

The Universal Principles for Effective Communication in Leadership

A Monograph

by

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To lead you must communicate. Be it verbal or non-verbal, communication ensures common understanding and the actualization of ideas. It is quintessential to the military commander and a fundamental part of operational art and leadership. In both British and US Army doctrine, the importance of communication and its relevance to operational art are clearly articulated, however a method to enable effective communication is not. This study sought to identify a set of principles to enable effective communication by using a structured focused analysis of two case studies. The study found common aspects of effective communication evident in both case studies. Analyzing these common aspects, the study ascertained that the universal principles for effective communication are understanding, adaptability, content, standards, context and reflection. Finally, the study recommends that the identified universal principles for effective communication be adopted into both British Army and US Military doctrine.

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Abstract

The Universal Principles of Effective Communication in Leadership, by Maj Mike J. Brigham MBE, British Army, 42 pages.

To lead you must communicate. Be it verbal or non-verbal, communication ensures common understanding and the actualization of ideas into action. It is quintessential to the military commander and a fundamental part of operational art and leadership. In both British and US Army doctrine, the importance of communication and its relevance to operational art is clearly articulated, however a method to enable effective communication is not. This study sought to identify a set of principles to enable effective communication by using a structured focused analysis of two case studies.

The study found that common aspects of effective communication were evident in both case studies. Analyzing these common aspects, the study ascertained that the universal principles for effective communication are understanding, adaptability, content, standards, context and reflection. Finally, the study recommends that the identified universal principles for effective communication be adopted into both British Army and US Military doctrine.

If nothing else, the study attempts to inspire all military professionals to consider and reflect on their own communication style to ensure we continually get the best out of our people.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement	iv
Acronyms.....	v
Illustrations	vi
Introduction	1
Literature Review	4
Methodology.....	13
Case Studies.....	15
Allenby’s Sinai and Palestine Campaign	15
Ridgway’s Command in the Korean War	26
Findings and Analysis	34
Findings.....	35
Analysis.....	38
Conclusion	40

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Dr. Stanley, Colonel Remoy and Danny the journey of this monograph has just begun. The soldiers and officers who I will subsequently command will be better led because of your unfaltering support. You three and our journey together has and will continue to make me a better man for which I am, and always will be, eternally thankful.

Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AFM	Army Field Manual
EEF	Egyptian Expeditionary Force
GCB	Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath
GCMG	Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George
GCVO	Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order
TRADOC	Army Training and Doctrine Command
UN	United Nations

Illustrations

Figure 1. The Battle of Beersheba, 1917.....	20
Figure 2. Operation Killer, 1951	30

Introduction

If you have an important point to make, don't try to be subtle or clever. Use a pile driver. Hit the point once. Then come back and hit it again. Then hit it a third time - a tremendous whack.

— Sir Winston Churchill, House of Lords.

When one thinks of operational leadership it is often a romanticized image of generals directing battle or heroic charges against unimaginable odds. The reality is that operational leadership is not limited to the heroic acts of history or fiction but is an everyday occurrence, which has one common aspect irrespective of all others - to lead you must communicate. Be it verbal or non-verbal, communication ensures common understanding and the actualization of ideas into action. It is quintessential to the military commander and a fundamental part of operational art and leadership.

Both British and US Army doctrine clearly articulate the importance of communication and its relevance to operational art, however both are less clear on a method to enable communication. This study will seek to identify such a method by distilling communication down to its universal principles and recommending a method to enable their use to create effective communication.

The study will propose that communication is critical to operational leadership and command. Communication creates understanding to enable mission command and mitigate risk. Communication methods and leadership/management style will vary between individuals and societies. It is likely a set of universal principles exist for the phenomena of effective communication in operational leadership and command. Finally this study will determine said phenomena to be the principles of understanding, adaptability, content, standards, context and reflection.

The purpose for identifying the universal principles of communication within this study is to provide a framework for enabling effective communication as part of operational art. The study will provide a clear methodology to effectively communicate at all levels of command to aid

operational leaders within the British and US Army. If these forces make the decision to adopt the theory into doctrine then it will validate the significance of this work. The study will recommend that both the British and US military add the effective communication framework and methodology to their doctrine. Specifically to: *Army Field Manual (AFM), Command* (AC 72062), CH 1, Section 13, Para H, for communication in the British Army; to Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-10, *Institutional Leader Training and Education*, Section 8, adding to the qualities of a leader for the US Army; and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, CH 10, para 20, concerning communication in operational leadership for the US Army.

The key terms used within this study are: communication; operational leadership; command; understanding; communication methods; and effective communication. Communication is defined as “the process of informing and/or sharing an idea or intent regarding a subject with another or others.”¹ Operational leadership is defined as “army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and make decisions that accomplish missions.”² Operational Leadership is the former applied to the operational and tactical level of war. Command is defined as “the authoritative application of leadership to a problem to generate solutions.”³ Understanding is defined as “shared knowledge regarding a subject or object that is common and simple to comprehend.”⁴ Communication method is defined as “the system or process in which a person communicates their intentions to a target audience.”⁵ Finally, effective communication is defined as “the sharing of intent, via a

¹ British Army, Army Defence Publication (ADP), *Operations* (AC 71952) (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, Sep 2010), 2-30.

² *Ibid.*, 6-17.

³ British Army, Army Field Manual (AFM), *Command* (AC 72062) (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, May 2017), 1-3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1-7.

⁵ ADP *Operations* (AC 71952), 6-42.

communication method, in a clear [precise and concise] manner that is simple to follow and not subject to misinterpretation [unless intended], thus enabling shared understanding.”⁶

The theoretical framework for the study will be anchored on the US Army theory of operational art as described in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0.⁷ Particularly, the framework for a commander to share their intent via the process of understand, visualize, describe and direct. The study will also seek to apply its findings to the theoretical framework in an attempt to improve the application of operational art.

The study will use inductive reasoning with three hypotheses to determine universal principles. The first hypothesis asserts that when commanders effectively communicate their vision and intent they are able to enable mission command. The second hypothesis proposes that when commanders effectively communicate their vision and intent they are able to mitigate operational and strategic risk. The third hypothesis suggests that when commanders effectively communicate their vision and intent they are able to create a culture of organizational change.

Due to the volume of leadership theories and scholarly articles it will be difficult for the author to prove original thought, and separately could lead to the critical analysis being diluted by examples. The study will attempt to mitigate both challenges by providing critical analysis of set materials but acknowledging the volume of complementary and contrasting sources within the researched material. Additionally, the ability of the author to collect primary data compared to the volume of secondary data could tempt the study to not rely on primary collection. The study will strive to gather relevant, subjective and objective primary data to ensure this is not the case. This study assumes that the chosen subjects for its case studies were effective communicators and leaders, meeting the criteria in the terms above.

⁶ AFM *Command* (AC 72062), 3-43.

⁷ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 9.

This study is organized into seven sections. Following the introduction, section two will contain the literature review focused on identifying the key components of communication as part of leadership and in operational art. Section three will discuss the methodology and how the study seeks to conduct its research and examine the case studies. Section four and five will be case studies on Field Marshal Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby, GCB, GCMG, GCVO and General Mathew Bunker Ridgway respectively. Section six will detail the findings and analysis and section seven concludes the study with the universal principles for communication.

Literature Review

The literature review will examine primary and secondary sources regarding operational art, leadership and communication therein. Its purpose will be to form a lens for the examination of the aforementioned Allenby and Ridgway cases. The literature review will contain three sections to form this lens. Section one, defines the theoretical framework and identifies gaps in the professional body of knowledge. Additionally section one adds depth by analyzing key authoritative sources regarding the theory of communication, particularly within operational leadership. Section two ensures clarity by stating the definitions, terms, and the form of measurement used within the case studies. Section three outlines how and why the study's hypotheses were selected and state their relevance, before summarizing.

British Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) *Land Operations* defines leadership as “a combination of character, knowledge and action that inspire others to succeed.”⁸ It states there are three components of leadership “the Army Leadership Framework (what leaders are/know/do), the Army Leadership Model (the three roles and six functions) and the Army

⁸ British Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), *Land Operations* (AC 71940) (Swindon: Ministry of Defence, Mar 2017), 3-10.

Leadership Code.”⁹ Within each of these components, influence or communication is prevalent. In the Army Leadership Framework, ‘what leaders are’ is expressed as a force to influence people and events; ‘what leaders know’ is expressed as professional context to create understanding; and ‘what leaders do’ is expressed as translating competence and understanding into action.¹⁰ None of this would be possible without some form of verbal or written communication. Furthermore, the Army Leadership Model describes leaders performing three generic roles: achieving the task; building teams; and developing individuals. It continues by stating the six-leadership functions work within these roles to aid in contextual understanding; one of which is communication.¹¹

US Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”¹² Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22 *Army Leadership*, states that influence “entails more than simply passing along orders.”¹³ Separately, “the Army’s core leader competencies, especially leading others, involve influence.”¹⁴ ADP 6-22 outlines the responsibilities of leaders and states that good leaders who listen actively create shared understanding to accomplish missions and tasks.¹⁵

Despite both militaries being close strategic and operational partners, they do not share a common definition of leadership. Similarly, the academic definition of leadership is also notoriously varied; Ralph Stogdill states, “There are almost as many different definitions of

⁹ Ibid., 3-11.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ ADP, *Land Operations* (AC 71940), CH 3, 11-17.

¹² US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.

¹³ Ibid., 1-1.

¹⁴ Ibid., 6-1.

¹⁵ Ibid., 6-8.

leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept.”¹⁶ Furthermore, Bruce Avolio criticizes leadership theory for having a lack of “theoretical integration.”¹⁷

Stogdill defined leadership as “the process (act) of influencing the activities of an organized group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement.”¹⁸ This was the first time leadership was acknowledged as a process to influence others, rather than a personal trait.

Subsequently, John Kotter added to this theory by defining leadership as “the process of moving a group (or groups) in some direction through mostly non-coercive means.”¹⁹ In this definition, there is no use of coercive means since there should be a voluntary followership (which represents a step away from the nineteenth-century scholars). Not all scholars agree upon this theory, for example, Barbara Kellerman insists that the use of force is leadership.²⁰ Further to Kotter’s idea, Charles Handy states the importance of a leader’s vision “a leader shapes and shares a vision which gives point to the work of others.”²¹ Joseph Rost also stated leadership was a process to achieve some common goals: “Leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes.”²²

Influence and communication is within each of the aforementioned theories; whether it is setting and achieving goals, moving a group in a certain direction or setting a vision. Gilbert Amelio, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Semiconductor Corporation

¹⁶ Ralph M. Stogdill, R. M. *Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research* (New York: Free Press, 1974), 9.

¹⁷ Bruce J. Avolio, “Promoting More Integrative Strategies for Leadership Theory-Building,” *The American Psychologist* 62, (January 2007): 25-33.

¹⁸ Ralph M. Stogdill, “Leadership, Membership, and Organization,” *Psychological Bulletin* 47, no. 1-14 (1950): 7.

¹⁹ John P. Kotter, *The Leadership Factor* (Chicago: Free Press, 1988), 13.

²⁰ Barbara Kellerman, *Hard Times: Leadership in America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books, 2014), 7-12.

²¹ Charles Handy, “The Language of Leadership,” in *Frontiers of Leadership: An Essential Reader*, ed. Michael Syrett and Clare Hogg (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 303.

²² Joseph Rost, *Leadership for the 21st Century* (London: Praeger Publishing, 1993), 137.

states, “Developing excellent communication skills is absolutely essential to effective leadership. The leader must be able to share knowledge and ideas to transmit a sense of urgency and enthusiasm to others. If a leader can’t get a message across clearly and motivate others to act on it, then having a message doesn’t even matter.”²³

Similarly, British Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Command states, “the ability to communicate effectively is an important aspect of command. However brilliant a commander's powers of analysis and decision-making, they are of no use if he cannot express his intentions clearly in order that others can act.”²⁴ ADP *Command* also states that, “in peacetime, the temptation is to rely too much on written methods of communication...but written papers, briefs and directives may not necessarily have the same impact as oral orders, consultations and briefings.”²⁵ Furthermore, ADP *Command* states, “a commander must be able to think on his feet - without prepared scripts or notes - and be confident and competent enough to brief well and give succinct orders to his subordinates.”²⁶ ADP *Command* concludes its discussion on communication by stating, “Communication provides the principal method by which command and control can be decentralized and executed.” Moreover, “careful planning and management of human and technical communications assets will increase the capability of commanders and staffs to pass critical information and decisions at the right time.”²⁷ In short, ADP *Command* describes the importance of communication to create shared understanding for enabling action. It stresses the importance of verbal communication, whilst balancing the use of human and technical systems to enable decision-making at the right time, with the right information. Critically, ADP

²³Lyn Boyer, “How Leaders Build Trust Through Communication,” *Leadership Options* (blog), n.d., accessed September 23, 2017, <https://lynboyer.net/communication/leaders-build-trust-through-communication.html>.

²⁴ ADP, *Command* (AC 71564), 42.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 42-47.

²⁷ Ibid., 43.

Command indicates effective communication, builds team cohesion and aids in achieving success.

Similarly, ADP 6-0, *Mission Command* states, “communication is the means [through] which commanders exercise immediate and personal control over their forces... communication links information to decisions and decisions to action.”²⁸ Moreover ADP 6-0 states, “no decision...can be executed without clear communication...military operations require collective efforts, effective communication is imperative.”²⁹ ADP 6-0 states that effective communication is free and unhindered sharing of meaningful information and knowledge across all echelons.³⁰ ADP 6-0 indicates that communication is more important than simply exchanging information and that it strengthens bonds, builds trust, creates shared understanding and enables decentralized execution of intent.³¹

Although British and US Military doctrinal definitions of communication diverge, they both articulate several key beneficial themes of effective communication. Firstly, by creating shared understanding and providing context a commander enables effective and time efficient action. Secondly, the use of effective communication creates cohesion, builds trust and enables mission command. Supporting this summation, Simon Sinek states that effective leaders communicate by demonstrating the why (your values and beliefs) to create shared understanding and inspire others into action.³² Separately, Sinek states that to be a great leader your message needs “clarity, discipline and consistency.”³³

²⁸ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), 6-0 *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 8.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 8.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Simon Sinek, *Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2009), 156, 160-162.

³³ Ibid., 162.

Both British and US Military Doctrine clearly articulate the importance of communication in leadership and allude to Sinek's theories above, but neither clearly states principles of communication within their professional body of knowledge. Furthermore, the importance of communication is stated or assumed within both military's concept of operational art but never clarified.

The theoretical development of operational art is credited to Soviet theorists between the first and second world wars.³⁴ Theorists Aleksandr A. Svechin, Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, Vladimir K. Triandafillov, and Georgii S. Isserson developed the theory of operational art, evolving the extant concept of war to include an operational level between the strategic and tactical. The inception of the operational level of war can be traced to Svechin's 1927 publication *Strategy*. In *Strategy*, Svechin articulated the art of war as having three parts: tactics, operations, and strategy.³⁵ Svechin stated that tactics were "battle requirements" and its art was "adapting equipment to battle conditions."³⁶ Svechin described strategy as "the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving a goal set by the war for the armed forces."³⁷ Critically, Svechin suggests that between the tactical and strategic lay an operational level of war that provided a "path to the ultimate goal broken down into a series of operations."³⁸

Furthering Svechin's concept, Triandafillov published *The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies*, in 1929, which stated operational art is the bridge between tactics and strategy

³⁴ Georgii S. Isserson, *The Evolution of Operational Art*, trans. Bruce W. Menning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Theoretical Special Edition, 2005), iii, vii-xxii.

³⁵ Aleksandr A. Svechin, *Strategy*, ed. Kent D Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1991), originally published as *Strategiia* (Moscow: Voennyi Vestnik, 1927), (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1991), 66-69.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 68.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 69.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 69.

linking a series of tactical successes as operational bounds in one continuous, deep operation.³⁹

This theory was further developed and supported by Tukachevsky's essay *New Problems of War*.⁴⁰ Finally, Isserson developed the theory of deep operations as part of the operational level of war in his 1932 publication of *the Evolution of Operational Art*; and again in the expanded 1937 version.⁴¹

Isserson's development of deep operations was a result of technological and tactical changes in warfare. Isserson noted by the First World War, Napoleonic battles of single points to disperse and mass against the enemies flank had transitioned to battles of multiple points, across continuous fronts.⁴² The broadening of the fronts, growing size of armies and technological advances in artillery and mechanization resulted in armies that were less susceptible to Napoleonic flank attacks or single point penetration. Isserson identified this change as a crisis in warfare and advocated deep operations for its resolution.⁴³ Isserson used deep operations as his lens to articulate the solution to the crisis as operational art. Isserson's operational art was a "continuous chain of merged combat efforts through the entire depths", coordinated at the operational level in time and space to achieve the strategic aim.⁴⁴ Isserson described the relationship of actions to the strategic aim as "united by the general intent of defeating or resisting the enemy."⁴⁵

Operational art has continued to be explained by theorists in terms of linking actions in time and space for the obtainment of strategic objectives. Specifically, James Schneider stated

³⁹ Valadimir K. Triandafillov, *The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies* (London: Taylor & Francis Group Publisher, 1994), xv.

⁴⁰ Richard Simpkin and John Erickson, *Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukachevskii* (London: Pergamon-Brassey, 1987), 156.

⁴¹ Isserson, *The Evolution of Operational Art*, xvi-xvii, 1-9.

⁴² Isserson, *The Evolution of Operational Art*, 19, 26, 76.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

“operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, John Boyd described operational art as a system to increase opportunities for success by enabling shared understanding of the operational and strategic aims.⁴⁷ US Army doctrine combines the ideas of the Soviet theorists with Schneider and Boyd to define operational art as “the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.”⁴⁸ US Joint Doctrine expands this idea to concept including the cognitive approach utilizing skills, knowledge, experience, creativity and judgment to develop operational plans to achieve strategic ends.⁴⁹

Similarly in the British Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) *Operations* “Operational art is defined as the employment of forces to attain strategic and, or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.”⁵⁰ Expanded further as the “orchestration of a series of tactical actions, if necessary along multiple tactical lines of activity.”⁵¹ Operational Art is further expressed as a result of the “higher commander’s intent [and] translates strategic direction into tactical execution.”⁵² Finally, operational art is explained as a cognitive process to apply military judgment to array options to commanders and mitigate risk, by synchronizing resources against

⁴⁶ James J. Schneider, “Theoretical Paper No.3: The Theory of Operational Art” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988), 52.

⁴⁷ John, Boyd, *Patterns of Conflict, Proceedings of Seminar on Air Antitank Warfare, May 25-26, 1978* (Springfield, VA: Battelle, Columbus Laboratories, 1979), accessed September 23, 2017, <http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/>, 90-140.

⁴⁸ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4-1.

⁴⁹ *ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, 4-1.

⁵⁰ ADP, *Land Operations* (AC 71940), 8-10.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

tasks in time and space.⁵³ The latter is the most encompassing description of operational art within the British and US military doctrine and forms a common understanding of operational art.

Both the British and US military definitions of operational art indicate the importance of communication and influence within operational art but fail to include any granularity of its application. Both definitions assume communication as a forcing function throughout operational art and thus do not obtain specific mention as a process or principles. This creates a doctrine gap, namely the lack of principles for communication that this study seeks to identify.

The study will use inductive reasoning to analyze two case studies to determine the universal principles of effective communication. The first hypothesis asserts that when commanders effectively communicate their vision and intent they are able to enable mission command. The relevance of this hypothesis is apparent from the examination of British and US Military doctrine on communication, alluding to the enablement of mission command from a clear commander's vision and intent. The study will examine the clarity, discipline and consistency of orders issued by Allenby and Ridgway to measure the effectiveness of mission command. The second hypothesis proposes that when commanders effectively communicate their vision and intent they are able to mitigate operational and strategic risk. Similar to the first, the clarity, discipline and consistency of communications by Allenby and Ridgway to their superiors and subordinates will be examined to determine how risk was articulated and mitigated. The measurement for success will relate to how the communication affected change. The third hypothesis suggests when commanders effectively communicate their vision and intent they are able to create a culture of organizational change. Again, clarity, discipline and consistency of communication will be examined to determine how well Allenby and Ridgway articulated the requirement for each to transition from the defense to offensive action in their respective theatres of war.

⁵³ Ibid., 8-11.

The literature review confirms a gap within British and US Army doctrine in the form of principles for communication. First of said principles is likely to be the requirement for leaders to create shared understanding and provide context to enable effective and time efficient action. A second is likely to be the requirement for commanders to create cohesion, build trust and enable mission command. A third is likely to be the requirement for a leader to clearly message and motivate others to act. Separately, the study suggests that these principles should be bounded by clarity, discipline and consistency. The potential principles identified from the literature review will be refined using the hypotheses during the case studies.

Methodology

This study uses a structured, focused comparison methodology to qualitatively examine two case studies using a series of research questions. The “structure” is provided by five research questions used throughout the study to derive comparable qualitative data to assess the case studies. Meanwhile, the “focus” of this comparison will be assessing the use of communication to achieve effect within the case studies. By comparing two cases, this study seeks to reveal one or more contributing factors that help explain the different outcomes of the selected campaigns. The rest of this section includes a brief overview of the two cases this study will analyze, the research questions this study will use to conduct its analysis, and the sources this study will use to obtain qualitative data.

The first case study will be of Field Marshall Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby GCB GCMG GCVO and his command of the British Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign against the Ottoman Empire. The case will explore three distinct phases of the campaign. Firstly, the capture of Beersheba, Jaffa and Jerusalem between October and December 1917. Secondly, the occupation of the Jordan valley and eventual capture of

Palestine. Thirdly, the pursuit and capture of Damascus, followed by the advance into Northern Syria.⁵⁴

The second case study will be of General Matthew ‘Bunker’ Ridgway and his command of the eighth US Army in South Korea. The case will explore three distinct phases of the campaign. Firstly, Ridgway’s assumption of command, following General Walton Walker’s death, in retreat from North Korea. Secondly, Ridgway’s reorganization and restructuring of the eighth US Army. Thirdly, the offensive actions to reduce Chinese operational tempo and regain the initiative.⁵⁵

The five research questions, used as criteria to frame the study’s findings, ensure the proposed solution fulfills the identified doctrine gap and remains relevant. The five proposed research questions are: What are the communication requirements and responsibilities for operational leadership and command? What leadership and management styles affect the communication methods utilized by commanders? What styles of leaders, regarded as effective communicators, are innate and nurtured? What are the principles or methods for communication employed by historic leaders? What communication principles are universal and how can the modern military professional utilize them? It is likely that the assumptions within the literature review and examining the research questions will result in the generation of a set of universal principles for communication. It is also likely that the criteria of discipline, clarity and consistency for all communication will underpin said principles. It is anticipated that there is no set system employed by the commanders within the case studies, but rather just methods and techniques relating to their individual leadership style.

⁵⁴ Edmund H. H. Allenby, *A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force* (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1919), A1-A9.

⁵⁵ US Command and General Staff College, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: A Commander’s Maturation of Operational Art* (London: Create Space Publishing, 2014), 34.

This study will be mixed methods research utilizing primary and secondary sources to acquire data. The data will include journals, academic books, online databases and scholarly articles; websites; the British Army Personnel Centre; British and US Army and Defense policy; national archives and historic operation orders. The main sources used to examine the case studies are: Allenby's *A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force: 1919*; and Ridgway's *The Korean War: 1967*. The use of operation orders to cross-reference the information obtained within the sources will add authenticity.

In summary, the structured focused comparison of the two aforementioned case studies, alongside the research questions will enable the study to deduce whether the leaders utilized a system or set of principles for their communications. Furthermore, it will enable analysis, assessing the suitability of said systems or principles used by commanders in the application of effective communication, and in-turn generate the universal principles for communication.

Case Studies

Following the introduction, this section examines two case studies: Allenby's Sinai and Palestine campaign; and subsequently Ridgway's command in South Korea. Each case study will provide a short description of its principal's personality and leadership followed by an outline of the campaign examined. Subsequently, the theory and terminology outlined in the literature review will be used to answer the studies focused questions against the respective case studies. Answering the focused questions will establish the data required to compare and contrast Allenby and Ridgway's communication methods. In comparing and contrasting the methods, the study will seek to identify a philosophy for effective communication and the corresponding universal principles of communication within its findings.

Allenby's Sinai and Palestine Campaign

The first case study will examine Allenby's command of the British EEF in the Palestine and Sinai campaign. The case will be examined in three parts: an introduction to Allenby's

personality and leadership style; the outline of actions that led to the capture of Jerusalem; and finally answering the posed research questions.

When one imagines the campaigns against the Ottoman Empire in World War I, it is hard not to imagine Thomas E. Lawrence standing at the great dunes looking distantly into the setting sun. Lawrence is often thought to be the great hero of the campaign, when in fact it was Allenby who was hailed a hero and driven through the streets of London in autumn of 1919.⁵⁶ There are numerous theories stating the reasons for the popular portrayal, the most convincing of which is found within Lawrence James's book *Imperial Warrior*. James states, "a romantic war required a romantic hero", which Allenby's ascetics and demeanor did not fit.⁵⁷

Allenby is widely regarded as a principled, temperamental and bullish leader. His subordinate and supporter, General Sir Archibald Wavell wrote Allenby's temper seemed to "confirm the legend that 'the Bull' was merely a bad-tempered, obstinate hothead, a 'thud-and-blunder' general."⁵⁸ Wavell continued to state that his principles were to be admired, demonstrated by a refusal to allow his subordinates to openly criticize his superior, General Sir Douglas Haig, despite severe personal doubts regarding Haig's leadership.⁵⁹ Mark Urban states that the submissive nature of his relationship with Haig led to an inability to work to his own agenda and his failings in the Western Front prior to his commanding the British EEF.

Despite being stifled by his loyalty to Haig, Allenby's staff officers found an intellectually curious general who was interested in finding new ways of breaking the stalemate.⁶⁰ J. F. C. Fuller called Allenby "a man I grew to like and respect", a man who "always

⁵⁶ Lawrence James, *Imperial Warrior: The Life and Times of Field Marshall Viscount Allenby 1861-1936* (London: Thistle Publishing, 1993), II.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, III.

⁵⁸ Mark Urban, *Generals: Ten British Commanders Who Shaped the Modern World* (London: Faber and Faber, 2006), 219.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 220.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 221.

asked his staff if they had any new ideas about how to win the war.”⁶¹ Allenby had an insatiable thirst for knowledge in a wide variety of subjects from wider botany to poetry and was noted for his critical intellect.⁶² A subordinate officer cited:

His keen grey-blue eyes, under heavy brows, search the face while he probes the mind with sharp, almost staccato questions about everything under the sun except what is expected. He cannot suffer fools gladly and demands an unequivocal affirmative or negative to every query he makes. He has a habit of asking questions on the most abstruse subjects, and an unpleasant knack of catching out anyone who gives an evasive answer for the sake of politeness.⁶³

Command of the British EEF sprung Allenby into a new form of leadership that was strikingly different from his previously style.⁶⁴ With his new responsibility Allenby was invigorated to visit his force, ensuring inspections and standards were maintained or in some cases restored. It energized a motionless, defeat weary Army to become a motivated, well-led and emboldened force.⁶⁵ Allenby had transitioned from a submissive, stifled leader to a cavalryman who now “had the chance to fight the battles he instinctively understood, where boldness and dexterity of maneuver held the key to victory.”⁶⁶

Assuming command after the second failed attack on Gaza in April 1917 by General Sir Archibald Murray, Allenby personally reviewed the defensive positions of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Army had three active fronts: Mesopotamia, Arabia and the Gaza front. Allenby lobbied the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George for additional forces: three more infantry divisions, aircraft and artillery.⁶⁷ In October 1917, Allenby was granted the reinforcements requested and ordered to capture Jerusalem by Christmas that year. Allenby prepared for the third

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., 222.

⁶⁴ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 184.

⁶⁵ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 203.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 205-209.

attack against the Gaza front, estimated to be forty kilometers in length, with thirty-five thousand men from the Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies, in defensive locations between Gaza and Beersheba.⁶⁸

Allenby began readying his force with a symbolic act of relocating his headquarters from a first-class Cairo hotel to the front line in an attempt to boost the flagging morale of the British troops and be seen as a fighting general. Allenby incorporated his reinforcements and oversaw the training of the British EEF, ensuring his standards were maintained in line with his direction.⁶⁹ A key concern of Allenby's was to secure Beersheba's water supply at an early stage, alluding to its importance as a key factor to his wider plan of capturing Jerusalem.⁷⁰

Allenby directed four days of bombardment of Gaza, by three divisions and 218 artillery guns, prior to the attack on Beersheba commencing to lure the Turkish force into believing Gaza was the objective. On October 31, 1917, Allenby ordered forty thousand troops to attack the lightly defended garrison in Beersheba. Allenby's plan had succeeded capturing Beersheba and critically the water supply, without the enemy contaminating its source.⁷¹ The Turkish force initially withdrew to Gaza, only to abandon their positions again on November 6, 1917. Allenby had broken the enemy's line, captured Gaza and set conditions for the Army's subsequent attack on Jerusalem.⁷²

⁶⁸ Ibid., 224.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 184, 202, 203.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 232, 233.

⁷¹ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 226.

⁷² Ibid., 234.




Figure 1. Battle of Beersheba, 1917. Cyril Falls, *History of the Great War, based on Official Documents of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence Military Operations Egypt and Palestine from June 1917 to the end of War, Volume 2 Part 1* (UK: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), Map 3.

Allenby continued on the offense, knowing he had established valuable base locations affording water for his force and extending his operational reach. Despite efforts by the Seventh Turkish Army to attack the British EEF flanks in an attempt to delay Allenby's advance, he

continued to pursue and capture of El Mughar. The Turkish Seventh Army continued the delaying action, whilst the Turkish Eighth Army withdrew to defend Jerusalem. Allenby demonstrated his flexibility and ingenuity tasking the Australian Mounted Division to guard his flank against the Turkish Seventh Army, using their horse or camel mounted cavalry to out maneuver the Turkish force. This enabled Allenby to reduce his resource requirements for defending his lines of communications and allocated additional resources to mass troops for offensive operations. Eventually this enabled the dislocation of the Turkish Seventh Army by cutting their lines of communication at Junction Station on November 13, 1917.⁷³

Allenby now commanded the Judea Hills and a defensive position at Jaffa, which continued to block the Turkish Seventh Army and cut the lines of communication to Jerusalem. The Arrival of General Erich von Falkenhayn's Yiderim Force increased the strength of the Turkish Seventh Army, delaying Allenby's advance and resulting in a requirement to adapt his plan. Allenby consolidated his force into a defensive line and generated two assault formations for the offensive operations in the vicinity of Jerusalem. Allenby directed a central thrust from the high ground extending from Nebi-Samweli thirteen kilometers from the west of Jerusalem; and a second attack to the south at Bethehem.⁷⁴

The continued success of British EEF attacks, combined with the failed Turkish counter-attacks demoralized the Turkish force in Jerusalem, resulting in their capitulation on December 8, 1917; after only one day of fighting. Allenby entered Jerusalem for its surrender on December 11, 1917. Falkenhayn attempted a final unsuccessful counter-attack on Jerusalem with the Turkish Seventh Army on December 26, 1917, suffering further heavy losses. The loss of Jerusalem constituted an unrecoverable disaster for the Ottoman Empire. As a result of Allenby's success the

⁷³ Ibid., 237.

⁷⁴ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 238-240.

War Office in London postponed operations in Mesopotamia in favor of the ensuing offensive in Palestine.⁷⁵

The first research question is what are the communication requirements and responsibilities for operational leadership and command? During the case study it was evident that Allenby prioritized the following communication requirements: sharing his intent and enabling the organizational changes required; clear and disciplined communication with superiors to gain trust; and the issuing of clear and concise orders to enable disciplined initiative.

Allenby's first prioritized requirement of communication was ensuring shared understanding of his intent. Allenby established this requirement by visiting each of the force locations for hurried inspections, to instill standards and demonstrate he was a fighting general and not a bureaucrat. Allenby furthers this concept by moving his headquarters to the front line, reinforcing the narrative of the fighting general.⁷⁶ Urban also argues, Allenby built a learning organization by applying a change model for the transition of the British EEF from a stalemated defense to offensive action.⁷⁷

Allenby's second prioritized communication requirement was requesting additional resources from his higher commander. Allenby consistently messaged a steady theme to the Prime Minister David Lloyd George articulating that under resourcing would result in an inability to capture Jerusalem.⁷⁸ Critically, Allenby's request for resources was logical, disciplined, and accurate, articulating specific details as to why the resources were required, which engendered trust and support from his superiors.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 249, 250.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 184, 202, 203.

⁷⁷ Urban, *Generals*, 229.

⁷⁸ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 205-209.

Allenby's third priority and requirement of communication was demonstrated in his operational leadership and orders to his subordinates.⁷⁹ Allenby consistently issued very clear orders, which allocated areas of responsibility and tasks. This was clearly demonstrated in the capturing of Beersheba with the sequencing and simultaneity of the British EEF attacks enabling the deception and subsequent defeat of the enemy force.⁸⁰

The second research question is what leadership and communication challenges did the leader face and how were they overcome? The principle leadership and communication challenges faced by Allenby were: operating in the arid environment of the desert; communicating intent and coordination with a force spread over a vast operating area; and the requirement for mission command to maintain tempo and unity of effort.⁸¹ Allenby overcame these challenges by adapting his leadership style and techniques to ensure greater understanding and execution of his intent.

The first and most notable challenge to Allenby's command and control within the Palestine and Sinai Campaign was the harsh desert environment. The arid environment, combined with its hot days and cold nights combined some of the worst conditions for warfare and created huge logistical and operational constraints to Allenby's campaign. Allenby mastered the requirement to fight for resources, particularly water, and ensured his subordinates knew to deviate from the plan in order to take and hold these key resources.⁸² Separately, the environment proved difficult to navigate large forces due to a lack of discernable land features for reference. To counter this difficulty, Allenby used aircraft to monitor and report the progress and

⁷⁹ Allenby, *Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force*, A1-A9.

⁸⁰ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 226-231.

⁸¹ Geronimo Nuño, *Incomplete Victory: General Allenby and Mission Command in Palestine, 1917-1918* (Washington DC: Pickles Partners Publishing, 2015), 124.

⁸² Nuño, *Incomplete Victory*, 126.

dispositions of his forces and to identify key terrain and objectives.⁸³ Subsequently, he would send a reverse situation report to all of his commanders at the end of each day by camel dispatch riders, radio or where applicable telegram. Key information within his telegrams were the location of friendly force dispositions, key resources, and confirmation of the method of communications between echelons.⁸⁴

The second challenge, communicating intent across vast operating areas, was in part mitigated by the aforementioned reverse situation reports, a new style for Allenby in attempts to improve the coordination of his intent across a large operating area. Another method to mitigate the hazard of communication across vast operating areas was the positioning of operational headquarters closer to the frontline. In Allenby's orders to General Sir Harry Chauvel, one of his mounted corps commanders, he outlined clear priorities of his intent alongside urging him to move his headquarters forward to counter the difficulties in command and control.⁸⁵ Allenby's own example of forward basing his headquarters and demanding the same of his subordinates was a lesson he learnt from experience. The forward basing enabled greater shared understanding that led to his orders being executed more effectively. Notably, moving the headquarters forward to distances not seen since the Napoleonic wars brought considerable risk from long-range artillery and aircraft. Nonetheless, this was a risk Allenby was keen to exploit.⁸⁶

The third challenge was the requirement to enable mission command, while maintaining operational tempo and unity of effort. Due to the dispersed dispositions of the force and the uncertainty that resulted from absent information, commanders often sought to micromanage situations until certainty or predictability were apparent. During Allenby's campaign in the West

⁸³ Cyril Falls, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, from June 1917 to the End of the War* (London, UK: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), 521.

⁸⁴ Nuño, *Incomplete Victory*, 127; Falls, *Military Operations*, 519.

⁸⁵ Urban, *Generals*, 227.

⁸⁶ Allenby, *Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force*, A4-9; Urban, *Generals*, 227.

he would often constrain or reduce the freedom of his subordinates to follow extremely detailed plans with little or any latitude for deviation. This system was not possible in Allenby's Palestine and Sinai campaign and as a result Allenby evolved. Urban and Nuño both cite that Allenby's style changed, adding greater latitude for his subordinates, by including priorities and way-points to monitor progress and coordinate operational intent.⁸⁷

The third research question is what aspects of Allenby's leadership, regarded as effective communication, are innate and nurtured? This study indicates that Allenby's effective communication was nurtured rather than innate. His style evolved between his command in France and that demonstrated during his command of the British EEF. Of particular note was: Allenby's improved method of enabling shared understanding; the increased persuasiveness of his style in interactions with subordinates; and finally the reinvigorated consistency of his communication.

The first improvement came from Allenby's experience in France. Allenby recognized the difficulties in creating and maintaining shared understanding, thus immediately ordered the movement of his headquarters closer to the front line in order to transform the apparent "remote and cushy institution" to a war fighting organization.⁸⁸ This enabled Allenby to ensure that he commanded where he was needed. Allenby ensured his staff consistently communicated with advancing formations to maintain operational tempo. Allenby achieved this by establishing mechanisms for command and control that included routine reverse situation reports and the use of dispatch riders and aircraft for reconnaissance. This approach took considerable resources and staff effort, but nevertheless Allenby saw this as his priority duty of command.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Urban, *Generals*, 223; Nuño, *Incomplete Victory*, 126.

⁸⁸ Urban, *Generals*, 227.

⁸⁹ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 206.

The second improvement in Allenby's style was his persuasiveness. Allenby, or the "Bull" as he was known, had a reputation for "pedantry and abrasive visits" to his subordinates.⁹⁰ On assuming command of the British EEF, Allenby demonstrated that this was only one aspect of his command style. His initial visits to troops messaged that he was a fighting general and expected high standards, yet at the same time he took his time to get to know his subordinates and demonstrate that he valued their perspectives. Within weeks Allenby had stamped his personality and leadership style on every soldier within the corps.⁹¹ Allenby was known as the fighting general as he desired, and inspired his troops to follow his will. Of particular note were his interactions with General Chauvel and Lawrence of Arabia whom Allenby would seemingly seek council and plant ideas with to later credit their brilliance for what were essentially his plans.⁹² This had particular effect with Lawrence of Arabia who prior to Allenby's new approach would blatantly disregard orders under the guise of the indigenous force's intent.

The third improvement for Allenby was the consistency with which he communicated. Allenby had learnt the hard lesson that forces in Europe, which were ineffective in their communication to one another and their higher command, often led to degraded tempo or tactical loss.⁹³ Allenby instituted measures to ensure the consistency, timeliness and discipline of his communication via a rigorous routine. Allenby himself asserted to his staff that "priority, timeliness and discipline" were key to the successful understanding of orders to subordinates.⁹⁴ Of particular note, Allenby's British EEF was a mixed force that included commonwealth and indigenous forces further adding to the requirement for disciplined communication to ensure clear direction.

⁹⁰ Urban, *Generals*, 221.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 227.

⁹² Allenby, *Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force*, A2-A3.

⁹³ Urban, *Generals*, 226.

⁹⁴ Allenby, *Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force*, A-6.

The fourth research question is what are the principles or methods for communication employed by the historic leaders identified within the case study? As addressed above the communication methods employed by Allenby were: a requirement to provide context and shared understanding for coordinating actions to enable intent; a requirement to persuade and build trust to enable disciplined initiative and mission command; the final method which underpinned Allenby's British EEF command was consistent, clear and disciplined communication to his superiors and subordinates.

Ridgway's Command in the Korean War

The second case study will examine Ridgway's command of the Eighth US Army in South Korea. The case will be examined in three parts: an introduction to Ridgway's personality and leadership style; the outline of actions from retreat to offensive action, resulting in the recapturing of Seoul; and finally answering the posed research questions.

Born into a military family, Ridgway was an exceptionally bright West Point graduate who had an insatiable thirst for knowledge, especially regarding military biographies and memoirs.⁹⁵ Furthermore, he would spend hours in discussion with World War I commanders and studying accounts of the Great War to enhance his knowledge with first hand experiences.⁹⁶ Ridgway had an acute ability to analyse a problem, clearly communicate his thoughts and outline solutions.⁹⁷ He became apt at writing complicated war plans, analytical papers and speeches with comparative ease.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), 560.

⁹⁶ Matthew B. Ridgway and Harold H. Martin, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 34.

⁹⁷ Blair, *The Forgotten War*, 560.

⁹⁸ Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), 164.

Ridgway had developed a reputation for innovation, boldness and leadership. By nature an aggressive commander, Ridgway proved to be an excellent choice for airborne command.⁹⁹ Leading his men by example, and never far behind the front line, he inspired his subordinates by his mere presence. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Gavin referred to Ridgway as “a great combat commander. Lots of courage. He was right up front every minute. Hard as flint and full of intensity, almost grinding his teeth with intensity so much so, I thought: that man's going to have a heart attack before it's over.”¹⁰⁰

After the death of Lieutenant General Walton Walker, Ridgway assumed command of the Eighth US Army in Korea. His immediate superior was the commander of the United Nations (UN) forces in Korea, the intimidating General Douglas MacArthur. Ridgway was not fazed by the daunting prospect of working for the hands on commander but knew he needed to win his trust to gain more latitude than had been granted to his predecessor. On arrival in Korea, Ridgway met with MacArthur and visited the stalemated defensive positions. At the conclusion of the meeting Ridgway articulated his plan to attack should the situation arise and sought MacArthur's permission. MacArthur responded, “Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think best.”¹⁰¹

In December 1950, Ridgway assumed command of the Eighth Army while it was still in tactical retreat from an overwhelming and unexpected Chinese offensive. Ridgway identified that before the Eighth Army could resume the offensive it needed to have its fighting spirit restored, confidence in its leadership and faith in its mission.¹⁰² Ridgway immediately commenced restoring the morale and fighting spirit of a war weary Army focused on defense. Ridgway set about his program of change by reorganizing the command structure to rotate out commanders who had been in appointments for longer than six months and replace them with fresh leaders.

⁹⁹ Blair, *The Forgotten War*, 560.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁰¹ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 83 and 101.

¹⁰² Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 85.

Separately, he sent out guidance informing his subordinate commanders that they were to spend more time on the front lines with their troops and produce offensive options for battle.¹⁰³

To further ensure the restoration of the Eighth Army's fighting spirit, Ridgway ordered his subordinate commanders to reestablish the defensive lines and produce their plans for offensive action. On presentation of the plans it became apparent that neither I or IX Corps had planned for offensive action. Ridgway immediately dismissed the plans and ordered the corps commanders to reestablish offensive action with the Chinese in order to develop the understanding of the enemy's dispositions.¹⁰⁴

Ridgway knew that modern warfare was not about the numbers of men on the battlefield but the resources and material available for the battles.¹⁰⁵ Ridgway set the perimeter of his defensive line with smaller tactical groups with massed artillery and aircraft in support. Knowing that the Chinese greatly outnumbered the Eighth Army and that smaller forces would attract Chinese aggression, Ridgway drew his enemy into battle and destroyed their forces with "terrifying strength" of artillery and airpower. Ridgway's change in tactics devastated the Chinese in the Hoengsong and Wonju areas as part of Operation Killer in February 1951. The battles lasted seven days, resulting in five thousand Chinese dead and an undisputed control of the region by IX corps.¹⁰⁶ The successful tactical actions restored the degraded fighting spirit of the Eighth Army.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 97-100, 104-105.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 105.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 111.

¹⁰⁶ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 111-112.




Figure 1. Operation Killer, 1951. Korean War Online, “*Operation Killer, 1951*,” accessed 13 February 2018, <http://www.koreanwaronline.com/arms/OperationKiller.htm>

Operation Killer set in motion a series of small tactical successes to drive Chinese forces north of the Han River and control the adjacent mountain ridge to the East of Seoul overlooking enemy supply and communication routes. To the West, Ridgway ordered his infantry to take control of the Pukhan River, which would lead to the eventual isolation of Seoul from the West. With access to the East and West of Seoul controlled by his force in spring 1951, Ridgway ordered the execution of Operation Ripper to re-capture Seoul and drive back the Chinese occupation of Korea. Operation Ripper commenced on March 11, 1951, Seoul was captured three days later on March 14, 1951.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 112-115.

Ridgway's force continued its offensive, with the Chinese taking heavy casualties and withdrawing gradually to the north. On April 11, 1951, President Harry Truman removed MacArthur from command, which elevated Ridgway to Commander of the United Nations Force in Korea. Ridgway continued to apply operational pressure to the battered, but not beaten, Chinese force. The Chinese conducted several counter attacks, twice breaking through the South Korean line but the combined UN force eventually pushed them back to the 38th parallel in May 1951.¹⁰⁸

In six months Ridgway had transformed a defensive and degraded force into a highly motivated offensive force. Ridgway's leadership enabled the recapturing of Seoul and the repulsion of the Chinese and North Korean Armies north of the 38th parallel. Ridgway had confirmed his place in history and his perception as an American hero.¹⁰⁹

The first research question is what are the communication requirements and responsibilities for operational leadership and command? During the case study it became apparent that Ridgway prioritized the following communication requirements: unmistakably clear and precise communication to ensure subordinates understood his intent; a reality and standards check with subordinates to ensure they felt both appreciated and supported; and a consistency in communication to engender trust.

The first priority of communication for Ridgway was unmistakably clear and precise communication. Separately, Ridgway believed that commanders should always take into consideration the thoughts and opinions of subordinate commanders, where possible assuming their suggestions into his plans.¹¹⁰ Ridgway having clearly defined standards, which he expected of his subordinates and embodied himself, aided the priority of clear and concise communication. In a letter addressing the entire Eighth Army, Ridgway articulated the importance of their role in

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 150-151.

¹⁰⁹ Blair, *The Forgotten War*, 561-563.

¹¹⁰ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 164.

Korea and the values he expected. Notably, these standards also directed officers to become more engaged with the frontline and to leave behind the comforts of well-developed headquarters. Furthermore, he empathized the importance of accurate and clear reporting to ensure that shared understanding.¹¹¹

The second priority of communication was a reality check on standards to ensure that subordinates were appreciated and supported. Ridgway was determined to rid the Eighth Army of “slipshod reporting, indicative of complacency, or inadequate supervision, or insufficient staff visits to front-line units.”¹¹² Additionally, Ridgway considered leadership to have three traits that he demanded of his subordinate commanders: character, courage and competence (the 3Cs).¹¹³ Ridgway described character as self-discipline, loyalty and selflessness. Ridgway described courage as both moral and physical. Finally, Ridgway described competence as unquestionable physical and technical skills, but critically being able to resolve crisis and communicate clearly with subordinates ensuring they were treated fairly and led well.¹¹⁴

The third priority of communication was a consistency in message to engender trust. Ridgway demanded commanders develop the trust of their troops. A clear example can be seen by Ridgway rescinding orders, explaining that leaders were concerned for the safety of the troop’s lives and that he would not risk their lives needlessly.¹¹⁵ Ridgway further developed the trust of his subordinates by ensuring that he and the echelon commanders were all closer to the front-line and leading by example. Ridgway demonstrated that he would not take risks with his subordinates’ lives that he would not be willing to take with his own.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 89, 100, 101, 103, 118.

¹¹² Ibid., 118.

¹¹³ Matthew B. Ridgway, “Leadership,” *Military Review* (October 1966): 40-49, accessed September 28, 2017, <http://cgsc.contrntdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/colliom/p124201coli1/id/634>.

¹¹⁴ Ridgway, *Leadership*, 40-49.

¹¹⁵ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 90, 100.

The second research question is what leadership and communication challenges did the leader face and how were they overcome? The principal leadership and communication challenges faced by Ridgway were: regaining the fighting and offensive spirit of the Eighth Army against a numerically superior enemy; and returning to tried and tested methods of communication in conjunction with modern communication techniques to ensure commonality of intent between echelons.

The first challenge that Ridgway faced was regaining the fighting and offensive spirit of the Eighth Army against a numerically superior enemy. Ridgway's philosophy was to engender the trust in his commanders and subordinates that he would issue every order with the greatest concern for every individual's life. Ridgway realized that for subordinate commanders to be successful they must instinctively trust their higher command to support their actions. Ridgway believed that soldiers do not fight with all their physical energy and devotion without established trust. To establish this wholehearted trust Ridgway informed his subordinates of the plans feasibility, the support they should expect and what the higher command would be doing to support their actions prior to issuing orders. He would consult with his immediate subordinate commanders to gain their appreciation of the task at hand and expect that they had done the same.¹¹⁶

The second challenge faced by Ridgway was creating efficiency between echelons via the incorporation of tried and tested methods of communication with modern communication technologies.¹¹⁷ Ridgway recognized that the subordinate commanders were focused on the immediate fight and not using the range of artillery or the natural advantages of terrain to create advantage. Ridgway noted the phenomena had emerged from over reliance on modern technologies and forgoing lessons learnt from institutional experience. Ridgway reinstated

¹¹⁶ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 101-103.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 88, 89.

techniques such as runners, smoke signals and dispatch riders to ensure information was passed, especially if the radios and phones were not working.¹¹⁸ The employment of the reversionary means of communication ensured subordinates reinstated discipline and routine into battlefield communication, which led to greater shared understanding between echelons.

The third research question is what aspects of Ridgway's leadership, regarded as effective communication, are innate and nurtured? This study indicates that Ridgway had innate leadership traits that he improved over time. Of particular note were Ridgway's: grasp of leadership responsibilities and his intuition and understanding of the importance of communication in leadership. Both of these traits were improved and inculcated through Ridgway's operational experience in World War I.

The first of Ridgway's innate talents which he nurtured overtime was a deep understanding of his personal leadership code. Ridgway believed the cardinal responsibility of a commander was to foresee, insofar as possible, where and when a crisis could occur. He emphasised that commanders provided a command perspective and decision-making authority. In terms of battlefield presence Ridgway wrote:

As commander of a division or smaller unit, there will rarely be more than one crisis, one really critical situation facing you at any one time. The commander belongs right at that spot, not at some rear command post. He should be there before the crisis erupts, if possible. If it is not possible, then he should get there as soon as he can after it develops. Once there, then by personal observation of terrain, enemy fires, reactions, and attitudes of his own commanders on the spot – by his eyes, ears, brain, nose, and his sixth sense – he gets the best possible picture of what is happening and can best exercise his troop leadership and the full authority of his command. He can start help of every kind to his hard-pressed subordinates. He can urge higher commanders to provide additional fire support, artillery, air, other infantry weapons, and, in the future, perhaps, nuclear strikes.¹¹⁹

Ridgway's code of conduct emerged throughout his career, reaching maturity in his command of the 82nd Airborne Brigade in World War I.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 88, 89.

¹¹⁹ Ridgway, *Leadership*, 40-49.

¹²⁰ Ridgway, *Leadership*, 40.

The second trait Ridgway developed during his career was his intuition and understanding of his subordinates and superiors. Ridgway consistently invested in his subordinates to understand their perspectives and problems to ensure he could always provide support, training, or correction where needed. Ridgway believed that the only way to fully understand his subordinate's perspectives was to share common experiences. His personal method involved meeting with the men on the front-line and taking in their experiences with all his senses to fully immerse him in the situation at hand.¹²¹

The fourth research question is what are the principles or methods for communication employed by historic leaders? As demonstrated in the first three research questions Ridgway's communication method included: unmistakably clear and precise communication to create shared understanding and intent; a requirement to share experiences with subordinates to understand their perspective and engender their trust; to exact standards and discipline in all communication and leadership, which is demonstrated through personal example; and finally the use of his 3Cs leadership methodology one of which being communication.

Findings and Analysis

Following the introduction, this section compares and examines the empirical evidence gathered from the case studies section. The section will comprise of two parts, the findings and analysis. The findings section will compare the data gathered from each case study against the focused research questions to indicate commonalities or differences in an attempt to identify aspects of effective communication. Separately, the analysis section will use the study's findings to examine the studies hypothesis prior to recommending universal principles for communication.

¹²¹ Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 85.

Findings

The study's first research question is what are the communication requirements and responsibilities for operational leadership and command? The empirical evidence suggests that the first communication requirement and responsibility sought by both Allenby and Ridgway was to understand their audience, purpose, and aims prior to any formal communication.¹²² Secondly, it suggests that both Allenby and Ridgway placed great emphasis on ensuring the content of their communication was disciplined, clear and consistent. Thirdly, the case studies demonstrated that both Allenby and Ridgway believed effective communication was critical to enabling disciplined initiative.¹²³ The summation of the first research question indicates the requirement to understand (your audience, purpose and aim) prior to communicating your content (with discipline, clarity and consistency) to ensure its effectiveness.

The study's second research question is what leadership and communication challenges did the leader face and how were they overcome? The empirical evidence suggests that the first leadership challenge faced by both commanders was to adapt to the conditions of the operating environment. This aspect involved adapting leadership and communication styles to meet the geographic, technical and resource requirements of the operating environment.¹²⁴ The second leadership challenge was enabling change and clarity of intent through clearly communicated standards to encourage disciplined initiative. Both Allenby and Ridgway demonstrated their understanding of this requirement in the personal examples they set to change the manner and conduct of their organizations. Notably both leaders were willing to adapt their styles to the needs of their subordinates to ensure effective communication.¹²⁵ The summation of the second research

¹²² James, *Imperial Warrior*, 184, 202-203; Ridgway, *Leadership*, 40-49.

¹²³ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 226-231; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 118.

¹²⁴ Urban, *Generals*, 93; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 90 and 100.

¹²⁵ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 184; Ridgway, *Leadership*, 40.

question indicates the requirement for adaptability (understanding the needs of your audience and operating environment) and clearly defined standards (expected or required to enable disciplined initiative) within effective communication.

The study's third research question is what aspects of leadership regarded as effective communication, are innate and nurtured? The case studies indicated that communication techniques could be improved over time. Firstly, both Allenby and Ridgway improved the persuasiveness of their communication by indicating the way of their intent. Secondly, both Allenby and Ridgway demonstrated that reflection in communication was critical to develop and mitigate their intuition in order to understand the effectiveness of their communication styles.¹²⁶ The case studies indicated that persuasion and self-improvement are critical to continued effective communication. The summation of the third research question indicates that communication skills can be nurtured by articulating the why (improving persuasiveness) and subsequently reflecting (in order to mitigate and improve intuition) to improve one's effectiveness.

The study's fourth research question is what are the principles or methods for communication employed by the historic leaders identified within the case study? The examination of the study's fourth research question yields the following principles that enable effective communication: understanding, adaptability, content, standards, context and reflection. These aspects provide the basis for the universal principles of communication and require further explanation.

Understanding is an internal process that includes the ability to examine your audience, purpose, and aim. When considering the audience, the study suggest that to be an effective communicator the commander must seek clarification on who the audience is, why they need to be influenced, and what their objectives and priorities are. The purpose of communication is also critical to effective communication, but purpose can come in many forms. Both Allenby and

¹²⁶ James, *Imperial Warrior*, 184; Urban, *Generals*, 227; Ridgway, *Leadership*, 40; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 101-103.

Ridgway used communication to purposefully engender trust, to transform organizations, and to gain further understanding. Finally the aim of communication must be clearly stated and examined in its conception to truly understand the extent upon which it will be effective or attract unintended consequences.

Adaptability is an external process that anticipates the needs of your audience and operating environment. The study suggests that a typical hierarchical approach to leadership where the commander is rigid and expects subordinates to meet their style does not achieve effective communication. Both Allenby and Ridgway demonstrated the ability to adapt to their audience and operating environment, creating more effective methods for communication.

Content is the process of ensuring communication is conducted with discipline, clarity and consistency. In regards to discipline the case study suggests a commander must resist the urge to change instruction prior to intent being actualized or communicate too often stifling disciplined initiative. Clarity is another aspect for consideration regarding content. Although this appears to be obvious, both Allenby and Ridgway placed great emphasis on the requirement for clarity. Ridgway particularly stated he found all too often clarity was missing from most forms of communication, stating that being unmistakably clear with his intent was critical to success. Finally, both case studies indicated that consistency in communication builds trust and cohesion with subordinates and superiors. In regards to consistency the study suggests routine, style and method of communication are all areas for consideration.

Establishing standards is the process of clearly outlining the best-case and minimum acceptable resolution of the intent alongside its priority. The case studies suggest that outlining the standards and priority enables subordinates (or superiors) maximum freedom, thus increasing the likelihood of an intent being actualized. Furthermore, the case studies indicate that increasing the freedoms and articulating priorities for subordinates without over prescribing the outcome will enhance trust, cohesion, and disciplined initiative.

Explaining the context is the process of generating understanding within your superiors and subordinates but also a method of improving the persuasiveness of intent. Both Allenby and Ridgway recognized the necessity to improve persuasiveness particularly when dealing with organizational change or superiors. Simon Sinek suggests demonstrating the why enables others to believe in the intent of the communicator by creating a sense of belonging.¹²⁷

Finally, reflection is the process of assessing whether improvement can be gained from assessing and mitigating one's actions to improve intuition. Separately, reflection also offers a mechanism to validate the communication requirements a given subordinate requires to enable the intent. Both commanders within the case study used reflection to improve and further train their intuition, alongside providing enduring guidance for their subordinates.

Analysis

The study uses inductive reasoning to analyze two case studies to determine the universal principles of effective communication. The first hypothesis asserts that when commanders effectively communicate their vision and intent they are able to enable mission command. The study demonstrates that the first hypothesis is supported. Both Allenby and Ridgway stated the importance of sharing intent and vision to enable mission command or disciplined initiative.¹²⁸ Allenby and Ridgway initially ensured shared understanding by personal visits to frontline locations to ensure their subordinates knew what was expected and what latitude they had to work within intent.¹²⁹ Furthermore, the hypothesis is supported by the transformation that both Allenby and Ridgway enabled within their respective commands through effective communication and a clear vision with guidance.

¹²⁷ Sinek, *Start with Why*, 162.

¹²⁸ Urban, *Generals*, 229; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 164.

¹²⁹ Urban, *Generals*, 229; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 97-100.

The second hypothesis proposes that when commanders effectively communicate their vision and intent they are able to mitigate operational and strategic risk. The evidence within the case study suggests the second hypothesis is supported. During the case studies Allenby and Ridgway demonstrated that the main route to mitigating risk was ensuring that subordinates and superiors clearly understood their priorities, intent and vision.¹³⁰ Ensuring knowledge of these aspects enabled subordinates to enact mission command and superiors to understand the implications of either supporting or not supporting their requests for additional resources.¹³¹ Finally, this hypothesis is further supported by the trust engendered by sharing intent and vision leading to subordinates being willing to provide feedback and improvement to operations, thus further reducing risk. This was particularly evident in the study of Ridgway.

The third hypothesis suggests when commanders effectively communicate their vision and intent they are able to create a culture of organizational change. The evidence within the case study suggests the third hypothesis is supported. Both Allenby and Ridgway effected change within their command to transform defensive Armies with low morale into effective fighting organizations with high morale and offensive spirit.¹³² This hypothesis is further supported by the fact that both Allenby and Ridgway were able to affect change within multinational commands, which is attributed to the persuasiveness and the manner in which they communicated their vision and intent.

The literature review identified a doctrine gap in both the British and US Army doctrine in the form of principles of communication. The literature review suggested that the principles were likely to include a requirement for leaders to create shared understanding and provide context. The second was for commanders to create cohesion, build trust and enable mission

¹³⁰ Allenby, *Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force*, A4-9; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 101-103.

¹³¹ Nuño, *Incomplete Victory*, 127; Falls, *Military Operations*, 519.

¹³² James, *Imperial Warrior*, 203; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 97-100, 104-105.

command. The third was for a leader to clearly message and motivate others to act. Finally, it suggested that these principles should be bounded by clarity, discipline and consistency. Within the findings and analysis these principles have been examined and expanded upon.

In summary the findings and analysis depict a recommendation that the universal principles for communication should be: understanding, adaptability, content, standards, context and reflection. The first principal, understanding, would involve asking who you need to influence, to what end, and for what aim? The second, adaptability, would involve asking what are the needs of the target audience in terms of capabilities and capacity, and what freedoms and constraints are afforded in the operating environment? The third, content, would involve asking what guidance do I need to provide, to who, when and how to ensure intent can be anticipated and unmistakably clear? The fourth, standards, would ask what the acceptable minimum is, what is the best-case scenario and what is the priority of the task? The fifth, context, would ask why are we doing this task and why is it important to the wider strategic situation and target audience? The sixth, reflection, would ask two questions. Firstly, what additional guidance is needed to ensure intent is actualized? Secondly, what methods or techniques could I improve and train to enhance or mitigate my style and intuition?

Conclusion

Despite the vast volume of literature on leadership, operational art and communication there is not currently a set of communication principles in either British or US military doctrine. This study compared leadership styles and techniques from case studies on Allenby and Ridgway to determine if a set of universal principles for effective communication could be deduced. This study was intended to establish said principles to fill the aforementioned gap in doctrine. The empirical evidence identified within the study supports its thesis, which asserts that the universal principles for communication are understanding, adaptability, content, standards, context and reflection.

The study collected primary and secondary data using five research questions in a structured focused analysis to compare the two case studies and test its three hypotheses. The research questions sought to examine the requirements of communication, the styles utilized, how and if the style of communication changed due to circumstance, and finally what systems of communication were used by Allenby and Ridgway. Ultimately the findings from the analysis supported the study's hypothesis and confirmed its thesis.

The study concludes by recommending the universal principles for effective communication (understanding, adaptability, content, standards, context and reflection) be adopted into British and US Military Doctrine. Specifically to: *Army Field Manual (AFM), Command (AC 72062)*, CH 1, Section 13, Para H, for communication in the British Army; to Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-10, *Institutional Leader Training and Education*, Section 8, adding to the qualities of a leader for the US Army; and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, CH 10, para 20, concerning communication in operational leadership for the US Army.

If nothing else, the study attempts to inspire all military professionals to consider and reflect on their own communication style to ensure we continually get the best out of our people.

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