

In Case of War Break Glass: A Conversation about the Security Force Assistance Brigade in US Army Expansion

A Monograph

by

MAJ Phillip M. Denker
US Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

2018

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 27-06-2017	2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUNE 2017 – MAY 2018
--	---	---

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE In Case of War Break Glass: A Conversation about the Security Force Assistance Brigade in Army Expansion	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Phillip M. Denker US Army	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
--	---

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) AMSP	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
The United States Army presently lacks a strategic reserve. As the Army transitioned to the modern force and undertook continuous stability operations in the Global War on Terror, the Army operationalized the Reserve Components to meet ongoing requirements. The operationalization of the Reserve Components left the United States lacking a strategic reserve for the land domain to counter a near peer or peer threat in future large-scale combat operations. The Army's new Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) is built around a core of capable tested leaders like the cadre used to create new divisions in World War II. To fill the role of strategic reserve, this monograph recommends the consideration of using the SFAB to form the core of a new Army formation, the Strategic Reserve Division (SRD), rather than the currently planned expansion to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Army planners should build and iteratively hone an expansion plan for the land component, the SFAB to SRD conversion should be part of their conversation.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Security Force Assistance Brigade, Expandability, Mobilization, New Divisions, Strategic Reserve, World War II, All Volunteer Force, Army Transformation

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	47	

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ Phillip M. Denker

Monograph Title: In Case of War Break Glass: A Conversation about the Security Force Assistance Brigade in US Army Expansion

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, PhD

_____, Seminar Leader
Christopher M. McGowan, COL

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
James C. Markert, COL

Accepted this 24th day of May 2018 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

Abstract

In Case of War Break Glass: A Conversation about the Security Force Assistance Brigade in Army Expansion, by MAJ Phillip M. Denker, ARMY, 47 pages.

The United States Army presently lacks a strategic reserve. As the Army transitioned to the modern force and undertook continuous stability operations in the Global War on Terror, the Army operationalized the Reserve Components to meet ongoing requirements. The operationalization of the Reserve Components left the United States lacking a strategic reserve for the land domain to counter a near peer or peer threat in future large-scale combat operations.

The Army's new Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) could provide a strong core to build a future strategic reserve force for large-scale combat operations. The Army already proposed using the SFAB as a part of an expandable ground force, but current Army proposals suggest the SFAB transition into a combat brigade. This monograph argues proper planning and preparation could transform the SFABs into a division-sized element providing greater capability and flexibility versus near peer or peer threats.

The SFAB is built around a core of capable tested leaders like the cadre used to create new divisions in World War II. To fill the role of strategic reserve, this monograph recommends the consideration of using the SFAB to form the core of a new Army formation, the Strategic Reserve Division (SRD), rather than the currently planned expansion to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The transformation of the six planned SFABs into SRDs during national emergency could increase the number of Army maneuver battalions by 24% (54 battalions). Army planners should build and iteratively hone an expansion plan for the land component, the SFAB to SRD conversion should be part of their conversation.

Contents

Abstract	iii
Acronyms	v
Illustrations	vi
Tables	vi
Introduction	1
The Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB)	6
Mobilization of Combat Forces in World War II	11
Mobilization Planning	11
Mobilizing	16
The Modern Force	22
The All-Volunteer Force	23
Army Transformation and the Modern Force.....	27
The Operational Reserve	32
The Expandable Future Force	34
The Strategic Reserve Division (SRD).....	36
Manning, Training, and Equipping the SRD.....	39
Conclusions	44
Recommendations	45
Bibliography	48

Acronyms

AC	Active Component
AEF	Allied Expeditionary Force
AGF	Army Ground Forces
ABCT	Armored Brigade Combat Team
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
IMP	Industrial Mobilization Plan
LSCO	Large-Scale Combat Operations
MRAP	Mine-Resistant Armor Protected
PMP	Protective Mobilization Plan
ROMO	Range of Military Operations
RC	Reserve Component
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade
SRD	Strategic Reserve Division
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
US	United States
WPD	War Plans Division
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War II

Illustrations

Figure 1 The Security Force Assistance Brigade's Role Across the Range of Military Operations..	3
Figure 2. SFAB Structure	8
Figure 3. Heavy/Armored, Infantry, and Stryker BCTs from FM 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team, August 2006.	31
Figure 4. SFAB Transformation to Strategic Reserve Division.....	37
Figure 5. Hypothetical Strategic Reserve Division.. ..	38
Figure 6. Hypothetical SRD Maneuver Brigade.	39
Figure 7. Battalion Advising Team to SRD Brigade Staff Transition.....	40

Tables

Table 1. SFAB to SRD Combat Comparison.....	10
Table 2. Major Ground Combat Equipment.....	43

Introduction

In every battle there comes a time when both sides consider themselves beaten, then he who continues the attack wins.

— Ulysses S. Grant

The night sky over Korea tore open as the missile raced from its launcher. US Army Specialist Richards and Republic of Korea Sergeant Noh watched as it accelerated out of view. A moment later both men shielded their eyes as night turned into day in an instant. The second shot in a new war had just been fired. Moments earlier, a set of dormant computer viruses shut down the New York Stock Exchange, turned off all cooling pumps at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Arizona, and altered internet search algorithms to always show American flag-draped coffins. The nuclear detonation in space along with the coordinated cyber and information attacks changed everything. America faced an existential threat as global transportation, communication, and trade ground to a halt.

One year later Specialist Richards and Sergeant Noh were among the 2,000,000 dead allied troops. The dead included 600,000 support soldiers deployed with minimal mobilization training out of necessity. Soldiers had been lost at such a rate that the lucky ones were buried near where they fell. The opposing North Korea and China coalition suffered even greater losses. Belligerents on both sides were exhausted from the unprecedented speed and savage nature of the brawl.

Both sides were whittled to shells of their former selves. The United States led allied coalition retained an advantage in the air and sea domains, but the opposing forces had fought to a standstill on land. China's anti-access and area-denial capabilities were preventing the battered allies from seizing the initiative. The last two National Guard Brigade Combat Teams, the final components of the allies' reserve, had rushed to the theater but could not break the stalemate. The allies could not generate forces in time to take advantage of the window of opportunity created by their land and sea advantage. The Chinese would soon create divisions at a rate of two per month

and methodically push the allies out of the theater. The window in time would close, and the allies would not have another opportunity in this war.

The above fictional scenario depicts a bleak future for the US Military attempting to make up for inadequacies of preparation during a war. Historians Marvin Kriedberg and Merton Henry claimed: “it has been abundantly proven in all of the wars in which the United States has engaged that time cannot be bought at any price.”¹ If time cannot be bought during a conflict, then pre-conflict planning and preparation provide the only means to maximize time during battle. Pre-conflict planning and preparation speed up mobilization of new combat units in an expanding army thereby increasing capability to counter near-peer or peer threats in large-scale combat operations (LSCOs). The United States needs to plan and prepare for a strategic reserve force that can be mobilized to fight rare but highly lethal large wars. The Army’s new Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) provide a foundation to build this strategic reserve force. Proper planning and preparation could transform the SFABs into division sized elements hereafter called Strategic Reserve Divisions (SRDs) to fight and win the nation’s large wars.

The National Commission on the Future of the Army recently reported the current force size is the “minimally sufficient force to meet current and anticipated missions with an acceptable level of national risk.” The commission found the Army has limited ability to react to unforeseen circumstances. The commission stated that based on planning assumptions for fiscal year 2017 the Army was not “sized nor shaped for conducting any kind of large-scale, long-duration mission at acceptable risk.”² The 2018 National Defense Strategy called for “innovative

¹ Marvin Kriedberg and Merton Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945* (Washington DC: Department of the Army Center of Military History, 1955), 695.

² National Commission on the Future of the Army, *National Commission on the Future of the Army: Report to the President and the Congress of the United States* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 2, 35, 52.

operational concepts” and “dynamic force employment” to help “account for the uncertainty that exists in the changing global strategic environment.”³ Can the Army be sized to conduct recurring small scale stability and regional conflicts while simultaneously being prepared to face LSCOs? As Figure 1 below shows, this monograph proposes the SFAB can provide a dynamic force employment option across the full-spectrum of conflict and Range of Military Operations (ROMO). The Army envisions the SFAB primarily focused at the lower end of the ROMO while retaining limited ability to transition to LSCO, this monograph proposes the SFABs focus on security force assistance roles while preparing to fill a much larger role as trained cadre at the core of new combat divisions at the higher end of the ROMO.




Figure 1 The Security Force Assistance Brigade's Role Across the Range of Military Operations. Created by the Author, Range of Military Operations modified from Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 *Joint Operations*, Washington DC, Government Printing Office, 2011, V-1.

Historically, long periods of peace and geographical separation allowed the United States lengthy mobilization periods following the outbreak of LSCO. The modern Army has continuously fought small wars since 2001 but still must prepare for LSCO. While the Cold-

³ US Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 7.

War's peace dividend allowed the Army to reduce active component (AC) end strength, current geopolitical conditions require high operational tempo for all Army components. Army deployments continue at such a pace that any new operation requiring substantial troop numbers may require troop reductions in other areas.

Ground combat requirements in future conflicts are likely to remain high. The Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) intelligence section labels the near future as the "Era of Accelerated Human Progress," running from the present through 2035. TRADOC claims our adversaries will take advantage of new technologies, doctrine, and strategies to challenge the US military across multiple domains.⁴ TRADOC claims future conflict between peers will be more destructive, with increased speed, over longer-ranges resulting in significant equipment and manpower losses.⁵ Based on these reports the Army will fight adversaries with greater capabilities while doing so with a smaller initial force and needing a larger force soon after initial contact.

Future threats, ongoing operations, and budget constraints combine into a requirement for an expandable Army. An expandable force is not a new concept. After the war of 1812, the Secretary of War John C. Calhoun recommended a scalable force based on a cadre of regular forces that would rapidly train and lead the mobilized militias.⁶ After the American Civil War, Union Major General Emory Upton became the most well-known advocate for an expandable

⁴ US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare*, accessed September 16, 2017, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/watch/Operational_Environment_ChangingCharacter_FutureWarfare.pdf.

⁵ Training and Doctrine Command, *Future Warfare*, 19.

⁶ Charles E. Heller, *Manpower, Force Structure, and Mobilization Readiness: A peacetime Cadre System for the U.S. Army* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1990), 10-11.

force spending the remainder of his military career fighting for an expandable army based on well trained regular soldiers that would lead civilian recruits during war.⁷

At the start of WWII, the Army had to expand to counter the threats posed by the Axis powers. As hostilities began in Europe, the Army Ground Force (AGF) was smaller than the current AC, but by 1945 the Army had mobilized over 8,500,000 soldiers, of which 2,000,000 filled out 91 Army divisions.⁸ The WWII Army expansion was the Nation's largest expansion but not the only one. The Army expanded to meet requirements in nearly all large American wars. The methodical WWII expansion was a historical anomaly when compared to other Army expansions. For example, the Korean War included the activation of two corps headquarters within two months of deploying and division expansions to incorporate 30,000 to 40,000 Republic of Korea soldiers.⁹ In 1965, during the Vietnam War ground force expansion, the Army transformed the 1st Cavalry Division into an airmobile division in six months with a complete unit redesign and incorporation of over 6,000 new soldiers.¹⁰ The modern force also expanded during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Army expansion was necessary in the past, but not always methodically planned and executed.

The Army is currently in the process of fielding a new organization, the Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). The SFABs should reduce deployments of the Army's primary ground force, the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), in advisory missions thereby freeing BCTs for

⁷ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1964).

⁸ Kent Greenfield, Robert Palmer, and Bell Wiley. *United States Army in World War II The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2004), 492.

⁹ Roy E. Appleman, *United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1992), 385, 544. I Corps was activated on 2 August 1950 and in Korea by while IX Corps was activated on 10 August 1950 and left Fort Sheridan on 5 September 1950 to Korea. Over 8,625 South Korean recruits were shipped from Korea to Japan to link in with the 1st Cavalry Division before its arrival in Korea.

¹⁰ John M. Carland, *United States Army in Vietnam: Combat Operations, Stemming the Tide May 1965 to October 1966* (Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2000), 54-59.

LSCOs. The SFAB is similar in organizational design to a BCT but lacks most junior soldiers present in BCTs. The SFAB is designed to provide the Army with a security force assistance capability, but it also provides a ready trained command and staff team augmentable with additional soldiers and equipment to transition to a BCT during rapid Army expansion.

This monograph analyzes the use of the SFAB as the backbone of an expandable Army and recommends that the SFAB forms the core of a new division rather than a BCT. To understand how the SFAB could be expanded to form an SRD, lessons from the methodical WWII Army expansion are analyzed. Changes since WWII alter how the modern Army would expand, so the transition to the all-volunteer force and brigade modularity are studied for impacts on mobilization. Lastly, recommendations are made for planning, equipping, and training the SFAB as it transitions from an advisory role to a new SRD.

The Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB)

On 8 February 2018, Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley activated the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade in a ceremony at Fort Benning, GA. This ceremony marked a shift in the Army's capabilities. For decades the Army conducted Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions using ad-hoc advisor groups or by temporarily reconfiguring combat formations. The 1st SFAB's fielding gives the Army a permanent SFA focused organization.¹¹ The 1st SFAB is just the first of six SFABs the Army intends to field. These new formations will free up BCTs to prepare for LSCOs and provide better-trained personnel for SFA missions.¹²

¹¹ Chuck Williams, "Army's top general tells new Fort Benning unit they are marching into history," *Ledger-Enquirer*, February 8, 2018, accessed February 10, 2018, <http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/news/local/military/article199188524.html>.

¹² Todd C. Lopez, "Security Force Assistance Brigades to free Brigade Combat Teams from advise, assist mission." May 18, 2017, accessed December 1, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/188004/security_force_assistance_brigades_to_free_brigade_combat_teams_from_advise_assist_mission; US Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, "Security Force Assistance Brigades," *DCS G-3/5/7*, October 1, 2017, accessed December 13, 2017, <http://www.benning.army.mil/MCoE/CDID/TCM>.

The SFABs will primarily conduct SFA activities to shape operational environments by supporting partner nations against threats to security and stability. According to FM 3-0 *Operations*, the SFABs will provide theater commanders the “capability to support theater security cooperation activities and build partner-nation security force capacity.”¹³ SFA activities occur across the ROMO but are often lower intensity missions including organizing, advising, training, and assisting, partner nation security forces.¹⁴

SFAB manning is still under review. Initial fielding plans called for the SFAB to consist of 529 personnel.¹⁵ More recent plans increase the SFABs to around 800 experienced leaders.¹⁶ SFAB commanders are selected from Colonels (O-6) who previously commanded BCTs and SFAB battalion commanders are selected from previous battalion commanders. This use of experienced soldiers continues through the NCO and company grade officers.¹⁷ Upon selection to the organization, SFAB personnel receive additional specialized SFA training.¹⁸

The core of the SFAB formation parallels the BCT construct. Each SFAB has a headquarters and headquarters company and six advisory battalions. Advisor battalions include two maneuver, one cavalry, one field artillery, one engineer (with embedded signal and military intelligence companies), and an advisory brigade support battalion to focus primarily on tactical

¹³ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 2-10.

¹⁴ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), B-1, B-8, B-9.

¹⁵ Lopez, "Security force assistance brigades," 2017.

¹⁶ US Department of the Army, "Army announces the activation of second Security Force Assistance Brigade at Fort Bragg," December 8, 2017, accessed December 13, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/197954/army_announces_activation_of_second_security_force_assistance_brigade_at_fort_bragg.

¹⁷ Williams, "Army's top general," 2018.

¹⁸ US Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, "Security Force Assistance Brigades," 2017.

and operational advising.¹⁹ The SFAB also has multiple combat advisor teams embedded in each company led by a captain and sergeant first class. While the SFAB mimics the BCT construct, it is only a BCT shell. The SFAB has less than a quarter of the personnel of a BCT and a fraction of the equipment. SFABs do not include heavy combat vehicles such as Abrams Tanks or Bradley Fighting Vehicles; instead they are equipped with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) wheeled vehicles, small arms, and communication equipment appropriate for SFA missions.²⁰

Figure 2 below shows a notional SFAB formation.




Figure 2. SFAB Structure. Created by the author.

SFABs, while designed for SFA, help the Army prepare for LSCO in two ways. First, SFABs can replace BCTs in ongoing SFA missions.²¹ BCTs have succeeded in SFA roles during

¹⁹ US Army, FM 3-0 (2017), 2-10.

²⁰ Scott Nicholas, "DLA, Army Partner to Equip 1st of Six Security Force Assistance Brigades," *ExecutiveGov*, October 26, 2017, accessed November 21, 2017, <http://www.executivegov.com/2017/10/dla-army-partner-to-equip-1st-of-six-security-force-assistance-brigades/>.

²¹ Jared Keller, "The 1st SFAB's Afghan Deployment is a Moment of Truth for the Global War On Terror," *Task and Purpose*, January 22, 2018, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://taskandpurpose.com/sfab-train-advise-assist-afghanistan/>. BCTs have been conducting SFA roles for approximately fifteen years.

GWOT, but their design rendered them inefficient. BCTs conducting SFA often left many trained soldiers and combat equipment behind as experienced leaders deployed. By conducting SFA missions with smaller SFABs, larger BCTs will be free to prepare for major combat operations.²² Also, the Army designed the SFAB on a standard BCT block and line chart so if needed they can be expanded to create BCTs. In testimony before Congress in 2017 Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7 stated SFABs will "serve as the backbone of new brigades if the Army is ever called to rapidly expand."²³ The SFAB is designed to take some strain off BCTs allowing them to focus on their primary LSCO missions.

If the Army plans to use the SFAB in an expandable role, how much additional combat power could SFAB transition generate? Table 1 below shows three scenarios in which the Army could expand using SFABs. Ground combat maneuver battalion quantity was selected as a measure of combat power (the Army currently has 220 maneuver battalions including infantry, armor, and cavalry battalions).²⁴ The three scenarios analyzed included a short duration regional contingency, a long duration regional contingency, and a national emergency/peer conflict. In the short duration regional contingency scenario, all six SFABs transitioned to BCTs increasing combat power by eight percent (18 new combat battalions). In the long duration contingency scenario, three SFABs transitioned to BCTs as a surge force while the Army retains three SFABs for SFA capacity. This scenario increases the number of maneuver battalions by four percent (8 new combat battalions). The national emergency scenario forces expansion of the Total Army to oppose a peer. This scenario transitioned the SFABs into SRDs rather than BCTs. This last

²² Lopez, "Security force assistance brigades," 2017.

²³ *Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services: The Effect of Sequestration and Continuing Resolutions on Modernization and Readiness*, 115th Cong., March 16, 2017, 12.

²⁴ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Ballance 2017," *The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics* (Oxfordshire, UK: Taylor and Francis, 2017), 45-47.

scenario increases the number of combat battalions by twenty-five percent as 54 new combat battalions join the 220 in the Total Army. The last section of this monograph will discuss this transformation in more detail.

Combat Power Increase from SFAB Expansion							
Scenario #	Conflict type	SFAB Transition Type	SFABs Transitioned	Initial total force maneuver battalions	Additional Combined Arms BNs M+18	Percent increase in maneuver battalions	Scenario details
Scenario 1	Short duration regional contingency	SFAB to BCT	6	220	18	8%	SFAB transition provides near term expansion of BCT pool to a limited contingency operation not expected to exceed 36 months. No SFABs retained for SFA missions.
Scenario 2	Long duration regional contingency	SFAB to BCT	3	220	9	4%	SFAB transition to BCTs for long duration conflict reduces the availability to conduct SFA mission that are likely part of the long duration mission. Therefore, scenario only considers transition of three SFABs as a combat power surge until the Army can build new BCTs through regular expansion. Global SFA requirements may have to be reduced during surge period.
Scenario 3	National emergency/peer conflict	SFAB to SRD	6	220	54	25%	National emergency requires Total Army employment to counter peer threat. All SFABs conduct rapid transition to new Strategic Reserve Divisions. IRR called to fill positions unable to be filled via basic/AIT/OSUT/ and commissioning sources. No SFABs remain to conduct SFA.

Table 1. SFAB to SRD Combat Comparison. *Source:* Created by author.

While all three of the scenarios are possible, the first two indicate that the expansion of the Army under an SFAB to BCT transformation is relatively limited. The expansion of SFABs to BCTs produced only a small relative increase in combat power but a simultaneous loss of SFA capability. In real-world situations, more combat power may be gained in contingency operations using SFABs to increase local partner capacity than through transition to BCTs. However, if the Army were to adopt a broader expansionist policy, transforming the SFABs into SRDs rather than BCTs, the increase in ground combat power could allow more options for military leaders. This transformation of the SFAB into divisions will be the lens used to view the WWII and modern force case studies below.

Mobilization of Combat Forces in World War II

Americans are an unmilitary people who have fought nine major wars and have been prepared for none.

—John Brown Sloan, *The Draftee Division*

When German forces attacked Poland in September of 1939 the American Regular Army had fewer than 200,000 soldiers, by mid-1941 1,200,000 soldiers were mobilized, assigned to units, and conducting training.²⁵ By 1943 there were ninety-one combat divisions in the Army. This mobilization for war was a miraculous feat of planning, ingenuity, and industrialization, but was not flawless. Difficulty predicting manning, training, and equipping requirements for the upcoming war delayed forces to the war and ultimately cost lives as sometimes poorly prepared soldiers shipped off to war.²⁶ This section reviews the WWII mobilization and analyzes lessons learned for applicability to an SFAB to SRD transformation in a future expandable Army.

Mobilization Planning

The United States' political and military leadership may have been surprised by the attack on Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war by Germany, but some leaders saw a large war nearing.²⁷ Throughout the interwar period, Army planners considered a variety of mobilization scenarios. Once war came, the Army mobilized, in some cases following prewar planning, in other instances improvising, but it is evident prewar planning eased WWII Army expansion.

²⁵ Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: Macmillan Inc. 1994), 416. The mobilization of the first 1,000,000 men included the activation of 300,000 National Guardsmen and 600,000 draftees as part of the nation's first peacetime draft.

²⁶ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Procurement and Training*, 433-434, 456-469. Divisions training for deployment often shuffled personnel continuously up to the date of deployment shorting divisions of key personnel at the least opportune time. The lack of equipment often forced training on obsolete equipment if available at all.

²⁷ J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, *The First Peacetime Draft* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 230-231. While the American people largely were isolationists in the late 1930s and before the attack on Pearl Harbor, political and military leaders were moving some parts of the nation closer to a war footing. Many of these leaders were mobilizing forces for hemispheric defense rather than direct action in Europe or the Pacific, but the movement to the first peacetime draft in 1940 described by Clifford and Spencer shows the military and political necessity to start preparation.

Following WWI, political will in the United States precluded a large standing army. While the Army shrank in size, military leaders were busy analyzing where the next war would be, what military capabilities would be needed, and how changes in technology and doctrine would impact the next war. WWII Army planners were challenged with the problem of making a small army expandable to counter future threats.

Interwar period mobilization planning began in earnest twenty-one years before the attack on Pearl Harbor with the National Defense Act of 1920 and the subsequent Harbord Board which established responsibility for mobilization planning. Early 1920's planning focused mainly on manning a future force. Initial mobilization plans called for up to 5,000,000 men in the Army within the first eleven months of conflict. These early plans were overly optimistic in their assessments of the Army's ability to mobilize, train, and equip. Throughout the 1920s manpower mobilization planning was iteratively refined. Mobilization planning of reserve components (RC) personnel was initially rudimentary, initially able to be written on a single page, but it too progressed over time.²⁸ Planners started to develop force structures for the mobilizing force. For example, the 1923 plan called for fielding sixty-six combat divisions within eighteen months.²⁹ By 1924, unit training entered planning consideration with the focus on using a core of experienced cadre to train recruits.³⁰ Modifications and refinements to mobilization plans continued throughout the 1920s.

²⁸ Kreidberg and Henry, *Military Mobilization*, 380-388. The General Headquarters G-4 (logistics) determined the 1920 mobilization plan would cost a "staggering \$5,039,000,000" in 1920 dollars; therefore, they requested a new plan that considered budgeting and sustainment of the force in the mobilization planning.

²⁹ Frank N. Schubert, *CMH Pub 72-32 Mobilization: A World War II Commemorative Pamphlet* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office 1994), 6. By 1923, Army Chief of Staff General John Pershing approved a plan for a 1:2:3 ratio of Regular, National Guard, and Organized Reserve combat divisions. A total of fifty-four infantry divisions and twelve cavalry divisions under six field armies reaching 1,300,000 men after four months and achieving total mobilization in eighteen months.

³⁰ Kreidberg and Henry, *Military Mobilization*, 407. The cadre would need to be activated and prepared before the activation of the mobilization plan. Planning at this stage did not include necessary details, rather it instead merely specified cadre as trainers, but lacked how, where, and under what conditions they would train new divisions.

Early plans accounted for personnel and general formations but lacked details for how personnel and equipment would be organized into units and prepared to fight. In 1931 General Douglas MacArthur claimed the early plans provided “simply a collection of skeletonized divisions, each reporting directly to the War Department.” By 1933 plans called for a 5,000,000-man force mobilized in six months and ready for combat six months later. These plans included unit designations, mobilization sites, training cadre, and higher headquarters structure for each division. The 1936 mobilization plan, called the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP), specified a “nucleus comprised of roughly 80,000 Regular Army troops and 180,000 National Guardsman who would be available for action on mobilization day. One month later there would be approximately 420,000 personnel mobilized in four Regular Army divisions and eighteen National Guard divisions.”³¹ The PMP was the last major manpower planning iteration before the war and was, therefore, the plan implemented, with adaptations, as the United States mobilized for war.

During the interwar period, Army leaders also reorganized the basic division structure then developed and tested new doctrine. By September 1939, the Army transitioned from WWI standard square infantry divisions to triangular divisions with three regiments of three battalions each. The first six triangular divisions were tested in a series of training exercises in Louisiana. These “Louisiana Maneuvers” led to changes incorporating new technology and facilitating command and control. Also, the Army tested and organized new mechanized, cavalry, airborne, and armored divisions based on another round of maneuver testing.³²

Industrial mobilization planning in the interwar period trailed behind manpower mobilization planning, but also took an iterative form finally catching up to manpower

³¹ Kreidberg and Henry, *Military Mobilization*, 424, 446, 476-491.

³² John B. Wilson, *CMH PUB 60-14-1 Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1998), 143-144, 160.

mobilization planning in the 1930s.³³ Initial planning efforts in the 1920s were mainly procurement focused, lacking the mobilization of industry and the broader economy to meet war needs.³⁴ Four industrial mobilization plans (IMPs) completed in the 1930s were more refined than earlier plans.³⁵ A final twenty-five page IMP implemented in 1939 took the Army to war. Industrial mobilization impacted all military services and the entirety of the nation's economy therefor planners created joint boards between military services and incorporated civilian agencies and review.³⁶

As WWII neared, the Army mobilization planning had progressed from conceptual to detailed plans including force structure for armies, corps, and divisions. The divisions were combined arms formations designed to operate as the primary independent tactical formation of the Army. The plans included personnel acquisition, manning guidelines, and generally how units would be trained, equipped, and led. The training and leadership of these mobilizing divisions would fall on a small cadre of AC soldiers augmented with previously trained personnel from the National Guard.

The above review of the interwar period mobilization planning experience can inform future Army expansion planners, including those planning the transition of the SFAB into a LCSO force. The interwar experience showed that plans completed during peacetime informed actual wartime mobilization, but an iterative planning process is needed to make plans sufficient

³³ Paul A.C. Koistinen, *Planning War, Pursuing Peace: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1920-1939* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 42-43. The industrial mobilization plan lagged manpower mobilization planning due to the lack of understanding in how to conduct emergency procurement which was the primary focus of the Office of the Secretary of War for much of the 1920s.

³⁴ Koistinen, *Planning War*, 50.

³⁵ Paul A.C. Koistinen, *State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 239. Plans were completed in 1930, 1933, 1936, and 1939.

³⁶ Koistinen, *Planning War*, 62-64, 71. The Army-Navy Munitions Board was one of the primary joint agencies overseeing industrial mobilization.

for execution.³⁷ If future large-scale mobilization of the Army is required, an iteratively honed expansion plan has a higher probability of success than one that is designed at the outset of conflict. Not all aspects of expansion planning will be evident to early planners, revelations that will guide execution are likely to be discovered during planning iterations. If we are going to use the SFAB in an expandable role, either as a BCT or SRD we should start planning for that transition now so the plan can be refined before it is needed.

In addition to being iterative, plans must be holistic. Early mobilization plans mainly focused on manpower acquisition but lacked adequate information on organization, training, and equipping. The initial industrial mobilization plan lagged manpower planning by nearly a decade but eventually proved critical to victory.³⁸ While the early mobilization plans lacked information on how cadre would train and equip mobilizing forces, the Army as a whole had not lost sight of these factors.³⁹ Future mobilization planners should address planning holistically including impacts from industrial capacity, economic considerations, and evolving technologies.

The redesign of the divisions in the interwar period should guide planners designing an SFAB transition to LSCO. The interwar division redesigns were not merely conceived on paper, but large-scale maneuvers tested the formations and forced adjustments. Future expansion planning should include considerations including aspects of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). If SFABs are to be

³⁷ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Procurement and Training*, 436.

³⁸ Robert P. Patterson, *Arming the Nation for War: Mobilization, Supply, and the American War Effort in World War II*, ed. Brian Waddell (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2014), 216. Interestingly, this work written by former Secretary of War Patterson while he was still in office, was left unpublished for years as it was stored in a file in his law firm after his early death. The manuscript was found in 1969 only to be stored away for several more decades by his son not understanding the significance. The edited work was finally published in 2014 sixty-two years after Patterson's death.

³⁹ Peter J. Schifferle, *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 28-31, 39-41. Experimentation occurred on a broad range of topics from new types of equipment, including artillery, motorization, and mechanization, along with intellectual exercises on combined arms maneuver helped accumulate knowledge for modern warfare even if it was not fully included in the early mobilization plans.

employed as tools of an expandable Army, concept testing of the new formation should be coordinated.

Interwar mobilization planners grappled with a range of issues. Similarly, today's mobilization planners should take a holistic and iterative approach to planning. Just like interwar planners vastly overestimating the speed and personnel numbers they could mobilize, today's planners should consider a broad range of possible mobilization scenarios, like those proposed in Table 1 and determine if the nation can provide the requirements. Six new divisions, as proposed in this monograph based on the current SFAB fielding plan, may or may not be sufficient to counter future threats. Planners could consider fielding a larger number of SFABs now to prepare for expansion. SFAB to division expansion is also just one piece of a larger expansion puzzle including the expansion of echelon above division for command and control of newly formed divisions. Ultimately, the planning in the interwar period facilitated more rapid force expansion when mobilization commenced, and any preparation the Army does now for future expansion would benefit that expansion.⁴⁰

Mobilizing

Just as the interwar expansion planning can inform future Army expansion planners, the mobilization of divisions in WWII can guide today's expansion planners. The largest Army expansion in the nation's history was fraught with difficulty requiring innovation and ingenuity to overcome.

The Army began mobilization well before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Army only had five activated divisions in 1938, but when the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred the Army had thirty-six activated combat divisions in various states of readiness.⁴¹ Although expansion began in

⁴⁰ Kreidberg and Henry, *Military Mobilization*, 696. The authors state in their lessons learned that "mobilization of manpower is best accomplished when it is guided by plans prepared well in advance."

⁴¹ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Procurement and Training*, 489-491. These thirty-six divisions consisted of seventeen Regular Army, eighteen National Guard, and one Army of the United States.

1939, not a single division was combat ready on 7 December 1941.⁴² At that time, total Army strength was nearly 1,500,000 with approximately 500,000 in the Regular Army, 17,500 in the Army Reserve, 256,000 in the federalized National Guard, and 700,000 draftees. The Army had absorbed all the draftees it could fit in its existing formations forcing future growth into entirely new formations.⁴³ From the thirty-six divisions activated before the war, another fifty-five divisions formed during the war. Eighty-nine of these ninety-one divisions eventually saw combat.⁴⁴ The new divisions, or “draftee divisions,” were organized without any pre-war formation existing in any Army component. The 88th Division became the first of the new divisions deployed and engaged in combat, progressing from activation to embarkation in only sixteen months.⁴⁵

One of the largest lessons from the WWII expansion was the fundamentals of cadre use in creating new divisions. Divisions initially formed around a cadre of 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted cadre drawn from other trained divisions. Experience of early new divisions pushed cadre requirements to 216 officers and 1,460 enlisted cadre per division.⁴⁶ This cadre was supposed to

⁴² Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *United States Army in World War II The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2004), 52. Several of the Regular Army divisions that were active during peacetime may have been ready for combat, but none of the newly forming divisions were prepared.

⁴³ John Sloan Brown, *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 10.

⁴⁴ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Procurement and Training*, 165; Maurice Matloff, “Chapter 15: The 90-Division Gamble,” in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Greenfield (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 367-380. Accounts of the total number of combat divisions differ slightly on the determination of what constitutes a WWII combat division. Some accounts include all infantry, armor, airmobile, and cavalry divisions formed and possibly employable during the war (91) some only include those divisions that saw actual combat (89). The 2d Cavalry Division, 13th Airborne Division, and 98th Infantry Division all activated but never conducted combat operations during the war. The need for America’s continued industrial capacity to support the Allied war effort forced American leaders to expect a smaller deployable Army than many suspected it would take to win the war (estimated requirements over 200 divisions were common).

⁴⁵ Brown, *Draftee Division*, 12.

⁴⁶ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Procurement and Training*, 435-438

organize, equip, and train a division within twelve months.⁴⁷ The cadre system allowed the Army to grow from a small peacetime force to a total strength of over 8,000,000 during the war.⁴⁸

Initially, only about 14,000 AC officers were available for all Army requirements including cadre for activating divisions. The National Guard, Officer Reserve Corps, Reserve Officers Training Corps, Officer Candidate School, and direct commissions supplied cadre for divisions created later.⁴⁹ By 1942, the Army was using freshly trained officers, some with as little as ninety days, to prepare newly arriving civilians indicating that a larger initial pool of cadre would have been advantageous.⁵⁰ In addition to a general shortage of cadre, complications included improper proportions of trained personnel by branch, the rigidity of Reserve Officer Training Corps programs, shifts in the allocation of troops between units, and shifts in strategic plans.⁵¹ After all the trained personnel across Army components were called up, the AGF started looking for civilians with leadership potential to fill junior level cadre needs. Eventually military taught Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) personnel helped fill the void.⁵² The importance of having the right numbers of correctly trained cadre proved difficult to overcome in WWII. With more technical modern equipment the need to have correctly trained cadre on hand in an expandable Army may be more critical than before. The SFAB provides an organization to retain trained leaders in a useful role until needed in an expanding Army.

⁴⁷ Brown, *Draftee Division*, 70.

⁴⁸ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Army Ground Forces*, 191, 230.

⁴⁹ Brown, *Draftee Division*, 22.

⁵⁰ Eli Ginzberg, *The Lost Divisions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 24.

⁵¹ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Procurement and Training*, 158, 162; Kreidberg and Henry, *Military Mobilization*, 605. By June 1941, over fifty percent of the available Reserve Officers had been called up to conduct duty training the civilian draftees.

⁵² Heller, "Civilian Conservation Corps," 439–453. The Army trained 350,000 men annually starting in 1933 as part of the CCC exposing them to military culture and leadership opportunities. Over fifty percent of the CCC personnel would volunteer to join the military, many becoming NCOs when the nation mobilized.

Some other essential WWII cadre related lessons can inform the use of the SFAB as an expandable organization. The percentage and type of cadre required to train WWII units varied between unit type; therefore, today's force managers should consider SFAB designs to ensure the right numbers of specially trained personnel are included for future expansion. Cadre selection in WWII was critical, new units needed quality personnel but losing units often gave up poor performers. The SFABs should overcome this issue by selecting cadre before Army expansion from previously successful candidates.⁵³ Cadre specific training prior to division mobilization and personnel stability were also essential for successful mobilization. A stability period allowed new formations to train together before deployment. Losing cadre to other units was typical during the war, however, the most effective draftee divisions were those with personnel stability. John Sloan Brown determined personnel turbulence in new divisions was the single greatest factor of new division success in WWII.⁵⁴ Based on these findings from WWII, SFABs transitioning to SRDs should receive high-quality personnel before expansion, they should train for their roles as cadre, and SFAB personnel should stabilize throughout the expansion period.

During expansion, SFAB personnel would not only become commanders, some would also become division primary staff officers. WWII can also inform the role of SFAB personnel as

⁵³ Bernard Rostker et al., *The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1993), 89. Army promotion and selection of officers during WWII was not conducted through a centralized process, rather field commanders selected officers up to lieutenant colonel. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act changed this process to a largely centralized selection thereby altering how officers in an expanding Army would be promoted, managed, and selected for commands. The current centralized process provides a list of alternate selections for command positions that could be used for filling out additional commands in a transition from the SFAB to an SRD.

⁵⁴ Brown, *Draftee Division*, 218, 19, 26-32, 37. Infantry regiments only required about eleven percent of their force as cadre, whereas specialty or low-density units required a higher percentage of their strength as cadre (engineers fourteen percent, artillery sixteen percent, special troops over twenty percent). There was a prime period in the development of the draftee divisions in World War II, those divisions that were too early were robbed of talent to fill units that were deploying first or to provide cadre for other divisions that would be fielded later. Those divisions that were fielded too late suffered losses of personnel needed to fill combat losses of the first deploying units. The divisions that were afforded personnel stabilization due to chance and timing were well regarded during the war. Brown goes on to state "it is impossible to exaggerate the effect of personnel turbulence upon the efficient use of military manpower."

staff in an expandable Army. For example, the war demonstrated that the way a staff operated in peacetime equated to its wartime potential and significant staff reorganization during wartime had detrimental consequences.⁵⁵ By using the existing SFAB team that trains and operates together for SFA missions, the Army will be getting a division staff during expansion with a high level of familiarity.

The WWII expansion found the Army lacking enough trained officers to meet staff requirements.⁵⁶ Officers to fill needs came from existing officer cohorts but needed training to lead large formations. To meet staffing requirements, the Army shortened its mid-career professional military education course, the Command and General Staff College from one year to just eighteen weeks and added a one-month course to train the staff of newly formed divisions.⁵⁷ Most division commanders and some subordinate commanders had been through the pre-war long course, but there were not enough trained officers to fill the primary staff at division and below with officers educated before the war.⁵⁸ The SFABs could help alleviate a shortage of trained officers in a future expansion as their structure retains a higher ratio of senior officers and NCOs to junior soldiers than other Army formations.

Training was critical for WWII mobilization and will be for future Army expansion. The WWII expansion forced the Army to shorten training timelines and adjust training techniques. Individual initial entry training at consolidated basic training sites proved superior to initial entry training within combat units. New divisions followed Mobilization Training Programs (MTP) which specified the number of weeks allowed for individual, unit, combined arms, and higher

⁵⁵ Kreidberg and Henry, *Military Mobilization*, 696.

⁵⁶ Schifferle, *School for War*, 171. The AGF in December of 1941 found itself with only about thirteen percent of the required mid-level and senior officers with professional military education. The shortage of Leavenworth trained officers forced the Army to use the prewar trained officers in corps and above positions leaving few trained officers for division level and below staff.

⁵⁷ Schifferle, *School for War*, 149-150.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 172.

echelon training. Army Training Programs (ATP), subordinate to the MTP, established unit specific training plans.⁵⁹ Today's expansion planners should prepare training plans for expanding units to include when, where, and how new unit leaders, staff, cadre, and new soldiers are trained. Divisions also needed about fifteen percent extra manpower at the beginning of their training cycle to cover training losses and attrition.⁶⁰ These extra personnel made "it possible for a division to run through the gamut of training without interruption."⁶¹ Extra personnel fielded to expanding units may be more critical in today's high technology force often requiring extensive crew training that would be interrupted by personnel losses.

The War Production Board created in 1941 oversaw economic mobilization under the combined efforts of military and industrial leaders.⁶² From a slow trickle of equipment before the war, a nearly unimaginable industrial achievement occurred the first years of the war. In total the United States produced over 88 thousand tanks, 250 thousand artillery and antiaircraft weapons, over 2.6 million machine guns, 6.5 million rifles, 2.3 million military trucks, and 40 billion bullets.⁶³ Assistant Secretary of War Robert Patterson, who oversaw mobilization of Nation's industrial capacity during WWII believed the military victory occurred on battlefields in 1944 and 1945, but the battle of production was won between 1940 and 1943.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Brown, *Draftee Division*, 36, 159.

⁶⁰ Eli Ginzberg, *Lost Divisions*, 21. Ginzberg notes that over 2,500,000 men were removed from service to the Army, mostly due to poor service that the Army considered it beneficial to release them. This is a dated source, but Ginzberg based his work on analysis of primary source material including Army and Selective Service records.

⁶¹ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Procurement and Training*, 438.

⁶² Koistinen, *State of War*, 241.

⁶³ Maury Klein, *A Call to Arms: Mobilizing America for World War II* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 515.

⁶⁴ Patterson, *Arming the Nation*, 216.

While the industrial mobilization produced vast equipment quantities during the war, there was initially a lack of equipment as divisions prepared for war. Prioritized equipment fielding to units nearing deployment meant later deploying units often went without. Equipment shortages and hierarchical fielding resulted in units receiving unfamiliar equipment after concluding mobilization training; sometimes equipment arrived immediately before its use in combat. Rarely did mobilizing divisions need a full complement of equipment to conduct training for their mission. New divisions were often able to overcome equipment shortages by coordinating training with other units or using obsolete equipment during training. In addition to new equipment fielding late in mobilization, some units lacked new equipment entirely and deployed with outdated equipment unfit for assigned missions.⁶⁵

The WWII mobilization was successful due to prewar expansion planning that provided flexibility and space to innovate during combat. Author John Sloan Brown claimed since new divisions “demonstrated that masses of citizens could be welded into proficient modern fighting organizations in reasonable periods of time, that the United States need not endure enormous armies in times of peace to field enormous armies in times of war.”⁶⁶ Planning and preparing the SFAB for a transformation to an SRD could similarly demonstrate the expandability of the Army thereby providing options for future leaders in large wars.

The Modern Force

The WWII expansion provides an understanding of methodical Army expansion, but there are significant differences between today's Army and the Army circa WWII. One key difference is in force manning. The country anticipated conscription to meet wartime needs during WWII, in the modern era the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) became the primary manning

⁶⁵ Kreidberg and Henry, *Military Mobilization*, 676-679.

⁶⁶ Brown, *Draftee Division*, 70, 162. Brown noted it took the 88th Division twenty months to deploy after activation.

means. The modern Army also differs from the WWII force due to America's strategic standing, evolving threats, and technological advances. After the cold-war, the Army transformed from a division-centered force focused on major combat operations, to a brigade-centered force focused across the ROMO. Along with transition to a brigade centered force, the Army transitioned the RC from a strategic reserve to a critical component of the operational force. This section addresses these three transformations, conscripted force to AVF, division-centered to brigade-centered force, and operationalization of the RC, to help understand impacts to future Army expansion.

The All-Volunteer Force

Current Army manning is demonstrably different than during WWII. Historically the United States relied on a small professional army. Nineteenth and early twentieth-century military leaders proposed a professional standing army which would lead an expanding force during times of national emergency. Conscription was paramount to military manning equations. Conscripts filled Army manning requirements from WWI until public opinion forced a transition to an AVF post-Vietnam. The question of whether the AVF can meet Army manning requirements during prolonged LSCO is complex, emotionally charged, and beyond this research's scope, but manning difficulties during the GWOT indicate future mobilization planners will need to cope with these challenges.⁶⁷

The United States' first national draft occurred during the Civil War when the Enrollment Act allowed the Federal Government to draft citizens into the war effort.⁶⁸ Conscription played an

⁶⁷ William M. Raymond Jr., *Uncle Sam says, "I Want You!" – The Politics of the Draft and National Service* (SAMS Monograph, Army Command and General Staff College, 2005), 51-55. COL Raymond's work provides an in-depth look at manning the force in the modern era with discussion of the impacts of the AVF and its limitations.

⁶⁸ Robert K. Griffith, *The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 5-6. The act was not popular and led to opposition including the New York City draft riot in July of 1863. All told the draft resulted in only about six percent of the total Union force in the war.

even larger role in the twentieth century, as the US military drafted nearly 3,000,000 men for WWI, over 10,000,000 for WWII, and over 1,000,000 each for the Korean and Vietnam wars.⁶⁹ Public perception of obligatory military service was positive from WWI through the 1950s.⁷⁰

The Vietnam War shifted public opinion against conscription. Richard Nixon found it political necessity to end both the Vietnam War and the draft. Nixon believed market forces could supply soldiers for the war, so he created the Gates Commission in May of 1969 to develop a transition plan to the AVF.⁷¹ The Gates Commission unanimously endorsed the transition to an AVF with a “standby draft” to meet manpower needs in national emergencies.⁷² By July 1974, Secretary of the Army Howard Callaway proclaimed the AVF a success as the Army met its recruiting numbers without a draft.⁷³

Volunteers filled Army ranks in the 1970s, but troop quality became a problem as market forces provided more low-quality recruits.⁷⁴ In the 1980s the Army shifted advertising, improved military pay, and demonstrated battlefield success allowing it to attract better quality recruits. By the late 1980s, the Army finally had an educated professional AVF able to work with the

⁶⁹ US Selective Service System, “History and Record: Induction Statistics,” accessed January 25, 2018, <https://www.sss.gov/About/History-And-Records/Induction-Statistics>.

⁷⁰ Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 10, 12. American public opinion of conscription during WWII ranged from over ninety-three percent in 1942 and only down to seventy-nine percent by May 1945.

⁷¹ Thomas Gates, *The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1970).

⁷² Gates, *All-Volunteer Force*, iii, 120-124.

⁷³ Griffith, *Army's Transition*, 293.

⁷⁴ Bailey, *America's Army*, 121-125. Troops recruited from Armed Forces Qualification Testing (AFQT) Category IV took 50% longer to train than those from category III. Unfortunately for the Army, by fiscal year 1980 fifty percent of all recruits were in category IV.

technology demanded on the modern battlefield.⁷⁵ The AVF first proved victorious in the 1991 Gulf War.

The Global War on Terror tested the AVF under continuous combat operations. After two years of fighting in Iraq, the Army resorted to extraordinary measures (large bonuses, college incentives, reduced education and testing requirements, moral waivers, and recruiting in Mexico) to meet wartime requirements.⁷⁶ Even using relaxed education and moral standards, the "target zone" of potential Army recruits was only about 1,600,000 out of a population over 300,000,000.⁷⁷ Wartime needs in 2005 required extending deployment lengths from twelve to fifteen months, and "stop-loss" prevented soldiers from voluntarily exiting the Army after completing their initial term of service.⁷⁸ Congress approved Army manning increases to meet demands, but the Army struggled to meet needs.⁷⁹ The GWOT AVF was minimally meeting personnel demand in extended conflict.

The debate about a return to US military conscription increased during GWOT. US House Representative Charles Rangel proposed Military Selective Service Act amendments on

⁷⁵ Bailey, *America's Army*, 175-184, 194-197. By the late 1980s, over ninety percent of recruits were high school graduates, and only four percent were in category IV.

⁷⁶ Lawrence J. Korb, "Meeting the Military's Manpower Challenges" (The Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), 6. Sean Duggan and Lawrence J. Korb, "An All-Volunteer Army? Recruitment and Its Problems," *Political Science and Politics* (American Political Science Association, 2007) 467-471.

⁷⁷ Bailey, *America's Army*, 253. Only about 30 percent of military-aged (17 to 24 years old) met the minimum standards for military service in the mid-2000s. Rates of obesity were high, high school graduations rates were down, and some crimes ruled out military service.

⁷⁸ Charles A. Henning, "U.S. Military Stop Loss Program," In *Recruiting, Retention, and Future Levels of Military Personnel*, ed. Emmanuel D. Chapman (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2010), 149-168. The Army has used the Stop Loss program to help retain personnel "during periods of national emergency or a Presidential call-up of the reserve components." Stop loss has been used by the army during each of the major campaigns since enacted in the law in 1984. The program allowed the service to hold soldiers on active duty through a deployment with their unit. At the height of the program's use between 2005 and 2008, about 10 percent of the deployed force in Iraq were stop-loss soldiers. During the GWOT public backlash against stoploss as a "backdoor draft" led the DoD to significantly reduce the use of the program.

⁷⁹ Bailey, *America's Army*, 254-255.

numerous occasions from 2003 to 2015 calling for reinstatement of a draft.⁸⁰ The debate about draft reinstatement continued throughout the GWOT and intensified as tension escalated after North Korean nuclear threats in 2017-18.⁸¹ One modern draft proponent, Major General (Ret.) Dennis Laich, listed a host of wrongs he claimed may be fixed by returning to a conscripted force.⁸² COL William Raymond analyzed the politics of the draft during the height of the GWOT, concluding the United States needed a program of voluntary national service to meet its manpower requirements, if that failed, the United States might need mandatory service.⁸³ Pressure to transition away from the AVF has not neared an inflection point, but the debate is likely to continue and future military needs in LSCO could alter the argument.

While calls to reinstate the draft continue, the AVF's positive impacts helped create a profession of arms by increasing average soldier education level and service length.⁸⁴ The 2016 National Commission on the Future of the Army stated the AVF is "vital to the future of the nation" and recommended all force management and budget decisions be made with the AVF in

⁸⁰ Amendment to Selective Service Act, H. Res.1509, 114th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* (March 19, 2015). No votes have taken place in Congress on a return to a draft even though amendments have been submitted.

⁸¹ Kelly Tunney, "Will There Be A Draft If We Go To War? North Korea's Threats Are Increasingly Foreboding," *Bustle*, August 10, 2017, accessed November 2, 2017, <https://www.bustle.com/p/will-there-be-a-draft-if-we-go-to-war-north-koreas-threats-are-increasingly-foreboding-75872>; Todd South, "Bringing back the draft," *Military Times*, July 25, 2017, accessed November 2, 2017, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2017/07/25/bringing-back-the-draft/>. *Bustle* is a magazine focused on women's issues but recently ran an article about bringing back the draft. *Military Times*, which has a primarily military member and retiree focused audience, covered a similar topic at about the same time.

⁸² Dennis Laich, *Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and Patriots* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2013), 87-118. MG (Ret.) Laich considers the AVF during continued war to be a contributing factor in many social ills. These ills include: increased soldier suicides, post-traumatic stress disorder, veteran unemployment and homelessness, increased drug abuse, increased domestic violence in military families, increase in the Veterans Administration backlog, a reduction in trust in the military, increase in defense spending, reduced military capabilities, and an underrepresentation of higher socioeconomic classes within the force. He further states that during GWOT the only way the US military was able to maintain the AVF was through the unprecedented use of Stop-loss, a variety of physical, medical, and moral waivers, payment of large enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, and reduced standards.

⁸³ Raymond, "Uncle Sam," 51-55.

⁸⁴ National Commission, *Future of the Army*, 10-11. Only 18 percent of the pre-AVF force had over four years of service, as of 2006 over half of all soldiers stayed in over four years.

consideration.⁸⁵ Current social and political conditions rely on the AVF on as the primary military manning means at the outset of future conflict, although Joint Publication 4-05 *Joint Mobilization* addresses the possibility of conscription during national emergency.⁸⁶

Before WWII, planners knew the force would grow through conscription and they merely had to figure out how many soldiers could be brought in and how quickly they could be organized into a fighting force. Today's expansion planners have a different challenge; they must figure out how to expand the Army to engage and win future LSCOs when politics dictate planners contend with the use of only volunteers at least at the outset of conflict.⁸⁷ The GWOT stretched the ability to man the Army with volunteers during limited contingency operations, a rapid mobilization to fight LSCOs, especially if significant casualties are suffered, may break the AVF. To transform SFABs in an expandable Army, planners will need detailed analysis prescribing where additional soldiers will come from to fill the SRD's ranks.

Army Transformation and the Modern Force

The transition from conscription to AVF broadly affected the Army, but technology advances and post-Cold-War power realignments equally changed the force. Dealing with these changes transformed the Army's structure, operations, and mobilization. The Army reorganized from a division-centered force to a brigade-centered force. This transformation had significant impacts on future Army expansion including the SFAB's use as a foundation for a future SRD.

⁸⁵ National Commission, *Future of the Army*, 11.

⁸⁶ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 4-05, *Joint Mobilization* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), A-6. "If Congress deems it necessary under the Selective Service Act (Title 50, USC, Sections 451-473), the SSS can begin involuntarily drafting eligible, nonexempt men for military service. Repeal of Title 50, USC, Section 467(c) is necessary before the SSS may initiate an involuntary draft of non-prior service personnel."

⁸⁷ Raymond, "Uncle Sam," 36. COL Raymond discusses how US political will can change when the nation faces a threat that cannot be met with volunteers.

Divisions were the lowest level independently deployable combined arms force in the Army since 1916.⁸⁸ This division-based force continued through the early stages of the GWOT. While the Army maintained a division-based force, there were over twenty combat division redesigns since the end of WWII ranging from under nine-thousand soldiers to over twenty-thousand.⁸⁹

The Soviet Union collapse shifted global power and forced the Army to transform for a new strategic environment. Historian John Sloan Brown argues, in *Kevlar Legions*, the Soviet Union collapse forced a tectonic shift in Army thinking from defending against a peer threat to being a more expeditionary force focused on myriad less dangerous but more common threats.⁹⁰ This transformation included shifting organizational structures, incorporating new equipment, along with changing logistical practices, training, and doctrine.⁹¹

The Gulf War furthered the need for Army transformation by showing the value of air power and precision strike weapons. To remain relevant, the Army needed strategic mobility to project power globally and modernization to incorporate into a digital joint force. To meet these challenges, strategically positioned equipment and supply points, known as Army War Reserves

⁸⁸ Wilson, *Divisions and Separate Brigades*, 19-24. Following the Spanish American War, the Army reformed to counter battlefield challenges. Secretary of War Elihu Root implemented reforms based mainly on Emory Upton's ideas, leading to significant education, organization, and mobilization reforms. Army leaders determined permanent combined arms divisions were needed. Starting in 1905 these divisions included three infantry brigades, one cavalry regiment, a field artillery regiment, an engineer battalion, and other enablers.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 207-407. The smallest division was the 8,661-soldier Pentomic division; the largest was the 20,459-soldier heavy division of the early 1980s.

⁹⁰ John Sloan Brown, *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the Army, 1989-2005* (Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2011), 76, 93. "Globalization increased American national security interests everywhere, whereas the collapses of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union radically diminished the likelihood of a major confrontation in Europe. The United States Army could no longer concentrate on a few key regions where it could readily reinforce robust forward-deployed forces. Instead, it would have to be capable of rapidly inserting itself into far more numerous trouble spots scattered around the world—where it might have little or no prior presence."

⁹¹ Congressional Budget Office, *An Analysis of the Army's Transformation Programs and Possible Alternatives: Publication Number 3195* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 2, 4.

(AWR), were reconfigured for brigade-size operations by 1995. The Army embraced digitization to improve battle tracking and communication across the integrated joint force thereby making Army brigades more lethal and reducing fratricide. Within five years of the Gulf War, the active Army shrunk by about 250,000 troops, was increasingly expeditionary, and started to enter the information age.⁹²

The Army entered the GWOT in mid-transition. The Army was still division-based but increased strategic mobility through pre-positioning of equipment and incorporated new technology.⁹³ When General Eric Shinseki became Army Chief of Staff in 1999, he determined armored division deployment timelines posed a risk which could be overcome using more rapidly deployable combined arms brigades built around lighter mechanized equipment. Shinseki planned transition from divisions to modular brigades by 2010.⁹⁴ General Peter J. Schoomaker took over as Army Chief of Staff after as the Army was heavily engaged in stability operations in Iraq. With the war ongoing, Schoomaker pushed capabilities-based brigades and rapid incorporation of new technologies as part of constant transformation.⁹⁵ As the Iraq war entered its second year a new problem appeared. In contrast to previous wars, where units stayed and personnel rotated in, the

⁹² Brown, *Kevlar Legions*, 90-93, 97-98, 120-128.

⁹³ Douglas A. Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 75-80. COL Macgregor was an early but controversial proponent for transformation from division to a lower echelon combined arms force.

⁹⁴ Brown, *Kevlar Legions*, 195-198, 201, 218-235. General Shinseki envisioned a shift from the legacy force (non-digitized M1 Abrams and M2/M3 Bradley based), to an interim force (Stryker based), then finally an objective force (based new technology as part of the Future Combat System or FCS). The objective force would emerge around 2010 incorporating new lighter more lethal major end items on a single vehicle platform (called the Future Combat System) based off yet to be developed technologies with innovations from the information age not as add-on components but as an integral part of the system.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 248-249. Gone were the “legacy force” and “interim force” concepts, replaced with “current force” and “Stryker Brigade” respectively and there would no longer be an “objective force” as the Army at war needed technologies fielded now not as part of a package later.

Iraq war required the rotation of six entire divisions in four months starting in March 2004. The Army lacked divisions to continue mass rotations in a long war.⁹⁶

General Schoomaker envisioned a modular force where units would organize, train, deploy, conduct operations, redeploy, stand down, then repeat the cycle. FM 1 *The Army* solidified the modular brigade-based rotational force in doctrine in 2005. The transformation required brigades to assemble "into strategically responsive force packages able to rapidly move wherever needed" and "quickly and seamlessly transition among types of operations better than could their predecessors."⁹⁷ The modular brigades, now called Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) included greater self-sustainment and independent capability than their predecessors. Numerous enabler forces including artillery, engineers, military police, and sustainment moved into BCTs permanently.⁹⁸ In addition, divisions no longer maintained organic relationships with the same brigades in combat and garrison. Under Schoomaker, transformation from a division-based to a brigade-based force was substantially complete.

Modularity created three BCT designs, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), and the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) later renamed the Armored BCT (ABCT). The standard model for an ABCT included a brigade headquarters, two combined arms battalions, one reconnaissance squadron, one fires battalion, one support battalion, one special troops battalion. IBCT and SBCT standardization was similar

⁹⁶ Brown, *Kevlar Legions*, 250-252, 254. All told, approximately 244,000 soldiers would be part of this rotation.

⁹⁷ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1, *The Army* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 1-9, 2-10, 4-6. FM 1 states: the Army is "undergoing its most profound restructuring in more than 50 years. Combat capabilities and capacities designed to defeat a peer competitor are being converted to those better able to sustain protracted operations across the range of military operations."

⁹⁸ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-1.

but differed based on vehicle composition and capabilities. Figure 3 below shows the basic BCT organizational design in 2005.⁹⁹




Figure 3. Heavy/Armored, Infantry, and Stryker BCTs from FM 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team, August 2006.

The total Army converted from twenty-eight independently deployable divisions of up to twenty-thousand soldiers to seventy-seven independently deployable brigades of approximately thirty-five hundred soldiers.¹⁰⁰ While BCTs could be committed separately, usually a modular division headquarters deployed to command and control up to six BCTs.¹⁰¹

Performance in training and combat drove BCT changes from minor specialty personnel adjustments to the addition of a third combined arms battalion.¹⁰² By 2017 the Army was reduced to only fifty-nine BCTs, but they grew to approximately forty-five hundred soldiers each.¹⁰³ The

⁹⁹ Army, FM 3-90.6 (2006), 2-1, 2-7.

¹⁰⁰ Army, FM 1 (2005), 4-7, 4-8.

¹⁰¹ Army, FM 3-90.6 (2006), 2-1.

¹⁰² Brown, *Kevlar Legions*, 309. War games and combat indicated a third maneuver battalion was requested to provide reserves at the brigade level that was lacking in the two combined arms battalion formation.

¹⁰³ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 2016," *The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics* (Oxfordshire, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 47; Brown, *Kevlar Legions*, 257.

Army Transformation was complete, but the total Army was much smaller than the force that deterred the Soviet Union. At the end of the Cold-War the Total Army had over 2,400,000 soldiers, by 2017 that total was just slightly over 1,000,000.¹⁰⁴ The Army transformation allowed the nation to have a small highly technical and constantly deployed force, but the shrinking of the Army reduced its capacity to quickly field a large force to counter the most lethal threats in LSCOs.

The Operational Reserve

Along with the transition to BCTs, the GWOT forced major transitions in Army components that further the need for SFAB expandability. The Army planned to fight the Cold-War with the AC first while the RC mobilized, trained, and deployed as a strategic reserve. As the GWOT lengthened, the smaller post-Cold-war AC could not meet all requirements, forcing civilian and military leaders to shift the RC to an operational reserve rather than a strategic reserve.¹⁰⁵ By 2006 National Guard and Reserve units regularly provided fifteen to twenty percent of GWOT rotational forces.¹⁰⁶ Many enabler forces were moved into the RC thereby ensuring that RC support would be required for ongoing operations.

A recent RAND analysis determined RC BCTs mobilized for the GWOT took four to five months after notification to arrive in theater for counter-insurgency operations. The study also determined no RC maneuver brigade in the past fifty years deployed within twelve months of

¹⁰⁴ US Department of Defense, *Selected Manpower Statistics: Fiscal Year 1997* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 53, 174.

¹⁰⁵ Kathryn Roe Coker, *The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold-War Operational Army Reserve, 1990-2010* (Fort Bragg, NC: Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army Reserve Command, 2013), 328-333.

¹⁰⁶ Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan, *Ground Truth: The Future of US Land Power* (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2008), 108; Beth Reece, "Army's top general moves to lessen strain on troops," *Army*, December 15, 2006, accessed December 2, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/993/armys_top_general_moves_to_lesser_strain_on_troops.

notification to conduct major combat operations.¹⁰⁷ In 2017, Chief of Army Reserves, Lieutenant General Charles Luckey stated the top priority for the Army Reserves was generating a rapidly deployable reserve force for full-spectrum operations.¹⁰⁸ The RC transition from a strategic reserve a key component of the operational force allowed the total Army to deploy a ground force approaching two-hundred-thousand soldiers indefinitely, but institutional requirements account for the remainder of the force.¹⁰⁹ The RC became a vital component in ongoing wars, but can no longer be on standby for the next large war. The Army retained minimal strategic reserve capacity.

In 2016, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Daniel Allyn stated only nine BCTs were ready and available to address near-term contingencies.¹¹⁰ The 2016 National Commission on the Future of the Army stated the Army had the minimum capability for near-term challenges but was "neither sized nor shaped for conducting any kind of large-scale, long-duration mission at acceptable risk."¹¹¹ RAND studies from 2015 and 2016 assessing readiness against Russia and

¹⁰⁷ Joshua Klimas et al., *Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve Component Force Mix* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR417-1.html. 5-6. Klimas states the reason no RC brigade has been deployed within twelve months for major combat operations is the requirement for additional training and preparation after mobilization.

¹⁰⁸ LTG Luckey stated, "the Army Reserve must now focus its training, equipping and manning priorities to meet the challenge of generating full-spectrum readiness for a Ready Force of some 25,000 to 33,000 Soldiers who are capable of deploying to the fight in a matter of days and weeks." Charles D. Luckey, *The 2017 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: The Army Reserve: America's Global Operational Reserve Force* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), <https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/042617-Luckey-Army-Reserve-Testimony.pdf>. 3.

¹⁰⁹ Timothy M. Bonds, Michael Johnson, and Paul S. Steinberg, *Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1320.html, 2. The Army has found deployment to home station training ratio of 1:2 for the active duty and 1:5 for reserve components sufficient to maintain the force, when including infrastructure, major commands, training, generating forces. This ratio allows for indefinite deployment of about one-third of the active force and one-sixth of the reserve components at a given time.

¹¹⁰ General Daniel Allyn, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, on March 15, 2016, *Current State of Readiness of the U.S. Forces in Review of the Defense*, 114th Cong., 2d sess., 2016, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), accessed November 29, 2017, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Allyn_03-15-16.pdf. 3.

¹¹¹ National Commission, *Future of the Army*, 52-52.

North Korea also indicated the Army lacked adequate ready forces to counter those threats.¹¹² A 2017 Heritage Foundation estimate determined the Army needs twenty-one combat ready BCTs above ongoing requirements to fight one major regional conflict.¹¹³ The above estimates indicate the Army lacks available combat power to counter regional threats much less face a peer competitor in LSCO. The Army needs a strategic reserve and with proper planning, the SFAB can become that reserve.

The Expandable Future Force

The Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, starting with the most lethal conditions first-large-scale combat against a regional peer.

—FM 3-0 Operations, 2017

The future is uncertain, in 1935 few predicted the United States would need eighty-nine divisions a few years later, but by 1942 some military leaders thought over three-hundred divisions were required to win the war.¹¹⁴ In 2017, the Heritage Foundation estimated the modern force needed twenty-one brigades just to fight one major regional conflict and those estimates are above ongoing requirements.¹¹⁵ Others argued that global uncertainty required a “genuinely”

¹¹² Bonds, *Limiting Regret*, 10-16. Analysis concluded deterring Russian aggression (not defeat of Russian invasion) in the Baltics would take 120,000 soldiers while actions against the North Koreans would take 150,000 troops deployed over those already engaged around the globe. In addition to the figures above this RAND analysis requires that 80 percent of the operating force is ready to conduct decisive action at all times. The study also concluded that to meet the manpower shortages, 190,000 AC or 475,000 RC soldiers are needed for 1:2 active and 1:4 dwell ratios. David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html. A 2016 wargame of a Russian invasion of the Baltic states determined it would only take 60 hours for the Russians to advance to Tallinn and Riga.

¹¹³ Dakota L. Wood, *Index of US Military Strength: Assessing America's Ability to Provide for the Common Defense* (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2017).

¹¹⁴ Greenfield, Palmer and Wiley, *Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 198. A Joint Chiefs of Staff study in 1942 estimated 334 divisions would be needed to win WWII.

¹¹⁵ Wood, *US Military Strength*, 284. The Heritage Foundation recommended the United States needs a minimum of 50 BCTs.

expandable army that could rapidly grow to face new challenges.¹¹⁶ With increased uncertainty and costs associated with highly technical modern forces, it became infeasible to create a standing army to counter all possible threats. Rather modern times call for a flexible, adaptable, and expandable force.

Army War College Director of Research, Steven Metz, recently asked if the United States lost the ability to fight a major war.¹¹⁷ The Army's operational requirements during GWOT forced America to tap the RC strategic reserve leaving little remaining capacity for LSCOs. How can we continue to use the RC as an operational force and still maintain a strategic reserve and capacity to expand? With the AC and RC still near capacity it is time to relook the possibility of building an expandable army around a small professional cadre. This section discusses how Army expansion planners could use the SFABs as the foundation to construct more robust SRDs, not BCTs, when wartime requirements exceed AC and RC capacity.

The WWII experience showed that a cadre system provided a rapid expansion capability. The modern Army has several potential sources to provide cadre for expanding units. The First Army's nine Combined Arms Training Brigades and the Combat Training Center (CTC) opposing forces have been discussed as potential cadre before.¹¹⁸ Using these formations as cadre removes them from training missions vital to continued mobilization and should be considered a last resort. If First Army and the CTCs are used as cadre the continued mobilization of units later in a war would be adversely impacted. Luckily, the Army's new Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) provides an exceptional opportunity for an expansion cadre.

¹¹⁶ Donnelly and Kagan, *Ground Truth*, (2008), 108.

¹¹⁷ Steven Metz, "Has the United States Lost the Ability to Fight a Major War," *Parameters* 45, no. 2 (2015), 7-12. Metz argues the capacity to "expand and to fight a big war may atrophy all together" if Army does not change its mindset and plan for expansion.

¹¹⁸ Esli T. Pitts, "Army Expansibility: Expanding Brigade Combat Teams: Is the Training Base Adequate?" *Parameters* 47, no. 3 (2017), 95-96.

The Strategic Reserve Division (SRD)

The new SFAB, while primarily beneficial in its intended SFA role, provides the ability to conduct rapid expansion to support future requirements. General Milley discussed using the SFABs to create BCTs for major combat operations as early as 2015.¹¹⁹ But, why stop at expansion to a BCT? If the SFABs are needed in an expandable role the United States is likely facing LSCO against a peer or near-peer threat and a moderate increase in combat power may not suffice. By planning to expand the SFAB into an SRD rather than a BCT the Army would possess a more robust expansion capability. This section proposes a possible means to accomplish the SFAB to SRD transformation.

The number of cadre available within the current SFAB design is smaller but similar to the cadre used to build divisions in the WWII Army expansion. While new divisions in WWII used a cadre of over 1,100, after the first few new divisions were created from the small Regular Army of the time, the cadre for later divisions consisted of soldiers who were only moderately trained prior to the war. In contrast, the 800-soldier SFAB is filled with highly trained soldiers who previously served in the positions they fill in the SFAB. With thorough planning the 800 soldier SFAB could conduct rapid reorganization based on a modified table of organization (MTOE) becoming the core of an SRD.

The SRD structure is overlaid on the existing SFAB organizational structure as shown in figure 4 below. Through this transition, the basic layout of the SFAB is maintained, but the hierarchical level of the unit moves up by one. For example, each SFAB combined arms battalion transitions into an SRD maneuver brigade, and the SFAB artillery battalion becomes the SRD fires brigade. This transformation retains continuity of command relationships. As the SFAB

¹¹⁹ Sydney j. Freedberg, "Army Mulls Train & Advise Brigades: Gen. Milley," *Breaking Defense*, December 14, 2015, accessed on February 19, 2018, <https://breakingdefense.com/2015/12/army-mulls-train-advise-brigades-gen-milley/>. As early as December 2015 General Milley was discussing the use of the SFAB as to grow the Army by filling it out with recruits.

commander becomes the SRD commander, they have the same subordinate commanders who previously served under them in the SFAB.




Figure 4. SFAB Transformation to Strategic Reserve Division. Created by the author.

There is risk associated with advancing personnel to a higher level of command if they are not ready. The SFAB to SRD transition takes advantage of the SFAB selection process which places officers in positions they have already held outside of the SFAB. SFAB majors, for example, already completed assignments as battalion executive officers or battalion operations officers preparing them for battalion command or primary staff roles in the SRD. NCOs would similarly move into positions of higher responsibility in the SRD. Rapid advancement of rank has occurred in previous LSCOs, and the transition of the SFAB to SRD would have a high probability of occurring under similar circumstance.

The brigades within the SRD would be mostly homogenous when compared to BCTs since most enablers would be retained under separate brigades subordinate to the division. This would be in keeping with lessons from WWII when units found it easier to train like kind soldiers together before coming together in combined arms formations. Keeping enablers at the division level during the transition from SFAB to SRD would simplify training facilitating more rapid transition and sooner deployment. The SRD commander could task organize the SRD's

subordinate formations into combined arms teams to meet mission criteria but during the transition unit homogeneity would make it easier to incorporate new personnel into the formation.

Figure 5 below shows a hypothetical SRD structure. This example formation demonstrates how a BCT based SFAB could be transformed into a division-sized formation. The SRD keeps all command relationships from the SFAB intact while increasing its size from 800 soldiers to approximately 13,000 thereby making it similarly sized to the average post-WWII division.¹²⁰ The SRD consists of a Division Headquarters, Division Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, two combined arms brigades (three maneuver battalions each), a cavalry regiment (three cavalry squadrons), a field artillery brigade (two fires battalions), an engineer brigade (two engineer battalions, one military intelligence battalion, and a signal battalion), and a sustainment brigade (five brigade support battalions and other enablers). Companies in the SRD could follow the same MTOE as that of their counterparts in BCT as far as equipment would allow (hypothetical SRD includes two motorized battalions due to ensure division mobility). The congruities with existing company size organizations ensure that company level doctrine used in BCTs support SRDs. A light or wheeled SRD could also mimic the SFAB.




Figure 5. Hypothetical Strategic Reserve Division. Created by the author.

¹²⁰ Wilson, *Divisions and Separate Brigades*, 208-407. The average of all non-training divisions between 1946 and 1987 was 14,576. The average armored or heavy division in the same period was 15,698, and infantry divisions averaged 13,697.

SFAB MTOE changes could reverberate through the SFAB to SRD transition. For example, adding an 80-soldier combined arms battalion to the SFAB could become the cadre for another SRD maneuver brigade increasing the SRD to around 15,000 soldiers and adding another 60 Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles to the formation (Figure 6 below shows the hypothetical SRD maneuver brigade). Likewise, the addition of one 20-soldier infantry company in the SFAB combined arms battalions equates to an additional 750-soldier infantry battalion in the expanded SRD.




Figure 6. Hypothetical SRD Maneuver Brigade. Created by the author.

Manning, Training, and Equipping the SRD

Where would the Army get the personnel and equipment to grow this force, and how could it be prepared for combat? The planning and preparation for an expandable Army during the interwar period can inform some of these questions. The transformation to the modern force raises questions not faced by interwar expansion planners.

The first manning challenge is where do SFAB personnel fit within the SRD. Command positions are straightforward as they move up one echelon, but the remaining positions as primary

staff officers and non-commissioned officers should be determined in advance of the transition. Fortunately, the SFAB formation again supports the transition to a division. SFAB advising teams at all levels under the current SFAB design can easily transition to primary staff roles within a division.¹²¹ Figure 7 below shows an example of the SFAB to SRD personnel transition. In this example an SFAB battalion advising team transitions to primary members of an SRD brigade staff. This same process could be conducted at every echelon during the SFAB to SRD transition.




Figure 7. Battalion Advising Team to SRD Brigade Staff Transition. Created by the author.

Manning the expandable force could be a challenge. Interwar planners could rely on the draft; modern planners are operating within the confines of the AVF. While a national emergency may bring a new batch of volunteers and alter public perception on conscription the initial plan to fill an expanding Army should focus on areas the Army can currently leverage. The first means to leverage for additional manpower may be the previously trained and contractually obligated soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Military volunteers usually have eight-year contractual obligations, but soldiers often leave active duty or drill status after four years while

¹²¹ US Department of the Army, Unpublished Draft Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-96.1 *Security Force Assistance Brigade* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 1-18 -1-26. This is an unpublished source, approval to cite was granted by the US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence on April 9, 2018.

the Army retains them in IRR status another four years. IRR soldiers could be used to fill in SRD positions at the outset of transition from SFAB to SRD. The National Commission the Future of the Army recommended US Code Title 10 be amended to "authorize a virtual muster" of IRR soldiers which could be used to facilitate rapid expansion of personnel to fill out the SRD.¹²² The Army could link IRR personnel directly to SRD MTOE positions and have personnel managers conduct virtual musters to update IRR contact information and status on a reoccurring basis. Beyond the IRR the Army could tap into healthy retired personnel to fill in non-cadre leadership positions in the SRDs. The Army could also look at innovative multi-component options where SRD designated personnel could join the Army, be trained for future SRD utilization but reside in a non-drill status within the RC until needed. Ultimately, most of the personnel to fill out the expanding SRD will have to come from the civilian population once a future war has already started or when tension with an adversary makes LSCOs inevitable.

Training personnel for an SFAB to SRD transition must be well planned. Interwar planners templated manning first, the expanding division's organization second, and lastly, training. Today's expansion planners may not have a decade to go through a similar process, so the Army should develop a training plan to transition the SFAB to an SRD. Just as the WWII plan included cadre training, then staff and incoming leader preparation, and finally training the rest of the divisions, any SFAB to SRD training plan should include a similarly well-organized plan.

The SFAB to SRD training plan should include how the SFAB cadre will be trained for their divisional roles. SFAB personnel could get some cadre training through the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) by operating as observers for other divisions' warfighter exercises. This use also applies directly to their SFA role as trainers to partner nation forces. The SFAB could also operate as a division tactical command post for other divisions training to get comfortable operating as a staff at the division level.

¹²² National Commission, *Future of the Army*, 80.

Once the bulk of lower enlisted and junior officers and NCOs arrive, the training of the SRD should be supported by individual unit training plans like the ATPs of WWII. The SRD, as proposed above, would allow for training of individual branches together. The entire fires brigade would focus on fires related tasks, while the homogenous infantry and armor battalions could conduct their branch specific training independently. Task organization of combat units to replicate those in current BCTs could occur after crew training to simplify training. Having whole battalions and even brigades of similar specialties could allow economy of scale training to speed up the training process and mitigate equipment and trainer shortages.

Another challenge is equipping the SRD. Rough equipment estimates for the SRD were calculated off current BCT manning and equipping documents.¹²³ Estimates of some major equipment needs based off similar organizations within an ABCT would equate to an SRD with approximately 120 M1A2 Abrams tanks, 250 M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle variant's, 36 M109A6 Paladins, and over 2,500 other wheeled and tracked vehicles. Few Stryker vehicles are in storage for use in a strategic reserve formation so one of the maneuver formations was changed to a motorized infantry division where it can take advantage of excess MRAP vehicles in storage. If all six SFABs were transitioned to similar SRDs it would equate to 720 M1A2s, 1,500, M2/M3 variants, 216 M109A6s, and over 15,000 other pieces of rolling stock. Table 3 below shows 2017 estimates for some pieces of major ground combat equipment. The SRD would move about one-fifth of the stored Abrams tanks and three-fourths of all stored Bradley fighting vehicles into combat formations.¹²⁴

¹²³ US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, *MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90 Force Structure Reference Data*, January 2015, accessed December 2, 2017, http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/SOH/SOH_Content/SOH.ORG.US.00.00.00.00.SE.pdf.

¹²⁴ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Ballance 2017," 45-47.

Major Ground Combat Equipment		
Type	AC/RC	Storage
Tanks (Abrams)	2384	3500
AIFV (Bradley)	4368	2000
APC Wheeled (Stryker)	3187	0
APC Tracked M113	5000	8000
MRAP	11,950	UNK
HMMWV	120,000	UKN
JLTV*	49,099	0
*Future Fielding		

Table 2. Major Ground Combat Equipment. Source: Created by author.

Another consideration for planners is what Table 3 equipment in storage is available for use by SRDs during expansion. LSCO in the future will be lethal and many of the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in the AC and RC during early stages of a future war may be destroyed. The stored vehicles above may be fielded to AC and RC units engaged in a fight therefore not making them available to the SRD during Army expansion. Planners may have to rely on innovative ideas to equip the SRDs.

If the SRD is to function as a strategic reserve for the Army we must ask how long the SFAB to SRD transition would take. The transition would take time. The SRD could not be expected to be employed at the outset of LSCOs. SFABs would have to be removed from current assignments, filled with personnel and equipment, then trained to fight as a unit. The AC must constitute the first echelon into combat. The RC would then mobilize, train, and deploy as support to the AC and as a second echelon. The RC is planning to have one-third of its brigades ready within weeks of fighting, but the rest would take months to prepare and deploy.¹²⁵ The SRD thus becomes the third echelon, fighting the remaining but depleted adversarial forces. In WWII new divisions were supposed to form, equip, train, and deploy forty-four weeks after activation.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Luckey, *Reserve Posture Statement*, 2017.

¹²⁶ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Procurement and Training*, 443.

Modern technology could require longer training times, but a planning factor of one year could be a good starting point.

The SRD in Figures 5 and 6 provides an example of SFAB organization in an expandable role to give the United States a strategic ground reserve for future LSCO. The details of the SRD organization need considerable scrutiny. Critical and creative thinking needs applied across the range of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) to ensure the SRD could operate as the Army's strategic reserve.

Conclusions

What we need is an armed guard that will wake up when the fire first starts or, better yet, one that will not permit a fire to start at all.

—John F. Kennedy, *Why England Slept*

This monograph seeks to add options for US ground forces in future LSCO. The Army has been tested in combat for over fifteen years. It fought a short LSCO engaging Iraqi ground forces in 2003 and was overwhelmingly successful. But the Army's transformation to meet the needs of an expeditionary force in sustained low-intensity conflict has resulted in operationalizing the RC thereby leaving limited capacity to quickly expand ground forces for LSCO against a near-peer or peer threat.

The creation of the SFAB relieves BCTs in the current force pool from SFA missions allowing them to gain readiness and prepare for future LSCOs. The SFABs special training should enable them to perform their SFA missions better than the BCTs forced into this role in the recent past. But while the SFAB conducts its SFA mission, its mix of highly qualified senior leaders makes it a prime candidate to perform transformation during national emergency into a significant combat power platform for the Army. The senior leader mix within the SFAB is similar to that used by the Army to create new divisions during WWII. The use of the SFAB as an SRD during times of national emergency would allow an additional path to victory in LSCO against a peer or near-peer threat that exceeds existing Total Army capacity. To prepare the

SFAB or any other formation to conduct rapid expansion the Army should start an iterative planning process to understand how unit would transform, where personnel would come from to fill out new formations, and how equipment could be mobilized to allow expanded force lethality when needed.

Recommendations

As the National Commission on the Future of the Army stated in 2016, the Army must plan for expandability.¹²⁷ All options for expansion should be explored before engagement in LSCO to ensure the Army can respond when needed. The Army should investigate the SFAB to SRD transformation and compare it to the SFAB to BCT transformation along with other Army expandability options. During this investigation, the Army should consider if six SRDs would be sufficient to counter peer threats. The small Army personnel size increase from the addition of more SFABs may make it prudent to increase the total number of SFABs. One SFAB per existing division (eighteen in total) would account for an additional five AC and seven RC SFABs over current planning. This conversion could double the number of Army combat divisions during a national emergency using less than 15,000 soldiers committed to the SFABs when the Army is not in an expandable role.

Additionally, if the SFAB to SRD concept becomes part of the Army's expansion plan, making the SFAB commander a Brigadier General billet could smooth SFAB to SRD transition. Under the proposed SFAB to SRD transformation, the SFAB commander (a Colonel) would promote over many Brigadier Generals to become the SRD commander. An alternative could transform the SFAB to SRD under the SFAB commander until the Army assigned a Major General to assume SRD command at which point the SFAB commander could assume the position of deputy commander or chief of staff.

¹²⁷ National Commission, *Future of the Army*, 80. Commission recommendation number fifty-one.

To facilitate Army expansion manning, the Army could consider extending IRR to ten years for recruits to ensure more soldiers are on IRR when needed in a national emergency or consider other incentives to retain soldiers with expiring contracts to remain on IRR for additional time. Other innovative manning programs include partnering with technical schools so high school age Army recruits could conduct basic training between their junior and senior years (like the Split Option Enlistment program), then after high school graduation, they return to the Army for advanced individual training before attending a civilian technical school. The Army could fund tuition for the technical program while retaining IRR and annual muster for the soldiers for eight years. All options to have a ready pool of trained young soldiers would benefit the Army when wartime requirements exceeded AC and normal RC capability.

Americans have come to consider it immoral to send soldiers into harm's way without the best equipment money can buy.¹²⁸ Unfortunately, production of the best equipment may be too slow to provide for the needs of an expanding Army. The transition of SFABs to SRDs may require the consideration of using obsolete equipment or rapid fielding of modified civilian equipment instead of specially created machines of war. Therefore, equipment planning for SRDs should be conducted with on hand stockpiles and industrial capabilities in mind. For example, SRD expansion planners could consider rapid armament upgrades to the stocks of Vietnam era M113 armored personnel carriers and HMMWVs replaced by recent procurements. Adding lightweight turrets or remote weapons systems could provide rapid armament upgrades to these

¹²⁸ Rebecca Leung, "GIs Lack Armor, Radios, Bullets" *CBS News*, October 31, 2004, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gis-lack-armor-radios-bullets-31-10-2004/>.

available platforms to fill out the SRD during expansion.¹²⁹ Another consideration would be to retrofit variations of civilian production vehicles with armor and lethality packages to fit rapid mobilization.¹³⁰ Even if these vehicles cannot compete with the M1 Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle or adversary counterparts, they could provide rapid fielding of significant combat capability to a rapidly expanding force during a window of opportunity across domains allowing battlefield advantages to US military forces.

The United States faces an uncertain future, LSCOs are rare, but when they occur additional time cannot be bought at any price. In the uncertain future, the US military will likely be asked to operate outside its current capabilities. Flexibility created by planning and preparation could allow rapid Army growth to counter threats and ensure the ongoing security of the American way of life. The use of the SFAB as a Strategic Reserve Division in an expandable Army would provide more options to future leaders. The United States does not have the luxury of waiting for war to start begin planning and preparation for the next big war. Just as Specialist Richards and Sergeant Noh and their 2,000,000 dead peers illustrated at the beginning of this monograph, modern war could be large and increasingly lethal. Today's 1,000,000 soldier Total Army may not be sufficient to counter all possible threats. The United States needs a ground force with the capability to defeat all adversaries, and the transition of the SFAB into the SRD could provide additional capacity to win America's future large wars.

¹²⁹ "Reconfigurable Integrated-weapons Platform Datasheet," Moog Inc., 2017, accessed February 16, 2018, http://www.moog.com/content/dam/moog/literature/Space_Defense/Defense_Literature/RIwP_datasheet.pdf; Christopher F. Foss, "Orbital ATK rolls out XM813 automatic cannon for Army Strykers," *Jane's International Defense Review*, 2017, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.janes.com/article/74348/orbital-atk-rolls-out-xm813-automatic-cannon-for-us-army-strykers>. Army planners could consider options such as the Moog Inc. Reconfigurable Integrated-weapons Platform (RIwP) or the Kongsberg Medium Caliber Remote Controlled Turret (MC-RCT). The RIwP and the MC-RCT can fire a variety of anti-air and anti-tank missiles such as stingers, Javelins, and hellfires, along with a range of currently available guns from 5.56mm up to 40mm.

¹³⁰ Jerry Hirsch, "Popularity of Pickup Trucks Drive 2017 Auto Sales," *Trucks.com*, January 4, 2018, accessed on February 26, 2018, <https://www.trucks.com/2018/01/04/2017-pickup-trucks-auto-sales/>. For example, in 2017 2,800,000 full and mid-size trucks (examples include Ford F150-F550, Dodge 1500-3500, GM Canyon and Sierra 1500-3500) were produced which could be retrofitted with armor and weapons for SRD use.

Bibliography

- Allyn, Daniel. "Current State of Readiness of the U.S. Forces in Review of the Defense." *Statement before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support*,. Ed. U.S. Senate, 114th Cong., 2nd ses. Committee on Armed Services. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2016. Accessed November 29, 2017. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Allyn_03-15-16.pdf.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. *Upton and the Army*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1964.
- Appleman, Roy E. *United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*. Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1992.
- Bailey, Beth. *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Berck, Peter and Jonathan Lipow. "Military Conscription and the (Socially) Optimal Number of Boots on the Ground." *Southern Economic Journal* (2011): 95-106.
- Bipartisan Policy Center. *Defense Personnel Systems: The Hidden Threat to a High-Performance Force*. Washington D.C.: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2017.
- Bonds, Timothy M., Michael Johnson and Paul S. Steinberg. *Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. Accessed November 23, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1320.html.
- Brady, Stephen D. *Assessing Stop-Loss Policy Options Through Personnel Flow Modeling*. RAND report for Office of Secretary of Defense. Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2014.
- Bridges, Olen Chad and Andrée Navarro. "Army Expansibility: Mobilizing for Major War." *Parameters* 47, no. 2 (2017): 87-93.
- Brown, John Sloan. *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986.
- _____. *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the Army, 1989-2005*. Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2011.
- Bulkley, Michael E and Gregory C Davis. "The Study of the Rapid Acquisition Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program and its Impact on the Warfighter." Joint Applied Project, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013.
- Carland, John M. *United States Army in Vietnam: Combat Operations, Stemming the Tide May 1965 to October 1966*. Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2000.
- Chapman, Emmanuel, ed., *Recruiting, Retention and Future Levels of Military Personnel*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010.

- Coker, Kathryn Roe. *The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold-War Operational Army Reserve, 1990-2010*. Fort Bragg NC: Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army Reserve Command, 2013.
- Donnelly, Thomas and Frederick W. Kagan. *Ground Truth: The Future of US Land Power*. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2008.
- Duggan, Sean E. and Lawrence J. Korb. "An All-Volunteer Army? Recruitment and Its Problems." *Political Science and Politics* (2007): 467-471.
- Economist*. "Who will fight the next war?" October 24, 2015. *The Economist*. Accessed November 3, 2017. <https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21676778-failures-iraq-and-afghanistan-have-widened-gulf-between-most-americans-and-armed>.
- Foss, Christopher F. *Orbital ATK rolls out XM813 automatic cannon for Army Strykers*. London: Jane's International Defense Review, 2017. Accessed February 17, 2018. <http://www.janes.com/article/74348/orbital-atk-rolls-out-xm813-automatic-cannon-for-us-army-strykers>.
- Freedburg, Sydney J. "Army Mulls Train & Advise Brigades: Gen. Milley." December 14, 2015. *Breaking Defense*. Accessed February 19, 2018. <https://breakingdefense.com/2015/12/army-mulls-train-advise-brigades-gen-milley/>.
- Gates, Robert M. *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*. New York: Random House LLC, 2014.
- Gates, Thomas, ed. *The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970.
- Ginzberg, Eli. *The Lost Divisions*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- Gordon, Michael R. and Thom Shanker. "US plan would shift troops from Iraq to Afghanistan." September 5, 2008. *The New York Times*. Accessed December 2, 2017. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/05/world/africa/05iht-05military.15912238.html>.
- Greenfield, Kent, Robert Palmer and Bell Wiley. *United States Army in World War II The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*. Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 2004.
- Griffith Jr., Robert K. *The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974 (CMH Pub 30-18)*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996.
- Heller, Charles E. *Manpower, Force Structure, and Mobilization Readiness: A peacetime Cadre System for the U.S. Army*. Study Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1990.
- _____. "The U.S. Army, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and Leadership for World War II, 1933-1942." *Armed Forces & Society* 36.3 (2009): 439-453.
- Henning, Charles A. "U.S. Military Stop Loss Program." *Recruiting, Retention, and Future Levels of Military Personnel*. Ed. Emmanuel D. Chapman. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2010. 149-168.

- Horowitz, Michael, Erin Simpson and Allan Stam. "Domestic Institutions and Wartime Casualties." *International Studies Quarterly* (2011): 909-936.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. "The Military Ballance 2016." *The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*. Oxfordshire UK: Taylor & Francis, February 2016.
- Kedzior, Richard W. *Evolution and Endurance: The Army Division in the Twentieth Century*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000. Accessed November 27, 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1211.pdf.
- Keller, Jared. "The 1st SFAB's Afghan Deployment is a Moment of Truth for the Global War On Terror ." *Task and Purpose*. January 22, 2018. Accessed February 1, 2018. <https://taskandpurpose.com/sfab-train-advise-assist-afghanistan/>.
- Klein, Maury. *A Call to Arms: Mobilizing America for World War II*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013.
- Joshua Klimas, Richard E. Darilek, Caroline Baxter, James Dryden, Thomas F. Lippiatt, Laurie L. McDonald, J. Michael Polich, Jerry M. Sollinger, Stephen Watts. *Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve Component Force Mix*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. Accessed December 10, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR417-1.html.
- Knorr, Klaus. *The War Potential of Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. *Planning War, Pursuing Peace: the Political Economy of American Warfare, 1920-1939*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
- _____. *State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012.
- Korb, Lawrence. *Meeting the Military's Manpower Challenges*. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2010.
- Kreidberg, Marvin and Merton Henry. *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945*. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1955.
- Laich, Dennis. *Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and Patriots*. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2013.
- Lopez, C. Todd. "Security force assistance brigades to free brigade combat teams from advise, assist mission." May 18, 2017. Accessed December 1, 2017. https://www.army.mil/article/188004/security_force_assistance_brigades_to_free_brigade_combat_teams_from_advise_assist_mission.
- Luckey, Charles D. *The 2017 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: The Army Reserve: America's Global Operational Reserve Force*. Report to Congress. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2017. Accessed December 12, 2017. <https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/042617-Luckey-Army-Reserve-testimony.pdf>.

- Lundy, Michael D. *FM 3-0 and Large-Scale Combat Operations*. Fort Leavenworth: Army Leader Exchange, 2018. Facebook Live. Accessed February 2, 2018. https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10156182602763552&id=121549478551.
- Macgregor, Douglas A. *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997.
- Margiotta, Franklin, James Brown and Michael Collins, *Changing U.S. Military Manpower Realities*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1983.
- Matloff, Maurice. "Chapter 15: The 90-Division Gamble." in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Greenfield (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 367-380
- Metz, Steven. "Has the United States Lost the Ability to Fight a Major War?" *Parameters* 45.2 (2015): 7-12.
- Millet, Allan R and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: A History of the United States of America*. New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1994.
- Mitchell, Robb C. "Army Expansibility: Rapid Expansion and the Army's Materiel: Is there Enough." *Parameters* 47.3 (2017).
- Moog Inc. *Reconfigurable Integrated-weapons Platform Datasheet*. Elma: Moog Space and Defense Group, 2017. Accessed February 16, 2018. http://www.moog.com/content/dam/moog/literature/Space_Defense/Defense_Literature/RIwP_datasheet.pdf.
- Nataraj, Shanthi, et al. *Assessing the Army's Ability to Regenerate Its Active Component End Strength*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017. Accessed November 23, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9940.html.
- National Commission on the Future of the Army. *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*. Congressional Commission. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2016.
- Nicholas, Scott. "DLA, Army Partner to Equip 1st of Six Security Force Assistance Brigades." October 26, 2017. *ExecutiveGov*. Accessed November 21, 2017. <http://www.executive.gov.com/2017/10/dla-army-partner-to-equip-1st-of-six-security-force-assistance-brigades/>.
- North, Lee. "The United States Army and the Sergeant Problem: the Army's systemic inability to produce enough sergeants and a proposal to fix it." SAMS monograph, Army Command and General Staff College, 2014.
- Patterson, Robert. *Arming the Nation for War: Mobilization, Supply, and the American War Effort in World War II*. Edited by Brian Waddell. Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 2014.
- Pitts, Esli T. "Army Expansibility: Expanding Brigade Combat Teams: Is the Training Base Adequate?" *Parameters* 47.3 (2017).
- Raymond, William M. COL. "Uncle Sam says, "I Want You!" – The Politics of the Draft and National Service." SAMS monograph, Army Command and General Staff College, 2005.

- Reece, Beth. "Army's top general moves to lessen strain on troops." December 15, 2006. *Army*. Accessed December 2, 2017. https://www.army.mil/article/993/armys_top_general_moves_to_lessen_strain_on_troops.
- Rodriquez, Stephen. "Eisenhower Meets Trump: A New Defense Industrial Base Strategy." August 1, 2017. *War on the Rocks*. Accessed November 18, 2017. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/eisenhower-meets-trump-a-new-defense-industrial-base-strategy/>.
- Schifferle, Peter. *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010.
- Schubert, Frank N. *CMH Pub 72-32 Mobilization: A World War II Commemorative Pamphlet*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994.
- Shlapak, David A. and Michael Johnson. *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. Accessed November 21, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.
- South, Todd. "Bringing back the draft." July 25, 2017. *Military Times*. Accessed November 2, 2017. <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2017/07/25/bringing-back-the-draft/>.
- Tunney, Kelly. "Will There Be A Draft If We Go To War? North Korea's Threats Are Increasingly Foreboding." August 2017. *Bustle*. Accessed November 2, 2017. <https://www.bustle.com/p/will-there-be-a-draft-if-we-go-to-war-north-koreas-threats-are-increasingly-foreboding-75872>.
- Upton, Emory. *Armies of Asia and Europe : embracing official reports on the armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and England. 1878 Reprint*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.
- _____. *The Military Policy of the United States*. 1904. Reprint. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.
- United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. *MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90 Force Structure Reference Data*. January 2015. Accessed December 2, 2017. http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/SOH/SOH_Content/SOH.ORG.US.00.00.00.00.SE.pdf.
- _____. "Security Force Assistance Brigades." October 1, 2017. *DCS G-3/5/7*. Accessed December 3, 2017. <http://www.benning.army.mil/MCoE/CDID/TCM-SFAB/content/PDF/SFAB%20Bugle%20Call.pdf>.
- United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. *The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare*. Circular. Washington DC: Training and Doctrine Command G-2, 2017. Accessed September 16, 2017. http://www.tradoc.army.mil/watch/Operational_Environment_ChangingCharacter_FutureWarfare.pdf.
- United States Congress. House. "Amendment to Selective Service Act." Vols. H. Res. 1509 114th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 19, 2015.
- _____. "The Effect of Sequestration and Continuing Resolutions on Modernization and Readiness." *Committee on Armed Services*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2017. 12.

- United States Congressional Budget Office. *An Analysis of the Army's Transformation Programs and Possible Alternatives: Publication Number 3195*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2009.
- United States Department of Defense. *Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2007.
- _____. *Department of Defense Instruction 1235.12*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2016. Accessed October 20, 2017. <http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/123512p.pdf>.
- _____. Joint Publication (JP) 3-20 *Security Cooperation*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.
- _____. Joint Publication (JP) 4-05 *Joint Mobilization*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2014.
- _____. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2014.
- _____. *Selected Manpower Statistics: Fiscal Year 1997*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1997.
- _____. *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018.
- United States Department of the Army. *Army announces activation of second Security Force Assistance Brigade at Fort Bragg*. December 8, 2017. Accessed December 13, 2017. https://www.army.mil/article/197954/army_announces_activation_of_second_security_force_assistance_brigade_at_fort_bragg.
- _____. Army Regulation 140-145 "Individual Augmentation Mobilization." Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2016.
- _____. Army Regulation 500-5 "Army Mobilization." Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2015.
- _____. Army Techniques Publication (ATP)3-91.6 Security Force Assistance Brigade. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2005.
- _____. Field Manual (FM) 1 *The Army*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2005.
- _____. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.
- _____. Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6 *The Brigade Combat Team*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006.
- United States Government. "Armed Forces Chapter 1209 - Active Duty." *US Code*. Vols. Title 10, secs 12301-19. Government Printing Office, 2012.

- United States Government Accountability Office. *Army Planning Comprehensive Risk Assessment Needed for Planned Changes to the Army's Force Structure*. GAO. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2016.
- United States Government Selective Service System. *Selective Service System: Induction Statistics*. January 25, 2018. Accessed January 25, 2018. <https://www.sss.gov/About/History-And-Records/Induction-Statistics>.
- United States President. *National Security Strategy December 2017*. Washington DC: Office of the President of the United States, 2017.
- Wiehe, Noelle. "1st SFAB combat advisor teams train for upcoming Afghanistan deployment." Department of the Army, January 16, 2018. Accessed February 10, 2018. https://www.army.mil/article/199082/1st_sfab_combat_advisor_teams_train_for_upcoming_afghanist_an_deployment.
- Williams, Chuck. "Army's top general tells new Fort Benning unit they are marching into history." Ledger-Enquirer, February 8, 2018. Accessed February 10, 2018. <http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/news/local/military/article199188524.html>.
- Wilson, John B. *CMH PUB 60-14-1 Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Seperate Brigades*. Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1998.
- Wood, Dakota L. *2017 Index of US Military Strength: Assessing America's Ability to Provide for the Common Defense*. Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2016.