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THESIS

**LESSONS IN IDEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORMAL EDUCATION,
SOCIALIZATION, AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

by

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September 2018

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FORMAL EDUCATION, SOCIALIZATION, AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

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ABSTRACT

Western governments have invested considerable resources in counter-violent extremism (CVE) programs in an effort to reduce the spread of terrorism both domestically and internationally. One approach, formal education, holds potential as a long-term strategy for preventing violent extremist ideologies from taking hold in a community. While many CVE experts agree that education is a valuable tool for preventing extremism, exactly what skills, knowledge, theories, and other aspects of education are most effective in countering violent extremism is still a matter of debate. This thesis applies socialization theory as an analytical lens to three case studies of educational programs in Indonesia and Australia to analyze how these programs instill commitment to the desired values and behaviors within students. It finds that socialization theory provides a useful framework for analyzing the ability of an educational institution to effect widespread social change, such as countering violent extremism. This research also indicates that a program's influence is not necessarily limited by its size, but considerable time, resources, and direction are required to achieve an organization's goals through education. Considering these findings, this thesis recommends that CVE practitioners incorporate socialization theory into future education programs to assist in countering violent extremist ideologies in target populations.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BPPAI	Bali Peace Park Association Incorporated
CCP	Creative Curriculum Program
CVE	counter-violent extremism
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation)
HW	Hizbul Wathan Scouts
IPM	Muhammadiyah Student Association
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JIL	Jaringan Islam Libera (Liberal Islam Network)
LIPIA	Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council)
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
PKS	Parai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party)
UIG	Ummah Initiative Group
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VSD	vocational skills development

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I. INTRODUCTION

Western governments have invested considerable resources in counter-violent extremism (CVE) programs in an effort to reduce the spread of terrorism both domestically and internationally. The need for effective preventative measures is especially critical today as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continues to recruit around the globe, despite the loss of territory in the Middle East. One approach, formal education, holds potential as a long-term strategy for preventing violent extremist ideologies from taking hold in a community.

This thesis aims to investigate the potential of formal education as a preventative strategy for reducing violent extremism, particularly in Muslim majority countries. Specifically, it aims to investigate what aspects of formal education may help prevent students from adopting violent extremist ideologies, and the potential challenges and pitfalls that may occur when outside actors promote specific types of formal education in Muslim-majority countries.

A. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

Numerous theories attempt to explain the complexities of the radicalization process and the social, political, religious, and psychological factors that lead to extremist violence. For example, political scientist Guilain Denoeux identifies more than twenty different radicalizing factors in three categories: socioeconomic drivers, including social exclusion, discrimination, the influence of social networks and group dynamics, relative deprivation, poverty, and greed; political drivers, such as corruption, war, repression, the existence of radical institutions, and state sponsorship of extremist organizations; and cultural drivers, including perceived cultural threats, religious intolerance, and proactive religious agendas that support extremist narratives and ways of thinking.¹ Denoeux argues that any combination of these factors, depending on individual circumstances, can set the conditions

¹ Guilain Denoeux, “*Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming*” (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, October 2009), 11–31.

for violent extremist narratives to thrive and influence individuals to support violent extremist organizations.²

Psychologist Randy Borum believes several social science theories show promise in explaining the radicalization process, including collective radicalization, conversion theory, and moral disengagement theory, among others. Collective radicalization posits that groups adopt extremist beliefs through a process of competition with state powers, in-group competition, and isolation, all of which intensify, coalesce, and polarize the opinions of their members to ever higher levels of radical belief.³ Conversion theory addresses radicalization at the individual level, rather than group level, and focuses on the individual process of transforming beliefs and ideologies in response to different motivations, including dissatisfaction with the current system, seeking acceptance, elevated status, revenge, or addressing personal or political grievances.⁴ Also at an individual level, moral disengagement theory holds that otherwise moral people commit violent acts by dehumanizing their victims, absolving themselves of blame, and disregarding the consequences of their actions.⁵ Borum concludes that no single theory can completely explain the radicalization process, but using established social science concepts may help CVE practitioners move forward in future research and activities.⁶

Several scholars note the connection between formal education and the potential for reducing extremist views and actions based on one or more of the above drivers. For example, education expert Ratna Ghosh claims that young people are particularly susceptible to violent extremist ideologies, and as such need to be positively engaged before they become radicalized.⁷ Ghosh argues that formal education can assist in reducing

² Denoeux, 3–4.

³ Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: Review of Social Science Theories,” *Journal of Strategic Security, Perspectives on Radicalization and Involvement in Terrorism*, 4, no. 4 (2011): 22.

⁴ Borum, 25–27.

⁵ Borum, 29–30.

⁶ Borum, 31.

⁷ Ratna Ghosh et al., “Can Education Counter Violent Religious Extremism?,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 23, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 119, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2016.1165713>.

or eliminating vulnerabilities within students that violent extremist organizations attempt to exploit, thus undermining the radicalization process before it begins.⁸ Claire Lorentzen, Education Manager at Generation Global, an international CVE education initiative of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation in the United Kingdom, asserts that formal education provides a proactive approach to equip young people with the knowledge and skills they need to reject violent extremism.⁹ Similarly, political scientist Ömer Taşpınar argues that education provides opportunities for growth and prosperity, which undermines the efforts of violent extremist organizations, who recruit largely from uneducated, impoverished youth with little prospects for the future.¹⁰ In 2015, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) developed a CVE educational program with the purpose of promoting relevant, equitable, and inclusive education to address the underlying conditions that lead to violent extremism.¹¹

While many CVE experts agree that education is a valuable tool in preventing extremism, exactly what skills, knowledge, theories, and other aspects of education are most effective in preventing or countering violent extremism is still a matter of some debate.¹² For example, the UN Global Education First Initiative held a roundtable debate in 2016 between CVE experts with differing views on the prevention of violent extremism through education. During the debate, Tunisian Representative Mohamed Khaled Khiari discussed increasing diversity and tolerance training within education, while Hahn Choonghee of the Republic of Korea stressed the need to provide young people with cognitive skills to judge right from wrong. Researcher Naureen Chowdhury Fink stressed the need for a gender-based perspective of CVE, arguing that women have largely been

⁸ Ghosh et al., 121.

⁹ Claire Lorentzen, "Education Programs Can Help to Prevent Radicalization in Schools," *Social Studies Review* 55 (2016): 44–46.

¹⁰ Ömer Taşpınar, "Fighting Radicalism, Not 'Terrorism': Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined," *SAIS Review* XXIX, no. 2 (2009): 75–89.

¹¹ Soo-Hyang Choi and Alexander Leicht, eds., *Preventing Violent Extremism Through Education: A Guide for Policy-Makers*, Education 2030 (Paris, France: United Nations Education, Science, and Cultural Organization, 2015).

¹² Agnese Macaluso, "From Countering to Preventing Radicalization Through Education: Limits and Opportunities," *The Hague Institute for Global Justice*, Hague Institute Working Paper Series, 18 (October 2016): 17.

seen as victims and bystanders of extremist violence instead of active participants. Finally, Jorge Sequeira, of the UN Counter-Terrorism Initiative Task Force, argued that more focus needs to be placed on how educational content is delivered, who should be involved, and how different education policies affect different populations.¹³

B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis investigates the following question: what is the relationship between formal education and violent extremism? More specifically, under what conditions do formal education prevent or instigate violent extremism? How do variations in aspects of formal education—such as curriculum, chosen learning style, subjects, materials, and pedagogy—affect violent extremism prevention strategies? And to what extent do cultural factors facilitate or inhibit preventative education programs? Finally, how can the United States Government best use formal education programs to prevent violent extremism abroad?

The thesis seeks to answer the above questions through a controlled case study comparison of educational programs, including the Salafi school system in Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah School system, also in Indonesia, and the Beyond Bali Education Program in Australia. These case studies were chosen for their socio-political values, educational practices, and comparative levels of success in advancing their aims through education. They were also chosen based on their size, geographic proximity to one another, and focus on Muslim communities.

The thesis applies socialization theory to help explain how these programs have instilled “commitment,” or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so, within their students. Specifically, it applies a framework based on five socializing activities identified by sociologists Jeffrey Hadden and Theodore Long—showing (demonstrating the values

¹³ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Can Education Prevent Violent Extremism? Roundtable Debate on the Prevention of Violent Extremism through Education,” Global Education First Initiative (New York: United Nations, June 2, 2016), <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/gefi/stories-events/recent-stories/2016/can-education-prevent-violent-extremism/>.

of the group), shaping (reinforcing commitment to those social values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new members), certifying (validating commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating members into the group)—to help identify and analyze the specific socializing aspects of the selected educational programs.

The thesis draws from academic materials used in the above programs, government documents, reports from non-governmental organizations, and secondary literature to investigate the underlying methodologies of these education programs. Each case study includes a brief history and purpose of the educational system, an analysis of the methodology and pedagogy of the educational system, and an examination of the specific aspects of the educational program—such as curriculum, chosen learning style, subjects, materials, content, and pedagogy—that have socializing effects that contribute to the education system’s ability to instill commitment to the organization’s values and objectives. Finally, the thesis compares the findings from each study and makes recommendations for future use in other countries looking to prevent violent extremism through education.

C. PREVIEW OF FINDINGS

Through the investigation of these cases, the thesis identifies four broad findings for developing and evaluating CVE education programs. First, an evaluation tool is needed for CVE programs, and socialization theory provides such a tool for analyzing the ability of educational institutions to prevent violent extremist ideologies from taking hold within a community. Second, socialization takes a considerable amount of time to achieve results, yet many CVE programs continue to operate for relatively short durations. Third, money is not the only form of influence; agents that control the content and context of a program can shape it to accomplish their goals. Finally, an educational program’s ability to exert influence over social structures at the national level is not necessarily dependent on the number of schools in the system, which means that Western governments do not necessarily need to establish massive CVE education programs to achieve broad effects. In light of these findings, this thesis recommends that practitioners incorporate socialization theory into future CVE education programs and that they consider the considerable time

and oversight required to fashion these programs into effective socializing agents. These points are further elucidated throughout the thesis and in its conclusion.

D. OUTLINE OF THESIS

The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II begins with a brief historical context of Western and Islamic views on the purpose of education and its use as a socializing agent. Critically, the chapter illustrates how the origins and history of education both in the West and in the Muslim world play important roles in shaping modern-day views on how various countries use education to counter violent extremism. Building off of this overview, Chapter II then defines socialization theory as the process in which individuals learn the social norms, morals, and skills necessary to operate as productive members of society, and how education lends itself as a socializing agent. It then proposes a framework based on the five-activity socialization process developed by Long and Hadden to help analyze each case study.

Chapter III surveys four major Western approaches to counter-violent extremism education: critical thinking skills, exposure to diversity, religious education, and vocational training, as well as the current debate surrounding their effectiveness. It concludes with an analysis of the approaches using the framework from Chapter II to identify how they commit students to specific communal values that contribute to preventing violent extremism. The chapter finds that the majority of the CVE approaches display at least two strong socializing activities, but none display all five. Each could benefit from further examination into how to operate as socializing agents to prevent violent extremism.

Chapter IV investigates the development and educational activities of the Salafi school system in Indonesia and how it has used social processes to spread this ultra-conservative form of Islam. It begins with a discussion on Salafism in Indonesia and various countries' support of Salafi education there, most notably Saudi Arabia. It then outlines the effects Salafi schools have had on Indonesian society, namely the increasing Arabization of the country. The chapter then describes the socializing activities of the Salafi school network and finds that the schools are able to socialize commitment to a

closed communal identity that refuses to operate within the secular political system, segregates itself from society, and antagonizes traditional establishments.

Chapter V examines the socializing properties of the Muhammadiyah educational institution in Indonesia, founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan. It outlines the organization's history, ideology, development, and relationship with the Indonesian government and describes the aspects of the Muhammadiyah school system that help students internalize the underlying principles of the organization. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the socializing activities of the Muhammadiyah school system and finds that it performs all five socializing activities to instill commitment to modernism, nationalism, and tolerance within the student population.

Chapter VI presents a case study of the Beyond Bali Education Program in Australia as a representative example of most current Western CVE education initiatives. The chapter describes the background and development of the Beyond Bali Education Program, its purpose, and its five-module curriculum, then summarizes the preliminary results of the program's execution in one secular school and one Islamic school in Australia. Lastly, the chapter analyzes the socializing activities of Beyond Bali and finds that while the program performs several socializing activities, it avoids socializing a particular set of communal values by instead focusing on critical thinking to inoculate against violent extremist ideologies.

Chapter VII concludes with an overview of the thesis and a case study comparison of the Salafi schools, Muhammadiyah schools, and Beyond Bali Education Program. Overall, it identifies that the Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools display strong evidence for all five socializing activities while the Beyond Bali Education Program displays both strong and weak aspects of showing, shaping, and placing with limited evidence of recruiting and certifying activities. It then articulates findings from the research and offers recommendations for constructing and evaluating CVE education programs.

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II. EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION

Education has a long history as a tool of social change, yet its purpose and methods have varied over time and between cultures. Today, considerable debate persists over the role of education in preventing and countering radicalization and violence extremism. This chapter provides a brief historical context of Western and Islamic views on the purpose of education and its use as a socializing agent. Building off of this introduction of the purpose of education, the chapter then outlines socialization theory and offers a framework based on a socialization process developed by sociologists Theodore Long and Jeffrey Hadden to identify and analyze five socializing activities within each selected education program and their correlation to the larger violent extremism problem in the country.

A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The origins and history of education both in the West and in the Muslim world play important roles in shaping modern-day views on how various countries use education to counter violent extremism. Critically, the origin of education systems was as much about teaching individuals to be members of a community or society as it was about imparting knowledge. This section provides a brief historical overview of Western and Islamic societies' educational systems with the goal of better understanding how education works as a tool of socialization.

1. Western Education

Perhaps the earliest examples of formal educational systems in the West come from the ancient Greek city-states. Historians Harry G. Good and William Boyd both point out that although Athens and Sparta had differing educational methods—Sparta's being far more militaristic—they shared the similar purpose of creating loyal soldiers and citizens who followed the same moral code.¹⁴ According to Good, ancient Greek schools did not concern themselves with cultivating individual freedom, nor were they concerned with

¹⁴ Harry G. Good, *A History of Western Education* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), 19; William Boyd, *The History of Western Education*, ed. Edmund J. King, 8th ed. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), 10–17.

imparting knowledge for the personal benefit of the individual.¹⁵ Education was a branch of politics, aimed at creating citizens devoted to the state and able to perform their part to ensure the state's continued success.¹⁶ Boyd argues that attitudes regarding the purpose of education began to shift towards imparting knowledge after Socrates and Plato constructed theories of education that included new rational methods and carefully selected content to provide the desired examples for children in service of the state.¹⁷

Historians Carroll Atkinson and Eugene Maleska describe how this system lost its socializing purpose following the Roman conquest of Greece in 146 B.C., and began to focus more on abstract learning than moral development, replicating selected information with little emphasis placed on generating new knowledge.¹⁸ According to Atkinson and Maleska, the school system also standardized, becoming more specialized and technical.¹⁹ By the fifth century A.D., this new system encompassed theological studies, chivalric education, trade skills and vocational training, as well as the creation of early universities.²⁰ Because education was not seen as a social obligation, these institutions were strictly reserved for the wealthy and religious elite while the majority of the population received no formal education.²¹ Boyd comes to the same conclusions regarding early education, and also notes that distinctions between religious and secular education did not exist at that time because the concept of religion was indistinguishable from the state.²² According to both Boyd and Good, this trend continued in Europe throughout the Medieval Ages and into the Renaissance.²³

¹⁵ Good, 36.

¹⁶ Good, 36.

¹⁷ Boyd, 26–42.

¹⁸ Carroll Atkinson and Eugene T. Maleska, *The Story of Education* (Philadelphia and New York: Chilton Company, 1962), 28–31.

¹⁹ Atkinson and Maleska, 32.

²⁰ Atkinson and Maleska, 34, 37–41.

²¹ Atkinson and Maleska, 40–41.

²² Boyd, 99–101.

²³ Boyd, 125–27, 159; Good, 135–36.

Good attributes the next major shift in western education to the age of Enlightenment and the rise of nationalism from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries.²⁴ By the 1760s, philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau pushed for compulsory public education to produce patriots for the burgeoning European nations, particularly in France.²⁵ Good credits Rousseau for creating the foundation for much of modern Western educational philosophy.²⁶ He notes in particular that because Rousseau believed that the existing culture of learning had degraded society's sense of morality and led men to neglect their duty as citizens, education, therefore, should focus on the moral, social, and patriotic growth of the child in preparation for public service in adulthood.²⁷ Rousseau further argued that one cannot simply tell citizens to be patriots, that "education must give the souls of the people a national form and must so shape their opinions and tastes that they become patriots as much by inclination and passion as by necessity...compel them, by education to love their country, its land and life and liberties."²⁸ Rousseau believed that the best way to achieve this ideal was to create an unconstrained, "natural" environment that stimulated growth and discovery of these values.²⁹

The rise of nationalism and the inception of mass conscription, the *levee en mass*, created another important demand for public education. Historian Ambrogio Caiani notes that, in 1790, the French government instituted the levee to muster a military force large enough to oppose other European armies.³⁰ Building and maintaining a compulsory force of that size required the support and participation of the people.³¹ To gain this support and

²⁴ Good, 135.

²⁵ Good, 197–209.

²⁶ Good, 207.

²⁷ Good, 207–9.

²⁸ Good, 209.

²⁹ Good, 222.

³⁰ Ambrogio A. Caiani, "Levée En Masse" (European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz, December 3, 2010), 1–3, <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/caiania-2010-en> URN: urn:nbn:de:0159-20100921155.

³¹ Caiani, 2–4.

to increase the efficacy of the conscription program, the French government used the education system to instill feelings of patriotic duty and provide preparatory training for military service.³² In effect, Europe's nationalist-era education reflected the educational aims of the ancient Greeks.

According to sociologist Milan Zafirovski, it took Western educators nearly a century to refine the system's nationalistic purpose and adopt a philosophy that followed the more ideological principles of the Enlightenment, including realism, liberty, secularism, and the scientific method.³³ Beginning in the late eighteenth century, Western education began to focus on personal enrichment in addition to social and economic productivity.³⁴ Good concurs, noting that much of Western society throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries established national liberal education systems with the aim to create a "wise, free, and noble" people, promoting the ideals of the French Revolution and the spread of modern democracy.³⁵ It was during this period that Europe, and to some extent the new United States, embraced a model of free and nearly universal secular education focused on critical thought and free debate.³⁶

While nationalist educators sought to cultivate a "civilized" society in Europe, historian James A. Mangan argues that European colonial powers used education for very different purposes in the territories they controlled overseas.³⁷ Mangan asserts that the British prevented conflict with colonized populations by using education, largely provided by Christian missionaries, to inculcate native children with "appropriate attitudes of dominance and deference" that legitimized British supremacy over the "inferior" native people.³⁸ Education expert Tatang Suratno offers an example of the Dutch education policy

³² Caiani, 4.

³³ Milan Zafirovski, *The Enlightenment and Its Effects on Modern Society* (New York: Springer, 2011), 144.

³⁴ Zafirovski, 144.

³⁵ Good, 247.

³⁶ Good, 314–15.

³⁷ James A. Mangan, *The Imperial Curriculum: Racial Images and Education in the British Colonial Experience*, vol. 105 (New York: Routledge, 1993), 6.

³⁸ Mangan, 105:6–7.

in Indonesia, which educated only the elite native families to create an obedient clerical class that administrated over the rest of the indigenous population in support of the Dutch monarchy.³⁹ As a result, the remainder of the population, particularly the indigenous Muslim community, were left to build native school systems separate from the colonial enterprise.⁴⁰ According to linguistics professor Peter Lowenberg, these systems struggled to provide basic education to the large indigenous population given their limited resources and lack of support from the Dutch colonial government.⁴¹ By 1900, a total of 1,500 schools existed in the Dutch East Indies, an average of only one school per 24,000 inhabitants.⁴² When Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, the literacy rate among Malayo-Muslims had reached only five percent.⁴³ However, according to Lowenberg, these native schools provided the groundwork for a future Indonesian national education system and preserved a unified indigenous linguistic and cultural identity that flourished in the years following independence.⁴⁴

The twentieth century has witnessed the development of numerous theories on the ideal purpose and methods of formal education. For example, philosopher John Dewey's "child-centered" educational theory focuses on providing experiential learning that allows children to interact with their environment through a self-guided learning process.⁴⁵ Rather than educating merely to meet the needs of the state, Dewey's theory emphasized educating to benefit the emotional, intellectual, and physical growth of the child.⁴⁶ Economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis credit Dewey's theory as the cornerstone of the modern

³⁹ Tatang Suratno, "The Education System in Indonesia at a Time of Significant Changes," *Revue Internationale d'éducation de Sèvres*, Education in Asia in 2014: What Global Issues?, May 19, 2014, 1.

⁴⁰ Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2007), 21; Suratno, 2.

⁴¹ Peter Lowenberg, "Writing and Literacy in Indonesia," *Studies in the Linguistic Sciences* 30, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 139.

⁴² Lowenberg, 140.

⁴³ Lowenberg, 135, 140.

⁴⁴ Lowenberg, 140–42.

⁴⁵ John Dewey, *The School and Society; and The Child and the Curriculum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 33–34.

⁴⁶ Dewey, 34–36.

progressive education movement in Europe and the United States.⁴⁷ Economists Laura Holden and Jeff Biddle attribute another major movement to fellow economist Theodore Schultz, who popularized the “human capital” theory in 1960. The theory holds that a government can spur economic growth by devoting resources to public development projects, including education.⁴⁸ Human capital theory frames education as an investment that improves the overall economic value of individuals, which in turn increases the productivity of the state.⁴⁹ According to Holden and Biddle, Schultz’s theory led to the “institutionalist” view of schooling responsible for much of the standardization and measurement of educational processes found in modern schools.⁵⁰

Over the last twenty years, some scholars have begun to advocate for less state-centric constructs that promote global citizenship over national identities. For instance, Fred Van Leeuwen, educator and General Secretary of Education International, a global teacher’s union federation, argues against academic testing and the economic model, favoring a reimagining of Enlightenment principles by teaching critical thinking skills and free debate in schools to generate understanding and tolerance among students in preparation for life in an increasingly globalized society.⁵¹ These and numerous other theories continue to vie for influence over public schools in many Western nations today. The fact that this tension between theories endures is, perhaps, telling of how the deeply-rooted ideals of critical thought and open debate continue to shape the Western conception of formal education.

⁴⁷ Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, “Corporate Capital and Progressive Education,” in *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 180.

⁴⁸ Laura Holden and Jeff Biddle, “The Introduction of Human Capital Theory into Educational Policy in the United States” (Working Paper, Michigan State University, 2016), 1–2.

⁴⁹ Holden and Biddle, 2–3, 31.

⁵⁰ Holden and Biddle, 9–12, 39–40.

⁵¹ Fred van Leeuwen, “Education, the Enlightenment, and the 21st-Century,” *Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce*, July 26, 2016, <https://www.thersa.org/discover/publications-and-articles/rsa-blogs/2016/07/education-the-enlightenment-and-the-21st-century>.

2. Islamic Education

Just as Western education developed from a plurality of ideas and practices, Islamic education has grown from a range of sources and philosophies, carried out by various actors for varying purposes over time. Anthropologists Robert Hefner and Muhammad Zaman describe the development of formal Islamic education, which began in Persia the early 1000s and spread throughout the Middle East and beyond.⁵² They assert that, for much of its history, the *madrasa*—literally meaning “school” in Arabic⁵³—provided instruction in both religious and non-religious topics, including classical Greek education, and pioneered developments in math, astronomy, medicine, philosophy, architecture, and more; these schools acted as the center of Muslim society.⁵⁴ Somewhat ironically, this vast body of knowledge, including classical literature and thought, eventually made its way back into Western academia through Spain and helped spark the European Renaissance.⁵⁵ Good goes so far as to claim that were it not for the efforts of these early Islamic scholars, much of the ancient literature neglected during the medieval era would have been lost forever.⁵⁶

Hefner argues that Islamic education has always been dependent on political and social support, and so the form and function of religious education has transformed to reflect the society it served.⁵⁷ For example, a strong and independent society in northern Iraq during the eleventh century instituted and managed the madrasa system separate from the ruling establishment as a means to exert authority in defiance of the state.⁵⁸ Alternately, in Mamluk Egypt and Syria, the Turkic elite sponsored madrasas to build legitimacy in the eyes of the largely Arab population over which they presided, and to appease powerful

⁵² Hefner and Zaman, 2–5.

⁵³ Jonathan P. Berkey, “Madrasas Medieval and Modern: Politics, Education, and the Problem of Muslim Identity,” in *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, ed. Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 41.

⁵⁴ Hefner and Zaman, 5–6.

⁵⁵ Good, 83–84.

⁵⁶ Good, 84.

⁵⁷ Hefner and Zaman, 4.

⁵⁸ Hefner and Zaman, 7.

Arab families who could pose a threat to the dynasty.⁵⁹ Historian Jonathan Berkey states that education became a tool for social reform in the Muslim world as early as the eighteenth century.⁶⁰ According to Berkey, the Ottoman Empire instituted widespread educational reforms, made educators effective employees of the state for the first time, and built a vast network of schools, all to resist European colonial encroachment and shape the larger Ottoman society for future advancement.⁶¹

By the late nineteenth century, Berkey argues, continued exposure to Western colonial education institutions generated the drive to provide an alternative Islamic education that has, over time, become increasingly narrow, rigid, and scripturalist in certain parts of the world.⁶² According to Berkey, this trend is due as much to various groups attempting to define and propagate a timeless, unitary form of Islamic practice as it is a reaction to Western secularism.⁶³ Berkey further states that early Islam functioned through oral transmission of knowledge derived from a consensus among respected religious authorities, but some believed that such a fluid system led to heterodoxy within the faith.⁶⁴ For example, the British Colonial government and Indian Ulama attempted to regulate British-Muslim relations by constructing an “Anglo-Muhammadan Law” to standardize Muslim practices and created Islamic equivalents to British law.⁶⁵ This move to standardize Islamic practice affected reform of Indian madrasas as well, spurring debate over whether it would be more useful for madrasas to prepare students to participate in modern social and economic life or protect “Islam” by focusing strictly on religious topics—which would require defining a unitary and timeless definition of Islam to protect and propagate.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ Hefner and Zaman, 7.

⁶⁰ Berkey, 41.

⁶¹ Berkey, 42–44.

⁶² Berkey, 51–52.

⁶³ Berkey, 56.

⁶⁴ Berkey, 51.

⁶⁵ Berkey, 51–52.

⁶⁶ Berkey, 52–53.

Indonesia provides a more recent example of the varying purposes within Islamic education, particularly in response to Western colonialism. Hefner and Zaman attribute the spread of Islamic education in Indonesia to small-scale, local schools—called pesantren, pondok, surau, or dayah schools, depending on the region in which they are located—that filled the vacuum created by Dutch inattention to most of the population and lack of a unified Islamic structure in the country.⁶⁷ These schools initially focused on traditional Qur’anic subjects, but by the early 1900s incorporated general education courses to compete with Dutch colonial schools and the newly established Islamic madrasas in the country that offered both religious and general education for the indigenous population.⁶⁸ These independent schools blended local tradition with Islamic teaching as well as elements of Western education to create a unique, populist, and trans-ethnic “Malayo-Muslim” identity throughout the country.⁶⁹

South Asian Islamic education, on the other hand, followed a different path. In 1867, during British colonial rule in India, a small Islamic school stood up in the village of Deoband and quickly spread throughout the continent.⁷⁰ According to Hefner, the loose confederation of schools known as the Deobandi system adopted Western administrative practices to compete with the state-run schools in the area but rejected Western content in the school curriculum.⁷¹ They instead focused on creating a unified Indian Muslim community that advocated for scriptural literacy and the primacy of the Hanafi school of Islamic law over local traditions.⁷² This school system further passed on the dress, social etiquette, and learning traditionally reserved for the Muslim upper class to all those who followed the Deobandi movement.⁷³ Initially, the Deobandi schools relied on local funding from the general public but, over time—and particularly after the partition of Pakistan and

⁶⁷ Hefner and Zaman, 176.

⁶⁸ Hefner and Zaman, 175–76.

⁶⁹ Hefner and Zaman, 20–21.

⁷⁰ Hefner and Zaman, 63.

⁷¹ Hefner and Zaman, 19.

⁷² Hefner and Zaman, 19.

⁷³ Hefner and Zaman, 19–20.

India—Pakistani madrasas began to receive significant funding from Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states, and with that funding came the influence of Salafism in Pakistan, an understanding of Islam that centers around strict adherence to *tawhid*, or the oneness of God, and the removal of human subjectivity, reason, and logic in following Qur’anic guidance.⁷⁴ According to political scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz, Salafism holds that there is only one legitimate religious understanding of God’s commands, and therefore, with no room for interpretation, Islamic pluralism cannot exist.⁷⁵ Wiktorowicz further contends that this uncompromising interpretation can exacerbate conflicts between those who hold different beliefs—even between different factions within Salafism—and limits prospects for compromise and understanding.⁷⁶

Today, Saudi-influenced Salafism dominates the current discourse on modern Islamic education. In 2013, sociologist William Racimora published a study for the Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union outlining the impact of Salafi financial support on educational and social institutions in Bosnia, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Tunisia.⁷⁷ In the report, Racimora argues that Salafis aim to impose their strict and literalist understanding of Sunni Islam throughout the globe.⁷⁸ The methods used to establish it, however, are highly adaptive to varying political contexts and exploit modern technologies, educational institutions, and both private and public charities in targeted societies.⁷⁹ Racimora credits the success of the movement, in particular, to the funding provided by financial elites in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.⁸⁰ Particularly

⁷⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (May 2006): 207–39, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004>; Hefner and Zaman, *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, 253–54.

⁷⁵ Wiktorowicz, 207.

⁷⁶ Wiktorowicz, 208.

⁷⁷ William Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, *Salafist/Wahhabite Financial Support to Educational, Social and Religious Institutions: Study* (Luxembourg: EUR-OP, 2013), [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457136/EXPO-AFET_ET\(2013\)457136_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457136/EXPO-AFET_ET(2013)457136_EN.pdf).

⁷⁸ Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 4.

⁷⁹ Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 23.

⁸⁰ Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 23–24.

since the 1970s, their support has spread the Salafi ideology beyond the Arabian Peninsula to challenge Western, local, and opposing Islamic educational practices worldwide.⁸¹

Just as in Western society, trends in Islamic education have shifted over time, and educational philosophies continue to differ among the various modern Islamic institutions teaching throughout the world today. Islamic education has taken on many forms since the eleventh century, from pioneering developments in mathematics, medicine, architecture, and philosophy to focusing strictly on theological studies, from encompassing a wide range of beliefs to competing to impose a single, unitary form of Islam. These differences exist in part as a reaction to the tension created by intersecting local traditions, Islamic education, and Western secular influence. This competition between local practices, Islamic ideologies, and secular education will likely continue well into the future.

B. SOCIALIZATION THEORY

Several scholars argue that socialization theory may help elucidate the connection between formal education and countering extremism. Although specific definitions of socialization vary by discipline, sociologist John A. Clausen provides a general description of socialization as “the process of inducing an individual to willingly conform to the standards of acceptable behavior expected by the group to which he or she belongs.”⁸² In socialization theory, Clausen argues, individuals learn the social norms, morals, and skills necessary to operate as productive members of society from various socializing agents, including parents and authority figures, social groups, religious institutions, and schools.⁸³ Sociologist Steven Barkan describes socialization as the “process by which people learn their culture.”⁸⁴ Without socialization, argues Barkan, people could not develop a culture, nor cultivate a coherent society.⁸⁵ Sociologists Jeffrey Hadden and Theodore Long agree

⁸¹ Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 23–24.

⁸² Social Science Research Council. Committee on Socialization and Social Structure and John A. Clausen, *Socialization and Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), 4.

⁸³ Social Science Research Council. Committee on Socialization and Social Structure and Clausen, 4–6.

⁸⁴ Steven E. Barkan, “Socialization,” in *Sociology: Understanding and Changing the Social World, Comprehensive Edition* (Boston: Flat World Knowledge, 2013), 108.

⁸⁵ Barkan, 108–9.

with Barkan regarding the significance of socialization theory and argue that the concept of socialization is so ingrained within the social sciences that it serves as the cornerstone of social theory.⁸⁶

Within the broader framework of socialization theory, the concept of “commitment” is particularly important. Hadden and Long define commitment as “the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so” and consider it the most important attribute that socializing agents produce within acceptable new members of a group.⁸⁷ This commitment produces confidence within the group that the new member is able and, more importantly, willing to perform as expected, especially in the absence of constant supervision.⁸⁸ Therefore, commitment represents “the members’ faithfulness to group ideals and intention to use them as a guide in discretionary situations.”⁸⁹ The authors argue that without commitment, any knowledge or skills imparted to the member are wasted, or worse, may be used to sabotage the group.⁹⁰

1. Education as a Socializing Agent

Formal education is a key socialization tool that develops a sense of commitment among young members to the ideals of their society. According to education expert Henry Giroux, education systems tend to reflect the social and ideological values of society, exemplify the values and duties of the ideal citizen in that society, and transmit those values to future generations.⁹¹ For example, sociologist Reinhard Bendix describes nineteenth-century Western socialization efforts using education to increase worker productivity and compliance in an industrializing market. Education at that time was designed to instill the

⁸⁶ Theodore E. Long and Jeffrey K. Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” *Sociological Theory* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 39.

⁸⁷ Long and Hadden, 42–43.

⁸⁸ Long and Hadden, 43.

⁸⁹ Long and Hadden, 43.

⁹⁰ Long and Hadden, 43.

⁹¹ Henry A. Giroux, “Critical Theory and Rationality in Citizenship Education,” *Curriculum Inquiry* 10, no. 4 (1980): 329–30.

values of frugality and hard work, ultimately creating a perception of “economic success as a symbol of virtue and failure a sign of moral turpitude.”⁹² Barkan also gives a poignant example of socialization in American education through a “hidden curriculum”—or the social lessons and communal values instructed in the school beyond the abstract knowledge included in the formal curriculum:

Children learn primarily positive things about the country’s past and present; they learn the importance of being neat, patient, and obedient; and they learn to compete for good grades and other rewards. In this manner, they learn to love America and not to recognize its faults, and they learn traits that prepare them for jobs and careers that will bolster the capitalist economy. Children are also socialized to believe that failure, such as earning poor grades, stems from not studying hard enough and, more generally, from not trying hard enough.⁹³

Barkan concludes that it is this hidden curriculum, as much or more than any other aspect of education, that engenders within students the cultural values of their society in which they live.⁹⁴

Historian Larry Holmes offers an additional example in how the revolutionary Soviet government used education as a socializing influence to secure its position and support of the citizens.⁹⁵ Following the Communist Revolution in Russia in 1917, the Soviet education wing, the Commissariat of Enlightenment, quickly set about reshaping the school system to reflect communist ideals and developed pedagogies that furthered the objectives of the revolution.⁹⁶ The Commissariat combined all Soviet schools into a single system that provided an identical, free, and universal education for every Soviet citizen.⁹⁷ The program implemented a curriculum designed to develop basic technical skills for

⁹² Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order* (New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), 61.

⁹³ Barkan, 127.

⁹⁴ Barkan, 127–28.

⁹⁵ Larry E. Holmes, *The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse: Reforming Education in Soviet Russia, 1917–1931*, Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 3.

⁹⁶ Holmes, 7–9.

⁹⁷ Holmes, 8–11.

future work, and also had its own “hidden curriculum” that sought to eradicate the concepts of social classes, the division of labor, and nationalism from the population.⁹⁸

Holmes discovered that the Commissariat could not simply dictate radical change and achieve meaningful results despite having complete authority over the national education system.⁹⁹ The plan faced continual resistance from local teachers who refused to implement the reforms in classrooms across the country.¹⁰⁰ Making the Soviet educational vision a reality required getting local teachers to commit to the purpose, methods, and desired outcomes of the new system, which took nearly thirty years of persuasion and a series of compromises to accomplish.¹⁰¹ Holmes concludes that, although the program eventually found some success in instilling communist ideals and support for the Soviet system amongst the population, the Soviet educational reforms demonstrated the need to apply vast resources, time, and direction to achieve widespread social change through education.¹⁰²

2. Analytical Framework

Considering the power of socialization to form identities and commit members of the group to specific values, the potential for socialization to contribute to the success of CVE educational programs warrants further examination. To that end, this thesis applies a framework based on a socialization model developed by Long and Hadden to identify the socializing activities of the selected educational programs and their effect on violent extremism. Long and Hadden focus on five socializing activities in particular that assist in engendering commitment: showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing.¹⁰³

Showing is, in essence, the introduction of the social order to the new member. This activity incorporates describing the group’s culture and organization, demonstrating the

⁹⁸ Holmes, 10.

⁹⁹ Holmes, xiii.

¹⁰⁰ Holmes, xiii.

¹⁰¹ Holmes, 10–12.

¹⁰² Holmes, 12–24.

¹⁰³ Long and Hadden, 45.

requirements for maintaining membership in the group, and defining how the group holds new members accountable for meeting these requirements.¹⁰⁴ This activity is necessarily abstract, requiring socializing agents to highlight selected aspects of the group at the cost of others, as the new members have neither the time nor ability to comprehend the full complexity of the system.¹⁰⁵ In an educational setting, this activity may manifest itself in the presentation of the values system of the school culture itself or those of the community of which the students are a part or will join upon graduation.

Shaping involves applying punishments and rewards for behavior to reinforce the values of the group.¹⁰⁶ These sanctions may be routine, such as through evaluations, or applied in an ad hoc manner to address specific situations as they arise. In a setting where individual membership to the group is automatic, such as child socialization in schools or communities, such actions should be frequent and explicit to account for the lack of the option to remove the member from the group.¹⁰⁷ Shaping is critical to influencing students to commit to desired values and behaviors because it compels them to adhere to the standards of the group, at least while under supervision. While shaping does not necessarily guarantee compliance, it does demonstrate the relative value of certain aspects of the group and the desired behaviors of members.¹⁰⁸

Recruiting is simply the selection process for identifying and attracting potential new members.¹⁰⁹ Hadden and Long identify child socialization as a partial exception to this because children are automatically selected to be members of their family and society, although they can be recruited to fill particular roles in those groups.¹¹⁰ For the purposes of CVE education, analysis of this activity will generally focus on if and how the school

¹⁰⁴ Long and Hadden, 45.

¹⁰⁵ Long and Hadden, 45.

¹⁰⁶ Long and Hadden, 45.

¹⁰⁷ Long and Hadden, 45.

¹⁰⁸ Long and Hadden, 45.

¹⁰⁹ Long and Hadden, 45.

¹¹⁰ Long and Hadden, 45.

assists with recruiting students into other groups and how those groups relate to any violent extremism in the community.

Certifying serves as a quality control measure to track a new member's progress and can be either formal or informal.¹¹¹ This activity includes making a judgment on the fitness of a potential member to join the group and the extent of their commitment to the values of the group, which is usually then ritually conferred to create "social confidence" within the new member and among others in accepting the new member.¹¹² Analysis of this activity within CVE education will focus on how the school creates social confidence within students as members of a follow-on group, more so than studying the formal evaluations of a student's understanding of curriculum content.

Placing requires situating the new member into positions—again either formal or informal—within the group.¹¹³ As a complement to recruiting, placing situates a new member within the group's social order, and defines the limits and opportunities for him or her as an acceptable member of that group.¹¹⁴ As with recruiting and certifying, this thesis will analyze placing in the context of how an educational program incorporates students into its social structure and then prepares and assists students in taking social positions after graduation.

Table 1 provides a reference for the five activities of the analytical framework to be used throughout the thesis. This framework is deliberately broad, which makes it particularly useful when attempting to operationalize socialization; it can incorporate any number or type of socializing agents, including schools, as long as they carry out one or more of the five activities, and can explain nearly any effort, including, for instance, how children are raised to become productive members of a community, or how violent extremist organizations integrate new members into patterns of terrorism.

¹¹¹ Long and Hadden, 46.

¹¹² Long and Hadden, 45–46.

¹¹³ Long and Hadden, 46.

¹¹⁴ Long and Hadden, 46.

Table 1. Analytical Framework

Socializing Activity	Description
Showing	Describing and demonstrating the group's culture and organization, the requirements for maintaining membership in the group, and how the group holds members accountable.
Shaping	Applying punishments and rewards for behavior to reinforce the values of the group. Builds commitment by habituating adherence to the standards of the group.
Recruiting	Identifying and attracting students to follow-on groups and how those groups relate to any violent extremism in the community.
Certifying	Conducting quality control to track a new member's progress in committing to certain values and creating "social confidence" within students as members of a group.
Placing	Incorporating students into the group's social structure and preparing and assisting students in taking social positions after graduation.

Identifying how an educational program conducts each of these activities will help determine the socializing outcome produced through the program. For instance, if the stated purpose of a program is merely to provide technical training, one can expect to see little focus on socializing a commitment to a set of values or ideals. This does not mean, however, that the program does not have a socializing effect on the students or that the program has no effect—either positive or negative—on the larger community's ability to combat violent extremism.

Addressing the above activities in each case study will help draw conclusions about how the educational program works as a socializing agent, how it positively or negatively affects violent extremism in the country, and what generalizable lessons learned can be taken from it for future CVE education efforts. The next chapter surveys current CVE education theories and employs the above framework to each of the four main Western CVE educational approaches.

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III. COUNTER-VIOLENT EXTREMISM EDUCATION

The complexity of the radicalization process and the difficulty in developing suitable programs to counter it has generated disagreement among experts over how best to prevent violent extremism through education. While many CVE experts agree that education is a valuable tool in preventing extremism, exactly what skills, knowledge, theories, and other aspects of education are most effective in countering violent extremism is still a matter of some debate.¹¹⁵ This debate is significant because it has resulted in the development of a variety of programs based on the many different—and sometimes conflicting—positions held by CVE education experts today. With a lack of consensus regarding optimal strategies for preventing extremism through education and the overall lack of empirical research and analysis of current CVE program effectiveness, additional examination of current CVE education theory and practice is needed to fully understand and address this problem.¹¹⁶

This chapter surveys four major Western approaches to counter-violent extremism education: critical thinking skills, exposure to diversity, religious education, and vocational training, as well as the current debate surrounding their effectiveness. It concludes with an analysis of the approaches using the framework from Chapter II, which focuses on the five socializing activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing to identify how they commit students to specific communal values that contribute to preventing violent extremism.

The chapter finds that the majority of the CVE approaches feature strong showing activities as part of their educational programs, but that most lack evidence of shaping, recruiting, certifying, or placing activities. Finally, while all four programs display at least

¹¹⁵ Macaluso. For a recent example of scholarly discourse that highlights the range of views regarding how to focus CVE education see United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Can Education Prevent Violent Extremism? Roundtable Debate on the Prevention of Violent Extremism through Education.”

¹¹⁶ Minerva Nasser-Eddine et al., “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” Technical Report (Edinburgh, South Australia: Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Center, Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization, 2011), 73–76.

two strong socializing activities, none display all five, and they could benefit from further examination into how to better operate as socializing agents to prevent violent extremism.

A. CVE EDUCATION APPROACHES

Scholars and practitioners from numerous countries have developed educational programs aimed at interrupting the radicalization process. Most of these CVE educational efforts can be categorized into four broad approaches: teaching vocational skills, developing critical thinking skills, increasing exposure to diversity, and reforming religious education. Each approach addresses specific factors that potentially lead to radicalization in an effort to reduce future incidences of violence or support for extremist organizations. In practice, CVE education programs can combine two or more approaches to address multiple factors influencing the target community and tailor outcomes to each community's unique circumstances.

1. Vocational Training

One CVE education approach focuses on teaching practical skills that will allow individuals to pursue gainful employment. This approach centers on the belief that poverty and the lack of economic prospects create perceptions of injustice and marginalization that drive extremism, and that providing skills training, resources, and economic opportunities for young people will preclude them from turning to violent extremist organizations.¹¹⁷ Economist and political scientist Ömer Taşpınar argues that education provides opportunities for growth and prosperity, which undermine the efforts of violent extremist organizations who recruit largely from uneducated, impoverished youth with little prospects for the future.¹¹⁸ He contends that CVE programs must prioritize increasing the quality of life in developing nations, particularly in the Muslim world, to combat feelings

¹¹⁷ Samantha de Silva, "Role of Education in the Prevention of Violent Extremism," Background Paper, Can Development Interventions Help Prevent Conflict and Violence? (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group and United Nations, October 1, 2017), 7–9, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/448221510079762554/Role-of-education-in-the-prevention-of-violent-extremism>.

¹¹⁸ Taşpınar, 81–82.

of discrimination or lack of opportunity among youth as they enter the workforce.¹¹⁹ By providing relevant skills and opportunities for employment commensurate with the expectations of young Muslims in an increasingly globalized society, Taspinar believes CVE programs can reduce the appeal of extremism as a means to combat inequality.¹²⁰ To achieve this goal, he recommends that Western nations implement programs that increase literacy rates, labor productivity, and technical training while incentivizing institutional reforms that promote human development and better governance within developing nations.¹²¹

Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recognizes growing perceptions of inequality and injustice as a major contributor to violent extremism and recommends creating effective economic alternatives for at-risk groups to combat this radicalizing influence.¹²² In addition to building state capacity and inclusiveness, UNDP programs focus on improving education levels and marketable skills for marginalized populations and provide them with better access to jobs.¹²³ UNDP stresses, however, that vocational training projects must create meaningful opportunities for employment to avoid creating unrealistic expectations that only increase feelings of inequality and discrimination.¹²⁴

Samantha de Silva, Senior Social Protection Specialist at the World Bank Group, also argues that lack of employment opportunities and the resulting hopelessness for a better future create the conditions that allow extremist ideologies to spread.¹²⁵ De Silva advocates for the vocational skills development (VSD) approach, which focuses on “basic education, technical and practical skills training and also soft and life skills” to empower

¹¹⁹ Taspinar, 80.

¹²⁰ Taspinar, 77–80.

¹²¹ Taspinar, 84.

¹²² United Nations Development Programme, “Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance, and Respect for Diversity: A Development Response to Addressing Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” 2016, 27.

¹²³ United Nations Development Programme, 27–28.

¹²⁴ United Nations Development Programme, 28.

¹²⁵ de Silva, 15.

youth and give them a sense of purpose, resulting in both employability and social inclusiveness.¹²⁶ Likewise, she supports instituting targeted skills programs that take into account the local labor market and social dynamics of the community to ensure the program develops realistic expectations among the trainees and avoids the perceptions of favoritism between groups.¹²⁷

One example of such a program is the Tujengane Tuinuane Youth Skills for Business & CVE program in Kenya. This program is administered by the Ummah Initiative Group (UIG), a Kenyan non-profit community development organization, and is sponsored by the USAID Kenya Youth Employment and Skills Program. Established in 2010, it trains local youth in competitive job skills to increase their access to economic opportunities and strengthen their resilience to violent extremism.¹²⁸ The three-month training program focuses on teaching business skills, basic computer skills, graphic design, photography, and videography so that students can find employment or start their own business as well as produce digital CVE counter-narrative products for the UIG.¹²⁹ The UIG also connects students with local businesses to provide on the job training and assists with navigating the Kenyan legal system to register for national identification cards and apply for business licenses.¹³⁰ Nimosi Hassan, program committee member and Ward Administrator for Bongwe Gombato Ward, Kwale County, believes this program will help empower local youth to compete in the local, national, and international markets to mitigate the negative effects of recent incidences of violent extremism and prevent future occurrences in her community.¹³¹

¹²⁶ de Silva, 19.

¹²⁷ de Silva, 19–20.

¹²⁸ Nimosi Hassan et al., “Tujengane Tuinuane Youth Skills for Business & CVE,” Ummah Initiative Group, 2018, <https://ummahinitiative.com/youth-skills-for-business-cve/>.

¹²⁹ Hassan et al.

¹³⁰ Pamela Wesonga, “USAID Kenya Youth Employment and Skills Activity Fact Sheet” (United States Agency for International Development, November 2017), 1, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/K-YES_Fact_Sheet_-_Nov._2017_final.pdf; Hassan et al.

¹³¹ Hassan et al.

2. Critical Thinking Skills

Other CVE programs aim to develop critical thinking skills, also known as autonomy education.¹³² These programs enable students to critically analyze and then reject arguments that attempt to justify violent extremism.¹³³ Overall, this approach intends for students to reject radical ideologies and adopt a more moderate and inclusive worldview. For example, Agnese Macaluso, a researcher at the Hague Institute for Global Justice, recommends that educational programs prioritize the cognitive skills of judgment and discernment over the inculcation of any specific values or singular identity.¹³⁴ She encourages critical thinking through continually challenging and questioning ideas, and to “think beyond taboos and common assumptions.”¹³⁵ Macaluso believes that critical thinking and idea-sharing are necessary for development. She also asserts that critical thinking skills compel students to form a nuanced and complex view of the world that prevents the kind of black-and-white thinking prevalent among violent extremists.¹³⁶

Education expert Lynn Davies argues that CVE educational programs should empower students with an awareness of conflicting viewpoints and give them the ability to compare their values to those espoused by extremist organizations.¹³⁷ According to Davies, education can address extremism in schools by encouraging critical analysis and political activism among students, using humor and satire to delegitimize violent extremist arguments and challenge their views by supporting secular human rights.¹³⁸ Davies also asserts that programs should develop skills to raise awareness of how information is

¹³² David Resnick, “Can Autonomy Counteract Extremism in Traditional Education?,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 42, no. 1 (2008): 107–8.

¹³³ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

¹³⁴ Macaluso, 7.

¹³⁵ Macaluso, 7–8.

¹³⁶ Macaluso, 7–10.

¹³⁷ Lynn Davies, *Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004); Lynn Davies, “Educating Against Extremism: Towards a Critical Politicalisation of Young People,” *International Review of Education* 55, no. 2–3 (May 2009): 183–203.

¹³⁸ Davies, “Educating Against Extremism: Towards a Critical Politicalisation of Young People,” 195–200.

presented and to analyze different narratives critically, especially in the media, to separate truth from myth and make informed decisions.¹³⁹

Education experts Farid Panjwani, Lynn Revell, Reza Gholami, and Mike Diboll advocate for a modern liberal education that focuses on developing critical thinking skills to “foster students’ powers of questioning, criticality and imagining egalitarian futures as the way forward in contesting all forms of extremism...”¹⁴⁰ Panjwani et al. contend that there is a difference between radical ideas and radical actions, including violence; the latter is a criminal act, but the former is a staple of liberal society that empowers citizens to critically analyze and address social issues for the betterment of society.¹⁴¹ Therefore, according to Panjwani, schools should foster an open environment of critical discussion and critique that allows students to constructively challenge both social norms and beliefs that are fixed, intolerant, and closed to scrutiny, such as those espoused by violent extremist organizations.¹⁴²

One program that promotes critical thinking to counter violent extremism is the Creative Curriculum Program (CCP) in Nigeria, a primary school CVE education package that empowers students to reject violent extremism.¹⁴³ Creative Associates International, a non-governmental organization focusing on development services in conflict environments, with support from USAID, manages the CCP as part of a broader educational effort including the Northern Education Initiative Plus and Education Crisis Response programs.¹⁴⁴ The program encourages students to practice creative problem

¹³⁹ Davies, 189–94.

¹⁴⁰ Farid Panjwani et al., eds., *Education and Extremisms: Rethinking Liberal Pedagogies in the Contemporary World* (London; New York: Routledge, 2017), 1.

¹⁴¹ Panjwani et al., 1–3.

¹⁴² Panjwani et al., 2.

¹⁴³ Hedayah, “Abu Dhabi Plan of Action for Education and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)” (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2015), 9, <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-30102016141558.pdf>.

¹⁴⁴ “Building Resilient Cities: Working with Government, Communities and Individuals to Tackle the Global Challenge of Violent Extremism” (Creative Associates International, May 2017), <https://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CVE.pdf>.

solving and critical thinking to increase self-confidence, tolerance, and empathy.¹⁴⁵ The program then provides opportunities for students to apply these skills to challenge divisive narratives in their communities.¹⁴⁶ The CCP expects that students thus armed with critical thinking and creative problem-solving skills will be able to identify and reject extremist narratives and ideologies that promote violence.¹⁴⁷

3. Exposure to Diversity

Another approach considers exposure to diversity as the fundamental preventative measure to violent extremism. Ratna Ghosh, Professor of Education at McGill University, argues that providing a positive learning environment that promotes respectful dialogue and higher tolerance for competing perspectives will increase understanding and appreciation for the varied cultural, religious, and social practices of the wider world. This approach, will, in turn, reduce the likelihood that students will adopt violent extremist ideologies.¹⁴⁸

UNESCO recommends a similar preventive approach in its guide for CVE education policymakers. It advocates increasing resilience to unsophisticated arguments that advocate for the use of violence to solve problems by improving students' ability to see problems from multiple perspectives and seek confirmation before making impulsive decisions.¹⁴⁹ Subsequently, UNESCO expects this approach will propagate an identity of global citizenship, which undermines extremist rhetoric that focuses on anti-Western messaging, xenophobia, negative stereotypes, and exclusionary identity-forming.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Hedayah, 9.

¹⁴⁶ Hedayah, 9.

¹⁴⁷ Hedayah, 9.

¹⁴⁸ Ratna Ghosh et al., "Education and Security: A Global Literature Review on the Role of Education in Countering Violent Religious Extremism" (McGill University, February 2016); Ratna Ghosh, "How Education, Not Surveillance, Is Most Effective in Countering Violent Extremism," *OpenCanada Online*, Books, not Bombs: Exploring a Crucial Missing Piece in Counter Extremism Strategies, 2016.

¹⁴⁹ Choi and Leicht.

¹⁵⁰ Choi and Leicht.

Education expert Alan Smith of Ulster University similarly advocates for increasing exposure to diversity in schools in conflict zones to reduce violence and the propagation of extremist ideologies. Smith states that many countries embroiled in conflict feature schooling which separates students based on ethnicity, language, or religion, which foments distrust between groups and reinforces divisions.¹⁵¹ He asserts that education contributes to peacebuilding when it combines different groups of children from conflicted areas to learn together.¹⁵² Furthermore, school programs that support sensitivity to diversity and inclusion, especially of minority groups, can help reduce negative stereotypes that provoke inter-group conflict.¹⁵³ Smith also argues that schools should increase exposure to diversity and inclusion by hiring both male and female teachers from different backgrounds to set a positive example for students.¹⁵⁴

One example of this method is through connecting learners—especially through technological means—to students of other nations and cultures. These virtual connections allow targeted populations to participate in exchange programs, and by involving both local and international cultural institutions.¹⁵⁵ One such program, Generation Global, an international digital education package, provides training through videoconferences that connect students from around the world to learn about the global community and to provide opportunities to improve knowledge of different cultures, which in turn increases the students’ ability to understand diversity.¹⁵⁶ Claire Lorentzen, U.S. Education Manager for Generation Global, further argues that media and information literacy are critical for this approach to succeed because modern communications technologies provide the conduit that exposes students to diverse worldviews.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵¹ Alan Smith, “The Influence of Education on Conflict and Peace Building,” Background Paper for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education* (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2010), 11.

¹⁵² Smith, 11.

¹⁵³ Smith, 11.

¹⁵⁴ Smith, 21.

¹⁵⁵ Ghosh et al., “Education and Security: A Global Literature Review on the Role of Education in Countering Violent Religious Extremism.”

¹⁵⁶ Lorentzen, 44–45.

¹⁵⁷ Lorentzen, 44–46.

4. Religious Education

Another approach focuses specifically on religious education as the driving factor behind radicalization and counter-radicalization efforts. David Resnick, Senior Lecturer at the Bar-Ilan University School of Education, argues that developing and propagating moderate, inclusive religious interpretations—primarily regarding Islamic teachings—undermines violent extremist ideologies that base their arguments on radical religious interpretations.¹⁵⁸ Resnick rejects the argument that autonomy education is the best CVE program for combatting extremism on the grounds that it becomes problematic for educators to force autonomy on cultures that place authority above autonomy. Furthermore, he argues that critical thinking rarely works well in practice because it focuses on deliberation rather than the content of the outcome.¹⁵⁹ Instead, Resnick advocates for reworking religious education to identify existing traditions that promote tolerance and to foster a form of autonomy in service of the community, rather than pure individual autonomy.¹⁶⁰

Research conducted by Indonesian scholar of political Islam Noorhaidi Hasan appears to support Resnick's assertion. Hasan contends that Salafi madrasas, which propagate a literalist and often intolerant form of Islam in Indonesia, have been widely rejected by the population due to their prior exposure to more moderate religious schools in that country, such as the Muhammadiyah school system.¹⁶¹ Muhammadiyah, established by Ahmad Dahlan in 1912 to provide indigenous Muslim children with meaningful education during Dutch colonial rule, combines Islamic teaching with secular education to develop an Islamic civil society that also supports the cultural and religious diversity of the

¹⁵⁸ Resnick.

¹⁵⁹ Resnick, 109–10.

¹⁶⁰ Resnick, 117.

¹⁶¹ Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign: Transnational Islam and the Salafi Madrasa in Post-9/11 Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 18, no. 4 (December 2010): 675–705, <https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2010.0015>.

Indonesian people.¹⁶² Sudibyo Markus, Executive Board Member for Muhammadiyah, states that Muhammadiyah currently operates more than 15,000 schools in Indonesia and boasts nearly 30 million members and supporters, including many prominent government and civil society leaders, which, he argues, places Muhammadiyah at the forefront of the moderate movement in the Islamic world.¹⁶³

A CVE-specific example of religious education is the “Enhancing the Role of Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia” program, also known as the “Convey” program. This collaborative effort between the Government of Japan, UNDP, and the Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta aims to promote tolerance, inclusivity, and nonviolence in Islamic secondary schools throughout Indonesia.¹⁶⁴ This program characterizes its activities as “Muslim Ngefriend” (the word *ngefriend* is Indonesian teen slang that roughly translates to “building understanding [of Islam] through familiarity, closeness, and fun”).¹⁶⁵ Muslim Ngefriend uses digital media, teen literature, games, and other youth pop-culture materials to connect with and engage Muslim youth on topics related to Islamic teachings of tolerance and nonviolence.¹⁶⁶ The program challenges students to be proud of both their faith and nationality, while continually seeking out opportunities for greater understanding and adaptability in diverse socio-cultural environments.¹⁶⁷

It is worth noting that some scholars have argued that this approach to CVE is unnecessary. Historian William Dalrymple, for instance, argues that, despite frequent claims to the contrary, evidence shows that most religious schools, particularly Islamic

¹⁶² Sudibyo Markus, “Education and Multiculturalism. A Muhammadiyah Case Study” (Conference Paper, September 3, 2007), https://www.westernsydney.edu.au/equity_diversity/equity_and_diversity/cultural_diversity/past_events/conference_documents/education_and_multiculturalism._a_muhammadiyah_case_study.

¹⁶³ Markus.

¹⁶⁴ Deden Ridwan, “Tentang Convey: Merawat Perdamaian Melalui Dunia Pendidikan,” Convey Indonesia, 2018, <https://conveyindonesia.com/tentang-convey.html>.

¹⁶⁵ Deden Ridwan, “Muslim Ngefriend,” Convey Indonesia, 2018, <https://conveyindonesia.com/muslim-ngefriend/>.

¹⁶⁶ Deden Ridwan, “‘Muslim Ngefriend’ dan Generasi Medsos,” *Redaksi Indonesia*, October 17, 2017, sec. Humaniora, <http://redaksiindonesia.com/read/muslim-ngefrend-dan-generasi-medsos.html>.

¹⁶⁷ Ridwan.

madrasas, do not produce violent extremists.¹⁶⁸ He points out that most of the men responsible for the September 2001 attacks were graduates of Western universities, not traditional Islamic madrasas.¹⁶⁹ Dalrymple acknowledges that many, but certainly not all, madrasas teach an outdated curriculum and focus on rote learning rather than critical study, but they provide the poor with an opportunity to advance themselves and have no record of producing violent Islamists.¹⁷⁰ He further notes that because most schools have little or no connection to violent extremism the call for widespread religious education reform is therefore misplaced and will do little to counter international terrorism.¹⁷¹

5. Challenges to Western CVE Education

Finally, it is important to recognize that not all agree that the above education methods can effectively prevent extremism, especially considering their foundations in Western perspectives. For example, Magnus Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defense College, argues that, since most experts who produce literature on CVE education come from Western countries, programs tend to align closely with modern Western liberal ideals.¹⁷² He states that the counter-terrorism literature is nearly devoid of non-Western points of view or competing interpretations, which makes it more difficult and more necessary to challenge the prevailing Western assumptions regarding violent extremism.¹⁷³ Ranstorp also warns against implementing overtly Western models that compete against local customs and traditions, as they may risk reinforcing extremist anti-Western narratives that exacerbate the extremism problem rather than solve it.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁸ William Dalrymple, "Inside the Madrasas," *The New York Review of Books* 52, no. 19 (December 2005): 7.

¹⁶⁹ Dalrymple, 7–8.

¹⁷⁰ Dalrymple, 8–10.

¹⁷¹ Dalrymple, 10–11.

¹⁷² Magnus Ranstorp, ed., *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction*, Cass Series: Political Violence (London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 8.

¹⁷³ Ranstorp, 9–10.

¹⁷⁴ Ranstorp, 10.

Similarly, education expert Henry A. Giroux argues that Western societies have begun to reduce social and political teachings in favor of abstract learning within schools.¹⁷⁵ He claims that when schools remove the social and political basis of education—that is, character development and citizenship education—and replace it with technical education, schools become disconnected from society and are thus unable to act as agents of socio-cultural development.¹⁷⁶ Giroux argues that for schools to revitalize a “noble and just society,” they have to reestablish this connection to citizenship education.¹⁷⁷

Education professor Michael Hand agrees with Giroux’s analysis and goes on to assert that modern Western theory cannot achieve the political goal of preventing violent extremism through education by focusing solely on abstract learning and skill development.¹⁷⁸ Specifically, Hand argues against relying on critical thinking to combat extremism, concluding that individuals are just as likely to employ those cognitive skills to justify undesirable decisions, including joining a violent extremist organization, as they are to make decisions favorable to the educator’s aims.¹⁷⁹

Still others argue against relying on any form of education to prevent extremism. Beza Tesfaye, Conflict and Governance Research Manager at Mercy Corps, determined from research conducted in Somaliland that exposing youth to secondary education actually increased their support for politically-motivated violence, while adding civic engagement activities decreased overall support for violent groups. As a result, the Mercy Corps Somali Youth Leaders Initiative focuses on involving youth in civic action programs to motivate them to be productive citizens in the community and reject violence.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁵ Giroux, 329–30.

¹⁷⁶ Giroux, 329–31.

¹⁷⁷ Giroux, 331.

¹⁷⁸ Michael Hand, “Against Autonomy as an Educational Aim,” *Oxford Review of Education* 32, no. 4 (September 1, 2006): 535–50, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03054980600884250>.

¹⁷⁹ Hand.

¹⁸⁰ Beza Tesfaye, “Critical Choices: Assessing the Effects of Education and Civic Engagement on Somali Youths’ Propensity Towards Violence” (Mercy Corps, November 2016).

The lack of empirical evidence to support CVE programs also confounds efforts to prove or disprove competing theories and programs based off results from the field.¹⁸¹ Researchers at the Australian Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre contend that the difficulty in gathering and analyzing data related to educational programs in conflict zones prevents empirically testing the effectiveness of these programs.¹⁸² This issue leads some proponents to rely on measures of performance—such as the number of schools built or enrolled students—or anecdotal evidence to justify their CVE educational programs.¹⁸³

Trees Pels and Doret J. de Ruyter, psychologists at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, emphasize the need to address the lack of research into the relationship between educational systems and the onset of radicalization in Muslim communities in particular.¹⁸⁴ Pels and de Ruyter assert that not enough is known about the causes of radicalization, including the role that negative authority figures may play in the radicalization of Muslim youth, or how Muslim communities typically respond to children being influenced by violent extremist narratives.¹⁸⁵ Pels and de Ruyter argue that more empirical research needs to be conducted on the content and style of education in Muslim communities to determine the best way ahead for CVE education.¹⁸⁶ With little consensus on how, or whether, to use education to prevent extremism, and the lack of evaluation regarding the effectiveness of CVE education, further research and analysis of historical programs is needed to determine an optimal methodology for future application.

¹⁸¹ Nasser-Eddine et al.

¹⁸² Nasser-Eddine et al.

¹⁸³ Nasser-Eddine et al.

¹⁸⁴ Trees Pels and Doret J. de Ruyter, “The Influence of Education and Socialization on Radicalization: An Exploration of Theoretical Presumptions and Empirical Research,” *Child & Youth Care Forum* 41, no. 3 (June 2012): 317, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10566-011-9155-5>.

¹⁸⁵ Pels and de Ruyter, 317–18.

¹⁸⁶ Pels and de Ruyter, 318–19.

B. SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND CVE EDUCATION

This section uses the analytical framework proposed in Chapter II to evaluate which of these programs incorporates the principles of socialization theory—or the process of indoctrinating individuals to social norms and standards of the group—when constructing their curriculum goals. According to Hadden and Long, the most important attribute that these socializing agents produce within new members is a sense of commitment, or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so.¹⁸⁷ This theory is significant for CVE education programs because it explains how children are either raised to become well-adjusted members of a community or how violent extremist organizations integrate new members into patterns of radicalism. The framework draws on Long’s and Hadden’s five criteria—showing (demonstrating the values of the group), shaping (reinforcing commitment to those social values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new members), certifying (validating commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating members into the group)—to help identify and analyze specific socializing aspects of the four CVE education programs described above.

1. Analysis of Vocational Training Programs

Vocational training aims to combat economic drivers of violent extremism rather than a social cause, so it understandably focuses on teaching job skills instead of addressing the social behaviors and ideological motivations of the students. The programs briefly discussed above, therefore, have no stated social objectives. Furthermore, the shaping activity is also lacking in vocational training programs. For instance, the World Bank Group focus on providing technical skills with the expectation that “social inclusiveness” will result from the students holding jobs within their community. Therefore, their programs do not introduce or reinforce any social values that help students integrate into their community or avoid violent extremist organizations regardless any favorable economic incentives they may offer.

¹⁸⁷ Long and Hadden, 42–43.

Despite lacking showing and shaping activities, vocational programs excel in recruiting, certifying, and placing. The programs draw in young students with opportunities to learn modern technologies and techniques, particularly in digital media use, and most programs actively link students to the local business community. The Tujengane Tuinuane program mentioned above, for example, assists with placing graduates into positions with local employers or starting their own businesses, as well as helps students with registering and interacting with the government. These activities strengthen the students' ties to their community and provide a viable alternative to the economic incentives offered by violent extremist organizations.

2. Analysis of Critical Thinking Programs

Critical thinking CVE educational programs offer a strong showing activity overall. They promote the deeply-held Western values described in Chapter II of rationality, secularism, individualism, and openness to a plurality of ideas. The Creative Curriculum Program (CCP) serves as a representative example of this activity by seeking to develop creative problem solving, critical thinking, tolerance, and empathy within students as a means to counter violent extremism in Nigeria.

Shaping in this approach seems to habituate the use of critical thinking skills, which Macaluso argues is critical for overall development, but explicitly eschews instilling any single communal identity or set of values. The CCP follows this trend by having students practice individual cognitive skills to analyze extremist narratives rather than addressing how their values compare to the social customs and expectations of the communities in which they live. This position is problematic because—as Giroux, Hand, Hadden and Long all argue—providing only abstract knowledge without a foundation of values allows students to choose conflicting ideologies, including those of a violent extremist organization.

Like shaping, certifying appears in this program only at the individual level and relates to a cognitive skill rather than a set of communal values. For example, the CCP validates the students' abilities to apply critical thinking skills to problems and seeks to develop confidence within students to investigate and challenge opposing viewpoints in

their communities. Critical to socialization theory, however, it does not seek to build a shared set of values within the students or help them integrate into Nigerian society.

Recruiting and placing also appear deliberately weak in the critical thinking approach, where individual autonomy takes precedence over social cohesion. The CCP, for instance, has no connection to the Nigerian community outside of the schools in which it operates, nor does it include follow-on activities or resources for its students after graduation. Overall, while critical thinking skills include a strong showing activity, the programs described above do not appear to offer the other necessary socialization aspects of shaping, recruiting, certifying, or placing.

3. Analysis of Exposure to Diversity Programs

The exposure to diversity approach focuses on the showing activity as the primary means of socializing students. These programs introduce students to a wide range of points of view, lifestyles, and ideals through face-to-face encounters or social media platforms, and, while not advocating for any one set of collective values in particular, they do promote understanding and open-mindedness. Both Generation Global and UNESCO promote these values through encouraging interaction between diverse cultures and introducing the concept of global citizenship. This considerable exposure to alternative viewpoints also assists in recruiting, where students witness the potential benefits of global citizenship and gain awareness of various communities of interest through the programs.

Despite offering showing and recruiting activities, these programs offer limited exposure to shaping or certifying activities to reinforce these values. Specifically, students are not required to respond in a particular way to this information, such as demonstrating understanding and empathy for differing viewpoints. Generation Global, in particular, focuses on improving knowledge of different cultures but does not discuss how one should interpret and interact with conflicting points of view. This lack of shaping or certifying may be problematic because exposure to an alternate viewpoint does not automatically lead to acceptance of it; it is important to reinforce these alternative viewpoints with guidance on how to productively engage with opposing ideals and reconcile one's beliefs with those of another. Sayyid Qutb, a founder of modern violent jihadism, serves as one example of

this point. His exposure to the “depravities” of Western society during his travels to the United States created tensions with his beliefs regarding virtuous living, and he received little guidance on how to peacefully engage with these competing cultural norms.¹⁸⁸ As a result, Qutb instigated a global physical jihad in defense of his Islamist beliefs, citing his unmitigated exposure to Western society as a driving factor behind his decision to adopt and propagate a violent extremist ideology.¹⁸⁹

Placing is also largely absent. In most programs, students are provided the opportunity to communicate with others from different cultures but are not incorporated into any related community or organization upon completion of the program. For example, Generation Global operates only within the context of its virtual exchange seminars with no formal opportunities for further interaction between students outside of the program.

4. Analysis of Religious Education Programs

Religious education programs appear to offer the strongest showing and shaping activities of the four CVE approaches. The programs tend to perform these two activities by promoting a set of religiously-based communal values centered on tolerance, inclusivity, and nonviolence. The Convey program, for example, incorporates popular interactive media into existing religious schools that engage young students with the materials and concepts.

Religious education programs also demonstrate shaping, both formally through the curriculum of the schools and informally through regular prayers, rituals, and practices that reinforce the lessons and values of the religious group. The Convey program, in particular, demonstrates this activity by requiring students to explore their religion and nationality as an integral part of a modern and diverse society.

Recruiting and certifying within these programs tend to occur automatically since they operate within existing religious schools, like the Islamic secondary schools linked to

¹⁸⁸ Yvonne Y. Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 68–73.

¹⁸⁹ Haddad, 68–73.

the Convey program through the State Islamic University in Indonesia. However, one potential limitation is that the programs do not appear to assist in recruiting or placing students into a specific religious group or community-based organization outside of the school. Nor do the programs deliberately focus on building social confidence between students and members of the community. This limitation is evident in the Convey program's unidirectional approach to religious education, where it provides materials to schools but does not directly interact with the students or connect them to like-minded religious institutions outside the school.

Analysis of the four CVE education approaches described in this chapter reveals several trends in socializing characteristics. Table 2 summarizes the five socializing activities from the analytical framework across the four CVE educational approaches. The critical thinking, exposure to diversity, and religious education programs all feature strong showing activities as part of their educational programs; only vocational training is excluded. This implies that the programs have a set of collective ideals to offer, even if they do not actually commit the students to those values. The overall lack of evidence for recruiting, certifying, and placing activities in the CVE approaches is understandable considering the educational context of this analysis. Logically these activities would appear stronger in programs that link directly to follow-on organizations, such as in vocational training programs that prepare students for particular job opportunities in their community.

Shaping activities are limited across all forms of Western CVE education programs except religious education, which directly connects to existing religious schools. Shaping is important because it serves as the fundamental activity that habituates the students' commitment to the desired values and behaviors while in school. It should be noted, however, that informal, ad hoc socializing activities, particularly shaping activities, may occur in these programs without being recorded in published studies. Overall, while all four programs display some strong socializing activities, none displays strong evidence for all five.

Table 2. CVE Education Approach Socializing Activity Comparison

Socializing Activity	Vocational Training	Critical Thinking	Exposure to Diversity	Religious Education
Showing	Lacking incorporation of social values	Strong presentation of Western values	Strong presentation of Western values	Strong presentation of religious values
Shaping	No social values to reinforce	Avoids promoting any single value set	Seeks to build knowledge, not commitment	Strong reinforcement through schools
Recruiting	Strong link to local business community	Focuses on individual autonomy over group identity	Strong promotion of global community	Link to schools but not larger community
Certifying	Strong social confidence in work context	Certifies only individual cognitive skills	Limited validation of commitment	Limited validation of commitment
Placing	Places students in job positions in community	Lacking link to follow-on groups	Lacking link to follow-on groups	Lacking link to follow-on groups

This chapter surveyed four major approaches to Western CVE education: critical thinking skills, exposure to diversity, vocational training, and religious education. It then analyzed their strengths and weaknesses compared to the analytical framework from Chapter II, which is based on socialization theory and identifies showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing as fundamental socializing activities.

The next chapter analyzes the socializing functions of the Salafi school system in Indonesia to identify characteristics of the program that have successfully committed students to the organization's values and furthered its goals in the country.

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IV. CASE STUDY: SALAFI SCHOOLS IN INDONESIA

The Salafi school network in Indonesia serves as a useful example of how formal education can instill a particular set of communal values in support of a group's socio-political objectives. According to sociologist Chris Chaplin, Saudi Arabia's *da'wa* activities—or religious outreach—started in Indonesia around the 1980s and have impacted the political and social discourse in the country.¹⁹⁰ He argues that Salafi educational institutions in Indonesia have helped propagate “the importance of the [Saudi] kingdom as a source of educational sponsorship but also, more interestingly, as a source of religious authority and social ideals.”¹⁹¹ Similarly, anthropologist Din Wahid notes that currently only around fifty of the roughly 37,000 religious schools in Indonesia identify as Salafi, yet this small network of schools has exerted influence in the country and garnered both opposition and support within the community.¹⁹² Moreover, Amanda Kovacs, researcher at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, argues that these schools and their influence have contributed to the Islamization and Arabization of Indonesian society in addition to causing tension between Salafis and traditional Muslim groups in the country.¹⁹³

This chapter investigates the development and educational activities of the Salafi school system in Indonesia with the aim of studying how it has used social processes to spread a particular understanding of Islam and the specific social values that accompany it. The chapter draws from fieldwork conducted by anthropologists Din Wahid and Martin van Bruinessen, scholar of political Islam Noorhaidi Hasan, and education expert Uzma Ansar, as well as other independent studies of Salafi schools in Indonesia. It begins with a

¹⁹⁰ Chris Chaplin, “Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques: The Social and Doctrinal Importance of Saudi Arabia in Indonesian Salafi Discourse,” *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies* 7, no. 2 (2014): 218.

¹⁹¹ Chaplin, 217.

¹⁹² Din Wahid, “Nurturing Salafi Manhaj: A Study of Salafi Pesantren in Contemporary Indonesia,” *Wacana* 15, no. 2 (January 27, 2014): 367–68, 374.

¹⁹³ Amanda Kovacs, “Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia’s Muslims,” *GIGA Focus International English Edition*, no. 7 (2014): 1–3.

discussion on Salafism in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia's support of Salafism in particular. It then outlines the effects Salafi schools have had on Indonesian society, namely the increasing Islamization and Arabization of the country. The chapter then describes the specific ideology, methodology, curriculum, and outreach activities found in the Salafi school network. Finally, using the framework from Chapter II, which focuses on the five socializing activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing, the chapter identifies how the Salafi school network commits students to specific communal values that advance its socio-religious objectives in Indonesia.

The chapter finds that these Salafi schools act as strong socializing agents by performing all five socializing activities as outlined in the analytical framework. The schools feature a strong, simple, and unambiguous vision of Islam, a tight-knit community, and religious legitimacy through their connection to Saudi Arabia as a prominent religious authority in the Muslim world. The schools suffer some limitations as socializing agents, however, due to their adversarial tone and exclusivist mentality. Nevertheless, they are able to socialize commitment to a closed communal identity that refuses to operate within the secular political system, segregates itself from society, and antagonizes traditional establishments.

A. SALAFISM AND SAUDI INFLUENCE IN INDONESIA

Since its emergence in the 1980s, the Salafi movement in Indonesia has developed a reputation for creating significant tension and, at times, violence in communities across the country.¹⁹⁴ This section begins by providing a very brief definition of Salafism, and why it is inherently conflictual with the forms of Islam practiced in Indonesia. It then highlights some of the approaches that Salafi groups have used to spread their understanding of the faith, and the tensions that have occurred since the emergence of Salafism in the country, including the arrival of Salafi schools.

¹⁹⁴ Wahid, 368.

Political scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz describes Salafism as a strict and literalist understanding of Sunni Islam.¹⁹⁵ The basic tenets of Salafism include the emphasis on *tawhid* (the oneness of God), the need to submit to the absolute truth of the Qur'an, the *hadith* and the *Sunna* (the sayings and traditions of the Prophet), and to reject anything related to the "corrupting" influence of modern secular culture.¹⁹⁶ Salafis also tend to strictly regulate behavior, enforce gender segregation, and advocate for social separation from non-believers.¹⁹⁷

Several scholars, including Wiktorowicz, Wahid, and Hasan, argue that Salafism is difficult to precisely define because, despite its insistence on one understanding of the faith, it is not a single, monolithic and homogenous movement.¹⁹⁸ Wiktorowicz identifies three subtypes of Salafis in particular: purists, who are politically quietist and focus primarily on maintaining the purity of Islam within society; politicos, the generally younger Salafis who prefer to apply Salafi doctrine through the political process to effect change within current regimes; and jihadis, who advocate for using violence to establish fundamentalist Islamic states.¹⁹⁹ Wiktorowicz contends that, despite these differences in action, all Salafi movements share the similar core set of beliefs outlined above.²⁰⁰ According to Hasan and Chaplin, most Salafis avoid the political process, and instead believe in gradually "Salafizing" Muslim society through education and purification as a precondition for being able to fully implement *shari'a*, Islam's legal code, in the country.²⁰¹

Indonesia hosts a variety of Salafi groups with differing methodologies for spreading their understanding of the faith. These movements range from apolitical groups to politically-active groups like the Justice and Prosperity Party (*Partai Keadilan*

¹⁹⁵ Wiktorowicz, 207.

¹⁹⁶ Wiktorowicz, 208–10.

¹⁹⁷ Wiktorowicz, 208–10.

¹⁹⁸ Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign," 676; Wahid, 372–73; Wiktorowicz, 207–8.

¹⁹⁹ Wiktorowicz, 217–28.

²⁰⁰ Wiktorowicz, 217.

²⁰¹ Chaplin, 219; Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 84, <https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-2006-045>.

Sejahtera, or PKS), to those with Salafi theological orientations that also embrace nationalist and pluralistic ideas, as well as a few violent groups, like Laskar Jihad.²⁰² In addition, anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen points out that the use of the term “Salafi” in Indonesia has caused some confusion because its meaning differs from the term “*Salafiyah*”—which translates as “in the way of previous generations”—used by most traditional non-Salafi religious schools in Indonesia.²⁰³ Van Bruinessen states that both terms relate to “*al-salaf al-salih*” or “the pious predecessors,” but otherwise represent opposite extremes of the Islamic religious spectrum in Indonesia.²⁰⁴

Sociologist William Racimora observes that the Indonesian government has had difficulties recognizing and regulating the various Salafi groups in Indonesia because of the diverse approaches of the different groups, each of which considers themselves the true authority on Salafism in the country.²⁰⁵ Racimora argues that these distinctions became even more pronounced after the Bali bombings in 2002 and the subsequent government crackdown on groups that the Indonesian government identified as supporting radical Islamic terrorism.²⁰⁶ The government’s response to the bombings included monitoring and restricting the flow of Arab funds, mainly from Saudi Arabia, to Islamic organizations in Indonesia. The reduction of funds, in turn, increased competition between Indonesian Salafi groups over the remaining financial resources.²⁰⁷ According to Racimora, the groups adopted increasingly radical Salafi ideologies in an attempt to distinguish themselves from other organizations and win Saudi support.²⁰⁸

²⁰² Mark Woodward, “Resisting Salafism and the Arabization of Indonesian Islam: A Contemporary Indonesian Didactic Tale by Komaruddin Hidayat,” *Contemporary Islam* 11, no. 3 (October 2017): 239–40, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-017-0388-4>.

²⁰³ Martin van Bruinessen, “‘Traditionalist’ and ‘Islamist’ Pesantren in Contemporary Indonesia” (Paper, May 24, 2004), 9.

²⁰⁴ van Bruinessen, 9.

²⁰⁵ Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 20.

²⁰⁶ Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 20.

²⁰⁷ Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 20.

²⁰⁸ Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 20.

Several scholars note that broadly speaking, the growth of the Salafi movement around the world correlates with Saudi Arabia's recent rise as a dominant political actor.²⁰⁹ Hassan, for example, argues that Saudi Arabia generates support for its regime and promulgates its religious philosophy by funding the construction of new mosques, Islamic schools, and other outreach activities through Islamic organizations abroad, presenting these expenditures as acts of solidarity, piety, and brotherhood with the *ummah*, or global Islamic community.²¹⁰ Kovacs identifies Saudi Arabia as the world's foremost provider of Islamic education which seeks to "create global alliances and legitimize the Saudi claim to be the leader of Islam – at home and abroad" through its educational outreach programs.²¹¹

Kovacs argues that Indonesia holds particular strategic interest to Saudi Arabia as the world's largest Muslim country, especially in the context of Saudi-Iranian competition since the 1979 Shia revolution in Iran.²¹² In addition to sending the largest number of pilgrims to Mecca for Hajj, which is a significant source of tourism money for Saudi Arabia, Kovacs contends that Indonesia acts as the Saudi Kingdom's gateway to the Muslim community of Southwest Asia.²¹³ In support of these interests, Saudi Arabia has funded the construction of dozens of Salafi madrasas throughout Indonesia, supports the political and educational outreach activities of Salafi organizations like the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, DDII), finances the Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA) in Jakarta (an Indonesian branch of the Imam Muhammad bin Saud University), and provides scholarships for thirty students to travel to Saudi Arabia for advanced education every year.²¹⁴ In addition, the kingdom

²⁰⁹ Hasan, "The Salafi Movement in Indonesia," 83.

²¹⁰ Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign," 682.

²¹¹ Kovacs, 1.

²¹² Kovacs, 2.

²¹³ Kovacs, 2.

²¹⁴ Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign," 682–83; Kovacs, 5–6; Hasan, "The Salafi Movement in Indonesia," 87.

provides teachers, textbooks, and other materials for madrasas as a means of controlling the content presented in the schools.²¹⁵

Hasan notes that Salafi schools mirror the greater Salafi movement in Indonesia in that they do not comprise a single homogenous institution, but rather a fragmented network of schools, each holding a slightly divergent interpretation of Salafi doctrine, which compete with each other for Arab funding.²¹⁶ Like Tan and Racimora, Hasan argues that these schools have had a direct influence on the development of exclusionary social groups and generated political, social, and religious conflict within Indonesian society.²¹⁷ According to Hasan, these initiatives have sparked a debate regarding Islamic reform in Indonesia, challenged the aims of established Indonesian Muslim organizations like al-Irsyad and Persis, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah, and extracted their support for transforming Indonesia into a “fully Islamic society.”²¹⁸ To complicate matters further, Hasan argues that many religious scholars within these organizations continue to accept the legitimacy of Saudi-sponsored institutions as partners in da’wa “for the glorification of Islam...in Indonesia” despite the growing challenge these transnational efforts pose to their traditional religious authority.²¹⁹ To illustrate how these schools have managed to generate this effect, the next section focuses on the activities of the network of Salafi schools in Indonesia as of 2018.²²⁰

B. THE SALAFI SCHOOL CURRICULUM

Over the last twenty-five years, Salafi schools have emerged throughout Indonesia, funded by a variety of organizations. According to Hasan, Saudi Arabia currently funnels

²¹⁵ Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia,” 89; Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 681; Wahid, 369.

²¹⁶ Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 680.

²¹⁷ Hasan, 680–84.

²¹⁸ Hasan, 683–84.

²¹⁹ Hasan, 684.

²²⁰ It is important to note that competition between the various Salafi schools complicates efforts to attribute the actions of specific institutions to the overall success of Saudi foreign policy objectives in the country or the growing Islamization and Arabization of Indonesian society in general. Still, an examination of these schools illustrates how they contribute to the process of propagating Saudi-inspired Salafi communal values and form conflicting alternative social groups in Indonesia.

money into Indonesia through several Islamic charities, including Hai'at al-Ighatha al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyya (International Islamic Relief Organization), al-Majlis al-'Alami li al-Masajid (World Council of Mosques), al-Nadwa al-'Alamiyya li al-Shabab al-Islami (World Assembly of Muslim Youth), and Lajna Birr al-Islami (Committee of Islamic Charity), primarily intended for DDII to establish schools and other social institutions.²²¹ Hasan states that the Ihya al-Sunna, established in 1994 in Yogyakarta, is the oldest such school in Indonesia, succeeded by the al-Turath al-Islami in 1995, followed by dozens of other schools that opened after that, especially after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998.²²²

Hasan contends that these Salafi schools are readily distinguishable from other Indonesian Islamic schools like *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools that focus primarily on religious education), and the indigenous Indonesian *madrasah*, or Islamic primary schools that encompass both secular and religious subjects and can be either private or under the direction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.²²³ Specifically, these schools teach an explicitly Saudi-style Salafi Islam, which focuses on “strict monotheism, anti-Sufism, as well as typical Arab-style dress, exclusivist tendencies and rigid ritual practices” and serves to support both the spread of Salafi religious ideas and the more general Arabization of Indonesian society.²²⁴ In addition, according to Hasan, male and female students are always strictly segregated on campus, and girls’ education focuses on “behavior, fashion, gender relations and methods of taking care of husbands and children” in addition to Islamic theology and jurisprudence.²²⁵

²²¹ Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia,” 88.

²²² In his study of Salafi madrasas, Hasan identified the following Saudi-sponsored schools: “al-Madina and Imam al-Bukhari in Solo, Minhaj al-Sunna in Magelang, Lu’lu wa-l-Marjan in Semarang, Ibn Taymiyya in Banyumas, al-Mansura and al-Furqan in Kroya, Imam al-Shafi’i in Cilacap, As-Sunnah in Cirebon and another al-Sunna in Makassar, al-Athariyya in Temenggung, Ittiba’ al-Sunna in Sukoharjo and another Ittiba’ al-Sunna in Magetan, Al-Salafy in Jember, Ta’dhim al-Sunna in Ngawi, Ibn ‘Abbas in Sragen, al-Bayyina in Gresik, al-Furqan in Cilacap and another al-Furqan in Pekanbaru, and Ibn Qayyim in Balikpapan...Bin Baz, al-Ansar, Difa’ ‘An al-Sunna in Yogyakarta, Ibn Taymiyya in Solo, Ihya al-Sunna in Tasikmalaya and Adwa’ al-Salaf in Bandung.” Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 685.

²²³ Hasan, 677–78.

²²⁴ Hasan, 677.

²²⁵ Hasan, 689.

Hasan further argues that the Salafi school system in Indonesia eschews local traditional religious authority and instead links directly to religious authorities in the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia in particular.²²⁶ For instance, most Indonesian Muslims defer to the Indonesian Ulama Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI), an independent Islamic judicial committee comprised of Islamic scholars from Indonesian Muslim groups, including both NU and Muhammadiyah, that issue *fatwas* (religious legal opinions) relating to Muslim matters in Indonesia.²²⁷ Salafi schools have no representation on the council, nor do they recognize its authority or judgments; instead, the schools have followed the directions of Saudi authorities, such as ‘Abd al-’Aziz ‘Abd Allah bin Baz and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani.²²⁸ Wahid also observed this connection to the Middle East in his study of Salafi schools in Indonesia. He states that many Salafi educators, having received their education in the Middle East, preserve their link to their former teachers by sending students to study with them, asking them for fatwas on religious affairs in Indonesia, and even inviting them to visit Indonesia to teach.²²⁹ Finally, the exclusivist mentality of the Salafi schools contrasts with both the pesantren and non-Salafi madrasahs, which Hasan credits with propagating a pluralistic religious identity within Indonesia.²³⁰

Apart from these distinctions, Salafi schools share several similarities with other non-Salafi institutions. Education expert Uzma Anzar notes that the Salafi schools’ teaching methodology and daily schedule resemble other Islamic schools in Indonesia.²³¹ Hasan describes the daily routine: Each school educates between seventy and 120 children, aged seven to seventeen, and classes usually go from eight o’clock in the morning until

²²⁶ Hasan, 677.

²²⁷ Majelis Ulama Indonesia, “Profil Organisasi,” Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2016, <http://mui.or.id/id/category/profile-organisasi/kepengurusan/>.

²²⁸ Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 681.

²²⁹ Wahid, 369.

²³⁰ Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 677–79.

²³¹ Uzma Anzar, “Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrasahs with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices,” Working Paper, March 2003, 10–11, https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1121703274255/1439264-1126807073059/Islamic_Education_Paper.pdf.

evening prayer at seven o'clock.²³² The classroom is run as an informal teacher-scholar approach; the students listen and take notes while the teacher lectures and reads from texts, explains the meaning of passages, and expounds on the lesson topic with relevant illustrations and examples.²³³ After the lessons, students are allowed to ask questions and then complete activities relevant to the period of instruction, such as homework on general subjects, reading and memorizing assigned theological texts, or practicing Arabic language phrases.²³⁴

Salafi schools feature a graded system based on the classification developed by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs and incorporate both religious and secular subjects, including Indonesian language, mathematics, natural and social sciences, and some vocational skills.²³⁵ At the end of each grade, all students are expected to master the foundations of Salafi doctrine and commit to living in accordance with Salafi principles, but must also pass a national exam to receive a certificate of compulsory primary education from the Ministries of Religious Affairs and National Education.²³⁶ Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner surmise that the inclusion of secular subjects and the national exams are a response to the Indonesian National Law on Education.²³⁷ The law identifies all Islamic schools in the country as part of the national education system and, therefore, are required to meet national education curriculum standards, including holding the national exams.²³⁸ In addition, adhering to the national standard helps elevate the Salafi schools to the same level as general schools and makes the students more competitive for attending university.²³⁹

²³² Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign," 689–90.

²³³ Hasan, 689.

²³⁴ Hasan, 689.

²³⁵ Anzar, 10; Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign," 700.

²³⁶ Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign," 701–2.

²³⁷ Azyumardi Azra, Dina Afrianty, and Robert W. Hefner, "Pesantren and Madrasa: Muslim Schools and National Ideals in Indonesia," in *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, ed. Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 186–87.

²³⁸ Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner, 187.

²³⁹ Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner, 187.

Despite the inclusion of secular subjects and national exams, Anzar asserts that the real focus within Salafi schools is on religious education.²⁴⁰ As is common to most traditional madrasas, focus is placed on understanding Islamic principles that govern daily life, such as *fiqh* (Islamic law), the hadith and Sunna, and logic.²⁴¹ Salafi schools' religious curriculum particularly emphasizes the understanding of tawhid through the study of certain Islamic theological texts, including the *Kitab al-Tawhid* and *al-Usul al-Thalatha* by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, a Saudi cleric from the eighteenth century.²⁴² In some cases, students must memorize these texts before moving on to other studies.²⁴³ Many of these texts are provided free of charge by LIPIA, a Saudi Arabian entity, which allows the organization to exert significant influence over the content and teachings within the schools.²⁴⁴

The curriculum also includes teachings on the importance of “*al-wala' wa-l-babra*”—or “allegiance to Islam and renunciation of unbelievers”—which, according to Hasan, theoretically defines the role of Muslims in protecting each other and denouncing infidels and provides the basis for Salafis segregating themselves from the general public.²⁴⁵ References to *kafir* (unbelievers; essentially anyone who does not subscribe to Salafism) and *taghut* (idolatry and non-adherence to the shari'a) appear in the school curriculum as the “source of error and destruction” which the students can avoid only through submission to shari'a and segregation into a community of believers.²⁴⁶ As stated above, although these Salafi principles do not directly support violent extremism, anthropologist Mark Woodward warns that, by calling for exclusion and open enmity

²⁴⁰ Anzar, 7.

²⁴¹ Wahid, 371; Anzar, 7.

²⁴² Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 687.

²⁴³ Hasan, 687.

²⁴⁴ Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia,” 89.

²⁴⁵ Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 687.

²⁴⁶ Woodward, 243; Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 687–88.

towards unbelievers, including fellow Muslims, this doctrine could be construed by some as legitimizing radicalism and physical jihad.²⁴⁷

The curriculum also contributes to the Arabization of the student body. Since most of the texts studied in the Salafi schools are in Arabic, students must also study the Arabic language.²⁴⁸ Generally, the schools use the same popular Arabic lesson materials found in traditional Indonesian pesantren, but also include the *al-'Arabiyya li al-Nashi'in*, a comprehensive Arabic textbook provided free-of-charge by the Saudi Arabian embassy.²⁴⁹ School administrators also see Arabic competency as necessary for empowering students and facilitating their further study in the Middle East.²⁵⁰ In addition to teaching Arabic, the schools encourage students to wear traditional Arab clothing, including long beards for male students, Arab-style *jalabiyya* robes, calf-length trousers, and black veils that cover the face for women when in public.²⁵¹ According to Woodward, clothing acts as an important and highly visible representation of one's personal and collective identity.²⁵² He claims that by having students dress "as the Prophet Muhammad did," Salafi schools are attempting to attach Arab cultural symbols to universal religious concepts.²⁵³ This tactic has had some success in Arabizing students, as one student expressed to Woodward, "it is obligatory for Muslims to follow the Prophet Muhammad in every possible way, and the best way to do this is to follow the practices of contemporary Saudi Arabians."²⁵⁴ Woodward argues that by relating Arab dress to being a proper Muslim, these schools are working to restructure Indonesian society to reflect Saudi-style religious ideals.²⁵⁵

²⁴⁷ Woodward, 243.

²⁴⁸ Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign," 688.

²⁴⁹ Hasan, 688.

²⁵⁰ Hasan, 689.

²⁵¹ Hasan, "The Salafi Movement in Indonesia," 83.

²⁵² Woodward, 244.

²⁵³ Woodward, 244.

²⁵⁴ Woodward, 244.

²⁵⁵ Woodward, 244.

In addition to their focus on educating students, Salafi school faculty also plan lessons, activities, and study groups within the local community, usually at local mosques or in private residences.²⁵⁶ Hasan claims that this tactic helps recruit new students and educate the local populace on Salafi philosophy and practices.²⁵⁷ Additionally, some schools operate radio stations to expose the local populace to the basic tenets of Salafism.²⁵⁸ Hasan argues that this form of activism—working through social networks rather than institutional ones—facilitates the Arabization and Islamization of local communities at the grassroots level and avoids the governmental oversight and restrictions on the movement.²⁵⁹

Hasan further notes that despite these outreach activities, the Salafi school’s “exclusivist and self-limiting character” has somewhat restricted its ability to generate popular support for the Salafi worldview in local villages.²⁶⁰ He contends that many surrounding villagers still see these schools as separate, foreign, and unfriendly.²⁶¹ The Salafi faculty’s persistent recruiting efforts, their insistence that Salafism constitutes “authentic” Islam, and vocal criticism of local practices particularly aggravate village elders.²⁶² Still, according to Hasan, their message has resonated with many disaffected youths looking for independence and a sense of empowerment.²⁶³ Additionally, the Salafi schools provide an alternative means for poor rural children to receive an education and offer a tight-knit community for those seeking social inclusion.²⁶⁴ During his fieldwork among Indonesian Salafi schools, Wahid also witnessed the initially hostile reactions of local villagers to the establishment of Salafi schools in their area.²⁶⁵ For example, local

²⁵⁶ Hasan, “The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign,” 690–97.

²⁵⁷ Hasan, 690.

²⁵⁸ Hasan, 697.

²⁵⁹ Hasan, 690.

²⁶⁰ Hasan, 691.

²⁶¹ Hasan, 691.

²⁶² Hasan, 691.

²⁶³ Hasan, 691.

²⁶⁴ Hasan, 691–92.

²⁶⁵ Wahid, 369.

authorities forcibly disbanded the al-Furqan school in Srowo (East Java) in 1994 and villagers attacked the al-Nur al-Atsari school in Banjarsari (West Java) in 2002.²⁶⁶ Over time, however, the presence of these schools normalized somewhat, and many schools have since amplified their outreach activities within local communities.²⁶⁷

Woodward attributes the success of the Salafi schools' recruiting efforts to the relative simplicity of their doctrine as well as their connection to Saudi Arabia.²⁶⁸ The schools provide students with a clearly defined vision of Islam, an unambiguous code of conduct that regulates social and religious practices, and simple instructions that take little effort to follow.²⁶⁹ Woodward reports that many students he interviewed considered the Salafi teachings more legitimate than local customs, believing that the messages must be true because they came from Mecca.²⁷⁰ Hasan notes that even though the schools have faced some difficulties in recruiting for and expanding the Salafi network, the indirect effect the schools have had on the local community is evident. During his review of local villages in Solo in 2010, Hasan recorded an increased awareness of the importance of religion, an increase in the number of practicing Muslims, and an increase in women wearing headscarves in villages near a Salafi school.²⁷¹

Some scholars, including Wahid, Tan, Kovacs, and Racimora, argue that the expansion of Salafi da'wa activities throughout Indonesia correlates with an increase in conflict between traditional Muslims and Salafis in the country and that Salafi schools, in particular, have played a role in the rise of radical Islam in Indonesia.²⁷² One example is the Salafi Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI) which, according to Kovacs, has been responsible for a number of violent acts against Muslim minorities since

²⁶⁶ Wahid, 370.

²⁶⁷ Wahid, 370.

²⁶⁸ Woodward, 241–42.

²⁶⁹ Woodward, 241.

²⁷⁰ Woodward, 241.

²⁷¹ Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign," 692.

²⁷² Wahid, 368; Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign," 676; Racimora, European Parliament, and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 20.

1999.²⁷³ Modeled after the Saudi religious police, the FPI targets “un-Islamic” institutions like nightclubs and restaurants that serve alcohol, as well as members of the Liberal Islam Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*, JIL).²⁷⁴ Another example is Salafi school leader Ja’far Umar Thalib, who established a paramilitary force, Laskar Jihad, which called for armed jihad against Christians as well as the Indonesian government from 2000 to 2003.²⁷⁵ Others, however, including van Bruinessen, argue that the link between Salafi schools and violent extremism is tenuous, and little empirical evidence exists to attribute these violent actions to the internal activities of the schools themselves.²⁷⁶

Irrespective of the schools’ supposed link to violent extremism, Kovacs contends that the Salafi schools have had a far-reaching impact in the country. She argues that they have the ability to provoke social change at the national level, with significant consequences for Indonesian society:

The Saudi educational institutes’ support for Salafism and glorification of Saudi rule challenge the host countries’ educational traditions; Saudi transnational educational establishments become reservoirs for Islamist ideologies that question the host society’s status quo and the right of other religious communities to exist. Collaboration between Saudi and local institutions and organizations is particularly insidious for secular or religiously pluralist societies, and countries that do not invest in educational systems remain open to Saudi influence. As the politically radical Salafi movements show, the Saudi educational offerings could challenge the legitimacy of the Indonesian state, and even lead to political uprisings.²⁷⁷

Kovacs argues that, despite the challenge posed by these Salafi school activities over the last several decades, the Indonesian government still has an opportunity to counter it through investing in education that supports democratic values and religious pluralism.²⁷⁸

²⁷³ Kovacs, 2.

²⁷⁴ Kovacs, 2.

²⁷⁵ Charlene Tan, “Educative Tradition and Islamic Education in Indonesia,” *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies* 14 (2014): 60; Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia,” 83.

²⁷⁶ van Bruinessen, 3–4.

²⁷⁷ Kovacs, 6.

²⁷⁸ Kovacs, 6.

As discussed above, the Salafi school system in Indonesia uses both secular and religious instruction to expand, normalize, and spread Salafi identity throughout the country. The schools' ability to recruit students to their cause and integrate them into exclusivist social groups in opposition to traditional Indonesian society has had a marked influence on the political, religious, and social discourse in Indonesia, which at times has resulted in conflict and violence. The next section analyzes the specific socializing aspects of the schools' curricula and activities that contribute to their ability to influence the Indonesian population.

C. SOCIALIZATION ANALYSIS OF SALAFI SCHOOLS

This section uses the analytical framework proposed in Chapter II to evaluate how Salafi schools incorporate the principles of socialization theory—or the process of indoctrinating individuals to social norms and standards of the group—when constructing their curriculum goals. According to Hadden and Long, the most important attribute that these socializing agents produce within new members is a sense of commitment, or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so.²⁷⁹ This theory is significant for studying the Salafi school system in Indonesia because it explains how children are raised to become members of an alternative community and how these organizations instill a set of exclusionary values within new members that generate conflict within the society in which they live. The framework draws on Long's and Hadden's five criteria—showing (demonstrating the values of the group), shaping (reinforcing commitment to those social values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new members), certifying (validating commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating members into the group)—to help identify and analyze specific socializing aspects of the Salafi schools described above.

Like the CVE religious education programs analyzed in Chapter III, Salafi schools offer a strong showing activity in their curriculum by promoting Salafi values and standards of behavior. As Woodward states, the schools provide a simple and unambiguous

²⁷⁹ Long and Hadden, 42–43.

understanding of Islam linked to Arab religious authority, and offer an idealized version of the Saudi social structure as the definitive example of pious Islamic living. The schools present these values as the core principles that govern daily life, which include a dedication to tawhid, fiqh, the hadith and Sunna, submission to shari'a, segregation of the sexes, specialized roles for girls as homemakers, isolation of the Salafi community from nonbelievers, and replicating Arab culture, language, and clothing styles to promote a Salafi collective identity. These ideals are also reinforced in the school textbooks and by the guest instructors from the Middle East who share similar values.

The strength of the showing activity in the Salafi schools is tempered somewhat outside the classroom. Their exclusivist and isolationist attitude, enmity towards so-called unbelievers, and open hostility towards local customs limit the reach of the schools' showing activities, although these limitations hardly affect students once they are enrolled in the curriculum. Overall, however, the schools show a robust set of religious and communal values and set clear expectations for their students to follow.

The shaping activity also features prominently in the schools' curriculum. Students develop habits that adhere to the social and religious principles of the school through their daily routine and classroom studies, which have both an Islamizing and Arabizing effect on the students and on the local community. Some examples of these activities include memorizing passages and texts relating to the desired principles, learning and using the Arabic language, wearing Arab style clothing, strict gender segregation, and separating themselves as much as possible from "non-believers" in the local community. Teachers reinforce these behaviors in class during their lectures and afterward during question and answer sessions and through homework assignments, as well as through their educational outreach activities in the community that reinforce their ideas outside the schools.

The recruiting activity for the Salafi school system contains both strong and weak elements. The schools actively recruit within local communities through educational outreach activities such as sermons and lessons at local mosques, as well as running radio programs to spread their message. As described above, the schools' link to Saudi Arabia serves as a strong recruiting tool because of the legitimacy gained from being connected to the kingdom and the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. The relative simplicity of the Salafi

message and easy-to-follow guidelines also aid in recruiting students with limited existing religious knowledge. As Hasan states, the schools also attract students from poor neighborhoods and disaffected youth looking for an alternative means of empowerment and social inclusion. The schools also recruit for Salafi universities in Indonesia, like LIPIA, and institutions in the Middle East through their connections with former religious teachers there.

As with the showing activity, the schools' exclusivist mentality and inflammatory rhetoric interfere with recruiting in local villages and, because of this, the schools must spend time normalizing their presence in the community to gain real benefit from their recruiting efforts. There also appears to be limited recruiting within the Salafi schools for any formal Salafi institutions or communities, other than universities, with which students can engage after graduation. The divergent interpretations of Salafi doctrine among the schools, coupled with their unwillingness to compromise may also limit recruiting for follow-on organizations if those groups subscribe to a slightly different version of Salafism. It seems likely, however, that the students' informal recruitment into the global Salafi movement and opportunities for travel to the Middle East have an effect in exposing students to new Salafi organizations.

Certifying in Salafi schools occurs both formally and informally. Formally, the schools test students at the end of every grade to ensure they have mastered the fundamental theological and practical aspects of Salafi doctrine before advancing them to the next grade. Informally, teachers certify a student's commitment on a frequent basis, such as through classwork and testing their memorization of texts, as well as ensure that the students complete daily prayers and rituals, wear the proper clothing, and act as expected with regards to gender relations and their interactions with each other and the community. One weakness of the certifying activity within Salafi schools is that they will only instill social confidence in the students' status among those members of the larger Salafi movement that adhere to the same strand of Salafism as the one taught in the school. Otherwise, it seems likely that a different community may reject the students for having divergent beliefs.

Placing within the Salafi schools is present, but appears rather weak compared to the other socializing activities. Like recruiting, the schools perform placing by sending

students to Salafi universities and offering them opportunities to travel abroad. Informally, placing occurs within the schools as a new social system for the students and segregating them from Indonesian society, as well as by placing them into the global Salafi movement as dedicated members of that religious practice. Conversely, the schools seem to have little connection to any specific organizations or communities into which they can place students after graduation, which may limit their reach.

Overall, the Salafi school system acts as a strong socializing agent by performing all five of the socializing activities described by Hadden and Long. Table 3 summarizes the five socializing activities of the Salafi schools in Indonesia.

Table 3. Analysis of Salafi School System Socializing Activities

Socializing Activity	Description of Activity within the Salafi School System
Showing	Strong religious and Saudi value system built around a simple, unambiguous vision of Islam linked to Arab religious authority, provides clear guidance for acceptable conduct. Somewhat limited by lack of positive exposure in the local community.
Shaping	Strong habituation of values through controlling the students' daily routine, language, clothing, maintaining segregation between genders and separation from the local community, reinforced by teachers in and out of school.
Recruiting	Strong recruiting in the community, attractive to disaffected youth and the poor, legitimized through connection to Saudi Arabia. Limited by the schools' adversarial and exclusivist nature and lack formal connections to follow-on groups.
Certifying	Strong formal testing of both ideological and academic content, consistent informal evaluation of behaviors. Builds confidence within students and some members of Salafi community, but limited by the divergence between different strands of Salafism.
Placing	Present by sending students to Salafi universities and abroad to Saudi Arabia, incorporates students into Salafi community within school, and informally into global Salafi movement, but lacks formal connection to specific follow-on organizations.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined the origins and development of the Salafi movement in Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries' efforts to Arabize and Islamize Indonesian society through da'wa activities, specifically through Salafi schools. It identified the background and mission of Salafi schools in Indonesia, the values and norms propagated through the schools' curricula, and the effects of their social outreach activities in local communities. Finally, this chapter analyzed the socializing elements of the Salafi school system and found that it performs all five activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing to instill commitment to a particular strand of Salafi values within the student body. While these schools do not promote violent extremist ideologies directly, their ability to socialize commitment to an exclusivist and intolerant communal identity—especially one that refuses to operate within the secular political system, segregates itself from the local community, and antagonizes traditional establishments—has led to conflict between in Indonesian communities, shifted political, social, and religious discourse in the country, and contributed to the increasing Islamization and Arabization of Indonesian society.

The next chapter studies the Muhammadiyah schools in Indonesia, which, in contrast to the Salafi schools, have propagated an open, pluralistic, nationalistic, and tolerant religious identity in Indonesia. An analysis of the socializing functions of the Muhammadiyah school system will identify characteristics that have successfully committed students to the organization's values and objectives in the country.

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V. CASE STUDY: MUHAMMADIYAH SCHOOLS

The Muhammadiyah school system in Indonesia illustrates how formal education can be used to propagate an open, pluralistic, nationalistic, and tolerant religious identity within a country. Since its founding in 1912, Muhammadiyah has grown to become the second largest Muslim social institution in Indonesia, with more than 30 million members and 15,000 schools operating throughout the country.²⁸⁰ According to Muhammadiyah executive board member Sudibyo Markus, the organization's large alumni community, which includes many prominent government and civil society leaders, spearheads the moderate movement in the Islamic world.²⁸¹ Several scholars, including political scientists Jeremy Menchik, Wendy Wirawan, and Adhikatama, argue that Muhammadiyah schools have even contributed to the creation of a communal identity in Indonesia that supports the Indonesian government and its political philosophy, opposes the efforts of transnational Islamist movements in the country and prevents violent ideologies from taking hold in the community.²⁸²

This chapter examines the socializing properties of Muhammadiyah's educational institutions through materials provided by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, research conducted by political scientists Jeremy Menchik, education expert Muhammad Fuad, and Indonesian scholars Agus Miswanto, Afrahul Daulai, and Ahmad Burhani, as well as additional secondary sources. The first section of this chapter outlines the organization's history, ideology, development, and relationship with the Indonesian government. The second section describes the Muhammadiyah school system itself and details the typical daily activities, curricula, materials, and lessons of these institutions. It then describes the effects these schools have had on their students and Indonesian society as a whole. Finally,

²⁸⁰ Central Board of Muhammadiyah, "Profil Muhammadiyah," Muhammadiyah, accessed May 29, 2018, <http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-49-det-profil.html>.

²⁸¹ Markus.

²⁸² Jeremy Menchik, "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 3 (2014): 593, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417514000267>; Wendy Wirawan and Adhikatama, "Contesting ISIS in Indonesia: Leadership and Ideological Barriers on Radicalism as Foundation to Counterterrorism," *Social Sciences* 7, no. 2 (2018): 60.

the chapter analyzes the school system using the framework from Chapter II, which focuses on the five socializing activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing to identify how it commits students to specific communal values that advance its ideas for Indonesian society.

The chapter finds that Muhammadiyah schools act as strong socializing agents by performing all five socializing activities outlined in the analytical framework. The schools actively promote the values of modernism, nationalism, and tolerance within the curriculum, and work to instill these values using an “active learning” model and community service to help students internalize the underlying principles of the organization. Although some Muhammadiyah schools exhibit a limited capacity to socialize their religious beliefs, many limit religious socialization deliberately in favor of propagating an atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation between diverse populations in support of Indonesian nationalism.

A. THE MUHAMMADIYAH MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 in Yogyakarta by Indonesian Islamic scholar Ahmad Dahlan and, according to Fuad, is an Islamic reformist movement that works through education to instill a modernist version of Islam in Indonesia.²⁸³ Before founding Muhammadiyah, Dahlan studied in the Middle East under Muslim scholars including Muhammad Rasyid Ridha, Jamaluddin al-Afghani, and Muhammad Abduh, and after returning to Indonesia, became a leader in the Muslim modernist movement in the country.²⁸⁴ Anthropologist Mark Woodward argues that Dahlan originally sought to provide high-quality education for indigenous Muslim children comparable to the Dutch or Christian missionary schools, which were either closed to Muslim children or considered undesirable by Muslim parents.²⁸⁵ Dahlan sought to merge aspects of the Western

²⁸³ Muhammad Fuad, “Islam, Modernity and Muhammadiyah’s Educational Programme,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 5, no. 3 (December 2004): 400, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1464937042000288697>.

²⁸⁴ Imron Wakhid Harits et al., “Indonesia Education Today: Dating Back Its History of Islam and Imparting European Education System,” *Asian Social Science* 12, no. 5 (April 19, 2016): 182–83, <https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v12n5p179>.

²⁸⁵ Mark Woodward et al., “Muslim Education, Celebrating Islam and Having Fun as Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Indonesia,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no. 4 (October 2010): 34.

education system—such as its teaching methods, organizational model, and the inclusion of modern secular topics like science—with Islamic teaching to produce an organization that would embrace modernity and nationalism while upholding Islamic values.²⁸⁶

Dahlan established the first Muhammadiyah school in 1911 in Yogyakarta, a year before he founded the overarching Muhammadiyah organization as a means to expand his vision for educational outreach.²⁸⁷ By the 1930s, Muhammadiyah had built more than 1,000 schools in several regions throughout Indonesia.²⁸⁸ According to Fuad, Muhammadiyah initially garnered support from middle-class Muslim merchants and traders, and as the school network expanded it received support from land-owning farmers as well. Economic changes after Indonesia's independence in 1945 caused a decline in these groups, yet Muhammadiyah's popularity continued to grow among civil servants and professionals.²⁸⁹ With many Muhammadiyah graduates moving on to earn advanced degrees over the next several decades, the Muhammadiyah community became one of the highest-educated Muslim groups in Indonesia.²⁹⁰

Throughout the next century, despite competition from Christian missionaries, the emergence of more stringent Salafi Islamic groups and the founding of traditional Indonesian Muslim organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah managed to spread throughout the country to become the second largest private educational institution in Indonesia.²⁹¹ As of 2018, according to the official Muhammadiyah website, the organization boasts over 30 million members, keeps 11,000 offices from the village to provincial level, operates hundreds of hospitals and clinics, maintains several universities, and runs over 15,000 schools from kindergarten level through high school in every region of the country.²⁹²

²⁸⁶ Fuad, 400–404.

²⁸⁷ Harits et al., 183.

²⁸⁸ Fuad, 403–4.

²⁸⁹ Fuad, 403.

²⁹⁰ Fuad, 403.

²⁹¹ Fuad, 402–5.

²⁹² Central Board of Muhammadiyah, “Profil Muhammadiyah.”

Woodward asserts that Muhammadiyah embraces core religious beliefs similar to the Salafi schools in Indonesia but is otherwise a profoundly different movement.²⁹³ Specifically, Woodward argues that, like the Salafi schools, Muhammadiyah follows the teachings of nineteenth century Saudi cleric Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, particularly his focus on *tawhid* (the oneness of God), the *hadith* and *Sunna* (the sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad), and opposition to Sufism (mystical Islam) and *bid’ah* (religious innovation).²⁹⁴ Unlike the Salafis, however, Woodward states that Muhammadiyah is staunchly nationalist and displays an extraordinary amount of tolerance for aspects of Indonesian Islam that it officially eschews, such as visiting grave sites, praying for the dead, and celebrating Muhammad’s birthday.²⁹⁵ Woodward emphasizes that the organization is “deeply committed to the idea of Indonesia and the diversity of Indonesian cultures.”²⁹⁶

Furthermore, as stated in the organization’s statutes and bylaws, Muhammadiyah does not advocate for the establishment of an Islamic state but instead seeks to “uphold and revere Islam so as to realize a real Islamic society” through good deeds, charity, and service based on the Qur’an and Sunna.²⁹⁷ The organization endeavors to foster faith and understanding in Islamic teachings, advance culture, science, technology, and the arts through education, increase health and welfare, and maintain national unity and members’ involvement in national life.²⁹⁸ Anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen asserts that these objectives drive Muhammadiyah to focus predominantly on social outreach and welfare activities, particularly formal education, rather than on political activism.²⁹⁹

²⁹³ Woodward et al.

²⁹⁴ Woodward et al., 38.

²⁹⁵ Woodward et al., 38–39.

²⁹⁶ Woodward et al., 39.

²⁹⁷ Central Board of Muhammadiyah, “Statutes” (Muhammadiyah, July 2005), Chapter III, Articles 6 and 7, <http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/en/content-51-det-anggaran-dasar.html>.

²⁹⁸ Central Board of Muhammadiyah, “Bylaws” (Muhammadiyah, July 2005), Article 3, <http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/en/content-51-det-anggaran-dasar.html>.

²⁹⁹ van Bruinessen, 11.

Muhammadiyah also circulates a statement called “The Faith Pledge and Aspirations of Muhammadiyah Life” that details the organization’s mission and desired end state. It advocates for the realization of a society based in faith (that is, a “pure and untainted Islam” free from polytheism and human innovation, but also dedicated to tolerance for others based on Islamic principles), knowledge, morality, and *muamalah* (or fairness in social and economic dealings according to Islamic jurisprudence).³⁰⁰ The document also outlines Muhammadiyah’s support of the government in general and of Indonesia’s core values, or *Pancasila*: the belief in one God; a just and civilized humanity (specifically that Indonesia will not tolerate oppression of any type); national unity; representative democracy; and equity and social justice for all Indonesians.³⁰¹

Fuad argues that Muhammadiyah’s endorsement of Pancasila and its close connection to the Indonesian government reflects the organization’s long history of working through the state to operate and expand.³⁰² Muhammadiyah’s steady compliance has won it favor in the form of subsidies for teachers’ salaries and relatively little interference from successive governments, including the Dutch colonial government, Sukarno’s government following Indonesia’s independence, Suharto’s New Order regime, and the new republican government since Suharto’s overthrow in 1998.³⁰³ Interestingly, while this relationship laid the foundations for the organization’s rapid growth and rising influence in Indonesian society, it also encouraged moderation within the organization itself as a means to avoid political suppression.³⁰⁴ Finally, Fuad contends that Muhammadiyah’s support for Pancasila and close ties to the Indonesian government contributed to the organization adopting a nationalist philosophy, which further

³⁰⁰ Central Board of Muhammadiyah, “Faith Pledge and Aspirations of Muhammadiyah Life” (Muhammadiyah, July 2005), 4, <http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/en/content-51-det-anggaran-dasar.html>.

³⁰¹ William H. Frederick and Robert L. Worden, eds., “The Pancasila,” in *Indonesia: A Country Study* (Washington: U.S. Government Publishing Office for the Library of Congress, 1993).

³⁰² Fuad, 403–4.

³⁰³ Fuad, 404.

³⁰⁴ Fuad, 404–5.

distinguishes the movement from transnational groups operating in Indonesia, particularly the Salafi schools described in Chapter IV.³⁰⁵

The organization continues to grow and seeks to expand beyond Indonesia's borders; in November 2017, Muhammadiyah chairman Haedar Nashir announced plans to establish a school in Melbourne, Australia, consisting of a preschool, an elementary school, junior high, and high school to service both the Australian Muslim population and Indonesian students wanting to study abroad.³⁰⁶

B. THE MUHAMMADIYAH CURRICULUM

The strength of the Muhammadiyah school system is its ability to operate at the local level. Officially, the Muhammadiyah school system follows a rigid hierarchy with strict regulations set by the national office.³⁰⁷ In practice, however, the organization grants significant latitude at the local level to build and develop educational programs. Local branches enjoy this autonomy from the national office partly because they must apply their own financial resources towards new school initiatives rather than appeal to the higher office for support.³⁰⁸ Since the bulk of funding for educational institutions comes from private donations collected and managed at the local level, requirements and expectations must also represent the interests of local donors.³⁰⁹ Fuad argues that this bottom-up approach to educational development creates natural ties between the Muhammadiyah school and the local community, which has, in part, underscored the institution's success over the last 100 years.³¹⁰

³⁰⁵ Fuad, 405.

³⁰⁶ Sri Wahyuni, "Muhammadiyah to Establish Islamic Schools in Australia," *The Jakarta Post*, November 27, 2017, Online edition, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/11/27/muhammadiyah-to-establish-islamic-schools-in-australia.html>.

³⁰⁷ Fuad, 401.

³⁰⁸ Fuad, 401.

³⁰⁹ Fuad, 401–2.

³¹⁰ Fuad, 401–2.

Daulai asserts that the schools seek to create a cadre of civic leaders who are neither secular nor resistant to social progress.³¹¹ The schools recognize and embrace the inclusion of modern secular subjects to prepare their students to adapt to advances in science and technology and thrive in Indonesia's rapidly evolving social environment.³¹² According to Daulai, the school curriculum also works to instill students with a particular work ethic laced with nationalistic undertones.³¹³ Lessons are designed not only to motivate students to take their studies seriously but also to work to build a greater Indonesian nation, citing the deeds of national leaders such as Ahmad Dahlan, General Sudirman, President Suharto, and political activist Hamka, among others, as examples to emulate.³¹⁴ Additionally, Indonesian Islamic scholars Sutarman, Heru Tjahjono, and Tasman Hamami, report that the schools enforce a daily culture of friendliness and politeness by encouraging smiling and greeting fellow students, teachers, and staff, in an effort to develop empathy, self-regulation, and social skills.³¹⁵ The schools also seek to instill conscientiousness and social responsibility, such as environmental stewardship, with activities that include cleaning up natural areas and plastic-free days in school.³¹⁶

The Muhammadiyah curriculum includes both religious and general subjects and, according to Daulai, the schools expect students to become masters in both types of knowledge.³¹⁷ Education expert Charlene Tan reports that the Muhammadiyah curriculum teaches seventy percent general education topics and thirty percent religious lessons, which certifies the schools as equivalent to public schools for students seeking admission into university programs.³¹⁸ Muhammadiyah's general education curriculum mirrors the

³¹¹ Afrahul Fadhila Daulai, "The Educational Culture of Muhammadiyah in North Sumatra," *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 22, no. 03 (April 2017): 59, <https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-2203075761>.

³¹² Daulai, 59.

³¹³ Daulai, 60.

³¹⁴ Daulai, 60.

³¹⁵ Sutarman Sutarman, Heru Kurnianto Tjahjono, and Tasman Hamami, "The Implementation of Holistic Education in Muhammadiyah's Madrasah Indonesia," *Dinamika Ilmu* 17, no. 2 (2017): 196.

³¹⁶ Sutarman, Tjahjono, and Hamami, 196.

³¹⁷ Daulai, 59.

³¹⁸ Tan, 52.

national curriculum established by the Ministries of Education and Religious Affairs, which includes mathematics, physical and social sciences, history, and lessons on the value of Indonesian democracy and Pancasila in particular.³¹⁹ Its religious curriculum focuses on Qur’anic lessons, Islamic history, and core Muhammadiyah beliefs, such as the need to purify tawhid, and to reject traditional superstitions and any form of heresy, generally defined as any act not based in the Qur’an or Sunna.³²⁰

According to Sutarman, Tjahjono, and Hamami, the typical school day starts at three o’clock in the morning with group prayers, after which the students participate in physical activities, such as sports, until breakfast.³²¹ Academic lessons generally occur from seven o’clock until three o’clock in the afternoon, with lunch and prayer breaks dispersed throughout the day.³²² After class, students participate in extracurricular activities or perform community service until seven o’clock in the evening, at which time they perform prayers, eat supper, and return home to study and rest until morning.³²³ To compete with government schools, Muhammadiyah schools also offer modern educational facilities—complete with computer labs, sports centers, and libraries—and incorporate standard grades of education from elementary to high school, with structured assessments at each level.³²⁴

Tan notes that the schools focus on “active learning” by placing the teacher in a facilitating role to allow students to “discuss, cooperate, experiment, inquire, and explore” throughout each learning experience.³²⁵ This form of self-directed learning, Tan argues, goes beyond rote memorization to encourage students to draw their own conclusions and develop evidence-based justifications for their arguments.³²⁶ Florian Pohl, Associate

³¹⁹ Harits et al., 182; Daulai, 59.

³²⁰ Daulai, 58.

³²¹ Sutarman, Tjahjono, and Hamami, 197.

³²² Sutarman, Tjahjono, and Hamami, 197–98.

³²³ Sutarman, Tjahjono, and Hamami, 198.

³²⁴ Tan, 52–55.

³²⁵ Tan, 55.

³²⁶ Tan, 57.

Professor in Religion at Emory University, also describes the schools' instructional methodology as one aimed at participatory learning and critical thinking.³²⁷ According to Pohl, course materials also address contemporary social issues including democracy, tolerance, and human rights using Islamic principles as a reference point for discussions.³²⁸

Tan reports that these schools follow Dahlan's founding vision to reconcile modern "Western" science, educational practices, and technologies with Islamic dogma.³²⁹ They reject the opinion that "modern" education is "Western" education, arguing instead that all knowledge comes from God.³³⁰ Also, the schools argue that modern Western intellectualism is predominantly based on medieval Europe's adoption of early Muslim advances in science and thought. Therefore, it is not anathema to the Islamic way of life.³³¹ To reinforce this connection, teachers link secular subjects to relevant Islamic history and teachings in the Qur'an, hadith, and Sunna.³³² For instance, according to Islamic scholar Agus Miswanto, Muhammadiyah textbooks point out that the basic tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are virtually identical to the five basic principles of *Maqashid al-Shariah*, which are the protection of religious freedom and belief; right to protection of life; protection of reproduction and child rights; protection of freedom of thought and expression; and rights to property and work.³³³ Tan also states that these schools attempt to instill religious values indirectly, such as by displaying religious lessons in high-visibility areas throughout the school.³³⁴

Tan reports that some schools still face difficulties integrating secular and religious concepts, mainly due to some teachers' inability to properly recognize and connect relevant

³²⁷ Florian Pohl, "Negotiating Religious and National Identities in Contemporary Indonesian Islamic Education," *CrossCurrents* 61, no. 3 (September 2011): 406.

³²⁸ Pohl, 406–7.

³²⁹ Tan, 57.

³³⁰ Tan, 58.

³³¹ Tan, 57.

³³² Tan, 58.

³³³ Agus Miswanto, "Human Rights Education in Indonesia: The Muhammadiyah Schools Experience," *Human Rights Education in Asia-Pacific* 3 (2012): 99–100.

³³⁴ Tan, 58.

Qur'anic verses to secular lessons.³³⁵ Tan concludes that this challenge has resulted in “educational dualism” in some schools, where lessons seem to come from two separate curricula—one religious and one secular—with little connection between the two.³³⁶ Somewhat similarly, Menchik states that Muhammadiyah schools in areas that have large Christian or Buddhist populations limit drawing connections between secular and religious topics, albeit deliberately.³³⁷ In these schools, teachers of any faith can instruct students of any faith in secular subjects, but religious topics are instructed by members of the corresponding religion.³³⁸ While this method contributes to the separation of secular and religious instruction, Menchik argues that it also promotes mutual respect and cooperation between members of different religions.³³⁹

Muhammadiyah schools also make an effort to respect the local cultural traditions of the communities in which they operate. Van Bruinessen states that most Muhammadiyah schools teach little to no Arabic, especially in the lower grades, and instead rely on contemporary Indonesian translations of religious texts.³⁴⁰ Islamic scholar Ahmad Burhani states that the reason for using the vernacular is not only to make the content more accessible, but also to reinforce the school's nationalist philosophy.³⁴¹ According to Burhani, language acts as a powerful method of separating locals from foreign influences and places them into a distinct national community unified by a shared language.³⁴² In addition to using local languages and dialects during lessons, Woodward states that the schools encourage students to wear traditional Indonesian clothing and, especially, modern Western clothing styles.³⁴³ The schools also participate in *Takbir Keliling*, a major

³³⁵ Tan, 58–59.

³³⁶ Tan, 58.

³³⁷ Menchik, 614.

³³⁸ Menchik, 614.

³³⁹ Menchik, 613–14.

³⁴⁰ van Bruinessen, 10.

³⁴¹ Ahmad Najib Burhani, “The Muhammadiyah's Attitude to Javanese Culture in 1912–1930: Appreciation and Tension” (Master's Thesis, Leiden University, 2004), 64.

³⁴² Burhani, 64–65.

³⁴³ Woodward et al., 41.

Indonesian holiday celebrating the end of Ramadan, by having students spend a month constructing elaborate floats and decorations to carry around the city during the event.³⁴⁴

According to Daulai, the schools also sponsor the Muhammadiyah Student Association (IPM), which all students are required to join.³⁴⁵ The association hosts activities for both students and the local community that focus mainly on teaching religious subjects, such as training in Qur'anic reading and sermonizing, and organizing Ramadan trips to various Muhammadiyah-sponsored mosques around the country.³⁴⁶ Other activities outside the school include a youth scouting organization called Hizbul Wathan (HW) Scouts, various martial arts groups, summer camps, sports teams, art groups, and drum bands.³⁴⁷ The school system considers these social functions critical for instilling a charitable mindset among students that will, in turn, protect them from immoral or impolite behavior at home, in the school, and in the community.³⁴⁸ Daulai further points out that Muhammadiyah also expects their students to represent and promote the organization and its values within society after graduation, essentially acting as informal ambassadors and recruiters for the organization.³⁴⁹

Political scientist Robin Bush, drawing from a national survey conducted in 2014 by the Asia Institute and Lingkaran Studi Indonesia, argues that the Muhammadiyah schools have had some success in instilling their values within student populations. In views relating to democracy and gender relations, for instance, eighty-nine percent of Muhammadiyah alumni respondents strongly believe that democracy is the best form of government, and eighty-two percent stated that wives have the right to earn income for the family and have a say in family financial decisions.³⁵⁰ Additionally, concerning religious

³⁴⁴ Woodward et al., 43–44.

³⁴⁵ Daulai, 59.

³⁴⁶ Daulai, 59.

³⁴⁷ Daulai, 59–60.

³⁴⁸ Daulai, 60.

³⁴⁹ Daulai, 58.

³⁵⁰ Robin Bush, "A Snapshot of Muhammadiyah Social Change and Shifting Markers of Identity and Values," ARI Working Paper (National University of Singapore: Asia Research Institute, May 2014), 21, www.ari.nus.edu.sg/pub/wps.htm.

tolerance, seventy percent of respondents indicated tolerance towards non-Muslims moving into their communities and more than eighty percent accepted non-Muslims becoming teachers in national schools.³⁵¹

Several scholars contend that the Muhammadiyah schools have made a broad impact on Indonesian society over the last century. Daulai states that Muhammadiyah's robust alumni network extends into almost all areas of the government and throughout civil society in the country.³⁵² She argues that Muhammadiyah members have participated in drafting government legislation on numerous topics, including the development of the national curriculum, which, over time, has led to a partial confluence in the content of the national public school curriculum and the Muhammadiyah curriculum.³⁵³ Education experts Imron Wakhid Harits, Stefan Chudy, Alena Juvova, and Pavla Andrysova argue that Muhammadiyah has played a major role in reforming general Indonesian thoughts on the value of education. They state that the organization continues to reflect Dahlan's support for universal education, which draws from the educational philosophy of Enlightenment scholar John Amos Comenius.³⁵⁴ Comenius and Dahlan both considered education a basic human right for all citizens regardless of religion, socio-economic status, or gender.³⁵⁵ Harits et al. conclude that Muhammadiyah's efforts to provide quality education for historically marginalized communities have helped spread support for the concept of education as a right throughout Indonesia.³⁵⁶

According to political scientists Wendy Wirawan and Adhikatama, Muhammadiyah's support for the government and promotion of Pancasila has even helped block radical ideologies from taking hold in Indonesian society.³⁵⁷ Wirawan and Adhikatama state that Muhammadiyah has successfully cultivated trust in the state and

³⁵¹ Bush, 22.

³⁵² Daulai.

³⁵³ Daulai, 57.

³⁵⁴ Harits et al., 180–81.

³⁵⁵ Harits et al., 180–81.

³⁵⁶ Harits et al., 180–82.

³⁵⁷ Wirawan and Adhikatama, 59.

dedication to common national identity within Indonesian citizens based on the principles of Pancasila.³⁵⁸ They further argue that this unified support for Pancasila and the Indonesian state has inoculated the population somewhat from contradicting values, particularly violent anti-state dogmas such as those espoused by the Indonesian branch of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).³⁵⁹

Menchik argues that Muhammadiyah's advocacy for religious pluralism has contributed to the development of what he terms "godly nationalism" in Indonesia, where otherwise conflicting religious movements come together in cooperation with the state based on their shared belief in God, without being particular about which path each should choose.³⁶⁰ Menchik argues that this form of nationalism has created a communal identity in Indonesia that is tolerant of religious diversity, although not of heterodox movements that seek religious homogeneity or threaten to destabilize the political system.³⁶¹ He further argues that widespread adoption of this concept is also partially responsible for the difficulty many Islamist movements have had in attempting to establish a foothold in Indonesia.³⁶²

C. SOCIALIZATION ANALYSIS OF MUHAMMADIYAH

This section uses the analytical framework proposed in Chapter II to evaluate how the Muhammadiyah schools incorporate the principles of socialization theory—or the process of indoctrinating individuals to social norms and standards of the group—when constructing their curriculum goals. According to Hadden and Long, the most important attribute that these socializing agents produce within new members is a sense of commitment, or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so.³⁶³ This theory is

³⁵⁸ Wirawan and Adhikatama, 59–60.

³⁵⁹ Wirawan and Adhikatama, 60.

³⁶⁰ Menchik, 594.

³⁶¹ Menchik, 594–96.

³⁶² Menchik, 593.

³⁶³ Long and Hadden, 42–43.

significant for studying the Muhammadiyah school system in Indonesia because it explains how children are raised to become dedicated members of an institution that supports democratic governance, tolerance, and social justice. The framework draws on Long's and Hadden's five criteria—showing (demonstrating the values of the group), shaping (reinforcing commitment to those social values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new members), certifying (validating commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating members into the group)—to help identify and analyze specific socializing aspects of the Muhammadiyah school system described above.

The Muhammadiyah schools display a strong showing activity in promoting their values of modernism, nationalism, and tolerance, but have a slightly reduced showing activity for their religious values. The school curriculum regularly infuses lessons with stories of national heroes who were either Muhammadiyah members or espoused ideals similar to Muhammadiyah, to reinforce their nationalist narrative and show Muhammadiyah values as congruent with those of the nation. The schools show their religious values by linking secular subjects to Qur'anic verses and lessons in the Hadith and Sunna. The schools also indirectly show these values by placing décor with religious teachings throughout the school. Muhammadiyah's showing activity for its religious ideals seems somewhat diluted by the organization's inclusion of conflicting traditional practices, such as visiting grave sites, praying for the dead, and the Takbir Keliling celebration, yet these activities simultaneously show how Muhammadiyah demonstrates tolerance for differing viewpoints. This activity is also limited in schools with teachers that have difficulties properly integrating Islamic and secular topics. Similarly, by adjusting the teachers and curriculum to suit the socio-religious backgrounds of different student populations in certain areas, the schools necessarily limit showing Muhammadiyah's religious ideology to promote the values of mutual respect and cooperation between religions.

The shaping activity is particularly strong within Muhammadiyah schools. Lessons are designed to challenge students to work hard in school and, later, to apply that work ethic toward improving the country. Teachers encourage students to smile and give daily greetings to habituate good social skills, empathy, and self-regulation. The schools apply

“active learning” to engage students and assist them in internalizing the lessons and their underlying values, which empowers them to be able to make and defend arguments in support of these concepts. The schools also teach mostly in the vernacular to make content more accessible and unify the student body through a shared language. Furthermore, the schools incorporate class activities that support the organization’s values, such as environmental cleanup events, community service activities, plastic-free days, and preparations for annual Takbir Keliling celebrations. Students are expected to participate in daily prayers and religious lessons, IPM student association activities, group physical training exercises, and extra-curricular activities like the HW Scouts, martial arts groups, sports teams, art groups, and drum bands. These activities are popular among students but also instill Muhammadiyah philosophies on morality, charity, and social responsibility.

The recruiting activity occurs within the Muhammadiyah schools by attracting new students, increasing membership in the national organization, and garnering popular support for the movement. The schools attract students by providing modern educational facilities and a curriculum structure similar to Indonesian public schools, which includes a significant proportion of secular subjects. More importantly, however, the schools recruit based on Dahlan’s founding principle of providing quality modern education while upholding Islamic values to create a “real Islamic society” in touch with the modern world. They recruit in local communities through their outreach activities and community service efforts, as well as by requiring graduating students to act as informal ambassadors and recruiters both for the schools themselves and the larger Muhammadiyah movement in Indonesia. Recruiting for the overarching Muhammadiyah organization also occurs in the schools by enforcing membership in the IPM student association and by exposing students to Muhammadiyah alumni, Muhammadiyah-aligned mosques, and other social institutions run by the organization. Muhammadiyah also plans to expand its outreach beyond Indonesia, particularly into Australia, to offer study abroad opportunities for Indonesian Muslim students and attract Australian Muslims looking for the type of Islamic education that Muhammadiyah provides.

The Muhammadiyah schools also offer a strong certifying activity in their curriculum through both formal and informal means. Like the critical thinking CVE

educational programs described in Chapter III, the Muhammadiyah schools use the active learning model to certify their students' ability to analyze and support arguments critically. Unlike the critical thinking CVE programs that avoid instilling any single values system, the Muhammadiyah schools link these cognitive skills with the institution's social values as a means of strengthening the students' confidence in articulating and defending those beliefs. Similar to the Salafi schools described in Chapter IV, Muhammadiyah teachers test students at the end of each grade on both secular and religious knowledge and monitor student behavior throughout the school day to ensure they act in accordance with the social standards set by the school. In addition, requiring students to act as informal ambassadors and to take part in student association activities, HW Scouts and other extracurricular activities contribute to instilling confidence in living the organization's values outside the classroom. It also seems likely that the students' frequent interactions with the country's large alumni community through these types of activities help to instill social confidence among older Muhammadiyah members to accept and integrate new graduates due to these existing relationships.

Placing also features strongly within the Muhammadiyah schools. The schools prepare students to apply to college, especially to one of Muhammadiyah's universities, and to find jobs by leveraging connections within the organization's massive alumni community of over 30 million members. The integration of Muhammadiyah members into most government departments, civil institutions, and many private businesses throughout the country also assists with placing new members into a cohesive community after graduation. More broadly, the schools help students become productive members of Indonesian society by enforcing community service and social outreach activities and inducing support for religious pluralism, tolerance, service, nationalism and Indonesia's core values.

Overall, the Muhammadiyah school system acts as a strong socializing agent by performing all five of the socializing activities described by Hadden and Long. Table 4 summarizes the five socializing activities of the Muhammadiyah schools in Indonesia.

Table 4. Analysis of Muhammadiyah School Socializing Activities

Socializing Activity	Description of Activity within Muhammadiyah Schools
Showing	Strong nationalist and tolerant values using historical examples, incorporating local practices, and including members from different religions. Religious values mixed into secular lessons and shown in the environment, but limited in favor of tolerance.
Shaping	Strong habituation of social behaviors, community service mindset, and work ethic in class. Empowers students to internalize and defend viewpoints. Reinforces values through organizations, group activities, and a shared language.
Recruiting	Strong recruiting for schools and larger organization through community outreach, mosques, alumni, and competitive program. Involves students in recruiting efforts through student association and after graduation as informal ambassadors.
Certifying	Strong formal and informal testing of ideological knowledge, behaviors, and social confidence using active learning model. Builds confidence among students and community through extracurricular activities and exposure to alumni.
Placing	Strong social connection to local communities and members of the larger Muhammadiyah movement, and informally places students into Indonesian society through social outreach, community service, and support for Indonesian nationalism.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter described the history, development, and activities of the Muhammadiyah school system in Indonesia. It identified the background and mission of Muhammadiyah movement, the values and norms propagated through the schools' curricula, and the effects of their social outreach activities in local communities and broader Indonesian society. Finally, this chapter analyzed the socializing elements of the Muhammadiyah school system and found that it performs all five activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing to instill a commitment to certain values within the student body, including religious pluralism, tolerance, community service, and a particular brand of Indonesian nationalism. The socializing activities conducted in Muhammadiyah schools have helped increase popular support for universal education, democracy, the Indonesian government and its political philosophy of Pancasila, as well as

bolster tolerance for traditional Indonesian customs and differing religious beliefs. Finally, these schools have contributed to the immunization of parts of Indonesian society against the encroachment of anti-establishment and violent extremist ideologies in the country.

The next chapter studies the Beyond Bali Education Program, which aims to instill certain traits in students that enable them to identify, analyze, and reject violent extremist ideologies. An analysis of the socializing functions of Beyond Bali will identify which characteristics of the program commit students to the program's values and objectives.

VI. CASE STUDY: BEYOND BALI EDUCATION PROGRAM

The previous chapters investigated the socializing activities of two established educational institutions in Indonesia: Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools. Both of these organizations offer a complete learning experience for students from elementary school through high school, to include extracurricular activities and community outreach events. Unlike these two complete school systems, many Western CVE education programs are supplemental packages designed to complement existing school curricula. As described in Chapter III, most CVE education programs fall into one or more of four broad approaches: teaching vocational skills, developing critical thinking skills, increasing exposure to diversity, and reforming religious education. Each approach addresses specific factors that potentially lead to radicalization in an effort to reduce future incidences of violence or support for extremist organizations. Many of these approaches are either short-duration training programs or individual lessons designed for use in existing schools.

This chapter examines one example of a Western CVE program—the Beyond Bali Education Program. Curtin University in Australia, together with the Bali Peace Park Association and the Australian government, developed Beyond Bali following the 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia, that killed more than 200 people, including eighty-eight Australian tourists.³⁶⁴ The program package comprises a five-module curriculum that focuses on critical thinking, exposure to diversity, and non-violent conflict resolution and is designed to integrate into both secular and Islamic schools in Australia. The chapter begins by describing the background and development of the Beyond Bali Education Program. It then outlines its purpose, curriculum, and preliminary results of the program's execution in one secular school and in one Islamic school in Australia. Finally, the chapter analyzes the socializing activities of Beyond Bali using the analytical framework from Chapter II to determine how the program commits students to values inimical to violent extremism. It draws from primary program materials, including teacher instructions, lesson

³⁶⁴ Variya Lulitanond, "Culture Shock and Moral Panic: An Analysis of Three Mainstream Australian Newspapers' Response to the Bali Bombings in October 2002 and the Arrest of 'Smiling Amrozi' in November 2002" (Master's Thesis, University of Tasmania, 2004), 1.

outlines, activity sheets, videos, and student workbooks, and reports from Beyond Bali program developers Anne Aly, Elizabeth Taylor, Saul Karnovsky concerning the development and execution of the program, as well as other independent analyses of the program.

The chapter finds that the program displays both strong and weak characteristics as a socializing agent. Beyond Bali avoids socializing a particular set of communal values by instead focusing on promoting critical thinking and exposure to diversity to inoculate against violent extremist ideologies. Nonetheless, because the program combines multiple CVE approaches and incorporates the communal activity of building a peace park it is able to perform more socializing activities than if it utilized only one approach.

A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF BEYOND BALI

In October 2002, two bombs detonated at the Sari Club near Kuta beach in Bali, Indonesia, killing more than 200 people. A South Asian terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, planned and conducted the attack, and included operatives from both Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as support from Al Qaeda. The attack, which took everyone by surprise, raised concerns across the region for how best to prevent such operations in the future.³⁶⁵ Following the bombings, professors at Curtin University in Western Australia and the Bali Peace Park Association Incorporated (BPPAI), an Indonesian non-profit organization working to build a peace park on the site of the 2002 bombings, began work on a CVE education program for inclusion into existing schools.³⁶⁶ The Australian Federal Attorney General's Department funded the project as part of its Building Community Resilience Program.³⁶⁷ The resulting package, called the Beyond Bali Education Program, is a counter-violent extremism education package designed to prevent Australian secondary

³⁶⁵ Matt Cianflone et al., *Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An In-Depth Investigation into the 2002 Bali, Indonesia, Bombings* (Pittsburg: Matthew B. Ridgeway Center for International Security Studies, 2007), 4.

³⁶⁶ Anne Aly, Elizabeth Taylor, and Saul Karnovsky, "Moral Disengagement and Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: An Education Intervention," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 37, no. 4 (2014): 377.

³⁶⁷ Elizabeth Taylor et al., "'Beyond Bali': A Transformative Education Approach for Developing Community Resilience to Violent Extremism," *Asia Pacific Journal of Education* 37, no. 2 (2017): 203, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02188791.2016.1240661>.

school students in educational years eight and nine—approximately ages thirteen to fifteen—from adopting violent extremist ideologies.³⁶⁸

The Beyond Bali project team, led by Aly, consisted of Curtin University educators, local school teachers, representatives from BPPAI, counter-terrorism experts, Bali Bombing victims, and a Muslim youth representative. Together they developed the program's concept and materials in accordance with the Australian Curriculum Framework, Australia's national educational criteria managed by the Australian Curriculum, Assessment, and Reporting Authority.³⁶⁹ The team designed the package for inclusion in both secular and Islamic schools throughout Australia. Aly reports that, as of 2018, the program has been implemented in approximately 400 schools across Australia—although she did not note the total number of Islamic schools that have adopted the program—and the creators have made the entire program package available to download free of charge on the Bali Peace Park website.³⁷⁰

Similar to the CVE education approaches defined in Chapter III, the Beyond Bali Education Program bases its CVE effort within moral disengagement theory, the concept that otherwise moral people commit violent acts in violation of their moral standards.³⁷¹ Developed by psychologist Albert Bandura, the theory describes moral disengagement as a psychological process that degrades one's self-sanctioning mechanisms by construing violent extremism as morally just, dehumanizing the victims, absolving attackers of blame, and disregarding the consequences of their actions.³⁷²

Beyond Bali seeks to prevent violent extremism by teaching students cognitive self-sanctioning skills that help them adhere to their moral code and reject violent extremist

³⁶⁸ Taylor et al., 202.

³⁶⁹ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 377–79.

³⁷⁰ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 382–83. The complete Beyond Bali Education Package is available online at <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>

³⁷¹ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 374.

³⁷² Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Terrorism," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161–91.

narratives.³⁷³ The program blends aspects of the critical thinking and exposure to diversity approaches described in Chapter III as foundations for its CVE methodology. Specifically, according to its published learning outcomes, the program aims to cultivate within students the cognitive skills to critically analyze violent extremism, along with its causes and social consequences from multiple points of view.³⁷⁴ By the end of the program, students should develop empathy for victims of terrorism, contemplate the negative effects of violent extremism, increase self-efficacy as it relates to self-sanctioning, and, ultimately, conclude that violent extremism is unjust and incompatible with the students' preexisting moral values.³⁷⁵

B. THE BEYOND BALI CURRICULUM

To accomplish the program's stated goals, the Beyond Bali curriculum targets the mechanisms for moral disengagement and facilitates critical thought by analyzing moral dilemma stories related to the Bali bombings.³⁷⁶ The program's use of moral dilemmas comes from psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive theory of moral development, which contends that analyzing moral dilemmas can enable students to explore, critically assess, and discuss their moral beliefs with their peers, leading to a reconstruction of assumptions and perspectives that furthers their moral learning.³⁷⁷ The program also offers the Bali Peace Park as a concrete example of a productive communal response to violent extremism and encourages students to think about other individual and collective methods to resist extremism.³⁷⁸ In addition to learning the CVE content, students are expected to develop skills in reading, note-taking, research, and analysis during the course.³⁷⁹

³⁷³ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky.

³⁷⁴ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Resource Module Outlines & Learning Outcomes" (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), 1–2, <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>.

³⁷⁵ Beyond Bali Education Program, 2; Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 377–78.

³⁷⁶ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 377.

³⁷⁷ Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages*, vol. 2, Essays on Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984).

³⁷⁸ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 378.

³⁷⁹ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Resource Module Outlines & Learning Outcomes," 1.

Aly and her team developed five modules designed to expose students to multiple points of view surrounding the implications of terrorism and offer non-violent approaches to problem-solving.³⁸⁰ According to Aly, the modules guide students “through five stages of engagement, empathy, moral reasoning and mindfulness, problem-solving, and creative resolution using the context of the Bali bombings and the Bali peace park.”³⁸¹ Module 1 introduces students to the program and generates interest in the subject through trivia games, photos and videos, and group activities that reveal the religious, cultural, and historical importance of both Indonesia and Australia.³⁸² Additionally, students complete reading and group research activities on Australian history, early Australian contact with Indonesia, and aspects of Hinduism and Islam in both countries to evaluate the significance of Australia’s role in the Asian-Pacific region, which forms the context in which they will study the Bali bombings themselves.³⁸³

Module 2 exposes students to details of the 2002 Bali bombings to explicate the consequences of extremist violence and to build empathy for the victims.³⁸⁴ News reports, video interviews with Australian and Indonesian survivors, and statistics regarding Bali’s tourism trends before and after the bombings present the social and economic impact of the terrorist attacks on Indonesia and Australia.³⁸⁵ Several activities ask students to identify, react to, and discuss their feelings and the feelings of the victims and their families in response to the bombings to build empathy and understanding of the consequences of violent action.³⁸⁶ The module also explores the concepts of peace and conflict through workbooks and group activities designed to discuss how violence creates division and

³⁸⁰ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 379.

³⁸¹ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 379.

³⁸² Beyond Bali Education Program, “Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 1 & 2” (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), 1–3, <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>.

³⁸³ Beyond Bali Education Program, “Beyond Bali Education Resource Module Outlines & Learning Outcomes,” 4.

³⁸⁴ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 378.

³⁸⁵ Beyond Bali Education Program, “Module 2 Resources” (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>.

³⁸⁶ Beyond Bali Education Program, “Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 1 & 2,” 9–12; Beyond Bali Education Program, “Module 2 Resources.”

conflict, while peaceful conflict resolution promotes unity and resilience against that conflict.³⁸⁷ According to Aly, this module forces students to think about their own moral values and requires the use of moral reasoning and critical thinking to analyze the Bali bombings and their aftermath in the context of their moral beliefs.³⁸⁸

Module 3 contains the central learning outcomes for the program. It incorporates moral dilemma scenarios intended to promote critical thinking and collaborative decision-making at different stages of the story, with a focus more on personal reflection and confrontation with competing values rather than on moral reasoning.³⁸⁹ The moral dilemmas revolve around the concepts of violence and revenge by comparing the decisions and values of the bomber, an Australian survivor and his wife, and a Balinese citizen. Students are asked to identify the feelings and justifications for each character's actions, and how they would approach the dilemma if they were in the same situation.³⁹⁰ The teacher then leads the class through a discussion of their findings to draw conclusions regarding the use of violence in achieving one's goals, from the points of view of both terrorism and counterterrorism.³⁹¹ Aly asserts that, in this module, students should be able to articulate their moral views and demonstrate increased self-efficacy in responding to extremism and self-sanctioning against violence.³⁹²

Module 4 outlines how various peace parks and peace activism work to promote peaceful resolutions to conflict and violent extremism.³⁹³ Students are introduced to the idea of a peace park as a safe place for people to memorialize and reflect on a past conflict, resolve conflicts, and build relationships, and how they act as a mechanism for

³⁸⁷ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Resource Module Outlines & Learning Outcomes," 4; Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 1 & 2," 12–22.

³⁸⁸ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 378.

³⁸⁹ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Resource Module Outlines & Learning Outcomes," 4–5.

³⁹⁰ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Module 3 Resources" (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>.

³⁹¹ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 3" (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), 1–5, <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>.

³⁹² Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 378–79.

³⁹³ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 381.

communities to reject violence and bullying.³⁹⁴ Students then conduct research into various peace parks and share their findings with the class. This module aims to reflect the Australian Curriculum Framework objectives of building information and communication technology capability and promoting social awareness and responsibility.³⁹⁵

Module 5 closes with a review of the program and a practical exercise during which the students are encouraged to work with their school, parents, and the local community to build their own peace park or garden.³⁹⁶ This activity is meant to provide the students with an opportunity to act and engages the students in carrying out a practical exercise in peace-building and self-sanctioning against violent extremism.³⁹⁷

In total, the five-module program is designed to integrate into existing school curricula as a thirty-hour elective learning package, and each activity within it is built to adhere to the learning outcomes directed by the Australian Curriculum Framework.³⁹⁸ Module 1 fulfills the Australian Curriculum Framework objectives of promoting collaboration and teamwork, an appreciation for Australia's social and cultural diversity, critical thinking, literacy, and intercultural understanding.³⁹⁹ The Module 2 and 3 goals intend to match the Australian Curriculum Framework objectives of literacy and fluency in learning technology, critical thinking, ethical behavior, and cross-cultural communication.⁴⁰⁰ Module 4 links to the objectives of social awareness, logical reasoning,

³⁹⁴ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Module 4 - Peace Parks Presentation, from Module 4 Resources" (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>.

³⁹⁵ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 4" (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), 1–8, <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>.

³⁹⁶ Total instruction hours are derived from the Beyond Bali Education Kit module instructions and do not include time spent developing a peace park in Module 5. Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Kit" (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>; Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 379.

³⁹⁷ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 379.

³⁹⁸ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 379.

³⁹⁹ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Module 1 Resources" (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>; Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 1 & 2," 1–7.

⁴⁰⁰ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 1 & 2," 7–21; Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 3."

social management and responsibility through cooperation, and inter-cultural understanding.⁴⁰¹ Module 5 also links to critical thinking and ethical decision-making and adds links to Framework objectives regarding active citizenship and commitment to democracy, equity, and justice.⁴⁰²

Despite its links to the Australian Curriculum Framework, the program has faced some difficulties integrating into schools. In their analysis of the program, Ali, Taylor, and Karnovsky expressed hope that linking the lessons to the Australian Curriculum Framework would make the modules acceptable to secondary school teachers expected to give the lessons, but they found evidence to suggest that some elements of the program failed to match the priorities and goals of local school teachers.⁴⁰³ For instance, the project team piloted the program in 2012 at two schools in Perth: a government secondary school and a private Islamic secondary school.⁴⁰⁴ The team administered questionnaires and conducted focus groups with the teachers and students to test the program's effectiveness in promoting moral engagement, the usability of the program package, student interest and engagement, and relevance of the program as part of the school curriculum.⁴⁰⁵ Aly argues that the students and teachers successfully engaged with the program because it aligned with the national curriculum, rather than being a stand-alone course.⁴⁰⁶

According to the results of the program trial, however, the teachers at the public school adapted the program to fit into the political science and philosophy classes they were teaching, and the teachers at the Islamic school reported that they made undisclosed changes to the materials but gave no other feedback on the program.⁴⁰⁷ During interviews with the students, the evaluation team discovered that, because the teachers changed or

⁴⁰¹ Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 4," 1–5.

⁴⁰² Beyond Bali Education Program, "Beyond Bali Education Kit Module 5" (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), 1–7, <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>.

⁴⁰³ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 379.

⁴⁰⁴ Taylor et al., 200.

⁴⁰⁵ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 379.

⁴⁰⁶ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 379.

⁴⁰⁷ Taylor et al., 200–202.

omitted activities, several important aspects of the program were lost, resulting in an overall reduction in the program's impact.⁴⁰⁸

Finally, the research conducted on this program failed to find evidence of additional schools adopting the program after it was made available online or analysis of the program's effectiveness within Australia. Determining the program's success in the selected schools or its overall effect in preventing violent extremism within the Australian community is therefore not possible. Research done by the Australian Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre, outlined in Chapter III, notes that this lack of data collection and analysis is typical of Western CVE educational programs. Notably, Aly received a grant to conduct a longitudinal study of the program starting in 2012, and her analysis is currently ongoing.⁴⁰⁹ Perhaps the results of this and other future evaluative efforts will shed light on the overall efficacy of this program in preventing violent extremism in Australia and whether or not the program might be useful in other countries, specifically Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia.

C. SOCIALIZATION ANALYSIS OF BEYOND BALI

This section uses the analytical framework proposed in Chapter II to evaluate how the Beyond Bali Education Program incorporates the principles of socialization theory—the process of indoctrinating individuals to social norms and standards of the group—when constructing its curriculum goals. According to Hadden and Long, the most important attribute that these socializing agents produce within new members is a sense of commitment, or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so.⁴¹⁰ This theory is significant for studying the Beyond Bali program because it explains how children are ingrained with cognitive and ethical skills that reinforce communal standards of moral behavior, non-violence and conflict resolution. The framework draws on Long's and Hadden's five criteria—showing (demonstrating the values of the group), shaping

⁴⁰⁸ Taylor et al., 201–2.

⁴⁰⁹ Taylor et al., 202.

⁴¹⁰ Long and Hadden, 42–43.

(reinforcing commitment to those social values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new members), certifying (validating commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating members into the group)—to help identify and analyze specific socializing aspects of the Beyond Bali program described above.

The Beyond Bali program offers a strong showing activity by combining aspects of the critical thinking CVE approach and exposure to diversity approach described in Chapter III. The program promotes consideration for diverse points of view, empathy, critical thinking, autonomy, and non-violent conflict resolution by leading students through a study of the Bali bombings using the experiences of both the victims and perpetrators of the attacks, and by exposing them the diverse views of fellow students regarding morality, violence, and conflict resolution. The program also shows the concept of a peace park as a concrete non-violent communal response to violent extremism and encourages students to consider how they can develop similar interventions in their community.

Nonetheless, the showing activity in Beyond Bali displays limitations similar to other critical thinking and exposure to diversity CVE programs. Beyond Bali addresses what the creators identify as a major source of violent extremism—moral disengagement—by condemning violence as a means of addressing grievances but refrains from promoting any one specific set of moral values. Aly states that “moral standards are adopted through the course of socialization and serve as guiding principles for moral conduct,” yet she does not state from where those morals come or what they should be.⁴¹¹ Interestingly, the Module 3 instructions for teachers support teaching moral values in schools but simultaneously condemn teaching any specific set of values to the students.⁴¹² The program instead advocates only to offer “opportunities for students to construct values themselves” and in doing so provide “the basis for values learning without the danger of indoctrination.”⁴¹³ It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that the act of exposing

⁴¹¹ Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky, 374.

⁴¹² Beyond Bali Education Program, “Module 3 for Teachers, from Module 3 Resources” (Bali Peace Park Association Inc., 2012), 3, <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>.

⁴¹³ Beyond Bali Education Program, 3–4.

students to the content of the program and the views of other students who already espouse the desired moral values shows these ideals to some extent.

As with the showing activity, Beyond Bali displays the shaping activity in some modules to reinforce certain skills but, in general, avoids habituating commitment to a specific set of communal values. Examples of shaping within the program include conducting role-playing activities in Modules 2 and 3 and building a peace park in Module 5 to reinforce understanding, critical thinking, and non-violent conflict resolution. Similar to the critical thinking and exposure to diversity CVE education programs in Chapter III, though, Beyond Bali refrains from reinforcing the community's accepted standard of moral behavior. Political scientist Sarah Marsden argues in her analysis of the program that this outlook undermines the purpose and effectiveness of the program by assuming students are already committed to the correct normative values. According to Marsden, there is no guarantee that students will adopt the correct values: a student might determine by the end of the class that his or her beliefs regarding the permissibility of the use of violence in certain circumstances are correct.⁴¹⁴ For example, Marsden claims that many individuals who engage in extremist violence generally believe their actions are moral and virtuous, so they knowingly break from the social norm of non-violence as an act of service and self-sacrifice to accomplish some "greater good through violence."⁴¹⁵ She further concludes that, while the Beyond Bali program shows the dominant Australian norms regarding violence, it falls short of actually committing the students to those norms.⁴¹⁶

Recruiting for the program is understandably lacking due to the fact that students automatically participate in Beyond Bali if their school has incorporated it into the curriculum, but some recruiting activities within the community do occur. For example, Module 5 of the Beyond Bali curriculum helps recruit parents and members of the local community to assist students with building their own peace park or garden, which increases

⁴¹⁴ Sarah Marsden, "Negotiating Difference in Education: Extremism, Political Agency and an Ethics of Care," in *Education and Extremisms: Rethinking Liberal Pedagogies in the Contemporary World*, ed. Farid Panjwani et al. (London; New York: Routledge, 2017).

⁴¹⁵ Marsden.

⁴¹⁶ Marsden.

exposure for the program and its ideals beyond the classroom. Despite these activities within the program, recruiting for follow-on social groups is weak because Beyond Bali does not formally connect students to organizations outside of school, even to the BPPAI, nor does it offer follow-on activities or resources for students after graduation.

Certifying also appears in this program, primarily at the individual level, and relates to a cognitive skill rather than building social confidence within the students and between them and members of the community. Characteristic of the critical thinking approach, Beyond Bali validates the students' ability to apply critical thinking skills to problems and seeks to develop confidence within students to investigate and challenge opposing viewpoints in their communities. Critical to socialization theory, however, it does not seek to build a shared set of values within the students or help them better integrate into Australian society. This lack of social confidence is particularly important within the Islamic schools that administer the Beyond Bali program as they represent a minority group in the country.

As with recruiting, the placing activity within Beyond Bali is somewhat lacking. Placing is accomplished to some extent in Module 5, which creates a gateway to nonviolent activism by involving students in the community by planning a peace park of their own, and, informally, students have the opportunity to continue working towards building and expanding peace parks within the community after graduation if they so choose. The program's limited integration into the community and lack of connections to follow-on organizations ultimately reduces the program's ability to place students into suitable social structures upon completion of the program.

Overall, Beyond Bali displays both strong and weak characteristics as a socializing agent. Table 5 summarizes the five socializing activities of the program.

Table 5. Analysis of Beyond Bali Socializing Activities

Socializing Activity	Description of Activity within Beyond Bali Program
Showing	Strong support for diverse points of view, empathy, critical thinking, autonomy, and non-violent conflict resolution. Offers concrete example through peace parks. Addresses moral disengagement but avoids showing a set of moral values.
Shaping	Strong habituation of individual autonomy skills with limited reinforcement of communal standards of behavior due to lack of showing activity regarding social values. Reinforces existing student values through role-playing and building a peace park.
Recruiting	Lacks formal recruiting activity for the program due to automatic participation as part of the school curriculum and displays limited connections to a community of interest or integration of students into a social structure after graduation.
Certifying	Strong formal validation of individual cognitive skills. Lacks development of social confidence between students and community regarding a shared set of values or integrating into society, especially in Islamic schools.
Placing	Present in Module 5 by involving students, parents, and community in building a peace park, but lacks formal connections to follow-on groups or social structures into which the students can be placed.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter described the background and development of the Beyond Bali Education Program, a CVE education initiative of Curtin University and the Bali Peace Park Association with support from the Australian government. It identified the purpose and objectives of the Beyond Bali program, defined the five modules of the curriculum, and outlined the preliminary results of the program's execution in both secular and Islamic schools in Australia. Finally, the chapter analyzed the socializing activities of Beyond Bali and found that the program displays both strong and weak characteristics as a socializing agent. The curriculum, lessons, and materials are well-designed to meet the goals of the program and display strong showing, shaping, and certifying activities to build individual autonomy within students. Beyond Bali avoids socializing within the students a commitment to a particular set of communal values in favor of promoting cognitive skills

and exposure to diversity to inoculate against violent extremist ideologies. In this way, Beyond Bali is representative of the Western CVE approaches that focus on diversity and critical thinking to combat violent extremism. By combining these approaches and involving the community in building a peace park, the program exhibits a greater socializing ability than if it adhered to only one approach. A lack of published analyses of the program makes measuring its success in countering violent extremism difficult, although the program is relatively young and research into its effectiveness is ongoing.

The next chapter compares the socializing activities of the Salafi schools, Muhammadiyah schools, and the Beyond Bali Education Program, draws overall conclusions from the thesis, gives recommendations for future CVE education programs, and suggests some areas for future research.

VII. CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to investigate how Western governments can use formal education to prevent violent extremist ideologies from taking hold in a community, particularly in Muslim-majority countries. While many CVE experts agree that education is a valuable tool in preventing extremism, exactly what skills, knowledge, and other aspects of education are most effective in countering violent extremism is still a matter of some debate. Consequently, this thesis asked the following question: what is the relationship between formal education and violent extremism? More specifically, under what conditions do formal education prevent or instigate violent extremism? How do variations in aspects of formal education—such as curriculum, chosen learning style, subjects, materials, and pedagogy—affect violent extremism prevention strategies? And to what extent do cultural factors facilitate or inhibit preventative education programs? Finally, how can the United States Government best use formal education programs to prevent violent extremism abroad?

This thesis sought to answer these questions through a controlled case study comparison of three educational programs, including the Salafi school system in Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah School system, also in Indonesia, and the Beyond Bali Education Program in Australia. The thesis used socialization theory to explain how these programs have instilled “commitment,” or the faithful realization of the principles of the group in all actions of its members and their willingness to be held accountable in doing so, within their students. Specifically, this thesis applied a framework based on five socializing activities identified by sociologists Jeffrey Hadden and Theodore Long—showing (demonstrating the values of the group), shaping (reinforcing commitment to those social values), recruiting (identifying and attracting new members), certifying (validating commitment to group values), and placing (incorporating members into the group)—to help identify and analyze specific socializing aspects of the selected educational programs.

The study began in Chapter II with a brief historical context of Western and Islamic views on the purpose of education and its use as a socializing agent. Critically, the chapter illustrated how the origins and history of education both in the West and in the Muslim

world play important roles in shaping modern-day views on how various countries use education to counter violent extremism. Building off of this overview, Chapter II defined socialization theory as the process in which individuals learn the social norms, morals, and skills necessary to operate as productive members of society, and described how education lends itself as a socializing agent. It then proposed a framework based on the five-activity socialization process developed by Long and Hadden to help analyze each case study.

Chapter III surveyed four major Western approaches to counter-violent extremism education: critical thinking skills, exposure to diversity, religious education, and vocational training, as well as the current debate surrounding their effectiveness. It concluded with an analysis of the approaches using the framework from Chapter II to identify how they commit students to specific communal values that contribute to preventing violent extremism. The chapter found that the majority of the CVE approaches feature strong showing activities as part of their educational programs, but that most lack evidence of shaping, recruiting, certifying, or placing activities. While all four programs display at least two strong socializing activities, none displays all five, and each could benefit from further examination into how to better operate as socializing agents to prevent violent extremism.

Chapter IV investigated the development and educational activities of the Salafi school system in Indonesia and how it has used social processes to spread this ultra-conservative form of Islam. It began with a discussion on Salafism in Indonesia and various countries' support of Salafi education, most notably Saudi Arabia. It then outlined the effects Salafi schools have had on Indonesian society, namely the increasing Arabization of the country. The chapter then described the specific ideology, methodology, curriculum, and outreach activities found in the Salafi school network. Finally, the chapter identified how the Salafi school network socializes commitment to specific communal values that advance its socio-religious objectives in Indonesia. It found that these Salafi schools act as strong socializing agents by performing all five socializing activities as outlined in the analytical framework. Although the schools suffer some limitations as socializing agents due to their adversarial tone and exclusivist mentality, they are able to socialize commitment to a closed community that refuses to operate within the secular political system, segregates itself from society, and antagonizes traditional establishments.

Chapter V examined the socializing properties of the Muhammadiyah educational institution in Indonesia, founded by Ahmad Dahlan in 1912. It outlined the organization's history, ideology, development, and relationship with the Indonesian government and described the details of the Muhammadiyah school system itself, including its typical daily activities, curricula, materials, and lessons, as well as its "active learning" model and community service activities that help students internalize the underlying principles of the organization. It then described the effects these schools have had on their students and Indonesian society as a whole. The chapter concluded with an analysis of the socializing activities of the Muhammadiyah school system and found that these schools perform all five socializing activities to instill the values of modernism, nationalism, and tolerance within the student population.

Chapter VI presented a case study of the Beyond Bali Education Program in Australia as a representative example of most current Western CVE education initiatives. The chapter described the background and development of the Beyond Bali Education Program, its purpose, and its five-module curriculum, then summarized the preliminary results of the program's execution in one secular school and one Islamic school in Australia. Lastly, the chapter analyzed the socializing activities of Beyond Bali and found that the program displays both strong and weak characteristics as a socializing agent. This is mainly because Beyond Bali avoids socializing a particular set of communal values by instead focusing on promoting critical thinking and exposure to diversity to inoculate against violent extremist ideologies. Nonetheless, combining multiple CVE approaches and incorporating the communal activity of building a peace park enables the program to perform more socializing activities than if it had utilized only one approach.

A. CASE STUDY COMPARISON

A comparison of the Salafi schools, Muhammadiyah schools, and Beyond Bali Education Program reveals important similarities and differences in how these educational programs implement each of the five socializing activities of showing, shaping, recruiting, certifying, and placing, and how those activities contribute to furthering the programs' objectives. All three educational programs offer a strong showing activity by promoting

the values and standards of behavior of their organizations. Both the Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools perform this by providing simple, highly-curated examples of individuals and activities that represent the organization's values and provide a model for students to emulate in their daily lives. For example, Salafi schools provide a simple and unambiguous understanding of Islam linked to Arab religious authority and offer an idealized version of the Saudi social structure as the definitive example of pious Islamic living. The Muhammadiyah school curriculum regularly infuses lessons with religious passages and stories of national heroes who espoused similar ideals to promote the organization's religious and nationalist narratives and show Muhammadiyah values as congruent with those of the nation. Similarly, Beyond Bali promotes its values through carefully selected stories of the 2002 Bali Bombings and by a peace park as a concrete non-violent communal response to violent extremism.

All three programs also display limitations in their showing activities. The Salafi schools' exclusivist and adversarial mentality reduce their reach into the community. Muhammadiyah sacrifices showing some religious values in order to show the values of tolerance and inclusion with non-Muslims in their communities. Beyond Bali prioritizes individual autonomy over communal values and relies on other socializing agents to provide the moral basis from which students analyze violent extremist ideologies. These limitations may complicate efforts to commit students to program goals.

The shaping activity serves as the fundamental activity that habituates the students' commitment to the desired values and behaviors. Shaping features prominently in both the Salafi and Muhammadiyah curricula to reinforce adherence to the standards of the group. Students develop habits that adhere to the social and religious principles of the schools through their daily routine and classroom studies. Some examples beyond lesson content include learning and using specific languages, wearing distinctive clothing, participating in group events and extra-curricular activities, and conducting outreach into the community, all of which reinforce organizational values and help students internalize commitment to those values. Unlike the Salafi and Muhammadiyah schools, Beyond Bali only displays the shaping activity in some modules to reinforce cognitive skills, but generally refrains from habituating commitment to the community's accepted standard of

moral behavior. This is problematic because, as political scientist Sarah Marsden argues, Beyond Bali assumes students are already committed to the correct normative values, but there is no guarantee that students have or will adopt values that support the program's goal of resisting violent extremism.⁴¹⁷

Recruiting involves identifying and attracting new members to fill particular roles in the group. Both the Muhammadiyah schools and Salafi schools display strong recruiting activity by offering a combination of modern educational facilities, a curriculum structure similar to Indonesian public schools, and commitment to Islamic values to attract Muslim parents and their children. Recruiting also occurs within both school systems by enforcing membership in student groups and by exposing students to alumni, religious leaders, and other associations linked to the schools' parent movements. Nevertheless, the Salafi schools suffer somewhat due to their exclusivist mentality and inflammatory rhetoric, which interferes with recruiting and forces the schools to spend time normalizing their presence in the community. While the Muhammadiyah schools offer the strongest recruiting activity by connecting directly to both the local community and the national Muhammadiyah organization, neither the Salafi schools nor Beyond Bali formally connect students to follow-on organizations after graduation. Finally, recruiting for Beyond Bali is lacking due to the fact that students automatically participate in the program, but the peace park project in Module 5 incorporates parents and members of the local community to increase exposure for the program and its ideals beyond the classroom.

Certifying serves as a quality control measure to gauge the extent of one's commitment to the values of the group and validates their level of social confidence as members of the group. Both the Muhammadiyah schools and Salafi schools offer a strong certifying activity in their curricula through both formal and informal means. Both school systems test students at the end of each grade and monitor student behavior throughout the day to ensure they act in accordance with the social standards set by the school. Certifying also appears in the Beyond Bali program but relates to validating cognitive skills rather than building social confidence within the students and between them and members of the

⁴¹⁷ Marsden.

community. Although Beyond Bali and Muhammadiyah schools both certify their students' ability to analyze and support arguments critically, the Beyond Bali program avoids instilling any single values system while the Muhammadiyah schools link these cognitive skills with the institution's social values to strengthen the students' confidence in those beliefs.

Placing requires situating a new member within the group's social order during and after the socialization process. Placing features strongly within the Muhammadiyah schools but appears somewhat lacking in Salafi schools and the Beyond Bali Education Program. The Muhammadiyah schools and Salafi schools both prepare students to apply to college, particularly universities that subscribe to the same values as their programs. Additionally, both school systems informally connect students to like-minded communities in Indonesia and, in the case of the Salafi schools, the Middle East. Muhammadiyah's real placing strength, however, comes from leveraging a massive alumni community of over 30 million members, many of whom hold positions in government ministries, civil institutions, and private businesses throughout the country. Conversely, the Salafi schools and Beyond Bali seem to have little connection to any specific organizations to which they can connect students after graduation, which may limit their ability to place students into suitable social structures upon completion of the program.

Overall, the Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools display strong evidence for all five socializing activities while the Beyond Bali Education Program displays both strong and weak aspects of showing, shaping, and placing with limited evidence of recruiting and certifying activities.

B. FINDINGS FOR BUILDING AND EVALUATING CVE PROGRAMS

The thesis concludes with four broad findings for developing and evaluating CVE education programs:

First, *an evaluation tool is needed for CVE programs*. Overall, this thesis finds that socialization theory provides a useful framework for analyzing the ability of educational institutions to effect widespread social change, including preventing violent extremist ideologies from taking hold within a community. The socialization model developed by

Hadden and Long is a useful tool for identifying and categorizing the activities of an educational program and how they impact its overall effectiveness. For instance, the success of both the Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools in Indonesia correlate with the strength of their socializing activities. Even though both systems share similar core religious beliefs, they each work towards conflicting national objectives and instill substantially different social values among Indonesian students. Nevertheless, both schools perform all five socializing activities and are able to socialize commitment to their values within students as well as influence Indonesian society in support of their organizational objectives. In contrast, no Western CVE educational program analyzed in this thesis performs all five socialization activities, which may explain, in part, why these programs have met with limited success. Therefore, this socialization framework may help experts expand the currently limited body of analytical research regarding the effectiveness of CVE education programs.

Second, *socialization takes time*. In addition to the five socializing activities, time is an important factor that affects an educational program's socializing capability. As the case studies illustrate, socializing widespread change through education requires a significant amount of time. It has taken the Salafi schools twenty-four years to reach their current level of influence within Indonesian socio-religious structures, and Muhammadiyah schools have attained their significant reach only after more than a century of educating Indonesian youth and promoting the organization's values. These lengthy timelines stand in contrast to the short-term execution typical of many Western CVE education initiatives, including the Beyond Bali Education Program, which seeks to instill lasting commitment to non-violence and resistance to extremism through a single thirty-hour sequence. Such a short-term outlook threatens to undermine the effectiveness of even the most robust CVE education programs, yet this mentality appears entrenched within contemporary CVE thought. For example, in September 2017, Eric Rosand, a former senior counterterrorism and CVE official in the U.S. State Department, identified the difficulty CVE programs face when "politicians demand results in the short term despite the longer-

term nature of CVE efforts.”⁴¹⁸ Interestingly, he then implored U.S. CVE practitioners to follow the lead of Australian and Canadian CVE programs, citing their large CVE budgets and programs “designed to run for one-to-four years” as examples to emulate.⁴¹⁹ Based on the findings of this thesis, however, it seems unlikely that a four-year program will produce a lasting effect in a community when it fails to outlast even a single generation of students in a school.

Third, *money is not the only form of influence*. Notably, the case studies indicate that the Salafi schools and Muhammadiyah schools have enjoyed far more support from their patrons than simply funding. These schools also received consistent ideological and organizational guidance over time to help define and accomplish their goals. Since their founding, the Salafi schools have received consistent support from Saudi Arabia in the form of textbooks, religious judgements—or *fatwas*—and guest instructors that espouse the desired socio-religious values. By providing this type of support, Saudi Arabia has been able to influence Salafi education by controlling and shaping the content of the instruction students receive. The general uniformity in curricula between schools in the Muhammadiyah system is due in part to the consistent ideological guidance from the parent Muhammadiyah organization. Furthermore, the school has cooperated with all of Indonesia’s governments, from the Dutch colonial authority in the early 1900s to both the Old and New Order regimes after Indonesian independence, and finally the modern Indonesian republic since 1998.

The example of the Soviet schools in Chapter II also supports the above points. Starting in 1917, the Soviet Commissariat for Enlightenment spent nearly three decades reshaping the national school system to provide universal education aimed at instilling communist ideals while eradicating the concepts of social classes, the division of labor, and nationalism from the popular mind. According to historian Larry Holmes, the program’s success in instilling communist ideals and support for the Soviet system

⁴¹⁸ Eric Rosand, “When It Comes to CVE, the United States Stands to Learn a Lot from Others. Will It?,” *Lawfare*, September 10, 2017, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-it-comes-cve-united-states-stands-learn-lot-others-will-it>.

⁴¹⁹ Rosand.

amongst the population required cooperation from a range of stakeholders, most importantly the teachers themselves, and the application of vast resources, time, and attention to the endeavor.⁴²⁰ Most CVE education programs, on the other hand, seem to neglect the socializing function of education in favor of its technical utility. This is problematic because, as education experts Henry A. Giroux and Michael Hand warn, the contemporary focus within Western CVE education on abstract learning and cognitive development, instead of on socio-political content such as character development and citizenship education, risks detaching the programs from society and rendering them unable to act as agents of socio-cultural change.

Fourth, *size does not necessarily equal influence*. The case studies also show that an educational program's ability to exert influence over social structures at the national level is not necessarily dependent on the number of schools in the system. It is unsurprising that the Muhammadiyah system, which boasts more than 15,000 schools and 30 million members in all sectors of Indonesian society, has been able to exert significant influence in Indonesia. Conversely, a loose network of only fifty Salafi schools has managed to shift social, political, and religious discourse in the country and contribute to the increasing Arabization and Islamization of Indonesian society. As of 2018, over 400 schools have implemented the Beyond Bali Education Program. Given the success of the smaller Salafi school network, a program the size of Beyond Bali should have sufficient reach, at least, to be able to produce meaningful social change in a target community.

The idea that influence does not require a large number of schools is significant because it means that Western governments do not necessarily need to establish a massive CVE education program to achieve broad effects. Considering this feature, a smaller CVE program can expend less logistical and financial resources and still meet the program objective. Initially restricting a program's size also enables planners to focus on quality over quantity to better ensure the program will produce the desired effects. Finally, this point may even improve assessment by allowing evaluative efforts to focus on a smaller target population to validate results before expanding the program.

⁴²⁰ Holmes, 12–24.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY

Considering the power of socialization to form communal identities and commit members of a group to specific values, this thesis offers three broad recommendations for incorporating socialization into CVE education. First, CVE education practitioners should consider incorporating socialization theory into new plans and applying the theory to analyses of existing CVE education efforts. To accomplish this fully, planners should select and incorporate a specific set of communal values that shape social norms to support the desired end state of the program. Furthermore, CVE practitioners need to focus on shaping the content of a program to reinforce its socializing effect rather than simply teaching abstract knowledge and cognitive skills so that students gain not only the necessary knowledge but also the motivation and commitment to behave in a manner consistent with the goals of the program.

Second, CVE planners and policymakers should consider the time, direction, and resources that CVE education programs need to achieve lasting results. This support should extend beyond providing funds to include teacher education and highly-curated content specifically designed to impart a set of communal values and behavioral expectations that support the objective of the program. Despite the political, logistical, and financial complications involved, planners and policymakers need to consider that CVE programs need to execute for decades, or even indefinitely. In addition to the consistency that a long timeline provides, CVE programs need this time to work because prevention requires persistence and the socialization process restarts with every new generation of students. While a CVE program that lasts only several years may achieve success with current students, future groups of students will not receive the necessary education to build and maintain communal resistance to violent extremism.

Finally, it is important to note that schools are not the only socializing agents exerting influence over students. Families, social groups, religious institutions, and many other organizations all have a socializing effect in the environment. Shaping a CVE program to complement the socio-cultural dynamics, belief systems, social trends, and familial expectations of the target society will reinforce its socializing impact, avoid unnecessary conflicts with other socializing agents, and help secure the program's position

as part of the community's educational tradition. This social integration is particularly important if CVE programs hope to function effectively in the community over a significant period.

Western governments will likely continue to invest considerable resources in CVE programs in their efforts to reduce the spread of terrorism both domestically and internationally. To assist in applying these resources with greater efficiency, this thesis investigated the potential of formal education as a long-term strategy for preventing violent extremism through socialization. The results of this study indicate a correlation between an educational program's socialization activity and its ability to achieve its socio-political objectives, but further research is needed on how and why CVE education programs succeed or fail to confirm whether there is, in fact, a causal relationship between formal education, socialization, and violent extremism. Even so, socialization theory may serve as a powerful tool to assist planners in developing education programs to counter violent extremist ideologies. This theory may also potentially apply to a wide range of other socio-political objectives, and assist in altering undesired social behaviors.

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