

Toward a European Defense System

How the European Union Should Improve Its Planning and Conduct Capacity for the Prevention and Management of Crises

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Abstract: The European Union (EU) needs to improve its capability to plan and conduct comprehensive civil-military measures for the prevention and management of crises. The aim of this article is to propose one possible solution that sees the creation of an integrated structure consisting of two directorates. This new structure would optimize the planning and conduct of EU interventions at the strategic level and support the introduction of a new type of integrated mission, which is a mission where the civil, police, and military components are combined into a single structure. The proposed solutions will form the foundation of a European defense system and will improve the EU's rapid reaction intervention capability.

Keywords: European Union defense, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, European strategy, integrated mission, European External Action Service, EEAS

The added value that the EU can bring to the defense and security sector in comparison to a military alliance such as NATO lies in its capability to deliver a comprehensive action on behalf of 27 European states.

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This is achieved by combining in a synergistic manner the full spectrum of political, economic, and military instruments. In this context, it is important that the policies of the European Commission, the Common Foreign Security Policy, and the Common Security and Defense Policy are fully coherent. This cohesion requires Common Security and Defense Policy interventions characterized by an internal integration between civilian and military components, to be easily inserted into a broader framework that would include the in-theater activities of EU special representatives, the directorates-general of the European Commission, and other organizations and international agencies. This is even more important because the EU is currently conducting civil missions and military operations that are poorly coordinated and sometimes contain different chains of command within the same theater of operations. Furthermore, the integration between civilian and military components is a necessary step toward a comprehensive approach in crisis management.

Presently, there are three significant shortfalls in the existing Common Security and Defense Policy architecture for interventions. First, there is a discontinuity in the command and control structure between the politico-strategic level and the military-strategic level because the EU does not have a permanent headquarters at the operational level. Second, there is a poor integration between the civilian and military component in the political-strategic and strategic structures in Brussels. Third, there is a disconnect between civilian missions and military operations, even though they operate in the same geographical area, both from a point of view of command and control and of the financial mechanisms. These shortfalls considerably weaken the EU's capability to plan and conduct comprehensive civil-military measures for the prevention and management of crises. There are already ongoing debates and initiatives on how to overcome these shortfalls. To this aim, a great opportunity comes from the recently approved security strategy document *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*.¹

Within the context of these shortfalls, initiatives, and opportunities, the aim of this article is to propose one possible solution: the creation of an integrated structure consisting of two directorates. This new structure would optimize the planning and conduct of Common Security and Defense Policy interventions at the strategic level and support the introduction of a new type of integrated mission, which is a mission where the civil, police, and military components are combined into a single structure. The proposed solutions will form the foundation of a European defense system coupled with the improvement of the EU's rapid reaction intervention capability.

The Root of the Problem

Multiple emergencies and rapidly evolving global trends have undermined the EU's role as a security actor with three main implications: instability surrounding the EU, financial crisis and austerity measures that weakened military capabilities and resources, and the rise of new economic and demographic realities that switched the world's economic center of gravity away from Europe.

Despite the fact that the European continent has enjoyed a long period of peace, instability has spread in its neighboring regions, from the Middle East and North Africa region, including the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, through the Caucasus, and up to the eastern boundaries of Europe. Moreover, the evolution in the post-bipolar security environment has led to the development in those areas of various threats that spread across political, social, and economic dimensions and are increasingly interconnected. In particular, these threats range from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to cyber attacks, piracy, the actions of ethnonationalist groups with subversive intentions, and threats to energy and environmental security. Globalization acts as an ideal vehicle for these threats spreading across national borders, blurring the line between internal and external threats. Hybrid warfare also represents a common threat and a source of instability to all European Union member states.

The first blow to the European balance of peace came from the 2014 Russian aggression against Ukraine and its indirect threat to the integrity of EU territorial water and air space. This act of aggression also has reminded Europeans of the specter of a military attack and occupation on European soil. Even if the Ukrainian crisis affected member states in different ways, as it exposed the fragility of the gas supplies, the EU members' reactions were uncoordinated, which suggested that it was a problem only for Eastern and Central Europe.² In the same way, the implosion of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa region and the resulting migration flow appears to be a problem only for the member states in the south, while the threat of terrorist group infiltration within migrants should be a concern for all member states. Consequently, the difference in threat perception and security concerns among member states is preventing the emergence of a common strategic culture and the creation of joint procedures and assets for all EU member states to face crises.

The second implication of the current global scenario that undermined the EU's role as a security actor is the financial crisis and the resulting austerity measures that heavily affected the defense budget in EU member states. The trend of downsizing the military budget started after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. Indeed, the rising costs of new technological weapons and increased skepticism from the public about the role of the military made it difficult for European governments to justify high levels of defense expenditures.³ However,

the recent increasing levels of threats and public concerns allowed the EU member states to increase the defense budgets, even a very modest amount, in line with the austerity measures still governing the economic policy of the EU states. However, these efforts resulted in a series of duplicated capacities, platforms, and systems that are not interoperable. Despite the fact that EU member states have modestly increased their defense budgets, they are investing in military equipment in an inefficient way instead of coordinating strategy and spending.

To make matters worse, the rising powers in the eastern part of the world, especially China, have caused a shift of the world's economic center of gravity away from Europe. Consequently, the percentages of defense expenditures have changed all around the world. The emerging economies in the East are closing the gap and will soon outdo the Western countries in defense expenditures. China has increased its budget by 150 percent during the past decade, with a further rise of 7 percent expected in 2017, while Russia invested 5.4 percent of its gross domestic product on defense last year.⁴ The main consequence of this new assertiveness of the emerging powers will be in terms of more tensions and insecurity. In an increasingly threatening world, it is evident that the EU should enhance its ability to act as a security provider to regain its influence on the world stage. The only way to become a security provider is to act with a unified will and not through the initiative of individual member states.

The rise of EU defense capability will also benefit NATO, considering that of the 28 EU member states, 22 are NATO allies. Indeed, the transatlantic alliance needs the EU to increase its military capability and its will to invest in defense matters. Otherwise, the risk for NATO is to become an alliance of "collective military irrelevance," as pointed out by the former U.S. secretary of defense, Robert M. Gates.⁵

Numerous emergencies in the EU's strategic neighborhood, hybrid security threats, years of uncoordinated cuts in defense spending, and rapidly evolving global trends have all eroded the EU's role as a security actor in a multipolar world. The EU is facing the problem of not having its own military instrument, which would enhance its strategic autonomy and its ability to act as a security provider on the international stage. The need for a defense system is more evident considering the increasingly tense global security environment, characterized by the build-up of troops on the EU's eastern borders, war and terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa region, and increasing militarization around the world.

How the EU Can Optimize the Planning and Conduct of Common Security and Defense Policy Interventions

Within the ongoing debate to overcome the already cited shortfalls in the

Common Security and Defense Policy architecture for interventions and reinforcing the European External Action Service's capability to plan and conduct civil-military measures for the prevention and management of crises, member states are discussing some possible options. This includes the establishment of a permanent operation headquarters at Brussels and the optimization of the already existing Common Security and Defense Policy structures. Meanwhile, the EU has introduced an unprecedented multidimensional approach in the Horn of Africa through a series of measures including:

1. The activation of the operations center with the task of coordinating and supporting the three Common Security and Defense Policy interventions in the area;
2. The nomination of a special representative;
3. The development of a regional strategy (i.e., *A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa*);
4. The establishment of numerous coordination mechanisms including, for example, the Capacity-Building Coordination Platform and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE).

Assumptions and Constraints

For the purpose of this article, it is important to formulate assumptions that are at the base of the proposed solution to optimize the Common Security and Defense Policy conduct and planning capabilities for crisis prevention and management. Furthermore, assumptions in this case are necessary considering the political nature of the EU, and in particular the fact that in the defense field the EU cannot adopt resolutions that are binding for the member states. Therefore, it is assumed that:

1. Member states would not be able to commit additional significant financial and personnel resources in the European External Action Service's planning and conduct capability.
2. EU common security and defense management operations will be of a civil-military nature and will adopt a holistic approach.
3. The current organizational structure of the Common Security and Defense Policy can be changed.

Other than these assumptions, this article considers the following constraints to make the proposed solution as concrete and feasible as possible:

1. The European External Action Service's planning and conduct capability must not duplicate NATO's capability.
2. The structure for the planning and direction of operations must be able to meet the EU's level of ambition.
3. The new structure shall not include any additional personnel, except


for a possible contribution of a maximum of two additional personnel made by each member state.

Proposal

The current EU architecture at the strategic level for crisis management encompasses three main bodies: the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, and EU Military Staff. Furthermore, the EU has at its disposal, in the case of military operations, the decentralized operational headquarters that the EU can activate for a particular intervention (i.e., EU Italian Operational Headquarters—Rome is activated for EU Naval Force, Mediterranean's Operation Sophia).⁶

To optimize its planning and conduct capabilities, the EU should establish a single integrated civil-military structure at the political-strategic level called the Integrated Civilian–Military Directorate and a single integrated civil-military structure at the strategic level called the Missions and Operations Directorate. These two structures could be created by using the resources readily available in the existing Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, and EU Military Staff. They could be augmented by other personnel drawn from the five national framework operational headquarters, together with a minimum contribution (one or two people) from the member states. The functions performed by the existing structures (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, EU Military Staff, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, operations center, and operation headquarters) should be reallocated to the two new directorates according to criteria that optimize output rather than the retention of current competencies. Indeed, the EU needs integrated structures that are able to develop comprehensive plans for crisis prevention and management, rather than multiple entities, each of which is in charge of a single aspect that is not coordinated with others. These resulting structures, physically located in Brussels, would facilitate every possible interaction and synergy among themselves and with other EU bodies. The strictly functional support to the EU Military Committee would continue to be guaranteed by EU Military Staff of about 20 personnel.⁷

At the political-strategic level, the Integrated Civilian–Military Directorate (figure 1) would be responsible for the management and planning of the interventions in crisis areas. Therefore, the conduct of the advance and crisis response planning would fall under the responsibility of the Integrated Civilian–Military Directorate. This would include the development of the crisis management concept, the military/civilian strategic options, and the Initial Military Directive. This new integrated structure would be able to improve relationships and synergies with other European Union External Action Service bodies (geographic desks for each area, delegations around the world, etc.),

Figure 1. Proposed organizational chart for the Integrated Civilian–Military Directorate (ICMD)


Source: courtesy of the author, adapted by MCUP.

relevant directorates-general of the European Commission, and the member states (through the Political and Security Committee) to implement effective coordination of all available instruments.

At the civil-military strategic level, the Missions and Operations Directorate (figure 2) would exercise command and control of military operations and civilian missions. Strategic planning and conduct would fall, therefore, within the Missions and Operations Directorate's remit (figure 3). The Missions and Operations Directorate director would, therefore, be the “commander” of the all the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy interventions under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the authority of the high representative. The directorate would use integrated planning and conduct teams, drawing on the resources of all three of its divisions/offices, in order to meet the demands of each individual mission/operation.


At the operational level, the new structure introduces the possibility of undertaking a new type of Common Security and Defense Policy intervention to be financed with a single funding stream. Consequently, all components (civilian and military) operating in a defined area are placed under the command of a single head of mission. In the initial phase of planning and initiating a mission

Figure 2. Proposed organizational chart for the Missions and Operations Directorate



Source: courtesy of the author, adapted by MCUP.

Figure 3. Planning process within the EU Institutions according to the “Crisis Management Concept,” integrating the new structures



Source: courtesy of the author, adapted by MCUP.

or operation, the head of mission/force commander would be supported by a team of planners, both civilian and military. The Missions and Operations Directorate would temporarily detach this team, thus allowing the head of mission/force commander to develop their own planning documents in full compliance with the concept of operations and the operation plan produced at the strategic level.

Consequences

It should be noted that one of the consequences of this reorganization is that the standby EU Battlegroups would be under the direct control of the Missions and Operations Directorate. This would generate substantial savings by avoiding the activation of two different operational headquarters every six months and the related agreements that currently have to be developed for each successive EU Battlegroups. Furthermore, it would markedly increase the degree of EU Battlegroup standardization in the preparation and validation phases. Another consequence would be eliminating the need for ad hoc organizations in Brussels, such as the current operations center, to support planning and coordination. These tasks would be fulfilled by the Missions and Operations Directorate with its integrated planning and conduct teams.

Finally, the need to have, for solely military interventions, an operational headquarters as a command and control structure at the strategic level would be greatly reduced. In particular, the EU would limit the activation of an operational headquarters to very complex and/or high-intensity interventions for which the European countries would opt for an application of the Berlin Plus agreements and would use the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe as operational headquarters (as for the most recent case for the operation ALTHEA).

Financially, the implementation of the proposal would present limited transitional costs, primarily involving the expansion of the Missions and Operations Directorate Communication and Information System component by utilizing facilities already available at the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and the European Union Military Staff Operations Centre/Watch Keeping Capability. Thus, it is fundamental to understand that the Missions and Operations Directorate would be configured as a civil-military integrated center for the direction of military operations, civil missions, and integrated missions. Therefore, at least initially, it would need Communication and Information System capabilities to be able to perform the aforementioned function. In evaluating the cost-effectiveness of this proposal, all those costs related to initiatives that would be carried out to fill the European Union External Action's current capability gaps should not be included (e.g.,

the enhancing of mission planning capabilities and the creation of a protected computer network).

Intermediate Steps

The Common Security and Defense Policy has demonstrated a lack of some of the necessary capabilities in terms of planning and conducting interventions, especially for nonexecutive military missions (training, advising, monitoring, mentoring, etc.). Indeed, the mission commander lacks the necessary support for the conduct of military planning at the strategic level, which is normally carried out by the operational headquarters for executive military operations. Therefore, they must assume all responsibilities at both strategic and operational levels. This forces the mission commander to go back and forth between the theater and Brussels, while their physical presence is crucial to exercising command and to providing the necessary coordination and interaction with third parties within the theater of operations, not to mention the increased workload. The EU, to develop its ambition of a wider comprehensive approach, should progress toward an increased synergy among civilian activities and military operations. This could be delivered by a more integrated civilian-military structure and synchronization at the strategic level in terms of Common Security and Defense Policy structures.

In the short to medium term (two to five years), with the aim of optimizing the planning and conduct of nonexecutive military missions and the ongoing discussion of the future of the activated operations center, a possible avenue to overcome the Common Security and Defense Policy's shortfalls could be strengthening the role of the European Union Military Staff. In particular, the European Union Military Staff could take over the responsibilities of the military commander for the conduct of military planning of nonexecutive missions at the strategic level and the functions of the activated operations center, while retaining its current tasks. In this perspective, the resources of the activated operations center would be absorbed by the European Union Military Staff. In such an approach, the European Union Military Staff, whose title could be European Union Military Staff plus, would be capable of planning and conducting nonexecutive military missions and would continue to provide added value to existing Common Security and Defense Policy activities in the Horn of Africa in terms of coordination support.⁸

In the long term (5–10 years), we could envision bringing together homogeneous EU interventions to external conflicts and crises (in the field of security sector reform) in one single command and control structure (that we could call "Civ-Mil Missions Directorate") for the planning and conduct of both nonexecutive military and civilian missions. The aim would be to deliver the vision of a greater synergy between civilian and military activities and to

consider the likelihood of a growing trend toward capacity-building activities. In such a view, the new structure would absorb the functions and recourses of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and a portion of the so-called European Union Military Staff plus to be capable of planning and conducting all Common Security and Defense Policy missions (civilian and nonexecutive military). In this perspective, the European Union Military Staff would resume current duties and provide coordination for Common Security and Defense Policy activities that exist in the same geographical area.

Considerations

The so-called European Union Military Staff plus would constitute a permanent structure in Brussels, for the planning and conduct of an increasing number of military missions with nonexecutive mandates. This includes the early stage of the planning, pending the nomination of the military commander, as well as the force generation process. In addition, it preserves the added-value functions currently provided by the activated operations center.

The proposed avenues draw upon existing resources—in relation to the desired output—and neither changes the way the EU develops executive military operations, nor does it duplicate existing international organizations in the area of security, such as NATO. As far as human resources are concerned—if deemed necessary—manpower could be strengthened by seconded national experts provided on a voluntary basis by the member states. In addition, the long-term vision would improve the civilian-military cooperation and interaction. Indeed, the new structure (the Civ-Mil Missions Directorate) would optimize the planning and conduct of civilian missions that include military components, promoting the pursuit of a wider comprehensive approach. Lastly, as an added value in such an approach—since homogeneous EU crisis responses, in the field of security sector reform (both civilian and nonexecutive military missions), would be brought together under a single structure—it would be possible to finance those military missions with nonexecutive mandates and all civilian missions through the same funding mechanism, scaled accordingly.⁹

Improvement of the Common Security and Defense Policy Rapid Reaction Intervention Capacity

During the last three years, the EU's institutions have been trying to find and propose potential solutions aimed at improving the EU Battlegroup institution. Among recent proposals, for example, was the possibility for member states to contribute to the EU Battlegroup's forces list with niche capabilities by a modular approach (organic units, even small ones) or by a proportional number of units depending on if they are a framework nation (responsible for the command of the EU Battlegroup) or only a contributing nation. However, all these


proposals are not in themselves capable of resolving the current constraints that impact the use of the EU Battlegroup and the member states' contributions to it. These shortfalls were recently demonstrated at the outbreak of the crisis in the Sahel, which culminated with the launch of the military operation European Union Training Mission in Mali, where the EU Battlegroup was not and could not be used. For this reason, it is believed that it is necessary to improve the current rapid reaction intervention capacity to increase flexibility and effectiveness.

The reason for the lack of political will that affects the usability of the EU Battlegroup has to be identified in the planning horizon of the EU Battlegroup, which is about five years, in accordance with the current concept.¹⁰ This means that member states who commit today would not be eager to deploy their forces within five years to address a situation of crisis, especially if they do not have specific concerns over that crisis. For these reasons, it is necessary to seek a solution aimed at complementing the current planning horizon framework with other options and, to do this, it is necessary to amend the EU Battlegroup concept.

A potential solution consists of differentiating the nature of the European rapid reaction formations and amending, accordingly, the EU Battlegroup concept, transforming it into a wider rapid reaction intervention capability concept. To this end, on the one hand, the current EU Battlegroup must evolve into a joint military rapid reaction formation, which has the necessary capabilities to establish efficient and reliable links with civilian actors in the field and that can be used effectively across the whole spectrum of its potential tasks to increase its deployability. On the other hand, there should be introduced, under the same (but expanded) concept, Joint European Expeditionary High-Readiness Task Forces to react to specific threats and potential emergencies.

At any time, at least one EU Battlegroup should be kept in standby status under the protocols of the current EU Battlegroup concept (i.e., as a rapid reaction force to deal with immediate and unpredictable crises while promoting military transformation and integration among all member states). The effectiveness of this EU Battlegroup could be improved by leveraging the concepts of framework nations and modular employment and also through the inclusion of military niche capabilities and a civil outreach capacity. A Joint European Expeditionary High-Readiness Task Force (JEUTF), however, could be swiftly created and tailored to the specific requirements of an emerging crisis. This Joint European Expeditionary High-Readiness Task Force will not be generated in line with the existing force generation process planning horizon for the EU Battlegroup but would be established when necessary even with a short notice, and its standby period of up to twelve months would be determined by contributing nations (figure 4).

Figure 4. Current and proposed EU Battlegroup planning horizon



Source: courtesy of the author, adapted by MCUP.

Such a JEUTF could be formed, on a volunteer basis, by groups of member states with shared concerns over a developing crisis when the EU deems it necessary to be prepared to address a specific potential crisis. The establishment of a Joint European Expeditionary High-Readiness Task Force could positively influence the situation in the field well in advance of the actual development of the crisis by highlighting the concrete commitment of the EU to a rapid intervention if needed. In addition, these JEUTFs could be used, with a predefined set of assumptions, as an “entry force,” an “over the horizon force,” for humanitarian assistance missions, or for training and advisory missions. Accordingly, Joint European Expeditionary High-Readiness Task Forces would provide an immediate intervention capability for specific threats or emergencies, which would take longer to obtain through the standard force generation process and is not guaranteed by a traditional EU Battlegroup in standby.

This solution would be even more effective if, during their standby period, the battle groups/task forces were to be placed directly under the control of a Common Security and Defense Policy structure in Brussels with strategic responsibility for the planning and conduct of preparation and employment. To facilitate a more equal burden share between the member states it would

also be necessary to identify new funding mechanisms for the EU Battlegroup and the Joint European Expeditionary High-Readiness Task Force, foreseeing reimbursement broader than that currently provided by the Athena mechanism.¹¹

Pooling and Sharing for Operations: A Pragmatic Common Security and Defense Policy Approach

Future Common Security and Defense Policy operations should be approached in a more pragmatic way to maximize operational results, to reduce the individual burden of member states, and to share responsibilities among those member states who are willing to take part in the operation.

At the outbreak of a crisis, a multinational EU force could be swiftly created and tailored to the specific requirements of the emerging crisis itself. This multinational force would be established when necessary, even on short notice, following a specific initiative of a framework nation when the EU deems it necessary to be prepared to address the crisis. Such a force could be formed, on a volunteer basis, by groups of other member states with shared concerns over the developing crisis. The prompt establishment of this force could positively influence the situation in the field by highlighting the concrete commitment of the EU to a rapid intervention. The framework nation could volunteer to address a specific crisis on the basis of the will and the capacity to act, in relation to the proximity of the crisis area (reducing deployment/redeployment related costs), and specific knowledge of the region and environment. Other nations could join the operation by offering a specific package of forces or capacities (e.g., intelligence-surveillance-target-acquisition-reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets; logistics; strategic airlift/air-to-air refueling (AAR); intelligence; staff personnel; and C4I—command, control, communication, computer, and information) in a sort of pooling and sharing procedure tailored to operations. In shaping the command and control structure, the particular interest of the framework nation should be addressed as the main factor. The strategic direction and political control of this type of operation would be exercised by the Political and Security Committee.

In this context, it would be effective to make better use of existing multinational initiatives at the European level, such as the Multinational Land Force, the Weimar Battlegroup, the Visegrad Battlegroup, and the Nordic Battlegroup, just to mention the main ones.¹² Member states involved in these initiatives could act as a “framework nation”—actually a group of nations—able to pool military assets and share responsibilities, ready to address a specific crisis on behalf of the European Union. This includes also, in a comprehensive way, more politically oriented initiatives, such as the 5+5 Defense Initiative for

enhancing military/civilian coordination within the Mediterranean theater.¹³ The 5+5 Defense Initiative brings together five countries on the southern side of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) and five countries on the northern side (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain).

The overall objective of this approach is to promote the execution of military operations in a sustainable, prompt, and effective way, enabling European nations to substantially contribute to international security and thereby to the EU's role as a global security actor. The underlying idea of this article is that those nations that have a broad capability spectrum and have specific concerns over a given crisis could act as framework nations to provide an operational framework for cooperation with other concerned EU partners.

Conclusions

The president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has recently stressed in his 2017 State of the Union speech the need for “a Europe that protects, a Europe that empowers, a Europe that defends.”¹⁴ The president is definitively calling for the EU member states to take greater responsibility for the security of European citizens. The security and protection from internal and external threats will be possible through the development of key defense capabilities able to deter, respond, and protect. The acquisition of such capabilities, and more generally of a defense system, will require an adequate superstructure able to employ them.

The proposed organizational changes to improve the planning and conduct of Common Security and Defense Policy interventions will allow the EU to better manage its commitment in crisis prevention and management, thus increasing its role as a global security actor. Furthermore, the proposed changes are optimized for the conduct of missions in which the military component is integrated with civil and police components into a single mission. The new organization will still retain an ability to separate the management of civilian missions and military operations while also providing an integrated component for managing aspects that are common to both types of intervention. Furthermore, it is optimized for the type of military operations provided by the Lisbon Treaty. In respect to the direction of missions and operations, it combines civilian capabilities with an appropriate structure to ensure delivery of all the functions needed to plan and conduct military operations (J1-J9).¹⁵ In addition, this will facilitate linkages between all EU organizations involved in crisis prevention and management to achieve a fully multilateral response capability.

Together with the improvement of the EU's rapid reaction capability, the proposed reorganization would allow for better sharing of resources and for more equitable burden sharing between EU countries, requiring the partici-

pation of all countries in the direction of operations/missions. Both proposals would also avoid any duplication of already existing international structures in the area of security, providing the EU with an efficient structure that complements both NATO and the UN in the sectors of peace and security.

Notes

1. *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* (Brussels: European External Action Service, 2016).
2. "EUROSTAT Statistics Explained," EUROSTAT, 20 July 2017. European countries import the bulk of natural gases for their consumption. The main exporters of natural gases in Europe are Norway (29 percent), Russia (18.3 percent), and Ukraine (17.1 percent). It is obvious that a crisis among the second and third major exporters had severe repercussions for European countries, especially in terms of rising costs.
3. Other than economic reasons, it was a political choice of the EU member states to turn to the so-called soft power as the principal means of EU foreign policy, as explained masterfully in Nick Witney, *How to Stop the Demilitarisation of Europe?*, ECFR Policy Brief no. 40 (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011).
4. *Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence* (Brussels: European Commission, 2017).
5. U.S. secretary of defense Robert M. Gates, "The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO)" (speech, Brussels, Belgium, 10 June 2011).
6. Currently, five EU operational headquarters exist within national frameworks in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the UK (future availability will depend on the agreement about Brexit), in addition to SHAPE as envisaged with Berlin Plus agreements and the EU's Operation Centre located in the EU Military Staff in Brussels.
7. The European Union Military Committee is the highest military body within the European Council. It provides military advice and recommendations to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), as well as military direction to the EU Military Staff.
8. And/or other geographical areas where there are more than one Common Security and Defense Policy missions or operations active, following the ongoing discussion about the future of the activated operations center.
9. Eva Gross, *Assessing the EU's Approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR)* (Brussels: European Union, 2013). This study explains that "SSR activities are key for stabilizing fragile and post-conflict states through their emphasis on training, institutional reform and governance."
10. This time horizon refers to the contribution of individual member states to the EU Battlegroup, meaning that at each Force Generation Conference they have to establish their own contribution for the next five years.
11. Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP of 14 May 2007 established a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or defense implications (Athena).
12. The multinational land force is a multinational formation including Hungary and Slovenia. It is constituted on the base of the Italian "Julia" Alpine Brigade, integrated by a battalion for each nation. It receives orders by a military-political committee of three nations. The multinational land force can be employed by one of the following international organizations: NATO, UN, EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). "Multinational Land Force," Ministry of Defence, Italian Army. The Weimar Battlegroup is a multinational EU Battlegroup under Polish leadership, in which Germany and France also participate as members of the Weimar Triangle. See Marcel Dickow et al., *Weimar Defence Cooperation—Projects to Respond to the European Imperative*, FG03-WP No 6 (Berlin: German Institute for International Security and Affairs, 2011). The Visegrád Battlegroup or V4 EU Battlegroup is an EU Battlegroup led by Poland, in which the other Visegrád Group countries—the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary—participate. For the Visegrád Group, see Wojciech

- Lorenz, “EU Battle Group: A Chance for a Breakthrough in Visegrad 4 Cooperation,” *Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin* 39, no. 492 (16 April 2013). The Nordic Battlegroup is a multinational EU Battlegroup led by Sweden with contingents from Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway. See Jan Joel Andersson, “If Not Now, When?: The Nordic EU Battlegroup,” *Issue Alert*, no. 11 (February 2015).
13. The “5+5 Defence Initiative” is the defense part of the “5+5 Dialogue,” which brings together five countries on the southern side of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) and five countries on the northern side (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain).
 14. “President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017” (speech, Brussels, Belgium, 13 September 2017).
 15. The “J” stands for “Joint” and it refers to the kind of organization, while the numbers from 1 to 9 are associated with different military branches (J1 is the personnel branch, J2 intelligence, J3 operations, J4 logistic, J5 plans, J6 communications, J7 training, J8 administration, J9 civil-military cooperation).