to facilitate business in the Sahel G5 space.²⁷⁵ The major activity will be the building of a railroad (6000 kilometers) connecting all the other countries to Mauritania, the only country that has access to the ocean.²⁷⁶ Also, the setting up of a Sahelian Airways Company, in addition to the digging of wells across the desert as well as developing in the remote areas, are part of the organization's most urgent needs.²⁷⁷ Table 5 gives the projects' details and indicates a gap of 65% of the funding needed.²⁷⁸

Table 5. The infrastructure program details (February 2018).²⁷⁹

Programs	Number of projects	Cost (Euro Million)	Funding Available	Missing (Gap)	Percentage of gap
Railroad	01	5	0	5	100%

²⁷³ "Strategie pour le Developement et la Securite des Pays du G5 Sahel," [Strategy for Development and Security of Sahel G5 Countries] SG5 web page, September 2016, 24, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/SDS_G5S_VF.pdf.

²⁷⁴ "Programme D'investissements Prioritaires (PIP/G5 Sahel) Première Phase: 2018–2020 Présentation du Portefeuille Actualisé des Projets," [Priority Investment Program (PIP / G5 Sahel) First Phase: 2018–2020 Presentation of the Updated Projects Portfolio] Sahel G5 web page, February 2018, 16, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Alain Chémali, "Niger: les pays du G5-Sahel peinent à boucler le budget de la force conjointe," [Niger: G5-Sahel countries struggle to finalize joint force budget] *France Info*, February 8, 2018, <http://geopolis.francetvinfo.fr/niger-les-pays-du-g5-sahel-peinent-a-boucler-le-budget-de-la-force-conjointe-178577>.

²⁷⁷ "Programme D'investissements Prioritaires (PIP/G5 Sahel) Première Phase: 2018–2020 Présentation du Portefeuille Actualisé des Projets," [Priority Investment Program (PIP / G5 Sahel) First Phase: 2018–2020 Presentation of the Updated Projects Portfolio] Sahel G5 web page, February 2018, 6, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Adapted from "Programme D'investissements Prioritaires (PIP/G5 Sahel) Première Phase: 2018–2020 Présentation du Portefeuille Actualisé des Projets," [Priority Investment Program (PIP / G5 Sahel) First Phase: 2018–2020 Presentation of the Updated Projects Portfolio] Sahel G5 web page, February 2018, 6, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

Roads	19	2,800.7	436.7	2,364.7	84%
Hydraulic	07	288.3	33.8	254.5	88%
Energy	11	1,787.7	1,303	484.7	27%
Telecommunication	07	665.5	179.5	468	73%
Total	45	5,547.2	1,953	3,594.2	65%

4. Resilience and Human Development

According to the Sahel G5 experts, their space is a harsh, agro-sylvo-pastoral zone where populations are exposed to multiple vulnerabilities, including climatic and ecological issues leading to food and nutritional shortage, ecosystem and livestock destruction, and unemployment.²⁸⁰ The organization aims to enhance the five countries' populations' resilience, specifically those who live across the borders and suffer deeply from climate change effects.²⁸¹ In response to that situation, the organization has established a set of measures, including the support of resilient pastoralism by immunizing livestock, protecting agricultural lands, securing borders, enhancing rural populations' harvests, and mitigating conflicts among breeders.²⁸² In addition, valuating natural resources, helping rural populations and people with low incomes to loan access, facilitating the access to education and health care are part of the organization course of action.²⁸³ The Resilience and Human Development projects represent a cost of €140.5 million.²⁸⁴

²⁸⁰ "Strategie pour le developpement et la Securite des Pays du G5 Sahel," SG5 web page, September 2016, 25, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/SDS_G5S_VF.pdf.

²⁸¹ Ibid. 26–27.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ "Strategie pour le developpement et la Securite des Pays du G5 Sahel," September 2016, 25–27, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/SDS_G5S_VF.pdf

²⁸⁴ "Programme d'Investissement Prioritaire," SG5 web page, February 2018, 2, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

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IV. THE MAIN TERRORIST GROUPS AND THE SAHEL G5 ORGANIZATION'S CHANCES OF SUCCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

After having explored the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel and discussed the Sahel G5 organization's concept of addressing terrorism threats, the identification of the main terrorist groups operating in the Sahel will help to assess the SG5's chances of success in combating and destroying them. Indeed, the SG5's leaders can learn from existing knowledge to strengthen their strategy and defeat the terrorist organizations in the Sahel. Therefore, understanding the main groups' dynamics and their environment can contribute to mastering the terrorism issue in the Sahel.

B. THE MAIN TERRORISTS GROUPS OPERATING IN THE SAHEL

This section describes the Sahel region. Then it explains the conditions that contributed or facilitated the rise of terrorism in the Sahel. Finally, it points out the main terrorist groups according to their origins and their areas of operation.

1. The Sahel: A Complex Security Environment

The African region called Sahel, which extends from Mauritania and Senegal (Atlantic coast) to Sudan and Djibouti (Pacific coast), has suffered from many kinds of societal and security conflicts.²⁸⁵ The Sahel is composed of 11 countries, but only five of them, located in its central and western part, constitute the Sahel G5 covering more than 5 million square kilometers, as represented in Figure 6.²⁸⁶ That region, mostly a harsh desert,

²⁸⁵ International Crisis Group, "Map of Sahel" accessed July 10, 2018, https://www.google.com/search?q=the+sahel+g5&rlz=1C1CHXU_enUS737US737&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&fir=S_InFrZ7TC6XsM%253A%252CDVlJMvevSF_6mM%252C_&usg=__OQxZezNJdeUYf-952_4gJltHIZk%3D&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj796yRrrvcAhUWFzQIHdPfDlQ_h0wFHoECAoQCw#imgrc=jpRkK5jv0Iaj1M

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

has been host to many security conflicts: forays, separatist rebellions, Islamist terrorism, human trafficking, and many other transnational crimes.²⁸⁷




Figure 6. Map of the Sahel region. Source: International Crisis Group.²⁸⁸

While analyzing the security issues in Sahel, it appears that the region encompasses all the ingredients of a regional security complex as described by Barry Buzan.²⁸⁹ Each of the Sahel G5 states faces the same security issues: Islamist terrorism, human trafficking, separatism, and smuggling. Moreover, these states accumulate almost as high a level of

²⁸⁷ Wolfram Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region," in *Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahara*, ed. Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 61–85.

²⁸⁸ Source: International Crisis Group, "Map of Sahel," accessed July 10, 2018, https://www.google.com/search?q=the+sahel+g5&rlz=1C1CHXU_enUS737US737&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&fir=S_InFrZ7TC6XsM%253A%252CDVIJMvevSF_6mM%252C_&usg=__OQxZezNJdeUYf-952_4gJltHIZk%3D&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj796yRrrvcAhUWFzQIHdPfDlQ_h0wFH0ECAoQCw#imgrc=jpRkK5jv0Iaj1M

²⁸⁹ Barry Buzan, Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World. In *Theories of New Regionalism. International Political Economy Series*, ed. F. Söderbaum and T.M. Shaw (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403938794_8.

economic instability as social unrest.²⁹⁰ In terms of International Relations, that similarity among the Sahel G5 states allows a regional level of analysis, and deserves to be transversally understood since transnational terrorism is their main challenge. Therefore, the Sahel G5 area represents a regional security complex run by many terrorist groups that cross borders and destroy national and international efforts to develop the countries. The complexity of that situation has justified the Sahel G5 organization's creation, which in turn has contributed to strengthen cooperation between neighboring countries.

2. The Rise of Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel

The Algerian political instability has contributed to the birth of a violent form of extremism that polluted the Sahel.²⁹¹ The 1991 military incursion to stop elections in Algeria was seen as a coup d'état by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a religious political party likely to win these elections.²⁹² That military intervention sparked a societal conflict, which led to what is called the Algerian civil war, lasting ten years and killing more than 100,000 people.²⁹³ During the present decade, the Algerian military regime has conducted antiterrorism operations and has defeated the terrorist groups.²⁹⁴ These groups retreated southward into the Sahara and Sahel, where they installed in ungoverned areas in

²⁹⁰ Yahia H. Zoubir, "Défis sécuritaires, migrations, instabilité et extrémisme violent au Sahel," in *Troubles géopolitiques et leurs effets dans la région méditerranéenne* ["Security Challenges, Migrations, Instability and Violent Extremism in the Sahel," in *Geopolitical Disorders and their Effects in the Mediterranean Region*] (Annuaire IEMed. de la Méditerranée 2017), accessed July 12, 2018, http://www.iemed.org/publicacions-fr/historic-de-publicacions/anuari-de-la-mediterrania-fr/sumaris/observatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2017/french/IEMed_MedYearbook2017fr_migrations_extremisme_sahel_zoubir.pdf.

²⁹¹ Lawrence Cline, "Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 10 (2007): 890, DOI: 10.1080/10576100701559032.

²⁹² Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Islamic Party in Algeria Defeats Ruling Group in Local Elections," *New York Times*, June 14, 1990, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/14/world/islamic-party-in-algeria-defeats-ruling-group-in-local-elections.html>.

²⁹³ Marianne Meunier, "1991-2000 la décennie qui hante l'Algérie," [1991-2000 the decade that haunts Algeria] *LA CROIX*, May 19, 2011, https://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/1991-2000-la-decennie-qui-hante-l-Algerie-_EP_-2011-05-19-617033#.

²⁹⁴ Bruce Riedel, "Algeria a Complex Ally in War against al Qaeda," Brookings, February 3, 2013, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/algeria-a-complex-ally-in-war-against-al-qaeda/>; "Algerian Army Claims Success over Rebels," *Al Jazeera*, September 2003, accessed July 10, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2003/09/200849144840187777.html>.

Mauritania, Mali, and Niger.²⁹⁵ Therefore, it is clear that the Algerian civil war has indirectly influenced the terrorist groups' proliferating in the Sahel.

Even though most of the terrorist groups first came from Algeria, the inability of Sahelian governments to secure their borders and to meet their populations' needs has facilitated the terrorist groups' implantation. Lawrence Line asserts, "Most Sahelian countries are lightly governed outside their capitals, giving potential access to terrorist groups in outlying areas."²⁹⁶ Taking advantage of these opportunities, the terrorist groups stayed and established deep relationships with locals, even providing social services as well as security to the populations living in these areas while recruiting and training the youth.²⁹⁷ In addition, they started applying Sharia, the Islamic Law, which is very restrictive.²⁹⁸ That combination of facts strengthened the terrorist hold upon local populations, among which some persons were promoted as team leaders, managers, or terrorist leaders' representatives in the villages or tribes. More importantly, as they are foreigners marrying local women, as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is doing in Iraq and Syria, the terrorist militants build very close relationships and blood alliances with local populations.²⁹⁹ In sum, the terrorist groups fleeing Algerian security forces have taken advantage of the ungoverned areas in northern Mali, northern and western Niger, and northern Mauritania to get ready before spreading over Burkina Faso and Chad.

²⁹⁵ Malek Bachir and Akram Kharief, "Acculée en Algérie, AQMI est contrainte au repli," [Cornered in Algeria, AQIM is forced to withdraw] *Middle East Eye*, February 2018, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/reportages/sale-temps-pour-aqmi-en-alg-rie-1298208816>.

Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb>.

²⁹⁶ Lawrence Cline, "Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 10 (2007):889, DOI: 10.1080/10576100701559032 .

²⁹⁷ Andrew Lebovich, "The Hotel Attacks and Militant Realignment in the Sahara-Sahel Region," Combating Terrorism Center 9, no. 1 (January 2016), <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-hotel-attacks-and-militant-realignment-in-the-sahara-sahel-region/>.

²⁹⁸ Sergei Boeke, "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (2016):914–936, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280.

²⁹⁹ Samuel Forey, "Les dynamiques socio-économiques et les ressorts des réseaux de la Wilayat Sinai," [The socio-economic dynamics and the springs of the networks of the Wilayat Sinai] *Observatoire du Monde Arabe-Musulman et du Sahel*, June 2016, <https://www.frstrategie.org/web/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/5.pdf>.

3. The Main Terrorist Groups Operating in the Sahel

The main terrorist groups threatening the Sahel G5 countries are composed of AQMI and its derivative groups, and Boko Haram. The map in Figure 7 gives an overview of the terrorist group's activities.³⁰⁰ It appears that AQMI and its affiliated groups (MUJAO, Ansar Dine) occupy the largest territory northward while Boko Haram is operating on the Niger-Chad border.³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ PNAFRICOM TV, Eode/ Geopolitique/ Les Cartes Pour Comprendre Le Dossier De L'insecurite Au Sahel (I) : Djihadismes Entre Al-Qaida Et Daech, [Maps To Understand The Insecurity Record In The Sahel (I): Jihadism Between Al-Qaida And Daesh,](Mar 2017), accessed Jul 12, 2018, <http://www.panafricom-tv.com/2017/03/02/eode-geopolitique-les-cartes-pour-comprendre-le-dossier-de-linsecurite-au-sahel-i-djihadismes-entre-al-qaida-et-daech/>

³⁰¹ Ibid.




Figure 7. Map of the main terrorist groups operating in the Sahel.³⁰²

a. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Born from the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 2007, AQMI is the most important group in terms of area of operation (territory shown in Figure

³⁰² Source: PNAFRICOM TV, EODE/ Geopolitique/ Les Cartes Pour Comprendre Le Dossier De L'insecurite Au Sahel (I) : Djihadismes Entre Al-Qaida Et Daech, [Maps To Understand The Insecurity Record In The Sahel (I): Jihadism Between Al-Qaida And Daesh,](Mar 2017), accessed Jul 12, 2018, <http://www.panafricom-tv.com/2017/03/02/eode-geopolitique-les-cartes-pour-comprendre-le-dossier-de-linsecurite-au-sahel-i-djihadismes-entre-al-qaida-et-daech/>

8) and expertise.³⁰³ AQMI's area of operation goes from Mauritania to Chad.³⁰⁴ That terrorist group is active in Mali as well as in Niger and Burkina Faso.³⁰⁵ The following map shows AQMI activity density across the Sahel G5 countries.³⁰⁶ In addition, most of its founders, including Yahya Abu Hammam, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and Abdelmalek Droukdel, have earned a very long experience of battlefields in Algeria as well as in Afghanistan and Middle East.³⁰⁷ AQMI's various expertise allows it to plan and conduct complex operations such as the kidnapping of hotel residents, suicide bombings, car bombings, or remotely triggering Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).³⁰⁸ The group was involved in taking hostages in Bamako (Radisson Blue Hotel, 2015) as well as Ouagadougou (2017 and 2018) and Abidjan (2017).³⁰⁹ As the most experienced terrorist group in the Sahel, AQMI represents a gigantic challenge to Sahelian defense institutions, which are weak in terms of training and equipment. Even though AQMI itself is seen as the most important group, mostly because of its international wingspan and its expertise in manipulating IEDs, its strategy is generally based on the dynamic of its local subsidiaries, which have taken different names depending on the country where they operate.

³⁰³ Alexander Thurston, Pamela G. Faber, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): An Al-Qaeda Affiliate Case Study," CNA, October 2017, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DIM-2017-U-016119-2Rev.pdf.

³⁰⁴ PNAFRICOM TV, EODE/ Geopolitique/ Les Cartes Pour Comprendre Le Dossier De L'insecurite Au Sahel (I): Djihadismes Entre Al-Qaida Et Daech, [Maps To Understand The Insecurity Record In The Sahel (I): Jihadism Between Al-Qaida And Daesh,] March 2017, <http://www.panafricom-tv.com/2017/03/02/eode-geopolitique-les-cartes-pour-comprendre-le-dossier-de-linsecurite-au-sahel-i-djihadismes-entre-al-qaida-et-daech/>.

³⁰⁵ Philippe Morand, "New Alliance in the Sahel Region," Lyon Risk Management, April 21, 2017, <https://www.lyonriskmanagement.com/new-alliance-in-the-sahel-region/>

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Alexander Thurston, Pamela G. Faber, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): An Al-Qaeda Affiliate Case Study," CNA, October 2017, 10–17, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DIM-2017-U-016119-2Rev.pdf.

³⁰⁸ "AQIM: The Devolution of al Qaeda's North African Node," STATFOR, August 10, 2010, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/aqim-devolution-al-qaedas-north-african-node>

³⁰⁹ Sergei Boeke, "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?" *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (2016): 914–936, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280?scroll=top&needAccess=true>

Conor Gaffey, "Which Jihadi Groups Operate in Africa's Sahel Region," *Newsweek*, June 6, 2017, <https://www.newsweek.com/isis-africa-al-qaeda-africa-boko-haram-621443>.




Figure 8. Map of AQMI's area of operation.³¹⁰

b. Ansar Dine

In Mali, Ansar Dine, an AQMI affiliate group, is mostly composed of Tuareg people operating in the northern part of that country and suspected of having connections with laic separatist groups.³¹¹ Ansar Dine has revealed itself as a major actor in northern Mali; when mutualizing with the National Movement of the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), it defeated Malian army in 2012.³¹² Subsequently, through its strategy to overtake all of northern Mali, the terrorists defeated MNLA; the latter's leaders fled, having taken refuge in neighboring countries. Ansar Dine continued to attack Malian forces, making hostages among military as well as civilians. In addition, the group has organized

³¹⁰ Source: Philippe Morand, "New Alliance in the Sahel Region," *Lyon Risk Management*, April 21, 2017, <https://www.lyonriskmanagement.com/new-alliance-in-the-sahel-region/>

³¹¹ Philipp Sandner, "Ansar Dine: Radical Islamists in Northern Mali," *DW Made for Minds*, December 18, 2014, <https://www.dw.com/en/ansar-dine-radical-islamists-in-northern-mali/a-18139091>

³¹² John Campbell, Jendayi Frazer, Reuben E. Brigety II, and Stewart M. Patrick, "Destabilization of Mali," *Council on Foreign Relations*, August 8, 2018, [https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?co=C042701#!conflict/destabilization-of-mali](https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?co=C042701#!/conflict/destabilization-of-mali).

the destruction of Timbuktu's mausoleums and manuscript collections, which as historical and cultural monuments were classified by UNESCO's World Heritage program.³¹³ Deeply tied to AQMI and led by Iyad Ag Aghaly, Ansar Dine has created many cells that have developed and spread over central Malian regions and northern Burkina Faso.

c. *The Macina Liberation Front*

The Mali's central region is the operation area of the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), an Ansar Dine affiliate terrorist group that has indoctrinated militants from the Fulani people and sparked a dangerous intercommunity conflict in addition to Islamist terrorism.³¹⁴ Jacob Zenn, an Associate Fellow of African and Eurasian Affairs, speculates that the FLM combatants number about 4,000.³¹⁵ Amadou Koufa, the FLM's leader created its own group in 2013 after the French military operation helped Malian defense forces to stop the southward offensive of terrorist groups (AQMI, Ansar Dine).³¹⁶ Since most of its combatants were from the Fulani ethnic group, which originated from Mali central region, Koufa did think of regenerating the former Fulani Empire of the 19th century.³¹⁷ From 2013 to 2018, his group has been responsible for the kidnappings of many military members and government workers, the burning of villages and food stores in Dogon and of Bambara ethnic group's villages. In response to that, locals armed themselves and

³¹³Thomas Fessy, "Mali Conflict: Timbuktu Manuscripts Destroyed," *BBC News*, January 30, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21257200>

Ishaan Tharoor, "Timbuktu's Destruction: Why Islamists Are Wrecking Mali's Cultural Heritage," *TIME*, July 2, 2012, <http://world.time.com/2012/07/02/timbuktus-destruction-why-islamists-are-wrecking-malis-cultural-heritage/>

³¹⁴ Jacob Zenn, "The Sahel's Militant 'Melting Pot': Hamadou Kouffa's Macina Liberation Front (FLM)," *Jamestown Foundation*, Volume XIII, Issue 22, November 13, 2015, <https://jamestown.org/program/the-sahels-militant-melting-pot-hamadou-kouffas-macina-liberation-front-flm/>

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ AFP, "Mali Islamists Armed Group Push Fighting beyond Conflict-Hit North," *Telegraph*, September 23, 2015, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/11884570/Mali-Islamists-armed-group-push-fighting-beyond-conflict-hit-north.html>.

Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari, "Jihadism in Mali and the Sahel: Evolving Dynamics and Patterns," *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, June 2017, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_21_Sahel.pdf.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

constituted communalist militias attacking Fulani villages, even those who have had nothing to do with Koufa's group.³¹⁸ As result, Koufa's group has agitated the dormant and long lasting conflict that traditionally opposed farmers and pastoralists. Consequently, Mali's central region became a very instable zone, where government workers have fled the rural areas, and populations suffer from terrorist intimidations and attacks.³¹⁹ According to the map in Figure 9, 2017, has been the most deadly year in Mali in terms of terrorist death tolls. More than 100 persons were killed in the month of August alone.³²⁰

³¹⁸ Aurelien Tobie, "New SIPRI brief on central Mali shows how interpretations of the conflict shape the responses," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 7, 2018, <https://www.sipri.org/media/2018/new-sipri-brief-central-mali-shows-how-interpretations-conflict-shape-responses>

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Célian Macé Laurent, "La course de vitesse du sprinteur Macron," [The Macron's sprint race] *Liberation*, December 13, 2017, http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2017/12/13/g5-sahel-la-course-de-vitesse-du-sprinteur-macron_1616434.




Figure 9. Map of armed groups' attacks and corresponding death toll in Mali 2014–2017.³²¹

d. Ansaroul Islam

In late 2016, wanting to replicate Koufa's dream of reviving Macina's ancient empire in his country, Ibrahim Malam Dicko, a radical Fulani preacher from Burkina Faso, created Ansaroul Islam.³²² According to Héní Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss, Ansaroul Islam was involved in almost 80 deadly attacks in Burkina Faso, targeting security forces and

³²¹ Source: Célian Macé Laurent, "La course de vitesse du sprinteur Macron," [The Macron's sprint race] *Liberation*, December 13, 2017, http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2017/12/13/g5-sahel-la-course-de-vitesse-du-sprinteur-macron_1616434.

³²² Morgan Le Cam, "How was Born Ansarul Islam, the First Jihadist Group in the History of Burkina Faso," *Le Monde Afrique*, December 2016, https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/04/11/c-omment-est-ne-ansaroul-islam-premier-groupe-djihadiste-de-l-histoire-du-burkina-faso_5109520_3212.html&prev=search.

government civilian workers and mayors as well as their supposed local collaborators.³²³ To many researchers, this new group, initially based at the Mali-Burkina border, took advantage of the Malian instability to develop.³²⁴ In its way of gathering Fulani young people and arming them, Ansaroul Islam contributes to the destabilization of Burkina Faso, in addition to worsening the existing cleavage between Fulani (nomadic people) and other rural communities (sedentary).

e. The Islamic State in Greater Sahara

Formed through the fusion of different terrorist groups, the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) operates in the area known as the zone of the three borders (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger).³²⁵ According to Jason Warner, in 2015 some terrorist groups, including the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al-Mourabitoun, operating in northern Mali merged under the leadership of Adnan Abu Walid Sahraoui's, formed the ISGS.³²⁶ This group is the one that carried out a deadly ambush against U.S. soldiers in Niger on October 3, 2017.³²⁷

f. Boko Haram

Although Niger and Chad still suffer from AQMI's incursion, Boko Haram (BH) represents the main terrorist group impacting these countries' security. BH is a Nigerian-

³²³ Héní Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss, "Ansaroul Islam and the Growing Terrorist Insurgency in Burkina Faso," *Combating Terrorism Center* 11, no. 3 (March 2018), <https://ctc.usma.edu/ansaroul-islam-growing-terrorist-insurgency-burkina-faso/>

³²⁴ Morgan Le Cam, "How was Born Ansarul Islam, the First Jihadist Group in the History of Burkina Faso," *Le Monde Afrique*, December 2016, https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/04/11/c-omment-est-ne-ansaroul-islam-premier-groupe-djihadiste-de-l-histoire-du-burkina-faso_5109520_3212.html&prev=search; Héní Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss, "Ansaroul Islam and the Growing Terrorist Insurgency in Burkina Faso," *Combating Terrorism Center* 11, no. 3 (March 2018), <https://ctc.usma.edu/ansaroul-islam-growing-terrorist-insurgency-burkina-faso/>.

³²⁵ Jason Warner, "Sub-Saharan Africa's Three "New" Islamic State Affiliates," *Combating Terrorism Center* 10, no. 1 (January 2017), <https://ctc.usma.edu/sub-saharan-africas-three-new-islamic-state-affiliates/>.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Rukmini Callimachi, Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, Alan Blinder, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "'An Endless War': Why 4 U.S. Soldiers Died in a Remote African Desert," *New York Times*, February 20, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/17/world/africa/niger-ambush-american-soldiers.html>.

born terrorist group that has prospered in southern Niger and Chad. Created by Mohamed Yussuf in 2009, today BH is led by Abubakar Chekau, and has extended its area of operation to Cameroon as well as to Niger and Chad.³²⁸ Operating in the Lake Chad region, the group continuously attacks and kidnaps locals, even children and women, in addition to conducting suicide and car bombings. Chad and Niger are part of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) formed in 2014 to fight BH.³²⁹ According to Mark Wilson, the horrific violence from BH has produced more than 20,000 dead, while more than two thousand have moved as internally displaced persons (IDP) or refugees.³³⁰ The graphic in Figure 10 indicates the evolution of BH attacks through 2016 and 2017.³³¹ Wilson also mentioned that from 2016 to 2017, Niger and Chad have suffered from twenty five and five attacks from BH, respectively.³³²

³²⁸ International Crisis Group, “Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency,” Report No. 245 / AFRICA, February 27, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/niger/245-niger-and-boko-haram-beyond-counter-insurgency>.

³²⁹ William Assanvo, Jeannine Ella A. Abatan, and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo, “Assessing the Multinational Joint Task.” Report No 19, West Africa, September 2016, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf>.

“Force against Boko Haram,” Institute for Security Studies, West Africa Report, Issue 19, September 2016, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS%20Africa%20Assessing%20the%20Multinational%20Joint%20Task%20Force%20against%20Boko%20Haram.pdf>.

³³⁰ Mark Wilson, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Attacks in Numbers - as Lethal as Ever,” *BBC News*, January 25, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42735414>.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid.




Figure 10. Boko Haram attacks in Chad and Niger, 2016–2017.³³³

C. THE SAHEL G5 ORGANIZATION’S CHANCES OF SUCCESS

Evaluating the Sahel G5’s chances of success needs to take into account some key factors including the funding issue in addition to having a look at what the organization is actually doing, and how it is doing that. That analysis is viewed through the four pillars of the antiterrorism strategy—governance, security, economy, and education—as the thesis was developed through these variables. Even though this thesis does not aim to compare the U.S. counterterrorism strategy to the SG5 strategy, putting aside what the United States has done and what the SG5 is planning to do (or is doing) in terms of counterterrorism will help to identify what needs to be done and what needs to be avoided for SG5 policy makers.

³³³ Source: Mark Wilson, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Attacks in Numbers—as Lethal as Ever,” BBC News, January 25, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42735414>.

1. Funding Issue

Despite the real political willingness that led to the SG5's creation, the organization suffers from the funding shortfall, which is a real threat to its future. The funding question is a key factor to the Sahel G5's success since the five countries, part some of the poorest in the world, depend on international assistance and cannot financially support that organization alone. In February 2018, only 35% of the SG5's infrastructure global budget was available.³³⁴ The PIP portfolio indicates \$7,238.47 as its global cost.³³⁵ From Table 6 it appears that, if the SG5 countries have to support the PIP by themselves, each country would have to provide \$2,522.9 million. That seems impossible considering their economic weakness. According to a comparison of their 2017 budgets, the PIP represents 57.38% of the five countries' budgets together. The PIP would cost almost three quarters of some countries' annual budgets (Mali and Burkina Faso) while Niger would have to contribute more than 80% of its own 2017 budget, and Chad (210.85%) and Mauritania (195.46%) would be very far behind. Therefore, the SG5's overall success seems jeopardized by the lack of funding. One can assume that the Sahel G5 organization is going to fail if the international community does nothing.

Table 6. Comparison of SG5 PIP's cost over the countries' national budgets.³³⁶

Countries	2017 Budget		PIP Cost	PIP Cost per Country	PIP Percentage of National Budget
	CFA billion	\$ million	In \$ million		
Mali	2,013.578	3,480.69	7,238.47	2,522.90	72.48%
Chad	692.206	1,196.55		2,522.90	210.85%

³³⁴ G5 Sahel, accessed September 18, 2018, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf

³³⁵ G5 Sahel, accessed September 18, 2018, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf

³³⁶ Adapted from data from the Sahel G5, accessed September 18, 2018, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf

Countries	2017 Budget		PIP Cost	PIP Cost per Country	PIP Percentage of National Budget
	CFA billion	\$ million	In \$ million		
Niger	1,809.000	3,127.05		2,522.90	80.68%
Burkina Faso	2,036.000	3,519.45		2,522.90	71.68%
Mauritania	746.693	1,290.74		2,522.90	195.46%
Total	7,297.477	12,614.48		12,614.50	57.38%

Precisely, the JF funding issue reveals how difficult it is for SG5 countries to even deal with the security threats. The JF's first-year functioning budget was estimated at \$523 million.³³⁷ The JF was expected to reach its full operational capacity in 2018 after mobilizing its necessary funding the year before (2017). Tellingly, Trading Economics has revealed that, in 2017 fiscal years, except Chad (+1.7%); all the other Sahel G5 countries have had a budget deficit (Mauritania -0.6%, Mali -3.3%, Niger -5.7%, Burkina Faso -5.5%).³³⁸ For the same year, the World Bank has reported that the five countries have lent \$882 million from financial partners (Mauritania \$44 million, Mali \$117 million, Niger \$121 million, Burkina Faso \$226 million, and Chad \$214 million).³³⁹ Legitimately, the question is how five countries that have their budgets in deficit, are struggling to meet their populations' minimum needs, and are continuously borrowing money on the international market can each annually gather more than \$500 million. Therefore, one can argue that if

³³⁷ Benjamin Nickels, Jean-Baptiste Matton, and Alix Boucher, "The G5 Sahel Joint Force Gains Traction," *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, February 9, 2018, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/g5-sahel-joint-force-gains-traction/>.

³³⁸ Trading Economics, "Mauritania," "Mali," "Burkina Faso," "Niger" and "Chad" 2017 budgets, accessed August 1, 2018, <https://tradingeconomics.com/mauritania/government-budget>, <https://tradingeconomics.com/mali/government-budget>, <https://tradingeconomics.com/burkina-faso/government-budget>, <https://tradingeconomics.com/niger/government-budget>, <https://tradingeconomics.com/chad/government-budget>.

³³⁹ The World Bank, "The World Bank in Mauritania," "The World Bank in Mali," "The World Bank in Niger," "The World Bank in Burkina Faso," "The World Bank in Chad," accessed August 1, 2018, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mauritania/overview>, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mali/overview>, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview>, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chad/overview>.

the JF has to wait for its own countries' funding, the chances are slim that the JF will ever be operational.

2. Governance Aspect

From this thesis, as mentioned by many scholars, it appears that the governance aspect plays an important role in fighting terrorism.³⁴⁰ In general, scholars, among them Richard Downie, agree that people should respect the democratic principles and the rule of law.³⁴¹ Finally, it is a matter of building an effective democracy. Together, these measures (democracy, justice, anticorruption, providing basic needs) will contribute to the SG5 populations' satisfaction and will make them more resistant to terrorist propaganda.

For fighting terrorism in the Sahel, the United States implemented many programs to strengthen the Sahelian countries' governance. Conducted through USAID, the programs have contributed to facilitate the population's access to justice in the Sahelian countries as well as strengthening the civil societies, so they can actively play their role of oversight in government activities. Some of the programs have engaged people in communicating positively, avoiding aggressive speeches, and cultivating peace and the domestic security spirit. Obviously, these programs did contribute to reduce violence as well as to mitigate terrorists' influence on the youth in the Sahel region.

Even though the Sahel G5 countries have not made great achievements in terms of governance at the regional level, each country has implemented its own strategy. In February 2018, the organization's PIP portfolio mentioned zero funding mobilized in favor of the governance projects whose cost was estimated at \$104.27 million. As ambitious as the SG5's projects are, without necessary funding, the projects are doomed to failure. Nonetheless, the organization advancing new good ideas, like implementing a G5 parliament tasked with oversight of the organization's activities. The recurring funding issue seems to hamper the Sahel G5's governance strategy. After all, knowing that

³⁴⁰Richard Downie, "Collective Insecurity in the Sahel: Fighting Terror with Good Governance," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 16, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2015): 70–78, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43773669?newaccount=true&read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

terrorism always takes advantage of underlying conditions such as unhappiness and dissatisfaction among citizens, one can assume that enhancing governance is necessary to make the Sahel G5 successful.

3. Security Aspect

Even though some scholars prioritize security measures in fighting terrorism, they mostly categorize it as part of a comprehensive strategy.³⁴² These measures aim to destroy the terrorist groups' military capabilities. The security measures target their troops as well as their infrastructures. Although using military forces in response to terrorist attacks cannot be sufficient to definitively defeat terrorism, it is necessary to immediately address their actions as well as to preemptively destroy their military capacities when identified.

The United States' engagement in the Sahel through PSI, TSCTP, and AFRICOM aimed to prepare the Sahelian forces to confront the terrorist groups using military means. The U.S. programs have included training as well as equipment. According to Stephen Ellis, the 2004 PSI was funded for \$7.75 million, which represents "small change in Washington, but a substantial amount for such poor countries."³⁴³ For about two decades, the U.S. experts have been training Sahelian forces to get them ready so they can defeat terrorist groups.

In terms of security measures, the creation and the deployment of the JF represent the most visible achievements by the Sahel G5 organization. The JF Headquarters was installed in Mali and the countries together mobilized the 5,000 soldiers as planned. Even though the JF patrols the borders, it lacks sufficient means to be fully operational. In February 2018, the SG5 PIP portfolio dedicated to Security and Defense projects mentioned a gap of 100% in terms of funding needed. Despite great commitments from international partners to support the Sahel G5 JF, the money is still unavailable. The cost

³⁴² Sanaa Khan and Mieke Eoyang, "The Plan to Combat Terrorism," Third Way, accessed May 28, 2018, <https://www.thirdway.org/report/the-plan-to-combat-terrorism>.

³⁴³ Stephen Ellis, "Briefing: The Pan-Sahel Initiative," *African Affairs* 103, no. 412 (2004): 459, DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adh067.

of Security and Defense projects was estimated at \$544.53 million.³⁴⁴ Shared among the five countries, each one would have to pay \$104.6 million. Therefore, the Security and Defense projects would weigh on their 2017 budgets as follows: Chad represents 8.74%, Mauritania 8.10%, Niger 3.35%, Mali 3.01%, and Burkina Faso 2.95%. These percentages seem low, but considering the countries' priorities in terms of socio-economic needs, allowing these amounts to SG5 Defense and Security projects would create greater economic tensions domestically.

The SG5's efforts to implement its security and defense approach are encouraging and deserve a wider support. Despite the fact that the international partners did not send money as they promised, the SG5 has launched military operations in addition to activating its Headquarters on September 9, 2017, in Sevare (Mali).³⁴⁵ In November 2017, the first operation baptized "HAWBI" took place in the zone called the three-borders' zone (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), where the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara had a sanctuary. That operation was judged successful since the JF attacked and dispersed the terrorist group's elements. Furthermore, two other military operations were launched in January 2018 and June 2018. Launching three limited and sporadic military operations, however, cannot represent a real and sustainable success, even though it should be encouraged. The real need is to take and durably stay on the ground. Definitively controlling this zone requires much more logistical support that the JF does not have yet.

4. Economic Aspect

In general, scholars agree that poor economic and living conditions are a contributing factor to terrorism. Scholars also have mentioned unemployment as potential driver. Indeed, lacking jobs and living in squalor could change one's mind and make him espouse radical or violent ideologies. In addition, terrorist propaganda including job offers and business funding could attract young and at-risk men in search of better living

³⁴⁴ See Table 3.

³⁴⁵ Nathalie Guibert, "La force du G5 Sahel se met progressivement en place, [The Sahel G5 Force gradually takes place]" *Le Monde Afrique*, September 11, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/09/11/la-force-du-g5-sahel-se-met-progressivement-en-place_5183870_3212.html.

conditions. Since the lack of economic opportunities is a driver in certain regions of the Sahel, the solution to provide such opportunities could not be other than jobs' creation and better prospects for the youth. According to Gertrude Adwoa Offeibea Ansaaku, "Measures such as job creation ... can stem the growth of terror outfits before they become a threat.... Bridging the development gaps within countries would help diffuse the anger and frustration of youth living in deprived regions."³⁴⁶

In its strategy of addressing terrorism in the Sahel region, the United States has directed many economic oriented programs. Tackling the economic conditions, the U.S. programs have contributed to enhance populations' resilience in addition to support the governments' policies in terms of economic development. Under the USAID's umbrella, the U.S. sponsored programs funded some local NGOs as well as international NGOs. Intervening in the conflict zones, these programs have reached people who deeply bear the consequence of terrorist attacks as well as the absence of government services. Doing so, the United States' programs have contributed to make people more resistant to the terrorists' appeal.

In terms of economic measures, the Sahel G5 has plans concerning infrastructure, as well as resilience and human development. For the infrastructure projects (45 in total) estimated at \$6,426.88 million, the SG5 has gathered 35% of the cost and has started building 2,977 kilometers of road (Mali 2,460 kilometers in Mali, 483 kilometers in Burkina Faso, and 34 kilometers in Niger).³⁴⁷ By contrast, the resilience and human development projects still wait for funding.

5. Educational Aspect

According to many scholars, terrorists might take advantage of people's lack of education and illiteracy to lure them. Indeed, uneducated or illiterate people might easily adhere to terrorist propaganda. In addition, even some extremist preachers lack sufficient

³⁴⁶ Gertrude Adwoa Offeibea Ansaaku, "Youth Unemployment and The Fight against Terrorism in West Africa," *World Policy*, August 15, 2017, <https://worldpolicy.org/2017/08/15/youth-unemployment-and-the-fight-against-terrorism-in-west-africa/>.

³⁴⁷ G5 Sahel, "Programme d'Investissement Prioritaire," February 2018, 2, accessed July 10, 2018, http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/PIP_G5_Sahel_Premi%C3%A8re_Phase_2018-2020_f.pdf.

understanding of the Muslim Holy Scriptures. Still other propagandists use their manipulative skills to drive less educated people to embrace terrorism. Therefore, misinterpreting the Quran can lead to violent extremism.

The United States has contributed to raise both schooling and literacy rates in the Sahelian countries through many programs. As measures against terrorism, the programs were implemented in conflict zones as well as in secure zones. The programs encouraged more children to go to school and strengthened teachers' skills. They also helped in organizing associations for parents of schoolchildren. In particular, USAID sponsored programs have helped even previously failing students to return to school.

The Sahel G5 organization does not have specific lines of projects dedicated to education. However, the willingness to tackle the issues related to the lack of education regularly comes up in the meetings. Both governance and resilience projects signal the necessity to strengthen the education system. They even stress the imams' education, so they can understand the Quranic verses and promote peaceful messages.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

The study of counterterrorism in the Sahel in light of both the United States' experience and the comments of scholars and analysts has revealed the necessity to combine different measures to address the terrorism threat. These measures go beyond the quaternary frame upon which the whole thesis was built. For sure, the thesis' four pillars (governance, security, economic development, and education) have allowed a methodological and concise view of the issue. Yet, a larger scope is necessary to address the terrorism threat in the Sahel region. Therefore, the scope of the topic and its correlation with some International Relations' aspects involving the neighboring countries' willingness as well as other geopolitical interests should be important to the SG5 policy makers.

1. Funding Aspect

In response to the funding issue, the Sahel G5 countries must be able to convince critical partners to thoroughly endorse and sustainably contribute to securing and developing the Sahel region. Surprisingly, the United States and the United Nations seem less engaged in terms of financially supporting the JF. According to Michelle Nichols, the United States has been wary about paying more money since it aims to reduce the its U.N.-related costs, as the United States is the first contributor (28.5%) of the Peace Keeping budget.³⁴⁸ Tellingly, the Sahel region's security issue should be globally perceived. The Niger President, Mahamadou Issouf has warned that, "The Sahel is a dam that must not break."³⁴⁹ In that area, terrorist groups take advantage of the states' weaknesses and the populations' poverty, to dangerously develop. In addition to maintaining local communities under their grips, terrorists massively abuse human rights and endanger

³⁴⁸Michelle Nichols, "U.S. Wary of French Push for U.N. to Back Sahel Force: Diplomats," Reuters, June 8, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-security-sahel-un-idUSKBN18Z2R7>.

³⁴⁹ Andrew Lebovich, "G5 Sahel: Much Done, More to Do," *European Council for Foreign Relations*, March 8, 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_g5_sahel_much_done_more_to_do.

international security.³⁵⁰ As such, the international community should follow the example of France and the European Union (with a contribution of more than \$115.17 million), which represent the biggest contributors of the Sahel G5 organization.³⁵¹

Given that the Sahel G5 countries alone are unable to fund their JF, the only sustainable way for making the Sahel JF effective and successful is to fund it from the U.N. Department of Peace keeping Operations (DPKO). It would be a low cost investment since the battalions would be deployed in their own countries. Obviously, instead of paying for battalions coming from abroad with their logistics, it will be cheaper to support the local troops that also have the advantage of mastering the field in addition to being more capable of understanding the local social dynamics. That option seems potentially and logically far more beneficial than engaging foreign peacekeepers who probably would do best to avoid confrontation with terrorist groups. Nonetheless, the risks inherent to engaging less professionalized military will always remain. But, a less professionalized military does not mean unprofessional military at all. Finally, missioning local troops (training and equipping, and supporting them) to fight terrorist groups in their own countries will be the most efficient option.

2. Algerian Factor

Algeria is a regional power essential in fighting terrorism in the Sahel region for many reasons. First, in the 1990s the country had deeply suffered from terrorism. The positive outcome is that the country has developed a very effective antiterrorism strategy that allowed it to defeat terrorist groups and completely control its borders today. The decade-long bloody Algerian war ended up providing valuable antiterrorism experience, while the remaining terrorist combatants have dispersed in the Sahel. Second, as regional power, the Algerian voice bears weight with all the neighboring countries as well as with the armed groups. Actually, the role Algeria has played in the Malian crisis resolution

³⁵⁰ Erin Foster-Bowser and Angelia Sanders, "Security Threats in the Sahel and Beyond: AQIM, Boko Haram and al Shabaab," *NATO Civil Military Fusion Center*, April 2012, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/security-threats-sahel-and-beyond-aqim-boko-haram-and-al-shabaab>.

³⁵¹ Andrew Lebovich, "G5 Sahel: Much Done, More to Do," *European Council for Foreign Relations*, March 8, 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_g5_sahel_much_done_more_to_do.

witnesses its central role in the region. Although the Malian peace agreement started in Burkina Faso in 2012, since 2013 it has quickly fallen under Algerian leadership as to recognize this country's essential role in the Sahel region. Therefore, the SG5 leaders should not only learn from Algerian experience, but also find the best way to convince this country to endorse and support the SG5 organization.

3. Governance Aspect

The access to justice should be guaranteed and people should be treated equally before the law. In other words, people must not escape from their liability because of their social position, their financial conditions, or their political connections. Some scholars have also mentioned the necessity of meeting populations' basic needs like the access to health care. Another thought is that, at the government level, corruption and connections with terrorist organizations are signs of poor governance, since it compromises citizens' security and affects the states' credibility.

4. Security and Defense Aspect

Training and equipping the militaries are essential to the Sahel G5 organization's success. The training should focus on enhancing proper military skills as well as respect for human rights and the conventions of war. Some of the militaries have been accused of extrajudicial execution, illegal arrests, and connection with criminal networks. In addition to firmly punishing those behaviors, the military chain of command should address the problems' root causes, which might be the lack of training at the countries' national levels as well as at the SG5 regional level. Then, effectively equipping the militaries will not only make them more confident, but it will enable them to efficiently use their skills against terrorist groups. Therefore, both training and equipping the soldiers will make them not only stronger on the battlefield, but also more respectful of the countries' laws and the conventions of the war. Consequently, these actions will make local populations adhere to the organization's goals and offer encouragement to international partners, who do not want to be associated with abusive militaries.

A better coordination with the different security actors in the Sahel is necessary for SG5 success. The SG5 JF is stepping into an area already taken account of by national

defense forces or international forces. Since the 2012–2013 terrorist invasion in Mali, France has sent troops to rescue its former colony. France still keeps a significant force of 4,000 soldiers operating across the whole Sahel, targeting terrorist groups' leaders, striking their bases from the air, and supporting local militaries. For the same reason, the international community holds a peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) to support the Malian government and protect civilians suffering from terrorist groups' actions. Other superpowers like the United States are present through their Special Forces and drones' base. In addition, each of the five Sahel countries tries to secure its own borders through its national forces. Therefore, working with all the partners and clearly defining each one's task and area of responsibility is necessary. Failing to convince these partners will certainly reduce the SG5 JF's chances of success.

Another challenge to deal with is the lack of confidence and coordination among the different forces operating in the Sahel. The international troops do not report to the host country leaders, nor do they request any form of authorization to conduct military operations because of their specific mandates. This lack of coordination flows from a state of spirit that is a source of frustration and discouragement. For sure, only a few officials will openly recognize it, but the reality is that, in general, their Western colleagues see African officers as unskilled, unprofessional, and not reliable enough. On the other hand, the African officers sometimes see the Western officers as arrogant. The same perception comes up even between two African officers if one works for an international mission. The one who comes under a peacekeeping mission considers himself as more skilled than the one who works at the national level, just because of the peacekeeping mission's better working conditions. Both African officers and their Western comrades could be right, because everything they state is about verifiable facts. Different backgrounds obviously lead to different competencies. Not understanding that not everything is about Western standards could lead to arrogance and frustration. Furthermore, a working environment in which different military components interact to reach the same goal should be free of suspicions and arrogance. The organizations' leaders should facilitate collaborative conditions allowing the different military components to work together effectively. Each component should be clearly assigned tasks according to its capacities. That dynamic

should make the French BARKHANE force, the United Nations Integrated Mission for Stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA) military component, and the U.S. Special Forces fully share intelligence with the SG5 JF. Moreover, coordinating and conducting operations together will enhance the chances of success in favor of all the stakeholders.

5. Economic Development Aspect

Sometimes, the trend for young men and women to join terrorist organizations has nothing to do with a real religious conviction. It is a simple economic calculation, an economic opportunity, which has nothing to do with morality or adhering to a political ideology. Tellingly, taking actions to reduce unemployment rates would certainly reduce the tendency for young men and women to embrace terrorism. People want to live with dignity, honestly deserving what they receive. The SG5 organization should provide more jobs to youth, especially in conflict areas, where terrorist groups' appeal is stronger. Creating more job opportunities in these marginalized regions will enhance populations' resilience.

6. Educational Aspect

The educational aspect looms large in fighting terrorism. The SG5 should invest in building schools and literacy centers as well as training teachers. These training programs must include French schoolteachers as well as Medersa and Quranic teachers. Supportive programs benefiting vulnerable communities should be rooted in mitigating the terrorist influence. For example, poor families can be provided with food for each child attending school.

B. CONCLUSION

The Sahel G5 is a young and very ambitious organization. Because of both its originality and the actual threats it aims to address, the Sahel G5 has been welcomed not only by the Sahelian communities but also by the entire international community. This organization, however, crucially lacks the means to match its ambitions. The strategy it has concocted targets the same issues as previously mentioned while assessing the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel.

Implementing its Defense and Security measures, the Sahel G5 organization wants to train and equip its JF to make it more professional and prepared to militarily defeat the terrorist groups that run the Sahel. The economic measures come under the organization's infrastructure strategy as well as its resilience and human development strategy for mitigating poverty and lack of development. Though it focuses less directly on education, the governance measures meet the U.S. strategy. Education, however, does appear to some degree in the governance strategy as well as in the resilience and human development strategy. Ultimately, the Sahel G5 organization's strategy of combating terrorism by allying security and development deserves the support of the whole world. The doubt raised by some scholars deserves a deeper analysis to make the Sahel G5 organization more successful, even though the organization will never be able to fund, in the short term, its ambitious projects on its own.

As some analysts think that the insecurity in the Sahel "is a spillover of Algerian terrorism," including Algeria in the solution might help to eradicate that insecurity.³⁵² Including Algeria does not necessarily mean opening up to Algeria's inclusion in the Sahel G5 organization. On the contrary, that would disturb the Sahel G5 system's coherence. A regional power among that small group of five weak countries would create de facto a dominating effect. Therefore, Algeria can help from outside in terms of intelligence sharing and military training and supply. As a regional power that has proved its effectiveness in fighting terrorism, Algeria's close cooperation is essential to the Sahel countries' security and stability.

To make the Sahel G5 organization trustworthy in the eyes of Algeria, the organization leaders need to show that they are not France's instrument in the Algerian backyard. As a regional power, Algeria does not accept a foreign power operating in a region that local forces supposedly secure under Algerian leadership. In other words, endorsing the SG5 JF means Algeria would be recognizing its own failure to secure territories (Mali, Mauritania, Niger) that *The North Africa Post* calls "Algerian

³⁵² North Africa Post "International Community Wary of Algeria's Unwillingness to Combat Terrorism in Sahel," July 5, 2017, <http://northafricapost.com/18656-international-community-wary-algerias-unwillingness-combat-terrorism-sahel.html>.

Backyard.”³⁵³ Therefore, the Sahel G5 should engage diplomatic actions towards Algeria to convincing it that both the SG5 and Algeria face the same threat and France is just a friendly country.

As the study has revealed that terrorism’s root causes are strongly interconnected, the Sahel G5 organization should comprehensively address them. Bad governance, lack of education or illiteracy, poverty, unemployment, and lack of development represent issues the organization needs to fix. Therefore, any strategy endorsing education and literacy could positively contribute to enlighten people and make them resistant to terrorists’ appeals. To be complete, professionalizing the security apparatuses through a deep security sector reform, including training and equipping the military, represents crucial action. The political willingness that has made the Sahel G5 organization’s creation possible should be evolving even more strongly, comprehensively addressing the multiple challenges (funding issues and doubts) and making itself trustworthy (at both national and international levels). Then it will defeat terrorism in the Sahel. That seems to be the only way the Sahel G5 will fill the hope of local communities in addition to significantly contributing to make the world safer, free of terrorism.

³⁵³ Ibid.

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