

Policy & War: Bellum in Belli

A Monograph

by

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How do operational artists understand and use national policy to develop and nest strategy by effectively using military capabilities in the contemporary operating environment? Operational artists must understand national policy as they plan and prepare military operations within an overall strategy to ensure political aims are properly achieved. This is important as a state's blood and treasure is expended to pursue its policy. A strategy that does not support the directed policy not only wastes these important resources but creates additional problems for the policymaker. Effective strategy is more critical in wars of limited aims which have come to define conflict since the advent of nuclear weapons. Carl von Clausewitz teaches us "the more powerful and inspiring the motives for war...the closer war will approach its abstract concept...the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be." The relationship of policy and strategy and its direction of war is critical for the operational artist to understand. This monograph uses the comparative case study methodology demonstrating how operational artists develop strategy for accomplishing policy aims. Evidence is captured in the performances of ADM Chester Nimitz commanding in the Pacific during World War II and GEN Douglas MacArthur in the Korean War. The criteria used to evaluate the case studies to test the hypothesis include: first the role and location of negotiation between the operational artist and the policymaker; second, the authority of the operational artist to define the military aim through negotiation to determine the means for achieving the aim and to assign time, space, force, and purpose to the means; and finally, the responsibility of the operational artist for the accomplishment of the aim. The case studies demonstrate the difference between policy and strategy in wars with an absolute political aim as in the Second World War, and especially in the post-1945 era exemplified by the limited aims and limited means of the Korean War. They further explain the responsibility operational artists possess for setting conditions conducive to policy assisting the policymaker in addressing problems. The Nimitz case study reveals the potential that operational artists hold to shape the operating environment in creating options for policymakers to consider. Nimitz operated within limited aims defining the Pacific Theater throughout 1942, but executed a strategy supporting the absolute aims sought in policy from 1943 through 1945. The MacArthur case study explains when the operational artist does not nest strategy with policy. Operational results or effects provide little value if the political aim is not supported. Both case studies determine that operational artists must not only understand national policy but ensure the military strategy is suitable to the political goals determined by policymakers.

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Abstract

Policy & War: Bellum in Belli, MAJ Tim R. Garland, 44 pages. How do operational artists understand and use national policy to develop and nest strategy by effectively using military capabilities in the contemporary operating environment? Operational artists must understand national policy as they plan and prepare military operations within an overall strategy to ensure political aims are properly achieved. This is important as a state's blood and treasure is expended to pursue its policy. A strategy that does not support the directed policy not only wastes these important resources but creates additional problems for the policymaker. Effective strategy is more critical in wars of limited aims which have come to define conflict since the advent of nuclear weapons. Carl von Clausewitz teaches us powerful motivations in war more closely coincide the political and military aim. The relationship of policy and strategy and its direction of war is critical for the operational artist to understand.

This monograph uses the comparative case study methodology demonstrating how operational artists develop strategy for accomplishing policy aims. Evidence is captured in the performances of ADM Chester Nimitz commanding in the Pacific during World War II and GEN Douglas MacArthur in the Korean War. The criteria used to evaluate the case studies to test the hypothesis include: first the role and location of negotiation between the operational artist and the policymaker; second, the authority of the operational artist to define the military aim through negotiation to determine the means for achieving the aim and to assign time, space, force, and purpose to the means; and finally, the responsibility of the operational artist for the accomplishment of the aim.

The case studies demonstrate the difference between policy and strategy in wars with an absolute political aim as in the Second World War, and especially in the post-1945 era exemplified by the limited aims and limited means of the Korean War. They further explain the responsibility operational artists possess for setting conditions conducive to policy assisting the policymaker in addressing problems. The Nimitz case study reveals the potential that operational artists hold to shape the operating environment in creating options for policymakers to consider. Nimitz operated within limited aims defining the Pacific Theater throughout 1942, but executed a strategy supporting the absolute aims sought in policy from 1943 through 1945. The MacArthur case study explains when the operational artist does not nest strategy with policy. Operational results or effects provide little value if the political aim is not supported. Both case studies determine that operational artists must not only understand national policy but ensure the military strategy is suitable to the political goals determined by policymakers.

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Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
CCF	Chinese Communist Forces
CCOS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JP	Joint Publication
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PRC	People's Republic of China
RPOL	Rear Passage of Lines
ROK	Republic of Korea
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication

Section 1: Introduction

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

—Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

In May of 2003, President George W. Bush landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln and presented to the American people and the world a proclamation that coalition forces, largely consisting of the United States, accomplished its assigned mission in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The goals of eliminating Iraqi Army forces, removing the government under Saddam Hussein from power, and occupying the capital of Baghdad were all accomplished within three weeks of ground, air, and naval operations. However, the political aim of locating and eliminating Iraq's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction material was still unfinished. All of this signaled the end of the war, but in reality, the conflict was far from over. The enemy was about to change the character of the war, from high intensity combined arms maneuver, to an irregular style of warfare with insurgent forces. The United States lost the strategic initiative and found itself in an ongoing war. Military means did not bring about a pacified post-Saddam Iraq, even when the dictator was captured in December of 2003. The question this research explores is how do operational artists understand national policy to develop and nest campaigns effectively, using military capabilities in the contemporary operating environment?

Carl von Clausewitz first theorized in *On War* that “when whole communities go to war – whole peoples, especially *civilized* peoples – the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object.”¹ War is policy of the state and is not a separate event controlled solely by a military elite, but is instead a shared responsibility between

¹ Carl von Clausewitz in, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 86-87.

senior military leaders and policymakers.² The political aims, or the policy that invokes war, remains the supreme purpose of the war. War between states always occur within a political context and a state's decision to wage war comes from its pursuit of policy. Therefore, to understand a particular war is to understand the policy which brought it into being and how this policy influences the war's conduct.

War is never separate from its purpose and policy does more than simply authorize the use of military means. According to Clausewitz, policy is so important it determines the war's very character. The wider or "more powerful and inspiring" the political aim, the more unlimited or "more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide."³ Policy sanctions the level and intensity of violence leveled towards the enemy army and populace. The absolute political aims defined for the Pacific theater in World War II helps to explain the fire-bombing of Japanese cities by US Army Air Forces. The limited aims defining the Korean War explain why bombers could not fly over Manchuria to target bridges and cut off enemy supply lines coming into Korea.⁴ The policy of unconditional surrender drove military action and sanctioned the intensity of violence to compel the Japanese into capitulation. The limited aims in Korea, by contrast, convinced President Truman to pursue a diplomatic solution even without the capitulation of North Korea.

The character of war influences and can change the policy that brings war into existence.⁵ For Clausewitz, policy aims establish the purpose of war, but the war's true character is not

² William E. Rapp, "Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making," *Parameters* 45 (Autumn 2015): 16, accessed November 28, 2017, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2015/Parameters%20Autumn%202015%20Vol45%20No3_ONLINE.pdf.

³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87-88.

⁴ H.W. Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War* (New York: Doubleday, 2016), 202-204.

⁵ Clausewitz surmised war can affect policy when the enemy's policy overpowers one's own purposes in war. Clausewitz, *On War*, 97.

known until the military strategy is tested within the operating environment.⁶ If the nature of the conflict requires greater violence than originally anticipated, the operational artist must confer with the policymaker to verify the current strategy or adjust it to prevent it from jeopardizing the political aim. The negotiation that develops strategy occurs for both unlimited wars and wars for limited aims. This negotiation between the operational artist and the policymaker sees greater challenges in wars of limited aims because the nature of limited war diverges the political goal and the military objective. This is largely due to the limited effort and limited means permitted to the military instrument in these types of wars. This paper explores what happens between the operational artist and the policymaker when war becomes too costly or unsuitable for achieving the political aim. The value of this insight better educates present and future operational planners on their importance in assisting operational artists and policymakers.

America's experience in OIF shows the importance of considering the use of military means to achieve political ends. What are the lessons to be learned and how can military professionals apply these lessons to future military operations seeking to produce political solutions? This research uses the theory, as first written by Carl von Clausewitz in his treatise *On War*, to illustrate war's relationship with policy. These theories are summarized as: one, the ultimate conduct of the war inevitably goes back to the war's original purpose and therefore it is never outside the subordination of policy; two, a war's character can change or influence the policy that brought the war into existence; three, the state's willingness to accept the costs of war enables the politician to assume greater risk by defining political aims allowing for larger military objectives.⁷ Clausewitz's theory is important to the operational artist, who is responsible for using military means in the ways appropriate to achieve stated ends.

⁶ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century* (London: Phoenix, 2006), 363.

⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87-88.

The hypothesis here is that operational artists must understand and nest national policy as they plan military operations. They do this to solve problems within the operating environment and provide recommendations as the effects of military means and ways impact and potentially modify political aims. The operational artist, for the purpose of this research, is the individual who embodies both the authority and responsibility to do order the military means in the ways necessary to accomplish the aims. Staff planners producing operational design, described in Joint Publications 3-0 and 5-0, are not operational artists because they lack the authority and responsibility to the policymaker.⁸ The operational artist's interaction with the senior policymaker is the nexus of civil-military relations and strategy.

The literature chosen for this research is classified into three categories. The first is the historical theory underpinning the questions used in this study. As already mentioned, Clausewitz addresses the idea of war's relationship to policy and the effect war has on political aims. Other sources used for theory are the scholars who clarify and expand Clausewitz's ideas using historical examples.⁹ The second category of literature supports the historical case studies for the comparative methodology. These sources provide the narrating context, analysis, and facts used to build each case study. The literature used for the case studies at times speak directly to the theory outlined above but the case studies primarily demonstrate the theory through historical fact. The third category of literature used in this research pertains to civil-military relations. The

⁸ G. Stephen Lauer, "The Tao of Doctrine: Contesting an Art of Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 82, (3rd Quarter 2016):122, accessed July 20, 2017, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-82/Article/830866/the-tao-of-doctrine-contesting-an-art-of-operations/>.

⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*. Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz's On War: A Biography* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007) 4-9. Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 4-7.

sources discuss both theory and practice of the relationships between civilian policymaker and the military operational artist.¹⁰

Clausewitz provides the main source of the theory used for this research, but the literature also includes contemporary scholars who expand on this theory. Authors Sir Hew Strachan and Christopher Bassford have devoted scholarly work to illuminate the theory outlined above supporting the hypothesis. Strachan ties Clausewitz's ideas to modern conflicts such as Desert Storm and OIF explaining how policy succeeded or failed through the respective strategies. Bassford's work details the influence Clausewitz has on military thinkers from the time *On War* was published through to 1945. The writings of both men increase understanding of Clausewitz's views concerning policy and war and contribute insight on the importance of this relationship.¹¹

Ian W. Toll and Eric Larrabee both provide writings narrating the larger story of the Pacific Theater during WWII. This narration establishes the facts used in the Admiral Chester Nimitz case study to demonstrate the hypothesis.¹² The Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal are specifically highlighted in the Pacific narrative because of the impact these battles placed on Nimitz's strategy. Richard B. Franks, author of *Guadalcanal* and authors Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, of *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway*, provide

¹⁰ G. Stephen Lauer, "The Tao of Doctrine: Contesting an Art of Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 82, (3rd Quarter 2016):118, accessed July 20, 2017, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-82/Article/830866/the-tao-of-doctrine-contesting-an-art-of-operations/>.

¹¹ Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz In Britain and America 1815-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 152. Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 60.

¹² Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987). Ian W. Toll, *Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 179-182.

detailed accounts and analysis of the battles. These works provide the account of the Pacific Theater building the Nimitz case study and demonstrating the paper's hypothesis.¹³

The General Douglas MacArthur case study for the Korean War builds on the works of historian H.W. Brands in *The General v. the President*, and author Adrian R. Lewis in *The American Culture of War*. Brands gives a comprehensive account of GEN MacArthur's conduct as a commanding general in the Korean War as well as his conduct in his relationship with President Harry S. Truman. Lewis's work details the American Army's performance in Korea under GEN MacArthur but also highlights the nature of the United States' political objectives. Together these works provide a useful foundation for the MacArthur case study and the correlations between the theory and hypothesis.¹⁴

The final category of literature used in this research are the works informing the subject of civilian-military relations. Eliot A. Cohen and Colin S. Gray are two of the authors whose works inform this area of research on this subject. Cohen's *Supreme Command* and *The Big Stick* provide models for civilian-military relations. Gray's work, *Another Bloody Century*, highlights how civilian-military relations help to build and implement strategy. Both scholars provide material to better understand the case studies, specifically highlighting the relationship between the operational artist and the policymaker. The material articulates ideas outlining the roles and interactions between military and civilian leadership. Although these scholars' material is not used to evaluate the criteria they assist in how the criteria should apply in each case study.¹⁵

¹³ Richard B. Franks, *Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990). Jonathan B. Parshall, and Anthony P. Tully, *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2007) Ch. 23, Kindle.

¹⁴ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*. Adrian R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operational Iraqi Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

¹⁵ Eliot Cohen, *The Big Stick* (New York: Basic Books, 2016); Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002); Colin S. Gray, *Strategy and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

These sources were chosen because together they assist in examining war and policy from important points of view. Major observations include how policy differs from strategy, the resulting relationship between policy and strategy and how war and policy perform in the post-World War II era. These observations also articulate the responsibility of operational artists for setting conditions and therefore assist policymakers to establish the most appropriate policy or approach to war. The approach to waging war after 1945 took on new significance for policymakers. The advent of atomic weapons created a widespread pause throughout the community of nations producing new apprehension to waging war.

The scale of destruction during World War II now paled in comparison to the destructive power the United States and the Soviet Union possessed through nuclear weapons. War was now lethal on an unprecedented scale and the decision to employ military force now carried greater consequences than existed before Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Modern weapons platforms, contemporary training and other technology contribute to the immensity of devastation war can now bring upon nation states. If war is to be waged it must be done so in a limited fashion to avoid the escalating damage found in its potential. The limited character of war is a protection against escalation but not a guarantee, therefore war is likely limited not just in time but in space. If war is limited in its aim, it must also be limited in its ways and means.¹⁶

The policymaker creates political aims by considering risk, preferences, and legitimacy through political discourse.¹⁷ Once this discourse produces suitable options the operational artist is likely to receive a policy decision that may or may not be definitive. The operational artist receives this policy and then negotiates for the means to achieve it and develops military

¹⁶ Michael Carver, "Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age" in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Pater Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 814. Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, 81.

¹⁷ Alan C. Lamborn, "Theory and the Politics in World Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (June 1997): 191-198, accessed January 12, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013931>.

operations to accomplish the emergent strategy. As operations unfold, tactics can have a strategic impact and potentially drives new or refined political discourse changing or producing new policy.¹⁸ This understanding on the creation of policy, how it differs from strategy and where strategy emerges from, is important to nest military plans with policy aims. Dr. G. Stephen Lauer's article, "The Tao of Doctrine", published in the *Joint Force Quarterly*, describes this model and is used to evaluate the cases studies used in this monograph.¹⁹ This emphasizes the importance of strategy and how it is to support the stated policy. If the strategy is mismatched, then it increases risk for the policymaker. This is important because if risk increases too much the policymaker will revise the political aims of the conflict. This in turn effects strategy and can have implications for the entire war.

Fleet Admiral (ADM) Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas during World War II and General of the Army (GEN) Douglas MacArthur, commander of United Nations Forces during the Korean War, provide the two case studies for this research. The comparative case study method identifies and demonstrates how the operational artist developed strategy for accomplishing policy aims. The case studies identify the operational artist by demonstrating who receives policy and then negotiates for the ways and means to achieve the political aims. Both case studies show how strategy emerges according to the model outlined above, one within the context of a war defined by total victory and the other within a war of

¹⁸ G. Stephen Lauer, "Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks: Politics, Policy, and the Military Operational Artist in Wars of Limited Aim in the 21st Century," *Strategy Bridge*, accessed February 20, 2018, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/2/20/blue-whales-and-tiger-sharks-politics-policy-and-the-military-operational-artist>.

¹⁹ G. Stephen Lauer, "The Tao of Doctrine: Contesting an Art of Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 82, (3rd Quarter 2016):118, accessed July 20, 2017, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-82/Article/830866/the-tao-of-doctrine-contesting-an-art-of-operations/>.

limited aims.²⁰ This comparison demonstrates two operational artists from different service cultures negotiating for the ways and means to formulate strategy and achieve policy ends.

The methodology then demonstrates how the operational artists applied the emergent strategy to achieve policy aims within their respective contexts. The following criteria apply in the examination of each case study. First, the role and location of negotiation between the operational artist and the policymaker. Secondly, the authority of the operational artist to define the military aim, to determine the means for achieving the aim, and assigning time, space, force, and purpose to the means. Finally, the responsibility of the operational artist for the accomplishment of the aim. These criteria help to understand why military operations must support national policy and the operational artist's responsibility to provide recommendations when war's character influences potential change to the stated policy.

The following paper is organized into two separate case studies, one presenting ADM Nimitz commanding US forces in the Pacific during WWII. The second presents GEN MacArthur commanding UN forces during the Korean War. Each case study cites narrative facts outlining applicable events, applies the evaluation criteria and demonstrates the model frame-worked by Dr. Lauer. The case studies end with major deductions on how well the criteria explain the policy model. The paper ends by summarizing major conclusions synthesizing the case studies with the stated hypothesis.

²⁰ We have been talking about a total victory – that is, not simply a battle won, but the complete defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz, *On War*, 625.

Section 2: Nimitz in the Pacific

On December 08, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt communicated to Congress and the American people, that the coming struggle with Japan would result in “absolute victory” and “inevitable triumph.”²¹ These broad terms gave indications to what the end state of the struggle would look like but missing were details on what constituted the political aim of “absolute victory.” A full twelve months later the President, with the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill by his side, defined unconditional surrender as “total elimination” of the Axis nations’ ability to make war.²² Why did it take a full year to define the condition required to end war with Japan? Carl von Clausewitz presents a theory to better understand America’s policy and strategy for the Pacific Theater during 1942. “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”²³ This case study demonstrates that in the wake of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt established limited aims for the Pacific Theater in 1942 due to limited means. As ADM Nimitz achieved military gains through the resulting limited strategy, he created conditions allowing President Roosevelt to declare a wider policy that envisioned final victory over Japan by January 1943.

The overall situation Roosevelt faced in December 1941 logically led to the establishment of limited aims at least for the initial phase of the war. Limited war material, lack

²¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Day of Infamy Speech (Speech given to Congress December 08, 1941, asking for a declaration of war with the Empire of Japan), accessed November 09, 2017, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/msf/msfb0003.

²² Nigel Hamilton, *The Mantle of Command: FDR at War 1931-1942* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 128.

²³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 88.

of trained service members, and a shortage of equipment created a critical situation in December 1941 through April 1942. Where do you prioritize limited means to make war when facing two belligerents in opposite theaters? Germany declared war on December 11, 1941, cementing the United States into a coalition with Great Britain. The newly formed coalition created the “Germany First” policy pulling limited means the United States had to offer towards Europe.²⁴ This policy created tremendous impacts on resources supplying Nimitz’s area of operations which was compounded by the demands of GEN Douglas MacArthur’s own separate command in the Southwest Pacific Ocean Area. The President was inclined to support the Germany First policy to prevent the Germans from triumphing over the Soviet Union and from further destroying Britain’s war capability. The other need for pushing resources to Europe was America’s emerging military strategy for crossing of the English Channel. This strategy of opening a second front in Europe required a build-up of resources and forces prior to invading Western Europe to defeat Germany first. The British, disagreeing with crossing the English Channel in 1942 or 1943, nonetheless guarded the Germany First policy and challenged any perceived changes during discussions with the US Joint Chiefs.²⁵

A major influence regarding policy for the Pacific Theater was the coalition between the United States and Great Britain. This context provides better understanding on why the policy of unconditional surrender was declared a year after Pearl Harbor. The agreements between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, were hammered out in greater detail by the military chiefs from each country. The initial meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCOS), titled “Arcadia,” took place from December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942 and produced the initial

²⁴ John Lundstrom, *The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy December 1941-June 1942* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 127.

²⁵ Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944*, CMH Pub 1-4, *United States in World War II* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1994) 35-37.

Allied strategy.²⁶ The strategy defined what Nimitz pursued militarily throughout 1942. The Allies agreed to “secure points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can be eventually developed.”²⁷ The British understandably pushed for a “Germany First” approach given the limited resources and means at the Allies disposal. The concern was men, material and equipment would stretch too thin between both Europe and the Pacific producing negligible results in both theaters. The sound approach was to amass against Germany first, secure its defeat, and then focus resources on Japan. The American chiefs agreed to the Germany First policy recognizing Germany as the “predominate member of the Axis Powers.”²⁸ ADM Ernst J. King, Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, however, presented in March 1942 a case to the President for greater action in the Pacific. The proposal outlined that Nimitz hold Hawaii, the United States continue to support Australia, and then advance to the northwest from the New Hebrides towards New Guinea.²⁹ The President quickly approved King’s proposal as the general strategy for the Pacific.

Another major influence on resources and supply going to the Pacific Theater was American industry had yet to produce at capacity to make offensive operations feasible. The United States industrial potential was not fully realized until 1943. In early 1942 Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs could not simply “establish...the kind of war” suitable against Japan.³⁰ What America was producing was largely absorbed into the lend-lease program supporting both Great

²⁶ Ian W. Toll, *Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 179-182.

²⁷ Lundstrom, *The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941- June 1942*, 19.

²⁸ Toll, *Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942*, 180.

²⁹ Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, 174.

³⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 88.

Britain and the Soviet Union in their two and half year struggle with Germany. The small maritime shipping capacity the United States had at this time was another challenge of providing already limited means to the Pacific. These realities and the Japanese offenses in the first week of December 1941, gave the strategic initiative to Japan. With this strategic situation, ADM King created the limited military objectives, approved by the President, forcing Nimitz to fight a strategic defense in the Pacific Theater.

Despite a limited military strategy, Nimitz created the political space needed for a refined policy supporting a wider strategy. Nimitz only had broad guidance from Washington, awaiting Nimitz's ability to create conditions for the emerging political aim. The situation in 1942 demonstrates the intricate relationship between war and policy.³¹ Clausewitz theorized that war is not an isolated event governed solely by a military elite, but is a shared responsibility between military leaders and policymakers.³² Domestically the President faced little to no political risk if he immediately stated unconditional surrender of Japan because of the American people's desire for avenging Pearl Harbor.³³ The greater risk was in setting an unachievable policy for the Pacific Theater. Clausewitz again helps us to see how the war in the Pacific changed policy from a limited to a more unlimited one. Nimitz's conduct of the war from January to July 1942, produced positive military outcomes for the United States. Roosevelt needed military gains to establish a wider policy for fighting the kind of war desired against the Japanese Empire. Nimitz provided those victories in 1942, through a limited military strategy, giving the President the conditions necessary to declare unconditional surrender of Japan in January 1943.

³¹ Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*, 80.

³² Clausewitz, *On War*, 88.

³³ Lamborn, "Theory and the Politics in World Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, 10, accessed January 12, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013931>.

Nimitz worked to achieve the initial objectives, outlined by ADM King, from December 1941 to July 1942. These initial objectives did recognize the state of war existing between the United States and Japan as outlined by the President, but also the dire state of the Pacific Fleet. Until the Navy could exercise a greater offensive capability, ADM King issued two key objectives to Nimitz for the Pacific Theater. First, Nimitz was to defend Hawaii, along with the remaining military infrastructure at Pearl Harbor, by securing the SLOCs from North America to Hawaii and finally out to Midway Island. Second, the ocean lanes from North America to Australia must remain open via Hawaii to Samoa and eventually to the Fiji Islands.³⁴ This allowed the Allies to increase shipping to Australia and build up war material for the eventual offensive operations in the Pacific.³⁵ These two initial objectives were large concerning the geographic area but tailored to what Nimitz had at his disposal to fight the Japanese forces, a Pacific Fleet constituted around the three aircraft carriers which survived the attack at Pearl Harbor.³⁶

ADMs King and Nimitz worked quickly to devise a strategy for the Pacific based on the aims listed above. The Germany First policy limited some of the resources available for large-scale offenses, however, more than anyone else, King kept the Pacific Theater on the CCOS agenda. He successfully pushed additional allocations of resources to enable wider operations against Japan. King did not simply wish to put the entire theater on the defensive for an unknown period but worked to devise a “defensive-offensive posture,”³⁷ a policy of ‘hold what you’ve got

³⁴ Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, 174.

³⁵ Toll, *Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942*, 182.

³⁶ Ernest J. King, *U.S. Navy at War: 1941-1945; Official reports to the Secretary of the Navy* (Washington, DC: US Navy Department, 1946), 15.

³⁷ Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, 173.

and hit them when you can.”³⁸ This was an approach of seizing the initiative where resources and conditions afforded the opportunity and centered on the two main objectives King defined for the Pacific Theater; protecting Hawaii and Australia from Japanese aggression and takeover. Initial limited means required a limited military strategy, but the results established the realization of larger subsequent objectives.

Nimitz skillfully used the means at his disposal, in the ways necessary to achieve the ends laid out for 1942. In reviewing the political-military model, it becomes clear that Nimitz emerged as the operational artist for his area of responsibility. Nimitz negotiated the ways and means to achieve the aims given to him by the policymaker.³⁹ Although ADM King drafted the aims under which Nimitz operated, those aims were not official until approved by the President. Nimitz executed a strategy without incurring political risk to the President and did not jeopardize the legitimacy of US military action nor the political ends of the war. The absolute nature of the policy sanctioned the operational costs against Japanese aggression.

The JCS refined the aims for Nimitz in the summer of 1942 expanding the goals in the Pacific beyond simply protecting the SLOCs between North America, Hawaii, and Australia.⁴⁰ The overall Allied goal was defeating Japan, but the appropriate strategy to achieve this had yet to be fully defined. The axis of advance for the overall offensive was from south to north, from the New Hebrides and Australia through the Solomon’s, the Bismarck Archipelago, Papua and New Guinea. From there the advance continued through the Celebes and the Philippines. To support this overall strategy inter-service agreements were reached by dividing commands and

³⁸ Toll, *Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942*, 184.

³⁹ Edwin P. Hoyt, *How They Won The War in the Pacific: Nimitz and his Admirals* (Guilford: Lyons Press, 2000), 49-51, iBooks.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 38, iBooks.

areas of responsibilities.⁴¹ Nimitz remained in command of the Central Pacific Area while the Army, under GEN MacArthur's command, retained the South-West Pacific Area and advanced from Australia. ADM Ghormley operated from the South Pacific Area protecting MacArthur's eastern flank. This greater definition of the Pacific Theater helped to further the initial strategy.⁴²

With newly defined areas of responsibility, initial aims, and an emergent strategy, along with resources ADM King so skillfully acquired, Nimitz carried the fight to the Japanese. Nimitz worked through his staff and subordinate commanders to plan and execute the Battles of the Coral Sea (May 1942) and Midway (June 1942) to prevent further Japanese advances. The Battle of the Coral Sea signified the first naval engagement in which the belligerents' ships were out of visual range from each other.⁴³ Nimitz understood as CINCPAC that, following the destruction of the Pacific Fleet's battleships at Pearl Harbor, the aircraft carrier became the dominant naval weapons platform.⁴⁴ Task Force (TF) 17, comprising of the carriers *USS Yorktown* and *USS Lexington* and under the command ADM Frank Fletcher, sailed to the Coral Sea with the purpose of preventing the Japanese invasion of the geographically significant Port Moresby in New Guinea. Port Moresby was a vantage point the Japanese wanted to use for follow-on operations against Australia and the South Pacific. TF 17's actions convinced the Japanese commander to abandon the invasion but at the cost of the United States losing the *Lexington*.⁴⁵ The other significant outcome of this battle was the damaging of two Japanese aircraft carriers keeping them away from the Battle of Midway as repairs continued on both vessels.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Ibid., 47, iBooks.

⁴² Lundstrom, *The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941- June 1942*, 59-60.

⁴³ Hoyt, *How They Won The War in the Pacific: Nimitz and his Admirals*, 51-53, iBooks.

⁴⁴ Toll, *Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942*, 374-375.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 328-335.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 375.

The Battle of Midway itself resulted in the destruction of four Japanese carriers inflicting a significant loss of naval combat power shaping Japanese capability throughout the rest of the war.⁴⁷ Between the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, the Americans suffered close to 970 killed in action. This number although high was relatively small compared to the loss of life in the Pearl Harbor attack and did not create any political risk to Roosevelt, the JCS, or ADM Nimitz. The gains justified the losses and did much to raise morale of the US public. More importantly, these two major battles, along with other minor battles and raids throughout 1942, resulted in protecting the SLOCs Nimitz was initially charged to secure. These initial gains in 1942 set the stage for the Battle of Guadalcanal.⁴⁸

The Island of Guadalcanal offered the United States significant advantages based on the Pacific strategy of 1942. The position of the island provided the Americans a geographic foothold and stepping stone in the larger Solomons Island chain. The Solomons facilitated the northwest advance approved by the President towards New Guinea. A major reason Guadalcanal facilitated the overall advance was due to an airfield constructed by the Japanese which provided a significant striking capability on the Japanese base at Rabaul, located in northern New Britain. This base supported Japanese offensives throughout the South Pacific.⁴⁹ The Battle of Guadalcanal highlighted the shortcomings of American sustainment to supply forces and demonstrated the United States' limited operational reach. The Japanese were also at the limits of their defensive perimeter and saw similar strains on their sustainment systems. The battle took place from August 1942 to February 1943 and resulted in the American capture of the island. Guadalcanal was the turning point putting the Japanese squarely on the defense and giving the

⁴⁷ Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2007), Ch. 23, Kindle.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Ch. 23, Kindle.

⁴⁹ Franks, *Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle*, 64.

strategic initiative to the Americans. This capitalized on the losses the Japanese already suffered at the Battle of Midway and firmly halted the Japanese advance throughout the South Pacific.⁵⁰

The Battle of Guadalcanal illustrates the effect policy can have on war. The Germany First decision from the Arcadia Conference lowered the priority of the Pacific Theater to receive supply and material. Transport was another matter in that ships were also less available to the Pacific. This meant what supply stocks were available, failed to move quickly enough to properly sustain operations. The Marines on Guadalcanal underwent deprivation for periods of time because the sustainment systems simply did not keep up to demands. Inadequate shipping was first evident at San Francisco where supply stocks bottlenecked and were slow to move out in any organized or rational manner. Supply stocks that did make it into the Pacific experienced additional bottlenecks namely at Noumea, headquarters of the South Pacific Area.⁵¹ Nimitz conducted a first-hand tour of ADM Ghormley's command responsible for sustaining the Marines on Guadalcanal. Nimitz observed just how inefficient sustainment functions were as supply and material just sat in Noumea.⁵² In view of this, Nimitz was sensitive to the Combined Chiefs demanding additional shipping to be pulled from the Pacific to support Operation Torch in Northwest Africa.⁵³

The military victories from the Coral Sea to Guadalcanal provided the conditions President Roosevelt needed to declare unconditional surrender at Casablanca in January 1943. Nimitz shaped the Pacific Theater in relation to the enemy reducing the political risk for an unconditional surrender policy. Nimitz demonstrated that a policy with the political aim of final victory, an absolute aim, was achievable and that forces under his command could seize and use

⁵⁰ Richard Overy, *Why The Allies Won* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 43.

⁵¹ Franks, *Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle*, 136-138.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 276.

⁵³ Hoyt, *How They Won The War in the Pacific: Nimitz and his Admirals*, 124-127, iBooks.

the strategic initiative. These military gains, along with the increasing industrial production of the United States, mitigated the policy risk enough for Roosevelt to announce these large and more defined aims as Casablanca which were infeasible in December 1941. The United States took the fight to the Japanese and proved American service members could hold their own under trying circumstances. This was the demonstration Roosevelt needed to show the world that an unconditional surrender policy was both realistic and feasible for the United States to pursue against Japan. The situation changed in a positive manner from the one the President faced in December 1941 when he used broad ambiguous terms in front of Congress. With Churchill at his side in Casablanca and Stalin successfully defeating the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, Roosevelt could now declare to the world what the Allies were ultimately out to achieve.

As Guadalcanal was beginning, a significant event was taking place in August of 1942 that was to foreshadow major advantages in the outcome of the Pacific War.⁵⁴ The USS Essex was launched and ushered in a new class of ship referred to as the fast carrier. American industrial capacity was ramping up through 1942 and beginning to show the first results of which the fast carriers of the Essex and Independence Classes were a big portion.⁵⁵ The United States also deployed an advanced fighter in the F6F Hellcat which was out-climbing and out-maneuvering the Japanese Zero. These capabilities combined with innovations in sustainment multiplied the Pacific Fleet's operational reach exponentially throughout the rest of the war.⁵⁶ Eric Larrabee described units whose purpose was to exercise sustainment at sea as a "massive logistic 'tail' afloat" organized into two separate service squadrons or "Servrons."⁵⁷ One provided

⁵⁴ Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, 394-395.

⁵⁵ Paul Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory* (New York: Random House, 2013), 313-314; Richard Overy, *Why The Allies Won* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 192-194.

⁵⁶ Maury Klein, *A Call to Arms: Mobilizing America for WWII* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 516.

⁵⁷ Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, 391.

barrels of fuel oil, aviation fuel, and the other “capable of supplying food, ammunition, and medicine for twenty thousand” service members.⁵⁸ The Servrons operated in open ocean able to conduct repairs and tow barges filled with classes of supply.⁵⁹ This enabled the Pacific Fleet to sever its ties to land bases and stay at sea for as long as operations required giving commanders unprecedented flexibility.⁶⁰ The Pacific Fleet was also being manned by better trained service members. All of this meant greater military means were now available for the President to provide his theater commanders.⁶¹ Once Nimitz negotiated for and secured the means in relation to those going to Europe, he was better able to articulate the ways to pursue the policy aims.⁶²

Clausewitz theorized the more absolute or “more powerful and inspiring” the political aim, the larger or “more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide.”⁶³ Nimitz’s strategy in 1944 through 1945 was powerfully different than the one he executed in 1942. After seizing the strategic initiative from the Japanese and the unconditional surrender proclamation, Nimitz pursued a strategy directly in line with the national policy of unconditional surrender, or absolute political and military victory. The Pacific Fleet executed both carrier and amphibious operations from the Caroline and the Marshall Islands to the Marianas then onto Leyte in the Philippines and finally on through Iwo Jima and Okinawa. President Roosevelt

⁵⁸ Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, 391.

⁵⁹ Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory*, 304-305. Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, 391.

⁶⁰ Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory*, 304-305.

⁶¹ King, *U.S. Navy at War: 1941-1945: Official reports to the Secretary of the Navy*, 15.

⁶² Overy, *Why The Allies Won*, 192-194.

⁶³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87-88.

established the initial limited policy aims of the Pacific Theater and Nimitz exercised this war of limited aims with a military emergent strategy that conformed to the political aim at the time.

Once the changing circumstances of the war and the harnessing of American industrial power began, along with the successful seizure of the initiative from Japan in 1942, the absolute aims described at Casablanca in 1943 became feasible. The strategy that emerged from 1943 was to drive US forces through the Central Pacific to the Japanese home islands until an unconditional surrender was secured in 1945, demonstrating the role and function of the interaction, dialogue, and negotiation that the operational artist in a war of absolute aims engages with the policymaker for the means and the military objective in accordance with the political aim.

Section 3: MacArthur in Korea

The Korean War demonstrates Clausewitz's theory within the context of limited aims. The war saw in the space of its first six months a dramatic changing of political aims, each time demanding a re-negotiation for the military objective. Tactical victory and defeat between June 1950 and January 1951, drove three significant policy decisions by the Truman Administration. First, the initial policy in June 1950 was to simply restore the boundary at the 38th Parallel by destroying North Korean forces in the south.⁶⁴ After the successful Inchon landings and the recapture of Seoul in September 1950, a new policy sought to reunify the peninsula.⁶⁵ Finally, after China's intervention and following Eighth Army and UN Forces' retreat south, US policy aims returned to the original purpose of restoring the 38th Parallel through a negotiated settlement.⁶⁶ The operational successes and failures during the Korean War reveal Clausewitz's theory concerning war's relationship with policy, especially how tactical victory and defeat influences or changes political aims, and how policy continuously influences operations.⁶⁷

This case study examines the difference in thinking between President Truman and General MacArthur over the Korean War's purpose and aims. This highlights the consequences when operational artists attempt to pursue aims outside stated policy. The importance of the operational artist in understanding and operating within the given policy aim is paramount for any operation to succeed. The strategy the operational artist ultimately decides must nest with policy. Not doing this turns the war into something incompatible with its purpose. It is the responsibility

⁶⁴ National Security Council, *NSC 81 United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea*, Report to the National Security Council September 1, 1950, page 7, accessed January 12, 2018, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-09-01&documentid=ki-17-1&pagenumber=1.

⁶⁵ Bevin Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986), 235.

⁶⁶ David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion Books, 2007) 494-495.

⁶⁷ Colin S. Gray, *Perspectives on Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 60.

of the operational artist to appreciate politically limited aims and execute an appropriate strategy supporting the greater political context.

The post-World War II period quickly gave way to the Cold War, shaping the international system for decades. The United States now found itself in an ideological struggle with the Soviet Union for the greater world order. Unlike prior to 1945, wars fought during this period garnered greater consequence if states pursued broad versus limited aims. The risk of another world war involving multiple states through treaty alliances, and the specter of nuclear weapons, both made war local and therefore limited in its character. The Cold War context, and the United States and Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities, remade the concept of comprehensive victory a dangerous prospect. War acquired a uniquely limiting characteristic tied to the reality of atomic and nuclear weapons. This is the context of the Korean War and the framework of wider political aims was less compatible for a suitable victory. The new framework of limited aims challenged the expertise of GEN MacArthur, whose WWII experience predisposed him to fight for unconditional surrender.⁶⁸ MacArthur's proclivity for decisive military success over a defeated enemy force is famously summed up in his words to Congressman Joseph Martin, "there is no substitute for victory."⁶⁹

General Douglas MacArthur, biased by his success in fighting for unlimited aims in WWII, criticized the limited political ends of the Korean War.⁷⁰ MacArthur argued Korea's importance in Asia and viewed its role in the Cold War more crucially than the Truman Administration. For MacArthur, Korea was the hinge of victory or defeat from combatting

⁶⁸ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 294.

⁶⁹ This quote is found in a letter to Congressman Joseph Martin (R) dated March 20, 1951. The letter was made public a few weeks later soon after GEN MacArthur pre-empted President Truman's pursuit of a cease fire with his own declaration of cease fire terms. The timing of these two events finally convinced Truman to fire MacArthur. Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 283.

⁷⁰ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 406-408.

communism in Asia. President Truman viewed Korea as a potential sidetrack to the more critical European Theater.⁷¹ Truman acknowledged the importance of confronting flagrant communist aggression, but wanted to conclude the war as quickly as possible. Until the war ended, Truman's concern was that Korea appeared as a Soviet diversion, degrading the United States' ability to counter Soviet threats in Europe.

General MacArthur showed little appreciation for the limited character of the Korean War and chafed at the restraints placed on him. After meeting with President Truman at the Wake Island conference on October 15, 1950, MacArthur wrote, "Up to now I had been engaged in warfare as it had been conducted through the ages – to fight and win. But I could see now the Korean War was developing into something quite different. There seemed to be a deliberate underestimating of the importance of the conflict."⁷² MacArthur's perception of policymakers "underestimating of the importance" of the Korean War was actually President Truman appreciating the reality of the Cold War context. The chances of the war expanding to involve China, or the Soviet Union, was a grave concern in Washington. Before November 1950, MacArthur dismissed the possibility of Chinese military involvement in the war and repeatedly stated Beijing would not intervene. However, the Chinese viewed any advance of American forces north of the 38th Parallel as a serious threat to their security and Beijing indicated they would not tolerate an American presence near their border.⁷³ By carelessly dismissing the Chinese threat, MacArthur demonstrated little acceptance on the importance of the Korean War's limited character.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 97-98.

⁷² This quote is taken from GEN MacArthur's accounts of the Wake Island Conference with President Truman, from within his memoirs titled *Reminiscences* published in 1964. Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 363.

⁷³ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 97.

⁷⁴ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 406-408.

President Truman's instincts were more attuned to the Cold War context than MacArthur's desire for defeating North Korean forces. The Administration initially announced a limited aim for simply restoring the border at the 38th Parallel to demonstrate resolve against communist aggression in Asia. The United States did not want to exhibit a lack of will against communism but prove its determination to defend its allies with force.⁷⁵ Truman possessed a strong appreciation for what precedents Korea could establish for the greater Cold War, recalling the consequences for not responding to "fascist aggression in the 1930's."⁷⁶ Truman also concluded Korea was not as central to US national security as Europe, but American action was important in building alliances, and allies were important in fighting the Cold War.⁷⁷ In confronting communism however, the President also did not want to widen the conflict. Therefore, decisive action was necessary but not at the risk of a nuclear World War III.⁷⁸

Based on Truman's conclusions, initial US policy in reaction to the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea was not intended to deliver permanent solutions concerning the future of communism on the peninsula. The beginning aims for the Korean War was to counter North Korean aggression and restore the boundary at the 38th Parallel. This not only re-secured South Korea but also communicated in clear terms aggression was not appropriate against American allies.⁷⁹ The aim of restoring the 38th Parallel was limited because it did not mean to decisively destroy the North Korean Army therefore accepting the threat of possible communist aggression in the future. The aim was also limited because it did not create conditions for the reunification of

⁷⁵ Barton J. Bernstein, "New Light on the Korean War," in *MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader*, ed. William M. Leary (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 400.

⁷⁶ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 97.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁷⁹ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), 339.

the two Koreas even though this was stated in the UN Resolution authorizing military force dated June 27, 1950.⁸⁰

The Truman Administration was simply unprepared to enact major policy change on the Korean Peninsula. MacArthur on the contrary viewed North Korean aggression as adequate reason to pursue wider aims, but Truman prohibited potential actions north of the 38th Parallel to prevent an escalation with China and the Soviet Union.⁸¹ The difference of policy viewpoints was not addressed until MacArthur was actually in a position to fight north of the 38th Parallel. First, MacArthur had to solve the issue of the Pusan Perimeter that was keeping his forces bottled up on the southern end of the peninsula. The answer to this threat was executing an attack well north to the enemy's rear.

As North Korean forces attempted to destroy UN units trapped in the Pusan Perimeter, GEN MacArthur executed an amphibious assault to the west side of the peninsula. Many in the Pentagon questioned this approach.⁸² On September 15, 1950, MacArthur debarked forces at Inchon, a port located just 20 miles southwest from Seoul. The Inchon landings created operational success by cutting North Korea's lines of communications and routing the enemy army away from Pusan in the south. MacArthur now created new options for Truman that did not exist prior to the successful landings at Inchon. US formations advanced east capturing Seoul and faced an unanticipated opportunity to then advance north of the 38th Parallel, not only promising a

⁸⁰ NSC 81 cites the UN political objectives for Korea as stated in General Resolutions dated November 14, 1947 include unification of the peninsula but does state to which government unification would belong. Authorization of military force was decreed in Security Council Resolution dated June 27, 1950. National Security Council, *NSC 81 United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea*, Report to the National Security Council September 1, 1950, page 7, accessed January 12, 2018, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-09-01&documentid=ki-17-1&pagenumber=1.

⁸¹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 337. Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. military Force from World War II to Operational Iraqi Freedom*, 90. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, 341.

⁸² Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 154.

decisive defeat of the North Koreans, but also reunifying the peninsula under a US ally. Truman, reeling from the “loss of China” to the communists in 1949, undoubtedly saw the opportunity to render a more sizeable defeat to communism in Asia.⁸³

MacArthur viewed the defeat of the North Korean army as the most suitable outcome of the war.⁸⁴ The American people’s experience in WWII preserved the idea of decisive victory in the nation’s wars. Now the successful landings at Inchon put a similar WWII styled victory within reach. South Korea’s control over the entire peninsula was also more in line with America’s foreign policy expectations. Truman now faced low political risk based on the events at Inchon and was able to relook the war’s policy, deciding to expand its aims.⁸⁵

On September 27, 1950, GEN MacArthur received orders from the JCS stating, “Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces...you are authorized to conduct military operations...north of the 38th Parallel in Korea.”⁸⁶ The President constrained MacArthur in this policy by directing Republic of Korea (ROK) forces lead the advance north and no US units enter the provinces bordering China and the Soviet Union. It is important to note MacArthur received a change in policy, but did not see an increase in the means available to his strategy. The successes of landing at Inchon, the retaking of Seoul, and routing the North Korean Army quickly overshadowed Truman’s earlier concerns of China entering and escalating the war.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) signaled clear warning signs if UN forces advanced beyond the 38th Parallel and threaten North Korea.⁸⁷ China always viewed the Korean

⁸³ Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. military Force from World War II to Operational Iraqi Freedom*, 102.

⁸⁴ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 169-170.

⁸⁵ Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. military Force from World War II to Operational Iraqi Freedom*, 102.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 103.

⁸⁷ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 97.

Peninsula as a strategic vulnerability, as did Japan. The historical march of armies caused both nations to appreciate the peninsula as a land bridge for invading forces threatening their respective territories. The memory of the first Sino-Japanese War was likely in the minds of Chinese leaders as MacArthur's forces maneuvered north of the 38th Parallel.⁸⁸ Since Washington and Beijing did not have a formal diplomatic relationship, Beijing communicated concerns through the Indian ambassador who promptly informed New Delhi, and who in turn forwarded the message to the UN and Washington. The recent one-year anniversary of the communist takeover of China reinforced the notion that the young country still had to fight for its survival.⁸⁹ China refused to tolerate an armed anti-communist aggressor nearing the Yalu River. Beijing's decision to enter the conflict was in the context of its national defense and it achieved strategic, operational, and tactical surprise over UN forces as they neared the Yalu River in October 1950. China's entry into the war should not have been a surprise but after Inchon, apparent victory caused a change in US policy modifying Washington's original concerns.

The UN forces under MacArthur, mainly comprising of the US Eighth Army, US X Corps, and ROK units, rapidly advanced north of the 38th Parallel from early October through early November 1950. As UN forces raced to maintain contact with retreating North Korean units, the front became wider and overstretched friendly lines of communication. This was the situation facing China on October 25, 1950, when it initiated its first of two interventions attacking US and ROK positions. China's first offensive lasted from October 25th through November 6th when it abruptly broke contact with UN forces.

⁸⁸ S.C.M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 16-17, iBooks.

⁸⁹ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 193-194.

The first indication of real danger was when ROK units captured the first Chinese prisoner of the war in the vicinity of Onjong on October 25, 1950.⁹⁰ Afterwards, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) pressed devastating attacks on ROK positions between October 26th and 27th cutting supply lines and trapping the 1st ROK Division in and around Unsan. The fact China caught the UN Forces so off guard indicates the level of indifference MacArthur and subordinate commanders, along with their various intelligence staffs, paid to the indications of China's first intervention. Eighth Army's intelligence report summarizing the interrogation of the captured Chinese prisoners concluded they were simply reinforcements to North Korea, not a full commitment of Chinese military force.⁹¹ Major General (MG) Willoughby, MacArthur's G2 in the Far East Command, commented on the presence of Chinese prisoners, stating any advantages the Chinese afforded to North Korea were now negligible.⁹² This summary of the situation surmised the presence of Chinese fighters as inconsequential.⁹³ MacArthur agreed with Willoughby, even if China were making serious military commitments, they were ineffectual in the face of deployed US combat power.

China proved this assessment grossly incorrect and UN success turned into a disaster as the CCF fought and destroyed ROK formations in the lead of UN forces.⁹⁴ The CCF attacks were mitigated during the day as US and ROK units used close air support to blunt Chinese assaults. This advantage was lost during night hours or in limited visibility allowing the CCF to continue attacking trapped units, destroying men and equipment. Airdrops kept these units sustained on

⁹⁰ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 263.

⁹¹ Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953*, (New York: Anchor Press, 1987) 378.

⁹² Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 265-266.

⁹³ Justin M. Haynes, "Intelligence Failure in Korea: Major General Charles A. Willoughby's Role in the United Nations Command's Defeat in November 1950," masters thesis (Command and General Staff College) 2009, 87-88.

⁹⁴ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 264-266.

fuel and munitions, but the wounded were increasing in number.⁹⁵ The situation continued to deteriorate into the first days of November while CCF unit strength was not fully understood in Washington. President Truman requested an update from MacArthur through the JCS on November 3rd, trying to ascertain the seriousness of China's involvement in the war.⁹⁶ MacArthur's response to the request did not answer any of Washington's questions and contributed to the lack of situational awareness for both the Pentagon and the White House.⁹⁷

Lieutenant General Walton Walker, the commander of Eighth Army, grew concerned when the CCF continued to attack in force and ordered the US 1st Cavalry Division to move to Unsan and relieve the 1st ROK Division through a rear passage of lines (RPOL). It was Walker's intent, once the RPOL was complete, for the 1st CAV Division to attack and continue the UN advance north towards the Yalu River.⁹⁸ The CCF attacks were successful in preventing any further advance north by Eighth Army. By November 3rd, remnants of the ROK 1st Division and US 1st CAV were retrograding south of the Chongchon River to reconsolidate defensive positions. The CCF suddenly broke all contact on November 6th reconsolidating north and effectively ending the 1st Chinese offensive of the Korean War.⁹⁹

The Pentagon realized how serious the situation had deteriorated on November 5th. The commander of Far Eastern Air Forces, Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, informed the US Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, of MacArthur's order for air bombers to strike the bridges over the Yalu River on the Korean side.¹⁰⁰ MacArthur's intent was to cut off resupply and movement out of Manchuria, but the two-week bombing plan risked escalating the

⁹⁵ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 266.

⁹⁶ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 287.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 288.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 267.

⁹⁹ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 285.

¹⁰⁰ Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953*, 393-394.

war with China and potentially the Soviet Union. It was one thing to bomb North Koreans and Chinese on Korean soil, but a decision to bomb near Manchuria was provocative and open to misinterpretation.¹⁰¹ Defense officials, now aware of the bombing plan, contacted the State Department on November 6th, who subsequently informed Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson alerted Truman who then ordered through the JCS a complete suspension of the bombing plan.¹⁰²

The significance of MacArthur's plan to bomb the bridges over the Yalu helped officials in Washington understand how much the commanding general's assessment of the Chinese threat changed over the last few days. The JCS ordered the halt to the bombing, and at the President's request, asked for MacArthur's justification. MacArthur's response demonstrates he did not appreciate how the entry of Chinese forces changed both the tactical and political character of the war. This also showed MacArthur's continuing indifference to the political considerations of the war's Cold War context. In his response, MacArthur painted a picture of military necessity for the bombing, stating that failing to do so "threatens the ultimate destruction of forces under my command."¹⁰³ This statement, compared to MacArthur's earlier assessment of Chinese forces, was a complete reversal concerning the danger of the CCF. MacArthur's intent was now clear; he intended to fight both China and North Korea, showing no hesitation in the ways he was applying military means.¹⁰⁴ It is also revealing in the breakdown in dialogue. MacArthur failed to acknowledge how much the situation changed, when he previously predicted the war was almost at an end, in regards to the new problems created by China's entry. MacArthur also failed to communicate to Washington his intentions on how he planned to deal with the problem.

¹⁰¹ Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953*, 394.

¹⁰² Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 289.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 290.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 288-290.

MacArthur was still acting under the policy approved after Inchon, directing military reunification of the Korean peninsula by defeating the North Korean army.¹⁰⁵ China's entry into the war effectively voided this policy based on the constraints put in place by Truman.¹⁰⁶ The policy after Inchon was predicated on the condition that the war not escalate by involving China or the Soviet Union. MacArthur violated this guidance when he ordered his American commanders to secure Korean territory all the way to the Yalu River on October 24th.¹⁰⁷ There is little evidence MacArthur recognized or appreciated he was fighting a war within the Cold War context. This lack of awareness forced the President to intervene when he ordered the halt of the bombing plan for the bridges over the Yalu River. MacArthur did not acknowledge the President's concern over the political implications and failed to incorporate them into the war's strategy.

Despite the presence of Chinese soldiers in Korea and the ferocity of CCF attacks, both Eighth Army and MacArthur's Far East Command still concluded China was not fully committed to entering the war. This conclusion from the intelligence assessments made in late October 1950 was a dramatic turn from MacArthur's dire warnings justifying his bombing plan for the Yalu bridges. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) based its own assessments from Eighth Army's reporting and provided similar conclusions in Washington.¹⁰⁸ MacArthur, determining the first Chinese offensive inconsequential, used the first half of November 1950 to prepare a renewed operation for defeating North Korea.

¹⁰⁵ Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operational Iraqi Freedom*, 103.

¹⁰⁶ Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, 360.

¹⁰⁷ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 195-196.

¹⁰⁸ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 287.

The new UN Campaign commenced on November 24th and for the first twenty-four hours it exhibited promising gains in moving UN forces further into North Korea. MacArthur discovered how wrong he was concerning China's commitment to North Korea. China initiated its second offensive on the evening of November 25th against UN forces. This attack left no question of Beijing's resolve to repel the American presence from its border. Over 200,000 "volunteers" moved south, encircling the Eighth Army and X Corps formations forcing US Army and Marine units to withdraw. The resulting unexpected and devastating defeat created by China produced a desperate retreat for survival over 120 miles south towards the 38th Parallel.¹⁰⁹ The UN's losses continued throughout the rest of November and into December 1950.

LTG Walker was killed in a vehicle crash on December 23, 1950 while the CCF, along with reconstituted North Korean units, pushed both US and ROK forces further south on the peninsula. LTG Matthew Ridgway was then sent by Army Chief of Staff, General Lawton Collins, to take command of Eighth Army and turn the situation around. Ridgway noted that the Han River south of Seoul provided the best position to regroup Eighth Army forces, stabilize the front, and defend remaining South Korean territory. Ridgway's leadership breathed new life into Eighth Army helping it to rediscover its fighting spirit just as the enemy offensive was overstretching its own lines of communications.¹¹⁰

The CCF offensive south against UN forces from November 1950 to January 1951 took the CCF from the Yalu River, south across the 38th Parallel, well beyond their initial basing and supply nodes. Eighth Army, under LTG Ridgway's leadership, turned itself around and, fought hard in the battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyeong-ni, providing stiffer resistance to the CCF. Eighth Army began to push CCF positions north on the peninsula, and by March 14, 1951, US

¹⁰⁹ Alexander, *Korea: The First We Lost*, 271-282.

¹¹⁰ Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operational Iraqi Freedom*, 113.

forces had retaken Seoul for the second time and repelled CCF and North Korean forces further north. Eighth Army solidified defensive lines in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel.¹¹¹ The situation fully shifted from disaster to favorable conditions setting the stage for a new change in the war's policy.

The third change in policy governing the Korean War by President Truman is captured in his agreement with the recommendations made at a NSC meeting on November 28th. Secretary of Defense Marshall and Secretary Acheson argued for the United States to immediately terminate the conflict with China and the President concurred with this suggestion. The reason was that a prolonged war with China was not feasible and too high a risk given the Cold War and US commitments in Europe.¹¹² Truman's agreement to terminate the war diplomatically on November 28th is the third and final change in the war's policy.

The JCS recommended on November 28th that no change of instructions be issued to MacArthur until there was a clear understanding of the military situation.¹¹³ The Administration's discourse following this NSC meeting focused on Eighth Army's survival prior to Ridgway taking command. The army's mission to protect Japan was classified as a higher strategic priority leading to the discussion of it abandoning the Korean Peninsula.¹¹⁴ This idea was debated throughout MacArthur's retrograde south in the face of CCF and North Korean attacks. LTG Ridgway's work to stabilize the front throughout January 1951 changed the debate in Washington from abandoning the peninsula to pursuing a negotiated cease-fire agreement.

Eighth Army captured the initiative from the Chinese from January to March 1951, providing Truman more suitable and acceptable options on how and on what terms to negotiate a

¹¹¹ Roy E. Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea* (Williams-Ford: Texas A&M University Press, 1990) 579-580.

¹¹² Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 218.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 214

¹¹⁴ Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, 360.

cease-fire. Truman's strategic patience during these months paid off, and in March 1951 he now viewed the time was right to announce a cease-fire proposal to China and North Korea.¹¹⁵ On March 21, 1951, MacArthur received notice from the JCS that with South Korea now clear of enemy forces, the situation supported a position to negotiate a cease-fire.¹¹⁶ The JCS asked for MacArthur's military advice concerning the mission to protect UN Forces while maintaining contact with the enemy, but not continuing offensive combat operations, and reducing US and UN casualties. MacArthur protested these constraints preventing continued offensive operations.¹¹⁷ The General expressed his disagreement that victory was not achieved, and therefore the war's strategy needed to expand in its means and aims.¹¹⁸ Truman, however, decided the political aim was secure and moved the UN to pursue a cease-fire with communist forces.

MacArthur opposed the idea of pursuing a diplomatic solution before military unification of the peninsula was complete. GEN Omar Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, knew the President ruled out expanding the war and reiterated this to MacArthur.¹¹⁹ MacArthur then announced his own cessation of hostilities prior to the President's announcement of cease-fire terms to the Chinese and North Koreans. However, MacArthur added that if the enemy did not wish to negotiate, then this refusal would result in the enemy's destruction.¹²⁰ Truman was upset MacArthur preempted his announcement and also included a threat of destruction when he was trying to initiate a diplomatic solution. MacArthur disagreed with policy, and Truman viewed this

¹¹⁵ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 284.

¹¹⁶ Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, 437-438.

¹¹⁷ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 387.

¹¹⁸ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 264-265.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 285.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 286.

as a serious act of insubordination by a commanding general in the field.¹²¹ MacArthur was speaking on a matter that, in Truman's view, belonged solely to the President as the chief policymaker.¹²²

In the first week of April 1951, Truman convened a meeting with his cabinet and GEN Bradley, to discuss MacArthur's continued service as a commanding general. The pattern of indignation and public criticism convinced Secretary Marshall and Bradley to recommend the President relieve MacArthur of all his command authority and recall him home to the United States. The Joint Chiefs also reached this conclusion and endorsed the secretary and chairman's recommendation.¹²³ Marshall, Bradley and the JCS realized the principle of civilian control over the military was at stake. Inaction, or even a simple reprimand, was insufficient. MacArthur had eroded all trust to carry out the President's policy in Korea. Truman decided on MacArthur's termination and even though he carried the endorsement of the cabinet, he did not highlight their support in the subsequent press release. The decision was Truman's alone.¹²⁴

MacArthur's strategy emerged first in the defense of Pusan with the policy aim to restore the 38th Parallel boundary, and developed further after the landings at Inchon. After Inchon, policy changed to the reunification of the peninsula, again requiring a new emergent strategy to conform to policy and its constraints. The strategy then pursued the aim of destroying the North Korean Army in MacArthur's northern advance to the Yalu River. Due to CCF intervention, he failed to secure all of Korea for eventual reunification. Truman wanted to avoid a wider and prolonged war with China and returned US policy aims to the original goal of re-securing South

¹²¹ Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, 442.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 448.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 448-450.

¹²⁴ Brands, *The General VS. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*, 303.

Korea at the 38th Parallel.¹²⁵ MacArthur, not satisfied with a return to more limited aims, attempted to influence the decision by publicly disagreeing with policy and negotiate a strategy to achieve wider aims. This lack of respect for official policy violated MacArthur's responsibility as an operational artist and precluded him from implementing an appropriate strategy.

¹²⁵ The three policies of the Korean War: 1. Clear South Korea of North Korean forces and reestablish the boundary at the 38th Parallel dated June 27, 1950. 2. Defeat North Korean forces by advancing north of the 38th Parallel and reunifying the peninsula under Seoul dated September 27, 1950. 3. Clear South Korea of CCF and reestablish the border at the 38th Parallel, February 1951.

Section 4: Conclusion

The case studies presented here confirm the person holding the authority to define the military aim, who then, through negotiation with the policymaker, determines and achieves concurrence for the necessary means, and assigns them in time, space, and purpose is the operational artist. This commander is responsible to the policymaker for an appropriate strategy to achieve the war's political ends. Nimitz' and MacArthur's exercise of this authority and responsibility in the formulation of their strategies for their respective theaters demonstrates how each strategy impacted and influenced the policies governing the war's purpose.

Nimitz formulated his strategy for the Pacific through numerous meetings with ADM King, a member of the key coterie of President Roosevelt's wartime leaders, including General Marshall. Through these interactions and negotiations on the direction of national policy and military objectives, Nimitz made the case for available ways and means to accomplish those objectives in the Pacific Theater of operations. The dialogue between Nimitz and King helped to advance a strategy more conducive to the Navy's desire for policy in the war against Japan.¹²⁶ The resulting battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal prevented the Japanese from severing the SLOCs between North America and Australia. This strategy of strategic defense, executed in the United States' first year of the war, proved to Roosevelt what was possible in the Pacific against Japan.¹²⁷ These early military objectives in seizing the strategic initiative supported Roosevelt's desire for a wider policy aim of defeating the Japanese. By the end of 1942, the United States achieved the strategic initiative in the Pacific, as well as in other theaters,

¹²⁶ Chester Nimitz, "Policy," Naval War College Naval Historical Collection, accessed 27 December 2017, http://digark.us/imageserver/NWC/DS/002/PDFA/NWC_DS_002_03_WEB.pdf.

¹²⁷ King, *U.S. Navy at War: 1941-1945: Official reports to the Secretary of the Navy*, 39.

permitting Roosevelt to announce the unconditional surrender policy at Casablanca in January 1943.¹²⁸

Once the United States possessed the strategic initiative from Japan and a wider policy was in place, Nimitz executed a more comprehensive strategy aimed at defeating Japan militarily throughout the Pacific Theater. This strategy was Nimitz's plan to execute a military campaign through the central Pacific and set conditions for Japan's unconditional surrender. The Nimitz case study demonstrates policy and strategy converge more seamlessly when the political aims are unlimited in scope. Nimitz's strategy throughout 1942 seized the strategic initiative and reduced the risk of wider policy aims within the Pacific Ocean Areas.

MacArthur conversely failed to support the latter policy aims of the Truman Administration. MacArthur's strategy lacked an appreciation for the wider political considerations of the Korean War. Truman's first and foremost aim was to prevent conflict with the Soviet Union and risking World War III.¹²⁹ Contrary to Truman's limited policy to prevent escalation, MacArthur viewed the Korean War strategy within the framework of wider aims. This partly explains the dismissive attitude MacArthur showed towards the Chinese threat, because it did not support his preferred military strategy. MacArthur therefore did not develop an appropriate strategy to account for the President's political concerns. The resulting campaign plan to continue the attack to the Yalu River on November 24, 1950, with US forces, violated Truman's policy guidance that required ROK units lead the attack. MacArthur dismissed the Chinese threat.

The Korean War case study realizes Clausewitz's theory concerning policy's influence on war and explains why policymakers consider potential risk in operations modifying their

¹²⁸ Mark M. Lowenthal, "Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: The Search for United States Policy 1937-41," *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 16, No. 3, (July 1981): 432-434, accessed December 05, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org.lumen.cgseccarl.com/stable/pdf/260313.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9b717b169e32d77fcea06eb0aaba358e>.

¹²⁹ Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, 345-346.

aims.¹³⁰ Adequate dialogue provides operational artists opportunity to assist policymaker's evaluation of risk in relation to ways and means.¹³¹ Tactical and operational level actions can impact policy causing feedback into political discourse and modifying strategy.¹³² Actions that jeopardize policy or cause risk to increase, such as a high number of casualties or civilian collateral damage, questions the policy a state pursues with military means. Either the policy is adjusted or changed, or the military strategy will change. MacArthur failed to account into his strategy the threat of Chinese intervention and this failure resulted in disastrous consequences for American aims in the Korean War.

Strategy emerges from the negotiation with policy and must therefore operate not only with the appropriate means, but must fit within the greater political context as understood by the policymaker. Without this understanding, the operational artist cannot facilitate dialogue. Nimitz pursued limited aims with limited means in 1942 and understood the importance of operational victories. The objectives in the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal achieved the initial policy of strategic defense. These victories set conditions for seizing the strategic initiative, creating the way for President Roosevelt's change of policy for final victory against Japan. MacArthur's strategy failed to understand and support Truman's policy demanding the war's limited character. A better understanding of political risk increases the chances of tailoring an appropriate strategy. An appropriate and effective strategy must properly account for the policy aims on which the war is purposed, and this is the critical responsibility of the operational artist.

¹³⁰ Gray, *Perspectives on Strategy*, 60.

¹³¹ Eliot Cohen, *The Big Stick* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 141, iBooks; Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 209.

¹³² G. Stephen Lauer, "Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks: Politics, Policy, and the Military Operational Artist in Wars of Limited Aim in the 21st Century," *Strategy Bridge* accessed February 20, 2018, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/2/20/blue-whales-and-tiger-sharks-politics-policy-and-the-military-operational-artist>.

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