



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**THE RISE OF TERRORISM IN MALI: A REVIEW OF  
THE HISTORICAL CAUSES AND THE FAILURES OF  
BOTH MALIAN AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS.**

by

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December 2018

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**THE RISE OF TERRORISM IN MALI: A REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL  
CAUSES AND THE FAILURES OF BOTH MALIAN AND INTERNATIONAL  
EFFORTS.**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Since the 1960s, Mali has faced several insurgencies from groups seeking more autonomy, particularly in the northern parts of the country. Each insurgency has been marked by regional, ethnic, religious, and racial divisions, leading to the formation and subsequent disintegration of short-lived alliances that have made negotiations between Malian insurgent groups and the government complex. Although leadership pursued negotiations, the resulting agreements never became a lasting solution. Most recently, in 2012, insurgent and jihadist groups in the north unified and sparked an unprecedented crisis that has spilled into central Mali. The crisis pushed the French to intervene with Chadian troops, at the request of Mali's government, which also requested a European Union training mission to improve the capacity of the Malian security forces. Furthermore, the United Nations authorized an African-led mission, which soon became a UN-led mission, to resolve the conflict. All these initiatives, however, have failed to bring peace. Based on a review of scholarly research and relevant documents, including the peace agreements that followed the prior crises in Mali, this thesis analyzes the underlying causes of the ongoing violence and the factors that have contributed to the failure of the resolution efforts. The thesis builds on those findings to recommend ways in which the government of Mali and international partners can avoid such missteps going forward.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

|         |                                                              |
|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| ADC     | Alliance for Democracy and Change                            |
| ADIN    | Agency for the Northern Integrated Development               |
| AFISMA  | African-Led International Support Mission                    |
| AND     | Agency for Northern Development                              |
| ANICT   | National Agency for Investment in Territorial Collectivities |
| AQIM    | Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb                                  |
| AU      | African Union                                                |
| CMA     | Coordination of Azawad Movements                             |
| CMMFPR2 | Coordination of Patriotic Movements of Resistance            |
| CPA     | Coalition of Azawad People                                   |
| DDR     | Disarmament Demobilization and Reinsertion                   |
| DGSE    | General Directorate for State Security                       |
| ECOWAS  | Economic Community of West African States                    |
| EU      | European Union                                               |
| EUCAP   | European Union capacity Building Mission                     |
| EUEAS   | European Union External Action Service                       |
| EUTM    | European Union Training Mission in Mali                      |
| FIA     | Islamic Front of Azawad                                      |
| FLM     | Macina Liberation Front                                      |
| GATIA   | Tuareg, Imaghad, and Allies Self-defense Group               |
| GIA     | Armed Islamic Group                                          |
| GSIM    | Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims                   |
| GSPC    | Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat                      |
| HCUA    | High Council for the Uniqueness of Azawad                    |
| IED     | Improvised Explosive Device                                  |
| ISGS    | Islamic State in the Greater Sahara                          |
| MAA     | Arab Movement of Azawad                                      |
| MAF     | Malian Armed Forces                                          |
| MFUA    | Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad                       |
| MIA     | Islamic Movement of Azawad Ansar Dine Defenders of the Faith |

|         |                                                                                       |
|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| MINUSMA | United Nations Multidimensional Mission for the Stabilization of Mali                 |
| MNLA    | National Movement of the Azawad Liberation                                            |
| MPA     | Popular Movement of Azawad                                                            |
| MSA     | Azawad Salvation Movement                                                             |
| MUJAO   | Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa                                           |
| NGO     | Non-Governmental Organization                                                         |
| PAREM   | Program to Support the Socio-economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Northern Mali |
| PSPSDN  | Special Program for Peace and Development in Northern Mali                            |
| PURDN   | Emergency Program for the Revival of the Development of Northern Regions of Mali      |
| U.S.    | United States                                                                         |
| UNHCR   | United Nations High Commission for Refugees                                           |
| UNSC    | United Nations Security Council                                                       |

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## I. BACKGROUND

West Africa suffered many internal conflicts from the early 1990s until the mid-2000s: civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, rebellion in Mali and Niger, the dictatorial regime in Gambia, Senegal with its rebellion in Casamance dating to the early 1980s, and Nigeria fighting against Niger Delta insurgents and Muslim revolts in the north. Furthermore, around 2000, one of the most stable countries, Cote d'Ivoire, was divided by ethnic conflict between the north and south of the country. This militancy, coupled with Islamic militancy in Algeria, eventually contributed to the growing crisis in Mali.

All these conflicts became incubators of future Islamic militancy or insurgency. According to James Gow and Funmi Olonisakin, decades of conflict and instability in 1990 and after facilitated different kinds of insecurities within and across borders in West Africa.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, insecurity and high poverty led communities to seek satisfaction through their faiths. Islamic leaders without significant knowledge of Islam began teaching and literally interpreting the Quran as the vanguard against societal problems.

Within the region, most of the conflicts are linked to the population's dissatisfaction with their governments. The high level of corruption among the elites forced ordinary citizens to claim their rights. As explained by Abdullah Bin Khaled al-Saud and James Gow, the main conditions for grievances are the notion of dispossession, the feeling that some parts of the population are excluded and deprived of some important aspects of social, economic, and political life of the country.<sup>2</sup> Economic deprivation has been the key driver of youth dissatisfaction, coupled with high levels of corruption in most of the West Africa states.

Mali, in particular, is known to be among the most corrupt in the world. According to Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, Mali is ranked 122nd of

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<sup>1</sup> James Gow and Funmi Olonisakin, *Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Religion Politics and Radicalization* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 2, <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781135968502>.

<sup>2</sup> Abdullah Bin Khaled al-Saud and James Gow, "Religion, Radicalisation and Violence," in *Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Religion, Politics and Radicalization*, eds. James Gow, Funmi Olonisakin and Ernst Dijkhoorn (New York: Routledge, 2013), 20.

180 countries.<sup>3</sup> This figure suggests the possible level of the people's disaffection and discontentment with their leaders. These grievances may lead to insurrection in Mali, a situation that has plagued the country several times since independence.

As illustrated by insurgencies in Mali, Islamic militancy follows different patterns. After Mali's independence, the Tuareg, who consist of many insurgent groups, launched successive insurrections against the central government from 1960 to 1963, 1988 to 1996, 2006 to 2008, and 2012 to today. These ethnic insurgents were seeking development prospects. Around 2000, Algerian security forces began inflicting more casualties on the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Under the pressure of their government, Islamic militant groups started shifting to northern Mali, and today the militant Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb is an offshoot of GSPC. As described by Jeremy Keenan, Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb settled in the Sahel in two distinct phases: the first phase began in 2002 and the second in 2006.<sup>4</sup>

Terrorist groups' successes against legitimate governments, and the possible expansion of such groups in the region and beyond, forced the international community to intervene in Mali. In Mali, the government requested France's intervention when the coalition of insurgents and terrorists decided to stretch their conquest to the southern part of the country.

In 2011, the National Movement of the Azawad Liberation (MNLA) gained momentum, and its leaders requested independence for the three northern regions of Mali (Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal).<sup>5</sup> On January 17, 2012, the MNLA launched their first attack against Malian troops. That was followed by many successful attacks against Malian troops because the MNLA made a quick alliance with Ancar-Dine, which is a jihadist

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<sup>3</sup> Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2017," [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org), accessed November 8, 2018, [https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2017](https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017).

<sup>4</sup> Jeremy H. Keenan, "Al-Qaeda in the West for the West," *Social Justice* 37 (n.d.): 29, doi:10.2307/j.ctt183pb7z.19.

<sup>5</sup> "Focus Mali: Situation Securitaire [Focus Mali: Security Situation]," Staatssekretariat Für Migration, 7, last modified September 2015, <https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/internationales/herkunftslander/afrika/mli/MLI-sicherheitslage-2015-f.pdf>.

group, and pledged the application of Islamic law.<sup>6</sup> These successes created a mutiny within the armed forces of Mali, which resulted in a coup d'état against an elected government because the mutineers were dissatisfied with the armed forces' inability to counter insurgent groups. This chaos facilitated different movements' efforts to take full control of the three regions on April 5, 2012,<sup>7</sup> and under international pressure, soldiers were obliged to hand over power to an interim government. Thereafter, the MNLA was overrun by jihadist groups, which were financially and militarily powerful. These groups included Ancar Dine (supporters of faith), Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).<sup>8</sup>

## **A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This thesis aims to investigate the following questions: First, why, after five years of international efforts in Mali, does the crisis of Islamic militancy and insurgency still exist? Second, is the right combination of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tools being used?

## **B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION**

This thesis is relevant to the current multidimensional crisis in Mali. Both the Malian government and the international community have been engaged in counter-insurgency operations for the past five years, beginning with the French intervention in 2013, followed by an Africa-led mission, and the Multidimensional United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Mali. Moreover, a new regional operation called the Sahel G5 is in the implementation process. The member states for this operation are Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad.

This thesis argues that all of these factors are interconnected, and an understanding of historical factors that contribute to the different insurrections in Mali will assist in making sense of the government of Mali's inability to find the right answers to mitigate

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<sup>6</sup> "Focus Mali: Situation Securitaire [Focus Mali: Security Situation]," 8.

<sup>7</sup> "Focus Mali," 8.

<sup>8</sup> "Focus Mali," 8.

the current crisis and prevent recurrent conflicts. Finding ways to analyze and understand the failure of different agreements to address the root causes of these crises could facilitate policy makers, governments, and the international community in shifting their strategies from hard power to soft power. Moreover, this thesis can assist policy makers in their future decision-making in West Africa and in the West.

## **C. LITERATURE REVIEW**

Since 2013, many military initiatives have been taken to assist Mali in recovering its sovereignty and end the cycle of insurgencies. Nevertheless, after five years of interventions and capacity building of the armed forces, insecurity is still growing. The crisis has expanded from the north to the center of the country. At the same time, a substantial part of the population has lived in abject poverty since the country's independence in 1960. The democratization process started in early 1990 only increased the poverty gap between rural and urban areas. Moreover, according to Stephen A. Harmon, corruption started in the early age of Malian democracy and has worsened more under democratic regimes than under dictatorship.<sup>9</sup> The urban people who are the elites are highly corrupt and are the main beneficiaries of the wealth. Against this backdrop, Mali is living in the most important crisis of its history. A multi-dimensional crisis has stricken Mali, which includes local insurgents, internal and external Islamic groups, and other bandits who are looking for a better standard of living.

### **1. International Military Interventions in Mali**

The Malian transitional government requested assistance from France when terrorists and independents' groups' attacked in southern Mali. The first operation, called Serval, was conducted by French and Chadian troops to repel the invading terrorist organizations in 2013. After Serval, several other operations have been launched in Mali. The French government transformed Operation Serval to Operation Barkhane on August

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<sup>9</sup> Stephen A Harmon, *Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region Corruption, Contraband, Jihad and the Mali War of 2012–2013* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 77.

1, 2014, with approximately 3,000 soldiers, which included French troops in partnership with Mauritania, Mali, Niger Republic, Chad, and Burkina Faso.<sup>10</sup>

Prior to the French operation in northern Mali, a regionally led mission was authorized by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 on December 20, 2012, with the name Africa-led International Support Mission (AFISMA).<sup>11</sup> The capacity of Africa-led forces to prepare Malian troops forces, however, was questionable. AFISMA had a mission to prepare Mali security forces to engage operations against jihadists.<sup>12</sup> The international community was doubtful about the readiness and commitment of these forces, and the probable human rights violations that would result from the operations.<sup>13</sup> The UN secretary general's special envoy on the Sahel Romano Prodi and other experts believed that AFISMA was going to take a year or more to deploy in Mali because West African countries lack logistics and combat capacity, have language barriers, and lack of common standard in operations to fulfill their counterinsurgency task in the Sahara.<sup>14</sup>

The United Nations Multidimensional Mission for the Stabilization of Mali (MINUSMA) was created in April 2013.<sup>15</sup> Since 2014, the UN mission included in their tasks as a priority the security and protection of civil populations.<sup>16</sup> As of April 2018, MINUSMA has 11,684 contingent troops, 448 staff officers, and 1,744 police officers.<sup>17</sup>

In 2014, yet another organization called the Sahel G5 was created by five countries in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania.<sup>18</sup> These states are Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad,

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<sup>10</sup>“Focus Mali,” 8.

<sup>11</sup>Alexis Arieff, “Crisis in Mali,” *Current Politics and Economics of Africa* 6, no. 1 (2013): 28.

<sup>12</sup> Arieff, “Crisis in Mali,” 28.

<sup>13</sup> Arieff, 28.

<sup>14</sup> Arieff, 39.

<sup>15</sup>“Focus Mali,” 10.

<sup>16</sup>“Focus Mali,” 10.

<sup>17</sup> “MINUSMA,” United Nations Peacekeeping, last modified 2013, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>.

<sup>18</sup> Hugo Sada, “What Future for the G5?,” Foundation for Strategic Research, March 2017, xx, <https://www.frstrategie.org/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/quel-avenir-pour-le-g5->.

and Burkina, and the organization has the goal of fighting terrorism, criminality, illegal trafficking, and rebels' armed resurgent and inter-community conflicts.<sup>19</sup>

The deployments of all the aforementioned international forces have not secured the country. According to Charlotte Wiedemann, Mali was more secure during Operation Serval in 2013 and at the beginning of Operation Barkhane in 2014.<sup>20</sup> She adds that the peace the UN mission must bring is non-existent.<sup>21</sup> The French troops are obliged to seal alliances with local armed groups, some of which are not trustworthy.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, after the beginning of the UN mission militants started using improvised explosive devices (IED) and suicide bombings.<sup>23</sup> The French intervention may have freed the population in northern Mali from occupation, but they are actually suffering from asymmetric warfare, and the threat has shifted from the north to the central part of Mali.<sup>24</sup>

## **2. Poverty, Bad Governance, Corruption**

Scholars believe that the real grievances of Malian insurgents and Islamic militants are socio-structural factors that include ethnic, economic, and environmental concerns.<sup>25</sup> In the same vein, others underline some issues related to socio-economic factors—namely poverty, illiteracy and unemployment—as the key drivers of radicalization and violence in Mali as well as other countries in the region, so long as the latter phenomena are present.<sup>26</sup> In addition, other structural factors have increased the number of Islamic groups in West Africa. As argued by Henry Wilkinson “the real menace of the region stems from poverty,

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<sup>19</sup> Sada, “What Future for the G5 ?,” 4.

<sup>20</sup> Charlotte Wiedemann, “Une Grande Presence Militaire, Moins de Securite: Le Mali, Cinq ans apres le debut de l'intervention [A Major Military Presence, Less Security: Mali, Five Years After the Start of the Intervention],” *Heinrich Boll Stiftung*, January 2018, 5, [https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/mali\\_cinq\\_ans.pdf](https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/mali_cinq_ans.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> Wiedemann, “Une Grande Presence Militaire,” [A Major Military Presence], 4.

<sup>22</sup> Wiedemann, 5.

<sup>23</sup> Wiedemann, 5.

<sup>24</sup> Wiedemann, 5.

<sup>25</sup> Eric Denece and Alain Rodier, “The Security Challenges of West Africa,” in *West African Studies: Global Security Risks and West Africa Development Challenges*, eds. Philipp Heinrigs and Marie Tremilieres (Paris: OECD, 2012), 38.

<sup>26</sup> Gow and Olonisakin, “Militancy and Violence in West Africa,” 7.

bad governance, a lack of democracy, corruption and economic mismanagement.”<sup>27</sup> Eric Denece and Alain Rodier, who show that corruption and nepotism have paved the way for violence and lawlessness, confirm this argument.<sup>28</sup>

Similarly, the European Union External Action Service (EUEAS) believes that extreme poverty, poor governance, corruption, internal tensions confront the Sahel states, along with the risk of possibility of developing extremism, religious radicalization, and all kinds of illicit trafficking, tied to terrorist security threats.<sup>29</sup> These phenomena are relevant, but they are unlikely to be the only causes of insurgency, radicalization, human trafficking, and smuggling. Nor is a large Islamic population necessarily a cause of radicalization. Sierra Leone, for example, is a majority Muslim country, but it has never known religious terrorism.

Mali is ranked “175th out of 188 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index for 2015. Poverty is much lower in urban areas, with 90% of all poor living in rural areas, and concentrated in the south, where population density is highest.”<sup>30</sup> In Mali, the average poverty rate was 64 per cent of the population in 2004. This rate is much higher in the northern part: For example, Timbuktu is at 77 percent; Gao, 78.7 percent; and Kidal with 92 percent.<sup>31</sup> The hard economic situation in northern Mali plays a key role in youth radicalization because young people do not have other opportunities.

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<sup>27</sup> Henry Wilkinson, “Reversal of Fortune: AQIM’s Stalemate in Algeria and Its New Front in the Sahel,” in *West African Studies: Global Security Risks and West Africa Development Challenges*, eds. Philipp Heinrigs and Marie Tremilieres (Paris: OECD, 2012), 13.

<sup>28</sup> Denece and Rodier, “the Security Challenges of West Africa,” 39.

<sup>29</sup> Simeon H. Alozieuwa, “The March 22, 2012 Coup in Mali: Lessons and Implications for Democracy in the West Africa Subregion in the Wave of Transnational Terrorism,” *Democracy and Security* 9, no. 4 (2013): 389, doi:10.1080/17419166.2013.833811.

<sup>30</sup> “The World Bank in Mali: The World Bank Supporting Mali in Addressing its Economic Challenges with a Focus on Education, Health, Agriculture, and Energy,” World Bank, accessed November 8, 2018, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mali/overview>.

<sup>31</sup> Hussein Solomon, “The African State and the Failure of U.S. Counter-terrorism Initiatives in Africa: The Cases of Nigeria and Mali,” *South African Journal of International Affairs* 20, no. 3 (October 2013): 432, doi:10.1080/10220461.2013.841804.

Mali ranked third in gold production in Africa, just behind Ghana and South Africa with 50.9 tons of gold produced in 2016.<sup>32</sup> The country also benefited between 2000 and 2010 from over U.S. \$6 billion aid, while Malian citizens' living standards were declining.<sup>33</sup> The beneficiaries of these funds were those people who had links with the ruling party under President Amadou Toumani Toure.<sup>34</sup> Corruption has been a central element of Malian democracy. For example at the Ministry of Health, according to Hussein Solomon, U.S. \$4 million was stolen from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis.<sup>35</sup> This open sky of corruption nurtures fertile ground for all kinds of militancy in Mali.

Another important factor in Mali's democratization is the full implementation of democratic rules. Throughout West Africa, economic deprivation and democratic failure have provided a propitious recipe for internal conflict.<sup>36</sup> Mali, however, was considered as a model of democracy in Africa, but for three flawed perceptions: "robust parliamentary institutions, a famously free press, and an apparently successful program of government decentralization."<sup>37</sup> Yet, a deep analysis of Malian democracy shows a fictitious structure. Malian institutions and the economy have been endangered by abject corruption, "lack of transparency, and general abandonment of the rule of law."<sup>38</sup> Peter Beaumont refers to Malian democracy as "a procedural democracy"<sup>39</sup> because it has never reached the periphery or the masses. Moreover, the people believe that democracy means everyone can do what he wants because there was no accountability.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Tiemoko Diallo, "Mali's Gold Production Up by 0,4 Tonnes in 2016," Reuters, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/mali-gold/malis-gold-production-up-by-0-4-tonnes-in-2016-idUSL5N1F23MA>.

<sup>33</sup> Solomon, "The African State and the Failure," 431.

<sup>34</sup> Solomon, 431.

<sup>35</sup> Solomon, 431.

<sup>36</sup> Solomon, 431.

<sup>37</sup> Harmon, "Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara," 74.

<sup>38</sup> Harmon, 76.

<sup>39</sup> Harmon, 76.

<sup>40</sup> Harmon, 77.

Solomon argues that external radicalization has been a key factor; for example, in Mali, the country received successive waves of Pakistani (Dawa Al-Tabkigh) and Saudi (Wahhabis) preachers.<sup>41</sup> These preachers penetrated local populations, and forcefully overtook Sufi Islamic scholars.<sup>42</sup> Denece and Rodier explain that Afghan preachers of the Dawa sect, who are Al-Qaeda supporters, were seen in northern Mali towns of Kidal and Tessalit, as well as Niger in 2002.<sup>43</sup> These towns were also the home of Malian insurgents. Later on, these places were transformed into safe havens for many international jihadists.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, in 2003, the government of Niger expelled many international preachers, especially those from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria.<sup>45</sup> The government of Mali did not take any measures to expel those preachers from its territory.

Similarly, the GSPC was not able to achieve its goals in Algeria because Algerian security forces drastically reduced its capabilities.<sup>46</sup> This crackdown obliged the organization to shift and expand its area of operations in the Sahel, mainly in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast. This point is amplified by Silvia D'Amato, who notes that when counterterrorism operations reduce terrorists' capabilities, terrorists will seek more favorable areas from which to launch attacks to remain active.<sup>47</sup> Terrorists, though, need more than a location from which to launch attacks; they need weapons and the means to procure them. Trafficking of all kinds have permitted jihadists to obtain their supplies of weapons and vehicles.<sup>48</sup> Corruption has also facilitated illegal movement in the region.<sup>49</sup> The Sahara has never been fully controlled, particularly in countries such as Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. These countries must rely on other countries, primarily Algeria, for

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<sup>41</sup> Solomon "The African State and the Failure," 430.

<sup>42</sup> Solomon, 430.

<sup>43</sup> Denece and Rodier, "the Security Challenges of West Africa," 40.

<sup>44</sup> Denece and Rodier, 40.

<sup>45</sup> Denece and Rodier, 40.

<sup>46</sup> Wilkinson, "Reversal of Fortune," 12.

<sup>47</sup> Silvia D'Amato, "Terrorists Going Transnational: Rethinking the Role of States in the Case of AQIM and Boko Haram," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 11, no. 1 (2017): 156, doi:10.1080/17539153.2017.1347238.

<sup>48</sup> Denece and Rodier, 41.

<sup>49</sup> Denece and Rodier, 41.

most basic supplies such as food and gas. Consequently, Algeria is the only country in the area with the ability to control to some extent its borders.

#### **D. HYPOTHESIS**

First, this thesis hypothesizes that the Malian government has not fulfilled its obligations agreed to in different agreements due to corruption, unaccountability, and the failure of the decentralization.

Second, Mali has received many international missions to assist the country's armed forces capacity building, and to fight international terrorism starting with the European Union training mission, Operations Serval and Barkhane, MINUSMA, and currently including the Sahel G5. This thesis hypothesizes that not all these initiatives are allowing the return of peace and security in Mali. Notably, due to the French alliance with the MNLA insurgents, this alliance has rendered the crisis more complex because other communities that do not share the MNLA views have created their own groups. Moreover, the UN troops have neither the mission nor the capabilities to fight terrorist organizations. In contrast, the security threat is expanding in the central part of Mali in Koulikoro, Segou and Mopti.

#### **E. METHODS AND SOURCES**

This thesis identifies the root causes of terrorism in West Africa, with a special focus on Mali in order to provide accurate mitigation policies to the military and intelligence communities, and to policy makers. It will further provide some directives to the external powers in their assistance schemes.

This thesis relies mainly on the review and analysis of literature, based on research collected in books, scholarly journals, reviews, reports from national and international institutions on terrorism and counterterrorism around the world, with close focus on West Africa. This study also looks at lessons learned from other countries that have dealt with terrorism.

## **F. THESIS OVERVIEW**

Terrorism has become the most important threat in West Africa, particularly in Mali, where it continues to threaten the country's existence. This thesis reviews the socio-economic factors that may significantly fuel the rise of terrorism in Mali. Then the thesis reviews different international military interventions in Mali from AFISMA, Operation Serval, MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane, and lastly, the Sahel G5. That discussion is followed by a study of different insurgency groups and their interconnections. Moreover, this thesis examines the failures of Malian democracy, which is riddled with corruption, poor leadership, and bad governance, and plagued by concerns about unemployment and decentralization. This thesis reviews and analyzes the different methods, including national initiatives applied by the Malian government and assistance from the international community to resolve the Malian multi-dimensional crisis.

Furthermore, this research analyzes and proposes solutions to the crisis, which is causing the suffering of millions of people in West Africa. This work consists of four additional chapters. Chapter II analyzes the complexity of the Malian problem by identifying the numerous insurgent and terrorist groups involved. Chapter III identifies the various internal and external responses to the crisis generated by the insurgent and terrorist groups. Chapter IV presents an analysis of the failure of the various responses to the crisis to date. The final chapter provides conclusions and recommendations for a possible path to a successful resolution of the crisis. The goal is to suggest measures the country could undertake to overcome its complicated situation, without neglecting the need for accountability and transparency of the institutions that must oversee the armed forces and the government's public funds.

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## **II. HISTORY OF INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM IN MALI**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Northern Mali has known many insurgencies since the 1960s, and in the last decade, there has been a proliferation of insurgent and terrorist groups in Mali. A second insurrection broke out in the 1990s, followed by the 2006 insurgency led by northern communities integrated with the armed forces. The 1960s and 1990s insurgents were requesting more development for the northern regions. In 2006, insurgents also began to request autonomy for their regions. And, finally, in 2012, insurgent and jihadist groups unified and launched an unprecedented crisis in northern Mali, which led to a unilateral declaration of independence by the Mouvement National de Liberation de l'Azawad (MNLA). A few months later, the MNLA was defeated by a coalition of terrorist organizations.

Each insurgency contained different regional, national, ethnic, religious, and racial divisions, which have created different mixes of anti- and pro-government forces. Alliance formations and disintegrations were frequent and made negotiations between Malian insurgent groups and the government complex. This chapter reviews the complex history of insurgency, terrorism, and the creation of pro-government militias in Mali. The first section addresses the background of these insurgent groups. The second section examines the terrorist organizations involved, and the last section describes the formation of pro-government militias.

### **B. INSURGENT MOVEMENTS**

Mali has faced numerous insurgencies from groups seeking more development opportunities and autonomy. In 1960, three years after Mali gained independence, the country was confronted by an insurgency, primarily in the northern Kidal region. The Kidal region land is mainly desert, where agriculture and livestock farming are difficult. These difficulties were the root causes of the insurgency. As argued by Arthur Boutellis and Marie Joelle Zahar, the insurgents requested the socialist government provide more assistance,

due to the special characteristics of northern Mali.<sup>50</sup> Ultimately, the insurgency was repressed militarily by the armed forces with assistance from the Soviet Union.<sup>51</sup>

From 1991 to 1996, northern Mali experienced its second insurgency. According to Stephanie Pezard and Micheal Shurkin, this movement was led by former foreign legion soldiers who had been recruited by Libyan leader Gaddafi, some of whom had fought in Chad and Lebanon, as well as by disaffected youth from the north.<sup>52</sup> These groups opposed government policies, and they alleged government prioritization of the south. This insurgency ended with the Tamarassat peace agreement and the national pact.

Then in 2006, a short-lived insurgency erupted but fell apart due to ethnic divisions among the Tuareg tribes. The former insurgents who had integrated into the Malian Armed Forces attacked their duty stations and took control of the equipment. This event was followed by massive desertions by former integrated soldiers, as well as by Tuaregs who had been recruited into the security forces. A Global Security publication states that the Tuareg military and civilian insurgents created the Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC). The coalition had a short life, however, due to intra-Tuareg divisions.<sup>53</sup> By the end of 2006, the ADC attacked jihadist positions; these religious elements later became the Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).<sup>54</sup> As reported by insurgents who participated in the attack, Ifoghas fighters were requested by Iyad Ghali to not engage with the religious militants.<sup>55</sup> Idnane and Taghat Melets ethnic groups were the only ones that attacked the AQIM.<sup>56</sup> In turn, the AQIM captured many combatants from the groups. The Ifoghas' betrayal of other ethnic groups forced the latter to leave the ADC.

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<sup>50</sup> Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, *A Process in Search of Peace Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement* (New York, NY: International Peace Institute (IPI), 2017), 3.

<sup>51</sup> Boutellis and Zahar, *A Process in Search of Peace*, 3.

<sup>52</sup> Stéphanie Pézard and Michael Robert Shurkin, *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 12.

<sup>53</sup> "Tuareg-Mali-2006-2009," Globalsecurity.org, last modified 2006, <https://globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/tuareg-mali-2006.htm>.

<sup>54</sup> "Tuareg-Mali," 1.

<sup>55</sup> "Tuareg-Mali," 1.

<sup>56</sup> "Tuareg-Mali," 1.

The 1991 and 2006 insurrections were resolved by negotiations led by the Algerian government. These peace accords set development programs, transferred Malian Armed Forces barracks out of agglomerations and pastures, and created local security forces managed by local authorities. Although both insurrections were resolved by peace agreements, the government's inability to fulfill its promises was a source of resentment for Tuareg leadership.

Francesco Saraceno indicates that the Arab Spring led to the end of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011; subsequently, Malian northern insurgents received both substantial human resources from Gaddafi's foreign legion, and equipment from Libyan stockpiles,<sup>57</sup> which gave ascendancy to Malian insurgents (specifically, the MNLA) to defeat the Malian military. According to Ole M. Gaasholt, these victories led to huge discontent within the Malian Armed Forces, and this contributed to the military coup d'état in 2012.<sup>58</sup> Then, the coup was followed by the full control of northern Mali by insurgents and Islamic groups. These factors amplified the institutional and security crises in the country.

The 2012 Tuareg insurrection was the most complex in the country's history because it involved a mix of separatist groups and both local and transnational jihadist organizations. The secessionist groups formed the Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA). Zeini Moulaye traces the establishment of this coalition on May 9, 2014, in Algiers.<sup>59</sup> Some influential groups in the coalition [CMA] are the MNLA, Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad (MAA or Ould Sidatti branch), and the Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad (HCUA). Nonetheless, alliances in northern Mali are not permanent; moreover, internal division split the Coalition du Peuple de l'Azawad into two groups; the strong

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<sup>57</sup> Francesco Saraceno, "Reflections on Azawad Crisis and Malian Democracy: The Statehood, Its Deficiencies and Inclusion Failure," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 50, no. 3 (2014): 1, doi: 10.1177/0021909614529265.

<sup>58</sup> Ole M. Gaasholt, "Northern Mali 2012: the Short-Lived Triumph of Irredentism," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 35, no. 2 (November 2013): 69, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1509394773/fulltextPDF/7BBA9B1C961C4C38PQ/1?accountid=12702>.

<sup>59</sup> Zeini Moulaye, "Les Defis et Enjeux Securitaires dans l'Espace Sahelo-Saharien: La Perspective du Mali [Challenges and Security Issues in Sahelo-Saharan Space: The Mali Perspective]," *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, 2016, 12, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14018.pdf>.

branch joined the pro-government militias, and the second joined the CMA. In March 2014, the Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad was created and split thereafter into two groups. The one led by Sidi Brahimi decided to join the CMA,<sup>60</sup> and the second joined pro-government militias. Another group named the Coordination des Mouvements et Forces Patriotiques de Resistance (CMMFPR2), an offshoot of CMMFPR1, which was composed of some elements of Kanda Koy and Ganda Iso, also joined the CMA. At the inception of Algerian peace negotiations, these secessionists were under the banner of the CMA, although their alliance may well be temporary.<sup>61</sup>

Alliance formation in northern Mali is like drifting dunes, and the origin of the MNLA can be traced from the merger of two groups. Sometimes, groups come together for specific operations needed to fight Malian troops stationed in the region. After the mission, they will then dissolve or even fight one another. In the same vein, according to Ibrahim Maiga, the MNLA was created from the fusion of the National Azawad Movement (Mouvement National de Liberation de l'Azawad) and the Tuareg Movement in Northern Mali (Mouvement Touareg du Nord Mali).<sup>62</sup> The aim of the MNLA was the establishment of an independent state in northern Mali.

In late 2011, the fall of the Gaddafi regime reinforced the ranks of the insurgents in northern Mali with Malian Tuareg returnees. Gaasholt confirms that these elements brought with them small arms, heavy armaments, and equipment. In addition, they had the same aim of obtaining secession from Mali.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, the government of Mali did not take any measures to disarm these fighters before their settlement in the country. With this influx of soldiers and military equipment, the rebellion that started in 2006 became stronger; the MNLA started staging attacks against governmental troops, with much success.

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<sup>60</sup> Moulaye, "Les Defis et Enjeux Securitaires, [Challenges and Security Issues]," 13.

<sup>61</sup> Bruno Charbonneau, "Intervention in Mali: Building Peace between Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35, no. 4 (2017): 422, doi:10.1080/02589001.2017.1363383.

<sup>62</sup> Ibrahim Maiga, "Armed Groups in Mali: Beyond the Labels," Institute for Security Studies, last modified June 2017, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/WestAfricaReport17.pdf>.

<sup>63</sup> Gaasholt, "Northern Mali 2012," 69.

The coalition of separatist and religious militants contributed to the insurgents' victories, just after the creation of the MNLA. Iyad Agali, a former leader of the 1990 rebellion who was famous inside Tuareg communities, created an Islamic group called Ansar Dine. Ansar Dine's goal was the implementation of Islamic law in all parts of the country. Gaasholt observes that the MNLA tried to distance itself from the Islamic group, specifically AQIM, but all evidence indicated the existence of tactical support among MNLA, Ansar Dine, and AQIM.<sup>64</sup> Although, according to Ibrahim Maiga, the majority of the MNLA members were from the Idnanes tribe, the group always claimed to possess non-ethnic and secular views.<sup>65</sup> This non-ethnic and secular orientation helped the MNLA to gain the support of France.

Furthermore, French government policy was to support secular insurgents, and set negotiations between the Malian government and non-terrorist groups. As mentioned by Nicolas Normand, the French-led Operation Serval had reduced the capability of jihadist groups and handed over Kidal to secessionist groups rather than the government of Mali, other Tuareg non-separatists, and black communities in the north.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, Gaasholt comments that the French support to secessionists favored the creation of new armed groups linked to the Bamako government.<sup>67</sup>

Without the support of jihadist groups, MNLA was not able to drive out the Malian security forces or control the territory alone. Gaasholt observes that "the ability of the MNLA to establish territorial control was in large part due to the military strength of the AQIM."<sup>68</sup> Maiga explains that with the assistance of Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO, the MNLA announced the independence of Azawad (the regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu)

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<sup>64</sup> Gaasholt, 70.

<sup>65</sup> Maiga, "Armed Groups in Mali," 2.

<sup>66</sup> Nicolas Normand, "Au Mali, le Chaos Resulte d'une Succession de Faux Pas de la Diplomatie Francaise [In Mali, the Chaos Result of a Succession of False Step of the French Diplomacy]," *Le Monde*, July 26, 2018, [https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/07/26/au-mali-le-chaos-resulte-d-une-succession-de-faux-pas-de-la-diplomatie-francaise\\_53366048\\_3232.html](https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/07/26/au-mali-le-chaos-resulte-d-une-succession-de-faux-pas-de-la-diplomatie-francaise_53366048_3232.html).

<sup>67</sup> Normand, "Au Mali, le Chaos [In Mali, the Chaos]," 2.

<sup>68</sup> Gaasholt, "Northern Mali 2012," 70.

in March 2012.<sup>69</sup> This cocktail of secessionist and jihadist organizations had a short life; the two groups had very different objectives. When the MNLA made a deal with Ansar Dine in 2012, this was criticized by both the international community and even some leaders of the MNLA; its secular view was incompatible with Sharia law.<sup>70</sup> The deal was denounced by some Islamic groups as well, which forced Iyad Ag Ghali to abandon this collaboration.<sup>71</sup> The failure of this agreement weakened the position of the MNLA in northern Mali.

In June 2012, the end of the MNLA coalition with terrorist groups occurred, marked by the MNLA's expulsion from the northern cities. According to Maiga, after merciless combat, the MNLA was chased from Gao by the MUJAO; jihadist groups defeated the MNLA in other towns in northern Mali.<sup>72</sup> Jihadist groups' takeover of northern Mali forced MNLA leadership to become refugees in neighboring countries or to join jihadist groups. When Franco-African intervention drove out jihadist groups in 2013, however, this allowed the MNLA to come back with its military and political wings.<sup>73</sup> After the French intervention in January 2013, insurgents flourished in the northern area. The HCUA is composed of the Ifoghas, a tribe that has led many Tuareg communities since the early stage of French colonization. Zeini Moulaye argues that the HCUA is a political organization requesting more autonomy, and its leadership consists of moderate Muslims. Yet, the Mouvement Islamique de l'Azawad (MIA) is fused within the HCUA,<sup>74</sup> and some eminent leaders of that movement had a strong connection with the leader of Ansar Dine.

### **C. TERRORIST GROUPS**

The alliance of these jihadist groups with the MNLA helped insurgents and terrorists to overrun the Malian armed forces after the March 22, 2012 coup d'état against

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<sup>69</sup> Maiga, "Armed Groups in Mali," 2.

<sup>70</sup> Maiga, 3.

<sup>71</sup> Maiga, 3.

<sup>72</sup> Maiga, 3.

<sup>73</sup> Maiga, 3.

<sup>74</sup> Moulaye, "Les Defis et Enjeux Securitaires [Challenges and Security Issues]," 13.

the democratically elected president of Mali. Bruno Charbonneau notes that groups with jihadist sympathies include AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith), Al-Mourabitoune (a splinter from AQIM), and Front de Liberation de Macina (FLM).<sup>75</sup> At the beginning of their campaign against the Malian government, the jihadist groups never publicly showed their participation in the secessionists' fights. As suggested by Charbonneau, in early 2016, terrorist groups divided northern and central Mali into delineated areas of operations: Timbuktu was under AQIM; Kidal was controlled by Ansar Dine; FLM controlled the center in Segou and Mopti; the Ivory Coast border was controlled by an unnamed group; and Al-Mourabitoune was suspected of having moved to Libya, but it resurfaced in Mali and Burkina Faso with shocking attacks on both capitals.<sup>76</sup>

AQIM history can be traced to the Algerian Islamist Front of Salvation, which won the Algerian general election in 1991. Nevertheless, the Algerian military stopped the ascension of an Islamic party to power. That fact forced some of the Algerian Islamist Front of Salvation (FIS) members to create an armed group called the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). In turn, dissatisfied members of the GIA created the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, or GSPC. The new group had faced strong pressure from the Algerian military. Alta Grobbelaar and Hussein Solomon substantiate that when Algerian authorities increased pressure and reduced the movements of the GSPC, they successfully confined the group to southern Algeria, northern Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.<sup>77</sup> According to Morten Boas, the GSPC, at its establishment, pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda, and in 2007, it took the name of AQIM.<sup>78</sup>

Grobbelaar and Solomon remark that the AQIM's Katibas (regional commands) in the Sahel grew, as its two leaders, Mokhtar Belmokhtar and AbouZeid, started kidnapping westerners, which benefited the group with millions of dollars in ransom payments; they

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<sup>75</sup> Charbonneau, "Intervention in Mali," 422.

<sup>76</sup> Charbonneau, 422.

<sup>77</sup> Alta Grobbelaar and Hussein Solomon, "The Origins, Ideology and Development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," *Africa Review* 7, no. 2 (2015): 151, doi:10.1080/09744053.2015.1030870.

<sup>78</sup> Morten Bøås and Liv E. Torheim, "The International Intervention in Mali: "Desert Blues" or a New Beginning?," *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 68, no. 3 (2013): 419, doi:10.1177/0020702013505430.

also increased their finances through cigarette smuggling and taxes from drug transits in their areas of control.<sup>79</sup> In addition, AQIM made alliances through marriages, protection of locals, and securing of illegal businesses' roads in northern Mali.<sup>80</sup> Similarly, by protecting their routes, AQIM strengthened its relationship with local nomadic communities engaged in smuggling.

According to Jessica M. Huckabey, the MUJAO is an offshoot of AQIM, and is an Islamic terrorist organization connected to other jihadist groups in northern Mali. MUJAO announced its existence in October 2011 by abducting three European aid workers in southern Algeria and requesting 30 million Euros for ransom.<sup>81</sup> In December, the group's unofficial leader, a Mauritanian called Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, released a video declaring war against France for its hostility to Islam.<sup>82</sup> In the same video, Agence France-Press (AFP) confirmed that young black combatants preached for "pure and tough" Islam and explained their ambition to expand Sharia into all of West Africa if necessary.<sup>83</sup> In March 2012, MUJAO attacked a gendarmerie base in southern Algeria with suicide bombers.<sup>84</sup> Within a year, in December 2012, the United States put "the group on its blacklist of terrorist organizations."<sup>85</sup>

At the same time, MUJAO leadership still had a very close relationship with AQIM and Ansar Dine. The leader of the MUJAO, Kheirou, joined and fought for Al-Qaida in Iraq in 2003; in 2006, during a jail break in Mauritania, he was able to regain his liberty, and joined AQIM.<sup>86</sup> Other founders of both MUJAO and AQIM are former Algerian and Moroccan members; for example, the group spokesperson, Omar Ould Hamaha, is a Malian Arab with deep relationships to Mauritania and to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an

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<sup>79</sup> Grobbelaar and Solomon, "The Origins, Ideology and Development of Al-Qaeda," 151.

<sup>80</sup> Grobbelaar and Solomon, 153.

<sup>81</sup> Jessica M. Huckabey, "Al Qaeda in Mali: The Defection Connections," *Orbis* 57, no. 3 (2013): 469, doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2013.05.008.

<sup>82</sup> Huckabey, "Al Qaeda in Mali," 469.

<sup>83</sup> Huckabey, 469.

<sup>84</sup> Huckabey, 469.

<sup>85</sup> Huckabey, 470.

<sup>86</sup> Huckabey, 470.

Algerian and a leader of AQIM in Mali.<sup>87</sup> According to Huckabey, Hamaha has links with almost all the jihadist organizations in the Sahel.<sup>88</sup> Hamaha was affiliated with the Tuareg Islamic group, Ansar Dine, before officially declaring his transfer to MUJAO in mid-2012.<sup>89</sup>

At its inception, the leadership of MUJAO was composed mainly of North African and Malian Arabs. When the need for more personnel increased in northern Mali, however, the group was forced to start diversifying its pool of recruits nationally and internationally. It first decided to attract local recruits from northern Mali ethnic groups, which are mainly black Songhai and Fulani.<sup>90</sup> The spokesman for MUJAO, Omar Ould Hamaha, addressed people in the streets of Timbuktu in northern Mali in a recruitment video: “Our combat is in the name of Islam, it is not Arab, Tuareg or black or white.”<sup>91</sup> The MUJAO also produced a video explaining the greatness of the Songhai Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries, demonstrating their past bravery in combat.<sup>92</sup> According to the MUJAO leaders, the campaign was successful because it resulted in the creation in early 2013 of a new brigade mainly composed of black northern and central people.<sup>93</sup>

In mid-2012, MUJAO attracted many other West African black recruits. According to MUJAO representatives, the group registered a high number of black recruits in northern Mali in its two facilities in Gao for military and religious training.<sup>94</sup> During the same period, the group promoted a black man named Hicham Bilal as katiba [brigade] commander to explicitly show the group’s diversity and to broaden the pool of recruitment.<sup>95</sup> Bilal, the first black commander of a katiba, stated in one of his interviews

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<sup>87</sup> Huckabey, 470.

<sup>88</sup> Huckabey, 470.

<sup>89</sup> Huckabey, 470.

<sup>90</sup> Huckabey, 471.

<sup>91</sup> Huckabey, 471.

<sup>92</sup> Huckabey, 471.

<sup>93</sup> Huckabey, 472.

<sup>94</sup> Huckabey, 472.

<sup>95</sup> Huckabey, 472.

that the group would give more leadership positions to blacks because in Islam there is no ethnicity.<sup>96</sup> These appeals to black populations echoed around West Africa. Many new recruits reported to MUJAO camps in Gao in northern Mali. According to Huckabey, hundreds of teenagers and adults joined the group from Senegal, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast.<sup>97</sup>

These recruits came with diverse motivations; some were committed Muslims, and others were interested in the opportunities offered by the group, including financial incentives.<sup>98</sup> The U.S. Africa Command reported that MUJAO received around 100 Boko Haram fighters; these combatants from the Nigeria radical Islamist organization assisted MUJAO in training and combat missions.<sup>99</sup> MUJAO targeted the recruitment of many West Africans to the jihadist movement. Other groups like AQIM, and its splinters, were dominated by foreigners and Arabs of northern Mali. In addition to the focus on religion, MUJAO showed itself as a vanguard for black populations against the Tuaregs and Arabs in the Gao region. As expressed by Marc-Andre Boisvert, MUJAO demonstrated its ability to protect black communities against injustices from Tuaregs and Arabs and to give job opportunities to the youth.<sup>100</sup> The black populations in northern Mali were delighted by these promises because they felt marginalized by the government in comparison to Arab and Tuareg groups. According to Gaasholt, this power to unify the masses allowed the MUJAO to take over MNLA-controlled territory.<sup>101</sup> Eventually, in 2012, jihadist organizations imposed Sharia law in northern Mali.<sup>102</sup>

According to Jason Warner, the MUJAO and the Masked Men Brigade, a component of al-Mouribitoun, merged to create the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

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<sup>96</sup> Huckabey, 472.

<sup>97</sup> Huckabey, 472.

<sup>98</sup> Huckabey, 472.

<sup>99</sup> Huckabey, 472.

<sup>100</sup> Marc-André Boisvert, "Failing at Violence: The Longer-lasting Impact of Pro-government Militias in Northern Mali since 2012," *African Security* 8, no. 4 (2015): 279, doi:10.1080/19392206.2015.1100505.

<sup>101</sup> Gaasholt, "Northern Mali 2012," 68.

<sup>102</sup> Gaasholt, 70.

(ISGS).<sup>103</sup> Prior to this merger, these groups generally operated in Mali. After the merger, ISGS conducted attacks in other Mali neighboring countries. As explained by Warner, the ISGS conducted attacks in Burkina-Faso, Mali, and Niger, two of which occurred in 2016: the attack against a Burkina Faso gendarmerie post on the Nigerian border, which resulted in the deaths of two gendarmes; and an attack on a Burkina police outpost on the Malian border, which left three policemen dead.<sup>104</sup> Moreover, the ISGS' most spectacular attack was an attempt to release Boko Haram fighters from jail in Niger in 2017. Although the ISGS is a Malian-based group, its targets went beyond Mali due to interconnections among tribes along the borders.

The multiplication of movements in Mali pushed a Fulani preacher to create another militant movement, the Macina Liberation Front, or FLM. According to Susanna D. Wing, the FLM surfaced in January 2015, as a result of inter-communal violence between Fulani and Bambara communities.<sup>105</sup> The group aimed to recreate the Fulani Empire of Macina and to create a caliphate in the center of Mali, specifically in the Mopti and Segou regions. The Macina Liberation Front is also directly linked to Ansar Dine and other jihadist groups in northern Mali. The group has staged many attacks in central Mali; the most notorious one was an attack in August 2015 on the Hotel Byblos in Sevare, which resulted in the deaths of 12 people, most of whom were United Nations peacekeeping operation workers.<sup>106</sup>

In 2017, Islamic militant groups created a new organization, Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM). According to the U.S Congressional Research Service, the GSIM is composed of the AQIM, Al Murabitoun, and two local jihadist groups.<sup>107</sup> As

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<sup>103</sup> Jason Warner, "Sub-Saharan Africa's Three "New" Islamic State Affiliates," *Combating Terrorism Center* 10, no. 1 (January 2017): 28, <https://ctc.usma.edu/sub-saharan-africas-three-new-islamic-state-affiliates/>.

<sup>104</sup> Warner, "Sub-Saharan Africa," 29.

<sup>105</sup> Susanna D. Wing, "Mali's Enduring Crisis," *Current History* 116 (May 2017): 193.

<sup>106</sup> Wing, "Mali's Enduring Crisis," 193.

<sup>107</sup> Alexis Arieff, "Conflict in Mali," Congressional Research Service, In Focus, last modified September 19, 2018, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10116.pdf>.

ascertained by Charbonneau, the GSIM was created in March 2017, and placed under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of Ansar Dine.<sup>108</sup>

#### **D. PRO-GOVERNMENT MILITIAS**

Plateforme refers to different groups supporting the central government with a goal to defend the interest of their communities for the future benefit of humanitarian aid, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration into the Malian Armed forces, security services, and public services. The Plateforme was created in June 2014 as a politico-military coalition with military wings that included the Groupe Auto-defense Touareg; Imghad et Allie (GATIA); MAA-Ahmed, a splinter of the Coalition de Peuple de l'Azawad (CPA); and CMFPR1, a coordination of many other small groups like Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso. In September 2016, a new group seceded from the CMA, and took the name of the Azawad Salvation Mouvement (MSA). According to Radio France International, the new entity members come from the Tuareg Daoussak tribe.<sup>109</sup> The group is in coalition with the GATIA to fight against terrorist organizations along the Mali-Niger border.

According to Boisvert, GATIA's creation was motivated by the failure of the Malian Armed Forces, and the defeat of Malian military in the battle of Anefis, near Kidal.<sup>110</sup> As suggested by Adam Sandor, the GATIA is mainly composed of the Imghad ethnic group, which is part of the Tuareg tribe.<sup>111</sup> The group is allegedly commanded by Haji Ag Gamou, a general in the Malian Armed Forces and head of the military wing

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<sup>108</sup> Charbonneau, "Intervention in Mali," 422.

<sup>109</sup> "Mali: Le Mouvement Pour Le Salut De L'Azawad, Nouveau Groupe Politico-militaire – RFI [Mali: The Movement for the Salvation of Azawad, New Politico-Military Group]," RFI Afrique, last modified September 11, 2016, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160911-mali-creation-msa-nouveau-mouvement-politico-militaire>.

<sup>110</sup> Boisvert, "Failing at Violence," 276.

<sup>111</sup> Adam Sandor, "Insecurity, the Breakdown of Social Trust, and Armed Actor Governance in Central and Northern Mali," Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études Stratégiques et Diplomatiques, UQAM, last modified August 2017, <https://dandurand.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/10/Sandor-english-Report.pdf>.

composed of combatants from his clan.<sup>112</sup> This demonstrates the difficulty in trying to draw a clear line between Malian security forces and the militias that support the state.<sup>113</sup>

GATIA was joined by an offshoot of both the Movement Arabe de l’Azawad, which was defending the rights of Arabs in northern Mali, and the Mouvement pour le Salut de Azawad, which broke away from the CMA. The MAA is a breakaway from the first MAA, which was part of the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad. As explained by Boisvert, Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed, one leader of the MAA, decided to join the militias that supported the central government of Mali.<sup>114</sup> On the other hand, Sandor states that the MSA is composed mainly of members from the Daoussahak and Chamanamas ethnic groups, who were among the key players of the CMA.<sup>115</sup> Their fighters were engaged in combat missions in the Kidal and Menaka regions. Elements of the two tribes were dissatisfied with the CMA’s leadership, which is dominated by the Ifoghas, so the Daoussahak and Chamanamas decided to leave the coalition. The Ifoghas refused to sustain them in their fight in the Niger borderland; they also accused the CMA of not allowing them to be involved in the decision making process.

There are many minor players among pro-governmental militias in northern Mali, some of which are the Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy, and Ganda Iso. Boisvert points out that the first means “masters of the land” and the second “son of the land” in the Songhai language. The Ganda Koy began during the 1990 Tuareg insurgency, with its creation stemming from a group of communities’ leaders, particularly Mohamad N’tissa who is from nobility.<sup>116</sup> The Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy can be traced to the early 1990s when northern black communities decided to take responsibility for their own security against recurring attacks by Tuareg and Arab groups. The Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy’s first military leader was an airborne Colonel Abdoulaye Mahamada Maiga,

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<sup>112</sup> Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, “Toward a Secure and Stable Mali,” RAND Corporation, accessed November 9, 2018, 9, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR296.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR296.html).

<sup>113</sup> Sandor, “Insecurity,” 21.

<sup>114</sup> Boisvert, “Failing of Violence,” 272.

<sup>115</sup> Sandor, 23.

<sup>116</sup> Boisvert, 277.

who left the military in 1994.<sup>117</sup> Ganda Koy sustained the Malian military during the 1990 to 1996 insurgency against Tuareg rebels. After the 1995 peace agreement between the Malian government and insurgent groups, the Ganda Koy was demobilized, and amnestied in 1996, and the majority of the combatants returned to civilian life.<sup>118</sup>

Nevertheless, as insurgency reoccurred in northern Mali, so too did the formation of self-defense and vigilante groups in response. In 2008, a new movement named Ganda Iso was created to protect Songhoi and Fulani communities against Tuareg rebels. Specifically, Ganda Iso's goal was to protect Fulani herdsman against Tuareg groups and transnational bandits. The group rapidly shifted from its first mission of protecting people against banditry to ethnic-based extra-judicial targeting and killing of four Tuareg herders.<sup>119</sup> As Boisvert notes, this horrendous killing of the Tuareg herdsman pushed the government to arrest 22 members of Ganda Iso.<sup>120</sup> Although the group was never dismantled, between 2009 and 2011, Ganda Iso fighters disappeared from the public scene. In late 2011, when the state security forces were losing ground in the northern part of the country, however, the spiritual leader of Ganda Koy decided to resume the group's activities. As mentioned by Boisvert, the imam Mohamed N'tissa Maiga declared that, because of general insecurity in northern Mali, Ganda Koy recalled all its former combatants who were demobilized in 1996.<sup>121</sup> The group supported Malian troops in combat missions, but they were unable to defeat the separatist groups reinforced by Libyan returnees and jihadist groups.

After the military coup in 2012, Ganda Iso re-emerged well organized with political and military wings. As confirmed by Boisvert, between 2012 and 2013, Ganda Iso set up a political office in Bamako and regional offices for better coordination of the group's

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<sup>117</sup> Boisvert, 277.

<sup>118</sup> Boisvert, 277.

<sup>119</sup> Boisvert, 277.

<sup>120</sup> Boisvert, 277.

<sup>121</sup> Boisvert, 280.

activities.<sup>122</sup> This transformation gave the group more clarity and vision in peace negotiations as a member of the Plateforme.

## **E. CONCLUSION**

The government's inability to provide security and prosperity to its people facilitated the creation of numerous secessionist groups and national and international terrorist organizations. The popularity of these groups grew out of the lack of development opportunities and an alleged reduction of state military presence in the northern part of Mali. As explained in this chapter, the coalition between secessionists and jihadists did not last more than a few months. According to Ousmane A. Diallo, the jihadist groups, under the umbrella of AQIM, took over the three regions (Gao, Kidal, Tombouctou) from MNLA, and deepened the crisis in Mali.<sup>123</sup> On the other hand, the Plateforme, which is a mix of GATIA, MAA, Ganda Koy, and Ganda Iso, sustained the central government of Mali. All the militant groups, however, may cooperate when they have a common goal, such as the protection and escort of drug traffickers in the Sahara desert. The complexity of the most recent Malian insurrection demonstrates a shifting of alliances between and among secessionist, jihadist, and pro-government militias. These ill-defined boundaries between groups makes reaching any stable peace agreement difficult.

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<sup>122</sup> Boisvert, 280.

<sup>123</sup> Ousmane A. Diallo, "Ethnic Clashes, Jihad, and Insecurity in Central Mali," *Peace Review* 29, no. 3 (2017): 99, doi:10.1080/10402659.2017.1344529.

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### **III. RESPONSES TO INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM**

#### **A. OVERVIEW**

This chapter reviews the different initiatives taken by the Malian government and the international community to mitigate the current Malian crisis. After a brief overview, the next section lays out the internal responses, and the final section describes the international responses to the crisis.

The government of Mali has undertaken many initiatives to fight insurgents and establish the peace with diverse militant groups in northern Mali. Some of these initiatives include internal and international partners, while international communities led others. The first initiative, the 1991 agreement, led to the cessation of hostilities between the government of Mali and both the Azawad Popular Movement (MPA) and the Arab Islamic Front (FIA). The signing of the National Pact, which marked the end of hostilities, gave special status to the northern region of Mali. The second agreement in 2006 was called the Algiers's Agreement for Peace Restoration, Security and the Development of the Kidal region. In 2013, a third peace effort resulted in a preliminary agreement signed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, to allow for the presidential election and inclusive peace talks between Malians. This agreement was signed after the French intervention in Mali in 2013. The signatories were the government of Mali and two militant movements, the MNLA and HCUA, a splinter group from Ansar Dine. This last agreement made possible a general election in Mali. Other tribes, though, which did not recognize themselves as part of the MNLA and HCUA, created their own insurgent organizations and claimed seats for any future negotiations.

In July 2014, a new negotiations roadmap for the Algiers process was signed between the aforementioned parties, along with a new group called la Coordination des Mouvements et Forces Patriotiques de Resistance (CMFPR). Finally, in 2015, a peace and reconciliation agreement arising from the Algiers process was signed by many parties, including, on the one hand, the government of Mali and its pro-government militias called

Plateforme, and on the other, the Coordination of Azawad Movements, or CMA, composed of groups fighting the government.

Unfortunately, these national initiatives to bring peace did not succeed. In 2012, the northern regions fell into the hands of insurgents and jihadists. This event motivated the international community to start military intervention in 2013. The international community decided to intervene in northern Mali after the separatist and terrorist organizations' takeover of two thirds of the country's territory. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) initiated an intervention with the support of the UN. Before this international intervention, however, jihadist groups led an offensive against the southern part of Mali controlled by the government. That offensive forced the newly elected French president to launch Operation Serval in January 2013, which had an objective to stop the advance of terrorist groups. Moreover, in the same year, the African led International Mission in Mali, AFISMA, transformed into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA. After the liberation of northern Mali's main towns by Operation Serval, the French closed the operation and created a new operation in the Sahel named Operation Barkhane, which included many Sub-Saharan countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). Finally, in 2014, the leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad created the Group of Sahel 5 states. This new entity has had two goals: to fight against terrorism and mitigate the causes of the insurgencies in the region.

## **B. INTERNAL RESPONSE**

The government of Mali signed many peace agreements with insurgents to end the conflict in northern part since 1991.

### **1. Agreement for Cessation of Hostilities in 1991**

The first agreement to end hostilities was signed in 1991 by the Malian dictatorial regime and two movements: the Mouvement Populaire de l'Azawad and the Front

Islamique de Arabe.<sup>124</sup> According to the Agreement's Articles 1 and 2, both parties stopped all military operations in Mali, particularly in the Tombouctou and Gao regions. The same agreement stipulated that Malian Armed Forces would start reducing troops in both regions and transferring barracks to more appropriate areas. Most importantly, former combatants could integrate into the Malian security forces. Finally, the parties created a commission headed by the Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic to supervise the cessation of hostilities. This agreement, however, did not include all the militant groups on the ground; only the Ifoghas and Arab tribes were the signatories. To definitively settle the peace and mitigate factors causing grievances, a National Pact was drafted, accepted, and signed by president of the transitional government and the delegate of the Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l'Azawad.<sup>125</sup>

## **2. The National Pact of 1992**

This pact was intended to be the core document for peace restoration, decentralization, and organization of local elections.<sup>126</sup> In addition, the National Pact of 1992 mentioned some conflict resolution measures expected to begin immediately; however, the implementations of others, designed to start in 60 days, were delayed, including the integration of combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad into the Malian Armed Forces, police, and customs' services with their ranks assigned according to their competences. The integration was voluntary and individual. Moreover, this pact required the recruitment of some insurgents into public administration and semi-public service; the government accepted the creation for one year of special units composed mainly of former insurgents from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad. The government also accepted the creation of an internal security corps under the

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<sup>124</sup> "Accord sur la cessation des hostilités, le Gouvernement de la République du Mali d'une part et le Mouvement Populaire de l'Azaouad et le Front Islamique Arabe d'autre part, [Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, the Government of the Republic of Mali on the one hand and the People's Movement of Azaouad and the Arab Islamic Front on the other hand]," UNESCO | Building Peace in the Minds of Men and Women, last modified January 6, 1991, [http://www.unesco.org/culture/fr/indigenous/Dvd/pj/TOUAREG/TouaregC4\\_2.pdf](http://www.unesco.org/culture/fr/indigenous/Dvd/pj/TOUAREG/TouaregC4_2.pdf).

<sup>125</sup> "Pacte National [National Pact]," UN Peacemaker, accessed November 8, 2018, [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML\\_920411\\_PacteNationalGouvMaliAzawad.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML_920411_PacteNationalGouvMaliAzawad.pdf).

<sup>126</sup> "Pacte National [National Pact]," 28.

authorities of locally elected government bodies within their administrative areas; these corps were to be composed of local populations and integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad. Yet, the government never implemented the internal security corps. Furthermore, the agreement authorized the creation of special units of the army, with the mission to preserve internal and external security, and the recruitment was to be open to all segments of the local populations. The creation of special units was to be achieved after the peace settlement, which also called for the allocation of four parliamentary seats to northern displaced populations via election. The peace settlement agreement also stipulated the introduction of special teaching and military training programs for northern populations. The Ceasefire Commission was charged to secure integrated combatants and supervise these operations of integration.

The National Pact of 1992 planned to reduce the military presence in the northern part of the country by moving military settlements outside of towns and farmland, and transforming some military installations into schools for military, para-military, and civilian training centers. The aforementioned arrangements were to be supervised by the Ceasefire Commission, composed of ten members from the government, ten from insurgent groups, and an Algerian mediator. Furthermore, this pact stated that all expenditures of the Ceasefire Commission, including a special allowance for commission representatives, were to be charged to the Government of the Republic of Mali.<sup>127</sup>

The repatriation of the internally displaced and refugees would be conducted simultaneously with the collaboration of friendly countries and international humanitarian organizations as noted in the pact. Following repatriation and the arrival of the internally displaced, the government was to initiate reinsertion and assist victims of the conflict via two funds. The first was a special fund for development and reinsertion aimed to create small and medium sized industries and enterprises, and facilitate the reinsertion of displaced people into active life. The fund would assist and compensate all victims of the

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<sup>127</sup> “Pacte National, Decret No 92–121/P-CTSP Portant Promulgation du Pacte National, [National Pact, Decree No. 92–121 / P-CTSP Promulgating the National Pact],” UN Peacemaker, accessed November 8, 2018, [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML\\_920411\\_PacteNationalGouvMaliAzawad.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML_920411_PacteNationalGouvMaliAzawad.pdf).

conflict: military, insurgents, civilians, and their heirs. A priority would be given to victims recognized by the Independent Commission for Inquiry. These identifications were to be completed by a permanent body to take care of military victims of both parties and their family inheritors. The second fund was for a program intended to assist and compensate insurgent, government, and civilian victims of the conflict and their heirs.

### **3. Commission Mandate**

This agreement established the Independent Commission, which had the following mandate: to inquire into all actions taken against civilian populations and their properties during the conflict, which included “theft, pillage, and vandalism.”<sup>128</sup> The task of the commission was to define responsibilities for such acts and evaluate compensations. This independent body had 17 members: five from the government, five from militant groups, and the remaining seven were experts from Algeria, Burkina Faso, France, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. An independent expert, elected by his peers, headed the commission. Furthermore, the National Pact offered special status to the northern regions of Mali.

### **4. Northern Region Special Status**

The agreement recognized the special status of the northern regions of Mali, which aimed to allow locals to manage their own affairs and required a new territorial and administrative reorganization of northern Mali. In addition, these elected assemblies were responsible for several measures.

The regional assemblies would organize the urban and rural life of their constituents. In addition, they would promote economic and social development programs, some of which included, as mentioned in the Algiers peace agreement, “industry, transport, communications, health, education, culture, tourism, promotion of local languages,” management of land, and land tenure. Furthermore, the document notes that regional assemblies would oversee “local and regional policing forces and law enforcement”

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<sup>128</sup> “Pacte National, Decret No 92–121/P-CTSP Portant Promulgation du Pacte National, [National Pact, Decree No. 92–121 / P-CTSP Promulgating the National Pact],” 290.

entities, and promote cooperation with non-governmental organizations for local government development.<sup>129</sup> Lastly, they would supervise voting for regional budgets, which would be funded from taxes, state subsidies, and donations and legacies.

Their local populations elected all the members of these assemblies for five years, and the government would appoint its own representative who worked closely with the president of the regional assembly to ensure the legality of local assemblies' decisions. The regional executive was assisted by other state, deconcentrated services. The delineation of the local governments' boundaries was planned to be done through consultation with locals (arrondissement, cercle,<sup>130</sup> and villages).

## **5. Special Development Program**

In the National Pact, the government of Mali approved special development schemes through the next decade. The objective of the plan was to balance economic inequalities between the north and the south, with the additional goals of improving infrastructures and attracting investors. Local assemblies, funded yearly by the central government, proposed the projects, and regional assemblies managed the allocated funds. The government permitted a special tax waiver to the northern regions to encourage investors. The National Pact, however, did not bring definite solutions to the crisis because many articles were not implemented. Despite the pact's continued application, in 2006, a new insurrection started in northern Mali, which was resolved by the government signing a new agreement specifically for the Kidal region, the 2006 Algiers Peace Agreement for Restoring Peace, Security, and the Development of Kidal Region.

## **6. Algiers Peace Agreement of 2006 for Restoring Peace, Security, and the Development of Kidal Region**

As with the previous agreement between the government of Mali and insurgent groups, the 2006 agreement resolved the insurrection that specifically concerned the Kidal region and the insurgent leadership's same grievances regarding development

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<sup>129</sup> "Pacte National, Decret No 92-121/P-CTSP Portant Promulgation du Pacte National, [National Pact, Decree No. 92-121 / P-CTSP Promulgating the National Pact]," 292.

<sup>130</sup> Administrative division of Mali is as follows: region followed by cercle and arrondissement.

opportunities. Accordingly, the 2006 peace agreement, in many instances, was based on the National Pact. For example, regional assemblies could seek for assistance, development, and cooperation with neighboring countries' regional assemblies.<sup>131</sup> Furthermore, security management in the Kidal region had to be under the authority of a regional assembly, as stipulated in the National Pact. The agreement, however, included specific urgent investments to be made in the Kidal region, and, in addition, it provided some solutions to security concerns.

## **7. Economic, Social, and Cultural Development**

After the signature of the 2006 peace agreement the government and insurgents decided to organize the Kidal forum for the creation of special investment funds to implement economic, social, and cultural development plans. The development had to focus on some specific areas like livestock, hydraulic power, transportation, communication, health, education, culture, handicrafts, and natural resources' exploitation. The forum requested a quick transfer of competence to local government. The creation of small and medium size enterprises gave loans to people and trained them in management. Moreover, it demanded the creation of a healthcare system appropriate to nomadic populations, and the government would have to develop a system that would ensure the availability of drinkable water to populations mainly in towns or villages. The agreement also mentions the paving of main routes from Kidal to Gao, Menaka, and the Algerian border, and the construction of the Kidal airport. The government would have to provide electricity to cercles [towns] and their local governments. Furthermore, mobile phone access would have to be extended to cercles and their local governments. Additionally, the government would open regional radio stations, and provide access to television, with one hour of special programming for the region to promote culture, and support the creation and implementation of an education system adapted to social values, culture, and religious beliefs. Another point was the creation of a special program to retrain graduates speaking

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<sup>131</sup> "Accord d'Alger pour la Restauration de la Paix, de la Securite et du developpement de la Region de Kidal, [Algiers Agreement for the Restoration of Peace, Security and Development in the Kidal Region]," UN Peacemaker, accessed November 8, 2018, [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML\\_060704\\_Accord%20d%27Alger.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML_060704_Accord%20d%27Alger.pdf).

Arabic and enable them to become teachers. It additionally stated the renewal for another ten years of the preferential fiscal regime mentioned in the National Pact, in order to boost investments.<sup>132</sup>

## **8. Solutions to Immediate Security Concerns**

The government of Mali and insurgents concluded some quick measures to pacify the northern part of the country. Some of these measures included the relocation of military garrisons outside of towns, as previously mentioned in the National Pact, and the requirement that insurgents would have to hand over all government weapons, ammunitions, and equipment stolen by elements of the armed forces during the May 23, 2006 attacks at Kidal, Menaka, and Tessalit to a facilitator.

## **9. Special Security Units**

The government of Mali agreed and created Special Units for security, hierarchically organized under the authority of the regional General Officer Commanding the Kidal region as mentioned in the pact. The members of the units were predominantly northern people.

These units' missions were as follows: the protection and caretaking of public buildings; the protection of high profile authorities; the conducting of reconnaissance mission and patrols; the provision of assistance to judiciary police; intervention, and other missions as specified.

## **10. Preliminary Agreement for Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali 2013**

After the March 2012 military coup, the crisis in northern Mali entered a new phase, in which insurgent groups recorded victories against government troops and militias, some of whom subsequently joined the insurgents or jihadists. These astounding victories by insurgents and jihadists led to the occupation of territory. The area under insurgent control represented two-thirds of the country's territory. This occupation of and subsequent jihadist

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<sup>132</sup> Accord d'Alger of 2006 [the 2006 Algiers Peace Agreement].

attacks on the southern part of Mali obliged the French to intervene in January 2013. French intervention drove the Islamic militants out of towns and into disarray. Furthermore, French intervention led to the rebirth of the CMA, the creation of the HCUA, a splinter of Ansar Dine, and the beginning of the preliminary agreement for the presidential election and inclusive peace talks in Mali at Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso.<sup>133</sup> As result of these talks, the government of Mali and the MNLA and HCUA agreed upon the following actions:

- To resolve the crisis by dialogue and negotiation.
- To respect Malian unity and territorial integrity.
- To respect the republican form of government and the secular state.
- To respect human rights, human dignity, and fundamental religious liberty.
- To protect the cultural heritage of the northern part of the country.
- To respect the equality among citizens.
- To reject all forms of extremism and terrorism.
- To fight against terrorism, criminal economy, and all forms of impunity.
- To organize the presidential election in all parts of the territory, in particular the Kidal region.<sup>134</sup>

After the presidential election and appointment of the government, the parties would start inclusive dialogue to determine definitive solutions to the crisis.

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<sup>133</sup> “Accord Preliminaire A l’Election Presidentielle et aux Pourparlers Inclusives de Paix au Mali [Preliminary Agreement on Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali],” UN Peacemaker, accessed November 8, 2018, [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML\\_130618\\_AccordElectionsDialogueInclusif.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML_130618_AccordElectionsDialogueInclusif.pdf).

<sup>134</sup> Accord Preliminaire A l’Election Presidentielle et aux Pourparlers Inclusives de Paix au Mali, [Preliminary Agreement on Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali].

## **11. Creation of Conditions to Facilitate the Election's Organizations**

It was urgent for the Malian government and the international community to set quick elective and negotiations mechanisms, which would allow free and transparent elections in Mali. To that end, the negotiation between the Malian government and insurgents in Ouagadougou resulted in the following points: the parties ceased all hostilities, and the disarmament was to start after the signing of the final agreement as required by ECOWAS, the AU, and the United Nations. Moreover, the parties agreed to set up a joint technical safety commission under authority of the commander of the MISMA/MINUSMA: this commission would decide any matter of the ceasefire. Furthermore, the commission would be in charge of security arrangements, cantonment and disarmament of armed groups, and the deployment of Malian security forces. The commission was composed of four elements of Malian defense and security forces, four members of the signatory groups, one member from MISMA/MINUSMA, one representative of the Serval Force, one envoy of the mediator, one delegate of the associate mediator (ECOWAS), and one member of the AU. The agreement also allowed the deployment of personnel capable of providing administration and social services to areas under the militants' control. Both humanitarian relief missions and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees would be authorized. A monitoring and evaluation committee under the special representative of the UN secretary-general would be established. This committee would have two members appointed by government, two elements of the signatory armed groups, one representative of the mediator, one person designated by the associate mediator (ECOWAS), one representative each from the AU, UN, EU, Islamic Cooperation Organization (OCI), Algeria, France, Mauritania, Niger, Switzerland, and Chad. Finally, the parties agreed to set up an international inquiry as described in 2013 preliminary agreement for elections: "commission to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, sexual violence, drug trafficking, and any serious violations of international human right law and international humanitarian law."<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Accord Preliminaire A l'Election Presidentielle [Preliminary Agreement on Presidential Election], 9.

## **12. Peace and Reconciliation Agreement Resulting from the Algiers Process in Mali in 2015**

It must be noted that some important points of the 2015 agreement were already included in previous documents, specifically in the National Pact and the 2006 peace agreement. However, the 2015 agreement included additional requests, including the creation of a second chamber of parliament, and the re-mapping of regions by creating more electorates' zones, which aims to increase the participation of locals in governance.<sup>136</sup> The high council of collectivities has to be opened to representatives of traditional nobility, women, and youth. Moreover, regions must have the ability to fix local taxes, royalties, and their developmental objectives. Furthermore, the central government accepted to transfer 30 percent of national budget revenues to local governments or territorial communities. The benefit of natural resources and minerals exploited in territorial communities has to be shared between the government and the source community. In addition, the central government must transfer deconcentrated services to territorial communities. Moreover, northern populations have to be prioritized by the central government during recruitment into public functions in territorial collectivities. The agreement considered the redeployment of national armed forces in a progressive manner from the date of the signing of the present agreement. Parties would undertake the coordination of the Operational Mechanism (Mecanisme Operationnel de Coordination) with the assistance of MINUSMA, following the national armed forces' redeployment. This redeployment will consider the balance between southern and northern soldiers at all levels.

The agreement sets the cantonment, integration and disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion process working concomitantly with the cantonment of former rebels. These programs would be conducted under the supervision of the MINUSMA and national commission on disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion (DDR). The government created a national council for security sector reform with representatives of all northern

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<sup>136</sup> Accord Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Mali Issu du Processus d'Alger [Peace and Reconciliation Agreement Resulting from the Algiers Process in Mali in 2015], 6, <https://photos.state.gov/libraries/mali/328671/peace-accord-translations/1-accord-paix-et-reconciliation-francais.pdf>

communities to develop a national vision on security and defense, considering local, regional, national, and international factors. The parties agreed to fight against terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking. Additionally, the government needed to create a development zone for the northern regions with a consultative council composed of representatives of local assemblies.

This development zone was intended to develop the northern region within ten to 15 years. The central government has agreed to the opening of higher education institutions in the northern part of the country. Furthermore, the government set the creation of a transitional justice commission, focusing especially on truth, justice, and reconciliation. In addition, the government will create a commission to fight corruption and financial delinquencies. Moreover, traditional, and customary law into the justice system have to be integrated with the state law without causing prejudice to existing law. The central government must assist farmers; this assistance would include seeds and fertilizers subsidies. The government also has to reinforce animal health through renovation of veterinarian facilities in northern regions. The government has to support vulnerable populations through food distribution. Another important element is the development of infrastructure, mainly roads, in the northern and central regions, as well as the realization of solar and diesel plants in northern and central towns, along with the construction of regional health centers in Gao and Menaka, and the building of schools according to a new education planning.

From March 27, 2017, to April 2, 2017, in compliance with the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the government organized the Conference of National Understanding.<sup>137</sup> The goal of the conference was to start dialogue and discuss the underlying causes of the conflict between the Malian government and insurgent groups that did not support jihadism.<sup>138</sup> However, the recommendation to institute dialogue with local jihadist leaders provoked serious concern on the part of the French foreign Minister Jean

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<sup>137</sup> Alex Thurston, "Speaking with Jihadists: Mali Weighs Its Options," IPI Global Observatory, accessed November 8, 2018, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/05/jihadism-mali-al-qaeda-france-keita/>.

<sup>138</sup> Alex Thurston, "Mali's Conference of National Understanding," Sahel Blog, last modified March 29, 2017, <https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2017/03/30/malis-conference-of-national-understanding/>.

Marc Ayrault, who said, “We are in a fight. It is a fight without ambiguity against terrorism.... And so there is only one way, there is not two.”<sup>139</sup> This assertion demonstrated the importance and weight of the key international players in the conflict resolution in Mali.

### **C. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE MALIAN CRISIS**

The transitional leaders of Mali requested that the UN authorize the deployment of international forces to Mali on September 18, 2012. This deployment assisted the Malian military in conquering the regions under terrorist rule.<sup>140</sup> On October 12, 2012, the same transitional government demanded UN assistance in the determination of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the arresting of perpetrators of such crimes in northern Mali. After these requests, the terrorist organizations attacked southern Mali, at which point the international community decided to intervene in Mali. The following African-led and international missions intervened in Mali: AFISMA, Operation Serval, EUTM, EUCAP, MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane, and lastly, the Sahel G5, which is a local organization focused on tackling local problems, such as economic development, and the fighting of terrorism. The ECOWAS and AU took the lead to assist Mali to build up its armed forces and reconquer its territory in the hands of diverse jihadist groups.

#### **1. African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)**

The African-led mission could not be deployed before the French intervention, although the decision to intervene in Mali was taken by the ECOWAS in the aftermath of the March 22, 2012, coup d'état in Mali.<sup>141</sup> The ECOWAS had been prone to negotiate with the secular and local jihadist groups and requested the Ansar Dine to sever its tie with the AQIM.<sup>142</sup> These negotiations were hugely time consuming, and ECOWAS set a date for military intervention on September 2013.<sup>143</sup> However, the “UNSC resolution 2056 of

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<sup>139</sup> Thurston, “Speaking with Jihadists.”

<sup>140</sup> “Security Council Authorizes Deployment of African-Led International Support Mission in Mali for Initial Year-Long Period, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,” Welcome to the United Nations, accessed November 8, 2018, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10870.doc.htm>.

<sup>141</sup> Boas and Torheim, “The International Intervention in Mali,” 422.

<sup>142</sup> Boas and Torheim, 422.

<sup>143</sup> Boas and Torheim, 422.

5 July 2012 expressed support for the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the African Union and transitional authorities in Mali to restore the country's territorial integrity.”<sup>144</sup> According to Susanna D. Wing, the African-led mission was symbolic because at the inception of the operation, it had no sufficiently trained or equipped troops in Mali to counter the well-equipped Islamic militants.<sup>145</sup> On December 20, 2012, the UN Security Council Resolution 2085 authorized the deployment of AFISMA with some specific objectives.<sup>146</sup> Some of these objectives were as follows: the AFISMA had the duty to contribute to the combat readiness of Malian defense and security forces, in coordination with other partners like the EU and other UN members, in order to reconquer the northern regions with the support of the African-led mission. Additionally, AFISMA had to support the government of Mali to secure the distribution of humanitarian aid throughout the northern regions and the return of internally displaced people and refugees in coordination with UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations (NGO). Furthermore, the African-led mission would report to the Security Council every 60 days about its troops' deployment and the beginning of the military operation to recover the three regions in Mali. Furthermore, the mission had to inform the Security Council on the restoration of democracy and the negotiations process with groups that had agreed to abandon all links with terrorist organizations.

The Security Council called upon all its members to assist the AFISMA in terms of training, equipment, intelligence, and logistics in order to fulfill the mission's goals, which were the neutralization of terrorist organizations in Mali. The EU decided to provide transportation means to AFISMA contingents and equipment to reach Mali and allow the African-led mission to reach its full operational strength.<sup>147</sup> The EU also decided to support

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<sup>144</sup> Sergei Boeke and Bart Schuurman, “Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, no. 6 (2015): xx, doi:10.1080/01402390.2015.1045494.

<sup>145</sup> Susanna D. Wing, “French Intervention in Mali: Strategic Alliances, Long-term Regional Presence?,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 1 (2016): 65, doi:10.1080/09592318.2016.1123433.

<sup>146</sup> “Security Council Authorizes Deployment of African-Led International Support Mission in Mali.”

<sup>147</sup> RP Defense, “EEAS Provides a ‘Clearing House’ Mechanism to Support AFISMA Mission in Mali,” RP Defense, accessed November 8, 2018, <http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/article-eeas-provides-a-clearing-house-mechanism-to-support-afisma-mission-in-mali-114605689.html>.

AFISMA financially. AFISMA deployed 6,000 soldiers after the French intervention, many of whom would barely participate in any fighting in the early stage.<sup>148</sup> In contrast, 2,000 Chadian service members were engaged in fierce battles against Islamic militants in the north.<sup>149</sup>

After the starting of Operation Serval, the African-led mission began its limited deployment in Mali. Then, in April 2013, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) took resolution 2100, which stipulated the fusion of AFISMA into MINUSMA.<sup>150</sup> In July 2, 2013, an official ceremony was held in Bamako to mark the effective transfer of authority to the MINUSMA.<sup>151</sup> AFISMA lacked trained personnel and equipment, and those shortfalls forced the French government to promptly intervene in northern Mali when a coalition of jihadist organizations launched an attack against south Mali.

## **2. Operation Serval**

The advance of Islamic movement toward the south and the possible fall of the country into the hands of terrorists motivated French intervention. In early January 2013, jihadist groups launched an offensive against the south,<sup>152</sup> and quickly captured Konna. This capture posed a serious threat to Mopti, a main town of central Mali.<sup>153</sup> Before AQIM, An Sardine, and MUJWA moved to the south, France did not have troops in Mali. After Malian independence, the new state leaders had requested France to remove its military personnel and installations. Therefore, on January 10, 2013, the Malian interim president requested the French intervention and petitioned “the UN for military assistance.”<sup>154</sup> The French relied on their troops stationed in Africa. They had 250 soldiers in Senegal, 950

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<sup>148</sup> Boeke and Schuurman, “Operation Serval,” 814.

<sup>149</sup> Boeke and Schuurman, 814.

<sup>150</sup> Tchioffo Kodjo, “AFISMA Transfers Its Authority to MINUSMA-African Union - Peace and Security Department,” African Union, Peace and Security Department, accessed November 8, 2018, <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/afisma-transfers-its-authority-to-minusma>.

<sup>151</sup> Kodjo, “AFISMA Transfers Its Authority to MINUSMA.

<sup>152</sup> Boeke and Schuurman, 808.

<sup>153</sup> Dan E. Stigall, “The French Military Intervention in Mali, Counter-Terrorism, and the Law of Armed Conflict,” *Military Law Review* 223, no. 1 (January 2015): 4.

<sup>154</sup> Boeke and Schuurman, 801.

troops and fighter planes in Chad, 450 military personnel in Cote d'Ivoire, and lastly, 400 men based in Burkina Faso for special operations equipped with ISR and helicopters.<sup>155</sup> On January 11, 2013, the French simultaneously launched airstrikes and Special Forces to stop the jihadists' advance through southern Mali.<sup>156</sup> Two days later, the French president declared that the intervention had three objectives: stop terrorist attacks; secure Mali, which has thousands of French citizens; and favor the recovery of Malian territorial integrity.<sup>157</sup> According to Michael Robert Shurkin, an unannounced fourth goal was to liberate French, Dutch, Swedish, and South African hostages in AQIM hands.<sup>158</sup> Nevertheless, France's initial objective was to stop terrorist advances and wait for local and international troops authorized by the UN to continue the operations.<sup>159</sup> Approximately five hours after the meeting of the French president with France's defense council, French Special Forces helicopters and fighter jets engaged Islamic militants on the frontline at Konna.<sup>160</sup> At the same time, conventional forces stationed in Africa and France were moving to Bamako to secure foreigners and the capital city of Mali.<sup>161</sup> At its peak, Operation Serval counted around 4,000 soldiers, and the African-led mission troops were around 6,400.<sup>162</sup> Chad alone had 2,300 soldiers, who were deployed alongside the French troops to fight in the north of Mali; other African troops were in the south.<sup>163</sup> Operation Serval triggered the deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission and favored international donors' investments in Mali.<sup>164</sup> During the intervention, the French military noticed the weaknesses

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<sup>155</sup>Michael Robert Shurkin, *France's War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2014), 7, [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR700/RR770/RAND\\_RR770.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR770/RAND_RR770.pdf)

<sup>156</sup> Boeke and Schuurman, 801.

<sup>157</sup> Shurkin, *France's War in Mali*, 8.

<sup>158</sup> Shurkin, 9.

<sup>159</sup> Shurkin, 9.

<sup>160</sup> Antoine D'Evry, "l'Operation Serval a l'Epreuve du Doute Vrais Succes et Fausses Lecons [Operation Serval has the Test of Doubt Real Success and False Lessons]," *Focus Strategique*, no. 59 (July 2015): 22, [https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fs59devry\\_0.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fs59devry_0.pdf).

<sup>161</sup> d'Evry, "l'Operation Serval [Operation Serval]," 22.

<sup>162</sup> Stigall, "The French Military Intervention in Mali," 6.

<sup>163</sup> Stigall, 6.

<sup>164</sup> Boeke and Schuurman, 819.

of the Malian defense and security forces. The French noticed many flaws in the Malian armed forces, which paved the way for Malian government to request the EU's assistance in the training and development of Malian defense and security forces.

### **3. European Union Training Mission (EUTM)**

The government of Mali requested the EU to train the country's armed forces, and on February 18, 2013, the EU, in line with the UN resolution 2085, accepted Mali's request.<sup>165</sup> Consequently, 22 EU countries are participating in the EU training mission (EUTM) with 500 personnel, which includes 200 trainers and elements for the protection of installations.<sup>166</sup> The main objective of the EUTM is to “deliver advice to the Ministry of Defense and Malian Armed Forces (MAF) authorities and staff, military education and training to the MAF, in order to support the Malian authorities to reach a self-sustainable MAF able to contribute to the defense of the Malian territory and to the protection of the Malian population.”<sup>167</sup> The objective of the EUTM is to train 26 regiments, which is around 17,000 military personnel, by the end of 2019.<sup>168</sup> According to Emma Skeppström, Cecilia Hull Wiklund, and Micheal Jonsson, EUTM's mission in Mali can be seen as a “counter-insurgency proxy” because the EUTM trained the Malian Armed Forces with the goal to give those forces the capacity to fight internal threats and subsequently gain the ability to replace international forces.<sup>169</sup> The EU civilian mission to build the capacity of the internal security forces subsequently joined the EUTM in Mali.

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<sup>165</sup> “About Us,” Home - EUTM Mali, accessed November 8, 2018, <http://eutmmali.eu/en/about-us/>.

<sup>166</sup> Claire Mills, “In Brief: International Military Forces in Mali - Commons Library Briefing - UK Parliament,” Research Briefings, accessed November 8, 2018, <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06615>.

<sup>167</sup> “About Us.”

<sup>168</sup> Christopher Griffin, “Operation Barkhane and Boko Haram: French Counterterrorism and Military Cooperation in the Sahel,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (2016): 905, doi:10.1080/09592318.2016.1208283.

<sup>169</sup> Emma Skeppström, Cecilia Hull Wiklund, and Michael Jonsson, “European Union Training Missions: security sector reform or counter-insurgency by proxy?,” *European Security* 24, no. 2 (2014): 354, doi:10.1080/09662839.2014.972382.

#### **4. European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP)**

On February 20, 2014, the government of Mali invited the EU to deploy a nonmilitary mission, which would provide training and capacity development to its internal security personnel.<sup>170</sup> The following month, on March 17, 2014, the EU Council accepted the Crisis Management Concept and opened the possibility to assist Mali under the Common Security and Defense Policy.<sup>171</sup> The European Union Capacity Building Mission's (EUCAP) initial objectives were to assist the Malian Police, Gendarmerie, and the National Guard "to restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy throughout the territory of Mali by means of an effective redeployment of its administration."<sup>172</sup> Moreover, the EUCAP assisted Malian internal security forces (ISF) to conduct the security sector reforms with some specific targets, such as:

- Improving ISF operational capability and efficiency;
- Participating in the re-establishment of the ISF hierarchical chain of commands;
- Ensuring the role of judicial and administrative authorities in the management and supervision of their tasks; and
- Facilitating the ISF and administration redeployment to the north of Mali.<sup>173</sup>

#### **5. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)**

On April 25, 2013, the UNSC resolution 2100 authorized an international mission in Mali. The UNSC gave a robust mandate to the mission, which was "the use of all

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<sup>170</sup>"Council of European Union Legislative Acts and Other Instruments," Data.consilium.eu, last modified March 2014, 3, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8109-2014-REV-1/en/pdf>.

<sup>171</sup> Council of the European Union Legislative Acts and Other Instruments, 3.

<sup>172</sup> Council of the European Union Legislative Acts and Other Instruments, 4.

<sup>173</sup>Council of the European Union Legislative Acts and Other Instruments, 4 .

necessary means to address threats to the implementation of its mandate.”<sup>174</sup> The mission was supposed to have the strength of 11,200 soldiers and 1,440 police officers. The military personnel also had a reserve battalion, which could be called upon if necessary.

The main objectives of the MINUSMA were as follows:

- Support the return of democracy in Mali, and execute stabilization missions.
- Facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid.
- Protect human rights.
- Create conditions for the return of displaced persons.
- Participate in the extension of state authority in the northern part.
- Prepare free, inclusive, and peaceful elections.
- Conduct unilateral operations or bilateral operations with the defense and security forces of Mali.<sup>175</sup>

In 2015, the UN changed the mission mandate by including elements after the signatures of the Bamako Peace Accord on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali due to the degradation of the security situation of the country. Moreover, the number of military and police personnel increased. The actual numbers of police officers grew to 1,920, and soldiers 13,289.<sup>176</sup> Then, resolution 2423 adopted in 2018 stressed the necessity of the mission “to focus on political tasks and its support for the restoration of the State authority to the Centre of Mali, which is in the midst of a growing cycle of violence.”<sup>177</sup> The goal of

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<sup>174</sup> United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 2, <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history>

<sup>175</sup> United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali, 1, <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/mandate-0>

<sup>176</sup> United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali, 1, <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/mandate-0>

<sup>177</sup> “Mandate,” MINUSMA, last modified July 23, 2018, <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/mandate-0>.

the Pact for Peace was to “accelerate the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation and enhance coherence of international efforts in Mali.”<sup>178</sup> The new resolution requested the secretary-general to focus on a drafting of a “Pact for Peace,” which was a roadmap document between the government of Mali and the UN for the conduct of presidential and legislative elections in 2018. The newly elected president would have to implement the Peace Accord six months after his election. Furthermore, the UN mission would prioritize the quick implementation of political and institutional reforms mentioned in the Peace Accord signed in 2015 between the government of Mali, the Plateforme, and coordination of armed groups. In addition, the mission would “restore and extend the State authority and the rule of law throughout the national territory and supporting defense and security measures, as well as reconciliation and justice measures.”<sup>179</sup> The new mandate also would foster the state authority in the central part of Mali. Another important component of the resolution was the preservation of the “ceasefire, support to the cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups as well as the redeployment of the Malian Defense forces and Security Forces especially in the North of Mali.”<sup>180</sup> The deployment of the UN peacekeepers facilitated the reduction of French troops’ strength in Mali, and the French ended Operation Serval and created a new operation with fewer troops, with a different mission.

## **6. Operation Barkhane**

The French government decided to combine its operations in the Sahel into a new mission, Operation Barkhane. As noted by Christopher Griffin, on October 1, 2014, Operations Epervier and Serval were closed, and combined to create Operation Barkhane.<sup>181</sup> This new operation represented an objective to assist the Sahel countries in their fight against terrorism and to hamper terrorist organizations’ development in the

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<sup>178</sup> “Mandate,” MINUSMA.

<sup>179</sup> “Mandate,” MINUSMA.

<sup>180</sup> “Mandate,” MINUSMA.

<sup>181</sup> Griffin, “Operation Barkhane and Boko Haram,” 907.

region.<sup>182</sup> The new operation was headquartered at N'Djamena, Chad, and had the strength of “3000–3500 soldiers, 200 armored vehicles, six fighter aircraft, three drones, and a variety of transport equipment.”<sup>183</sup> Barkhane troops were divided across the Sahel, with 1,000 of French military personnel based in Gao, northern Mali, and the command center in N'Djamena, Chad, with 1,200 troops. The intelligence center was installed in Niger with 300 service members, and, finally, the Special Forces were based in Burkina Faso.<sup>184</sup> The French forces’ inability to control important parts of Malian territory and the lack of security in Mali’s neighboring countries pushed France to initiate the Sahel G5.

## **7. Sahel G5**

The Sahel G5 members are Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad.<sup>185</sup> These countries came together on February 16, 2014 to create an organization to address the root causes of the Sahel insecurity. The Sahel G5 has two components, security and economic development projects. However, the military component is soaring compared to the development element. The African Union and the UNSC with the resolution 2359 on June 21, 2017 approved the joint force; France introduced this resolution.<sup>186</sup> The main objectives of the Sahel G5 are to:<sup>187</sup>

- Guarantee conditions of development and security in the space of the member countries;
- Offer a strategic intervention framework to improve the living conditions of the population;

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<sup>182</sup> Griffin, 907.

<sup>183</sup> Griffin, 907.

<sup>184</sup> Wing, “French Intervention in Mali,” 69

<sup>185</sup> “LE G5 SAHEL,” Accueil - SECRETARIAT PERMANENT DU G5 SAHEL, accessed November 8, 2018, <http://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/qui-sommes-nous/le-g5-sahel>.

<sup>186</sup> “G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance,” France Diplomatie: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, accessed November 8, 2018, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/>.

<sup>187</sup> “G5 Sahel Joint Force.”

- Combine development and security, supported by democracy and good governance in a framework of mutually beneficial regional and international cooperation; and
- Promote inclusive and sustainable regional development.

Going forward, the Sahel G5 military wing will have 5,000 soldiers from member countries' armed forces.<sup>188</sup> The organization was able to conduct 18 operations since 2015.<sup>189</sup> Unfortunately, jihadists were able to reconstitute after each operation. Another concern is that the new organization will mainly depend on international financing, which is not guaranteed.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

The government of Mali, unable to defeat the insurgent groups, engaged in negotiations with insurgents. These negotiations resulted in the signing of the Tamanrasset peace agreement, and subsequently, the signing of the National Pact. The 1992 National Pact's goals were the integration of insurgents into the security forces and public administration, the reinsertion of others into socio-economic life, and the decentralization of northern Mali. Yet, these initiatives did not bring peace in northern Mali. In 2006, a new insurgency started in the Kidal region; the government negotiated and signed another peace deal with the insurgents in Algeria. The new agreement considered the National Pact as the core document and established the same developmental goal of the pact for Kidal region.

As with the National Pact, the 2006 agreement ultimately did not bring satisfactory answers to the insurgents' grievances. In 2011, northern Mali insurgents and their brothers from Gaddafi's former foreign legion launched an insurgency. These insurgents were joined by terrorist organizations in the Sahel, forming a coalition, which led to some victories for the insurgents and terrorists against Malian forces. These victories led to a coup d'état against the democratically elected president of Mali. A few days after the

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<sup>188</sup> "Mali: G5 Force Deployment Could Aid Wider Peace," Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service 24 (Nov 2017):1, 4.

<sup>189</sup> "Mali: G5 Force Deployment, 4.

military coup, the three northern regions fell under the control of insurgent and terrorist organizations, but this coalition fell apart when the terrorists defeated their secular former allies in all the main towns of northern Mali.

This victory of the terrorists forced the international community to assist Mali in its fight against terrorist groups. In January 2013, the French launched Operation Serval in coordination with Chadian troops of the AFISMA. The French with the assistance of the Chadians dismantled the terrorist groups' stronghold towns. In 2014, the UN took a new resolution to transfer the authority of the AFISMA to the MINUSMA, which is an international mission for the stabilization of Mali. After the deployment of the MINUSMA, the French reduced their troop strength and created a new operation in the Sahel called Operation Barkhane. Moreover, the EU decided to train Malian defense and security forces through the EUTM in 2013 and EUCAP in 2014. Finally, the Sahel countries decided to create a new organization called the Sahel G5, which can assist the member countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad—to address the root causes of the insurgency and terrorism in the region and fight against current organizations.

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## **IV. OVERVIEW OF THE FAILURES OF BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RESPONSES**

This chapter analyzes the methods applied by successive Malian governments and their international partners to resolve the various insurrections, and the failures of these approaches. The first section of this chapter assesses the concrete applications of agreements and the causes of the resulting failures. The government of Mali decided to implement the National Pact, a comprehensive document for the voluntary integration of former insurgents into the security forces, the reinsertion into socio-economic life of insurgents who did not join the security services, and the decentralization of authorities and resources. The second section analyzes the international community's intervention and its failures to address the crisis, starting with the French intervention in 2013 that gave serious hope of ending the terrorist occupation of territory in northern Mali. That intervention was coupled with the progressive deployment of the African led-mission and later the deployment of the UN-led mission, the MINUSMA. The second section concludes with an analysis of the EUTM, EUCAP, and the Sahel G5; these missions' objective was to train Malian forces to fight terrorist organizations. Ultimately, no international initiatives have reduced the insecurity in northern Mali. Moreover, the insecurity has even expanded to the central part, which was safer before the interventions. The international community made it clear that the fight against terrorism without negotiation is not optional. Therefore, an inter-Malian meeting on a durable peace settlement was requested on several occasions to negotiate with various local terrorist organizations. The conflict resolution tools applied by the government of Mali worked in the short term, but failed to settle peace in the long term. The international community has the same goals as the Malian government to find the right solutions to end the crisis.

### **A. FAILURE OF INTERNAL RESPONSES**

The government of Mali resolved the 1990s insurrections by negotiating with insurgents. According to the report by the Panel I committee, the Tamanrasset Agreement

was signed January 6, 1991.<sup>190</sup> Yet, the Panel I committee explains that the application of the agreement stopped due to the March 26, 1991 military coup against General Moussa Traore's dictatorial regime. In addition, the Panel report adds that all the negotiations undertaken to arrive at the agreement were between the government and various warlords in the absence of notable leaders and other communities in northern Mali. As noted by Jennifer C. Seely, the government of General Traore faced another internal threat, which was the democratic movement led by students and unions.<sup>191</sup> This second factor forced Traore's government to reach a quick agreement with a single movement, the MFUA, in which the government accepted the withdrawal of the armed forces from some localities. This decision would naturally weaken the government's ability to undertake any serious military intervention in northern Mali without breaching its commitment to respect the National Pact and other requirements of the agreements.

The conflict resolution strategy in the Malian insurrections of the 1990s was based on the National Pact. The pact served as a comprehensive conflict resolution tool, which received the full support of the international community, and its DDR program received donors' contributions. The government and its partners focused on the National Pact to launch the DDR program. The first scheme was the integration of former insurgents into the military, paramilitary, and the civil service; the second phase was the reinsertion of alleged combatants into the socio-economic life, in which the Mali partners played a key role; and last scheme was the decentralization of the northern regions of Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal.

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<sup>190</sup>“Panel I Bilan de la Mise en Aeuve des Instruments Juridiques Ayant Mis Fin aux Rebellions Passees et la Preparation des Futures Negociations (Cadres et Instruments de Negociation) [Panel I Review of the Implementation of Legal Instruments Ending Passed Rebellions and the Preparation of Future Negotiations (Frames and Negotiation Instruments)],” Home Page - Fr.solidaritenordsud, accessed November 9, 2018, [http://fr.solidaritenordsud.net/res/site107721/res793951\\_QUADRO-E-STRUMENTI-DI-NEGOZIAZIONE-SEYDOU-TRAORE-ED-ALTRI...-Panel-1\\_Bilan-et-ne-gociation-Notes-pour-la-Rapporteur-Ge-ne-ral-.pdf](http://fr.solidaritenordsud.net/res/site107721/res793951_QUADRO-E-STRUMENTI-DI-NEGOZIAZIONE-SEYDOU-TRAORE-ED-ALTRI...-Panel-1_Bilan-et-ne-gociation-Notes-pour-la-Rapporteur-Ge-ne-ral-.pdf).

<sup>191</sup> Jennifer C. Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 3 (2001): 39, doi:10.1017/s0022278x0100369x.

## 1. Creation of the Commission for the North

In compliance with the National Pact, the government created the National Commission for the North. According to Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim Ag Youssouf, the government of Mali, in an effort to achieve the final settlement of the conflict, created the Commissariat au Nord [Commission for the North] as an office directly under the president of the republic.<sup>192</sup> Poulton and Youssouf add that the office had a mission to ensure the application of the National Pact and ensure the implementation of the decentralization.<sup>193</sup>

### a. *Integration of Combatants of the United Movements and Fronts of Azawad*

Poulton and Youssouf state that in February 1993, the government of Mali and the United Movements and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA) agreed to integrate the insurgents into the security forces; yet, the government was unable to ensure a smooth transition. The two authors explain the integration process as follows: 640 insurgents would integrate into the armed forces as officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted; 13 former insurgents who had university degrees would receive appointments as advisors to ministries; and the leader of the political wing of the MFUA was appointed as the deputy commissioner for the north.<sup>194</sup> The government of Mali, the Popular Movement for Azawad (MPA), and Islamic Front of Azawad (FIA) exploited this agreement. On one hand, the government exploited the two insurgent groups to fight other Tuareg tribes, segments that had not agreed with the peace settlement. On the other, the MFUA took advantage of the agreement to subdue other Tuareg tribes, which were seeking to challenge Ifoghas's domination over other communities. Nonetheless, Poulton and Youssouf mention that in reality, the new

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<sup>192</sup> Robin Edward Poulton and Ibrahim Ag Youssouf, *Paix de Tombouctou- Gestion Democratique-Developpement-Construction Africaine de la Paix* (Geneve: UNIDIR, 1999), 129, <http://malilink.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/20160915-Paix-de-Tombouctou.pdf>.

<sup>193</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, *Paix de Tombouctou* [Peace of Tombouctou], 106.

<sup>194</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 72.

insurgents who integrated into the armed forces never fully joined the spirit of the unique force of the country.<sup>195</sup>

Poulton and Youssouf's analysis is accurate. The former insurgents, knowing the weaknesses of the Malian system, generally requested to serve in their areas of birth, which was accepted by the hierarchy. In the future, these requests would prove problematic. For example, in 2012 in the wake of residual attacks against some Malian military barracks in the northern part of the country, the commander of the National Guard decided to deploy some northern soldiers in the south. These soldiers challenged this decision, and, subsequently, the presidency of the republic of Mali intervened to cancel the decisions. Secondly, when the recruits from the north deserted from the National Guard training center and the decision was taken to fire them, that decision was challenged and canceled for the sake of peace.

***b. Inclusive Negotiations***

As previously stated, only one group, which benefited from the terms of the agreement, signed the first agreement; further negotiations were organized to include others. As noted by Poulton and Youssouf, in 1994, further negotiations were held in Tamanrasset, Algeria, and the leader of the MFUA, Zahaby, requested the integration of 2,360 personnel into the security forces, and 800 into the public administration. In fact, these requests were due to the internal competition between different components of the MFUA, but other insurgent groups were not included. The goal of Zahaby was to have 80 percent of the integration slots for his faction and reserve the remaining 20 percent for other groups. As stated by Poulton and Youssouf, the government delegation played the mediator role between insurgent groups to resolve these issues.<sup>196</sup> It must be noted that from 1991 to the preliminary agreement for the 2013 elections, the government of Mali never negotiated a peace agreement that applied to all the groups. In general, the key players of these negotiations were the combatants who, particularly, looked for material incentives and forgot other groups of insurgents. This policy to resolve the insurrection case by case

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<sup>195</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 73.

<sup>196</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 74.

increased the complexity of the crisis resolution. Consequently, in addition to the 640 MFUA soldiers, the government agreed to integrate other insurgents from the MFUA and other insurgent groups.

*c. Census and Integration of Some Insurgents*

The government and insurgent groups were engaged in a battle of numerical figures over the real number of former insurgents. Eventually, the number of 9,000, declared by the MFUA, became 11,000 when combined with the combatants of the Ganda Koy. When former combatants of other movements were taken into account, this figure rose to 11,645, of which 2,078 were in the process of being integrated into the military and paramilitary services.<sup>197</sup> However, the government did not foresee a smooth transition after the integration of insurgents into the security services. According to Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, the security services of Mali did not draft any policy to guide the integration of insurgents.<sup>198</sup> This fact complicated the transition from insurgents to soldiers; some of the integrated soldiers never espoused the spirit to serve the unique nation. The objective of most insurgents was to serve in their local areas and the military leadership favored that practice.

The Program to Support the Socio-economic Reintegration of Former Combatants in Northern Mali (PAREM) recorded 9,000 candidates for demobilization, disarmament, and reinsertion at a cost of 5 billion CFA francs, and the Ministry of Defense conducted another evaluation to identify insurgents for integration into the security forces. The first challenge for the Ministry of Defense, however, was to determine criteria for identification of elements of armed groups who were really combatants.<sup>199</sup> According to Poulton and Youssouf, the defense evaluation identified at least 2,000 probable candidates for military service, giving a good statistic for future integration programs. The Ministry of Defense revised this figure by estimating the maximum number of former combatants at 3,000 for

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<sup>197</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 122.

<sup>198</sup> Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and Rebecca S. Zimmerman, *Mali's Next Battle, Improving Counterterrorism Capabilities* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017), 62, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1241.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1241.html).

<sup>199</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 121.

a cost of 900 million CFA francs. The insurgents, however, protested this figure by explaining the temporary absence of combatants. Poulton and Youssouf's explanation demonstrates that neither the government of Mali nor the insurgents were able to come to an accurate figure to conduct the DDR process.

The government proposed to recruit 1,000 insurgents into the armed forces and 120 into public administration, and rejected all requests for the appointment of ministerial functions based on ethnic characteristics.<sup>200</sup> After four months in the cantonment sites practicing sports and watching movies, 1,500 men were selected for the security forces. These recruits took six months of military training and were sworn in under the national flag on September 22, 1996, the day of the 36th anniversary of Mali's independence.<sup>201</sup> Another 150 former insurgents were recruited into public service. Table 1 identifies the number of insurgents recruited into the military and paramilitary services, which was 1,479, and another 149 were recruited into public administration, which brought the total number of insurgents recruited to 1,648.<sup>202</sup>

Table 1. Numbers of Former Insurgents Integrated into Military and Public Services. Source MFAAC.<sup>203</sup>

|       | Military and Paramilitary Services | Total |
|-------|------------------------------------|-------|
| 1     | Armed Forces                       | 1199  |
| 2     | Police                             | 150   |
| 3     | Custom Service                     | 100   |
| 4     | Forest Service                     | 50    |
| Total |                                    | 1479  |

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<sup>200</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, *Paix de Tombouctou*, 123.

<sup>201</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, *Paix de Tombouctou*, 124.

<sup>202</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, *Paix de Tombouctou*, 124.

<sup>203</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, *Paix de Tombouctou*, 125

*d. Program to Support the Socio-economic Reintegration of Former Combatants in Northern Mali (PAREM)*

After the integration process, the second plan was the Programme d'appui à la réinsertion socio-économique des ex-combattants du Nord Mali (Program to Support the Socio-economic Reintegration of Former Combatants in Northern Mali, or PAREM).<sup>204</sup> According to Poulton and Youssouf, the PAREM had three goals. The political objective was to reduce the aggressiveness of former combatants by integrating them into the society. The economic objective was the creation of jobs and greater opportunities for youth other than insurrection. The security objective was to create conditions for the quick investment of the \$200 million promised by donors to develop northern Mali, an amount which would increase to \$500 million.<sup>205</sup> These investment goals facilitated the reintegration of demobilized members of the armed groups in the society, and it was coordinated by the UNPD and NGOs. The UNDP and NGOs relied on the PAREM for the conducting of a census of armed groups' combatants.

The PAREM started the census of insurgents. According to Poulton and Youssouf, the PAREM files on May 16, 1996, showed 6,000 former combatants who did participate in the cantonment. Moreover, in December 1997 the PAREM gave the Figure 7,852, to which they added 1,659 people from a previous cantonment who did not receive enrollment in the government services. The PAREM in total managed 9,511 individuals from diverse insurgent groups, and the origin of these elements was as follows: 2,416 from Kidal, 3,801 from Gao, and 3,294 from Tombouctou. The insurgents who did not integrate into security services received some incentives from the UNDP to start revenue-generating activities.

According to Poulton and Youssouf, the UNDP pretended to invest more than \$200 million for the development of northern Mali. As the authors note, from 1996 to 1997, few external donors significantly invested in these regions. Two that did reach set goals were the Programme Mali Nord [North Mali Program], financed by Germany, and the UNHCR. These programs participated considerably in the reinstallation of displaced populations in

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<sup>204</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 129.

<sup>205</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 130.

the west zone of Tombouctou. The UNHCR worked through many contractors who had sadly less experience.<sup>206</sup>

The UN helped the government finance the reinsertion of insurgents into society. The cantonment, though, was fully financed by the government of Mali. The UNDP special fund paid \$200 for each of the 3,000 demobilized combatants who were able to bring a weapon and \$100 to each of the 7,000 who were unable to bring a weapon. The insurgents' leadership identified these elements for the PAREM. Yet, these 3,000 and 7,000 personnel did not go through the cantonment. These figures demonstrated that the government, for political reasons, accepted the 9,000 former combatants requested by insurgent groups at the beginning of the process.<sup>207</sup> The allocation of \$200 or \$100 could not assist someone in leaving the insurrection. The PAREM paid 55,000 CFA francs to the remaining former combatants for their reinsertion in the society.<sup>208</sup> These amounts could not smoothly guarantee the reinsertion of former insurgents or their collaborators into the civil society.

Moreover, the National Pact endorsed by both the insurgents and the government of Mali suffered the same lack of application. As described by the Panel I committee, between 1994 and 2000, some revolts and desertions occurred, and the deserters accused the government of delaying the application of the National Pact. The panel explicitly ascertained that the government tried to resolve all these crises politically without addressing the real causes of the revolts or desertions. For example, the government created local governments in Menaka, Alata and Tinessako, Intadjedit. The goal of the creation of the two local governments, however, satisfied only some communities.

## **2. Government Support for Policy of Division**

The government policy to favor some tribes triggered the 2006 insurrection. According to the panel, the government began to privilege some intermediary tribes rather than notable leaders in Kidal, or other big Tuareg and Arab tribes. The Panel I committee

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<sup>206</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 84.

<sup>207</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 122.

<sup>208</sup> Poulton and Youssouf, 124.

also described the prominence of the Ifoghas in most of the national and local elections without any transparency, equity, and freedom for the communities to choose their own candidates during the election processes. According to Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, in 2008, then President Amadou Toumani Toure did not want to negotiate with the Ifoghas; rather, he decided to support the Arab and Imaghad tribes to counter an Ifoghas-led insurgency.<sup>209</sup> This approach was successful in the short term because it ended the insurrection. However, as explained by Pezard and Shurkin, the president's decision to empower the Imaghad and the Arabs polarized the existing opposition between the Ifoghas and other tribes. This was due to the clan and sub-clans hierarchy being a source of conflict in northern Mali. Since the independence of Mali, the new state did not achieve the transformation of the country into a modern state in which local chiefs have less power. In northern Mali, ethnic lineage determines an individual's position in the society due to an established hierarchy among tribes. According to Amy R. Poteete, Botswana's first leaders transformed the local chieftaincy to an honorific entity within local government without any power, and Botswana's state resources were allocated to the local governments that were held accountable.<sup>210</sup> Mali must learn the lesson from Botswana and reduce the power of traditional leaders who have seriously challenged the three branches of power in the country.

### **3. Agency for Integrated Development of Northern Mali (ADIN) and Agency for Northern Development (ADN)**

At the end of the first insurgency, the Malian government implemented the socio-economic development of northern Mali through two agencies: the Agency for Integrated Development of Northern Region (ADIN) and the Agency of Northern Development (ADN). The first program did not have available data online. The second initiative was initiated around 2006 and is still operating. According to the newspaper *Malijet*, from 2006 to 2011, the ADN dug 23 wells for villages, 10 wells for herders, 11 wells as tanks, and 22

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<sup>209</sup>Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, *Toward a Secure and Stable Mali: Approaches to Engaging Local Actors* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 9.

<sup>210</sup> Amy R. Poteete, "Is Development Path Dependent or Political? A Reinterpretation of Mineral-Dependent Development in Botswana," *Journal of Development Studies* 45, no. 4 (2009): 10, doi:10.1080/00220380802265488.

drilled wells equipped with solar or manual pumps. In addition, they built eight classrooms, fenced three schools, built two schools' administrative buildings, renovated three parks for the vaccination of cattle, and constructed seven micro dams.<sup>211</sup> Moreover, the same paper reports that the ADN built and equipped 15 micro finance offices, gave loans to seven micro finance organizations, and reinforced the capacity of three others. Furthermore, the *Malijet* explains that for the socio-economic reinsertion effort, the ADN financed 108 projects for 250 youth in Tombouctou, 122 projects for 206 youth in Gao, and 46 projects for 275 youth in Kidal region. In addition, *Malijet* continues that the ADN was expecting one billion CFA francs to finance projects for 4,000 youth.

On the other hand, another local newspaper, the *Maliweb*, describes the management of ADN as horrific. The newspaper describes that billions of national budget funds and funds from the program's technical and financial partners were injected into the ADN.<sup>212</sup> According to the same newspaper, these funds aimed to develop basic infrastructures for Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal for the sedentary and nomad populations. It would allow these populations to start activities generating income, some of which were water points, pastures for herders, and agriculture development, which would allow populations to have work during all seasons. The newspaper explains that the ADN dug a few wells that did not even have water. This cost hundreds of millions of CFA francs and the ADN did not implement any projects to relieve the populations who suffered from lack of water and food. The newspaper questioned where the money went and concluded an audit was necessary.

According to the magazine *Studio Tamani* in an interview in 2014, the director of ADN stated his organization was conducting 39 projects with an estimated cost of 840

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<sup>211</sup> "Agence De Développement Du Nord : Des Réalisations Et Des Perspectives Pour Booster Le Développement Du Septentrion Malien Bamako Mali [North Development Agency: Achievements and Perspectives to Boost the Development of the North of Mali]," *Malijet*, accessed November 9, 2018, [http://malijet.com/actualite\\_dans\\_les\\_regions\\_du\\_mali/rebellion\\_au\\_nord\\_du\\_mali/34315-agence\\_de\\_d\\_developpement\\_du\\_nord\\_des\\_r\\_alisations\\_et\\_des\\_perspect.html](http://malijet.com/actualite_dans_les_regions_du_mali/rebellion_au_nord_du_mali/34315-agence_de_d_developpement_du_nord_des_r_alisations_et_des_perspect.html).

<sup>212</sup> "Agence De Développement Du Nord (ADN): Où Sont Passés Les Milliards CFA Destinés Aux Populations Du Nord ?Northern Development Agency (ADN): Where Are the CFA Billions Going for Northern Populations?]," *Maliweb.net*, last modified May 14, 2012, <https://www.maliweb.net/politique/gestion-affaires-publiques/agence-de-developpement-du-nord-adn-ou-sont-passes-les-milliards-cfa-destines-aux-populations-du-nord-66306.html>.

billion CFA francs. The main projects were the construction of Taoussa dam at a cost of 130 billion CFA francs, as well as Niono-Goma Koura-Tombouctou roads, Tombouctou-Rharous-Taoussa roads, Bourem-Anefis-Kidal roads, and Ansongo-Menaka-Kidal roads.<sup>213</sup> According to the audio recorded by the *Studio Tamani*, the director mentioned that his office already had 420 billion CFA francs for some of the projects and they were looking for the remaining funds for others. Moreover, the journal *Bamada.net* reported that the minister of solidarity, humanitarian action, and northern reconstruction declared in March 2016 that the national budget had the foresight to commit 180 billion CFA francs for education, health, humanitarian action, food security, energy, hydraulic power, and justice.<sup>214</sup> The government of Mali must consider lessons learned from the failures of former projects and hold the managers of these funds accountable. The success of the crisis resolution will depend on the satisfaction of the populations in terms of their development opportunities and well-being.

#### **4. The Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali (PSPSDN)**

From 2008 to 2012, according to *Maliweb*, the government took an initiative to create the Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali (PSPSDN) with the mission to develop northern Mali.<sup>215</sup> As mentioned by *Maliweb*, then President Amadou Toumani Toure stated during a session of the PSPSDN in 2010 that he took this opportunity to present the new Emergency Program for the Eradication of Insecurity in northern Mali. He added that development of the northern regions was the only alternative to mitigate the current threat, and it would be the solution for the long

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<sup>213</sup>“Le Magazine Du 31 Décembre 2014: L’ADN (Agence De Développement Du Nord) Prépare L’après Crise [The Magazine of December 31, 2014: The DNA (Northern Development Agency) Prepares The After Crisis],” Studio Tamani, accessed November 9, 2018, <https://www.studiotamani.org/index.php/magazines/2666-le-magazine-du-31-decembre-2014-l-adn-agence-de-developpement-du-nord-prepare-l-apres-crise>.

<sup>214</sup> “Développement Du Nord-Mali: 180 Milliards Pour Financer Le Plan D’urgence [Development of NORTH-MALI: 180 Billion To Finance the Emergency Plan],” *Bamada.net*, accessed November 9, 2018, <http://bamada.net/developpement-du-nord-mali-180-milliards-pour-financer-le-plan-durgence>.

<sup>215</sup> “Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme : Une Réunion Interministérielle Des Experts Gouvernementaux à Bamako [Fight against Terrorism: An Interministerial Meeting of Government Experts in Bamako],” *Maliweb.net*, last modified November 16, 2011, <https://www.maliweb.net/insecurite/lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-une-reunion-interministrielle-des-experts-gouvernementaux-bamako-30956.html>.

term.<sup>216</sup> The PSPSDN manager was directly linked to the president. This office had a goal to coordinate, follow, and evaluate the new policy to reduce insecurity and fight terrorism in northern Mali.<sup>217</sup> In addition, the immediate objective of the PSPSDN was to reduce and possibly eradicate the causes of insecurity and terrorism in northern Mali. To achieve this goal, the PSPSDN would implement new measures for security, governance, local development, and communication.<sup>218</sup> According to *Afribone*, the PSPSDN programs included the construction and rehabilitation of barracks, advanced security posts, brigade of gendarmerie, police stations, and infrastructures for communities such as health centers, schools, equipped drilling, and housing for the civil servants who would be deployed in the three regions.<sup>219</sup> Furthermore, according to *Express de Bamako*, the national assembly passed a law on July 23, 2008, to suppress terrorism and create an office of financial treatment relating to the criminalization of the payment of ransom to persons, groups, and terrorist entities.<sup>220</sup> Enacting laws and executive orders is easy but their application will be the key to success in eradicating scourges affecting Mali and its development.

As in the case of the ADN, *Bamada.net* signaled mismanagement of the PSPSDN funds. The total budget was 33 billion CFA francs, and the first payment received by the program office was 16 billion CFA francs. The same newspaper added that northern intellectuals managed other programs without accountability. The PSPSDN suffered from both mismanagement and a lack of transparency. The program coordinator shared the 16 billion among the three regions as follows: 5.5 billion to Gao, only 500 million to Tombouctou, and 10 billion to the program coordinator's own region of Kidal.<sup>221</sup> As explained by the same journal, the repartition decision made both the populations of the

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<sup>216</sup>“Nord Mali : Programme Spécial Pour La Paix, La Sécurité [Northern Mali: Special Program For Peace, Security],” *Afribone.com*, accessed November 9, 2018, <http://www.afribonemali.net/spip.php?article29364>.

<sup>217</sup> “Lutte contre le Terrorisme [Fight against Terrorism],” *Maliweb.net*.

<sup>218</sup> “Nord Mali [Northern Mali], *Afribone*.

<sup>219</sup>“Lutte contre le Terrorisme [Fight against Terrorism],” *Maliweb.net*.

<sup>220</sup>“Lutte contre le Terrorisme [Fight against Terrorism],” *Maliweb.net*.

<sup>221</sup> “Programme Spécial Pour La Paix, La Sécurité Et Le Développement Dans Le Nord (PSP SDN) : Illusions Perdues [Special Program for Peace, Security and Development in the North (PSPSDN): Lost Illusions],” *Bamada.net*, accessed November 9, 2018, <http://bamada.net/programme-special-pour-la-paix-la-securite-et-le-developpement-dans-le-nord-psp-sdn-illusions-perdues>.

Gao and Tombouctou unhappy due to the uneven distribution of these funds. The Kidal population was around 23,000 in comparison to the populations of Gao and Tombouctou, which were respectively around 86,633 and 54,453.<sup>222</sup>

The lack of accountability in the management of public funds increased people's dissatisfaction and developed an environment of distrust, which has become normal in people's minds. Another factor contributing to the northern population's dissatisfaction was the lack of recruitment of youth by the business enterprises that received the contracts. This lack of job opportunities pushed the northern youth to attack and destroy construction sites as described by the journal *Bamada.net*.<sup>223</sup> According to the Panel I committee, the government made promises it could neither honor nor implement. Even so, these promises would be the basis of future claims.

Furthermore, the newspaper *le Monde* has stated that the most serious threat to the resolution of the Malian crisis would be the repetition of similar mistakes of not applying the agreement as happened in 2015, which was similar to the failure to apply the agreement of 1991, the National Pact, and the Algiers Agreement of 2006.<sup>224</sup> *Le Monde* particularly identified some concerns such as the corruption, the business around trafficking, and embezzlement of resources organized at local and national levels. These scourges are persistent and dominant in public life. These shortcomings hindered the achievement of any developmental goal in a country suffering from insurrection or terrorism. In such cases, when the people's living standards are low, the insurgents or terrorists generally assist the population. To ensure that it can provide the services to which its citizens are entitled, the government must be implacable in the fight against corruption.

With respect to the 2015 peace agreement, the government created the Program d'Urgence pour la Relance du Developpement des Regions du Nord (PURDN) [Emergency Program for the Revival of the Development of Northern Regions]. According to the

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<sup>222</sup>“Programme Spécial Pour La Paix [Special Program for Peace],”Bamada.net.

<sup>223</sup>“Programme Spécial Pour La Paix [Special Program for Peace],”Bamada.net.

<sup>224</sup> “Le Mali Réussira-t-il à Faire La Paix ? [Will Mali Succeed in Making Peace?],” *Le Monde*, accessed November 9, 2018, [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/11/20/le-mali-de-la-guerre-a-la-paix\\_4814451\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/11/20/le-mali-de-la-guerre-a-la-paix_4814451_3212.html).

journal *Lejecom*, this program budgeted 35.98 billion CFA francs to develop the northern regions.<sup>225</sup> This new structure is under the Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action. The same journal adds that the ministry declared that from that amount, they invested in rehabilitation, construction, equipment and office furniture for 274 administrative buildings; furnishing administration services of the state with 121 vehicles, 839 motorbikes, 514 pieces of information technology equipment, 860 pieces of furniture for offices, 1129 chairs, and 789 cupboards. This investment may satisfy the public servants, but they will not improve the daily life of rural populations of these regions, and with the high rate of insecurity in northern Mali, few public servants would go to their duty stations. The 2015 peace agreement's lack of application both by the government of Mali and the armed groups has impeded the peace process. According to Boutellis, since February 2015, the insurgents refused to start the cantonment of their fighters.<sup>226</sup>

## 5. Decentralization

Another important element of the National Pact was the implementation of decentralization. The government of Mali decided to hand over land management and the prioritization of investment to rural authorities via the decentralization officials, who were elected in April 1999. Nonetheless, questions remained about taxation and the sharing of these revenues.<sup>227</sup> Furthermore, as described by Charles E. Benjamin, in the Malian case of decentralization, former legal institutions worked along with the new community institutions.<sup>228</sup> Benjamin continues that the legal framework for decentralization in Mali emphasized the state's full control over community decisions.

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<sup>225</sup> Ismaila BA, "Développement Des Régions Du Nord-Mali: 35, 98 Milliards F.CFA Déjà Prévus [Development of the regions of North-Mali: 35.98 billion F. CFA already Planned]," *Lejecom Le Journal De L'économie Malienne*, last modified 17, [https://www.lejecom.com/Developpement-des-Regions-du-Nord-Mali-35-98-milliards-F-CFA-deja-prevus\\_a838.html](https://www.lejecom.com/Developpement-des-Regions-du-Nord-Mali-35-98-milliards-F-CFA-deja-prevus_a838.html).

<sup>226</sup> Arthur Boutellis, "Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine?," *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 4, no. 1 (2015): 9, doi:10.5334/sta.fz.

<sup>227</sup> Charles E. Benjamin, "Legal Pluralism and Decentralization: Natural Resource Management in Mali," *World Development* 36, no. 11 (2008): 2225, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.03.005.

<sup>228</sup> Benjamin, "Legal Pluralism and Decentralization," 2255.

The legislation, however, did not favor the local initiatives in their daily problem solving. Without the delegation of authority and funds to local governments, these entities could never solve the problems of their communities due to the lack of resources to develop education, health, and agriculture.

As mentioned by Benjamin, the government adopted the decentralization system and created 703 urban and rural communes; the composition of a commune is between 11 and 45 villages.<sup>229</sup> Each commune is led by a council, which is elected. Moreover, the council has the ability to select its mayor from among its members. The origin of new council members was diverse; according to Marie-Jo Demante, the performance of the newly elected council was critically judged by their constituents because of the criteria for their designation to be candidates.<sup>230</sup> People thought that they did not have a say in designating the candidates. Demante adds that some reached the position by political positioning, others by competency, social or economic status, redistribution capacity, and position in the chieftaincy. Some of these factors complicated the management of their council. Notably, the collection of taxes was difficult to implement due to the distrust between councils and their constituents.

Moreover, another factor impeded the implementation of the decentralization in poor local governments: the inability to self-finance their budgets. According to Demante, some local governments were not able to collect taxes due to the poverty of their constituents.<sup>231</sup> She continues that, without substantial tax collections, these local governments could not finance their educational programs, drill wells, or build markets, which were financed with local development taxes.<sup>232</sup> In addition, Demante notes that in some local governments, a lack funds and unavailability of council members prevented

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<sup>229</sup> Benjamin, 2260.

<sup>230</sup> Marie-Jo Demante, "Crise, développement local et décentralisation dans la région de Gao (Mali) [Crisis, local development and decentralization in the Gao region (Mali)]," *Afrique Contemporaine* 215, no. 3 (2005): 9, doi:10.3917/afco.215.0195.

<sup>231</sup> Demante, "Crise, développement local [Crisis, Local Development], 10.

<sup>232</sup> Demante, 11.

them from organizing the four required meetings of the council a year.<sup>233</sup> In contrast, the National Agency for Investment in Territorial Collectivities (ANICT), which is financed by the central government and international donors, had more resources. Demante explains that most of the investment done by local governments, by contrast, came from external donors or through the ANICT, which received funds from multiple donors and NGOs.<sup>234</sup> The lack of funds and the unavailability of council members demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Malian decentralization.

## **B. FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE EFFORTS**

In addition to the domestic initiatives, the international community accepted Mali's request for assistance, and helped Mali to regain its territorial integrity and bring peace between the government and the insurgents. Yet, this support did not bring the expected peace. The first initiative was the French intervention in Mali. France's decision to assist the Malian government deterred and forced the terrorists to withdraw their forces from important agglomerations in the short term, but terrorists still conduct many attacks against Malian forces and their international partners. In fact, when the French intervention took hold in Mali, terrorists resurfaced with lethal suicide bombings, IEDs, and even direct attacks against French, Malian, and UN mission troops. France started withdrawing its forces when the MINUSMA troops reached their maximum in Mali. Unlike the French forces, the majority of the UN troops came from African countries, which do not possess the expertise, equipment, or logistic support of the French. The UNSC gave a robust mandate to the MINUSMA to fulfill its mission, but this robust mandate has not changed the reality on the ground in northern and central Mali. In both regions today, insurgents and terrorists are causing more threats than ever. Furthermore, other organizations, mainly the EUTM and to some extent EUCAP, are not achieving their set goals to enable Malian troops to self-sustain in their fight against terrorists. This section analyzes the reasons for the failure of the international community's intervention in Mali. The first part assesses the

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<sup>233</sup> Demante, 13.

<sup>234</sup> Demante, 14.

failure of the French intervention, the second part evaluates the failure of the MINUSMA, and the last part analyzes the failure of both the EU training missions in Mali.

## **1. The French Operations**

The first French operation in 2013 in Mali was the most robust and coordinated military mission on Malian territory to liberate the northern regions under terrorist rule since mid-2012. During France's intervention, the MNLA offered to support French troops against terrorist organizations. According to the journal *France 24*, in 2013, the MNLA declared that they were ready to fight against terrorism and assist French troops in their mission.<sup>235</sup> As stated by the newspaper *Nouvel Observateur*, in March 2013, France appointed a new ambassador, Gilles Huberson, a former cadet of the Saint Cyr officer academy who was in touch with the MNLA. The same paper explains that the French military was disappointed it could not liberate Kidal because the secular insurgents were protected by the Direction Generale de Securite d'Etat (DGSE) (French secret service) and the insurgents had been assisted by the DGSE for ten years.<sup>236</sup> It continues that, according to the French Foreign Ministry, the alliance with the insurgents of Kidal was less beneficial than expected, especially during the preparation of the Amettetai conquest. This support to France emboldened the insurgents and facilitated the signature of the Ouagadougou peace agreement to end the hostilities with the MNLA and HCUA. Moreover, it enabled the creation and transformation of terrorist organizations into secular groups. These new groups had areas under their control without clear boundaries.

Following the cessation of hostilities, in which secular insurgents would keep their areas of control, the president imposed quick elections. As explained by the *Nouvel Observateur*, when the president of France imposed his agenda for a presidential election on July 28, 2013, even the UN secretary-general complained about the feasibility of this

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<sup>235</sup> "Le MNLA, Un Nouvel Allié Pour L'armée Française ? [The MNLA, A New Ally for the French Army?]," *France 24*, last modified January 23, 2013, <https://www.france24.com/fr/20130123-mnla-armee-francaise-mali-negociations-bamako-rebelles-touaregs-islamistes-ansar-dine>.

<sup>236</sup> Sarah Halifa-Legrain and Vincent Jaubert, "MALI. Les Secrets D'une Guerre éclair [MALI. The Secrets of A Lightning War]," *Nouvel Observateur*, last modified June 11, 2013, <https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20130607.OBS2446/mali-les-secrets-d-une-guerre-eclair.html>.

election and its legitimacy. However, the newspaper states that the French diplomat mentioned, “Nobody knows Mali more than us.”

It is a common mistake for diplomats and intelligence officers to believe they understand all the complexities of the sphere of influence. In the specific case of Mali, the French DGSE officers made an alliance with the MNLA, and time proved them wrong. Actually, the French extended their alliance to the MSA and the GATIA. According to the journal *Jeune Afrique*, in May 2017, the French military and diplomatic officials received the leaders of MSA and GATIA in Paris to negotiate military cooperation with Operation Barkhane to fight ISGS in Gao and Menaka.<sup>237</sup> At the inception of the French intervention, the pro-government militia GATIA was considered as the troublemaker in the regions. As the security situation developed on the ground, though, the French realized their mistake and started cooperating with pro-government militias. Still, French bias during the operation negated the intervention outcome. France disrupted terrorist organizations’ capabilities in northern Mali and consequently empowered the insurgents.

## **2. The MINUSMA**

The French decision makers facilitated the transformation of the African-led mission to a UN mission. According to John Karlsrud, the MINUSMA deployed its troops in Mali on July 1, 2013; its mission was to support the Malian forces’ efforts to regain control of the northern territory.<sup>238</sup> As explained by Arthur Boutellis, the number of terrorist attacks against the MINUSMA substantially increased, and that increase forced the UN and ECOWAS countries to rethink the pertinence of the UN led-mission’s mandate and the potential to fulfill its required tasks.<sup>239</sup> Boutellis also poses many questions about the standard stabilization mission of the UN and its possible inadequacy in the Malian

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<sup>237</sup> Jules Cretois, “Nord Du Mali: Ag Gamou et Ag Acharatoumane en Visite De Travail à Paris? [Northern Mali: Ag Gamou and Ag Acharatoumane in Business Visit in Paris],” *JeuneAfrique.com*, accessed November 9, 2018, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/441394/politiq>.

<sup>238</sup> John Karlsrud, “Towards UN Counter-terrorism Operations?,” *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 6 (2017): 1219, doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1268907.

<sup>239</sup> Boutellis, “Can the UN Stabilize Mali?,” 1.

crisis.<sup>240</sup> The UN stabilization mission's mandate in general works under the consent of both parties in the conflict to negotiate for a peace settlement, and the UN troops can engage in the fight in case one side tries to break the peace agreement.

Nevertheless, in the case of Mali, a third party exists, and it is lethal: terrorist organizations. The leadership of the MINUSMA recognized this terrorist threat. As described by Boutellis, both the leaders responsible for the peace operations, Herve Ladsous and the former MINUSMA force commander, General Jean Bosco Kazura, recognized that the mission was not working in an environment to maintain peace.<sup>241</sup> Furthermore, Boutellis adds that the Force Commander explained that the MINUSMA is operating in an asymmetric war environment without a mandate and that the troops do not have the skill, material, logistics, or the intelligence to mitigate that threat.<sup>242</sup> The mandate, and the lack of other military capabilities, constrained the MINUSMA from achieving its stated goal.

This deployment and the subsequent reduction of French troop numbers increased the tempo of terrorist and insurgent groups' attacks against the government, MINUSMA, and French forces in northern and southern Mali. As stated by Karlsrud, the UN Mine Action Service reported that, from the beginning of the UN mission in July 2013 to July 2016, the mission recorded 279 IED attacks; these attacks killed 119 persons and wounded 453 people. The same source adds that of these figures, 69 deaths were UN workers, and this fact forced the UNSC to reinforce the mandate of the mission on June 29, 2016, via the resolution 2295. The new robust mandate gave the power to the MINUSMA to anticipate, deter, and counter threats, and asymmetric threats.<sup>243</sup>

With all this power, according to the UNSC resolution 2295, the MINUSMA formally requested French assistance in case the mission soldiers came under threat. The request specifically called upon the French "to intervene in support of elements of

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<sup>240</sup> Boutellis, 1.

<sup>241</sup> Boutellis, 3.

<sup>242</sup> Boutellis, 3.

<sup>243</sup> Karlsrud, "Towards UN Counter-terrorism Operations?," 1220.

MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General.”<sup>244</sup> This assertion demonstrated the weaknesses of developing world troops to ensure their tasks without the assistance of a strong country. This lack of capability of the MINUSMA restrains its mission within main towns and agglomerations. The MINUSMA does not possess the means to achieve substantial counterterrorism operations in northern and central Mali. As explained by Arthur Boutellis and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, the deployment of sophisticated gadgets for intelligence gathering and analysis did not prevent terrorists from attacking soft targets.<sup>245</sup> Boutellis and Fink contend that this deployment did not improve the UN soldiers’ effectiveness; they are bunkered, and many observers believe that the UN combatants are not well equipped to fulfill their tasks.

### **3. The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) and European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP)**

The Malian government requested the assistance of the EU to provide training to Malian security forces. Therefore, the EU deployed two missions: the EUTM to train the defense force and the EUCAP for the security force. The European training mission in Mali recorded tremendous results on paper. According to the EUTM data, the mission trained 12,665 military, including eight joint battle groups with a strength of more than a battalion, around seven tactical units.<sup>246</sup> Moreover, the EUTM conducted many trainings. As mentioned on their website, the EUTM successfully accomplished seven company commander courses and nine logistic courses; leadership and education teams provided courses in eight schools, trained three personnel of the Malian joint operations center, and offered many other capacity development courses on diverse needs of the Malian armed forces.

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<sup>244</sup> “The UN Resolution 2295,” Security Council Report, accessed November 9, 2018, [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/s\\_res\\_2295.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/s_res_2295.pdf).

<sup>245</sup> Arthur Boutellis and Naureen Chowdhury, *Waging Peace: UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism and Violent Extremism* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2016), 18, [http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/IPI%201610\\_Waging-Peace.pdf](http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/IPI%201610_Waging-Peace.pdf).

<sup>246</sup> “Common Security and Defence Policy European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM),” EUTM Mali, accessed November 9, 2018, [http://eutmmali.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/EUTM\\_Mission\\_Factsheet\\_SEP18\\_EN.pdf](http://eutmmali.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/EUTM_Mission_Factsheet_SEP18_EN.pdf).

Nonetheless, this high number of trainings did not allow the security forces of Mali to secure the country. Furthermore, according to the U.S Center for Military Analysis report on Malian security forces, “due to a low starting capacity and limited resources, building a professional and independently functioning security sector will be very difficult and lengthy endeavor with no guarantee of success.”<sup>247</sup> In addition, the same report explains that the focus must be on the development of human resources through development of training centers, professional military education, and the delineations of authorities. These points of the U.S Center of Military Analysis firmly demonstrate the failure of the EUTM. Without addressing these deficiencies, Malian security forces will naturally have a hard time maintaining the security within the country. Even though the EUTM is trying its best to improve the quality of the Malian service members, the lead must be taken by the Malian authority to accept and embrace the idea of a complete reform. In contrast, the EUCAP mission could be evaluated as successful because its mission is not focused on the training of combat units. However, these internal forces also need deep reform to improve their performance and efficiency.

#### **4. The Sahel G5**

As mentioned previously the Sahel G5 is a promising initiative taken by the leaders of five Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. The fulfillment of the G5 objectives, however, might be achieved only if the international community will agree to finance the organization. According the *News 24*, in June 2018, the minister in charge of foreign affairs of Niger stated that the donors had agreed to finance the Sahel G5 with \$420 million. Yet, the disbursement of the funds was delayed.<sup>248</sup> Moreover, as noted by *DW.com*, the UN secretary-general proposed to fund the Sahel G5 directly with the UN, although that initiative had been rejected by the United States.<sup>249</sup> The success of the Sahel

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<sup>247</sup> William M. Fabian, *Malian Security Force Assistance Study* (Fort Belvoir, VA: Center for Army Analysis, 2014), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a602283.pdf>

<sup>248</sup>“Factfile on G5 Sahel Force,” *News24*, last modified July 3, 2018, <https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/factfile-on-g5-sahel-force-20180702>.

<sup>249</sup> Deutsche Welle, “US Rejects UN Funding Proposal for West African Sahel Force,” *DW.com*, last modified May 24, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/us-rejects-un-funding-proposal-for-west-african-sahel-force/a-43904983>.

G5 would depend mainly on the will of rich countries to finance poor countries to mitigate their common security threat in the Sahel. These terrorist organizations in the region have very loose connections, and they could easily destabilize another country that is not even a member of the Sahel G5.

### **C. CONCLUSION**

The government of Mali and the international community have undertaken many pathways to resolve the Malian conflict. On the one hand, the Malian government's main decision was to negotiate with the insurgents in the early 1990s because students and union movements for democratization of the country pressured the dictatorial regime. After the March 1991 coup d'état, the new and subsequent regimes favored the same negotiations, which resulted in the signing of peace agreements. The more comprehensive agreement was the National Pact of 1992. This agreement stipulated the integration of insurgents into the security forces and public administration, and the reinsertion of former insurgents into socio-economic life. These requirements were implemented through the PAREM, ADIN, ADN, and PSPDN, and with the assistance of the UNDP and NGOs. Most of these initiatives did not succeed, mainly because of the corruption, unaccountability, and immaturity of local collectives that could not manage their own affairs. Moreover, the decentralization also failed to achieve its set goals, largely because local governments lacked the resources to finance their programs.

Moreover, the international community's intervention was inadequate. At first, the French and Chadian armed forces succeeded in disrupting the terrorist organizations. The French acquaintance with secular insurgents pushed the French to hand over the Kidal to the insurgents. This action led to the quick signature of the Ouagadougou peace agreement, a ceasefire, and the opening of negotiations with secular insurgents, northern Mali Tuareg and black tribes who did not recognize themselves with the MNLA and its ally the HCUA, and started creating their own militias. This proliferation of armed groups throughout northern Mali rendered conflict resolution very complex. In addition, the MINUSMA deployed more than 10,000 troops without a mandate to fight against terrorists, coupled with insufficient training, material, logistics, and intelligence necessary to achieve their

mission. Furthermore, the EUTM trained more than 12,000 Malian soldiers. Despite this, the training did not change the balance of power on the ground. Terrorists and insurgents are still active in central and northern Mali. By contrast, the EUCAP mission to train and develop the gendarmerie, police, and the national guard could be judged more successful. It must be noted, however, that in general these personnel were not engaged in combat tasks. The most recent initiative of the Sahel countries is the Sahel G5, which is at its inception and needs funds to be operational. Without substantial funding from the international community, this initiative will have a short life.

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## V. CONCLUSION

This thesis has tested two hypotheses about the recurrent insurgencies and later growing terrorist threat in Mali along with the intervention and assistance of the international community. The research supports the first hypothesis based on the government failure to fulfill its promises, which also sustains the second hypothesis. This latter hypothesis supports that the conflict became complex due to the way in which the French led the international intervention. The first hypothesis centered on insurgents' claims that poverty, bad governance, corruption, poor education, and unemployment are prevalent in the northern part of the Mali, leading to uprisings, has been shown to be weak. Poverty is prevalent in most parts of the country, and some ethnic groups living with the Tuareg tribes never engaged in insurgency before the Tuareg-led insurrection. Importantly, the government always gave more opportunities to the Tuaregs rather than other ethnic groups during peace negotiations. Moreover, the World Bank data suggested that 90 percent of the poor are concentrated in rural areas in the south.<sup>250</sup> However, before the 2012 crisis, southern Mali never knew insurgency or terrorism. All the same, the social scourges are a real impediment and distances the populations from their leaders. The government's poor leadership, in which some tribes are always privileged over others, has created a problem. Tuareg tribes that want to maintain the balance of power or are willing to shift the balance of power to benefit the government engage in the insurgency. Nonetheless, this research has not found poverty to be the dominant motivation.

In 1992, 2006, and 2015, the successive governments and diverse insurgent groups signed holistic peace agreements to circumvent the recurrence of insurgencies in northern Mali, but the majority of these initiatives did not achieve their set goals to end the crisis. The National Pact was the most comprehensive peace agreement, which set the integration and reintegration of insurgents into the society, and set some development plans for the northern populations. The integration effort achieved its set goal to recruit former

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<sup>250</sup> "The World Bank Supporting Mali in Addressing its Economic Challenges with a Focus on Education, Health, Agriculture, and Energy," World Bank, accessed November 9, 2018, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mali/overview>.

insurgents into the security forces from the ranks of private to lieutenant colonel. The necessary change in the mindset of former insurgents, however, did not occur. Secondly, the reinsertion of insurgents into socio-economic life by the government and its partners failed because the long-term goal of creating employment for the populations was not achieved. Sound management of the resources allocated to the socio-economic program by both the government and different Tuareg communities can be the only solution to alleviate poverty. Moreover, both parties must abide by the rules of transparency and accountability.

Furthermore, the economic development programs of the government were unsuccessful. Since in the late 1990s, the government has injected billions of CFA francs through initiatives. Yet, people appointed by the government, who lacked accountability, poorly managed these programs. For example, the PAREM, a program funded with approximately 200 billion CFA francs by the government and its partners, did not resolve the crisis. Moreover, the mismanagement of the PSPDN was clear; a program with 32 billion CFA francs for developmental plans did not give birth to a tangible infrastructure project or create job opportunities on the ground. The ongoing program is the PURDN, with a known budget of nearly 36 billion CFA francs. According to a Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action address, the majority of the fund has been invested in renovation of, equipment for, and provision of transportation means to public services in northern Mali. These investments will not change the daily life of the common citizen. The government, its partners, and the insurgents have a duty to analyze viable and quick impact projects to sustain the development. In addition, they must design an education system that can fulfill the regions' needs because most the current graduates from the Malian education system do not have employment opportunities. A judicious analysis of the needs and proper investments could change the daily lives of the people of northern Mali.

Another important Malian government scheme was the decentralization of authority and resources, which transferred to local governments economic promotion and social development as mentioned in the National Pact.<sup>251</sup> According to Brian S.

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<sup>251</sup> "Pacte National [National Pact]."

Westerfield, the government did not hand over resources to the decentralized local governments:

Mali clearly undertook a meaningful political decentralization process by establishing the elected sub-national governments (*collectivités décentralisées* or *collectivités locales*), but beyond the formal fact of political decentralization, the achievements are much less clear. Fiscal decentralization has lagged (as responsibilities have been transferred without accompanying resources) and administrative decentralization retains a significant role for the state's exercise of its supervisory capacity.<sup>252</sup>

The success of the decentralization would naturally go hand-to-hand with allocations of a substantial budget for the local governments, which would allow them to develop their strategies to develop their economy in their areas of responsibilities. The government, however, could not fully rely on the donors' financing to develop the country. To achieve resource efficiency, the government must focus on fighting against corruption; this fight will allow the country's meager resources to reach the masses.

In addition, while the northern populations of Mali received waves of external radical religious preachers from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the government did not take any actions to expel them from the country. This lack of the sound leadership allowed the development of radical religious beliefs to take hold in northern Mali and outpace Sufi Islam, which advocates nonviolence. In contrast, Niger made a strong decision to expel international preachers from its territory.<sup>253</sup> Malian leaders must learn from their Nigerian counterparts to be decisive against practices that could endanger national security.

In general, the government of Mali agreed on very audacious peace agreements that it would never be able to fulfill. One demonstration was the creation of medium-sized industries and enterprises in northern Mali. According to the International Monetary Fund, Malian industries decreased from 12 percent of their capacity in 1995 to seven percent in

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<sup>252</sup> Brian S. Westerfield, "Decentralization, Counterinsurgency and Conflict Recurrence: A Study of the Tuareg Uprisings in Mali and Niger" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, n.d), 11, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27919>.

<sup>253</sup> Denece and Rodier, "The Security Challenges of West Africa," 40.

2013.<sup>254</sup> With the reduction of the industrial sector in the country, the government was unrealistic about creating industries in the north, a promise that could only satisfy the insurgents on the day of the agreements' signatures. Moreover, the Malian government and insurgents knew the incapacity of the government to fulfill that request. The government of Mali must be reasonable and mindful during the negotiations to avoid promising outcomes the country cannot accomplish.

Another promise that was never realized was the construction of the roads from Kidal to Gao, Menaka, and the Algerian border, and the building of the Kidal airport, as written in the 2006 Algiers peace agreement.<sup>255</sup> The government of Mali did not have the wealth of the Gulf countries to start such pharaonic projects. International investors will always evaluate the viability of their prospective investments before committing funds. The paving of these roads would receive very little attention from the international financial communities. The government must develop tourism, cattle raising, and the development of agriculture in the Niger basin, which can substantially develop local communities. In the same vein, the government agreed to create a development zone in the northern part of Mali to promote economic development. In a developing country in which electricity is among the rare commodities, the intention of this development zone would go a long way to reach its objective.

Moreover, both the government, the MPA, and FIA took advantage of the signatures of the Tamanrasset and the subsequent National Pact. On the one hand, the government used the signatory insurgents to fight others who did not recognize themselves in the agreement. On the other, the insurgents from the Ifoghas tribes exploited the agreement to maintain their social status against other tribes by receiving the support of the government in the internal conflict among the Tuaregs. The government's behavior polarized the conflict in northern Mali; Tuareg tribes sought the support of the government to look for a shift in the balance of power. In the 2006 insurrection, the government focused on the Imaghads and Arabs to defeat the Ifoghas. The government's permanent shifting of

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<sup>254</sup>“Mali Focus Issues,” IMF -- International Monetary Fund Home Page, last modified December 2015, 7, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15340.pdf>.

<sup>255</sup> “Accord d’Alger pour la Restauration de la Paix [Algiers Agreement for the Restoration of Peace].”

alliances will not bring a final solution to the crisis. The government must consider the preparation of its own troops, rather than using proxy clans, which will naturally widen the rift among the communities.

The second hypothesis of this thesis asserts that the international community's efforts to assist the government of Mali in its fight against terrorism have been ineffective. Before the UN resolution 2085 to authorize the AFISMA and the subsequent French intervention, few insurgent groups were known: the MNLA, a group defeated by the terrorist organizations; and the terrorist organizations, the Ansar Dine, AQIM, MUJAO, and Almourabitoun. The first is a secular insurgent group, which was demanding more development for northern Mali. The early stage of the French Operation Serval supported by the Chadian troops was a success. These two forces drove out terrorist groups from the towns. On the other hand, the French decision to hand over the town of Kidal to the secular insurgents rendered the crisis more complex and pressured the government of Bamako to quickly sign the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement for elections with the MNLA and HCUA, an offshoot of the Ansar Dine. These decisions forced the government to negotiate with secular insurgent organizations whose military wings were defeated by the terrorist groups.

France's long-time connections with secular insurgents pushed their political leadership to take this ill-judged decision to support the MNLA, and to expect the MNLA ground support to fight against terrorism. Unfortunately, this expectation failed. According to the *Nouvel Observateur*, the French foreign ministry stated that the alliance was less beneficial.<sup>256</sup> Moreover, other militias supporting the government of Mali were considered as enemies of the peace. As the insecurity dragged on, the French made alliances with the Plateforme pro-government militias to fight against terrorists in the Menaka and Gao regions, as explained by the newspaper *Jeune Afrique*.<sup>257</sup> France's strategic decision to

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<sup>256</sup> "Le MNLA, Un Nouvel Allié Pour L'armée Française? [The MNLA, A New Ally for the French Army?]," France 24.

<sup>257</sup> Cretois, "Nord Du Mali: Ag Gamou et Ag Acharatoumane en Visite De Travail à Paris? [Northern Mali: Ag Gamou and Ag Acharatoumane in Business Visit in Paris], *JeuneAfrique.com*.

reduce its troops and to support the MNLA in the early stage of the conflict resolution in Mali is considered the main cause of the proliferation of insurgent and terrorist groups.

Moreover, the agreement of Ouagadougou forced the government forces to stay on the defensive because the agreement stipulated that all the hostilities must end. Other populations who did not recognize themselves as part of either the MNLA or the HCUA started creating ethnically based groups. Consequently, insurgent groups expanded throughout the northern territory with some main alliances. The secular insurgents and separatists evolved around the MNLA. The terrorists created a new coalition in 2017 called the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims, or GSIM, and the pro-government militias regrouped under the banner of the Plateforme. This proliferation of insurgents and the coalition of terrorist groups made the crisis resolution very complex. At the early stage of their intervention, if the French had not supported the MNLA, the crisis of northern Mali would have been on its way to being resolved, and the key enemy would have been the terrorist organizations.

Moreover, the French decision makers facilitated the adoption of the resolution that fused the AFISMA to the MINUSMA and ended Operation Serval, which had more than 4,000 troops at its peak and created a new operation in the Sahel: Operation Barkhane, with 1,000 troops in Mali. This shift of the French was an opportunity for the terrorist organizations to extend their attacks to the southern part of Mali. At the same time, the reduction of French troops diminished the French operation's efficiency due to the complexity of the crisis.

In addition, the AFISMA continued its slow and difficult deployment in southern Mali. This African-led mission may have had the will to assist the government of Mali, but AFISMA's lack of training and equipment needed to face the terrorist organizations was evident. An essential mission of the AFISMA was to train the Malian security forces and participate in the securing of humanitarian aid in northern Mali. Without the appropriate training and equipment, their mission of assistance to the Malian security forces became impossible. The UN requested all its members to assist the AFISMA in training, equipment, intelligence, and logistics for the fulfillment of its mission. In a realistic military environment, that kind of organization assisting another weak state in the fight

against terrorism would have seemed impossible. As mentioned by Sergei Boeke and Bart Schuurman, the AFISMA deployed 6,000 soldiers who, except for the Chadian troops who had engaged alongside the French troops, had barely participated in any major fighting.<sup>258</sup> In July 2013, the UN finally fused the AFISMA to the MINUSMA.

The EU, at the request of the Malian government, deployed both the EUTM and EUCAP in Mali to develop the Malian armed and security forces' capabilities and assisted their Malian counterparts to undergo the reform of their security sectors. From the EU perspective, the mission is achieving its set goal. On the other hand, troops trained by the EUTM have been swept out by insurgents on many occasions. It is necessary for the Malian security force to undergo internal reform of the structures of its units and battalions. These structures have existed on paper only.

The MINUSMA has a robust mandate authorized by the UN; the mission can use all necessary means to achieve its mandate. As described by Boutellis, UN stabilization missions typically require the consent of both parties in a conflict. In the specific case of Mali, however, a third key player exists: terrorist organizations.<sup>259</sup> These organizations have never signed any peace agreement related to the successive insurgencies in Mali. According to Boutellis, both Herve Ladsous in charge of the UN peacekeeping and the former commander of the MINUSMA, General Bosco Kazura, recognize the terrorist threat and the inability of the mission to tackle it. It must be noted that the UN mission has to adjust its goal to the environment of operation to be successful. In the case of Mali, the mission does not have the mandate to fight against terrorism.

The most recent organization created to assist Mali and other countries of the Sahel—Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad—is the Sahel G5, with an ultimate goal to address the underlying causes of insurgency and terrorism and to fight current terrorist organizations in the Sahel. Before this new organization can take on its ultimate objective, however, it faces the even more daunting challenge of obtaining funding, which must come from the international community.

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<sup>258</sup> Boeke and Schuurman, "Operation Serval," 814.

<sup>259</sup> Boutellis, "Can the UN Stabilize Mali?," 1.

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